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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Greg Burton on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Greg Burton on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@gfburton?source=rss-f2a0d6ec5603------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Greg Burton on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Moving Parts: Internal Displacement in Nigeria]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@gfburton/moving-parts-internal-displacement-in-nigeria-a3d0f0f5186f?source=rss-f2a0d6ec5603------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[boko-haram]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nigeria]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Greg Burton]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Apr 2018 20:47:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-04-03T20:48:06.665Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*IGU34Lngem43x-ip7En5UA.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/regional/nnorth-east/187433-malnutrition-hits-adamawa-idp-camp.html">https://www.premiumtimesng.com/regional/nnorth-east/187433-malnutrition-hits-adamawa-idp-camp.html</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>INTRODUCTION</em></strong></p><p>There has been mixed news out of Nigeria in recent days. On the one hand, the government has <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-nigeria-security/nigeria-talking-to-boko-haram-about-possible-ceasefire-idUKKBN1H10OS"><strong>confirmed</strong></a> that they are now engaging in official <a href="http://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2018/03/26/girls-reunite-with-their-families/"><strong>ceasefire negotiations</strong></a> with Boko Haram with an eye on long-term peace, though these talks are made more difficult by the significant <a href="https://medium.com/@gfburton/the-internal-struggles-within-boko-haram-7b4913b2c467"><strong>divisions</strong></a> within the group. On the other hand, and more recently, Boko Haram <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security/suspected-boko-haram-militants-kill-at-least-15-in-nigerias-maiduguri-idUSKCN1H90L2"><strong>attacks</strong></a> on villages near Maiduguri in Borno State have <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/boko-haram-attack-leaves-18-dead-in-nigeria/ar-AAvnGxB"><strong>killed</strong></a> more than a dozen people, and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/04/dozens-killed-boko-haram-attacks-northeast-nigeria-180402183941480.html"><strong>wounded</strong></a><strong> </strong>many more. In the backdrop of all of this emerging, high-level news, however, there is a continued problem, that of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The proliferation of IDPs in Nigeria, largely as a result of Boko Haram activity in the region, has remained n issue despite supposed <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-35173618"><strong>advancements</strong></a><strong> </strong>against the terrorist group and negotiations with them. Numerous camps have been established for these individuals, but even these supposed sanctuaries have been the <a href="http://www.cameroonvoice.com/news/article-news-30489.html"><strong>target</strong></a><strong> </strong><a href="http://indianexpress.com/article/world/boko-haram-kills-nine-near-bombed-ne-nigeria-camp-4856661/"><strong>of</strong></a><strong> </strong><a href="http://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2017/12/12/three-killed-seven-injured-in-suicide-attack-on-idp-camp/"><strong>multiple</strong></a><strong> </strong><a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201802010224.html"><strong>attacks</strong></a> by Boko Haram in the past few months alone. The <a href="https://medium.com/@gfburton/background-report-the-fulani-herdsmen-part-i-key-findings-introduction-and-history-383c10f8137c"><strong>Fulani crisis</strong></a> elsewhere in the nation has also contributed to the growth of Nigeria’s IDP population, as has continued <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/199173-desertification-returning-idps-north-east-homes-trigger-fresh-conflicts-expert.html"><strong>desertification</strong></a> in the agriculturally-dependent areas of the country. All of these issues have combined to create a massive and diffuse community of Nigerians who no longer truly have anywhere to call home, and resolving this is an eventuality that the Nigerian government must account for as it continues its efforts to stabilize the region.</p><p><strong><em>WHAT ARE IDPs?</em></strong></p><p>In examining the issue of Internally Displaced Persons in Nigeria, it is important to understand who IDPs are in general. An individual is considered an IDP if they have been “forced or obliged to flee or to leave his or her home or place of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or human-made disasters, but remains within his or her country of origin” (<strong>Brookings Institute, 2007</strong>). Essentially, IDPs are those who would be considered refugees had they left their native country; they are people who have left their home against their will because of some outside force. For how long after the initial event these individuals are considered to be IDPs is a matter of contention, but by any definition it is clear that Nigeria has an incredibly large population of Internally Displaced Persons, <a href="http://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data"><strong>ranking</strong></a> seventh worldwide in total number of IDPs.</p><p><strong><em>NIGERIAN INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS</em></strong></p><p>The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) estimated a <a href="http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/nigeria/"><strong>figure</strong></a> of 2,152,000 internally displaced Nigerians as of the end of 2015, and while this number fell to 1,955,000 in 2016, more than 500,000 new IDPs were created that year. This demonstrates a key problem in resolving the issue, namely that people are displaced at nearly the same rate at which they are resettled. In fact, the first six months of 2017 saw another <a href="http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/country-profiles/Mid-Year-update-2017/NGA-conflict.pdf"><strong>142,000 IDPs</strong></a> created. Particularly telling is that the majority of IDPs (1,434,149) were tracked from Borno State alone, which has been the hub of Boko Haram activity in the country since 2009. An additional 78,000 IDPs were created in 2016 due to natural disasters, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees listed over 200,000 refugees of Nigerian origin at that time as well. These statistics indicate that internal displacement remains an enormous issue in Nigeria, and Nigeria’s international rankings make the same case. At the end of 2016 and per the <a href="http://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data"><strong>most recent data available</strong></a>, Nigeria had the seventh most IDPs overall, the fifth most new displacements due to violence, and the 20th most new displacements due to disaster out of 133 countries with registered IDPs.</p><p>Recently, the <a href="https://nigeria.iom.int/over-14-million-now-displaced-six-states-northeast-nigeria"><strong>communities established</strong></a><strong> </strong>to receive the hundreds of thousands of IDPs in Nigeria have faced significant hardship, in addition to the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/06/northern-nigeria-refuge-idps-fleeing-boko-haram-170629130042962.html"><strong>strain</strong></a><strong> </strong>placed on personal residences and existing communities. The close quarters and informal construction have led to deadly events like the March 26th <a href="http://saharareporters.com/2018/03/27/five-die-scores-injured-nigerias-idp-camp-fire"><strong>fire</strong></a><strong> </strong>in the IDP camp at Rann, Borno, where a Boko Haram <a href="http://punchng.com/bloodshed-in-borno-as-bharam-kills-three-un-workers-three-soldiers/"><strong>attack</strong></a><strong> </strong>killed six earlier that month. An <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/fire-kills-five-in-displaced-persons-camp-in-nigeria/"><strong>incident</strong></a><strong> </strong>the previous year at the same camp had cost over 100 their lives as well. Even in the absence of major tragedies like these, the situation in the camps is less than ideal, with most camps <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-au/news/world/thousands-displaced-by-boko-haram-languish-in-abuja-idp-camps/ar-BBKK9aN"><strong>suffering</strong></a> from a lack of access to resources and public goods like water, healthcare, and schooling. In some camps in Adamawa State, the conditions have deteriorated to the point that IDPs began staging <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/260994-displaced-boko-haram-hungry-idps-protest-food-shortage.html"><strong>peaceful protests</strong></a> in March, 2018 to bring attention to their plight. The issues may be resolved one at a time as they are given attention, but <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/regional/nnorth-east/261164-protests-hungry-idps-nema-begins-emergency-distribution-food-camps.html"><strong>these temporary solutions</strong></a> do little to resolve the overall problem of displacement.</p><p><strong><em>MOVING FORWARD</em></strong></p><p>So how does Nigeria go forward? There are many ways of thinking when it come to resolving the problem of internal displacement in any country. There have been efforts to aid Internally Displaced Persons, both by Nigerian internal actors and international response bodies, but the crisis yet persists. In late March of 2018, President Buhari <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/03/benue-killings-buhari-promises-rehabilitation-displaced-175000-idp-camp/"><strong>promised</strong></a> that the nearly 200,000 IDPs in Benue State would soon be returned to their homes. There has not been sufficient time to evaluate the accuracy of this claim, but researchers concerned with the matter have <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/199173-desertification-returning-idps-north-east-homes-trigger-fresh-conflicts-expert.html"><strong>suggested</strong></a> that resettlement without action to resolve environmental concerns like desertification would only intensify problems in the region. The Nigerian Air Force was also <a href="http://thenationonlineng.net/naf-begins-treatment-4450-idps-benue/"><strong>engaged</strong></a> to aid in dealing with health crises in Benue State. These efforts, while steps in the right direction, are limited in their scope, dealing only with one state, and have yet to see any significant successes.</p><p>While millions of dollars have been<strong> </strong><a href="http://devinit.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/GHA-START-briefing-Nigeria-07-04-2015.pdf"><strong>contributed</strong></a> to the resettlement efforts from outside the nation itself, this has also not been enough to resolve the problem, as indicated by the continued high numbers of IDPs. An end to hostilities with Boko Haram would undoubtedly slow the creation of new violence-related displacement, but it would not solve the problems of those already displaced. There is no simple solution, but research on the topic suggests that there must be a combined effort, not only to return the regions affected to their original status, but also to resolve the problems that existed before the violent conflict began displacing Nigerians en masse. While Boko Haram has been a driving force behind displacement, it was not the only influence. Nigeria must evaluate all of the causes of this crisis and approach them in a unified effort, dedicated to not only resolving the current issues but also preventing future crises from arising.