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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Gavin Kelly on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Gavin Kelly on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Gavin Kelly on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Against inequality-pessimism — why we can narrow income gaps]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/gk-test-blog/against-inequality-pessimism-why-we-can-narrow-income-gaps-2f2e0c7c8949?source=rss-34827f40a7a3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2f2e0c7c8949</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gavin Kelly]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 04 Dec 2023 20:27:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-12-05T13:23:30.221Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Against inequality-pessimism</strong></h3><h3><strong><em>Why it’s reasonable to believe we can narrow income gaps</em></strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/963/1*b1ti1CkwfdCtvNBMh-vpGA.png" /></figure><p>Britain’s stagnation era has not only diminished expectations about our future growth potential, it has created inequality-pessimism — a sense that it will prove extremely hard to shift the distribution of income in the country.</p><p>The unspoken assumption among much of the UK’s senior policy-community, whose education and early careers were forged in the shadow of the long-1980s in which every measure of inequality exploded, is that today’s income distribution is a fact of life, part of our national story and — like the weather — something we often moan about but ultimately need to accept.</p><p>This in part reflects the reality that high levels of income inequality — Britain is the most unequal large European economy — have, according to some of the headline statistics, remained broadly stable for over a generation. The scale of these gaps matters in a very real sense: they are part of the reason that low income households in the UK are 27% poorer than their French and German counterparts. And their duration reinforces the impression that they are here to stay.</p><p>Yet beneath this apparent stability have been all manner of twists and shifts. These are interesting in themselves, contradict some popular narratives and more importantly, as the Resolution Foundation and LSE’s new <a href="https://economy2030.resolutionfoundation.org/reports/ending-stagnation/">Ending Stagnation report</a> argues, help us to think afresh about how to close some of Britain’s yawning gaps.</p><p>The New Labour era saw rising incomes across the board while inequality broadly flatlined. The basic story was a rise in pre-tax (or ‘market’) income inequality offset by progressive tax and benefits measures. Key measures pushed earnings in a progressive direction, such as the rise in employment and, crucially, the introduction of the minimum wage. But set against this was slow-burn social change: Britain completed its journey from being a 20th century nation where the highest male earners were significantly less likely to have a working partner than their working-class peers, to being a 21st society where they were far more likely to do so. Meanwhile, the very rich pulled ahead from the upper-middle of society (and everyone one else) while rising housing costs dragged down disposable incomes. Pushing firmly against these forces were major increases in redistributive state support in the form of the ambitious tax credit system that greatly increased the living standards of millions of low-and-modest income families. All told, the result was steadily rising incomes and major reductions in poverty — but flat inequality.</p><p>The starkly different 2010s — with its stagnant productivity, slow income growth and long austerity — also saw stability in headline inequality but for different reasons. There was a <em>fall </em>in market income inequality (around 2 percentage points in the Gini) due to weaker post-crash pay performance for many professionals, rising employment concentrated on the bottom half of the income distribution, and more aggressive increases in the wage floor. Indeed, if we exclude the very highest earners there has been something of a silent compression in the shape of the UK’s 21st century pay distribution (which started pre-2010 but accelerated after it). When we compare fairly high pay to low pay — the so called 90:10 ratio — it reveals that wage inequality has been <em>falling</em> steadily since the mid-1990s and has now reached the <a href="https://ifs.org.uk/inequality/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Inequality-in-the-UK.pdf">level it was at over forty years</a> ago when Mrs Thatcher came to power.</p><p>These equalising forces have, however, been fully offset since 2010 by deep cuts to the welfare state which have reduced the incomes of the poorest fifth of the country by just under £3,000 a year generating a big rise in destitution. As with the Labour years, though, countervailing factors largely balanced out in terms of measures of inequality.</p><p>If we want to chart a course to a more equal Britain in the decades ahead we need to learn from these different episodes and eras — building on some elements and jettisoning others. Steady, but judicious, advances in the wage floor should be maintained as the UK continues its journey towards having one of the highest minimum wages in the world. The gains in the employment rate also need to be consolidated and built on — here, though, we need to recognise that further progress demands a different approach with targeted support for three groups. For parents with young children, the journey to a universal childcare system needs to be completed with direct funding of provision and the progressive disentanglement of support from Universal Credit, improving work incentives and simplifying a horribly bureaucratic system. When it comes to those with ill-health, improved support needs to be twinned with stronger rights for the long-term sick to return to their workplace, learning from our approach to maternity. And when it comes to older workers, reforms to the private pensions’ regime could make it easier to re-enter employment after a spell out, while also strengthening incentives to work longer.</p><p>Work-quality, and its link to working hours, need to be at the heart of any new agenda on inequality. Low earners have for several decades been reporting rising levels of work-intensity and falling job-satisfaction. Poor quality employment, not surprisingly, is a major barrier to part-timers working more hours (a recurrent theme in <a href="https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/publications/constrained-choices/">qualitative research</a>) as well as a generator of ill-health. Spreading ‘good work’ will mean raising minimum standards so low earners gain access to more of the things that high earners take for granted — including predictability over hours and decent sick pay — as well as pioneering <a href="https://economy2030.resolutionfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Putting-good-work-on-the-table.pdf">new sectoral institutions</a> to tackle concentrated problems in some sectors.</p><p>Over the longer term higher and fairer pay will require improved workforce skills especially for those not pursuing an academic track. Almost a third of our young people are not undertaking any education by age 18 — compared to just one in five in France and Germany. The UK’s longstanding and large-scale failure on this front is reflected in the fact that the lowest skilled workers are paid less — <em>far less</em> — relative to those with degrees than is the case in peer countries. In the UK those who peak at GCSE (or equivalent) qualifications take home just <a href="https://economy2030.resolutionfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Applying-the-Robbins-Principle-to-Further-Education-and-Apprenticeships.pdf">two-fifths of the earnings of their more-qualified peers</a> — in France or Germany it is three-fifths. Britain’s casual willingness to squander so much young talent is one of its ugliest features and results in low pay, blighted careers and a more unequal country.</p><p>Tilting the UK’s distribution of earnings in a more progressive direction won’t, however, suffice. To really lean against overall income inequality, we also need to rewire the social security system. Just as we have an obligation to pensioners, we also have a responsibility to the 11 million people of working age for whom earnings make up less than half of their income, often due to disability or caring responsibilities. As things stand, faster growth and improved earnings would leave them (further) behind. If in the decades ahead we want growth to lift everyone then, ultimately, working-age entitlements need to rise in line with wages. This argument has been won in countries such as New Zealand and Germany and here, too, with respect to pensions — recall, not long ago the pensions earnings link was seen as highly contentious; today, few question it. Sooner or later we need to move to the same approach for all benefits, as well as repairing the gaping holes in today’s safety net like the two-child limit.</p><p>The tax system, too, must be smarter, work harder and raise more. For decades it has incentivised the affluent and rich to take their (effective) income as capital gains, encouraged (inequality-increasing) self-employment, and preserved a system of property taxation that, with each passing year, becomes ever more ludicrously iniquitous. Add to this our asinine schedule of marginal effective tax rates which sees parents on £50k-£60k, or indeed high earners on £100k, facing punitively high effective rates we wouldn’t dream of placing on millionaires. Any government with a reforming pulse needs to take all this on.</p><p>The world-weary, glass half empty, response is to sympathise but say, alas, these problems are too hard to shift: we have neither the political resolve nor state capacity to change all this. Low quality work is hard-wired into the British jobs model, we’ve failed to create attractive non-academic vocational paths for generations, tax reform is a graveyard, and the resources simply aren’t available to lift benefits. There is a degree of truth to each point. But put them together and it amounts to a counsel of lazy fatalism posing as sage insight.</p><p>If your glass is half full, then, overtime, these shifts don’t seem so out of reach. Some build directly on success over recent decades. Others — like improved vocational learning — are issues that a broad swath of opinion can be mobilised behind. And, yes, there will, of course, be a cost — but this shouldn’t be overstated. Over half of the cost of uprating working-age benefits in line with earnings would be met by moving pensions to the same ‘double-lock’ approach. Other nations — including Anglo-Saxon economies like Australia and Canada — succeed with lower levels of inequality than us.</p><p>None of this is to say it will be easy. But a high employment, high wage floor, higher skill economy that twins decent jobs with a revitalised welfare system offering a rising social minimum, isn’t an impossibilist dream for 2030s Britain. Progress will come from steady attritional gains rather than transforming ourselves into an entirely different economy. We don’t need to become Stockholm-on-Thames — just a better, fairer, version of ourselves.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2f2e0c7c8949" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/gk-test-blog/against-inequality-pessimism-why-we-can-narrow-income-gaps-2f2e0c7c8949">Against inequality-pessimism — why we can narrow income gaps</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/gk-test-blog">Gavin Kelly’s blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The real Living Wage increases explained]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/gk-test-blog/the-real-living-wage-increases-explained-a1f6469ad63a?source=rss-34827f40a7a3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a1f6469ad63a</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gavin Kelly]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 24 Oct 2023 07:19:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-10-24T07:19:02.894Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>The below is my foreword to the Resolution Foundation report setting out the 2023/24 Living Wage rates.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*hZEU50fdKoUvh_pT.png" /></figure><p><strong>Foreword</strong></p><p>This marks the eighth year that the Living Wage Commission (LWC) has overseen the calculation of the Living Wage rates for the UK and London. This report, from the Resolution Foundation, sets out the Living Wage rates for 2023–24, and the details of the underpinning the calculation.</p><p>The new rates are: £12.00 across the UK and £13.15 in London (a 10.1 per cent rise for the UK rate, and 10.0 per cent in London).</p><p>Although the headline rate of inflation is now falling the context for this year’s rates is still the cost of living crisis that has gripped the UK for the past two years. The current rate of inflation — 6.7 per cent in September 2023 — is still higher than at any point since 1992, outside of the even more elevated rates of the past 12 months.</p><p>In this context the Living Wage campaign is more important than ever. Over the past two years, the overall cost of living (as measured by the Consumer Prices Index) has risen by 17.4 per cent (comparing September 2021 with September 2023). The rise has been even higher for low income households, whose consumption patterns are more weighted to basic goods and services like food and energy where prices have surged the most. The cost of living for the poorest households has risen 18.8 per cent over these past two years. Against this, the Living Wage rates for 2023–24 are 21.2 per cent and 19.0 per cent (in the UK and London, respectively) higher than two years ago. In both cases it has gone up by more than inflation. In this sense the Living Wage has done its job: protecting workers from a rising cost of living.</p><p>This has happened at the same time as average wages (up 13.9 per cent over the past two years) have lagged behind inflation. Even the minimum wage, which has been subject to significant uprating in recent years, has not quite kept up with the cost of living (rising 16.9 per cent between April 2021 and April 2023).</p><p>While the cost of living is the primary driver of the LW rates, there are, as ever, other important factors to consider. The job of the Living Wage is to determine the wage rate necessary to ensure that households earn enough to reach a minimum acceptable living standard as defined by the public. This means that the rates are affected by the Government’s stance on taxes and benefits, because these set the relationship between earnings and incomes.