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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by George C. Vollrath on Medium]]></title>
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            <title>Stories by George C. Vollrath on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Some notes on simulation and storage]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@georgevollrath/some-notes-on-simulation-and-storage-d4806a3cf989?source=rss-bb20592565bb------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[George C. Vollrath]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 20 Oct 2014 23:57:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2014-10-20T23:57:50.438Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tpaZtSz59CGI8njYlAeVkA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Time-axis manipulation, a central concept for Friedrich Kittler’s media theory, refers to the way in which media can reverse, slow down, speed up, or otherwise manipulate time as a variable. There is a crucial difference in the way that print media and electronic media manipulate time. Writing can store time as symbols arranged in sequences. When the time of oral speech becomes spatialized as writing it can be manipulated in ways that are impossible in speech. One can shift symbols around at will: readers can skip sentences, return to them, skim, etc. What can be stored in writing is, however, an extremely attenuated version of the information that is transmitted in speaking. Storage in writing forces everything through what Kittler calls “the bottleneck of the signifier.”</p><p>Electronic media, on the other hand, can store “real time” in the sense that audio devices capture sound <em>as such </em>and optical recorders capture light <em>as such. </em>The real inscribes itself in storage media, and every form of storage includes a materialization in space of a temporal process. Electronic media can store extra-symbolic information and writing cannot. That which had previously been singular and unrepeatable can now be translated into a code, quantified, and manipulated with techniques of spatial rearrangement.</p><p>All techniques of time-axis manipulation, however, concern the alteration of the flow of linear time with respect to the past, because only something that has already happened can be stored. Yet it may be possible to apply the concept of time-axis manipulation to the alteration of future time as well. Taking a cue from Luhmann’s systems theoretical account of society, we can think of time as an attribute of a system. To paraphrase Luhmann, when complexity increases, time becomes scarce. From the point of view of systems theory, the future exists as a measurement of uncertainty that characterizes the present. An open future is one characterized by a high degree of uncertainty. Defuturization is the process of reducing the complexity of system-environment relations to make the future more certain. Approaches to certainty about the future are always asymptotic, which is why the maintenance of a distinction between the present and future still and always will have some significance.</p><p>If we remember that information, as Claude Shannon tells us, is identified with improbability (the more probable a message the less information it contains), then the relationship between complexity and the future becomes clearer. The future is a projection, based on available information, about what will come to pass. The more complex our information about the future, the more information we must synthesize to reduce the uncertainty of what will happen. As we gather more and more information about the future we have less and less time to develop a reliable synthetic model of what will occur. In short, processing takes time, and the more there is to process, the less time we have. If we want to steer the present between a desirable future — to increase the probability of a particular future — then we will need sufficient time to gather and process as much relevant information as possible.</p><p>Most often, to reduce the improbability of particular futures coming to pass, we employ the services of media devices. Computers are especially useful for such tasks. Computers with sufficient processing power can simulate possible futures and offer feedback to guide our operations and decisions in the present. Insofar as a computer simulates the forward flow of possible events at a pace which beats the future to the finish line, a simulation can be said to perform a kind of time-axis manipulation. We are not dealing here with the manipulation of a stored past but with the manipulation of one or several possible futures. The future that is selected as the <em>ideal </em>from the cache of results the simulations produce will guide present decision making. This is why we can refer to simulation as a form of time-axis manipulation. The future arrives sooner and more certainly than it otherwise would, and in some ways simulation opens future time to manipulation as a code, even while some degree of uncertainty must always remain.