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a3d0f0f5186f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Going into Labor: Youth and the West African Workforce]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@gfburton/going-into-labor-youth-and-the-west-african-workforce-a653906cd2b6?source=rss-f2a0d6ec5603------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a653906cd2b6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[nigeria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[youth]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[west-africa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[unemployment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[namibia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Greg Burton]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 26 Jul 2017 23:31:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-07-26T23:33:15.223Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/1*9BO9xtWibkBDja8LNAuvsQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo: <a href="http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/05/sap-smart-academy-to-equip-nigerian-youths-for-tomorrow-workforce/">Vanguard News Nigeria</a></figcaption></figure><p>With about <a href="http://fpif.org/nigerias-youth-factor/"><strong>fifty percent of the Nigerian population</strong></a> between the ages of 18 and 34, it is evident that the younger generation of Nigerians can have a significant impact on the nation’s future, and much the same is true of many other countries in West Africa. It is not only in politics, however, that the significance of a younger generation can be seen. Across the region, youth have begun to impact the socioeconomic structure of West Africa, and efforts have been made to promote entrepreneurship and the integration of youths into the workforce. Youth unemployment, however, <a href="http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/902345/icode/"><strong>continues to be an issue</strong></a> across the continent. As such, it is important to examine the involvement of young people in developing economies throughout the region.</p><p>Africa as a whole has a significant unemployment problem, and the west is no exception. In Namibia, unemployment is at <a href="https://www.peacecorps.gov/volunteer/volunteer-openings/small-enterprise-and-entrepreneurship-development-volunteer-4879br/"><strong>nearly 28%</strong></a>, and has been increasing since 2006. Between 2014 and 2016, unemployment in Namibia <a href="http://www.namibian.com.na/56242/read/Lack-of-funds-cripples-young-mans-SME-dream"><strong>increased almost six percent</strong></a>. Nigerian unemployment is lower, but still<strong> </strong><a href="http://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/12/nigerias-unemployment-rate-rises-13-9-nbs/"><strong>rests at about 14%</strong></a>, which leaves millions out of the workforce. Across Africa, 37% of the working age population are between 15 and 24, but that same age range <a href="http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/ADI_Youth_Employment_summary.pdf"><strong>includes almost 60%</strong></a> of unemployed Africans. About <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/publication/new-report-outlines-priorities-to-address-africa-s-youth-employment-challenge"><strong>80% of employed Africans</strong></a><strong> </strong>work in the informal sector as well, meaning that they are not guaranteed paychecks, benefits, or job security. Additionally, many in the region fear that eligible workers <a href="http://newafricanmagazine.com/youth-exodus-africa-strategically-turned-giant-farm/"><strong>feel the need to leave Africa altogether</strong></a> due to the lack of jobs, leading them to take low-paying and dangerous jobs that don’t contribute at all to the regional economy. Increasing youth unemployment in recent years <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2015/12/07/enough-will-youth-protests-drive-social-change-in-africa/"><strong>has led to protests and discontent</strong></a>, another negative effect of the situation.</p><p>Many regional efforts have been enacted to combat youth unemployment in West Africa. These projects, in contrast with what one might expect, tend to focus on the training of skilled laborers and technically-proficient employees rather than simply brute creation of jobs. In one instance, the local monarch of Ife, Nigeria <a href="https://medium.com/-%09http:/punchng.com/ooni-organises-ict-training-for-200-youths"><strong>established a youth training program</strong></a> aimed to instill technical knowledge in 200 local youths by training them in computer programming. A similar program headed by the Industrial Training Fund and the Nigerian Employers’ Consultative Association <a href="http://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2017/06/29/itf-collaborates-with-neca-trains-3000-youths-on-entrepreneurship/"><strong>accepted 3,000 Nigerian youths</strong></a><strong> </strong>for year-long training in 18 different trades and crafts. The Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency created another such program, through which over 2,200 Nigerian youths were trained in the particulars of maritime studies. These focused efforts have been both governmental and commercial, and have focused on skilled training. As a result, there are more skilled workers in Nigeria, but neither 200 students nor 3,000 puts a significant dent in the hundreds of thousands of Nigerians who are unemployed.</p><p><a href="http://www.ecowas.int/"><strong>ECOWAS</strong></a>, an international body that works to organize West African economic efforts, has recently turned its focus to youth empowerment and employment as well. Having determined that the significant youth unemployment can be a <a href="http://www.pulse.com.gh/news/ecowas-summit-youth-unemployment-is-a-potential-threat-to-peace-prez-mahama-id3775206.html"><strong>threat to regional peace</strong></a>, ECOWAS has developed multiple programs to address the issue. The international organization hosts a youth council, which <a href="http://www.ecowasyouthcouncil.org/about/"><strong>aims to integrate youth movements</strong></a> in the area for the socioeconomic benefit of all. As a greater body, ECOWAS has initiated two main projects. The first of these, labeled “Youth Empowerment and Orientation on Conflict Prevention,” <a href="http://ecpf.ecowas.int/components/youth-empowerment/"><strong>aims to teach conflict resolution skills</strong></a><strong> </strong>alongside more marketable and technical ones in order to maintain peace in West Africa and bolster the area economically. The second <a href="http://ecpf.ecowas.int/components/youth-empowerment/"><strong>seeks to create more data</strong></a> about the status of youths in the region in order to better understand the issues surrounding unemployment. Recently, ECOWAS also <a href="http://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-consolidates-youth-empowerment-efforts/"><strong>created a “steering committee”</strong></a> composed of representatives from the fifteen constituent nations, whose goal is to consolidate youth empowerment efforts in West Africa and facilitate ECOWAS’s efforts to that end.</p><p>Many of the largest efforts toward eliminating youth unemployment in West Africa are fairly recent, and so it is difficult to gauge their success as yet. Youth unemployment in Nigeria is <a href="https://ieconomics.com/nigeria-youth-unemployment-rate-forecast"><strong>forecasted to rise</strong></a><strong> </strong>in the coming years as the Nigerian population does the same. In fact, it is speculated that such an increase in population <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2014/jul/11/africa-youth-unemployment-population-growth"><strong>may be tied to the problem of unemployment</strong></a>, and the development of the Nigerian population is not slowing, with an <a href="https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Publications/Files/Key_Findings_WPP_2015.pdf"><strong>increase of 80,000,000 people</strong></a> projected within the next 15 years. With new programs implemented, however, and with a new national and international focus on addressing youth unemployment, change may be in the offing for West Africa.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a653906cd2b6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Background Report: The Fulani Herdsmen (Part V— Conclusion)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@gfburton/background-report-the-fulani-herdsmen-part-v-conclusion-cfaeb826111c?source=rss-f2a0d6ec5603------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cfaeb826111c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[nigeria]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Greg Burton]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 22 Jul 2017 15:08:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-07-22T15:08:49.205Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Previously published November 2016 (Project Cyma)</em></p><p><strong>The current conflict in Nigeria between the Fulani herdsmen and their neighbors stems from a long history of feuding, farming, and herding, and will not easily be resolved. Preexisting communal conflicts have fueled violence as herdsmen turn militant in the face of urbanization, desertification, and the indifference of the Nigerian government to their plight. Fulani violence has taken more lives in the past six months than has Boko Haram, Nigeria’s most prominent terrorist organization, and it shows no signs of slowing in its deadly pace.</strong></p><p><strong><em>CONCLUSION</em></strong></p><p>In Nigeria’s middle belt, a crisis grows daily, and it must be resolved for danger of further loss of prosperity, property, and life. The region’s conflict has been growing for a long time, and it is not easily managed. Numerous factors are at play in central Nigeria, and each of them complicates the embattled climate. For tensions in the area to be fully relieved, the causes of the conflict — internal and external — will have to be addressed along with the damage to which it has led.</p><p>It is unlikely that the Fulani militants will allow tensions in the middle belt to decline until either they are stopped or their grievances are addressed. Since stopping the violence without negotiation and compromise would result in great loss of life and could worsen the situation, it is in the best interest of both the militants and the government to cooperate with one another. The militants do not seek to destroy the government as some of Nigeria’s terrorist groups do, so the powers that be in the nation have little to fear by resorting to negotiations. The Fulani themselves can benefit from talks with the government as well, perhaps achieving their end goal, if in a diminished form.