</p><p>There are a few points worth highlighting when it comes to the effect of policy. First, there are some elements of tax and benefit policy which, though not new, continue to affect the rates. One is the Government’s decision to keep tax thresholds frozen in nominal terms, which places upwards pressure on the LW rates because it lowers households’ disposable incomes. Another is the 2-child limit on the family elements of means-tested benefits which have applied to children born after 2017. This covers a larger share of children with every passing year and, again, places upwards pressure on the wage requirements for families with three or more children. A third ongoing factor, which pushes in the opposite direction, is the rollout of Universal Credit. This is more generous to working families than the tax credit system, so places downwards pressure on the rates as more families are brought into this system (the rollout has reached two-thirds of the total this year).</p><p>Alongside these ongoing factors are two new issues that also had a bearing on our calculations this year. One is the fact that ‘Local Housing Allowance’ (LHA) has since 2021 been frozen in nominal terms. The LHA determines how much housing support low income families can receive. Freezing these allowances while rents rise reduces support, placing upwards pressure on LW rates. The nature of the cost inputs used in our LW calculation (private rents are set at the 30th percentile) means this is the first year this policy freeze has affected the LW rates. The impact was relatively modest this year, but if the LHA freeze continues it can be expected to grow each year.</p><p>A second new factor concerns the assumption used in the calculation for working hours. Although most parts of the LW methodology have been unchanged since 2016, part of the job of the LWC is to keep the methodology and underpinning assumptions under review, and to make revisions when doing so means the LW rates better reflect their remit.</p><p>Several years ago the LWC first considered the issue of working hours. In particular, it decided to review the assumption that all adults in the calculation work full-time with a particular focus on the position of single parents and second earners in families. To better reflect the reality of working patterns among these two groups, and to better align the UK methodology with the approach taken on this issue in other countries, the LWC have decided to relax the assumption that these two groups work full-time. Single parents and second earners will now be assumed to work part-time. This is clearly in keeping with reality of low-earning workers: among families where the main earner is in the bottom quarter of the earnings distribution, seven-in-ten single parents work part-time, as do six-in-ten second earners in families with children. There will be no change for other groups: single adults without children, couples without children, and main earners in families will all be assumed to work full-time. Reducing the number of hours worked for single parents and second earners places upwards pressure on the rates. As such, and in keeping with previous methodology changes, the LWC plan to phase in this change over a number of years rather than introduce it all at once.</p><p>The cost of living crisis over the last two years has presented acute challenges for workers struggling to get by, as well as employers having to navigate surging costs. The Living Wage has done in its job in helping ensure that pay keeps up with the underlying pressures on households. The Resolution Foundation, together with the Living Wage Commission, will make sure it remains a credible benchmark available to workers, employers, civil society and public authorities.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a1f6469ad63a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/gk-test-blog/the-real-living-wage-increases-explained-a1f6469ad63a">The real Living Wage increases explained</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/gk-test-blog">Gavin Kelly’s blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[‘Riders on the Storm’: what would a Labour government face?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/gk-test-blog/riders-on-the-storm-what-would-a-labour-government-face-541e32a88da7?source=rss-34827f40a7a3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/541e32a88da7</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gavin Kelly]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 05 Oct 2023 14:34:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-10-05T14:34:05.961Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This piece is co-authored with Nick Pearce, Prof Public Policy &amp; Director at IPR.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Dt30bEecdwq9Dn2mSU7fUg.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>A future Labour government will face difficult circumstances — a stagnant economy, household hardship, political volatility and a weakened state. It will need to carefully plan a programme of economic reform while fleshing out its intellectual foundations — and maintaining a broad coalition of support.</em></p><p>How should we think about the prospective governing agenda of an incoming Labour government in 2024? Labour administrations have often come to power after long periods of Conservative or Conservative-led government, as they did in 1945, 1964 and 1997, borne into office on the back of accumulated popular demands for national renewal and social change. By contrast, when Labour has replaced single-term or short-lived predecessors, as it did in 1924, 1929 and 1974, the party has entered power as a precarious minority government or an administration resting on a barely workable majority. Labour has also often inherited significant, crisis-laden economic challenges on taking office, and if Labour forms a government in 2024 or early 2025, it would likely face a combination of these circumstances: fundamental economic problems and pressure for social reform that have steadily built up since the party’s defeat in 2010, twinned with the political precarity and electoral volatility generated by weakening partisan allegiance and a decade of crises and shocks ranging from the Scottish independence referendum to Brexit, the Covid-19 pandemic, and the invasion of Ukraine.</p><p>How a Labour government responds to these circumstances would be shaped by at least three factors: the precise economic inheritance of the new government; its own ideology and the wider climate of ideas; and the nature of the electoral and political-economic coalitions that have brought it to power. Doubtless there are other issues that will be of interest to political commentators, such as political leadership, party management and administrative capability, but we choose to focus here on the factors we consider most important to understanding the agenda and prospects of a putative Labour government.</p><h3>The economic inheritance</h3><p>A central factor is the nature of the economic inheritance. For much of the post-war period the UK economy performed respectably, if not remarkably. Despite periods such as the mid-1970s, when the UK under-performed in comparison to many other countries on various indicators, the trend in real wages remained strongly positive: up by 33 per cent a decade on average between 1970 and 2007. In the two decades prior to the 2008 financial crisis, the UK economy achieved steady growth, and actually outperformed a number of peers, achieving a modest catch-up in productivity. As such, despite the claims of its critics, the UK’s overall performance across the long post-war era was not one of remorseless decline — though it is certainly true that the UK de-industrialised particularly sharply, and that inequalities between people and places exploded in the 1980s, casting a long shadow we still live under today.1</p><p>Since the financial crisis in 2008, however, the UK economy has performed unquestionably badly by historical and comparative standards. There are multiple compounding reasons for this: the triple shocks of Brexit, the Covid-19 pandemic and the fallout from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine came on top of a decade of austerity, which itself overlaid long-term imbalances in the UK economy. The combined result is that the UK approaches the mid-2020s in an unusually weak position. With growth stalled, living standards falling and state capacity diminished, the UK is fiscally stretched, eyed sceptically by international capital markets, and lacking any clear sense of its future economic strategy.</p><p>It is hardly news that the country faces an economic malaise. Yet prevailing opinion hasn’t fully registered what this means for a future government. The UK’s current problems are not a blip, or a passing phase, but have become entrenched. Real wages have stagnated so severely they are back to the level they were at in 2005. A quarter of the UK workforce has never known what it’s like to be employed in an economy capable of generating steady wage gains. Stagnant productivity — which has advanced at a crawling rate of 0.4 per cent since the financial crisis — in no small part reflects a longer-term failure to invest. The UK has spent most of the past two decades languishing near the bottom of the high-income OECD business investment league table, with Brexit then compounding this problem.</p><p>The responses to more than a decade of shocks, together with this disastrous record on growth, has given rise to the UK’s weakened fiscal position. The debt to GDP ratio stands at 100 per cent, compared to 38 per cent in 1997 (which then fell below 30 per cent through New Labour’s first term). Today’s public services are grossly under-funded at the same time as the tax share has risen sharply. The scale of the problems in our public services is not just damaging the nation’s social fabric but is also materially holding back the productive capacity of the economy. The UK has become a test case demonstrating that when public investment and spending is choked — across health and care, education, and employment support — economic potential is lost.</p><p>For an incoming government simply to deal with the urgent social repair necessary to keep services functioning — settling major workforce unrest, making inroads into the enormous NHS backlogs, ensuring schools have enough qualified staff, preventing care workers leaving for higher pay in supermarkets, and so on — is going to be expensive, contentious and hugely time-absorbing. And all that is before any attempts to renew, let alone transform, key public services and the wider welfare state: whether via a new social care settlement, setting a path towards a fully universal childcare system, forging a new child poverty strategy, rebalancing towards preventative health care, or creating a new generation of social housing. On top of these longer-term agendas, we also need to add the steady upward pressure arising from an ageing society, the sustained investment needed to make up lost ground on Net Zero, and the imperative of replacing carbon-related revenue streams.</p><p>All incoming Labour governments tend to generate frustration as pent-up social demands collide with competing priorities and the grindingly slow business of bringing about noticeable change. But these challenges would be of a different order in the mid-2020s. Expectations about what government can achieve may have declined, but any political protection this offers is more than offset by the sheer scale of the task of keeping the show on the road.</p><p>This is a starkly different legacy to that in 1997. Admittedly, New Labour also took office against the backdrop of increases in taxation in the years following the Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis, albeit from a lower base. But that is where the parallels end — which limits how many direct policy lessons can be learned from this period. Wage levels were rising steadily in the mid-1990s, rather than falling back to 1979 levels, which would be the equivalent of today’s stagnation-era reversal. Productivity was still growing very respectably at over 2 per cent per annum, and, accordingly, tax revenues were rising steadily at constant tax rates. The global context was benign as the opening up of world trade resulted in cheaper goods and pressure for productivity gains, and certainly by the standards of recent years, there were few shocks to manage before 2008. There was, of course, a deep social, democratic and institutional malaise in the UK to address. But despite various underlying frailties in the British model — not least its record on investment, stubborn inactivity and long-term unemployment, and exceptional inequality — there was still an economic platform on which to forge a new governing agenda. It was overwhelmingly a moment of opportunity rather than peril, as arguably it was for Harold Wilson’s government in 1964, despite the looming prospect of a balance of payments crisis and Sterling devaluation. Neither Wilson in 1964 nor Blair in 1997 had to reckon with a nation stuck in a rut of economic stagnation.2</p><p>Nor can we view the economic legacy purely through the rear-view mirror, since decisions about future spending that have already been taken are likely to shape events for a period after the election. The current government’s assumptions for public expenditure until 2028 — which sets the baseline for any new administration — are so implausible that it seems almost bound to duck any Spending Review before the next election, as this would only crystallise the depth of further cuts in store for ‘non-protected’ public services (an implied additional 14 per cent reduction in spending per head by 2028).3 On taxation, which has already risen by 4 percentage points of GDP over recent years, there is another 1 percentage point rise baked in by 2028. The question isn’t whether taxes will rise — that’s a given whoever wins the election — it’s how much further still they may need to go up, and, crucially, whether the next government will be willing to make vital but contentious reforms to improve the efficiency and fairness of our dysfunctional tax system.4</p><p>Likewise, when it comes to monetary policy the impact of recent repeated interest rate rises, which are expected to continue through the rest of 2023, will still be playing out over the first half of the next Parliament. But there is radical uncertainty over how far this goes. The dominant market view is that we should anticipate a prolonged period of high inflation and seriously elevated interest rates, which would not only spell intense pain for the UK’s mortgage-holders and many businesses, resulting in higher unemployment and an economic downturn, but would also ratchet up fiscal pressures via elevated debt interest payments. The weight currently given to this scenario has perhaps resulted in an under-pricing of the likelihood that summer 2023 marks the peak of inflation and interest-rate pessimism. Under this alternative version of events, the UK may have already over-corrected on monetary tightening, and inflation is likely, belatedly, to start to fall more in line with those of our peer nations, enabling interest rates incrementally to come down as we move through 2024. If the structural pressures that drove rates downwards over recent decades haven’t all suddenly relented, we might expect the costs of borrowing to moderate over the next Parliament, though not back to post-2008 lows.