On January 27, 2026, a Russian drone strike disabled one of the pumping stations of the Druzhba oil pipeline in Ukraine. For eighty-five days, no Russian pipeline oil reached Hungary — the longest shutdown in the pipeline’s history. This analysis reconstructs, from public data, what happened to strategic reserves, and uses model calculations to show what would have happened if the pipeline had not resumed operation.

The Hungarian Hydrocarbon Stockpiling Association (MSZKSZ) publishes the so-called mobile volume of strategic reserves on a monthly basis. Through the end of 2025, the data shows stability: the number of stockpile days remained steady between 90 and 96 days, in line with the 90-day minimum required by the IEA and the EU. However, the drone strike on January 27 prompted MOL to initiate the release of strategic reserves as early as February — amounting, in the first round, to 250,000 tonnes of crude oil. By March, the impact had spread through the entire system: diesel stocks plunged from 535,000 tonnes to 144,000, and gasoline stocks fell from 269,000 to 55,000, within a single month.

The drop in stockpile days

The most telling indicator is the number of stockpile days: how many days the reserves would last under normal consumption. This stood at 96 days in January and fell to 44 days by March — deep below the 90-day international obligation, and dangerously close to the level at which security of supply is actually put at risk.

The model below calculates different trajectories. The baseline follows the actual course of events: a slow ramp-up of the Adria pipeline, followed by a restart on day 85 — with a modeled low point of 53 stockpile days, which closely approximates the observed actual low of 44 days (the difference stems from the fact that, in reality, the release of reserves took place in large, one-off batches rather than evenly). The optimistic trajectory shows what would have happened if Adria imports had ramped up to full capacity within two weeks: stockpile days would barely have dipped below 94. The worst-case trajectory answers the critical question. How much consumption rises, how reliable imports are, how quickly the Adria pipeline ramps up, and whether the Druzhba pipeline restarts at all — these are all factors in this modelable scenario.

What would have happened if the pipeline had not restarted?

In the worst-case scenario, Druzhba never restarts, Adria deliveries peak at 7,000 tonnes per day due to Croatian transit capacity constraints and the fee dispute, and the regulated (‘protected’) fuel price remains in place — which in the model translates into 2.5 percent of additional demand, since the artificially low price does nothing to curb consumption. The result:

The strategic reserves would have been completely depleted by October 29, 2026. If consumption had risen by 10 percent and imports had fallen 20 percent short of expectations, depletion would have moved forward to July 10 — that is, roughly now.

What would depletion have meant?

The exhaustion of reserves would not have meant that every fuel station ran dry overnight — Adria imports and domestic production would have covered roughly two-thirds of demand. But the missing third would still have been severe: Hungary’s GDP amounts to roughly HUF 240 billion per day, and international experience shows that a 10 percent fuel shortage causes a GDP loss of 0.5–1 percent over the affected period. A 60 percent supply disruption lasting one month would thus have meant an output loss on the order of HUF 300–650 billion, with concentrated losses in the most exposed sectors — road haulage, agriculture (at the peak of the harvest!), petrochemicals, construction — plus second-round inflationary effects.

Which parts of the country would run dry first? Since no station-level data is publicly available, the map below offers an illustrative estimate rather than a forecast: each county’s risk score combines its road distance from the Danube Refinery in Százhalombatta — the gravitational center of Hungary’s fuel logistics — with the weight of its fuel consumption. Anchored to the worst-case scenario, in which the Druzhba pipeline never restarts and national strategic stocks run out by October 29, 2026, the model suggests supply disruptions would begin in the eastern periphery: Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg, Hajdú-Bihar and Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén counties would face shortages roughly two to three days before the national average, while Budapest and the counties surrounding the refinery would hold out a day or two longer. The differences may look small on paper, but in a real shortage those few days are exactly when panic buying, rationing and queues at the pumps would concentrate — hover over each county on the map for its estimated date.

Hungary’s main crude artery stood silent for 85 days, reserves fell below half of their pre-crisis level — and it barely made the news. The models above suggest the margin was thinner than the calm implied: a slower repair or a weaker import ramp-up, and this quiet episode would have become a loud crisis. Silence is what energy security looks like when it works; it shouldn’t be mistaken for safety.