</p><p>A long history has led to the recent events in central Nigeria, and it has created a dangerous problem, but one that can be solved with care. Those affected will have to stop casting accusations and blame and begin to work together toward peace in the region. There may be a long period of tension and recovery, but the threat of Fulani militants only grows as their true goals are ignored, and so the work towards an answer must begin now. The solution may be simple or it may be infinitely complex, but it surely must start with a recognition of others not as militant and victim, Muslim and Christian, or herdsman and farmer, but as citizen and citizen, each with needs and concerns that must be weighed.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cfaeb826111c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Insight into the Push for Renewable Energy in West Africa]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@gfburton/insight-into-the-push-for-renewable-energy-in-west-africa-700a20bbcedb?source=rss-f2a0d6ec5603------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/700a20bbcedb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[west-africa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nigeria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[climate-change]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[liberia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Greg Burton]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 17 Jul 2017 11:46:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-07-17T11:46:59.981Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Previously published June 20, 2017 (Project Cyma)</em></p><p>The crowning point of a recent visit by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to the headquarters of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was the <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201706050877.html"><strong>cosigning of a one-billon dollar pledge</strong></a> by ECOWAS President Marcel de Souza, Prime Minister Netanyahu, and Yosef Abramowitz, CEO of the Israeli firm Energiya Global. This $1bn is set to be used over the next four years in the <a href="https://www.today.ng/business/energy/300959/west-africa-israel-sign-1-billion-clean-energy-pact"><strong>development of solar power infrastructure</strong></a> throughout ECOWAS’s member nations, beginning with a $20 million project in Liberia. This initial investment intends to produce solar power to the tune of 25% of Liberia’s energy needs by its completion, and marks a significant step in the expansion of renewable energy resources in West Africa. In introducing this venture, a member of the Israeli Knesset <a href="http://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/06/ecowas-israel-sign-1-bn-solar-energy-member-states/"><strong>cited as motivation</strong></a> the “600 million Africans without electricity,” and touted the humanitarian and economic benefits of the project. While still in its infancy, this project seems poised to greatly change the landscape of renewable energy in the region.</p><p>In light of this new development, it seems as good a time as any to examine the current lay of the land in West Africa as pertains to power and renewable resources. It seems that there is generally a dearth of data on renewables in the region, which is in itself not a good sign, and the data that exists is, for the most part, not positive. Since 2001, in Africa as a whole, the share of renewables in total energy usage <a href="https://yearbook.enerdata.net/#renewable-in-electricity-production-share-by-region.html"><strong>has increased by less than a full percent</strong></a><strong> </strong>(0.4%, to be exact). Furthermore, its share in Nigerian energy has decreased radically, from 38.2 percent in 2001 to 17.2 percent in 2015 (the most recent year for which this data was available). This renewable energy count also includes, <a href="http://energyatlas.iea.org/#!/tellmap/-1076250891"><strong>and is largely composed of</strong></a>, solid biofuel usage, such as that of wood or peat, rather than solely solar or wind power. On the other hand, however, throughout Africa, the share of wind and solar production in energy has <a href="https://yearbook.enerdata.net/#renewable-in-electricity-production-share-by-region.html"><strong>increased from 0.4 percent to 1.92 percent</strong></a> in the same timeframe. Statistics like these have led to some calls for change in energy policy throughout West Africa, <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201706130799.html"><strong>citing the negative economic impact</strong></a> of weak energy infrastructure. Despite what these numbers and complaints might suggest, however, the region’s journey toward renewable energy is not entirely stagnant.</p><p>Many nations in the region have made efforts, especially in recent years, to work toward renewability. For nearly a decade now, ECOWAS <a href="http://www.ecreee.org/page/overview-ecreee"><strong>has maintained a branch</strong></a> focused entirely on this arena, via the ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (ECREEE). This sub-organization has conducted research into the capabilities of the region for renewable energy, and has supervised regional projects toward that end. In addition to this larger body, individual nations have sought to do the same internally, as in Namibia, where the government has <a href="http://english.sina.com/news/2017-06-13/detail-ifyfzhpq6764242.shtml"><strong>turned toward</strong></a><strong> </strong>renewables as a means for socioeconomic development. Through non-governmental organizations, international bodies, and individual governments, there are a number of renewable energy projects in the offing across West Africa.</p><p>These projects themselves are numerous, and most have only just begun, but their prevalence seems to be an indicator of prevailing thought in the area. A wind farm is being <a href="https://economist.com.na/25123/mining-energy/envisaged-wind-farm-to-boost-clean-energy-generation/"><strong>planned for Namibia</strong></a>, and is said to be <a href="http://www.cbn.co.za/component/k2/wsp-helps-namibia-embrace-megawatts-of-power-with-diaz-wind-farm"><strong>among the first</strong></a> major clean energy projects in the country. Continuing in that vein, Namibia has gone on to sign a significant agreement with France <a href="https://southernafrican.news/2017/06/12/nam-france-sign-environment-sustainability-agreement/"><strong>encouraging eco-friendly business</strong></a> in both nations. Finally, the same nation has recently <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201706121105.html"><strong>commissioned a $120 million solar plant</strong></a> as one of 14 new renewable energy projects, intended to <a href="https://economist.com.na/25445/mining-energy/more-power-to-grid-as-karibib-solar-plant-launched/"><strong>provide thousands with power</strong></a>. In Nigeria, organizations such as Power for All have <a href="http://leadership.ng/2017/06/10/gender-specific-approach-renewables-will-reduce-energy-poverty-nigeria/"><strong>encouraged a gender-specific view</strong></a><strong> </strong>of energy use, aimed at conservation of electricity. The Nigerian government has <a href="http://leadership.ng/2017/06/10/nigeria-gear-efforts-access-500m-green-climate-fund/"><strong>begun working</strong></a> to develop plans for the use of hundreds of millions of USD in funding for clean energy, intended to encourage private sector involvement in renewability. Ghana has <a href="http://www.pulse.com.gh/business/clean-energy-government-to-set-up-renewable-energy-authority-id6797145.html"><strong>designated a Renewable Energy Authority</strong></a><strong> </strong>within its borders, with the goal of producing ten percent of all energy renewably by 2030. These approaches, which will almost certainly be bolstered in some way by the promised investment from Israel, but it will be some time before the results can be evaluated.</p><p>The impact of these projects will likely not be measured in the same manner as would be expected elsewhere in the world — in terms of environmental and global benefit. Instead, many will measure these efforts in their <a href="http://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/IRENA_Measuring-the-Economics_2016.pdf"><strong>economic and social impact</strong></a><strong> </strong>on the regions in which they are implemented, with environmental boons as a welcome side-effect. As emphasized by the proponents of Israel’s investment, the expansion of renewable energy in the region would be the expansion of all energy in the region, <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201706060356.html"><strong>giving affordability and access</strong></a> to those who had previously gone without. As such, developments like those discussed here are critical throughout the international community. Full access to any energy, much less completely clean and renewable energy, will not be immediate for West Africa, but the region has begun taking larger and larger steps in the right direction.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=700a20bbcedb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Background Report: The Fulani Herdsmen (Part IV — Analysis and Potential Solutions)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@gfburton/background-report-the-fulani-herdsmen-part-iv-analysis-and-potential-solutions-44d8ddae98b8?source=rss-f2a0d6ec5603------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/44d8ddae98b8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[boko-haram]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Greg Burton]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 16 Jul 2017 11:33:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-07-16T11:33:02.167Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Previously published November 2016 (Project Cyma)</em></p><p><strong>The current conflict in Nigeria between the Fulani herdsmen and their neighbors stems from a long history of feuding, farming, and herding, and will not easily be resolved. Preexisting communal conflicts have fueled violence as herdsmen turn militant in the face of urbanization, desertification, and the indifference of the Nigerian government to their plight. Fulani violence has taken more lives in the past six months than has Boko Haram, Nigeria’s most prominent terrorist organization, and it shows no signs of slowing in its deadly pace.</strong></p><p><strong><em>ANALYSIS and POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS</em></strong></p><p><em>Motivations for Middle Belt Conflict</em></p><p>The surge of Fulani activity in the middle belt of Nigeria has stemmed from many factors, and the threat will continue to grow unless these are addressed. These influences are internal and external, including the needs and actions of the Fulani themselves as well as the actions of local and national governments, Nigerian farmers, and other outside parties. Despite many assertions to the contrary, it does not appear that the Fulani militants in central Nigeria are motivated by ideology, but rather by simpler factors, if not more justifiable ones. The crisis in the region must be resolved through careful action, beginning with negotiation and compromise from all involved.</p><p>The internal factors that have influenced the Fulani militants who direct attacks in the middle belt are numerous. Population expansion, both of the Fula people in Nigeria due to immigration and natural growth, and of the Fulani herds, has necessitated the use of greater and greater swaths of land for grazing and encampment. This, in tandem with drought and desertification in the area, has forced the Fulani to range further and further afield, inspiring feuds with many communities that feel infringed upon. Furthermore, the increasing urbanization of Nigeria has deprived the pastoralists of valuable grassland, again forcing the Fulani to attempt to expand their “grass kingdom.”