</p><p>This macroeconomic uncertainty reinforces the risk that an already grim inheritance generates a self-fulfilling mood of fatalism, paving the way to a politics of stunted ambition. Balance is needed. For all the UK’s challenges, it may well be the case that the worst of the aftershocks arising from Brexit, Covid and the invasion of Ukraine are behind us. There should be a significant stability-dividend on offer to an administration demonstrating basic competence and governing purpose. Some improvements in our trading relations with the EU should be realisable, creating a new dynamic. And if there is any sort of silver lining at all to the UK’s lost decade and a half of productivity failure, it is that there is a huge amount of catch-up potential to be realised before the UK gets anywhere close to the global frontier.</p><p>Nor should the fog of gloom blind us to the fact that — contrary to the popular mood — on some issues, at least, the social context is brighter than it was in 1997. There are significantly fewer workless young people compared to the mid-1990s, and a far higher share of graduates in the workforce. School performance is up in relative and absolute terms. Greater Manchester and the West Midlands now have far greater capacity to come up with their own solutions, creating a path that other key city-regions can follow. The UK’s pension system certainly needs reform but pensioner poverty has fallen significantly in recent decades and there is a solid infrastructure to be built upon. More broadly, the rapidity of the UK’s deindustrialisation in the 1970s and 1980s means that the Net Zero transition — at least when it comes to the jobs market — will be less disruptive here than in in some peer nations.</p><p>Fully appreciating the severity of the inheritance, while not being cowed by it, is thus essential for a new government. Understanding the position is politically crucial for incoming ministers, since it won’t be long before they find themselves deemed to share responsibility for it. But it is important, too, because governing agendas are defined in no small part as reactions to the failings of what came before. The bleak seriousness of the 2024 legacy could, potentially, give a new Labour government definition: the questions it needs to answer will have been set.</p><h3>Ideas and ideology</h3><p>Ideas matter to an incoming government because they give energy and definition to a political project, as well as shaping policy. Parties use ideas to make sense of the world and to link their own programmes to the wider climate of opinion. In contemporary politics, ideas and policy programmes take shape in loose assemblages of sympathetic think-tanks, journalists, public intellectuals, party activists and civil society organisations.5</p><p>In recent years, Labour has prioritised party management over ideological development and, although it has taken political inspiration from the successful campaigns of sister parties in Germany and Australia, it has engaged less in intellectual exchange than New Labour did in the years leading up to 1997. Undoubtedly of greatest consequence for the economic thinking of the British centre left is the new ‘Bidenomics’ of the US Democrats. Policy transfer from North America is often influential within Labour Party circles, but the impact of the current US administration’s agenda goes far beyond that. The huge programme embodied in President Biden’s signature legislation of clean energy subsidies, infrastructure investment, healthcare, social security and R&amp;D spending, and semiconductor manufacturing, is reshaping market understandings of, and media expectations about, the appropriate ambitions of the state in economic policy. It has legitimised large-scale industrial strategy for the Net Zero transition and the public investment needed to achieve it, while coupling this self-declared ‘supply-side progressivism’ to a new regime of corporate taxation, trade union rights and ‘pro-worker’ trade policy. This represents a major reinvention of twenty-first century American liberalism, and one which is already being used to reframe the economic and industrial policy ideas of the Labour Party. Driven in large part by antagonism with China, the Biden administration’s agenda is also radically reshaping the geo-political context within which the UK must think about its defence and security strategies.</p><p>The Biden programme was launched before the invasion of Ukraine and in a different fiscal and monetary context to the contemporary UK one. But the influence of Bidenomics on the next government will be singularly important at the level of ideology because it mounts a challenge to the ideas embodied in the prevailing UK growth model — and the task facing a new government isn’t just to resuscitate that model, but to reform it. The composition of GDP growth, for instance, needs to shift towards a prolonged period of investment growth, a precondition for progress on productivity, living standards and Net Zero. But higher investment ultimately needs to be paid for via increased savings by firms or households (a tough sell at a time of depressed wages), or by increasing the UK’s already large current account deficit, at a time when the UK is already internationally exposed. Likewise, the embedded assumption that macroeconomic stabilisation is the sole preserve of monetary policy is both at odds with reality (witness the big fiscal response to Covid and surging energy prices) and serves to reinforce inertia when it comes to new thinking on how the broader policy framework should offset the distributional injustices of burdens and gains that arise from shifts in wider monetary conditions.</p><p>The UK’s post-financial crisis trajectory has also intensified concerns about income and wealth inequalities, in contrast to the primary focus on poverty and social exclusion in the ‘long 90s’. The incredible increase in the overall level of net wealth in British society — which rose from a post-WWII norm of three times GDP, to four times GDP by 1997, and then twice that again by the time of the Covid-pandemic — has highlighted concerns about intergenerational as well as class inequalities, and the way these block access to home ownership and social mobility, for the young and increasingly the middle aged too. This trend has powered a growing debate about how to rebalance the tax system towards a greater focus on wealth and assets rather than placing ever more emphasis on earned-income.</p><p>At the same time a new analytical focus in Labour discourses on the ‘foundational’ or ‘everyday’ economy, drawing on strands of academic thinking as well as innovations in Labour local government, has emphasised the importance of improving wages and conditions and ensuring dignity at work, especially in non-traded, low-paying, employment-rich sectors. Here the ideological imprimatur of the wider Anglosphere — whose liberal market economies share many institutional features with those of the UK — is also visible. These countries share common challenges around raising labour standards in economies where private sector unions have been in long-term decline, and where deregulation and contracting-out have generated concentrations of low-quality jobs. In New Zealand, Ireland and some US states, sectoral institutions capable of setting minimum standards on wages, conditions and training entitlements for workers are being developed, and these are influencing thinking in the UK.</p><p>European social investment state strategies remain a powerful current in social policy, as they were in the 1990s, but have been given new energy in the 2020s due to the impact of the under-resourcing of public services on economic performance. The need for social investment in skills training, childcare, public he alth, education and employment support remains acute. Meanwhile, the gender revolution in social policy has advanced across the OECD but remains incomplete in the UK, where the New Labour settlement in childcare, flexible working rights and parental leave entitlements has been maintained, and in some cases built on, but with lower levels of per capita funding. A key goal here should be moving towards a coherent, publicly-funded and organised system of early years education and childcare, rather than the patchwork of overlapping state funding streams and market mechanisms currently in place. This wider policy agenda — pioneered by social-democratic feminists in the 1980s and 1990s — is likely to remain influential through the 2020s.</p><p>Austerity and the pandemic have exposed some of the lacunae of the UK’s approach to social investment: rising destitution, poverty-levels of income support for working-age single adults, and income volatility for claimants of Universal Credit, to name a few. Labour market precarity and its link to income insecurity have given a new lease of life to demands for a guaranteed social minimum (as well as to supporters of a Universal Basic Income), as well as those seeking to redress the dysfunctions of ever more punitive benefit conditionality. These and other areas of social policy demand experimentation and innovation — and require reformers, as we have argued elsewhere, to learn from successful initiatives and fuse them together at a scale capable of realising new social ambitions.6</p><h3>Coalitions of support</h3><p>Building a coalition of support for governing through hard times has both electoral and political-economic dimensions. In the 1990s, ‘Third Way’ social-democratic parties successfully crafted new cross-class voting coalitions to replace the decline in their industrial working-class support, but these new voting blocs proved far less stable than those of the post-war era. Partisan allegiance has weakened since, and voters are now more likely to switch parties at general elections. In the UK, nearly half of all voters did not vote for the same party across the three general elections of 2010, 2015 and 2017, and on current opinion polls, the 2024 general election will renew this volatility, with a big swing expected away from the Conservative Party.7 The implication is that governing parties — left or right — cannot expect support from a stable and secure electoral coalition, however large their majorities.</p><p>Meanwhile, party competition has intensified. Across Europe, parties of the social-democratic and centre left have generally lost vote share since the 2008 financial crisis, and now compete with the nationalist right for working-class support, and with greens and others for the educated middle-class vote. In the UK, the majoritarian electoral system for Westminster offers some insulation to the Labour Party, but at a price of requiring it to pre-assemble a broadly-based electoral coalition in order to win power, rather than negotiating a governing coalition to gain office. This electoral challenge is all the harder because of low turnout amongst younger voters, particularly young working-class voters, and the increasing concentration of Labour’s support in cities and university towns, trends which have helped entrench the electoral power of Conservative-supporting older voters in recent years.</p><p>The age divide in British politics — in both turnout and party choice — has been particularly marked in the UK since 2010 compared to other OECD countries, and arguably reflects distinct features of the UK’s post-financial crisis political economy. The young and university educated cluster in higher-skill agglomerations of cities characterised by broadly liberal values. Older voters have high levels of home ownership and dominate the electoral geography of post-industrial towns, counties and rural areas. They tend to be more socially conservative, and less socialised into the kinds of liberal values that permeate higher education and many professional service occupations.</p><p>Home-owning older voters profited from rising asset values in the era of loose monetary policy, and enjoyed relative protection from austerity, in sharp contrast to the younger working-age population. This generational political economy has recently been disrupted by the spike in inflation and interest rates — although the immediate effect on the older cohort of voters is muted because of the large proportion who own their homes outright. Whether it gets unravelled depends very much on whether we have moved into a ‘new normal’ of elevated interest rates rather than this being a temporary phase. If the former, this could significantly reduce overall levels of wealth relative to GDP due to a downward correction in asset prices; among other things, this would reduce the upfront barriers to home-ownership and increase the expected returns to the lifetime pension savings of the young; shock the home-owning middle aged who stretched themselves to buy amid the price rises of the last decade; and damage the asset wealth of those approaching, and in, retirement.</p><p>These different forces and uncertainties create flux for all parties but, when it comes to potential coalitions of support, Labour may see the case for some very cautious optimism. The nature of the inheritance of an incoming government in 2024 creates shared interests and common agendas across disparate parts of the electorate. There is now both cross-class and inter-generational support for rescuing the NHS and investment in the clean energy transition, at the same time as the Brexit divide is fading and demand for pragmatic deal-making with the EU is rising, all against the backdrop of social attitudes that, through all the noise, slowly but remorselessly continue to become more liberal. The scope to mobilise political cleavages around so-called ‘culture wars’ is more limited for British conservatives than for US Republicans or Central European nationalists, while progressive parties sense a stronger basis for shaping a voting bloc around a core programme of pro-growth policies, redistributive economic reform, improved public services and the Net Zero transition. This more upbeat reading of the emerging electoral landscape from a Labour perspective must be caveated, however, by the perpetually uphill struggle of building broad support for a long-termist social investment agenda.