</p><p>This may seem like a strange proposition. We all know that past occurrences can be stored with greater or lesser fidelity in a variety of media. As we said, this occurs through the spatialization of a temporal process (like writing down a speech or recording music). This same process applies to time-axis manipulations of the future, but it passes through an extra stage. When we simulate the future, we do so in the present, and the simulation itself, as a material artifact, is a stored past just like a piece of recorded music. Once the future has been produced in simulation, it has passed through the present and into the past, even when the possible futures it simulates have not yet occurred. A stored simulation of the future is a stored past, just like any other media product. However, stored simulations have the unique characteristic of guiding decisions we make in the present about the future and seem to issue from the future itself. It is no longer the ghostly voice of a long dead orator we hear. In analyzing a simulation the voice issues from an imagined future as a call that requires a response. The future, then, in some ways exists in the present as <em>both </em>past (materialized recording) <em>and </em>future (the possibility that has not yet occurred).</p><p>As a more general point, systems use media to produce time. This can take the form of reproducing the past, or it can take the form of simulating futures. In simulating futures, time is produced in the sense that processing information by computer increases the time that a system has to make a decision concerning the future. We might take as an example the automatic braking systems that auto manufacturers have recently begun installing in cars. The car’s sensory apparatus takes in environmental information and processes it more quickly and accurately than is possible for a human. The car simulates possible futures based on available information in the present and makes a decision about whether or not to stop. The system as a whole (which includes both humans and machines), as a benefit of this new apparatus, has increased the time it has available to make decisions about the future, which then has the effect of reducing the uncertainty of the future. Thus, the speed at which the future arrives has been manipulated by technical means. Several simulated futures arrive more quickly which means the actual future arrives more slowly. The flow of time has been altered by technical manipulation.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d4806a3cf989" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Neuroscience and Handwriting]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@georgevollrath/neuroscience-and-handwriting-a2cf77a175c7?source=rss-bb20592565bb------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[George C. Vollrath]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 20 Oct 2014 23:44:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2014-10-21T00:02:47.798Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/372/1*HMZawOR8KTP31wO3aNJx4A.png" /></figure><p>Neuroscience and Handwriting</p><p>A recent article in the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/03/science/whats-lost-as-handwriting-fades.html?ref=science&amp;_r=0">New York Times</a> summarizes the results of several studies on the relationships between the production of letters and brain activity. Like all neuroscience, the studies examine the location and intensity of brain activity in various contexts. The conclusions are not particularly surprising, but they are nevertheless helpful in demonstrating the depths of what we do not yet know about hands, eyes, and minds. The article makes several claims that I’ll comment on in order.</p><p><em>“Children not only learn to read more quickly when they first learn to write by hand, but they also remain better able to generate ideas and retain information. In other words, it’s not just what we write that matters — but how.”</em></p><p>Why might this be? The immediately obvious answer is that there is something different about the way the brain processes the <em>activity </em>of writing compared to the <em>activity </em>of typing on a keyboard. The circuit produced in the brain-eye-hand triad in the case of handwriting is essentially different from the circuit that is activated by typing. Different areas of the brain fire, and different faculties are awakened.</p><p>A quick moment of reflection, however, reveals problems with this conclusion. The implication is that prior to handwriting human beings were<em>less </em>able to “generate ideas and retain information.” Socrates’ argument in the <em>Phaedrus </em>is turned on its head: writing does not lead to laziness and forgetfulness, but rather to greater creativity and facility with language. Oral cultures thus operate at a deficit, lacking the means to activate writing-related circuits.</p><p>Okay, so maybe oral cultures have less mental acuity when it comes to information handling. We cannot dismiss it as a possibility. What I think is much more likely, however, because it points to a consistency in the human condition rather than a psychological rupture that hinges on the advent of writing, is that handwriting acquisition is far more haptic than learning to write on a keyboard. When one learns to write with a stylus, the hand must be taught how to hold the implement, how to angle it, and how to exert the appropriate pressure for making one’s marks. The instructor must touch the hands of the child and shape them to the ergonomic fit of the stylus and writing surface.</p><p>How does the child who writes with a pencil learn to spell? Facial and oral feedback from a primary or secondary caretaker. How does a child who learns to write on a computer learn to spell? The computer is the arbiter of correctness. The intimacy of handwriting instruction undoubtedly cathects the child to the process much differently than the imposition of a nonhuman instructor.