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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by George Gulliver on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by George Gulliver on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by George Gulliver on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Neoplatonism versus Ancient Scepticism: why sceptical doubt does not work in an age of anxiety.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@georgegulliver/neoplatonism-versus-ancient-scepticism-why-sceptical-doubt-does-not-work-in-an-age-of-anxiety-b781d73ad044?source=rss-84d47f4f3088------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[ancient-greek-philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[metaphysics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mental-health]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[George Gulliver]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 19 Dec 2022 10:16:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-12-19T10:16:30.458Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This essay will critically discuss the ancient sceptical tradition in its argumentative ability to deconstruct the doctrinaire claims that were being put forward at the time by Stoics and Epicureans and the possibility for the sceptic to adequately demonstrate their sceptical view. Firstly, I will introduce the method of Pyrrhonian scepticism through key terms such as equipollence, epoche and ataraxia and how they function within the argument. I will then hold the sceptical method against the doctrinaire method to observe how the two modes of epistemology come into conflict despite seeking the same goal. Subsequently I will analyse the ten modes that come from Aenesidemus by way of the writings of Sextus Empiricus, and analyse whether or not these could be considered dogmatic positions themselves. Finally I will look towards David Hume’s writings on Pyrrhonism in order to observe whether or not Pyrrhonism is psychologically possible, not just possible on the level of thought and will conclude with some personal thoughts on Pyrrhonism versus dogmatism as means to the alleviation of anxiety.</p><p>The central question to the ancient epistemologists is ‘how do I know that the impression I am receiving is true?’ because what follows from this foundational question, to the ancients, lays the groundwork for the achievement of ataraxia, a peaceful state free from disturbance. For the sceptics, this means setting opposing arguments against each other to achieve a sort of equilibrium of argumentative power of two contradictory views. This is called equipollence. An example of equipollence in application can possibly be found in the inconsistency between Einstein’s theory of general relativity and the more recent theory of quantum mechanics (Powell, 2015). Both seem to be equally mathematically consistent but are fundamentally incompatible, thus we have reached a state of equipollence. Now what are we to do? In this state of equipollence, the sceptics recommend that we suspend judgement. In Greek this is understood as epoche. The sceptical tradition, mainly under the Pyrrhonian school, prescribes epoche as a means to reach ataraxia. They understand that endlessly interrogating the truth can be unsatisfying because there is no real way that we can be sure of the truth or falsity of anything inevitably leading to anxieties. So why not renounce the pursuit altogether so that we might be free from the anxiety of a constant pursuit of certainty in knowledge. The purpose of this essay is to consider whether truth plays a part in the generation or alleviation of anxiety. It is for this reason that I will not be considering the Academic sceptical position due to their doctrinaire claim that ‘nothing can be known’, thus succumbing to dogmatism and rejecting the possibility for judgement or the suspension thereof to be productive of ataraxia. In contrast, the Pyrrhonians do not come to any conclusions about the truth or falsity of anything because that would destroy the hope of pursuing scepticism for therapeutic ends. Even holding a negative position that nothing is real threatens the possibility of ataraxia. “The Pyrrhonist determines absolutely nothing, not even this very claim that nothing is determined” (Sextus Empiricus, <em>Against the Professors </em>7.159 -65, in Long and Sedley p460)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/457/0*4C52XipNvH7go9IM.jpg" /><figcaption>Bust of Pyrrho of Elis (360–270 BCE)</figcaption></figure><p>The sceptical method of radical questioning functioned to challenge the dogma laid out by Stoics and Epicureans in the Hellenistic period who claimed that the pursuit of knowledge is the bearer of ataraxia, allowing for a life free of disturbances. Their justification for thinking this was the valid position that possessing certain knowledge allows for the alleviation of anxiety on the basis that one will not be uncertain and thus vulnerable to unexpected happenings. The doctrinaire position holds that anxiety is produced from non-knowledge about the world and it is easy to see why they might think this. If I do not know whether or not the sun will rise the next day, there are some anxiety-inducing consequences to this — mainly that life would be reduced to a cold and faceless dark. So, to know that the sun will rise tomorrow and to be reassured in this certainty by the solar mechanics that necessitate the sunrise, I know that tomorrow will be bright. A modern example of this could be seen in the current state of mainstream media. The nature of media today is such that one must adopt the doctrinaire attitude towards the acquisition of knowledge in order not to be deceived by misinformation and fake news. One might perceive at first impression that there is an equipollence between two conflicting news narratives and seek to look behind the headlines at the sources to continue investigation into the truth of what is being presented. In discovering the truth behind a barrage of misinformation, surely it is the case that anxiety dissipates because you can finally be at peace with certainty. But is this really true? There is no reason why knowledge cannot also be traumatising, especially when considering the general negativity that is circulating in news media. I can assent to the knowledge that what Russia is doing in Ukraine is barbaric and tyrannical, despite Russia maintaining the contrary narrative, but in what way does this allow me to acquire ataraxia? Knowledge of unimaginable suffering does not induce a tranquil state, in fact it does the opposite. As Photius remarks, the seekers of knowledge are “wearing themselves out uselessly and expending themselves in ceaseless torments, are also ignorant of the very fact that they have gained cognition of none of the things of which they think that they have gained cognition”. (<em>Library</em> 169b18–170b3, Long and Sedley, p468).</p><p>The dogmatists held the claim that the soul has three movements: impression, impulse and assent (Plutarch, <em>Against Colotes </em>1122A-F, in Long and Sedley, p450). It is the movement of assent that provides knowledge. While maintaining that impression and impulse are impossible to avoid, the sceptics deny that assent is necessary for proper action in the world. Impression and impulse are sufficient criteria for action and are all that is needed. Plutarch notes Arcesilias’ argument as “the rationale of suspending judgement does not deflect sensation or implant a change in the irrational affections and movements themselves, which disturbs the occurrence of impressions; merely removes our opinions, but makes natural use of all the rest” (Plutarch, <em>Against Colotes</em> 1122A-F, Long and Sedley p450). It is the ‘natural use of all the rest’ that must be called into question because it is how the sceptics make natural use of all the rest that allows us to understand how action can take place. This reduces action to animalistic reaction where one acts on impulsion rather than with a careful evaluation of the phenomena in front of you which ends with an assent to the piece of knowledge that is in front of you. (Long and Sedley, p456). It might be argued that animals do not have the capacity for anxiety because they are unable to assent to sense data in front of them. They do not have the capacity for self-consciousness and therefore cannot weigh up impressions based on the consciousness of subjectivity. For example, an animal doesn’t ponder the nature of the stars, whether or not they are giant burning balls of gas millions of miles away or if they are sparkling diamonds embedded in a black ether because the nature of the universe is not the concern of the animal as a non-rational being, thus they do not worry about it. There may be negative consequences to this in the modern world because acting on impulse and never assenting or analysing to the truth of a sense impression is a sure way to be manipulated. Falling back on animal urges, considering the tribal inclinations of humans to distrust the unfamiliar, could make one averse to things that are not necessarily dangerous, like going to the dentist for example. No one goes to the dentist because impulse drives them to. It takes careful evaluation and an acceptance that whilst the thought produces an anxious impulse, the knowledge that it is preventative of pain in the future surely allows for a delayed state of ataraxia.</p><p>The ten modes, from Aenesidemus that come to us in the writings of Sextus Empiricus, present a schemata in which views are set against each other and consequently bring about <em>epoche</em>. The ten modes of sceptical deconstruction follow the general structure: 1) x appears F in situation S (in relation R). 2) x appears F* in situation S* (in relation R*). 3) we cannot prefer S to S* or vice versa. 4) we can neither affirm nor deny that x is really F or F* (Annas and Barnes, p20). For example, if Tom is cold when he goes outside, but Mary is warm when she goes outside, we cannot prefer Tom’s experience to Mary’s or vice versa, therefore we cannot affirm or deny whether or not it is cold or warm outside. The modes seek out to disarm the arguments put forward by the dogmatists by showing them that the nature of being a subjective being just does not allow us to be objective in our statements on the world. The finest example of the way the modes champion relativity can be found in the third mode: “the same object may affect different senses differently (honey seems pleasant to the taste but not to the eyes). An object possibly has qualities that cannot affect our senses; therefore the nature of the object is not evident to us, and epoche as to external objects follows.” (Woodruff, p214). Due to the incompleteness and contradictions among the senses, we cannot make any conclusive judgements about the nature of anything that affects them. In short, assent would mean committing to the truth of only one sense and exclude others. In the case of honey explored above, no judgement can be made on the nature of it because it affects all the senses differently. The Pyrrhonists are questioning on what grounds we can make any substantive claims about something based on one narrow perception of a multiplicity of possible sense interpretations. How are we to privilege one over another and how do we know which sense holds the key to the true nature of the thing being observed? There is no hierarchy of the ability of the sense to ‘know’ what it is they are perceiving, and this is aptly recognised in the ten Pyrrhonian modes.</p><p>There is valid debate surrounding whether or not these ten modes could be considered dogmatic beliefs. Paul Woodruff distinguishes between ephectic and aporetic Pyrrhonism to draw distinctions between engaging in equipollence for therapeutic means (ephectic) or so that we can continue the investigation (aporetic) (Woodruff, p213). It might be useful to identify the aporetic form of scepticism with the tradition started by Socrates with his constant seeking and refuting of the arguments of his interlocuters. The aporetic type of scepticism struggles in achieving ataraxia because it wields the modes merely as instruments to refute whatever knowledge claim is being made so that the sceptic must keep on seeking, never really arriving at a place of rest or satisfaction with knowledge. “As a result, they may not experience the calm that descends on the mind of the therapeutic sceptic” (Woodruff, p213). On the other hand, the ephectic Pyrrhonists do not much care for endless interrogation of truth or falsity because they are relative concepts to them and are thus unworthy of pursuit. So, one might argue that aporetic Pyrrhonists wield the modes as dogmatic instruments of refutation in the sense that they categorically demonstrate that the dogmatists are wrong in their beliefs, thus themselves falling back on dogmatism. Whereas maintaining an ephectic approach towards the modes shows them more to be demonstrative in that they do not hold any view on the rightness or wrongness of the dogmatic view but seek to demonstrate how an alternative can be the case. This functions in turning the dogmatic view from one of objectivity to one of relativity based on disparate receptions of sense data in the myriad senses.</p><p>Philosophers such as David Hume have pointed out that as a demonstration of th0ught, the Pyrrhonian position appeals to a sort of common sense in their quasi-Buddhist method of renouncing desire for knowledge as a means to achieve therapeutic ataraxia. However, he also questions whether it is psychologically possible for constant practice in the world by arguing that “a Pyrrhonian cannot expect that his philosophy will have any constant influence on the mind” (Hume, p168). Hume’s criticism comes from a distrust in the ability of the Pyrrhonian sceptic to live a life immersed in a constant sceptical mindset. It must be admitted that it is hard to see how a Pyrrhonian sceptic could live a life without constantly questioning whether or not the ground will open up beneath him to swallow him. It does seem that “nature is always too strong for principle” (Hume, p168) if we hold in our mind the idea that humans are naturally rational animals. If we do concede that humans can be naturally distinguished from the animals, as I have above, in our ability to rationally assent to impressions instead of merely acting on impulse, then it follows that it is our natural destiny to live as a dogmatist. The anxiety that is produced from the ‘how do I know?’ of human thought is a product of the basic human experience according to Hume. Sceptical doubt is a product of the inconsistency in the human senses and the rational seat of consciousness, of which according to Hume, “that we assent to our faculties and employ our reason only because we cannot help it” (Hume p194). So, it seems that Hume believes assent is natural due to some unconscious movement of reason, he is almost conflating impulse with assent; reducing them to the same thing.