</p><p>What about the political-economic basis of support that might be marshalled by a Labour government? In recent years, textbook approaches to political economy appear to have lost some explanatory power: Brexit, and the faction of the Conservative Party that promoted it, went against the interests of key high-value export sectors, like automotive manufacturing and chemicals, and those of the City, which lost passporting rights into the EU market, as well as those of higher education and the creative industries. Meanwhile, trade unions didn’t have their traditional purchase in mobilising workers in high-skilled, high-wage sectors against Brexit.8 Instead, interests outside the productive economy — the retired population, in particular — proved critical.9</p><p>The post-Brexit, post-pandemic, disruption of the bedrock of the Conservative Party’s electoral support has opened up possibilities for the centre left to shape a new political-economic base of support. This could combine workers in the ‘everyday economy’ dependent on public sector funding and procurement, like care workers, with public sector employees and so-called ‘socio-cultural’ professionals who commonly vote for centre-left parties; businesses and their workers in the advanced sectors of the economy, particularly in goods and service sectors that are dependent on close alignment with European markets and clean energy subsidies; and companies with a stake in regional regeneration or ‘levelling up’, which Labour is likely to prioritise in its green investment planning. The challenge will be to bring these disparate constituencies together with a broader cross-generational bloc of voters.</p><h3>The statecraft of a new government</h3><p>This analysis has implications for the priorities and statecraft of an incoming government, and particularly for the importance of making progress on urgent social needs while laying the foundations for longer-term institutional economic reforms to deliver sustained higher investment. It is going to have to deal with all this within a decidedly cramped fiscal space.</p><p>A new government will need to move at great pace while crafting a message of patience. It must rapi dly rebuild strategic capacity at the heart of government. Careful thought needs to be given to public sector reform, too, setting out longer term plans for building and embedding institutions that are effective and legitimate and therefore more likely to survive a change of government. Crucially, an incoming Labour government should review the fiscal framework, with the intention of ensuring that high and stable public investment is prioritised, and is not, contrary to the practice of recent decades, the first casualty of efforts to meet fiscal rules.10</p><p>For policy and statecraft, we also need to broaden out from questions of the economic legacy to consider the wider ‘governance inheritance’. Austerity has diminished state capacity in local government and in Whitehall itself, and the governance landscape is dramatically more complex than anything an incoming Labour government has faced before, as a result of devolution and a democratic reform process which is radically incomplete and asymmetric, particularly in England. This would require an artful approach to governing that respects the multi-national and pluralist nature of the UK, and the need to negotiate across multiple sites of powers, while also further reforming Westminster and the central state itself. If an incoming government is not to get trapped in survival mode in the House of Commons, appearing detached from the nations and the key counties and cities of England, it must navigate this new governance landscape with openness and dexterity.</p><p>How some of these inherent tensions are managed — the need to move at pace, with strong central direction, while pursuing longer-term reforms and shaping a new democratic governance — will necessarily depend on the precise outcome of a still highly uncertain election, and on whether a new government could command a stable majority or not. Different lessons on statecraft can be drawn from recent history. One option is to prosecute an agenda early and hard, as the incoming Coalition government did with austerity; another is to ride out early storms, as Margaret Thatcher’s first administration did, despite waning public support; yet another is to prioritise some early results while deferring painful decisions, as Harold Wilson did in 1964, with the prospect of a second election looming. It must be remembered, too, that major capital investments take time to plan, so early clarity on how these will build up across a Parliament is imperative.</p><p>It is impossible to plan for all eventualities, not least because every government is beset by unforeseen crises of one kind or another. But preparing for the key fiscal decisions, as well as prioritising and sequencing major reforms, and having a strategy for sustaining coalitions through the inevitable strains of governing, are the <em>sine qua non</em> of success in power. As the general election nears, these tasks only become more urgent.</p><p><em>This piece was originally written for </em><a href="https://journals.lwbooks.co.uk/renewal/vol-31-issue-3/article-9781/"><em>Renewal</em></a><em>.</em></p><p><a href="https://journals.lwbooks.co.uk/renewal/vol-31-issue-3/article-9781/">https://journals.lwbooks.co.uk/renewal/vol-31-issue-3/article-9781/</a></p><p><strong>Gavin Kelly</strong> worked at 10 Downing Street as Gordon Brown’s Deputy Chief of Staff, and was a member of the Number 10 Policy Unit under Tony Blair.</p><p><strong>Nick Pearce</strong> is Professor of Public Policy and Director of the Institute for Policy Research at the University of Bath, and was previously Head of the Number Ten Policy Unit.</p><h3>Notes</h3><p>1 Declinism has largely been rebutted in the work of economic historians. See Jim</p><p>Tomlinson,<em> ‘</em>Thrice denied: “declinism” as a recurrent theme in British history in the</p><p>long twentieth century’, <em>Twentieth Century British History</em>, Vol 20 No 2, 2009, pp227–251.</p><p>2 The circumstances are perhaps closer to those that faced the incoming Wilson government in 1974, albeit without the decades of public and private investment and productivity growth that preceded it.</p><p>3 Torsten Bell et al, <em>We’re Going on a Growth Hunt: Putting the Spring 2023 Budget in Context</em>, Resolution Foundation 2023: <a href="https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/app/">https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/app/</a> uploads/2023/03/Were-going-on-a-growth-hunt.pdf.</p><p>4 Molly Broome, Adam Corlett and Greg Thwaite, <em>Tax Planning: How to Match Higher Taxes with Better Taxes</em>, Resolution Foundation 2023: <a href="https://economy2030./">https://economy2030.</a> resolutionfoundation.org/reports/tax-planning/.</p><p>5 Eunice Goes, ‘Ideas and party change: the role of predistribution in Labour’s ideological renewal’, <em>Journal of Political Ideologies</em>, Vol 26 No 2, 2021, pp180–200.</p><p>6 Gavin Kelly and Nick Pearce, ‘Beveridge at eighty: learning the right lessons, <em>The Political Quarterly</em>, Vol 94 No 1, 2023, pp8–15.</p><p>7 British Election Study Team, ‘Most volatile British electorate in modern times’, 2019:</p><p><a href="https://www.britishelectionstudy.com/bes-resources/press-release-most-volatilebritish-electorate-in-modern-times/">https://www.britishelectionstudy.com/bes-resources/press-release-most-volatilebritish-electorate-in-modern-times/.</a></p><p>8 Ian Fitzgerald, Ron Beadle and Kevin Rowan, ‘Trade unions and the 2016 Brexit referendum’, <em>Economic and Industrial Democracy</em>,<em> </em>Vol 43 No 1, 2022, pp388–409.</p><p>9 Joe Chrisp and Nick Pearce, <em>The Age Divide in British Politics</em>, Institute for Policy Research, 2021: <a href="https://www.bath.ac.uk/publications/the-age-divide-in-uk-politics/">https://www.bath.ac.uk/publications/the-age-divide-in-uk-politics/</a> attachments/the-age-divide-in-uk-politics.pdf.</p><p>10 Felicia Odamtten and James Smith, <em>Cutting the Cuts</em>, Resolution Foundation 2023: <a href="https://economy2030.resolutionfoundation.org/reports/cutting-the-cuts/">https://economy2030.resolutionfoundation.org/reports/cutting-the-cuts/.</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=541e32a88da7" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/gk-test-blog/riders-on-the-storm-what-would-a-labour-government-face-541e32a88da7">‘Riders on the Storm’: what would a Labour government face?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/gk-test-blog">Gavin Kelly’s blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The path back to shared growth runs through British flexicurity]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/gk-test-blog/the-path-back-to-shared-growth-runs-through-british-flexicurity-c87dbe892b96?source=rss-34827f40a7a3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c87dbe892b96</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gavin Kelly]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 04 Jul 2023 11:04:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-07-04T11:17:52.977Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Britain has been so buffeted around by economic crisis over recent years that it feels almost indulgent to cast beyond the ongoing emergency phase of economic policy to consider the longer-term prospects and pre-requisites for shared growth. But, as current US experience shows, growth is certainly possible and purposeful governments can combine short and longer-term agendas.</p><p>So, let’s look beyond 2023’s gloom to ask what it would take for a period of growth to raise the living standards of the whole of society? The glass half-empty answer is: an awful lot. The half-full response would say: true, but it only requires feats we have managed to pull off in the not too distant past.</p><p>A <a href="https://economy2030.resolutionfoundation.org/reports/sharing-the-benefits">new report</a> from the Resolution Foundation by Mike Brewer, Karl Handscomb, Cara Pacitti and Lalitha Try helps crystallise the shared growth challenge. It models a number of scenarios to examine the impact on household incomes across the distribution. It starts by assuming a return to reasonable, not stellar, real wage growth (in line with the OBR’s current outlook). Next it says, ok, what if that wage growth is skewed towards those on low-wages (which we have seen in a number of times since the minimum wage was introduced, not least since the introduction of the National Living Wage). Then it layers on top of this an increase in the employment rate of the scale that occurred during the 2010s (no mean feat then, harder to repeat now).</p><p>The chart below shows how these different ‘what ifs’ combine to generate significant gains in living standards for much of the population. What it also demonstrates is that, even in this happy state of affairs, these gains are still skewed toward the middle and upper-middle part of the distribution and the gap with the bottom grows. This brings home, in case it wasn’t obvious, that achieving fully shared growth means running up a steep hill.</p><p><strong><em>The three pillars of shared growth: ten year income growth under different scenarios. (Real-terms non-pensioner after housing costs incomes, by income vigintile)</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="The three pillars of shared growth: ten year income growth under different scenarios
 (Real-terms non-pensioner after housing costs incomes, by income vigintile)" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/940/1*1CIS0ETbp3kDgkwQmNuuqA.png" /></figure><p><strong><em>For detailed notes on assumptions see </em></strong><a href="https://economy2030.resolutionfoundation.org/reports/sharing-the-benefits/"><strong><em>Resolution Foundation report</em></strong></a><strong><em>.</em></strong></p><p>To ensure a bottom-heavy pattern of income growth the essential additional condition is that social security entitlements rise in line with earnings rather than prices (or more specifically, the higher of the two). Over the longer-term the stance on benefit uprating matters for two key reasons. First, large swathes of the country will continue to rely on benefit income — the poorest fifth of working-age Britain receive roughly half their income from work (compared to 94 per cent for the richest fifth). This group, which changes over time, includes a large share of households with someone with a disability, as well as low income families with children. If we fail to increase benefits as GDP rises then these households inevitably fall further behind. Second, and crucially, steady growth is itself very likely to continue to push up housing costs roughly in line with typical incomes (as it has done over the last two decades). Again, uprating in line with inflation is likely to mean that households who are reliant on benefits to cover market rents will tend to become worse off over time.</p><p>An obvious, and often made, response to all this is that increasing benefits is a self-defeating strategy as it inevitably erodes the incentive to work. But uprating benefits in line with earnings simply preserves the strength of current work incentives. Indeed, given that any strategy for shared growth would involve the minimum wage rising at least as fast as average earnings, the incentives to work for those in low-paid work should still rise even with benefits indexed to average earnings.</p><p>We can also look to other advanced economies for insight on how benefit generosity intersects with labour market performance. Earnings-uprating does indeed happen in a number of successful economies. New Zealand has recently adopted this approach and Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands all uprate their equivalent to the UK’s means-tested benefits with reference to a combination of changes in earnings, GDP and prices.</p><p>But to get a broader sense of how a different strategy on benefit-generosity could interact with a flexible labour market, like the UK’s, we have a readymade case study: Danish ‘flexicurity’. This is the clunky label first given in the 1990s to capture Denmark’s unique approach to combining flexibility in the jobs market with high levels of income security. For a decade it received burgeoning international attention, but this has declined since 2008 as austerity and crisis management dominated economic and social policy discourse. Another <a href="https://economy2030.resolutionfoundation.org/reports/flexicurity-and-the-future-of-work/">new report</a> for the Resolution Foundation by Anna Ilsøe and Trine Pernille Larsen updates our understanding of how this system has performed and asks what lessons it might offer the UK in the 2020s.</p><p>The authors point out both striking similarities and differences between the two nations. When it comes to key metrics like unemployment, the employment rate and job mobility there is little between them. Similarly, if we look at key measures of flexibility — like ease of hiring and firing — both appear near the top of the OECD league table.</p><p>But when we turn to economic security the similarities end. Take benefit generosity: Danish unemployment insurance is set at a high rate — offering up to 90 percent of prior earnings for up to two years, with a cap of just under €2600 a month which results in a typical replacement rate of 57 percent (far higher than the UK’s 35 percent). Danish unemployment insurance covers around four out of five workers but even those not eligible can fall back on lower but still generous means-tested social assistance. The basic monthly level of means-tested support for claimants with one child are almost <em>three times</em> higher in Denmark (€2,300) than in the UK (£742 or €850).