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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by greatercaucasusmonitor on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by greatercaucasusmonitor on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by greatercaucasusmonitor on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[The battle for perceptions in the caucasus is now the main event]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@greatercaucasusmonitor/the-battle-for-perceptions-in-the-caucasus-is-now-the-main-event-1b38e65b3689?source=rss-60dc4f01455e------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[russian-influence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[south-caucasus]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[azerbaijan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[georgia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[armenia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[greatercaucasusmonitor]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 08:17:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-17T08:17:12.680Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KYNC4nqGYnCzL2NMyMAEyg.jpeg" /></figure><p>With the guns quieter, Baku, Yerevan, and Tbilisi are fighting over the story of who won — and Moscow&#39;s myth of invincibility is the prize.</p><h4>The new front is in the mind</h4><p>Ahmad Alili, a Baku-based analyst, posted something on 14 November that reads more like a doctrine than a tweet. &quot;The struggle for the Caucasus will not be fought through military pressure &amp; diplomacy alone,&quot; he wrote. &quot;It will also be a contest over perceptions of power, sovereignty &amp; regional order. The wars have exposed the limits of military might; next battle is if the myths built around it survive.&quot;</p><p>That&#39;s the angle most people miss when they look at this region. The shooting has largely stopped. The argument hasn&#39;t. And the argument is about something harder to map than a trench line: whether Russia and Iran still get to be the region&#39;s arbiters, or whether that authority was a story that has simply run out of subscribers.</p><p>Alili followed up a few minutes later: &quot;Military capabilities can decline faster than the political narratives surrounding them.&quot; He&#39;s talking about the gap between what Moscow can actually do and what its neighbours still assume it can do. That gap is where the whole game now sits.</p><h4>Two armies, one myth that cracked</h4><p>Look at what happened after 2020. For decades, the prevailing assumption in Yerevan, Tbilisi, and even Baku was that Russian power in the South Caucasus was a fixed feature of the landscape — like the Greater Caucasus range itself. You planned around it.</p><p>Then, in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, Azerbaijan retook the districts and much of the territory around the enclave in 44 days. A Russian peacekeeping contingent moved in. In September 2023, Baku took the rest of Karabakh in less than 24 hours. The peacekeepers, roughly 2,000 of them, stood by. They didn&#39;t fight. They didn&#39;t stop it. They eventually left.</p><p>That sequence did something no amount of diplomacy could. It didn&#39;t just defeat Armenia&#39;s army. It defeated the idea that Russian protection was a wall. Armenia&#39;s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan started saying the quiet part — that his country had relied on Russia for security and that the guarantor hadn&#39;t guaranteed. By 2024 Armenia had frozen its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Moscow-led bloc. In 2025, Yerevan pushed forward with an EU accession law and a normalization deal with Baku. You don&#39;t do that if you still believe the myth.</p><h4>Georgia&#39;s arithmetic</h4><p>Georgia has its own version of the same calculation, and it&#39;s messier. Tbilisi has been careful with Moscow since the 2008 war, which ended with Russian troops a short drive from the capital and two breakaway regions — Abkhazia and South Ossetia — recognized by Moscow and a handful of others.</p><p>There&#39;s a detail worth remembering. In 2012, Georgia&#39;s Wine and mineral water exports were banned by Russia for roughly a year and a half before being allowed back. The lesson Tbilisi drew wasn&#39;t &quot;resist harder.&quot; It was &quot;don&#39;t give them a reason.&quot; Georgian Dream, the ruling party, has spent years walking that line. Its critics call it capitulation. Its defenders call it survival math. Whatever you call it, the calculation is the same one Alili is describing: what does the neighbour&#39;s power actually consist of, and how much of it is theatre?</p><p>A reply to Alili&#39;s thread from the account Mark (@Eebo01) put the counterargument bluntly: Georgia has had multiple ethnic conflicts since leaving the USSR, and Russia stepped in to &quot;separate&quot; and &quot;stopped an ethnic war.