</p><p>It now appears that the Pyrrhonian cannot maintain that they stop just short of impulse. Instead, impressions stamp themselves unconsciously on the mind giving rise to impulse in a quick reaction and assent as merely an impulse that has been deliberated consciously rather than in the unconscious mind. In terms of ataraxia, it now seems somewhat unreachable — it now seems relegated to a central part of the human experience that one cannot function without. This should hardly come as a surprise, however. Ataraxia exists merely as a negation of anxiety, without the necessity of the latter there would be no reason for the former to be the goal of every ancient philosopher and many philosophers after them all the way up to today. It is for this reason that both dogmatists and sceptics hold ataraxia as the highest goal — the fact that they make this their highest goal means they are doomed never to reach it. If anything is to be learnt about anxiety from the ancients, it is that setting your sights solely on the achievement of ataraxia achieves the contrary as a second order anxiety arises from the first order anxiety. This is anxiety felt by the demand to be free from anxiety.</p><p>To conclude, it seems from my investigation into Pyrrhonian scepticism that it is viable as a method of deconstruction of dogmatic positions in order to expose the fundamental human condition as one of relativity and subjectivity. Hume shows us that whilst in thought the Pyrrhonist position of suspending judgement might be ideal, considering we don’t really know much about the nature of the world even to this day, it is not a sustainable mode of actual life. Life requires assent at some level, whether that be at the preconscious level of impulse or conscious assent to an impression. Anxiety is necessary to the human experience, an unavoidable fact of life. Therefore, it would not make sense to suppose that we can escape anxiety merely by setting two arguments against one another.</p><p><strong>Bibliography</strong></p><p>Annas, J. and Barnes, J. (1985). <em>The Modes of Scepticism: Ancient Texts and Modern Interpretations</em>. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p20.</p><p>Hume, D. (1955). <em>An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding</em>. New York: Liberal Arts Press. p168.</p><p>Long, A.A. and Sedley, D.N. (1987). <em>The Hellenistic Philosophers</em>. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 450–487.</p><p>Powell, C. (2015). <em>Relativity versus quantum mechanics: the battle for the universe.</em> Available: <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/nov/04/relativity-quantum-mechanics-universephysicists#:~:text=In%20general%20relativity%2C%20events%20are,probabilistic%20rather%20than%20definite%20outcomes.">https://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/nov/04/relativity-quantum-mechanics-universephysicists#:~:text=In%20general%20relativity%2C%20events%20are,probabilistic%20rather%20than%20definite%20outcomes.</a> Last accessed 12 May 2022.</p><p>Woodruff, P. (2010). The Pyrrhonian Modes. In: Bett, R <em>The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism</em>. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p208–230.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b781d73ad044" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How Confucians and Daoists each understand what it means to be virtuous.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@georgegulliver/how-confucians-and-daoists-each-understand-what-it-means-to-be-virtuous-6ec9edc84c0f?source=rss-84d47f4f3088------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6ec9edc84c0f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[metaphysics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[George Gulliver]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 16 Dec 2022 15:37:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-12-16T15:37:31.586Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The concept of de in classical Chinese philosophy translates most simply into English as ‘virtue’ or ‘moral power’. The concept of de also seeks to serve the highest good in Chinese philosophy, which is to preserve harmony within society, if every citizen was to embody the concept of de then society as a result will be harmonious. This essay will explore how the two main philosophical schools of thought in ancient China, Daoism and Confucianism, understand the concept of de through an observation and critique of the theoretical backgrounds of each school. Both Daoism and Confucianism approach virtue from radically different positions and in this essay I hope to show their differences and where they may fall short of a coherent attainable concept of de.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/550/0*LXnLQH67pZ3BdpPH.jpg" /><figcaption>Statue of Lao Zi carved from rock.</figcaption></figure><p>The Confucian understanding of what it means to be virtuous follows a socially relative, duty-based account. Under Confucianism, people are expected to ‘fill their role’ in society, acting in society according to their social status. For example, it would be immoral to hand your father into the police even if he committed a heinous crime, this is because your duty in society as a son is to act honourably towards your elders and adhere to strict codes of filial piety. A more contemporary example of how this weighs on modern Chinese culture is in ‘no smoking’ signs. They act only to deter those who cannot afford the penalty fine for smoking and those who can afford to pay the fine will completely disregard the rules, because they do not apply to them (Harbsmeier, p.517). Your ethical duty to society is directly tied to your position within it, this is what produces harmony in the Confucian society. The family unit is the basis for society and the example of familial relations is extended outwards to represent societal relations. This is way society takes virtue on a relational basis because it draws its inspiration from the family unit. If everyone in society acts appropriately towards the other members of society, the society will work perfectly. This is a completely idealised version of how a society should function, here I would critique the Confucian society because it is not the case that relations between members in society should be similar to those relations between members of a family. Society is a lot more complex than a family is due to the many more dimensions of relations between people, it seems to me that the Confucian has oversimplified the nature of societal relations.</p><p>The ideal of the moral individual is the goal of becoming jun zi (a virtuous nobleman). The unique element of jun zi in Confucian philosophy as opposed to paradigmatic Chinese thought is that this ideal is open to anyone who is willing to work for it, not just those who are lucky enough to be born noble. The Confucian path to jun zi is through careful moral cultivation, through education and by following strict codes of highly ritualistic and ceremonial behaviour. There is an emphasis on ritualistic behaviour because ritual embodies the tradition of civilisation, and the tradition of civility is valued to highly because only the highest virtues can stand the test of time. The focus on ritual practice of virtuous behaviour holds similarities with Aristotelian virtue ethics (Xinzhong, p.6) in the sense that observing the traditions of virtuous action and putting them in constant practice in daily life is the path the individual must take in order to become virtuous, of jun zi. It should be noted here that while at the level of interaction with virtue Confucianism and Aristotelianism are similar, however their end goals are different. In Aristotelian virtue ethics the goal is to become an individual of virtuous character which holds innate value whereas the goal in Confucianism is for the state to be in harmony through the individual, therefore virtue becomes instrumentally valuable. Further justification for ritualistic behaviour is found in the normalisation of social rules so that the individual is conditioned into acting according to societal norms. This is assumed on the basis that if ritualistic behaviour is normalised for the whole population, then people will be uninclined to step outside of the norm and break the rules. This avoidance of coercive control over the individual by the state reflects the Confucian principle that if you rule by punishment then criminals will seek solely to evade that punishment and will have no shame in doing so, whereas if you promote highly refined ritualistic behaviour then the individual will feel a sense of shame by transgressing moral and legal boundaries (Ivanhoe &amp; Van Norden, p.5). This could be seen from a Freudian perspective as an attempt from the state to cultivate a powerful super-ego within the individual that acts as an internal form of state policing where one automatically knows which rules not to break instead of an external form of policing that uses coercion to rule. This Freudian analysis could also extend into why the ideal leader in the Confucian tradition leads by virtuous example and embodies the concept of de. As the authoritarian figure, the paternal figure, within the state-family the leader is responsible for laying out the code of virtue by embodying it himself thus functioning as the patriarch in any family, enforcing rules and finding his own authoritarian ideals manifested within the super-ego of the citizens of the state. The idea that the moral character of the ruler is of highest importance is reinforced by the Chinese culture of filial piety that authoritarian figures must be obeyed.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*f1TstxFk3ADfaoI3.jpg" /><figcaption>Statue of Confucius</figcaption></figure><p>The Daoist puts forward a radically different perspective than the Confucian in the metaphysical basis for how harmony can be achieved through the concept of de. Under Daoism, harmony can only be achieved through living in accordance with the natural ‘way’ of the world, or dao. The dao is understood as the “root of all heaven and earth” (Ivanhoe &amp; Van Norden, p.163) and the ground from which all being springs forth into Being and which all being is contained within. The dao is fundamentally eternal, simultaneously everywhere and nowhere, simultaneously empty yet never filled. The dao should not be thought of as a ‘being amongst beings’ but as the all-encompassing substrate that brought into being all things contained within heaven and earth. Because of its all-encompassing nature, the dao is fundamentally unknowable. Humanity cannot gain any knowledge about the dao because the human reality is fundamentally subjective and contingent whereas the dao represents all things fundamentally objective and necessary, there is no way that we can bridge this gap. Any attempt at drawing comparisons between ancient Eastern philosophy and Western philosophy is doomed to be clumsy, however the interpretation most closely fitting is the distinction between the Kantian sense of noumena and phenomena. Because the dao is all-encompassing, it does not concern itself with human morality. What this means in terms of finding a Daoist ethic is that here one will not find a dogmatic or doctrinal system to go by. The only dogma within Daoism is to live according to nature, which is indifferent and amoral. There is no notion of a benevolent God that watches over and takes care of humanity in a filial way, God is not there to set forth a doctrine of ethics either.</p><p>The basis for the Daoist justification that education cannot lead one closer to the virtuous ideal can be found at this point. Daoists see education as an imposition of subjective human values onto the unknowable and eternal dao. Any attempt to understand and comprehend the dao is futile because the human mind is limited in its finitude, if one does try and comprehend the dao they will only ever reach a misunderstanding of the way it operates. This futility of trying to comprehend leads the Daoist to the concept of wu wei, or non-doing. Wu wei embodies the principle of living according to nature because nature is inactive and just effortlessly sets forth the motions of being, it is in this way that the Daoist believes that we as humans should also conduct ourselves in order to reach the virtuous ideal of de. Directly related to the Daoist view of reality as process ontology, instead of seeing the world as a system of objects going through changes and interactions as time passes like we understand reality in the West, the Daoist sees reality as a complex process of constant boundaryless exchange between objects. Take a tree for example, what is a tree? In the western tradition a tree is an object that springs from the ground and has composite parts; leaves, branches, trunk, roots. The Daoist would see this as subjective reality superimposed onto the object of a tree and instead would deny that ‘trees’ as we understand them exist at all. The constant exchange between the roots and the soil, the leaves and the air/light and bark and water/air creates an unbreakable fusion between objects and reality, all things are connected and respond to each other. The effortless exchange is embodied in the concept of wu wei.</p><p>Problems arise in the Daoist understanding of virtue when you consider the systems of power and control within ancient Chinese society. The concept of wu wei is easy enough to embody as a superficial mindset, but when trying to implement it in daily life it could be problematic. For example, if you are a peasant farmer working for your feudal lord then embodying an aura of non-action could lead to your starvation or being executed by your feudal lord for not being productive enough in farming grain. People in the lower castes of society cannot afford to be inactive, unlike those that live in palaces. The anti-education sentiment of the Daoists also presents itself as a barrier to any sort of social mobility. If you are unlucky enough to be born poor then you have no hope of becoming the jun zi because this status is only reserved for the born-noble, the unfathomable dao allocates all their appropriate place in the world so there is no room for transcending your caste because it is an innate fact of being that you are to be poor. It is here that Confucianism presents itself as a more humanist and ‘enlightened’ way of thinking (by the West’s standards), because of the possibility that anyone can become jun zi, not just those born into aristocracy.