</p><p>As a people, the Fulani are overwhelmingly Muslim, and many have attributed the recent attacks by militants to religious causes. Religious elements have influenced many communal conflicts related to the Fulani, including recurring disputes with the Tiv, Jukun, and Eggon, all of whom practice alternate religious traditions, and members of the Fulani-Hausa ethnic group were implicated in the religiously-motivated 2010 Jos Riots. Despite past events, however, it seems that religious motivations are absent in the most recent attacks by militant herdsmen.<em>(1)</em> Though the attackers are Muslim, their attacks are not in the name of Islam, but rather in the name of the cattle that need space to graze.</p><p>It is vital when looking at the rising Fulani conflict to understand that the militants responsible for these attacks are not Boko Haram. They do not pursue an organized agenda against the Nigerian government, and they do not campaign against westernization. Their goals are much simpler, and, as such, much more easily addressed. Without the significant religious and ideological motivations that drive Boko Haram, the Fulani are more likely to accept compromise, as long as it helps them and their cattle.</p><p>External influences have contributed to the conflict as well, coming from multiple sources. Previously mentioned communal feuds, as with the Tiv who have often been targeted by militant attacks, have worsened due to actions of all involved, and have provided targets for the militants, who commonly ascribe attacks to retribution.<em>(2)</em> These communities have alsoretaliated indiscriminately, failing to distinguish the militants from the herdsmen. This cycle of violence must be a focus of any attempted resolutions of the conflict at hand.</p><p>Governmental action, or the lack thereof, has impacted the rise of the conflict as well. The need for increased room to graze is not new, and Fulani have previously called upon the government to rectify the situation.<em>(3)</em> Due in part to ethnic and religious factors, as well as constituency concerns, there has been little action in the Nigerian government to resolve these problems, and proposed solutions have been rejected on the same grounds.<em>(4)</em> The militants within the Fulani have grown restless, and their impatience has led them to take violent action.<em>(5)</em> As any solution must involve the Nigerian government, biases held by both the Fulani and legislators must be put aside to achieve peace.</p><p><em>What Can be Done?</em></p><p>As evidenced by the massive human cost of Nigeria’s fastest-growing conflict, an expedient resolution is necessary. Methods have been proposed by many parties in Nigeria, ranging from the Fulani themselves to ordinary citizens. Predictably, all of these proposals have their positives and negatives, and each boasts both promoters and detractors. If a uniformly positive and uniquely well-received solution exists, it is yet to be discovered, and so any agreement to end the conflict will require compromise.</p><p><em>Proposed Solutions</em></p><p>One proposed solution to conflict in the region, and perhaps the simplest if most dangerous option, is the deployment of soldiers to combat Fulani militants. This approach has been advocated in two manners, some proponents recommending that the military be used as a defense against attacks and some calling for armed prophylaxis. Alhaji Ikelegbe, the Otaru of Auchi, advocated the use of soldiers to defend the citizenry, stating that the region would welcome “any support by government to dislodge these violent people,” concluding that there was a desperate need for “soldiers to come to the aid of [the] people.” Individuals like popular Nigerian radio host “Freeze” have recommended more extreme action, like the issuance of a “shoot on sight” order for herdsmen.<em>(6)</em> These solutions, while certainly decisive, would likely only inflame the conflict, and should be kept at best as a last resort.<em>(7)</em></p><p>More peaceful solutions have been proposed which, while remaining authoritative, would allow for nonviolent resolution of the conflict. One such possibility was proposed by the Chinua Achebe Center for Leadership and Development, recommending the introduction of a complete ban on grazing in affected areas and the imposition of strict ranching guidelines on Fulani herdsmen.<em>(8) </em>This proposal, while it would constrain the nomadic lifestyle of the Fulani, calls upon the government to provide resources for the relocated pastoralists and attempts to resolve a delicate situation.</p><p>Another nonviolent solution was proposed two years ago by a conference held by the National Judicial Institute, which attempted to resolve communal conflicts between herdsmen and farmers. The conference recommended the establishment of long-term cattle trails and grazing routes, and, like the Achebe Center recommendation, placed emphasis on the importance of establishing ranches. Furthermore, this report advised that traditional rulers be tasked with resolving conflicts between the Fulani and local farmers,<em>(9)</em> with additional arbitration methods available to them if they should fail.<em>(10)</em> This would encounter logistical issues, and may not be well received by any parties involved, but would provide reasonable concessions to all parties involved. Members of the Fula ethnic group have offered solutions similar to those recommended by the National Conference, but these have been similarly ignored in recent years. In 2013, the Miyette Allah Cattle Rearers Association called on the Nigerian government to create grazing routes throughout Nigeria in order to end conflict between herdsmen and farmers. As the report and suggestions were issued prior to the surge in tensions in the region, recommendations would have to be reexamined in light of recent events, but could still prove quite useful.<em>(11)</em></p><p>The most prominent proposal to combat the conflict in the region, as well as the most controversial one, takes the form of the National Grazing Bill that has been submitted in the Nigerian legislature. The bill undertakes to establish a Grazing Reserve made of federal land and land deemed necessary by the commission that it would create as a regulatory body.<em>(12)</em> It would endow such a commission with limited powers of eminent domain, aiming to create paths for Fulani to use in order to assuage the tensions that have led to violence. Met with anger and objection by many, it has been outright rejected by some local leaders and legislators.<em>(13)</em> The primary oppositions to it focus on the potential seizure of land and the perceived slant towards the aggressing militants, though some reactions have been stronger, with one former minister declaring the bill to be “more evil than the deadly Boko Haram insurgency.” Though the bill has failed once already, fears pertaining to it abound, and it is considered by many not to be viable as a solution to the crisis.<em>(14)</em></p><p><em>Potential Alternatives</em></p><p>Though many solutions have been proposed, each has its drawbacks, and none are universally accepted. There is, of course, no perfect way to resolve a conflict of this scale, but the ideal peace will be built from elements of many proposals. The concerns of the Fulani must be taken into account for violence to end, and the underlying causes of such concerns must also be addressed. Furthermore, preventative measures must be enacted in order to prevent such a crisis from emerging again in the future.</p><p>It seems clear that any agreement must begin with a ceasefire and a gift of amnesty. Those who have been imprisoned for their actions must be fairly tried, and governing bodies in the region must refrain from pursuing legal action against those who lay down their arms to accept a cessation of hostilities. The Fulani represent too large a group to be punished as a whole for their actions, and such punishment would likely only lead to later violence. Additionally, it may be nearly impossible to distinguish the militant herdsmen from the peaceful herdsmen once a peace has been reached, and so anything but amnesty would be an exercise in futility.</p><p>In order to resolve the symptoms of the problem at hand, the government should establish ranches and grazing paths, as recommended by the National Conference and others, but it should ensure that land is acquired as carefully and fairly as possible. Stricter penalties must be established for the use of land not designated as grazeable, and these must be determinedly enforced to prevent future conflict between herdsmen and farmers. To ease the transition and migration to the proper areas, the national government could provide subsidies to keep the prices of food low for Fulani cattle.</p><p>The solution cannot end with the symptoms, however; it must address the root causes of the conflict. While desertification and population problems cannot be easily combatted, communal conflicts can be resolved. The government must appoint impartial arbiters to settle known disputes between the Fulani and other communities, and must commission studies to identify other disputes for immediate resolution as well. The Fulani themselves could be called upon to aid in reconciliation, and must participate in recovery efforts in the battered region. Cooperation between the communities must be fostered by local leaders, thus reducing the potential for a resurgence of militant activity. Every step in the recovery process will require compromise and cooperation, and resolution of the crisis in the middle belt will be a difficult task that can only be accomplished if bias is set aside and the interests of all Nigerians are considered.</p><p><em>References</em></p><ol><li>Nossiter, Adam. “Toll From Religious and Ethnic Violence in Nigeria Rises to 500.” The New York Times. The New York Times, 08 Mar. 2010. Web.</li><li>Mkom, John. “10 Killed in Fresh Fulani, Tiv Clash in Taraba — Vanguard News.” Vanguard News. 15 Sept. 2015. Web.</li><li>Shuaib, Shuaib. “Fulani Demand Land Rights.” All Africa. 8 Sept. 2012. Web.</li><li>Jibueze, Joseph. “Ex-NBA President Rejects Grazing Bill.” The Nation Nigeria. 02 May 2016. Web.</li><li>Ibiwale, Jefferson. “Fulani Herdsmen Attacks: Edo Traditional Rulers Want Military Operatives Deployed.” Naij. 06 May 2016. Web.</li><li>Igwe, H. “Harsh? How Popular Broadcaster Wants Fulani Herdsmen Punished for Killings.” Naij. 26 Apr. 2016. Web.</li><li>“Total Ban Is Only Solution to Recurrent Fulani Herdsmen Terror Attacks — Achebe Center.” Lower Niger Congress USA. 23 May 2016. Web.</li><li>National Conference 2014 Report. 5.1.8.1a. Rep. Abuja, Nigeria: National Conference, 2014. Print.</li><li>Ibid</li><li>Duru, Peter. “Fulani Herdsmen Proffer Solution to Clashes with Tiv.”Vanguard News. 06 Jan. 2013. Web.</li><li>Udegbe, Clement. “The National Grazing Bill.” All Africa. 22 Apr. 2016. Web.</li><li>Gbolagunte, Bamigbola. “Afenifere, Mimiko Reject Grazing Commission Bill.” The Sun News. Sun News Nigeria, 15 Apr. 2016. Web.</li><li>Olu-Kayode, Olufemi. “National Grazing Bill More Evil than Boko Haram.”Naij. 19 Apr. 2016. Web.</li><li>Nwankwo, Arthur Agwuncha. “The National Grazing Reserve Bill And Islamization Of Nigeria: Matters Arising By Arthur Agwuncha Nwankwo.” Sahara Reporters. 29 Apr. 2016. Web.