</p><p>High levels of flexibility, and far greater income-security, come together via a third, vital, component of flexicurity: intensive support to help the unemployed find work and move roles. Denmark spends more on active labour market (ALM) policy than any country in the OECD — around 1.2 per cent of GDP, four times more than the UK. Personalised support comes in the form of case workers and there is a duty on the unemployed to undertake job-search and participate in support programmes. Since the late-1990s, for example, more than half of the unemployed participated annually in an ALM programme of some sort. Training is an integrated and valued part of the system with financial support to facilitate participation. The ALM strategy is refined and evaluated — not least via regular use of Randomised Control Trials. The system costs serious money and is treated seriously by national government, employers and unions.</p><p>There is, of course, a very different context for Danish social protection. Trade unions are radically more pervasive (two out of three workers are members) and the tax-share stands at 46 percent of GDP. Nor should we romanticise it: for all its virtues it has vices too — for instance, the employment rate is almost <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.36.4.81">30% percentage points</a> lower among non-natives compared to native Danes (a significantly larger gap than the OECD average) and, like the UK, it struggles with how best to incorporate the self-employed. And, of course, we can’t just transplant attractive elements of another system piecemeal from one nation to another.</p><p>Yet none of this should inhibit us from renewing our curiosity to learn from a near-by, open economy that has adjusted relatively successfully to globalisation and automation. Few nations have done better when it comes to securing popular consent for a national ambition to bear down on low pay and inequality, tackle job insecurity and invest in human capital.</p><p>Taken together these two reports help clarify the nature of the challenge ahead. The resumption of real wage growth (driven by productivity gains) is the most fundamental pre-condition for shared growth. A higher employment rate does significant additional work in boosting incomes near the bottom of the distribution. Achieving either of these goals would require concerted policy effort within the context of a serious economic strategy. But if we want to avoid the working-age poor being left behind then these two pillars — sooner or later — need to be bolstered by a third: benefits rising with a growing economy. This was effectively achieved in the late 1990s and early 2000s via the creation and expansion of working-age tax credits. And when it comes to pensioners there has been a solid consensus on doing exactly this (and more besides) since the mid-2000s. Achieving shared growth for everyone means forging a similar resolve to create a decent social minimum for the working age population and ensuring it rises over time with national prosperity.</p><p>All this would raise concerns about long term costs though, as the Resolution report shows, these are smaller than many would expect in part because of demographics (and half of the long-term cost could be covered by moving pensions uprating from a triple to a double-lock). And to be fully effective a new social security strategy would need to be married with a higher-road jobs market model which, among other things, raises the quality of lower-wage work and in doing so draws more people into the labour market.</p><p>We would be better placed to pull this off if we lift our gaze to consider the experience of other nations who have struck a better balance between flexibility and security; as well as mining insights from <a href="https://medium.com/gk-test-blog/preparing-for-a-decade-of-economic-change-lessons-from-the-era-of-white-heat-af3e3580f54a">our own efforts in the past</a>. Our current policy discourse feels small and reactive at a time when it is clear that other nations, big and small, are making strategic choices about the type of market economy they want to have. When Britain finally emerges out of its crisis-era mindset it needs to ask its own larger questions. One of these should be what our own distinctive version of flexicurity should look like for the late 2020s and beyond.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c87dbe892b96" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/gk-test-blog/the-path-back-to-shared-growth-runs-through-british-flexicurity-c87dbe892b96">The path back to shared growth runs through British flexicurity</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/gk-test-blog">Gavin Kelly’s blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[System collision: the interaction of Universal Credit and Child Benefit withdrawal is creating a…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/gk-test-blog/system-collision-the-interaction-of-universal-credit-and-child-benefit-withdrawal-is-creating-a-99e07a0b7a38?source=rss-34827f40a7a3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/99e07a0b7a38</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gavin Kelly]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 28 Dec 2022 00:25:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-12-28T07:34:45.271Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>System collision: the interaction of Universal Credit and Child Benefit withdrawal is creating a mess</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*R4PQsF-34GtMgdIjkadvmw.jpeg" /></figure><p>If there is anyone out there still harbouring the quaint idea that it’s the super-rich who face the highest marginal tax rates in the land, they should think again. There are various contenders for that dubious prize but we can now announce a clear winner: the small but fast-growing group of families receiving Universal Credit (UC) who are also having their Child Benefit withdrawn due to there being an earner in the household on between £50k-60k.</p><p>Families in this position find themselves paying an effective marginal tax rate of at least 80% (if they have one child), up to 96% (3 kids and the main earner repaying a student loan) — make that 97% if they live in Scotland. These are significantly higher effective tax rates than the already elevated ones facing the far larger numbers of families working on UC or having Child Benefit withdrawn (who aren’t on UC). You can read the details in this <a href="https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/publications/inconsistent-incentives/">research note</a> by Karl Handscomb, Mike Brewer and myself, but the key marginal tax rates are below.</p><p>This matters as this UC/Child Benefit withdrawal interaction is a big problem for the affected families, the numbers in this position are set to grow steadily and, more widely, this issue adds to the increasing mess that exists when it comes to support for families with children.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/940/1*fwUf5pOFLbKxxWdQhHBJew.png" /></figure><p>At the moment there are only around 50,000 families in this position, rising to 90,000 by the end of the decade, with ever more thereafter unless current policy settings change. In addition, there are another 250,000 families on UC and Child Benefit with someone on £40k-£50k who could easily find themselves in this ‘no-gain’ income zone if the main earner gets a pay rise. Again, these numbers will rise.</p><p>The first thing to say about this UC/Child Benefit issue is that it is clearly not the most pressing issue facing today’s social security system. These families are unlikely to be facing the acute ‘eat or heat’ choices faced by many this winter and solving this problem isn’t where I would spend the marginal pound. But unless we now live in an era of such diminished expectations that we’ve simply given up considering the functionality of our wider system of social protection and child support then we would do well to consider what this problem says about our current settlement.</p><p>Why, you might ask, are growing numbers of families in this position? After all, UC is generally thought of as a benefit for those on ‘low’ incomes whereas Child Benefit is supposed to be withdrawn from ‘higher’ income families. In reality, there has always been a degree of overlap because some middle and upper-middle income families face very high costs (living in high rent areas and/or high childcare costs) that require support.</p><p>But the extent of that overlap is growing fast for two reasons. First and foremost, because of the decision to indefinitely freeze in cash terms the threshold at which Child Benefit is withdrawn, meaning that ever more families are affected. Even without this aggravating UC interaction, the manner in which Child Benefit is withdrawn has always been clunky. Moreover, even if you accept the logic that led George Osborne to means test Child Benefit in 2013 (and many wouldn’t), if the ‘right’ threshold then was £50k to £60k, the correct figure today would be £64k to £77k, rising to something like £72k and £87k by the end of the decade. Meanwhile, UC has (this year at least) been uprated and, in addition, the rate at which it is withdrawn from households as they earn more (the ‘taper rate’) has been cut. This is a good thing. But it has the inevitable result that more middle and upper-middle income households become eligible. The combination of these two effects generates a slow motion car-crash for work incentives in this £50-£60k zone as each year more families lose their Child Benefit while still being on UC.</p><p>No rational policy maker would ever have designed what results. It creates a £10,000 stretch of income — at an increasingly busy point in the income distribution — where, for the higher earner (or only earner in a lone parent family), there is basically no point seeking a pay rise or getting more hours. It also means that many families who rent can face an extremely long continuous stretch of income where really high marginal tax rates apply. The sole earner in a family would need to reach earnings of £60k before their marginal effective tax rate <em>falls</em> down to 42 per cent (51 per cent for graduates; 54 per cent if we include pension contributions). This is pie in the sky for most people.</p><p>Take one step back and this episode provides us with an example of seeing like a state — except a highly fragmented one. Policies which may have appeared to make sense in isolation are then layered upon each other — Universal Credit, Child Benefit withdrawal, loan repayments — creating a mess from the perspective of a family.</p><p>Over and above the punishing marginal tax rates there is the bureaucratic headache. It’s not just that families need to navigate two entirely different means-tested income support systems run by separate departments — one via a UC claim administered by DWP, and one via the tax system and self-assessment run by HMRC. It’s also that many of the same families will also need to work out whether they would actually be better off claiming tax-free childcare (an entirely separate process) rather than support for childcare through UC (families cannot receive both). As a final twist, households with an earner above £60k, who therefore receive nothing at all from Child Benefit, still need to have the smarts to register for the benefit so that the person who cares for the child protects their future state pension entitlement. It’s an understatement to say that this is not what a family-friendly tax and benefit system looks like.</p><p>Step back further still and this unhappy episode also helps illuminate why our wider <a href="https://medium.com/gk-test-blog/the-politics-of-uk-tax-rises-are-as-complex-as-the-system-735b0daed0b8">tax politics is now so vexed</a> — both for aspiring tax risers and tax cutters — and why the 20th century mindsets which still hang over much of our tax discourse, are wide of the mark. Today’s tax and benefit system is just far more complicated than in previous eras with more people — those working on Universal Credit, many graduates, those losing their Child Benefit among others — facing higher marginal effective rates than the rich paying the top rate of income tax. Try telling a graduate on a modest salary raising a few kids in rented accommodation that they should contribute a bit more. In the event that they receive a pay rise (and they may smile ruefully at that notion) it’s already the case that precious little of it would find its way into their take-home pay. Equally, it brings home why talk about tax cuts — like a ‘penny off income tax’ — often fails to gain traction among some key demographics. Why get revved up when you are facing, say, a 70% marginal effective tax rate?</p><p>Normal people don’t inhabit the world of marginal deduction rates that pre-occupy economic geeks. But they do twig that their circumstances mean they keep little of any increase in earnings; and they know all too keenly what it feels like to be on the wrong end of multiple bureaucratic systems. Don’t believe those who say this stuff doesn’t matter outside of spreadsheets.</p><p>Some reading this may reach for the comfort-zone notion that the ‘solution’ is simply to end all support for households with someone on more than £50k. Those tempted by this response should take a minute. It means either the poorest in the land will be made poorer; or that the marginal effective tax rates facing those on UC on lower incomes should be even higher (or both). Attempting to dodge inevitable trade-offs like this is as unserious as it is fashionable.</p><p>The immediate and overwhelming priority should be to improve benefit adequacy for those at the sharp end (trade-off: costs new money). Before long, though, we are going to have to sort out the coherence of the wider system of support for most families with children. We’ve moved from a blend of universalism and targeting to having two increasingly overlapping means-tested systems which are themselves overlaid by multiple systems of support for childcare. A decade of tactical trimming and fiscal freezes have left us with a mess.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=99e07a0b7a38" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/gk-test-blog/system-collision-the-interaction-of-universal-credit-and-child-benefit-withdrawal-is-creating-a-99e07a0b7a38">System collision: the interaction of Universal Credit and Child Benefit withdrawal is creating a…</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/gk-test-blog">Gavin Kelly’s blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The real Living Wage increases explained]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/gk-test-blog/the-real-living-wage-increases-explained-ecac776bd6b6?source=rss-34827f40a7a3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ecac776bd6b6</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gavin Kelly]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 22 Sep 2022 07:29:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-09-22T08:52:36.488Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>The below is my foreword to the Resolution Foundation report setting out the 2022/23 Living Wage rates.