</p><p>Through a close analysis of the most prominent schools of thought in the East in the ancient times, I hope to have shown how Daoists and Confucians attempt to reach the concept of de and become jun zi and how they are different from each other in their pursuit of the virtuous ideal. The Confucian account presents a version of virtue that is more easily accessible to the general populace and does not enforce draconian power systems however the style of government is authoritarian in the way that ritualistic practice is enforced to psychologically control the people.</p><p>Bibliography</p><p>Harbsmeier, C. (2015). On the Nature of Early Confucian Classical Chinese Discourse on Ethical Norms. <em>J Value Inquiry</em>. 49 (1), p517–541.</p><p>Ivanhoe, P. and Van Norden, B (2001). <em>Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy</em>. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. p1–203.</p><p>Xinzhong, Y. (2021). De and Virtue in Early Confucian Texts: Introduction. <em>Journal of Chinese Philosophy</em>. 48 (1), p5–12.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6ec9edc84c0f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Is there a conceptual development from realism to idealism in early Buddhist thought?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@georgegulliver/is-there-a-conceptual-development-from-realism-to-idealism-in-early-buddhist-thought-1d634e543251?source=rss-84d47f4f3088------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1d634e543251</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[india]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[buddhism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[George Gulliver]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 12 Dec 2022 15:42:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-12-12T15:42:02.902Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This essay will outline the movement from Abhidharma to Sautrantika to Yogacara through a close analysis of how they construct their respective ontology of experience. In the concluding paragraph I will seek to show the conceptual development as a dialectic set in motion by a certain tension between the Buddha’s doctrine of impermanence and our experience of a world embedded in time.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*MDz8wAFMTL8X6AyY.jpg" /></figure><p>The Abhidharmist school of Buddhism can accurately be described as a form of realism simply because they believe that objects exist independently of human perception and are also directly perceptible to the human mind. The Vaibhasika arrival at a realist phenomenology was the result of their quest to discern a fundamental level of being for a foundation on which to build a metaphysic. They made an ontological distinction between a foundational world that is home to the dharmas, and the world we live in which is an insubstantial and contingent dimension that consists of aggregations of the dharmas. For them, dharmas are basic units of the cosmos that are uncaused, they are mental or physical. Dharmas possess svabhava, an essential characteristic to a particular dharma to distinguish it from others. This is very similar to the Platonic theory of the forms in the way that both schools distinguish between a world containing the essential elements of the universe and our world that is an insubstantial reflection of the basic primary world. The aggregates belonging to our world are not as ontologically ‘real’ as the basic units in the dharma ‘homeland’, which possess svabhava. However, the essential connection between Abhidharma and philosophical realism is their belief that components of the external world are directly accessible through our perceptive consciousnesses. Only dharmas possess svabhava, not aggregates, which is why our world is subject to change and decay. However, the dharmas are the building blocks of the universe and are permanent through time. This would contradict the Buddha’s original and foundational teaching that all things are impermanent, even svabhavas. This contradiction would catalyse the development from realism to idealism in early Buddhism as subsequent schools seek to reconcile this divergence from the original teachings. It is possible that they posited an unchanging primary world in order to anchor moral convictions; it is hard to see how anyone could argue for or maintain a working moral framework in an insubstantial world. Furthermore, Abhidharmists posited a foundational reality to explain how karma can be accumulated through time, something impossible in a wholly insubstantial universe. If karma could not accumulate, one could not reap the karmic consequences of their actions. Abhidharma Buddhists argued that when the Buddha said nothing was impermanent, he was speaking of this world of composites where nothing can remain an aggregate across time, they are all eventually broken up and return to this dharma ‘homeland’ of basic reality. Even so, this attempt at justifying a metaphysical foundation for morality still belies one of the Buddha’s most foundational teachings, that <em>all </em>things are impermanent. This could also be described as a form of Buddhist moral realism in the sense that they believe in the concrete existence of moral dharmas in the dharma homeland. Founder of the Madhyamaka school of Mahayana, Nagarjuna critiqued the Abhidharma school because he argued that essence is tied to origination, something that does not exist in Buddhism due to the cyclical aspect of time. Nagarjuna also makes this critique to argue that the Abhidharma conferral of svabhava onto the basic elements of the universe unnecessarily assigns stable identity to dharmas. To Nagarjuna, the Abhidharmists have committed a two-fold sin; creating a theory that contradicts central Buddhist tenets that time is infinite without a beginning middle or an end and the belief that things are able to persist through time. Nothing lasts long enough to gain an identity, Nagarjuna argues that reality is just one big amorphous cosmic flux and any attempt to confer identity or selfhood is a meaningless abstraction.</p><p>To restate what I mentioned earlier, one pole driving the conceptual development was the rejection of the Abhidharma notion of a permanent foundational reality, declaring it contradictory to the Buddha’s original teachings on impermanence. The school proceeding from the dissatisfaction was the Sautrantika school who saw Abhidharma as going beyond the sutras, they see themselves as returning to them. They held the belief that there are things that exist external to the mind whose existence can be inferred through the occurrence of a continuous flux of mental representations. Reality is constructed from the rapid expenditure of dharmas or the doctrine that origination is destruction. No sooner do things come into existence than cease to exist, time is a continuum of flashes of energy. The Sautrantika monks return to the central Buddhist idea of process ontology, abandoning the substance ontology of the Abhidharma and the notion of svabhava. This philosophy is representationalist in its phenomenological character because it is not the flashes of energy that we perceive but the way those flashes form impressions upon our minds. It is these impressions that indirectly and remotely construct reality as we know it. The contents of experience are concentrations of energies that are experienced by the mind using cognitive apparatus. They can only infer the reality of an outside world because experience seems to be ordered and displaying consistency. Dignaga, a key theorist in the Sautrantika school, argues that external reality is akin to a mass of amorphous raw data that is interpreted by our mind to form images and concepts. Concepts, such as colour or height, do not exist externally but are insubstantial abstractions made by the perceiving mind. Vasubandhu goes further in his critique of Abhidharma realism by declaring that it is impossible for dharmas to combine to form aggregations because they simply do not exist long enough to form anything substantial. Here we can see that there is now little motivation to believe in an external world anymore, it may not even be possible if everything is completely instantaneous, and aggregates are unable to form. This sheds light on the tension between the theoretical return to radical impermanence and the illusion of time and extension. The notion that origination is destruction does not adequately explain why we experience the slow passing of time. If they can shift the object of experience from the outside world to a source within the mind, then external reality can be discarded as a necessary component of phenomena. The leap from representationalism to idealism is not that large a leap.</p><p>The Yogacara philosophers, in particular Vasubandhu (Anacker, 2002), constructed a metaphysic of mind that does not rely on a synthesis between the inner and outer world in order to produce experience. The Yogacarins believe that the mind is the only thing that is necessary, rejecting the Sautrantika and Abhidharma argument that an external world exists. They performed an ancient sort of Occam’s razor by seeking to posit the least unnecessary entities to make their phenomenological argument function, they find no concrete reason to posit an externality to experience. Yogacarins abide by the doctrine of citta matra — meaning ‘mind-only’, in this way they can only be ontologically understood as idealists (Bartley, 2015). Yogacara monks meditated so deeply that they managed to dissolve the flimsy barrier between internal and external realities, concluding that the form and content of experience originate solely in the mind. The mind is divided into eight spheres of consciousness, the first five consciousnesses describe the conventional five senses that we often recognise: those five senses being sight, smell, sound, touch, and taste. The sixth consciousness is a mental consciousness which can be understood as perception or thought, interpreting the raw data supplied by the first five spheres o through ideation and conceptualisation. The seventh sphere is where all preceding spheres converge to produce the illusory consciousness of being a persistent self. The eighth sphere, however, is the locus of understanding Yogacara as a school of ontological idealism. This sphere contains the storehouse-consciousness, or alaya vijnana, and is the originator of phenomenological experience (Gold, 2021). The contents of reality consist of the reviving of previous experiences within a particular stream of consciousness. One might think that it would be impossible to just constantly recycle experiences because we would encounter an infinite regress, seeking out a first originator or prime mover that defines our Western Aristotelian culture of thought. This would be to forget that this process ontology wielded by the ancients of the East affords time no beginning or end but sees it as cyclical. The unending cycle of samsara creates a vast surplus of experiences that the mind employs to produce reality. The illusory and corrupted egoistic mentality has four major defects: the belief that there is an enduring and permanent self (atma-drishti), delusions about oneself (atma-moha), exaggerated sense of self-importance (atma-mano) and self-love (atma-sneha) (Bartley, 2015). These four mentalities converge upon one another, forming a subjective ‘worldview’. This subjective perspective alongside the constant experience production of the storehouse-consciousness allows for one to feel the dichotomy between subjecthood and object. Because of this fundamental nature of the mind to constantly produce experiences, they produce representations of objects of which the unenlightened perceive to exist independently of consciousness when in fact this is an illusion. In his critique of the notion of an external world, Vasubandhu declared that rupa dharmas (physical dharmas) that make up the external world do not exist, only citta dharmas (mental dharmas) that produce the phenomenon of experience exist (Bartley, 2015). It is evident here how the Yogacara idealists believe that we are all alone with our thoughts.</p><p>I have described the development from realism to idealism in early Buddhist thought, but what are we to actually make of this change? I understand this conceptual development as a dialectic progression into the revelation of the mind’s nature to itself. Fundamentally a unification between internal and external world through an investigation into the origins of the production of reality. The extended periods of meditation that monks endured is bound to reveal complex interpretative developments that reveal the mind’s nature to itself. The phenomenological thread I am weaving is of profoundly Hegelian character. If one abandons the scriptural importance of the sutras and the religious aspect of Buddhism to focus purely on the development of perception, then the dialectic is clear. It would be unfaithful to these ancient philosophers to suggest that their theories pivot around Hegel’s phenomenology of mind, however it is still a useful structural tool that we might use to understand purely the development of the concept of mind as it is understood by Buddhists — it is unhelpful in grasping the full image. What seems to be driving this dialectic is an internal tension between the incompatibility between our experience of an external world and the Buddha’s doctrine of impermanence. In both instances of development, realism to representationalism and on to idealism, this tension emerges.</p><p>Ultimately, there is a very obvious development from realism to idealism in early Buddhist thought. It would be hard to argue that there is not, simply because the movement from the Abhidharma notion of enduring svabhava to the rapid momentariness of phenomena for the Sautrantika to the outright denial of physical matter by the Yogacarins. To deny that the early Buddhist philosophers expressed a development in understanding the nature of the mind would be discredit to the intensive investigation into phenomena through long periods of meditation.