</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=44d8ddae98b8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Background Report: The Fulani Herdsmen (Part III — The Fulani and Boko Haram)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@gfburton/background-report-the-fulani-herdsmen-part-iii-the-fulani-and-boko-haram-67fa0c77b454?source=rss-f2a0d6ec5603------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/67fa0c77b454</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[boko-haram]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Greg Burton]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 13 Jul 2017 19:22:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-07-13T19:22:23.620Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Previously published November 2016 (Project Cyma)</em></p><p><strong>The current conflict in Nigeria between the Fulani herdsmen and their neighbors stems from a long history of feuding, farming, and herding, and will not easily be resolved. Preexisting communal conflicts have fueled violence as herdsmen turn militant in the face of urbanization, desertification, and the indifference of the Nigerian government to their plight. Fulani violence has taken more lives in the past six months than has Boko Haram, Nigeria’s most prominent terrorist organization, and it shows no signs of slowing in its deadly pace.</strong></p><p><strong><em>FULANI ETHNIC MILITIA vs. BOKO HARAM</em></strong></p><p>Nigeria has seen abundant terrorist activity in recent years, and the Fulani threat is just one of many. The region faces threats from groups like the Niger Delta Avengers, a militant organization that opposes oil interests in the river delta, and up until two years ago, when a ceasefire was declared, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) posed a threat to the nation as well. The most prominent threat, however, if not the largest, is posed by Boko Haram and, to a lesser extent its splinter group Ansaru. While the goals of Boko Haram are not in line with those of the Fulani, there are distinct similarities in their capability to cause widespread devastation in a troubled country.</p><p>Boko Haram and the Fulani, though somewhat similar in the nature of their attacks, differ greatly in the motivation for their violent acts. The founding tenet of Boko Haram is an opposition to westernization in Nigeria, with the very name of the group often translated as “Western Education is Forbidden.” To this end, the group aims to overthrow the Nigerian government in the northern region of the country, and their attacks have often targeted strategic locations in the furtherance of this goal. Additionally, Boko Haram often targets Christians and other non-Muslims, attempting to ensure the region they strive to control is a purely Islamic one. The Fulani have targeted Christians as well, but their attacks have focused primarily on rival communities that are Christian rather than non-Muslims in general. The main goal of the Fulani attacks is to take control of land in order to provide the herdsmen’s cattle with more grazing room, and their attacks are meant to drive away farmers and intimidate local landowners. Further Fulani attacks have been reprisal for the deaths of herdsmen, but the Fulani have aimed to get the attention of the government in order to achieve their goals rather than attempting to topple it.</p><p>The methods and target regions used by the Fulani have differed from those employed by Boko Haram. The Fulani have focused their attacks in Nigeria’s Middle Belt, particularly Benue, Kaduna, Nasarawa, Plateau, and Taraba States. Boko Haram, on the other hand, has concentrated its violence in Borno, Yobe, Kano, and Adamawa States in the north of the country, as well as the Federal Capital Territory. For the eight years of its active insurgency, Boko Haram has used bombings, suicide attacks, shootings, and prolonged attacks on cities and towns to achieve its goals. In contrast, the Fulani have mainly used shootings and physical confrontations, refraining from conducting bombings or extended assaults. Both terrorist groups, however, primarily target private citizens, with civilians representing 81% of deaths in Fulani attacks and 77% in Boko Haram attacks.<em>(1)</em></p><p>The line between the two terrorist groups has recently become blurred, especially in the wake of several attacks in Enugu State in April of 2016. After the attack, rumors have begun to circulate that those responsible for the violence were not Fulani herdsmen at all, but rather Boko Haram militants in disguise. Ijaw Youths Council (IYC) Worldwide was one of the organizations responsible for this theory, asserting that traditional Fulani herdsmen have not employed such violence in decades past, and that Boko Haram may be using their Fulani guiseas a means of fostering tension and between tribal groups in Nigeria. It would not be out of character for Boko Haram militants to masquerade as members of another group, as suicide bombers and fighters from the group have previously disguised themselves as women and pilgrims to avoid scrutiny on several occasions.<em>(2)</em> In fact, alleged Fulani herdsmen captured after an attack in Taraba State in 2014 confessed that they were in fact agents of Boko Haram, providing evidence that Boko Haram has done the same thing in the past.<em>(3)</em> Other individuals have expressed suspicion that, while the Fulani are not members of Boko Haram in disguise, the two groups may be working together in order to sow discord in the already-conflicted region,<em>(4)</em> though this scenario is unlikely given their vastly different goals and recent attacks on herdsmen.<em>(5,6)</em></p><p>The Fulani militants have been less publicized than Boko Haram, and their attacks, while deadly, have been on a smaller scale than those of the other terror group. The successes of the two groups’ respective agendas have differed greatly, however, with some indicators suggesting that the Fulani are much closer to realizing their goals. Despite Boko Haram’s continued efforts to subvert the Nigerian government and abolish western ways in the nation, they have not managed to gain total control over the region as intended. The Fulani attacks, which many believe focus on gaining land for grazing, have attracted less attention, but have nonetheless inspired government action, with a contentious grazing bill introduced into the Nigerian congress. Though, as of June 2016, this bill has not been approved, it signals progress toward achieving the Fulani ends and inspires hope for the end of Fulani hostilities. This success is something that Boko Haram has not achieved, and, by the very nature of their goals, will likely never achieve.</p><p>Fulani action has elicited strong responses from members of the public, ranging from the understandable anger of displaced farmers to stronger outcries that draw from religious or racial motivation. Because the militants come from a culture that is familiar to many Nigerians, the actions of militants have turned many citizens against an entire subdivision of their population in much the same way that Boko Haram and other fundamentalist sects have inspired the alienation of innocent Muslims. Now that the Fulani militants have increased the frequency of attacks and killed hundreds more Nigerians, they have often been ascribed the status as “the next Boko Haram,” a designation which, while ignoring the vast differences in ideologies, signifies the seriousness of the emerging threat. The Fulani Ethnic Militia are not Boko Haram, and they do not pursue the same goals, but they present as much of a threat to the average people of Nigeria, and will continue to do so until drastic change occurs in the region.<em>(7)</em></p><p><em>References</em></p><ol><li>Global Terrorism Index — 2015. Institute for Economics and Peace. Print.</li><li>Nwachukwu, John Owen. “Boko Haram Terrorists Disguising as Herdsmen to Kill.” Daily Post Nigeria. 27 Apr. 2016. Web.</li><li>“Nigerian Troops Nab Boko Haram Fighters Who Disguised as Women.”Nigeria News. Nigerian Eye. Web.</li><li>“Boko Haram Members Disguised As Fulani Herdsmen Arrested In Taraba State.” Naija Gists. 23 Apr. 2014. Web.</li><li>Chandler, Diana. “Boko Haram Aiding Islamic Herdsmen, Expert Says.”Baptist Press. Southern Baptist Convention, 29 Apr. 2016. Web.</li><li>Okpeahior, Kingsley. “30 Fulani Herdsmen Killed By Boko Haram Militants In Borno.” Reports Afrique News. 30 Apr. 2016. Web.</li><li>Akinwotu, Emmanuel. “The next Boko Haram? Nigerian Attacks Raise Fears of New ‘terror’ Threat.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 12 July 2016. Web.</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=67fa0c77b454" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Efficacy of ECOWAS]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@gfburton/the-efficacy-of-ecowas-ddb98dfd62a8?source=rss-f2a0d6ec5603------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ddb98dfd62a8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[international-relations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[socioeconomic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[democracy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[west-africa]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Greg Burton]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 11 Jul 2017 11:12:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-07-11T11:12:13.016Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Previously published June 6, 2017 (Project Cyma)</em></p><p>For roughly five days in May 2017, large factions of the military of Côte d’Ivoire <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201705170860.html"><strong>mutinied</strong></a>, an event which was met with a not-insignificant <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-statement-on-the-mutiny-in-cote-divoire/"><strong>international response</strong></a>. The situation was resolved quickly, and on May 19th a statement was released jointly by multiple international communities calling for the peaceful resolution of such disputes in the future. This statement, cosigned by the United Nations, the African Union, and ECOWAS, carried with it the authority of many nations. Among these three bodies, ECOWAS is likely the least recognizable and easily the least broad, but these factors alone should not be taken to reflect on the impact of ECOWAS on the West African region.</p><p>Established in 1975, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) consists of 15 member states throughout its namesake region. The organization <a href="http://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/history/"><strong>was created</strong></a><strong> </strong>to establish a trade bloc in West Africa with the intent of bolstering individual member economies as well as the economy of the region as a whole. In total, ECOWAS consists of three branches, namely its Executive, Judiciary, and Legislature, and is currently led by Chairman Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (President of Liberia) and President Marcel Alain de Souza (formerly Benin’s Minister of Development, Economic Analysis, and Forecast). In many of its current pursuits, the community is guided by its <a href="http://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/ECOWAS-VISION-2020.pdf"><strong>Vision 2020</strong></a> initiative and <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201204120219.html"><strong>Policy on Science and Technology</strong></a><strong> </strong>(created in 2007 and 2011 respectively). Some of its primary efforts have seen ECOWAS work to expand access to food throughout its member states, promote sustainability and sustainable energy, and to supplement national and international infrastructure in the region. Primarily, however, and building upon all of its other efforts, ECOWAS has a focus on trade and on increasing the significance of West Africa in the greater world economy.