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*aiQsBf3t3p7TxjBqTmPuYg.png" /></figure><p>This is the seventh year that the Living Wage Commission (LWC) has overseen the wage rates for the UK and London.</p><p>This year’s rates are being announced in the middle of the worst cost of living crisis in a generation. Near double-digit inflation is the highest it has been since the early 1980s and wages — currently rising at around 5 per cent — aren’t keeping pace. At the same time the government is undertaking intervention on an unprecedented scale to limit the energy price increases that households face. Against this volatile backdrop the stability offered by the real Living Wage is more important than ever.</p><p>This context also makes it a challenging year to set the real Living Wage rates. There is a huge amount of flux: both prices and policy are shifting from month to month.</p><p>This <a href="https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/publications/living-wage-real-london-uk-2022/">report</a>, from the Resolution Foundation, sets out the Living Wage rates for 2022- 23, and the details underpinning the calculation. The new hourly wage rates are <strong>£10.90</strong> across the UK and <strong>£11.95</strong> in London.</p><p>The basic intuition behind the Living Wage is a simple one: to determine the wage rate necessary to ensure that households earn enough to reach a minimum acceptable living standard as defined by the public. Translating this intuitive idea into practice, however, requires a wide range of data, assumptions and judgements to be brought together on issues ranging from the appropriate measurement of various household costs, to the nature of government support available to different families.</p><p>The Resolution Foundation undertakes this task according to a well-established approach, and its work is overseen by the independent Living Wage Commission. The Commission’s role is an important one. The calculation of the Living Wage is rooted in a clear methodology, but changes in the economic and policy context mean there are inevitably judgements to be made each year. The fast-changing context this year has thrown up more questions than usual. I would like to thank my fellow Commissioners for the conscientious and collegiate manner in which they have worked through all the issues.</p><p>This report sets out the issues impacting on this year’s rates — here I will briefly mention two key ones: rising prices and increases in government support.</p><p>The biggest driver of changes in the rates this year is, of course, high inflation, caused in large part by surging energy costs following the invasion of Ukraine. Even though the energy prices used in the Living Wage calculation reflect the government’s new energy cap they are still dramatically higher than those in last year’s calculation (more than 2.5 times higher). That said, if the government hadn’t introduced its new cap policy the upward pressure on the Living Wage rates would have been significantly greater.</p><p>Rising prices have, not surprisingly, generated by some way the largest ever increase in Living Wage rates both in percentage and cash terms. The new rates are now worth almost £3,000 more per year across the UK than the minimum wage for a full-time worker, and almost £5,000 more in London. The increases of 10.1 per cent in the UK and 8.1% in London compare to CPI inflation of 9 per cent in April 2022 (the point at which the prices in the Minimum Income Standard basket were collected), 9.9 per cent today, and Resolution Foundation projections of 8 per cent next May (by which point the new rates must be paid by accredited employers), with inflation then expected to fall steadily through 2023.</p><p>In keeping with the pattern last year, and contrary to the trends in the immediate pre- pandemic period, there has been more upward pressure from prices in the UK rate than in London. For instance, rents and childcare costs have risen faster outside London.</p><p>The other critical factor shaping this year’s rates has been major changes in the benefits system, including support to help with surging energy costs. The overall effect of these benefit changes has been to give significantly more support to low-and-moderate income households, particularly working households (i.e. the Living Wage population group). Even before the energy price crisis hit, changes to the ‘taper rate’ and ‘working allowances’ within Universal Credit both increased cash support, creating downward pressure on the Living Wage rates. More recently, the Government has committed to cash support for households to help with energy costs — £400 for all households, and an additional flat-rate £650 for all households on means-tested benefits.</p><p>Taken together these payments play a big role in offsetting some of the upward price pressure on the rates (which would otherwise have been much larger). Again, changes in Universal Credit and the new support for energy bills play out differently in London compared to the rest of the UK. In London, a significantly higher share of households in our calculation are eligible for means-tested benefits (by virtue of their high costs) compared to the rest of the UK, where costs (such as for housing) are typically lower. This is a second reason why the underlying increase in the London rate was lower than the UK rate this year.</p><p>Looking ahead to next year there remains a huge amount of uncertainty. In no small part this concerns the future path of inflation and global energy prices. But it is also about what happens to some key costs which appear to be picking up after having been relatively flat — such as London rents. And there are some major unresolved policy questions: will benefits be uprated in line with inflation, and will current cash support for energy bills be continued after April 2023? A lot hinges on these choices.</p><p>What we can say with certainty is that this will be an extremely challenging year for workers as well as for many employers who back the Living Wage. The Living Wage campaign approaches the year ahead from a position of strength. It has grown rapidly from a small, insurgent movement into a building block of the UK’s civic, social and economic infrastructure. Almost 400,000 workers benefit directly from the real Living Wage and over 11,000 employers are formally accredited, while many others informally shadow the rates. Year by year it is bending social norms towards fairer pay.</p><p>As workers and employers seek to adjust to the continuing challenges posed by this energy price surge, together with the aftershocks from the pandemic, it is vital that we have clear yardsticks that help society navigate towards a more equitable and resilient economy. One of these is the real Living Wage, which now stands at over 70% of the typical UK wage.</p><p>The Resolution Foundation, together with the Living Wage Commission, will ensure it remains a robust and credible benchmark available to workers, employers, civil society and public authorities.</p><p>Gavin Kelly</p><p>Chair, Living Wage Commission</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ecac776bd6b6" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/gk-test-blog/the-real-living-wage-increases-explained-ecac776bd6b6">The real Living Wage increases explained</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/gk-test-blog">Gavin Kelly’s blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Talking ‘tax cuts’ amid Britain’s social stagnation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/gk-test-blog/talking-tax-cuts-amid-britains-social-stagnation-19f8907a5f53?source=rss-34827f40a7a3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/19f8907a5f53</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gavin Kelly]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 02 Apr 2022 01:43:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-04-02T07:21:42.797Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>The social recession of the 2010s risks becoming a slump in the 2020s</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6RAuOl-qZVGenL-yEORlmg.jpeg" /></figure><p>The letters from my kid’s school asking for voluntary contributions to help meet rising running costs are getting ever more desperate. It’s just a straw in the wind but speaks to the wider condition of the UK’s public services which, after a long era of austerity followed by Covid and now a surge in inflation, are increasingly struggling to cope.</p><p>For some public services getting back to levels of funding they received in 2010 is the most that can be hoped for over the next few years. For others, even that isn’t on the cards. All of which makes it a curious time to be talking up tax cuts.</p><p>Evidence of back-sliding surrounds us. Funding for the NHS, which has been protected relative to other public services and recently increased by the Johnson government, has still sunk far below historic growth rates since 2010. It shows. Performance against key targets — treatment within 18 weeks and four hour waits in A&amp;E — slumped over the decade before Covid. The enormous strains and back-logs facing the NHS as it emerges from the pandemic have resulted in public satisfaction <a href="https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/publications/public-satisfaction-nhs-social-care-2021?utm_source=The%20King%27s%20Fund%20newsletters%20%28main%20account%29&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_campaign=13105107_MKPUB_BSA_2022%5BADDITIONALSEND%5D&amp;utm_content=Button_Header&amp;dm_i=21A8,7SVYR,I1JDLL,VTVQK,1">plummeting to 37%</a> down from a high of 70% in 2010.</p><p>When it comes to schools pupil funding <a href="https://ifs.org.uk/education-spending/schools">fell by 9%</a> in real terms in the decade before 2020 and, despite a recent increase, it will be the mid-2020s before it recovers to where it was in 2010. According to the IFS, experienced teachers are on course for a <a href="https://ifs.org.uk/publications/15989">14% real terms pay cut</a> between 2010 and 2023 — some will be looking elsewhere for work. The gap between state and private school resourcing has more than doubled over the last decade.</p><p>Schools, though, have fared better than Further Education where real spending per pupil is on course to be <a href="https://ifs.org.uk/education-spending/Further-Education-and-Sixth-Forms">10% lower</a> in 2025 than it was 15 years earlier. The recent <em>Levelling Up</em> <em>White Paper</em> rightly gave prominence to a 2030 target for adult skills but, even if it is met, it would reverse just <a href="https://learningandwork.org.uk/news-and-policy/levelling-up-in-england-through-lifelong-learning/">one quarter of the fall</a> in numbers since 2010.</p><p>The list goes on. Levels of child poverty are projected to be heading <a href="https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/press-releases/child-poverty-risks-hitting-record-levels/">back to levels last seen in the mid-1990s</a>. Prisons are creaking: assaults on prisoners <a href="https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publications/performance-tracker-2021">more than doubled</a> between 2010 and the pandemic. The courts system is under huge pressure with resources 22% lower than in 2010. Councils have been bit particularly hard hit with budgets for the likes of libraries and neighbourhood services decimated. In so many vital but ‘non-protected’ parts of our public services there is little prospect of funding returning to the level it was at when David Cameron came to office.</p><p>It would, of course, be wrong to suggest there have been no policy-driven social advances over the last decade. The state pension has risen while auto-enrolment has been rolled out, access to free childcare has been boosted, the minimum wage has climbed and devolution to cities advanced. All bright spots. But they appear on a dark canvass.</p><p>The wider point is that, just as economies can experience long-down turns so, too, can public services and welfare states. There is no guarantee of steady progress, no Whiggish arc of history to reassure us of inevitable advances to come. The social recession of the 2010s risks becoming a slump in the 2020s as low-growth and the scarring impact of the pandemic compound the legacy of austerity.</p><p>It is against this backdrop that the Chancellor has pledged that ‘every marginal pound should go to tax cuts’ despite, or more likely because, the overall tax burden is steadily rising. If nothing else Rishi Sunak has sent an early signal about the terms of the 2024 election. Unlike all Conservative manifestos since 1997 the next one seems likely to feature a commitment to cut the rate of income tax. Indeed, don’t be too surprised if there are echoes of the 1992 manifesto with its promise to incrementally reduce the basic rate to an aspirationally low number (in Major’s case it was the 20p rate).</p><p>The juxtaposition of ‘tax cuts’ alongside social stagnation could make for a riskier electoral gambit than some suppose. True, after nearly two decades of flat wages voters will certainly be in the market for ideas that might lift living standards. But the public may be growing tired of the ruse of cutting one tax rate at the same time as increasing another while overall tax bills increase as fiscal drag bites. It’s also the case that underlying popular sentiment has travelled a long way since the 2010s — and it is in the direction of <a href="https://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/latest-report/british-social-attitudes-37/key-time-series.aspx">favouring higher spending and taxes</a>.</p><p>It is no secret among the main political parties that whoever wins the next election is very likely to have to <a href="https://economy2030.resolutionfoundation.org/reports/under-pressure/">spend more</a> to keep the NHS, schools, police and the armed forces afloat, while meeting the costs of ageing and net zero.</p><p>The real question is whether that spending is sufficient, properly planned and funded through a reasonably coherent tax system that doesn’t unduly penalise work. Or whether it takes the form of crisis-driven sporadic spending spurts paid for by stealthy and generationally-skewed revenue raids that leave Britain with an ever more distorted tax system unfit for the 21st century.</p><p>Social stagnation, as much as economic, defines today’s Britain. An agenda for reversing it should involve a plan for sustained growth combined with candour about the scale of future spending pressures and the tax-base needed to fund them. Don’t hold your breath.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=19f8907a5f53" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/gk-test-blog/talking-tax-cuts-amid-britains-social-stagnation-19f8907a5f53">Talking ‘tax cuts’ amid Britain’s social stagnation</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/gk-test-blog">Gavin Kelly’s blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Real Living Wage rates for 2021–2022: what’s behind this year’s increase?