</p><p>Bibliography</p><p>Anacker, S. (2002). <em>Seven Works of Vasubandhu</em>. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. p181–189</p><p>Bartley. C (2015). <em>An Introduction to Indian Philosophy</em>. 2nd ed. London: Bloomsbury Publishing. p42–112.</p><p>Dan Lusthaus (2002). <em>Buddhist Phenomenology</em>. Oxon: Routledge. p1–91.</p><p>Gold, Jonathan C., “Vasubandhu”, <em>The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy </em>(Spring 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = &lt;https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/vasubandhu/&gt;.</p><p>Ronkin, Noa, “Abhidharma”, <em>The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy </em>(Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = &lt;https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/abhidharma/&gt;.</p><p>Sanderson, A. (1994). Sarvastivada and its Critics. In: Dhammakaya Foundation <em>Buddhism into the Year 2000</em>. Thailand: Dhammakaya Foundation. p32–48</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1d634e543251" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What does the ‘examined life’ mean to Aristotle and Plato.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@georgegulliver/what-does-the-examined-life-mean-to-aristotle-and-plato-41183f35dfcf?source=rss-84d47f4f3088------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/41183f35dfcf</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ancient-greek-philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[self-improvement]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[George Gulliver]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 09 Dec 2022 16:26:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-12-09T16:26:54.137Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When Socrates famously declared that ‘the unexamined life is not worth living’ shortly before being executed by the state, he was expressing that which he would happily die for, the life of philosophical exploration. With ancient Greek philosophy establishing the structure which we use to understand our world, Socrates’ statement about the importance of philosophical enquiry deserves the gravitas with which it is endowed. This essay will explore the importance that Plato and Aristotle place on living an examined life and their metaphysical justifications for doing so and the relation between these two philosophers in order to build a more coherent picture of the importance of the examined life.</p><p>Plato’s emphasis on living an examined life can most likely be drawn from him witnessing his teacher, Socrates, being executed by the state for ‘corrupting the youth’. Plato emphasises the importance of the contemplative life because it was what Socrates had died for, but this is only the emotional answer, Plato must also provide metaphysical justification for why the examined life is the only life worth living. Plato’s metaphysical justification that prioritises the examined life over any other life can be observed through his allegory of the cave. In short summary, Plato imagines that we are all prisoners in a cave unable to move, a fire roars behind us and objects are shown in front of the fire with their shadows reflected on the cave wall in front of our eyes. Plato argues that these shadows are what the everyman sees when he sees the world around him, unable to see things for how they truly are. He then goes on to argue that the person who wishes to live the ‘examined life’, the philosopher, is the one to break from captivity and climb out of the cave to see the world for how it really is, seeing the true forms of the objects that he had seen shadows of for his whole life. The escape from the cave is supposed to symbolise the philosopher’s journey to knowing the true nature of reality through the examined life. This can be done by contemplating the essential properties that make something what it is. The essential properties, or Forms, are eternal, divine and unchanging and can be identified through contemplation and through philosophy. The ultimate Form is the Form of the Good which allows all of the other forms to be known, with the pursuit of philosophy centring around the pursuit for knowledge of the Form of the Good. Plato illustrates the Form of the Good as the sun in his allegory, illuminating all objects in their true form under the sun’s light. Plato highlights the importance of living an examined life of philosophical enquiry by associating it with knowledge of eternal and transcendent truths.</p><p>Unlike Plato, who looked towards the world to find the answers he was seeking, Aristotle looked within at what it means to be a human and what our place is in this world. The examined life, for Aristotle, was to fulfil our purpose, or telos, as humans. Everything in the world has a telos and it is the goal of each thing to fulfil their telos so that they can achieve their purpose as a being in this world. What separates man from the various animals and objects is his capacity for rational thought, it is for this reason that Aristotle places an emphasis on the examined life because he understands that our telos must be to reason considering that is what makes us human. In order to fulfil our human purpose, it is important that we use our reason because it is by thinking and reflecting that we can become fully human. Aristotle states that “the good of man is the active exercise of his soul’s faculties in conformity with excellence or virtue” — when he speaks of the ‘active exercise of his soul’s faculties’, he is describing the active exercise of our reason ‘in conformity with excellence’. In this quote, Aristotle explains how we can become ‘good’ by utilising our rational capacities, within us, in alignment with what is virtuous and good in the outside world. For Aristotle, the contemplative life amounts to living in harmony with yourself and the world around you and is the superior life for humanity. He believes that the life of contemplation will “constitute perfect happiness” and that the career most suited to this way of life is the life of the philosopher because “by himself he can contemplate truth, and the better the wiser he is; he can perhaps do so better if he has fellow-workers, but still he is most self-sufficient.”. Here, Aristotle argues that the examined life of contemplation is the most self-sufficient life to lead because it is in accordance with man’s true nature and with the nature of the universe as a whole.</p><p>Where the two thinkers intersect, despite their differing ways of reaching the same conclusion, is where they both value the examined life of contemplation above all else. However, if philosophers believe that philosophers are living the superior life then we should be sceptical of why they think so because all farmers believe in the importance of farming above all else, as is the same with most professions. Plato and Aristotle both justify their claims about the examined life on divine and eternal grounds. Both appealing to some sort of higher and unseen order, for Plato this is ‘the One’ and for Aristotle it is ‘the Unmoved Mover’, which is reflected in the immortality and indivisibility of our intellect and soul. The divinity of the intellect is essential in justifying the examined life because it is only through this divine nature that we can come to know the divine nature of the world in front of us. Predating Christianity, both philosophers highlight contemplation of the eternal as essential to coming closer with the unknown nature of the world which we can see centuries later reflected in Christians emphasising contemplation of God (worship) as essential to becoming one with God in heaven. The examined life, according to these ancient thinkers, is as essential to living well as prayer and worship is to Christians seeking eternal oneness with God.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=41183f35dfcf" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Exactly how much does aesthetic theory matter to the history of Art?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@georgegulliver/exactly-how-much-does-aesthetic-theory-matter-to-the-history-of-art-d331f262e361?source=rss-84d47f4f3088------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d331f262e361</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[contemporary-art]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[aesthetics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[art]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[modern-art]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[George Gulliver]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 05 Dec 2022 17:44:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-12-05T18:16:07.608Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*BDs_2_rV7MiIQp3-" /><figcaption>Warhol, A. Brillo Boxes, 1964.</figcaption></figure><p>Arthur Danto announced the death of art history to cope with what he perceived as the complete dissolution of the boundary between art and reality. The 20th Century saw the introduction of ready-mades into the art scene, most famously with Duchamp’s <em>Fountain </em>in 1917, and culminated in the sixties with Andy Warhol’s <em>Brillo Boxes</em>, wooden copies of soapboxes that were being sold commercially at the time. A problem had been presented to philosophers; why does an object change when it is placed into an art gallery context? This essay will seek to explore the implications of this monumental artworld event firstly through an exploration of how art can be elevated from its ontological status as a brute object through theory. I will then argue for the view that what allows an object to be called ‘art’ is not an essential property common to all works of art but instead the object’s place in the context of art history that situates an object within the realm of art. Finally, I will go further to briefly assess the state of art at the end of art history and what this means for art moving forward.</p><p>When Warhol presented the public with his <em>Brillo Boxes</em>, we were shown how something as simple as a box of soap pads could be elevated from its ontological status as a brute object to a new and far more valuable status as an art-object. In the titular passage, Danto argues that it is the institution of art, or artworld, that “takes [the object] up into the work of art” (Danto, 1964, p581). In other words, what makes an object an artwork is the status as ‘art’ that has been conferred upon it by the acting representatives for ‘the artworld’ (Dickie, 1974, p34). The artworld is commonly understood to consist of anyone that produces, commissions, presents, preserves, promotes, criticises, buys, or sells art, this list extends to everyone who has any interest in art. What Danto does here is avoid any essentialist views of what makes an object ‘art’, there is no obscure property that is shared by all objects claiming to be ‘art’. For example, the Socratic ‘imitation theory’ is the idea that works of art aim at imitating or ‘holding a mirror up to’ nature in some way, are relevant for ancient artworks, but are non-sensical when you consider a work like <em>New York City I</em> by Mondrian. Despite not imitating New York City itself, there is no doubt that the painting is art and there is no doubt because the artworld has conferred this identity of being ‘art’ (Dickie, 1974, p34) onto the object based on a certain theory of art, namely abstract art.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/818/0*gAGm5daJZtby-Zdq.jpg" /><figcaption>New York City I, 1942. Mondrian, P.</figcaption></figure><p>What this indicates is that there is nothing immediately obvious about an object that would allow someone who is not part of the artworld to recognise an object as art. Danto uses a character called ‘Testadura’ to illustrate the observer who is not part of the artworld and refuses to acknowledge that the label ‘art’ does not signify anything significant in an object outside of the label itself — a “noted philistine” (Danto, 1964, p575). Taking the example of Rauschenberg’s <em>Bed</em> which depicts a bed hanging on a wall with paint splattered over it, Testadura has mistaken Rauschenberg’s great work for an actual bed with paint accidentally spilled on it by a clumsy owner. While Testadura is not wrong that it is in fact a bed with paint spilled on it and a hyperinflated price, we still do not want him to climb into Rauschenberg’s <em>Bed</em> and fall asleep. Why is Testadura wrong for mistaking art for reality? This mistake has been made countless times in every art epoch by those who, for whatever reason, have simply misunderstood and ontologically overdetermined the object to the point where there is no room for what we call ‘art’. What he has done is divide the artwork into simple and more easily understandable forms, a bed and paint. The mistake is made because art cannot be divided and oversimplified, the art-object is the sum of its parts and should not be mistaken for a composite part of itself. In a sense, the bed is to the artwork what a chair is to a dining set. Art emerges out of the whole composition. It could be useful here to think of what we call a ‘human being’. While a human being is neither her thoughts nor her body but a complex unity between these things that brings about a ‘human being’ through the coherence of mind and body. However, even when we unite both bed and paint there is still further to go; these things just put together do not automatically make a work of art but just a painted bed, so where is art? Appealing only to material criteria will not suffice because what Testadura wants is a sign to tell him he is looking at art, he will not find one because it is a cultural construct. Danto argues that only when we begin theorising about this paint-bed-object within the context of the cultural institution of art that it becomes art.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/200/0*wg-TeJoky7MtE7GP.jpg" /><figcaption>Bed, 1955. Rauschenberg, R.