</p><p>Many of the actions that ECOWAS undertakes may not appear to be directly related to trade, as the organization addresses not only factors that immediately impact economic growth, such as trade regulation, but also less directly related issues that nonetheless can have significant impact on socioeconomic development. Recently, ECOWAS has pushed for the elimination of statelessness, begun removing obstacles in the way of regional integration, and helped to maintain democracy in the region. Each of these moves, while not overtly economic, will allow for greater socioeconomic improvements in the region, as the ECOWAS bloc becomes more productive and more cohesive.</p><p>Eradicating the problem of statelessness has <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-members-adopt-a-declaration-on-eradication-of-statelessness-in-west-africa/"><strong>become a focus of ECOWAS</strong></a> in recent years, and for good reason. <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/international/21602251-changing-face-worlds-non-citizens-nowhere-call-home"><strong>Statelessness</strong></a><strong> </strong>occurs when an individual has no registered nationality; a stateless individual is a citizen of nowhere. The sort of limbo that accompanies statelessness has been seen to have <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/30/how-being-stateless-makes-you-poor/"><strong>significant negative socioeconomic impact</strong></a><strong> </strong>on both stateless individuals and their communities. As such, ECOWAS <a href="http://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-reaffirms-commitment-to-addressing-the-problem-of-statelessness/"><strong>seeks to eliminate statelessness</strong></a> in West Africa, allowing hundreds of thousands to truly join the workforce, gain access to education, and be ensured basic human rights. It is the belief of the international coalition that, if this can be eliminated as desired, the economic impact on the region will be significant. Therefore, ECOWAS <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2017/05/10/ecowas-works-towards-eradicating-statelessness-in-west-africa/"><strong>has begun working with its constituent nations</strong></a> to grant citizenship to many of the disenfranchised in expectation that, among other things, such developments will bolster the international economy. Insofar, its efforts are only in their infancy, but <a href="https://www.today.ng/news/nigeria/292820/unhcr-rep-lauds-ecowas-global-pacesetter-eradication-statelessness"><strong>have nonetheless received praise</strong></a> on an international level.</p><p>In the aftermath of a hotly contested election in the Gambia, the defeated former president, Yahya Jammeh, refused to step down from office. Adama Barrow, the democratically elected leader, was initially barred from taking office and so <a href="https://globalvoices.org/2017/01/30/operation-restore-democracy-raises-hopes-and-demands-across-west-africa/"><strong>ECOWAS chose to intervene</strong></a>. National leaders within ECOWAS, along with the threat of international military intervention, eventually convinced Jammeh to step down and go into exile outside of the Gambia, allowing the new Gambian President to take office. This action, entitled “Operation Restore Democracy” is a surprisingly authoritative one for the international body, and may presage future interventions in the event of electoral issues. The President of Ghana<strong> </strong><a href="https://ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Akufo-Addo-justifies-Yahya-Jammeh-removal-533597"><strong>noted in a speech</strong></a> that this action not only protected democracy in the area, but truly demonstrated the ability of ECOWAS to function as a unit, which will be critical for the more explicitly economic actions that the organization will pursue.</p><p>In addition to these supplemental actions aimed at regional cohesion, ECOWAS has <a href="http://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/achievements-of-ecowas-at-40/"><strong>undertaken significant efforts</strong></a><strong> </strong>that are more overtly economic. Perhaps the most significant of these are the pursuit of a unifying currency along the lines of the Euro and the introduction of international biometric identification cards. The body intends to introduce this currency, potentially called the “Eco,” by 2020, though the project <a href="http://africanreview.com/finance/economy/west-africa-s-single-currency-reliant-on-economic-growth"><strong>has been postponed</strong></a> once before. This goal is a lofty one, and <a href="http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/12/ecowas-to-implement-common-currency-in-west-africa-official/"><strong>intended</strong></a> to encourage trade among West African countries and to bring economic stability to the region. It is yet to be seen whether this effort will be successful. The second of ECOWAS’s significant socioeconomic strategies involves the <a href="http://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=240&amp;lang=en&amp;annee=2014"><strong>distribution of biometric identification</strong></a>, which will allow for free movement of people among member nations with reduced security fears. This has been noted to have <a href="https://www.thenigerianvoice.com/news/232061/aasu-applauds-senegal-for-issuing-ecowas-biometric-identity.html"><strong>potential economic benefit</strong></a>. Some nations, such as Ghana, have<strong> </strong><a href="https://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2016/09/14/id-card-system-held-back-as-ghana-seeks-to-adopt-ecowas-biometric-programme/"><strong>suffered significant delays</strong></a> in the rollout of this program, while others, <a href="https://www.newsghana.com.gh/senegal-successfully-issues-ecowas-biometric-identity-cards/"><strong>such as Senegal</strong></a>, have completed said rollout. The campaign to facilitate movement of goods and individuals may be one of the most productive that ECOWAS has undertaken if implemented fully and correctly</p><p>ECOWAS certainly suffers from some of the same <a href="http://www.ejil.org/article.php?article=2437&amp;issue=118"><strong>problems</strong></a> that afflict most international bodies, but it is making progress in the region. Most nations in ECOWAS have <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD"><strong>seen their GDP increase</strong></a> fairly steadily in recent years, and the success of ongoing ECOWAS efforts can cause the trend to continue and potentially improve. It is difficult to predict whether these endeavors will be successful, as they are dependent upon many factors and the wills of many nations, but recent events suggest that a positive outlook is not foolish. The success and urgency of ECOWAS’s response to the Gambian election, the partial implementation of biometric identification, and progress toward the elimination of statelessness all signal that ECOWAS is certainly capable of achieving its goals, but only time will tell whether the region will benefit in the long term.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ddb98dfd62a8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Background Report: The Fulani Herdsmen (Part II— Recent Events and Responses)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@gfburton/background-report-the-fulani-herdsmen-part-ii-recent-events-and-responses-41d6db9e18ae?source=rss-f2a0d6ec5603------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/41d6db9e18ae</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[fulani]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[terrorism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nigeria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[boko-haram]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[west-africa]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Greg Burton]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 10 Jul 2017 12:56:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-07-10T12:56:33.655Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Previously published November 2016 (Project Cyma)</em></p><p><strong>The current conflict in Nigeria between the Fulani herdsmen and their neighbors stems from a long history of feuding, farming, and herding, and will not easily be resolved. Preexisting communal conflicts have fueled violence as herdsmen turn militant in the face of urbanization, desertification, and the indifference of the Nigerian government to their plight. Fulani violence has taken more lives in the past six months than has Boko Haram, Nigeria’s most prominent terrorist organization, and it shows no signs of slowing in its deadly pace.</strong></p><p><strong><em>RECENT EVENTS</em></strong></p><p>In October of 2014, the government of Nigeria’s Kogi State announced its plans to build an international airport in the town of Lokoji. The airport would bolster the regional economy and create an agricultural hub.<em>(1)</em> It would also monopolize an extensive area of prime grazing land used largely by Fulani Herdsmen. This event and many like it have deprived the Fulani of an essential resource, namely land, and the majority of Fulani militants’ efforts aim to reclaim or repurpose areas for the grazing that is critical to the herdsmen’s livelihoods.</p><p>Several Tiv communities in Taraba State’s Gassol Local Government Area were attacked in May of 2016, leaving 12 dead and nearly 20 more injured. Altogether, 13 houses in the communities were burned, and fear was such that military and police forces were needed to reestablish a sense of security in the area.<em>(2)</em> The attacks were all attributed to Fulani militants, and the motivation behind them was clear: the militants intended to resolve by force an old dispute about farming rights in the area. Many recent attacks perpetrated by the Fulani have stemmed from long-standing disagreements, which are likely being finally brought to a head by the increasing desperation with which the Fulani Herdsmen perceive themselves to facing.</p><p>On April 5, 2016, Fulani militants killed four individuals in Benue State. On the tenth of the same month, they killed 15 in Taraba. Two farmers were killed the very next day by suspected Fulani Herdsmen, and about 40 were killed in Enugu State on the 25th of the month. There were nearly 60 significant attacks by Fulani Herdsmen in Nigeria from January 2015 to June 2016, and the frequency of such violence is rising. The number of attacks in the first half of 2016 has nearly equaled the sum of attacks in 2015, and governmental actions intended to resolve the situation have as yet had little effect.</p><p>It is important to note that, despite common misconceptions, many Fulani are not at all connected with the militants who have been active in Nigeria’s middle belt. While the militants themselves are primarily herdsmen, the majority of the members of the expansive Fula ethnic group are solely pastoralists, without connection to militant violence. Even these peaceful members of the ethnic group, however, are largely viewed with suspicion and anger by the sedentary peoples through whose land they take their cattle, largely as a result of the actions of the ethnic group’s militant wing. This tension between herdsmen and farmers has led to some of the violence on both sides.