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/gk-test-blog/new-real-living-wage-rates-for-2021-2022-18b770fb5d27?source=rss-34827f40a7a3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/18b770fb5d27</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gavin Kelly]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 15 Nov 2021 09:58:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-11-15T10:09:59.158Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>(The below is my foreword to the Resolution Foundation </em><a href="https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/publications/calculating-the-real-living-wage/"><em>report</em></a><em> setting out this year’s Living Wage calculation)</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*Yq3ZMWwpcl3T17ibilWnUA.jpeg" /></figure><p>This is the sixth year that the Living Wage Commission (LWC) has set the wage rates for the UK and London and, in the face of the continued economic challenges facing workers and employers in the UK, its role remains vital.</p><p>Over 300,000 workers benefit directly from the real Living Wage and 9000 employers are formally accredited while yet others informally shadow the rates. The real Living Wage has grown from an insurgent campaign into a crucial part of the UK’s civic, social and economic infrastructure.</p><p>The basic intuition behind the Living Wage is a simple one: to determine the wage rate necessary to ensure that households earn enough to reach a minimum acceptable living standard as defined by the public. Translating this idea into practice, however, requires a wide range of assumptions and judgements to be made on issues ranging from the measurement of household costs, the nature of government support available to households and the appropriate use of data. The Resolution Foundation undertakes this analysis and its work is overseen by the independent Living Wage Commission.</p><p>As we do every year we follow our established methodology to calculate the new hourly wage rates. This results in new 2021/2022 Living Wage rates of <strong>£9.90</strong> across the UK and <strong>£11.05</strong> in London. The body of this report sets out the detail of the calculation.</p><p>Let me just highlight three sets of issues that are relevant to this year’s calculation: cost pressures, changes in methodology and wider government policy.</p><p>First, the wider inflation picture is crucial and fast-changing. By way of context in April 2021 — the point at which the prices of the goods and services used in the Minimum Income Standard were collected — overall CPIH inflation stood at 1.6 per cent. This is significantly lower than current inflation (CPIH was 2.9 per cent in September 2021), with most forecasters expecting further rises in the months ahead. Recent increases will feed into the calculation of next year’s rates.</p><p>Looking specifically at the basket of goods and services used in our calculation we see a substantial divergence in cost pressures between London, which rose by just 1.1 per cent, and the rest of the UK, which increased by 2.5 per cent. This difference was mainly driven by rental costs (0.9 per cent in London versus 2.5 per cent across the UK), with the impact of this gap amplified by the fact that housing costs weigh particularly heavily in the calculation of the London rate. We also saw the cost of other important items — such as childcare and travel — grow more slowly in London than in the rest of the UK. Not surprisingly these different pressures result in a significantly larger increase in the UK Living Wage rate than the London one.</p><p>Second, we have seen the continued phasing in of several methodological changes in the calculation. Last year’s report set out a revised approach to how we take account of housing costs and pension contributions. These changes make sure our Living Wage calculation accurately reflects the actual pattern of tenure used by different household types, as well as the now well-established expectation that employees contribute to their workplace pension via auto-enrolment. These revisions create some upward pressure in the rates.</p><p>Lastly, there is the wider question of policy changes. Here it is worth highlighting that last year the LWC determined that it would ignore the ‘temporary’ boost to levels of Universal Credit and working tax credits announced by the government in response to the pandemic on the basis that the government was committed to reversing them. The uplift has indeed turned out to be temporary and has recently been removed, so doesn’t affect this year’s rates. Apart from this there were relatively few shifts in the policy framework that influenced this year’s calculation. Significant changes to Universal Credit announced in the recent autumn Budget will be reflected in next year’s calculation.</p><p>As workers and employers seek to adjust to the continuing challenges posed by Covid and the aftermath of Brexit it is vital that we have clear yardsticks that can help society navigate towards a more equitable and resilient economy. One of these is the real Living Wage. The LWC will ensure it remains a robust and credible fair pay benchmark available to employers, workers, civil society and public authorities.</p><p>Gavin Kelly, Chair, Living Wage Commission</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=18b770fb5d27" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/gk-test-blog/new-real-living-wage-rates-for-2021-2022-18b770fb5d27">Real Living Wage rates for 2021–2022: what’s behind this year’s increase?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/gk-test-blog">Gavin Kelly’s blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[We all pay the price for narrow thinking on social protection]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/gk-test-blog/we-all-pay-the-price-for-narrow-thinking-on-social-protection-d617fc486877?source=rss-34827f40a7a3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d617fc486877</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gavin Kelly]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 29 Aug 2021 20:46:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-08-30T18:14:41.196Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>We all pay the price for narrow thinking on social protection</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/677/1*I81Ar7CcpPY8Ud3YtxNXgQ@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>Whatever else ‘building back better’ was supposed to mean it is now clear it involves returning to exactly the system of social protection that existed before Covid struck.</p><p>When the furlough scheme and the crisis-related increase to Universal Credit disappear next month, assuming that still happens, the UK’s welfare state will slump back to its pre-pandemic normal. The telling facts about the social condition of the country that the Covid-era has highlighted — the pivotal role played by poorly treated key workers, threadbare sick pay, benefit levels for the unemployed stuck at the level they were when Mrs Thatcher left power — have not moved the government to think afresh.</p><p>It is important to understand the calculus that explains this. Treasury concerns about post-crisis fiscal pressures certainly weigh heavily, as does a boosterish view of what an improving labour market alone can achieve. But entrenched scepticism when it comes to measures that would boost the economic security of working-age population also stems from something deeper. It is rooted in a narrow — and flawed — worldview about who gains from higher standards of social protection.</p><p>The benefits of a stronger safety net will, according to this perspective, be overwhelmingly concentrated among a relatively small minority of persistently disadvantaged households, typically disconnected from the world of work, with little wider upside for the rest of society. This is a well-worn line of argument in British political history and there was more than a whiff of it surrounding the Prime Minister’s defence of the impending cut to Universal Credit on the basis that he favoured wages rising due to people’s ‘efforts’ rather than ‘welfare’.</p><p>It’s an argument that <a href="https://twitter.com/TorstenBell/status/1430901292566646786?s=20">implodes</a> on first contact with the reality that the clear majority of those on Universal Credit are either already in employment or claiming benefit precisely because the government has determined that their circumstances dictate that they should not be working.</p><p>But it fails, too, at a deeper level. Attempting to separate out those reliant on ‘benefits’ from the rest of society mis-understands the social dynamics of contemporary Britain. Over recent decades roughly one in five households have typically relied on some sort of working-age means-tested support at any moment in time (and <a href="https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/publications/age-old-or-new-age/">half of all children</a> live in families who receive universal credit or tax credits). But if we step back and consider a longer time horizon we see that <a href="https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10888-017-9362-x.pdf">over half of all households </a>rely on means-tested benefits at some point. This is hardly surprising when we consider, contrary to endless punditry suggesting the opposite, that the UK is <a href="https://gavinkellyblog.com/where-has-income-mobility-been-rising-fastest-britain-179e168189be">characterised by unusually high levels of mobility</a> across much of the income spectrum (excluding the rich who are ever more successful at protecting their relative position). We very clearly aren’t all in the same boat (contra to the arresting new Banksy image) but many more of us than currently realise will end up needing help to stay afloat at some stage. Making today’s poor even poorer — as per the planned cut to Universal Credit — not only hurts them, it also sets back the majority of others who will eventually be cushioned by the safety net too.</p><p>A narrow lens on the purpose of social protection also underpins intransigence on statutory sick pay. The Treasury may believe that sticking with the current broken system — which excludes the nation’s <a href="https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/app/uploads/2020/12/Time-out.pdf">two million lowest earners</a> and offers among the lowest levels of support in the advanced world — represents a win for muscular spending control. Given that the <a href="https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/app/uploads/2020/12/Time-out.pdf">majority of workers</a> can fall back on some sort of occupational sick pay scheme the politics of eroding state support may not feel all that choppy. But this mindset fails to weigh the wider costs of living in a country where the economically insecure are forced to work when ill. We’ve paid a heavy price for this: care homes providing sick pay to their workers <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/conditionsanddiseases/articles/impactofcoronavirusincarehomesinenglandvivaldi/26mayto19june2020">experienced significantly lower levels of Covid infection</a> among residents than those that didn’t. Decent social protection not only supports the ill, it guards the well too.</p><p>A similar logic applies to the treatment of care workers. Many might hope to live in a society where securing the dignity of today’s million plus workforce — most of whom get <a href="https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/app/uploads/2020/04/Care-workers-spotlight.pdf">paid less than the real Living Wage</a> — would itself be a prompt to action. All the more so given the jeopardy they’ve faced: care workers are roughly <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/causesofdeath/bulletins/coronaviruscovid19relateddeathsbyoccupationenglandandwales/deathsregisteredbetween9marchand28december2020">three times</a> more likely to have died of Covid-19 than the rest of us. But given these arguments have conspicuously failed to clinch the case for improved conditions then taking account of the broader knock-on effect on the quality of care for the nation’s elderly and vulnerable surely should. There is, afterall, no route to an improved system of social care that doesn’t involve a better deal for the workforce.</p><p>These different examples should remind us that decent social protection not only helps those who’ve currently fallen into hard times, crucial though that it is; it also provides a solid foundation for everyone else too.</p><p>Chip away at the cement of society for long enough and sooner or later something will give. When it does, it’s not just those relying on the immediate support system who get hurt. Everyone else living in the same building — whether they realise it or not — is vulnerable too.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d617fc486877" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/gk-test-blog/we-all-pay-the-price-for-narrow-thinking-on-social-protection-d617fc486877">We all pay the price for narrow thinking on social protection</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/gk-test-blog">Gavin Kelly’s blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Preparing for a decade of economic change: lessons from the era of White Heat]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/gk-test-blog/preparing-for-a-decade-of-economic-change-lessons-from-the-era-of-white-heat-af3e3580f54a?source=rss-34827f40a7a3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/af3e3580f54a</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gavin Kelly]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 02 Jul 2021 13:25:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-07-02T13:25:40.391Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rfNAFt3rP3hsRASfgnJMbA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Boris Johnson’s administration may well oversee the start of a period of major upheaval for the UK economy — quite possibly the largest since the 1980s. Whether it is post-Brexit trade dislocation, new patterns of production and consumption resulting from the imperative of Net Zero, a long Covid hangover, or the rise of digital technologies there is a long list of sources of <a href="https://economy2030.resolutionfoundation.org/reports/the-uks-decisive-decade/">potential economic disruption</a> facing Britain’s workers. And all this comes on top of the normal wear and tear of getting by in a flexible, open capitalist economy.</p><p>In the bloodless vernacular of economics, these shifts will inevitably see labour being ‘reallocated’. Plenty of workers will find new and better roles in growing sectors — this is by no means a simple tale of gloom. But many will experience periods of insecurity, and costly retraining, before they eventually adapt. Yet others will see both earnings power, and economic status, take a permanent hit. Given that some of this turbulence will flow directly from deliberate policy choices, rather than the playing out of impersonal shifts in technology or consumer preferences, maintaining popular consent will be vital.