</figcaption></figure><p>Now we have established that art-objects alone are not sufficient to be called ‘art’ but must be supported by the artworld, we must observe why this is the case in a post-historical artworld. The part of the title passage that reads “what in the end makes the difference” could be read as ‘what in the end of the history of art makes the difference’ and a subtle but important part of the passage. What Danto is so rigorously interrogating is in the end times of art history, what makes the difference between a Brillo box when it is in a shop versus when it is placed in a gallery. Referring once again to the Testadura character, “we cannot help him until he has mastered the <em>is of artistic identification</em> and so <em>constitutes</em> it a work of art. If he cannot achieve this, he will never look upon artworks: he will be like a child who sees sticks as sticks.” (Danto, 1964, p579). This ‘artistic identification’ that Danto refers to is a knowledge of where that object is situated within art history. To put it plainly and somewhat oversimplistic, we know that Warhol’s <em>Brillo Boxes </em>are art and that regular Brillo boxes are not because Warhol’s work follows coherently from a long dialectic process consisting of the sublation of artistic ideas, of which we do not necessarily know the origin, but nonetheless in some way understand (if you are part of the artworld). From direct imitation of the outside world to representation, to expression of the inner world, to abstraction and to conceptualisation, all that is needed to confer the identity of ‘art’ onto an object is knowledge of the institutional structure surrounding it. Until the observer has taken any steps to understand the institution of art, he will not see objects as being part of an artworld in the same way he will “be like a child who sees sticks as sticks” and not part of a sprawling oak tree. The designation of the ‘art’ label onto an object is “logically dependent upon the theories and history he rejects” (Danto, 1964, p579) and in the case of <em>Brillo Boxes</em> this means choosing to accept or reject the theories held by the New York art scene in the mid-60s and the history of art that has led it up to this point. While my initial reaction to this was that the already inaccessible clique of artists had once again pretentiously barred entry from their exclusive club by means of a certain type of knowledge, upon doing more thinking on the nature of expertise and knowledge in any field, it seems that the ‘artworld’ acts the same as any field of expertise. A scientist is qualified to designate a certain field of information as ‘science’ based on his knowledge of the field in question and the knowledge of the history of science as a whole. There is nothing essential uniting all that we call ‘science’ outside a certain group consensus among that institution that we call ‘the scientific community’. It is this designation from these people with knowledge of their fields and members of their intellectual communities that allows people to trust scientists and avoid pseudoscience by appealing to those with more specialised knowledge of the field. Art should not be treated any differently purely because of the cultural baggage it holds as mischievously vague and sometimes pretentious.</p><p>The fact that art has certain chronological criteria make identification more confusing. For example, it would be impossible to claim that Warhol’s <em>Brillo Boxes</em> is art in the 18th century artworld because the history and theory that surrounds discourse on art is not yet developed enough to understand the work as a piece of art. Like any development, art can only be understood from the moment of creation onwards. Prior to the Copernican revolution it was heresy to suggest the idea of heliocentricity but once that discovery was made, it retroactively changed the way that the history of science was viewed up to that point. In the same way the creation of <em>Brillo Boxes</em> changed how we see art and in turn retroactively changed the way we had seen art up to that point, in terms of art as expression or representation, and the only way to account for this retroactive change was to adapt the theory of art accordingly. The philistine in the 19th Century Paris Salon who insists that all he sees in Monet’s <em>Impression, Sunrise </em>is an unskilled rendering of the port of Le Havre has been left behind with outdated theories of art and consequently will not understand the artwork in front of him. Danto uses prehistoric art to illustrate this point writing that; “it is the role of artistic theories […] to make the artworld, and art, possible. It would […] never have occurred to the painters at Lascaux that they were producing <em>art</em> on those walls. Not unless there were Neolithic aestheticians” (Danto, 1965, p581). What he is highlighting here is that while the commonly held belief is that the markings prehistoric peoples made on caves were not produced to be art in the way that we know it, despite this we still designate to it the label of ‘art’ only because of our theory of art that has been developing for millennia. Danto found that once he had been presented with the ‘end of art’, we had also in some way fulfilled Hegel’s prediction centuries earlier that “in its highest realm, [Spirit] explicitly makes itself the object of its knowing and willing.” (Hegel, 1975, p93). The dialectic movement of Spirit into absolute self-knowledge can be seen underlying the progressive phases of art history. This is what is meant by the idea that only artistic theory can elevate a piece into ‘arthood’, the progression of art into self-knowledge means that in a post-historical art scene you can only understand an artwork (the particular) in relation to art itself — the artworld (the absolute). Art has now become both the subject and the object where it once used to be either nature, man, or God. We have come to a point in the history of art that Danto calls ‘post-historical’; all theories that we used to use to distinguish artworks from everyday objects are insufficient nowadays because art has completed its dialectical progression.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/740/0*NISb2gR5dPSxNKJI" /><figcaption>G. W. F. Hegel</figcaption></figure><p>The word ‘aesthetics’ was only coined in 1735, so how are we supposed to understand the art that was being produced before that? Is any art presented prior to the invention of the term to be discussed in the same way as works that came after the invention of aesthetics? Of course, it would be a mistake to take the position that art can only be meaningfully discussed within the period in which it was presented. This is because it would result in our inability to discuss works by Da Vinci and Rembrandt on the basis that we as theorists are not on equal ground with the art we are theorising about. It is for this reason that the chronological criteria for making art can only be understood with an institutional understanding of the artworld and that proceeding theories of art always have the power to revise or sublate previous theories. At the time that <em>Brillo Boxes</em> was made, Danto claimed that “it could not have been art fifty years ago” (Danto, 1964, p581) in a somewhat obvious way, but in saying this he highlights that people tend to define art based on an ontology of art that will forever be unknowable until the decision is made to understand “the theory that takes it up into the work of art”. In this case the New York scene in the sixties. Danto mentions that with the acceptance of post-impressionism not as “inept art” (Danto, 1964, p573) but as a valid artistic theory, the acceptance of a new theory of art signified a retroactive change of what we used to call ‘art’. For example, upon the admission of post-impressionist work into the canons of art history, not only post-impressionist paintings, but even other objects such as masks and weapons were transferred from anthropological museums to the revered Parisian <em>musées des beux artes</em>, the institutional epitome of ‘fine art’ (Danto, 1964, p581). What this tells us about the ontological status of objects, when a new aesthetic theory elevates them from the brute object to the art-object, is that it can reach back into the past and drag objects that were never supposed to be considered ‘aesthetically’ into a new artistic light. As has been iterated before in this essay and is the subject of this essay, this is due to the nature of aesthetic theory elevating an object — even if that object was created with alien intentions thousands of years ago — and imbuing it with meaning and significance external to the object itself. Art history can now be seen as a series of theoretical revisions progressing in compressing phases over time until we reach purely conceptual art at which point it implodes into art theorising about itself. The artworld becomes expository of itself as it comes to understand itself as the alchemical process in which art becomes “the object of its own theoretical consciousness” (Danto, 1964, p 581).</p><p>I would like to reserve the final part of this essay to discuss what it means for art to become post-historical in the artworld, should we give up now that art has “become vaporised in a dazzle of pure thought about itself?” (Danto, 1964, p581) I would argue that there is no reason to stop making art just because the narrative progression has finished. While it is true that no work of art now can develop the progress of art theory or history, never has art been produced solely for that end anyway. Artists generally do not produce with the primary intention of progressing with the narrative as an end in itself, this is usually at most a secondary aim of artists. Now we are done with art history, we should not treat the creation or appreciation of art any differently. The ability of art to imitate nature, express one’s inner world, explore abstract concepts or simply to be ‘beautiful’ has not been castrated by Danto’s proclamation but possibly enriched by the freedom it can give artists, this is mirrored by George Dickie’s open and circular definition of art laid out in 2000 (Dickie, 2000, p102). The end of art history is more of a liberation of creativity than a death knell signifying that time has run out for art. Art’s new ontological landscape is free from the burden of history because artists are not judged against the art epoch that they live in, in 1998 Danto says, “no art is any longer historically mandated as against any other art” (Danto, 1997, p27). No longer must they struggle, like the impressionists did, against the institution that denies their work of its status as ‘art’ but are presented with every creative pathway thinkable to make art. The liberating aspect of the ‘death of art’ parallels Nietzsche’s death of God because art is no longer expected to adhere to values and meanings, each individual artwork representing something different and not whole periods and movements of art conveying a handful of ideas.</p><p>Danto’s thought was interesting to me as it revealed that there is no essential property to a work of art that gives it ontological status independent of the existence of itself as an institution of culture/theory that has used its own historical narrative and significance as a pedestal to place itself upon. I believe there would be no sense in art today without the accompanying institutional theory of art because they are not distinct. What makes good art today is the somewhat contradictory relationship between the freedom for the artist to unchain themselves from a historically contingent aesthetic theory while simultaneously using theory to elevate the art-object from its status as an ordinary object to something infinitely more valuable.</p><p>Bibliography</p><p>Dickie, G. 1974. <em>Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis. </em>Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. p34.</p><p>Dickie, G. 2000. <em>Theories of Art Today</em>. London: University of Wisconsin Press. p93–108.</p><p>Danto, A. 1997. <em>After the End of Art: Contemporary Art and the Pale of History</em>. Chichester: Princeton University Press. p21–39.</p><p>Danto, A. 1964. The Artworld. <em>The Journal of Philosophy</em>. 61 (19), p571–584</p><p>Hegel, G. W. F. 1975. <em>Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art</em>. trans, T. M. Knox. Oxford. Oxford University Press. p91–105.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d331f262e361" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Does impartiality really matter for morality?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@georgegulliver/does-impartiality-really-matter-for-morality-2f9ad96cd4ae?source=rss-84d47f4f3088------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2f9ad96cd4ae</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[George Gulliver]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 05 Dec 2022 17:24:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-12-05T17:24:41.860Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Qchnx6rAny2NBTSh.jpg" /></figure><p>In the West it is normally understood that treating everyone fairly with absolute impartiality is the highest aim for a civilised societyHere I will explore the extents to which I believe the concept of impartiality matters when trying to act morally. By exploring how impartiality has played an undeniable and important role in creating a just society and looking at how and where it works in the modern age, I will attempt to show that we should not be too hasty to dismiss it. I will then go on to discuss where we could see impartiality falling short of the standard that it is held to by showing its impracticalities on a person-to-person and global basis.