<em>(3)</em></p><p><em>Figure 1. Fulani Attacks from January 2015 to June 2016</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/743/1*TXyjg5k97VO5cYkZnvQMPg.png" /><figcaption>The above map represents data collected by members of the Project Cyma research team regarding violent acts between January of 2015 and June of 2016. <em>(4)</em></figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>RESPONSES</em></strong></p><p>In response to the increased frequency of Fulani attacks, many Nigerians have been quick to attribute the violence to ethnic or religious motivations. Though this view appears to be largely unfounded, it is not unexpected. Nigeria has long been plagued by ethnic and religious violence, with Boko Haram drawing upon its bleak reading of Islamic scripture and many rural communities engaging in vicious feuds, so the assumption is reasonable, if not correct. While the true motivation of the Fulani has been revealed as tied to the interests of their cattle, this has not stopped many from citing other reasons for the violence, as well as for the seemingly slow governmental response.</p><p>The new wave of Fulani attacks has led to much criticism of the Nigerian national government as well as state and local governments. As noted above, governmental responses have been measured, partially due to the many issues that draw focus away from the Fulani attacks, such as the threats presented by Boko Haram, Ansaru, and the Niger Delta Avengers, but it is likely that other factors have influenced this reaction as well. The situation in central Nigeria is a fragile one, and the Fulani people make up a significant percentage of the population, so the Nigerian government must handle the crisis delicately to protect the interests of all involved.<em>(5)</em></p><p>The most serious criticisms of leadership, however, address not reticence but corruption. The Nigerian military has been accused of failing to act not due to incompetence or patient strategy, but due to partisan ties within the leadership. At least one group of representatives for the Igbo people have accused the military of covering up its failures by imprisoning innocents and blaming impostors for their actions. The most serious accusations, though, have been those directed at President Muhammadu Buhari, himself a member of the Fula ethnicity.<em>(6)</em> Buhari, who has remained silent in the wakes of attacks like the July 11 Benue Attack, has been accused of sympathizing with and even directly supporting the actions of Fulani militants. Others, while declaring him innocent of such motives, have attributed his inaction to the difficult politics of the situation and an overwhelming desire to retain political power.<em>(7)</em> Little evidence suggests that the former is true, while the latter is simply a matter of speculation, but the public, at least in communities often targeted by Fulani attacks, has come to its own conclusions.<em>(8)</em></p><p>Reactions to recent events have not been limited to criticism and accusations. Oganiru Ndigbo, or the Igbo Improvement Union, has allegedly filed suit against police and military forces in Nigeria for their failure to protect the people of Nigeria. Other groups, such as the 21st Century Wilberforce Initiative, have looked outside Nigeria for aid in light of the rise of groups like Boko Haram and the increasingly deadly Fulani Ethnic Militia.<em>(9)</em> The Wilberforce Initiative in particular called for U.S. President Barack Obama to appoint a Special Envoy for Nigeria and theLake Chad Region to combat the efforts of such groups. Though neither of these attempts have seen any success yet, they represent the embodiment of a public desire for action.<em>(10)</em></p><p>Though large-scale governmental action has not been forthcoming, the Nigerian government has not been completely silent on the Fulani issue. The Deputy President of Nigeria’s Senate, Ike Ekweremadu, has announced his condemnation of the attacks and has called on his Senate to act. The Governor of Nigeria’s Imo State, Rochas Okorocha, has called for unity and dismissed the ethnic aspect of the crisis, saying that the Fulani violence “is a national issue that also requires national approach to resolve” and that “an ethnic coloration… makes the solution to such problem somewhat difficult.”<em>(11)</em> Furthermore, the police and members of the army have, to some degree, entered the area in an effort to renew a sense of security.<em>(12)</em> While the actions of the government have not put a stop to Fulani violence, the powers that be in Nigeria have not been as complacent in the face of this threat as many assert.<em>(13)</em></p><p>Though the Fulani themselves have largely remained silent about the actions of militant herdsmen, spokespeople representing the ethnic group have on occasion offered justifications and explanations for goings on in the troubled region. In response to a March 2016 attack on multiple Agatu communities in Benue State, the National Secretary of a prominent Fulani organization, Saleh Bayeri, explained that the attacks constituted a reprisal for the death of an important Fulani at Agatu hands. It is important to note that, as part of the attack on Shehu Abdullahi, the important Fulani, the purported Agatu attackers also killed or stole hundreds of Fulani cattle.<em>(14)</em> Later, in May of the same year, a series of attacks struck Buruku Local Government Area in Benue State. While the government initially blamed Libyan herdsmen for the violence, Fulani in the area took responsibility, claiming the attack as a reprisal for the theft and killing of over 800 cattle by Tiv youth in the area.<em>(15)</em></p><p>Apologists for the Fulani cause, like Alhaji Ngelzarma of the Meyatti Allah Cattle Breeders Association, have blamed politicians like former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan for ignoring problems facing the Fulani and disregarding proposed solutions. Sultan Alhaji Abubakr of Sokoto, a regional spiritual leader, called for the people of Nigeria to stop blaming the Fulani for every violent act, acknowledging that, though the Fulani militants were responsible for some attacks, the Fulani “are only after their [own] cattle.”<em>(16)</em> Though the reasons provided perhaps do not adequately justify such violence, they indicate that the Fulani militants may not be the only guilty parties in this conflict.<em>(17)</em></p><p>Recent attacks have demonstrated the growing nature of the Fulani militant threat, and concurrent developments have increased the need of the Fulani for grazeable land. There has been insufficient government action to relieve tensions in the central region of Nigeria, and militants have shown few signs of stopping. All sides in the conflict have their critics and their defenders, and though blame for the violence may lie primarily with the militants, there is plenty to go around. Cooperation between innocent citizens, aggrieved Fulani, and the government will be hard to come by, but the conflict will require multi-level cooperation if it is to be resolved peacefully.</p><p><em>References</em></p><ol><li>“Nigeria to Build an International Airport in Kogi, by 2016.” <em>Construction Review Online</em>. Group Africa Publishing, 31 Oct. 2014. Web.</li><li>“Soldiers, Policemen Take over Communities over Killing of 12 People by Fulani Herdsmen.” <em>Vanguard News</em>. 09 May 2016. Web.</li><li>Oduah, Chika. “Deadly Nomad-versus-farmer Conflict Escalates.” <em>Al Jazeera</em>. Al Jazeera. Web.</li><li>Burton, Gregory F. “Fulani Attacks: January 2015 — June 2016.” <em>Project Cyma</em>. Web.</li><li>“Nigeria’s Government Must Ensure Balanced Response.” Chatham House. Chatham House. Web.</li><li>“DSS And Nigerian Army: The Existential Dangers Of Security Outfits That Serve Ethnic Interests — News Biafra.” News Biafra. 19 Apr. 2016. Web.</li><li>Awala, Verity. “Reactions Trail FG’s Silence on Fulani Herdsmen Attack on Benue Communities.” Information Nigeria. Web.</li><li>Yusuf, Omotayo. “Fulani Herdsmen Attack and the Foolishness of Playing Ethnicity.” Nigeria News Today. 04 May 2016. Web.</li><li>Newspaper, Punch. “Group to Sue Police Over Fulani Herdsmen Attack.”Sahara Reporters. 01 July 2016. Web.</li><li>“US Lawmaker Pledges to Push for Special Envoy to Nigeria.” World Watch Monitor. 12 May 2016. Web.</li><li>Bolashodun, Oluwatobi. “Ekweremadu Reacts to Fulani Herdsmen Attack in Enugu.” Nigeria News Today. 26 Apr. 2016. Web.</li><li>Mamah, Emeka, Clifford Ndujihe, Chidi Nkwopara, and Chinenyeh Ozor. “Bloodbath in Enugu as Fulani Herdsmen Kill 40.” Vanguard News. 26 Apr. 2016. Web.</li><li>“Soldiers, Policemen Take over Communities over Killing of 12 People by Fulani Herdsmen.” Vanguard News. 09 May 2016. Web.</li><li>Mayah, Emmanuel, Sani Turkur, and Hassan Adebayo. “Why We Struck in Agatu — Fulani Herdsmen — Premium Times Nigeria.” Premium Times Nigeria. The Premium Times, 19 Mar. 2016. Web.</li><li>Okoh, George, and Sunday Okobi. “Herdsmen Attack — We Killed Because Tiv Youths Stole 800 of Our Cows.” All Africa. 16 May 2016. Web.</li><li>Keobke, Alex. “Even Fulani Herdsmen Blame Jonathan.” See Naija. 29 Apr. 2016. Web.</li><li>Aminu, Mohammed, and Hammed Shittu. “Stop Blaming Fulani Herdsmen for Every Attack, Sultan Tells Nigerians.” This Day Live. This Day, 05 July 2016. Web.</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=41d6db9e18ae" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Varied Tactics Throughout the Boko Haram Insurgency]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@gfburton/varied-tactics-throughout-the-boko-haram-insurgency-ab62a6ca4400?source=rss-f2a0d6ec5603------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ab62a6ca4400</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[tactics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nigeria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[insurgency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[boko-haram]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[west-africa]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Greg Burton]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 09 Jul 2017 06:50:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-07-10T18:29:31.546Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Previously published March 29, 2017 (Project Cyma)</em></p><p>In 2009, the Boko Haram insurgency began with a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/aug/02/nigeria-boko-haram-islamist-sect"><strong>series of</strong></a><a href="http://www.rte.ie/news/2009/0727/120030-nigeria/"><strong> gunfights</strong></a> in Nigeria’s Borno State, eventually employing a greater variety of tactics in attacks across the northern region as time went on. This onslaught of attacks included a <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201009090034.html"><strong>large-scale prison break</strong></a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/31/nigeria-bomb-blast-abuja"><strong>the bombing of an army barracks</strong></a>, both in 2010. It wasn’t until 2011, however, that Boko Haram began to use the tactics for which it has become known, including kidnapping, suicide bombing, and large-scale attacks.