</p><p>All this poses questions about the UK’s preparedness for the decade ahead. There are plenty of immediate <a href="https://gavinkellyblog.com/the-welfare-state-after-covid-learning-from-our-bismarckian-moment-4c7cbdad5d40">lessons</a> to learn from the Covid-era. But we can look to other periods of history for ideas and insights — positive and negative — about managing economic change. Contemporary discussions often turn to the 1980s as a point of comparison given the profound occupational, sectoral and geographic shifts that took place. However, the mid-1960s presents another, less bitterly contested, case-study of an era when industrial modernisation was placed at the heart of political and economic debate. Aspects of this story — such as Wilson’s invocation of a ‘new Britain’ forged out of the <a href="http://nottspolitics.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Labours-Plan-for-science.pdf">white heat</a> of scientific revolution — still live near the surface of popular memory. Others, though, are overlooked and worth excavating as we prepare for the decade ahead.</p><p>Wilson’s early success is often ascribed to the novel way in which he weaponised public fears about relative stagnation while crafting a patriotic and optimistic narrative about Britain’s dynamic economic future. But the reality was that his embrace of the possibilities of technology and planning channelled (and escalated) well established pre-occupations of the early 1960s. The immediate context was the ‘growth fever’ that had taken over public debate of the early 1960s, with both main parties committing to totemic 4% growth targets. Indeed, before Labour came to office Harold Macmillan had already made a tentative turn towards a planned approach to growth and given it institutional expression through Selwyn Lloyd’s creation of the National Economic Development Council (NEDC). This reflected Whitehall’s growing curiosity about the French experience of indicative planning, rising anxiety about the potential for Soviet ‘planned’ growth to outperform the West’s ‘unplanned Keynesianism’, and a general conviction that the nation’s scientists — who, as CP Snow put it, carried ‘the future in their bones’ — needed to be reoriented from a military to a civil purpose, as well as from the margins to the mainstream of public discourse, if Britain was to avoid an era of decline and decay.</p><p>An overlooked aspect of that era’s debate about industrial modernisation was the conviction that stronger collective income-insurance was vital in order to facilitate the higher levels of worker reallocation demanded by rising automation and shifts in consumer demand. Earnings-related unemployment benefits were advocated in Neddy’s ‘Conditions Favourable to Faster Growth’ in 1963 and nodded to in the subsequent Conservative election manifesto. Labour’s thinking had already moved in this direction. Richard Crossman’s (LSE) Study Group, a social policy brains trust that shaped much of Labour’s post-war thinking on the welfare state, had since the late 1950s advocated a departure from Beveridge’s founding principle of flat rate contributions in return for flat rate benefits, particularly in relation to pensions. Partly this was thought to be an inevitable consequence of the move towards earnings-related contributions which, they argued, was essential to meet rising social security costs. But it also reflected the conviction that far more generous levels of provision were needed for those excluded from occupational pensions if Britain was to avoid becoming <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/bp.2009.27">‘two nations in retirement’</a>. By the early 1960s this post-Beveridgean thinking had spread to Labour’s stance on the working-age welfare state too.</p><p>Wilson came to Downing Street steeped in these issues. He was better versed on the link between ‘manpower’, the welfare state and the UK’s economic performance than any other modern Prime Minister. Before entering Cabinet (aged thirty-one) as President of the Board of Trade, Wilson had twice worked for William Beveridge — at Oxford and then in war-time Whitehall — and rose on the wave of mid-century social empiricism that the great liberal reformer did so much to create. Wilson, though, had a complicated relationship with Beveridge who was known to be a regularly trying and sometimes tormenting boss (he once summoned the young Wilson to return early from his honeymoon in order to resume his research duties). It is perhaps no great surprise that Wilson had turned down the offer of being secretary to what would become the totemic inquiry into <em>Social Insurance and Allied Services.</em> After Beveridge’s death Wilson lauded him as ‘one of the greatest social reformers in our history’ but laced his praise with caustic observation (in the first Beveridge memorial lecture, no less): while his former mentor was ‘probably the greatest administrative genius of this century’ he was ‘almost certainly the worst administrator’. He was, of course, an ‘intellectual giant’ but an ‘intellectual snob’ too. There was history here.</p><p>It was, therefore, for a wide range of reasons — economic and social, personal and philosophical — that the early 1960s saw policy elites from the main political parties converging behind the need for a new wave of earnings-related benefits.</p><p>Early-era Wilson showed great political dexterity in weaving these disparate strands into a compelling electoral and governing pitch. The better-known aspect of this was the call for a ‘shakeout from the country’s boardrooms’ ridding them of the amateurish, elitist and antiquated management that Wilson thought thwarted the meritocratic rise of a new generation of technicians and scientists who would usher in modern approaches and technologies. Britain could no longer be ‘a nation of Gentleman in world of players.’</p><p>What gets far less attention was Wilson’s conviction that modernisation also meant upheaval for the shop-floor. Faster growth relied on the rapid expansion of new industries and the reallocation of skilled labour towards them. The road to higher productivity went through increased worker mobility, as much as modern management. This was a difficult issue that needed to be debated and worked on rather than cloaked. Contrary to the received wisdom that would emerge fifteen years later, the belief was that greater labour market dynamism required more, not less, collective insurance and social support. Beveridge’s subsistence-level flat rate benefits were viewed as a road block to workers, particularly skilled workers, embracing risk.</p><p>‘Industrial change without labour re­deployment is a meaningless concept’, Wilson told Labour Party Conference in Brighton after his second election win in 1966. A central political challenge, therefore, was to ‘ease the transition from job to job which must be made if the country is to achieve the redeployment of manpower which it so urgently needs’ and that meant creating the ‘social conditions’ which made this ‘toler­able’. In short, harnessing the technological advances that so animated Wilson in the mid-1960s required his government to build the ‘social infrastructure required for industrial change’.</p><p>That new social infrastructure included a shift towards earnings related and time-limited unemployment benefit (introduced via the National Insurance Act 1966) as well as earnings-related sick pay and widow’s benefit (the argument being that it would be morally unacceptable for the latter two to lag behind the former). This came alongside a raft of other measures aimed in different ways at supporting labour to adjust and progress: the Statutory Redundancy Pay Act (1966), the delivery of Industrial Training Boards (legislated for at the close of the Conservative years with Labour support), Crosland’s pioneering of the <a href="https://www.hepi.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Scan-158.pdf">polytechnic system</a>, the post-Robbins expansion of universities and, of course, the launch of the Open University.</p><p>Looking back we can see this resulted in a rise in <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn06762/">benefit generosity</a> and an increase in the acquisition of skills and technical training for a new generation of workers. We can’t, however, know whether any of this played a part in the increase in labour mobility between industrial sectors that followed — many factors would have been relevant. We can, though, observe there was a 44% rise in labour reallocation between industrial sectors in the decade following 1968 compared to the one that went before, surpassing all the preceding decades of the 20th century other than the two dominated by World Wars.</p><p>If Wilson’s social security changes were linked to this increased labour market dynamism it would have been despite, not because, of the manner in which they were implemented. The UK’s 20th century experiment in earnings-unemployment insurance was rushed and <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-social-policy/article/abs/strange-case-of-british-earningsrelated-unemployment-benefit/DF1447045789DED43440F859E488E419">badly designed</a> (which also made it easier for it to be dismantled in the Thatcher years). New administrative burdens were placed on claimants and the ‘earnings link’ was highly opaque due to a long lag in the assessment period and a byzantine formula that determined the precise level of benefit. No ordinary worker could possibly have known in advance how much benefit they would receive.</p><p>The agenda of strengthening the social infrastructure in this period has since been obscured by the wider turbulence that surrounded Wilson’s first two administrations and the lure of the language of White Heat. Much of the economic modernisation agenda was, of course, fatally wounded by the sterling crisis and subsequent devaluation as well as the enervating conflict over the government’s incomes policy and <em>In Place of Strife. </em>From the start there were contradictions and blind-spots. The ambitions for major domestic expansion were always going to collide with the external constraint that resulted from the desire to protect that value of sterling. The popular attack on restrictive practices sat uncomfortably with the state-sponsored push for greater industrial concentration. And there was undue confidence in the potency of the ‘plans’ and programmes originating from new and often rivalrous public agencies — Department for Economic Affairs, Mintech, and the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation — to translate into real gains in the productive potential of the economy, not least due to the fact that neo-corporatist creations like the NEDC weren’t underpinned by deeper changes to the UK’s <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4091665">system of economic governance</a>.</p><p>Yet, for all that, there are insights to be gleaned. The early years of the Wilson administration provided an example of a government seeking to take a broad view of how economic and social policy need to work in tandem if they are to help a country adjust to pressures for industrial change. Wilson understood that — at least in the UK context — labour market dynamism tends to be an enabler of increased productivity and pay. He was, though, keenly aware that the promise of ‘economic change’ could be applauded in the conference hall yet fiercely resisted — collectively and individually — when it showed up in worker’s lives. There was an intuitive sense that stronger unemployment insurance could ultimately help workers find more productive employment than would otherwise be the case which in turn help generate gains that may outweigh costs arising from the possibility of slightly longer periods of unemployment (an insight that only entered the <a href="https://economics.mit.edu/files/5685">mainstream economics profession</a> some decades later). Above all, though, he was clear-eyed about the fact that social infrastructures, like their physical counterparts, have to be regularly renewed and periodically reimagined to meet new times.</p><p>We need to apply a similarly wide lens today. If the UK is to successfully navigate the post-Covid, post-Brexit, transition to net zero alongside the rise of the digitalised economy then it will have to cope with new social pressures and strains. Some sectors, occupations and localities will take a hit as others rise. The distribution of the risk of income loss across the workforce may alter, potentially spreading it more evenly across different types of workers. Society will have to find ways of sharing out new costs and burdens.</p><p>The UK today doesn’t measure up well against these challenges. We entered this decade with a threadbare social security system, extremely low levels of income-replacement for those who face a shock, a chronically underfunded training system, patchy employment support, a stunted idea of the potential of direct job creation, and weak and poorly enforced labour standards. Contrary to the entrenched narrative about the accelerating pace of change, the reality is that labour market dynamism, geographic mobility and workforce training are all significantly lower than they were at the turn of the millennium. We don’t resemble a nation poised to rise to the structural challenges of the 2020s.</p><p>None of this is fixed in stone. The success of the system of national wage insurance that the current government recently created reminds us of what is possible when old assumptions are ripped up and minds are focussed. If nothing else, it should help free us of sterile thinking about the sorts of policies that are thought to be compatible with our liberal market economy.</p><p>It is true, of course, that prevailing ideological and institutional assumptions always weigh heavily on the sense of what is viable. But alternative welfare trajectories are always possible, even if they are sometimes hard to envision. It wasn’t long ago that the basic state pension felt destined to wither on the vine, now the only question is whether it will be uprated by the ‘triple lock’ or merely earnings. The need to align economic and social objectives in the face of the shocks and shifts of the 2020s could, and should, act as an impetus for policy innovation.</p><p>‘He who rejects change is the architect of decay’ is one of Wilson’s better remembered lines. There is little doubt that economic change is coming in the 2020s. As for decay, well, that depends in no small part on whether today’s policy architects are up to the task of building a stronger 21st century social infrastructure.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=af3e3580f54a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/gk-test-blog/preparing-for-a-decade-of-economic-change-lessons-from-the-era-of-white-heat-af3e3580f54a">Preparing for a decade of economic change: lessons from the era of White Heat</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/gk-test-blog">Gavin Kelly’s blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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