&quot; That&#39;s a real argument people make. But notice what it concedes. It treats Russia&#39;s role as that of a firefighter, not a guarantor. That&#39;s a smaller claim than the one Moscow used to make, and smaller claims are how myths die.</p><h4>The armchair ethnographers are doing real work, badly</h4><p>The online conversation around this has a lot of heat and not much light. One account, Gayane Arstamyan, listed atrocity claims in a single sentence. Another, Archsorcerer Kiran, blamed &quot;Russian imperialism&quot; for everything from language policy to church politics. A reply from Yamnaya Girls offered a rival ethnic-grievance narrative, complete with raids and forced conversions stretching back centuries.</p><p>Most of it is noise. But the noise is itself a data point. These are the perception contests Alili is talking about, playing out in public. If you want to understand why the region is tense even without a war on, read the comment sections. The grievances are being rehearsed.</p><p>There&#39;s a more useful thread in the same pile. Thomas Wier, a linguist, noted that around 5% of Georgia&#39;s territory lies north of the Greater Caucasus watershed, and that the Russian North Caucasus is home to roughly 20% of Europe&#39;s languages — mostly indigenous and mostly non-Indo-European. That&#39;s the durable fact under the politics. This is one of the most linguistically dense patches of ground on earth, and it&#39;s been carved into republics by people who didn&#39;t always ask the locals.</p><h4>What &quot;$pecial interests&quot; actually means</h4><p>Alili&#39;s second post is the one to pin to the wall: Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia &quot;have long faced pressure to recognise the &#39;special interests&#39; of larger neighbours, restrict their strategic choices and avoid decisions unacceptable to Moscow or Tehran.&quot;</p><p>That&#39;s the operating system of the region, stated plainly. It&#39;s not a conspiracy. It&#39;s how big neighbours behave toward small ones everywhere. But the terms have shifted. Tehran is under its own pressures and has less room to project. Moscow is stretched. And the small states have noticed that the cost of defying the old rules is lower than it used to be — though not zero, as anyone in Tbilisi will tell you.</p><p>The next few years won&#39;t be decided by who has the most tanks in the foothills. They&#39;ll be decided by whether the assumption of Russian and Iranian dominance can be kept alive in the minds of the people who live between the mountains and the plains. Alili thinks the myth is cracking. He might be right. But myths don&#39;t die on schedule, and the Caucasus has a long history of bleeding while they do.</p><p>---</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1b38e65b3689" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Georgia's armenian and azerbaijani villages face off over a Soviet-Era reservoir]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@greatercaucasusmonitor/georgias-armenian-and-azerbaijani-villages-face-off-over-a-soviet-era-reservoir-7e04e6ba8fd6?source=rss-60dc4f01455e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7e04e6ba8fd6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[kvemo-kartli]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russian-influence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[south-caucasus]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethnic-conflict]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[georgia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[greatercaucasusmonitor]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 14 Nov 2026 13:46:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-14T13:46:58.373Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Gh5kxS_8HwzX_8z11ZCEwg.jpeg" /></figure><p>In Kvemo Kartli, a 40-year-old water dispute between ethnic Armenian and Azerbaijani farmers has become a test of whether Tbilisi can hold two minorities in one room.</p><h4>The ditch at Shaumiani</h4><p>Stand on the embankment of the Marneuli reservoir in southern Georgia and you can see both villages at once. To the north, the Armenian church tower of Shaumiani. To the south, the flat roofs of an Azerbaijani settlement with a mosque and a school named after Heydar Aliyev. Between them runs a Soviet-era irrigation ditch, built in 1978, that splits the water roughly 60/40 in favour of the Azerbaijani side. Armenian farmers have complained about it since the 1990s. This autumn, they stopped complaining and blocked it.</p><p>For eleven days in late October, according to the Georgian Ministry of Agriculture&#39;s local office, around 200 residents from the Armenian villages of Shaumiani and Damia physically prevented the ditch from being opened. Azerbaijani farmers downstream in the village of Kapanakhchi reported that 47 hectares of winter wheat went unwatered. Nobody was hurt. The Georgian police deployed 30 officers and did not make an arrest. But the story travelled, and it travelled further than Tbilisi would like.