</p><p>In order to begin our discussion of the role of impartiality in ethics, we must define what we are talking about to approach the subject in a meaningful way. An impartial action is a decision or action where everyone is treated with equal regard to each other, a decision or action where everyone is treated as equal to myself or a decision made based on reasons for action that do not rely on irrelevant or arbitrary differences. Partiality and selfishness seem to oppose everything that we are taught about acting morally. Children are brought up to share and treat one another with kindness and are taught that equality and fairness are fundamental virtues. Selfishness and partiality are taught to be vices based on our intuitions. The idea of impartiality forms a foundation for the vast majority of the ways in which the Western world does ethics, underpinning most normative ethical systems both consequential and deontological. For example, one of the central tenets of utilitarianism is the idea that everybody should “count for one, and nobody more than one” (Mill, 1863), this is known to Mill as Bentham’s dictum. Taking into account that the principle of utility (the greatest good for the greatest number) is usually how humans go about making ethical decisions, we can see how the principle of utility weighs on our ethical decision making. Furthermore, a principal maxim of Kant’s categorical imperative is to treat someone “never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end.” (Kant, 1785), which clearly falls under our previously stated definition of impartiality. It also seems that treating everyone with the same respect regardless of who they are is intuitive to moral behaviour because giving people preferential treatment arbitrarily or on an irrelevant basis (for example race or gender) seems unquestionably wrong. The principle of impartiality can also be observed in arguably the most influential moral system to Western society, that of Christianity. Throughout the Old and New Testament, impartiality is taught as central to living a good Christian life. In Matthew 7:12, Jesus notably paraphrases Leviticus 19:34, declaring, “all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them: for this is the law”. (Matthew, 7:12). This ‘golden rule’ of Christianity highlights the idea that the moral agent should treat everyone with equal consideration as one wishes to be treated themselves.</p><p>With Christianity being perhaps the biggest influence on Western society, it may be more helpful to look at the role that impartiality plays in the modern age. Arguably the second most important ideal that the West holds to be sacred, even more so than Christianity, is our political system of democracy, in which the principle of impartiality can also be seen to work. The modern democratic principle states that each person, no matter who they are (with exceptions as to age), will get one vote and one vote only to cast to elect their leader. Impartiality in democracy and the equality in voting power is seen as “a public symbol of our common humanity” (Nathan, 1989). It ensures that the people within society have the power to select their own leaders, thus having significant influence over their own way of life. Democratic institutions, in most cases, are effective safeguards against tyranny and oppression. Given that modern societies in general avoid tyranny and the fact that all forms of tyranny are regarded as immoral, the principle of impartiality in the democratic system allows us to conduct politics in a reasonably ‘moral’ fashion. The relevance and importance of impartiality to our modern way of life does not end at the carrying out of democratic justice, it also underpins the modern legal system. When thinking of ‘justice’, it would be difficult to imagine how we could reach the ideal form of justice without the help of a principle of impartiality. It could even be argued that justice itself is a form of impartiality and not the vice versa where we would see impartiality as a form of justice, or it could be argued that the statement ‘impartiality is justice’ is just a truism. The carrying out of justice in modern judicial systems relies on impartiality to deliver just sentences. A judge must essentially be trained in the art of being impartial and free of prejudice in order to be considered worthy of the position. When we see public outcry for the miscarriage of justice it is often the case where people in a privileged societal position have received a sentence that is significantly lesser than what they should have received. When viewed in comparison to an individual in a minority group who receives a disproportionately large sentence for a lesser crime, it is painfully obvious as to where impartiality is needed in order to create a judicial system that is truly just.</p><p>It is obvious that the job of a court judge is to play the part of a benevolent impartial spectator who does not take arbitrary differences into account when forming judgments and carrying out sentences. This is the role that court judges must play in society. Similarly, when regular people make day-to-day moral judgments, they must also sometimes take on the mantle of an impartial benevolent spectator, whether it be a teacher grading work ignoring the race or gender of a student or a referee in a football match remaining unbiased to arbitrary characteristics of the players. The importance of the impartial spectator is to uphold the idea that arbitrary differences like race or gender have no weighing when making moral judgments. To claim that different groups of people have different moral worth based on unrelated differences is a slippery slope that could lead to tyranny. The obvious example of where partiality in the wrong places has led to tyranny can be seen in Hitler’s Germany. By ascribing significantly less moral worth to Jews, black people, Roma people, homosexuals and disabled people, Hitler tried to justify the moral genocide of these people claiming that they were somehow less human based on justifications that had absolutely no relation to the question of humanity. It is upon reflection of the tyrannous injustices of the past that we can recognise the need for benevolent impartiality that disregards arbitrary differences in humans. However, when observed more closely, we are able to see how impartiality is not necessarily the shining beacon of justice that one would hope. Actually, impartiality in many cases is impractical when conducting our day-to-day private lives and that partiality and selfishness is as important a part of human conduct as impartiality.</p><p>It seems the case that we can intuitively rely on impartiality to live our lives in a just and virtuous fashion, that in order to be moral all we need to do is make sure we are impartial. In the abstract, in institutions and in systems impartiality works to preserve morality, for example in the judicial system or in the workplace or in sporting events it preserves an element of fairness. However, when we observe the principle of impartiality on a person-to-person basis the ideal starts to fall apart. John Cottingham in his paper “Ethics and Impartiality” points out that impartiality is impractical and can be immoral. We can see the problems as we start to examine the golden rule of Christianity in how it works within modern life. The golden rule states roughly that you should ‘do unto others as you would do to yourself’, but what does this actually entail? The implication and how most people will understand this maxim is to treat everyone with basic humanity and respect because, after all, that’s how you expect to be treated. However, this representation of the golden rule is condemned to be superficial. Cottingham points out that “If I am to love my neighbour as myself, then the improvement of his opportunities, or the quality of his life, must have an equal claim on my energy and resources.” (Cottingham, 1983). We can see here that the golden rule, when examined closer, is quickly reduced to impracticality. The same problem arises when we ascribe a secular principle of impartiality to the moral agent. A doctrine of impartial globalism is put forward by Peter Singer in his 1979 book “Practical Ethics”. He alludes to the idea that ‘self-interested’ actions can be opposed to ‘moral’ actions, writing; “When Macbeth, contemplating the murder of Duncan, admits that only ‘vaulting ambition’ drives him to do it, he is admitting that the act cannot be justified ethically. ‘So that I can be king in his place’ is not a weak attempt at ethical justification for assassination, it is not the sort of reason that counts as an ethical justification at all.” (Singer, 1979). Singer is misled here, confusing a self-interested act with an act of murder. The immoral aspect of Macbeth’s murderous act is not as such because it is self-interested, but immoral because it is an act of murder. Cottingham rephrases Macbeth’s predicament to fit a modern context, by imagining that Macbeth is moving out of his inner-city apartment and, legally and non-violently, moving into Duncan’s, much more pleasant, suburban house with the reason for this move to improve his quality of life (Cottingham, 1983). Singer’s critique of Macbeth’s self-interested murder does not translate when placed in the latter-day context. It is not clear how Singer could criticise our modern Macbeth for moving into Duncan’s house in order to improve the quality of his life. This ‘vaulting ambition’ that Macbeth feels is his motivation to improve his own life, which one can hardly be critical of being ambitious. Ambition is not <em>a priori</em> immoral as Singer suggests, to accept that self-interested acts are immoral would be to suggest that something like eating healthy food for one’s health benefit is immoral. It is here evident that the contrast between ‘self-interested’ and ‘moral’ can quite easily be reduced to absurdity, with Singer taking issue with murder rather than partiality. It appears that we must make a distinction between ‘selfish’ and ‘self-interested’ acts. A selfish act could be defined as an act which is committed at the expense of another. Taking this definition, we can see where Macbeth’s act of murder is selfish as it is committed at the expense of Duncan’s life thus making it immoral. Conversely, we can see now where house-hunting Macbeth’s act is merely self-interested and cannot be counted as selfish therefore making it a moral act.</p><p>Singer states later in Practical Ethics, Singer states that “my own interests cannot, simply because they are <em>my</em> interests, count more than the interests of anyone else”. Drawing on what has already been said in this essay, it might be clear how this statement might entail some nonsensical moral consequences. In order to fully express the potential consequences of living by this maxim, I will use Cottingham’s example of house painting. He asks us to imagine that our house needs painting because the job is overdue, and it is in my interest to maintain my house. Singer maintains that because this is in my own self-interest, I have no moral basis for justifying the upkeep of my own house over the upkeep of my neighbour’s house. Francis Hutcheson states in “An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue” (1725), that the good man must “treat himself as he would do a third person who was a competitor of equal merit”. What I must do here is weigh up my neighbour’s interests with my own interests as if I were an impartial spectator, without bias towards myself. If upon doing this, I find a relevant difference in favour of painting my neighbour’s house, then Singer would claim that we are obligated to go next door and paint his house. At first glance, it may seem that this is in fact the right thing to do. It does seem like a very demanding ethical system and we may not live up to this standard very often, but it could be argued that we nonetheless ought to do it. However, upon closer inspection we can observe the echoes of the Christian doctrine of treating others as you would yourself, and with it the problems. In taking Singer’s claim seriously, which must be admitted few people do, then other people have an equal claim to my resources and energy as I do. As Cottingham states, before I sit down at my desk and begin revising for my exam, I must consider whether any of my neighbours are more deserving of my efforts in the completion of their projects. If I hear that he will be made happier in the completion of his projects than I will upon completing mine, I must sacrifice my sleep and energy in making it so that he is successful. In doing otherwise, Singer should not hasten to label me ‘immoral’. Bernard Williams argues against this approach in his critique of utilitarianism, stating that to base all actions on a weighing up of general welfare would be to “alienate him in a real sense from his actions and the source of his action in his own convictions […] to neglect the extent to which <em>his</em> actions and <em>his</em> decisions have to be seen as the actions and decisions which flow from the projects and the attitudes with which he is most closely identified. It is thus in the most literal sense an attack on his integrity”. What Williams is emphasising is the idea that ceasing action from yourself and for yourself is to cease being human. It is a sacrifice of human integrity and individuality.</p><p>Williams’ points about human integrity and individuality extend much further than merely pursuing what is good for yourself. It is still the case that in some cases we ought to discriminate based only on characteristics that are unrelated to the moral issue being considered, these would be the characteristics that appeal to a detached and impartial observer. The problem that we come across as humans is the fact that it is next to impossible to become an impartial observer because we are conditioned to prioritise the needs of ourselves and the people that we are immediately associated with over people across the globe who we do not know. In response to Singer, we must ask whether or not it is psychologically possible to act in such a way. Our evolutionary bonds of affection towards our family and friends would restrict us from giving our resources to people that we have no emotional bonds with. This idea, which J. L. Mackie named “self-referential altruism” (Mackie, 1977), claims that it is justifiable to give preferential treatment towards an individual on the basis that that person is your lover or child or yourself purely because those people are more important to the moral agent. For example, if one was given the decision to look after their own sick child or the sick child of another, it would be unquestionable to abandon your own child in favour another’s. It is here that we can recognise self-referential altruism as being morally positive, and not as something morally neutral. Your duty as a parent is to provide for your children and ensure their safe development into adulthood. To reject your sick child in favour of someone else’s sick child seems wrong by intuition, almost as if you rare rejecting your duty and responsibility as a parent. Of course, this point can be argued against in the case that someone else’s child is sicker than your own, however in the case that both children are as sick as each other it would be strange to attempt to justify caring for the child of another over your own.