</p><p>Faciality and hapticity are not accounted for by the neurological studies. Such studies lack a sense of the milieu in which the acquisition of a cultural technique takes place. Even before language, cultural techniques were passed on to progeny by molding hands to tasks. A child learns to throw a spear or cook a meal by being shown where and how to move her hands. The child learns success and failure in the reflected appraisal of a human instructor, with whom the child necessarily shares some form of libidinal investment (otherwise, why teach, why learn?).</p><p>Computer instruction introduces a gap in the libidinal circuit between instructor and pupil. The instructor no longer guides: instead she checks scores, supervises, and facilitates. Reflected appraisal arrives from a screen that is impossible for a child to love or hate except by proxy (insofar as the screen may come to represent an instructor or other human agent). Touching and looking, so long understood to be utterly necessary to earlier stages of child development (in nursing, for example), are ignored by these studies in favor of a focus on the purely mechanical aspects of producing language. There is nothing special about handwriting, but there is something special about the way that it is taught and internalized by young learners.</p><p><em>“When we write, a unique neural circuit is automatically activated,” said Stanislas Dehaene, a psychologist at the Collège de France in Paris. “There is a core recognition of the gesture in the written word, a sort of recognition by mental simulation in your brain.”</em></p><p>This statement is misleading, because it implies that the human brain has neural circuits that naturally respond <em>specifically </em>to the activity of writing. Unless one believes in a God who favors writing or in an evolution that operates much more quickly than anyone has ever believed, then then brain cannot have writing-specific “circuits.” My supposition is that the researcher simply means that handwriting tends to activate particular areas of the brain in ways that typing does not. Otherwise, what he is saying is utter nonsense.</p><p>It is not too farfetched, however, to imagine an evolutionary preference for involved activities like handwriting. Prior to writing, the way in which skills were transferred hinged on direct instruction. Individuals who were better able to internalize transmitted know-how had clear advantages. Memory and learning are intimately tied to emotion: if one cares about what one is learning, one tends to learn it better. We learn to care for ourselves and for others through the mechanisms of voice, gaze, and touch. It has been demonstrated again and again that infants who lack these forms of close contact often will have much more difficulties in social adjustment and learning later in life. Again, it is not the gesture of handwriting itself that is responsible for more intense activation of neural circuits, but rather that handwriting acquisition requires the activation of intersubjective circuits involving voice, gaze, and touch, far more intensely than typing acquisition.</p><p><em>Dr. James attributes the differences to the messiness inherent in free-form handwriting: Not only must we first plan and execute the action in a way that is not required when we have a traceable outline, but we are also likely to produce a result that is highly variable.</em></p><p><em>That variability may itself be a learning tool. “When a kid produces a messy letter,” Dr. James said, “that might help him learn it.”</em></p><p><em>Our brain must understand that each possible iteration of, say, an “a” is the same, no matter how we see it written. Being able to decipher the messiness of each “a” may be more helpful in establishing that eventual representation than seeing the same result repeatedly.</em></p><p>Dr. James is making a different kind of argument than we have seen so far. I would not dispute that handwriting requires more attentiveness to pattern recognition. Handwriting is indeed often messy, and one imagines that more “processing power” is required to decipher its inconsistencies than is required to read the uniform marks of typewritten text. But here, there is nothing unique about handwriting — it is simply “complex pattern recognition,” and we can easily imagine substituting some other task that would train the areas of the brain responsible for this kind of processing. Complex pattern recognition is cast as an adjunct benefit of learning handwriting, and not as anything unique to writing as such.</p><p>The rest of the article makes arguments similar to those I’ve already commented on, so I’ll wrap things up here. My basic objection to the conclusions this article draws is that they all understand writing as a set of formal gestures that are not necessarily specific to context. Do hieroglyphic and pictographic forms of writing differ significantly? Does the medium of inscription matter? These questions are not addressed. Most important are the networks of relationships between people, things, and techniques that support the acquisition of a skill like writing. The gesture itself only enables or prohibits certain configurations of these networks. Handwriting tends to activate voice, gaze, and touch much more than typing, and thus it draws on a well of resources similar in kind to the other forms of basic skills we learn from primary caregivers such as speaking, behaving, hygiene, etc.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a2cf77a175c7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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