</p><h4>Why a ditch matters</h4><p>Georgia&#39;s Kvemo Kartli region is the country&#39;s most ethnically mixed. According to the 2014 census — the last one published; the 2024 results are still being processed — the region is 52 percent Azerbaijani and 38 percent Armenian, with Georgians a minority in several municipalities. Marneuli is Georgia&#39;s second-largest city by some counts. The Georgian Dream government has spent a decade telling Brussels and Washington that the country manages its minorities better than any of its neighbours. The reservoir dispute is awkward for that pitch.</p><p>It&#39;s also awkward because it arrives at a moment when Tbilisi&#39;s foreign policy is under strain. In October, the European Union froze 30 million euros of planned budget support to Georgia, citing the controversial foreign agents law passed in May 2024. The United States sanctioned two senior Georgian officials in September. Against that backdrop, a village-level water fight is exactly the sort of thing that external actors can pick up and amplify.</p><p>They already are. On X this week, an Azerbaijani user with the handle @EtibarSule91566 posted a thread praising Georgian-Azerbaijani ties and accusing Dagestani groups of betraying Chechen fighters in the 1990s. The thread got traction in Baku-adjacent accounts. A separate Georgian account, @gelavasadze, argued that &quot;a single geopolitical space called the South Caucasus does not exist and never has.&quot; Both posts are doing the same thing: treating the Caucasus as a set of zero-sum ethnic blocs rather than a place where people actually live together.</p><h4>The Russia factor, quietly</h4><p>Nobody credible thinks Moscow ordered the ditch dispute. But Moscow has an interest in it. Russia&#39;s 7th Military Base in Abkhazia and its 4th in South Ossetia are permanent facts, and the Kremlin&#39;s preferred narrative — that Georgia cannot manage its minorities without external supervision — depends on incidents like this one. In October, the North Caucasus Monitor, published by the Estonian-run GFSIS, flagged a rise in Russian-language social media activity targeting Georgian minority grievances. The Monitor didn&#39;t name the channels. It didn&#39;t have to.</p><p>There&#39;s also the Iranian and Turkish dimension, which Western analysts tend to underweight. Turkey funds religious and cultural institutions in Azerbaijani villages across Kvemo Kartli — around 100 mosques and community centres, by the estimate of Tbilisi-based NGO the Tolerance and Diversity Institute. Iran funds Shia institutions in some of the same villages, and the two don&#39;t always agree. Armenia&#39;s diplomatic footprint is thinner but not absent: the Armenian Apostolic Church runs the Shaumiani parish and has been outspoken about the reservoir.</p><p>So the ditch is not just a ditch. It&#39;s a piece of infrastructure sitting at the intersection of five states&#39; soft power and two minorities&#39; hard grievances.</p><h4>What Tbilisi is actually doing</h4><p>On 6 November, the Georgian government announced a 4.2 million lari (about 1.5 million US dollars) rehabilitation plan for the Marneuli irrigation system, to be completed by spring 2027. The agriculture ministry says the new system will split the water 50/50. Armenian community leaders in Shaumiani say they&#39;ve heard that before — the same promise was made in 2013 and again in 2019. Azerbaijani leaders in Kapanakhchi say they&#39;ll believe it when the ditch is dug.</p><p>The deeper problem is representation. Of the 38 members of Marneuli&#39;s municipal council, only seven are ethnic Armenian, according to the region&#39;s own published roster. The Azerbaijani majority dominates. That arithmetic, not the water, is what makes the dispute hard to solve. Georgian Dream has no incentive to change it; the opposition United National Movement has its own awkward record on minority outreach, having lost the Azerbaijani vote decisively in 2012 and never quite won it back.</p><h4>The bigger picture</h4><p>Here&#39;s the uncomfortable truth for everyone who writes about the Caucasus from a comfortable distance: the region&#39;s ethnic conflicts are mostly not about ancient hatreds. They&#39;re about water, land, jobs, and who sits on the municipal council. The 1990s wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia were real and their displaced populations are real — around 250,000 Georgians remain displaced from those two territories, according to the UNHCR. But the violence that could come next, if it comes, will most likely start with something smaller and more boring, like a blocked ditch in a district most Tbilisi journalists have never visited.</p><p>The EU, the US, Turkey, Russia, and Iran all have a stake in how this plays out. None of them has offered to mediate a water dispute. They&#39;re waiting to see whether Tbilisi can handle it on its own. That&#39;s the real test. Not the reservoir. The room.