</p><p>The limits of the impartiality thesis on a person-to-person are made evident up to this point. However, to observe the true extent of what impartiality means for ethics we must take Singer’s impartial doctrine to its true extent. Under Singer’s strict theory of impartiality, I must not only consider my neighbour as worthy of my efforts and resources but should extend this consideration to the whole world. When I receive my salary for the month, I cannot morally justify spending these resources on anything that is in my interest purely on the basis that they are my interests. I must weigh up who is more deserving of my resources and direct them there, to shave my living expenses down to the very bare minimum so that they can be redirected accordingly. A dire consequence arises from this strict brand of impartiality when the agent rejects the act-omissions doctrine. This doctrine states that omission from helping someone in danger is equally as immoral as the act that caused the danger. For example, not helping a drowning person is as bad as drowning that person yourself. The impartiality thesis, if accepted, would mean that if any person starved to death or died of any other lack of resources, I would be prima facie guilty of having murdered that person. If I buy myself a pastry from the bakery because I have worked hard and think I deserve it, I have deprived a starving child of food because my money did not go directly to them, it was spent on my pastry. Following from this, we must ask ourselves whether proponents of this type of doctrine would be willing to accept this outcome. The answer is most likely no.</p><p>It is here that, after evaluating where impartiality works and doesn’t work. From what has been written above there seems to be a line that we are able to draw between ‘public life’ and ‘private life’. Impartiality works when one must act as an impartial judge in a public situation like teaching or voting democratically. On the other hand, when providing for yourself or conducting your ‘private life’, we can see where impartiality gets in the way. It might be helpful to refer to your ‘duty’ or role in society when thinking about where we should apply the impartial thesis and where we should refrain from using it. For example, when carrying out your duty as a parent, it is important that you act partially and with discrimination to your own child instead of favouriting the child of another. When doing your duty as a court judge it is important to act impartially and without discrimination based on arbitrary factors. Of course, I must acknowledge the exceptions to this vague rule, for example your duty as a parent to always put your child first is ridiculous in situations that may have a higher priority. If your child needed to eat lunch but you witnessed a traffic accident and urgently needed to help people involved, it would be morally wrong to leave just so your child could eat their lunch. But even here the complex interplay between impartiality and morality can be observed in the case of the accident as, morally speaking, you ought to act impartially and tend to the needs of the crash victims as opposed to giving special preference to your child.</p><p>My goal throughout this essay has been to show that there is an evident role for impartiality in certain spheres of morality but in other, more institutional spheres it does not work as well as we would initially hope. Through my discussion of how important impartiality is for democracy, judicial fairness and ‘public spheres’ in general I hope to have shown that when placed against a different standard (the ‘private sphere’), we can observe the boundaries of the impartial thesis and also where they intersect each other.</p><p><strong>Bibliography</strong></p><p>Cottingham, J. (1983). Ethics and Impartiality. <em>Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition</em>. 43 (1), p83–99.</p><p>Hutcheson, Francis (2008). <em>An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue</em>. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund Inc.</p><p>Kant, I. (2002). <em>Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals</em>. New Haven: Yale University Press.</p><p>Mackie, J. (1977). <em>Ethics</em>. Harmondsworth: Penguin.</p><p>Matthew (7:12). <em>Holy Bible</em>. King James Version.</p><p>Mill, J.S. (2014). <em>Utilitarianism</em>. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</p><p>Nathan, N. M. L. (1989). Democracy and Impartiality. <em>Analysis</em>. 42 (2), p65–70.</p><p>Singer, P. (1979), <em>Practical Ethics</em>. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</p><p>Smart, J. J. C. and Williams, B. (1973), <em>Utilitarianism, For and Against.</em> Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2f9ad96cd4ae" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Edvard Munch’s ‘The Scream’: The face of existential ugliness.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@georgegulliver/edvard-munchs-the-scream-the-face-of-existential-ugliness-86ac35c0f8ef?source=rss-84d47f4f3088------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/86ac35c0f8ef</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[self-improvement]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[art]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[spirituality]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[existentialism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[George Gulliver]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2020 17:35:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-07-08T17:35:39.378Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wO_66g1ePVaomp26BwYZmA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Melancholy, by Edvard Munch</figcaption></figure><p>The Norwegian painter Edvard Munch, suffered from a terrible disease that has infected all of post-enlightenment humanity. This disease is the absence of a meaningful life.</p><p>The disenchantment of the world forces the observer to confront the bleak ugliness of <em>The Scream</em> as a portrait of the human condition of modern man, as we stray away from ideas of God, we are left with an empty void where humanity used to keep idolatry. The vulgarity expressed in Munch’s work is a result of a deprivation of the sublime aspects of art that existed before the enlightenment period, when society saw art as something of a higher order that belonged to the Gods. Zarathustra’s proclamation that “God is dead” foreshadows the despair of a meaningless existence that <em>The Scream</em> accurately symbolises. Munch’s expression in his work shows the epitome of mid 20th century vulgarity as without a higher power all meaning in life is essentially lost leaving us with the existential dread that is depicted in this painting. The figure in the painting is without identity, we are unable to decipher the gender, race, class or anything that might bring us closer to this figure’s identity. This important aspect of the painting describes the loss of identity that accompanies a fall into nihilism and the disenchantment of the world. In a world without essence, man does not know what he must be, we are each born without identity and must form one.</p><p>The figurative features of Munch’s painting pretty much just show a screaming figure on a bridge over a distorted background. The subject of the painting is seemingly facing the observer of the painting, almost looking directly at them with an expression of horror; this instantly places the observer’s psyche in an unnerving discomfort. The straight lines that make up the bridge contrast with the warped background creating a sense of vertigo and dizziness as the observer peers off of the bridge. The production of emotions such as dread and terror in the painting can be attributed to the double-aspect nature of <em>The Scream</em> where the flat two-dimensional painted surface depicts a three-dimensional scene; however if we were to step into the painting and confront the screaming figure then it could be argued that we would not experience the same feeling of existential dread but a feeling of confusion as to why this character is feeling its anguish. It is the perspective that we are allowed as an outside observer looking in that gives the piece its weighty effect on the spirit. The empathy that is produced is instantly relatable to a mind that recognises the uncertainty of the ability to create a meaningful existence.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/815/1*zZuLoVoofUB3UcczJll6Zw.jpeg" /><figcaption>The Scream, by Edvard Munch</figcaption></figure><p>The penetrating unease that is experienced upon observation of Munch’s work leads to the question of how can something that produces such a response to this work be of such high value that people around the world flock to see it. The problem of ugliness in art has puzzled philosophers and aestheticians for years. Beautiful objects are often not considered to be good art and at the same time ugly objects are considered masterpieces. Munch’s work is certainly not a significant work of design that expresses unimaginable beauty, so why are people drawn to it so much? The Humean response to this attraction to the disturbing is that the whole concept of beauty is in fact an illusion. Nothing is in itself beautiful, only to individual people. Beauty is in fact projected onto the piece of art being viewed, the art itself does not exude beauty. This answer is not satisfying because Munch’s work is not appreciated because some individuals believe it to be beautiful, it is appreciated because it produces a sense of unease in the viewer. Derek Matravers states that “sometimes a work’s aesthetic merit can lie not in its beauty but in its ugliness”, if we accept this to be true then we must solve the paradox of the tragic beauty in such pieces of art. Ugly pieces of art are not enjoyable despite their ugliness, we seem to enjoy them primarily because they are ugly, and it is this ugliness that stirs some deep emotions within us. It could be argued that we are psychologically drawn to mentally distressing images. In the case of <em>The Scream</em>, the observer enjoys the unease he feels when looking at the painting because in a sense, the painting reflects himself and his own psychological state somewhere deep within him. Maybe the observer feels a sense of comfort upon observation of the painting, knowing that what is so impossible for himself to express is shown right in front of him in the form of <em>The Scream</em>. It would be hard to imagine any pre-modern peoples being particularly moved by this painting because the chilling realisation of the meaninglessness of existence has not set in yet, they have nothing to relate it to. A more cynical approach to looking at why pleasure is found in disturbing elements of art is that we enjoy anything that makes us really feel emotions. It could be said that in modern times we are deprived of the real human feeling that civilisations before us felt, we are detached from war, we are close to solving death and the world is no longer dangerous. Yearning for some sort of primal feeling is what draws people to art that stirs them deeply.</p><p>Munch’s <em>The Scream</em> could be seen to symbolise the existentialist philosophical mood of the late 19th and early 20th Century. The painting depicts of a figure standing on a bridge over a bay letting out a scream. The most likely interpretation that one may make of this artwork is that it strikes the observer as instantly unnerving. Something about the warped background and the garish colours of the sky tell the observer that this is not an accurate depiction of a real-life setting. There seems to be an absence of any distinguishable horizon in the piece. The lack of any meeting point between earth and sky perfectly illustrates the existentialist thought that there is no higher power to give us meaning and we are not beings with the capacity for an innate meaning. The earth and the sky have no boundary between solidity and non-solidity, the mind has no boundary between the earthly mode of being that we experience and the divine mode of being expected after death. All is one, that which we know to exist. Probably the most disturbing feature of the painting is the pale, hairless and screaming subject. Munch did not explicitly state the meaning behind his work; however we can safely assume, that it references an existential angst that penetrates the soul. The fact that Munch was heavily influenced by Friedrich Nietzsche allows us to assume that <em>The Scream</em> references the danger of nihilism and the effects that follow from a life without meaning. In <em>The Birth of Tragedy</em>, Nietzsche discusses the effects of a meaningless life; “Innermost suffering makes the mind noble. Only that deepest, slow and extended pain that burns inside of us as firewood it forces us to go down into our depths… I doubt that such a pain could ever make us feel better, but I know that it makes us deeper beings, it makes us ask more rigorous and deeper questions to ourselves… Trust in life has disappeared. Life itself has become a problem.” Munch admired Nietzsche as a philosopher and within Nietzsche’s writings, Munch “discovered a shared spiritual kinship — both suffered from loneliness, a lack of recognition, and a fear of madness.” This kinship between artist and philosopher is important to the understanding of the importance of art in regards to observing the deeper questions that life presents us. The artistic way of creation is central to the philosophy of existentialism because it runs parallel to the quest to create meaning in life. just as the painter uses pigment and cloth in order to make a masterpiece of emotional significance, humanity must take equally basic instruments to create a masterpiece of life.</p><p>Upon observation of the ways in which <em>The Scream</em> portrays its message, the composition of the piece itself is loses a lot of its emotional value without the philosophical context that it must be placed in. Regarding Munch’s intentions for the painting, observing his influences and the time period that he was writing in, it would be absurd not to assume that this was in fact a seminal work of existentialist art. Munch’s masterpiece is a definitive example of the disenchantment of humankind at the hands of meaninglessness, it draws heavily on Nietzschean thought and illustrates the despairing existentialist mood that is still felt today. Despite this, somehow people have been able to find tremendous comfort in the work of Edvard Munch, almost a sense that the individual is not alone in suffering and that there is an opportunity for reconciliation with existence in the form of individual creation of pieces of art and literature, like Munch and Nietzsche.