</p><p>The first Boko Haram suicide attack occurred in June of 2011 when a militant <a href="http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE75G0BF20110617?sp=true"><strong>killed multiple people</strong></a>, including himself, in an Abuja carpark. The next month, a member of the terrorist organization <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2011/aug/26/abuja-bombing-un-offices-nigeria"><strong>did the same</strong></a> at the city’s United Nations complex. These attacks marked not only the escalation of Boko Haram’s insurgency, but also the first suicide bombings in Nigerian history. Since then, Boko Haram has employed suicide bombing as a common device, perpetrating <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1aDOgVyogc0cZG97CiRrBtA5yYsxsuq2S81osaDWVJH8/edit?usp=sharing"><strong>more than 70 such attacks</strong></a> in 2015, when suicide bombings comprised about 30% of Boko Haram’s violent acts. In contrast to <a href="http://www.columbia.edu/itc/journalism/stille/Politics%20Fall%202007/readings%20weeks%206-7/Strategic%20Logic%20of%20Suicide%20Missions.pdf"><strong>common expectations</strong></a> regarding suicide bombing, Boko Haram attacks have been carried out not only by willing volunteers, but also <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/missing-nigeria-schoolgirls/boko-haram-appears-be-using-abducted-girls-suicide-bombers-experts-n284456"><strong>by kidnapping victims</strong></a><strong> </strong>possibly forced into the act. Recent decreases in Boko Haram activity (likely the result of a <a href="http://thenewsnigeria.com.ng/2015/07/boko-haram-army-launches-operation-lafiya-dole/"><strong>significant push</strong></a> by the Nigerian government in combination with an <a href="http://www.projectcyma.org/theblog/2016/9/30/the-internal-struggles-within-boko-haram"><strong>internal power struggle</strong></a>) have seen the prevalence of suicide attacks reduced, from 30% of Boko Haram attacks in 2015 to roughly 20% in 2016.*</p><p>Another method <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/04/11/they-set-classrooms-fire/attacks-education-northeast-nigeria"><strong>often utilized</strong></a> by Boko Haram is abduction, which only began in earnest after a 2013 military push reduced Boko Haram’s ranks. In February 2014, Konduga, Borno State was<strong> </strong><a href="http://royaltimes.net/mission-to-free-20-abducted-girls-military-pounds-boko-harams-cells/"><strong>attacked</strong></a> and 20 girls were kidnapped. This attack was followed by a <a href="http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/02/b-haram-slaughters-43-students-yobe/"><strong>similar incident</strong></a> later that month in Buni Yadi, Yobe State. These abductions were characterized as a backlash to the Nigerian government’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/06/how-nigerian-police-also-detained-women-and-children-as-weapon-of-war"><strong>detention</strong></a> of the wives and children of suspected militant leaders. Most notably, in April 2014, 276 girls were <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/23/200-girls-missing-nigeria-care-sewol-tragedy"><strong>kidnapped</strong></a><strong> </strong>by Boko Haram in Chibok, Borno State. These kidnappings have <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56c62cfcf8508296a62feaf4/t/57dedfb129687f4474572bc3/1474224057317/KidnappingasaWeaponofWar_ProjectCyma.pdf"><strong>served multiple purposes</strong></a> in Boko Haram’s insurgency: providing soldiers, slaves, and, as previously mentioned, suicide bombers. Unlike suicide bombing, it does not appear that this tactic has seen a significant decrease in its usage in the last two years.</p><p>Perhaps the most significant change in tactics, however, is the decrease in sieges and other large-scale, high casualty attacks on cities and communities. From 2011 through early 2015, Boko Haram launched significant offensives against such towns as <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15605041"><strong>Damaturu</strong></a>, Baga (both in <a href="http://articles.latimes.com/2013/apr/22/world/la-fg-wn-nigeria-gun-battles-20130422"><strong>2013</strong></a><strong> </strong>and <a href="https://news.vice.com/article/gruesome-reports-emerge-of-new-boko-haram-massacre-in-northern-nigeria"><strong>early 2015</strong></a>), and<strong> </strong><a href="http://news.biharprabha.com/2014/05/over-200-killed-in-boko-haram-led-attack-in-nigerian-town/"><strong>Gamboru</strong></a>, killing between dozens and hundreds in each attack. As 2015 progressed, however, some attacks were soundly repelled, as in <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31469073"><strong>Gombe</strong></a>, and since then the frequency of such assaults has decreased, as has the <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201702070630.html"><strong>casualty count</strong></a> of Boko Haram’s average attack.</p><p>Boko Haram’s tactics have changed significantly in the years since 2009, ranging from relatively simple methods such as shootings and vandalism to kidnappings, suicide bombings, and even assaults on entire cities. Recently, however, Boko Haram activity has subsided somewhat, with less than 120 attacks attributed to the militant group in 2016 as opposed to around 250 in 2015. With this de-escalation, it seems that more simplistic tactics have increased in prevalence, with shootings and non-suicide bombings comprising greater shares of the violence. Though trends seem to indicate a change in Boko Haram’s tactics once again, it is yet to be seen what the coming months will bring.</p><p><em>*This data, as well as any other numerical data not otherwise attributed, was collected by Project Cyma.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ab62a6ca4400" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Beyond the Borders: Boko Haram in Niger]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@gfburton/beyond-the-borders-boko-haram-in-niger-ed26079dfb3b?source=rss-f2a0d6ec5603------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ed26079dfb3b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[boko-haram]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[insurgency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nigeria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[west-africa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[niger]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Greg Burton]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 08 Jul 2017 14:25:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-07-08T14:25:42.559Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Previously published November 3, 2016 (Project Cyma)</em></p><p><strong>Since its initial uprising in 2009, Boko Haram has been a source of terror throughout Nigeria’s northeast region. While the terrorist group has directed its activities largely toward the Nigerian government and Nigerian citizens, it has not limited itself on the basis of state boundaries. Campaigns and incursions into neighboring nations like Benin, Cameroon, and Niger have wreaked havoc on the border regions in particular. Niger, as a significant player in the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), a West African coalition now opposing Boko Haram, has been hit particularly hard.</strong></p><p>Since early 2015, Niger has ceased to view the conflict with Boko Haram as a solely Nigerian issue. At that time, Boko Haram had taken control of a number of towns near the Nigerien border with Nigeria.* One such captured town, Malam Fatori (which, until recently, <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/nigeria-troops-battle-boko-haram-malam-fatori-160921153240745.html"><strong>remained the scene of conflict</strong></a>) was a particular source of fear for some Nigeriens, with Mayor Kassoum of Diffa, a southeastern city in Niger, <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/niger-border-region-fears-boko-haram-incursion-000411656.html?ref=gs"><strong>expressing a concern</strong></a> that “one day, these people are going to want to attack us so they can gauge the strength of our army.”</p><p>These concerns were validated in February of 2015, as Boko Haram <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/first-boko-haram-attack-niger-witnesses-000757903.html?ref=gs"><strong>launched attacks</strong></a> on the border cities of Bosso and Diffa. The border offensive continued in the same week with an attack on Fotokol, another nearby town, with Nigerien and Chadian forces <a href="https://www.morningstaronline.co.uk/a-f00c-Boko-Haram-routed-after-cross-border-Niger-incursion#.WBoyfJMrLjA"><strong>combining to eventually repel</strong></a> the militants. These attacks continued for some time, with the severity of <a href="http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/06/258124.htm"><strong>at least one attack</strong></a> warranting international response. Though the Nigerien military was largely able to <a href="http://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/06/breaking-boko-haram-retakes-bosso/"><strong>stave off occupation</strong></a> in many cases, attacks continued through June of 2016. After June, however, Niger was the beneficiary of a brief reprieve in its conflict with the terror group.</p><p>In September of 2016, Boko Haram gunmen <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/five-dead-in-first-east-niger-boko-haram-attack-in-three-months/a-19525376"><strong>entered the town of Tourmour</strong></a> in eastern Niger, killing civilians and setting fire to town infrastructure. This development — another blow to the claim made almost a year ago by Nigerian President Buhari that Boko Haram has been “<a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35173618"><strong>technically defeated</strong></a>” — has been followed by a series of further assaults on Nigerien soil. These raids in Niger have been largely combatted by the MNJTF, but have left their mark on the Diffa Region.</p><p>The damages and death resulting from these Boko Haram incursions have combined with an influx of Nigerian refugees to exacerbate poverty in the already-troubled border area. The United Nations has recognized the residents of the Diffa Region as “<a href="http://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/lake-chad-basin-emergency-response-1-july-30-september-2016"><strong>arguably the poorest on earth</strong></a>,” and the turmoil that has spilled over its borders from northeastern Nigeria has resulted in “<a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/09/boko-haram-refugees-niger-find-safety-lack-aid-160916123622045.html"><strong>strict curfew, closing of markets and the suspension of trade</strong></a>,” further damaging the region’s economy.</p><p>While Boko Haram is no longer as powerful a force as it once was and is <a href="http://www.projectcyma.org/theblog/2016/9/30/the-internal-struggles-within-boko-haram"><strong>facing an internal power struggle</strong></a>, it has continued to plague West Africa. While Niger has not been the focus of the terrorist organization’s enmity, it has been the recipient of many harsh blows. Given the poverty of the region, even this lower intensity of attacks has had a devastating effect. While Nigeria certainly needs relief from Boko Haram’s reign of terror, it is important to recognize that Boko Haram has not constrained itself within national borders.</p><p><em>*The demonym “Nigerian” refers to those from Nigeria, while the demonym “Nigerien” refers to those from Niger.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ed26079dfb3b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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