</p><p>---</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7e04e6ba8fd6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Russia pressures armenia with trade bans ahead of june elections]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@greatercaucasusmonitor/russia-pressures-armenia-with-trade-bans-ahead-of-june-elections-8cc979855a74?source=rss-60dc4f01455e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8cc979855a74</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[south-caucasus]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[armenia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trade-sanctions]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eu-accession]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[greatercaucasusmonitor]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 17:33:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-06T17:33:13.154Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lfvOd3HqIhuKOqnTaOb8Ug.jpeg" /></figure><p>Moscow&#39;s agricultural restrictions on Armenian wine and mineral water echo its 2006 campaign against Georgia, as Yerevan weighs an EU path.</p><h4>A customs queue in the Ararat Valley</h4><p>In late May, trucks stacked up at the Upper Lars crossing on the Georgian Military Road. Drivers heading for Russia with Armenian brandy and bottled water sat for days. Some turned back. The Russian agriculture watchdog Rosselkhoznadzor had announced restrictions on Armenian wine, mineral water, and a range of fruit and vegetable shipments. It cited &quot;phytosanitary concerns&quot; — the standard phrase Moscow uses when the real concern is political.</p><p>The timing was not subtle. Armenia holds parliamentary elections on June 7, and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan&#39;s government has spent the past two years edging toward the European Union. In January 2026, the Armenian cabinet approved a bill to start the EU accession process, and the National Assembly backed it in March. Moscow responded with a familiar toolkit.</p><h4>The 2006 playbook, dusted off</h4><p>Gocha Gogsadze, writing for OC Media, was blunt: Russia&#39;s 2006 Georgia playbook is back. In that year, Rosselkhoznadzor banned Georgian wine and Borjomi mineral water, citing &quot;falsification&quot; and &quot;pesticides.&quot; The ban gutted a sector that accounted for a large share of Georgian agricultural exports. It came months after Tbilisi expelled Russian officers accused of espionage. Georgia&#39;s exports to Russia collapsed, and Moscow avoided any formal trade sanction that would draw WTO scrutiny.</p><p>The Armenian version is smaller in scale but similar in design. Armenia&#39;s wine sector is modest — around 15-16 million bottles a year, much of it exported to Russia. Mineral water is a bigger symbol. The Ararat and Jermuk brands have been on Russian shelves for generations. Cutting them off is meant to remind voters that their economy runs north, not west.</p><h4>What Russia still controls</h4><p>The pressure is not only economic. Armenia hosts Russia&#39;s 102nd Military Base at Gyumri, near the Turkish border, and Russian border guards still patrol the Armenian-Turkish and Armenian-Iranian frontiers. Armenia is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, though Pashinyan has frozen participation in CSTO activities since 2024, after the organization declined to help during Azerbaijan&#39;s 2023 offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh.</p><p>That freeze matters. When Azerbaijan retook Karabakh in September 2023, more than 100,000 Armenians left the territory within a week. Russia&#39;s peacekeeping contingent stood by. The lesson wasn&#39;t lost in Yerevan: the security guarantee Moscow sold for three decades did not hold when it counted.</p><h4>The external players</h4><p>Turkey and Iran both watch the Armenian election closely. Turkey backs Azerbaijan and wants a land corridor through Armenia&#39;s Syunik province to connect with Nakhchivan — the so-called Zangezur corridor. Iran opposes any change to that border, which it sees as its land bridge to Armenia and the wider region. Tehran has quietly expanded trade with Yerevan, and in 2024 the two countries signed a gas-for-electricity swap extension.</p><p>Washington&#39;s involvement is more uneven. The U.S. brokered the August 2025 Pashinyan-Trump-Aliyev meeting at the White House, which produced a peace framework and a U.S.-backed transport route through Armenian territory. That gave Pashinyan something to show voters. It also gave Moscow a grievance.</p><h4>The Cossack narrative returns</h4><p>There&#39;s a cultural layer to this. On November 3, the account @ShamanGeo flagged a point worth noting: Cossack groups and Russian settler populations are not on the front lines of Caucasus conflicts today, but Cossack identity functions as an ideological tool. The Kuban and Terek Cossack hosts are mobilized in rhetoric about Russia&#39;s &quot;historical role&quot; in the Caucasus — a way of framing Moscow&#39;s presence as organic rather than imperial. That framing shows up in state media coverage of Armenia and Georgia alike.