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=86ac35c0f8ef" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Nietzsche, Jung and Dostoyevsky: “God is dead”; resurrecting the good from within the individual.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@georgegulliver/nietzsche-jung-and-dostoyevsky-god-is-dead-resurrecting-the-good-from-within-the-individual-2cfb2fd0807d?source=rss-84d47f4f3088------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2cfb2fd0807d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[self-improvement]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nietzsche]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[jung]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dostoevsky]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[George Gulliver]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2020 16:52:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-07-06T16:52:32.256Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/1*2IT-N4E-v-yTGQQ6iXgujw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Nietzsche’s proclamation that “God is dead” (Nietzsche:1885, 41) was a monumental metaphysical event for the history of mankind. This being that has grounded all of our ideas of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ is no more. Humanity is left to its own devices to decide its own values. However, values do not automatically emerge from the existence of society, the individual must take it upon themselves to produce it because, after all, society is just a collection of individuals. The nihilist fallout that follows the death of God was something that Nietzsche saw as potentially deadly; he emphasised the importance of embracing meaning by writing that meaning “seemed to fill the gaping void; the door was closed against all suicidal nihilism.” (Nietzsche:1887, 136). However, this fall into nihilism is not inevitable. An alternate basis for morality and meaning can be found within the individual, if they are willing enough to search for it.</p><p>The death of God is by no means something we should be celebrating, according to Nietzsche. Without God humanity is in grave danger of nihilism and living a life without meaning which inevitably leads to meaningless suffering. Nietzsche makes the observation that “man <em>must</em> from time to time believe that he knows <em>why</em> he exists; his species cannot flourish without periodically confiding in life! Without the belief in <em>reason in life</em>!” (Nietzsche:1882, 32). The deadly nature of nihilism is found within our approach to suffering. Nietzsche by no means sees suffering as something we should avoid, instead he actively encourages seeking out suffering by telling humanity to “<em>live in danger</em>! Build your cities on the slope of Vesuvius! Send your ships into unexplored seas!” (Nietzsche:1882, 129). He argued that man can withstand suffering if there is a meaning behind his suffering, but also warned that suffering without meaning produces unbearable nihilism. Before the death of God, man had meaning for his suffering in the promise of a glorious life after death, temporary suffering would reap an eternal reward. Without this incentive, meaning disappears and we are left with nothing but our suffering. This is a world in which there is truly no reason to keep on living if empty suffering is the inescapable fact of life. There is a valid anti-natalist argument that under these circumstances, it is better to commit suicide than to carry on living or not to be born at all.</p><p>Nietzsche famously rejected the common Judeo-Christian ideas of virtue that our society revolves around today, claiming that it reflects a “slave-morality” (Nietzsche:1887, 22). Nietzsche’s slave-morality is that of piety, empathy and kindness which has made his ethics hard to swallow because he seems to reject all of the values that we see as ‘good’. In today’s society it is almost impossible not to identify with the long-standing Christian ethical tradition because it has been integrated with our laws and our upbringing through axioms such as ‘life is sacred’ and ‘sharing is a virtue’. Nietzsche does not believe that these axioms are innately wrong, he is instead asking us to question the validity of the foundations of all of our presuppositions about what is ‘good’, asking us to rigorously challenge the ideological roots of these claims to morality. This revaluation of all of our values that we pin onto ‘good’ and ‘evil’ sets us on our journey to self-overcoming and the birth of the Overman. The Overman is Nietzsche’s idea of a fully actualised individual who lives by his own values and exacts his will upon the world. The idea that people should exact their will upon the world sounds dangerous and that it would give birth to pathological ideologies like Stalinism or Nazism, however the Overman is not a virtuous man as much as a man is not a virtuous chimp. The Overman is not plagued by resentment and therefore does not feel the need to dominate and force his tyrannical ideals on others. The danger of this resentment is portrayed by Nietzsche in the transvaluation of values by the priest-caste and the Abrahamic religions. It is precisely the emergence of this resentment that has caused the shift from “noble-morality” (Nietzsche:1887, 22) to slave-morality. This hatred has come as a revenge against the powerful and noble that dominated the powerless. Revenge is taken through the transvaluation of values, making the weak and insignificant the virtuous and the noble and powerful the evil. Nietzsche uses this point of how values can easily be changed and revalued to illustrate the point that no dogma of morality should be taken as the overarching correct morality that all humans should live under. This moral relativism is often misunderstood by readers who perceive that the goal of Nietzschean philosophy is to subjugate and dominate when in fact Nietzsche did not actually take any strong moral stances anyway. He deliberately contradicted himself and did not reveal the truth of what he genuinely believed to be good through his polemic and aphoristic style of philosophy because he did not think that the proper way to come to the knowledge of the good is the herd-like following of dogma from self-proclaimed prophets.</p><p>Critics of Nietzsche’s philosophy are misled by arguing that his philosophy is elitist and unavailable for the majority of people. This critique is bound to arise from someone who has not closely observed the literature and believes that Nietzschean philosophy focuses on the domination and subjugation of the weak in order to affirm one’s life. These critics are lost in the aphorism. Nietzsche distinguishes between the noble-morality and the slave-morality by asserting that the noble mind sets its gaze “inwards to the self” rather than “to an ‘outside’, […] to a ‘non-self’, [this] belongs characteristically to <em>ressentiment</em>” (Nietzsche:1887, 22). Here, he paints a psychological picture of why people become resentful and come to commit tyrannical acts by placing blame and responsibility for evil on others instead of recognising that the evil also exists within them. Directing all responsibility for the evil in the world on others and refusing to acknowledge this evil within yourself cultivates resentment and is a huge blockade in becoming who you are. It can be seen in the tyrannical dictators of the 20th Century that Mao, Hitler and Stalin all place the evil within the world on one scapegoat, be it the Jews or the bourgeoisie, they grow resentful of what they are not. Swiss psychologist Dr Carl Gustav Jung was deeply influenced by the writings of Nietzsche and hypothesised that the fracturing of one’s psyche and the cause of neuroses was caused by a failure to integrate the “shadow” (Jung:1964, 73) into one’s consciousness. The archetype of the shadow is everything we see as negative about our personality that lies hidden to us in the unconscious. The integration of this darker side of our being into our conscious thought is a large step in what Jungians call “the process of individuation” (Jung:1964, 159). Achieving individuation is the Jungian interpretation of self-affirmation and becoming the Overman. Dr Jung conveys this idea of walking the line between order and chaos in saying; “No tree, it is said, can grow to the heavens unless its roots reach down to hell” (Jung:1951). This devastating quote illustrates the impossibility of self-overcoming without confronting evil within.</p><p>The first and most important criticism regarding Nietzsche’s ideal that everyone should strive to become the Overman is that it is impossible for there to exist a society of Overmen. This would be a sensible conclusion if becoming an Overman meant violently imposing your values on everyone else, however I believe this is not the way that the literature should be read. Becoming an Overman means affirming your own values without the need to impose them on others. It would not make sense that a ‘higher’ being would be bothered about whether or not others abided by his rules. Nietzsche’s philosophy is not for humanity at a societal level, instead it examines the individual. The Overman instead should be interpreted as a being who lives life so that the doctrine of eternal recurrence seems bearable. This means affirming life wherever it is possible and using your own values to make this affirmation possible so that one day we might conceive of the Overman. The second issue raised by Nietzsche is the danger of falling into nihilism after the death of God. I believe that this is not a dangerous thing at all, mainly because to commit to the life of a real nihilist is impossible. Obviously, nihilism does not need to be pure in order to pose a problem to humankind, but in the case of the partial nihilist they still have values that they can hold onto in order to give their life meaning. Human beings would not exist without the innate value of the archetype of ‘good’ and ‘evil’, they have created human flourishing in terms of cooperating underneath these values to conceive of complex social structures such as government. An almighty God does not need to exist to ground morals.</p><p>Even monarchs and the morally perverted are unable to transcend human values. Dostoyevsky illustrates this point through Raskolnikov in “Crime and Punishment” (Dostoyevsky:1866). Dostoyevsky uses the character of Raskolnikov to illustrate the emergence of nihilism in 19th Century Russian society. He murders an old pawnbroker for no reason other than the attempt to usurp the traditional mode of morality that has been set out by Abrahamic religion. After committing this ultimate defiance of morality, Raskolnikov swings between states of unimaginable guilt-ridden torment and ugly self-confident affirmation that he has transcended the common man. Raskolnikov eventually succumbs to his internal anguish and confesses his meaningless crime to the police. The devastating aspect of Dostoyevsky’s novel is that Raskolnikov is not a unique character, he is every one of us trying to navigate life in a world without moral grounding. The difference is that he slips, allowing himself to become inhuman and hateful. But no matter how distorted and twisted poor Raskolnikov’s psyche becomes, what little humanity that is left inside of him forces him to confess his moral perversion. Even Raskolnikov, seemingly transcendent of morality, feels the guilty consequences of defying these archetypes of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ after committing murder, and even the despairing suicidal man will hesitate to butcher a puppy.</p><p>This image of becoming the individual that you are is a message that is especially potent today as more and more children are being brought up not by their parents, but by the internet and the cacophony of contradictory opinions that the internet breeds. The world is plagued more and more by uninformed, politically charged opinions perpetuated by the media on why the opposing ideology is evil. The circulation of such ideologies is the very thing that Nietzsche would see as pathological, as he encourages us to look not outwards at whatever ‘virtuous’ moral code is being preached, but inwards into ourselves to cultivate values that hold true to your individual character. This is what Nietzsche means when saying “as the human race is constituted, there will perhaps be caves for milleniums yet, in which people will show [God’s] shadow. And we — we have still to overcome his shadow!” (Nietzsche:1882). Nietzsche knew the dangers that would come from the death of God and that ideologues would still stand on a pedestal and inform the public on their misinformed gospel of ‘virtue’. Modern man mistakes where the problems with the world lie. He criticises the world around him and says he wants to change the world for the better so that his children can grow up happy, but this man is himself without meaning. The question that Nietzsche asks is how you expect a perfect world if you yourself are not perfect. The ‘good’ in the world does not simply emerge from nowhere, the individuals that constitute the world must be good themselves before the world is expected to bring forth virtue.</p><p>After mourning the death of God, the individual must now grow up and take responsibility for themselves instead of looking outside for the clouds to part and meaning to come down from the heavens. The community does not have to deal with nihilism it is the individual who must rise to the challenge and overcome himself and affirm his own life.</p><p><strong>Bibliography</strong></p><p>Dostoyevsky, F. (2017). <em>Crime and Punishment</em>. New York, NY: Open Road Integrated Media, (orig. 1866).</p><p>Jung, C.G. (1991). <em>Aion: Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self</em>. New York, NY: Routledge, (orig. 1951). 43</p><p>Jung, C., Henderson, J., Franz, M., Jaffé, A. and Jacobi, J., (1964). M<em>an And His Symbols.</em> London: Aldus Books. 159.</p><p>Nietzsche, F. (1996). <em>On the Genealogy of Morals</em>. Oxford: Oxford University Press, (orig. 1887)</p><p>Nietzsche, F. (2018). <em>The Gay Science</em>. Lawrence, KS: Digireads.com Publishing, (orig. 1882)</p><p>Nietzsche, F. (1961). <em>Thus Spoke Zarathustra</em>. London: Penguin Books, (orig. 1885)</p><p>Nietzsche, F. (1998). <em>Twilight of the Idols</em>. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, (orig. 1889). 6.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2cfb2fd0807d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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