</p><p>The Russian-Ukrainian war has stretched the North Caucasus too. The GFSIS Estonia North Caucasus Monitor&#39;s September 2026 issue reviewed social and political developments across the region and tracked terrorism-related incidents, alongside the war&#39;s spillover effects. Dagestan and Ingushetia have seen heavy recruitment and casualty reports. The Kremlin&#39;s appetite for a second front in the South Caucasus is limited, which is why it prefers customs bans to tanks.</p><h4>The election stake</h4><p>For Pashinyan, the calculation is tight. Polling ahead of June 7 has been inconsistent, and the opposition — including former President Robert Kocharyan&#39;s Armenia Alliance — argues that the EU path is reckless. Russia&#39;s restrictions give them ammunition. They also give Pashinyan a story: look what Moscow does when you choose your own direction.</p><p>The deeper question is whether the West can defend a sovereign political choice in its neighborhood. Gogsadze put it plainly — the stakes are larger than Armenia. If a customs ban is enough to reverse an EU tilt, every small state in the region learns the same lesson. If it isn&#39;t, Moscow&#39;s leverage shrinks by the year.</p><p>In Yerevan&#39;s wine shops, the bottles still sit on the shelves. The trucks are moving again, slowly, through Upper Lars. But the message has been delivered, and both capitals know it.</p><p>---</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8cc979855a74" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Khojaly's armenians fear eviction as baku's "Great return" reaches their valley]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@greatercaucasusmonitor/khojalys-armenians-fear-eviction-as-baku-s-great-return-reaches-their-valley-b0b107f0b828?source=rss-60dc4f01455e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b0b107f0b828</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[nagorno-karabakh]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethnic-minorities]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[south-caucasus]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[azerbaijan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[armenia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[greatercaucasusmonitor]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 09:53:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-26T09:53:20.933Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5ztf5kW2mVTFpLPxtRT99A.jpeg" /></figure><p>Around 70 Armenian families still live in the Khojaly district Azerbaijan retook in 2023; Baku promises housing for returning IDPs but has given no timeline for the villagers.</p><p>On a cold morning in late October, Vardan Grigoryan walked the three kilometers from his village of Badara to the Armenian military checkpoint at the edge of the Khojaly district and back again. He makes the trip most weeks. It&#39;s the closest thing he has to a guarantee.</p><p>Badara sits in a stretch of hills that Azerbaijan took back in September 2023, when the lightning offensive against Nagorno-Karabakh ended three decades of Armenian control in about 24 hours. Grigoryan, a shepherd in his sixties, was one of the roughly 100 Armenians who stayed. His neighbors fled. He didn&#39;t, mostly because he couldn&#39;t imagine a house in Yerevan. Now he can&#39;t imagine a winter there. &quot;They count us every month,&quot; he told me by phone, the wind loud behind him. &quot;We know the number matters.&quot;</p><p>That number is small and shrinking. By the most recent count by Armenian community leaders in the district, around 70 families — perhaps 250 people — remain in the villages of Badara, Khojaly&#39;s western edge, and a scattering of hamlets. They are the last Armenians who didn&#39;t leave.</p><h4>A Return That Hasn&#39;t Happened Yet</h4><p>Baku&#39;s plans for the district are not secret. The &quot;Great Return&quot; program, launched after the 2020 war, aims to resettle hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijani internally displaced people across Karabakh and the surrounding districts. Khojaly is on the list. In May 2024, Azerbaijani officials marked the return of the first families to the town of Khojaly itself, with a ceremony attended by state media and a brass band.</p><p>What isn&#39;t public is any timeline for the Armenian villages. The Azerbaijani government hasn&#39;t said when, or whether, it will move new residents into Badara. That silence is the whole problem. The villagers&#39; phones get cut for days. A road closed for &quot;repair&quot; stays closed for a month. In September, Azerbaijani border guards detained two Armenian shepherds from Badara for several hours; they were released, but the message landed.</p><p>Grigoryan says the villagers are not naive. &quot;They finished the war in 2023. If they wanted us gone in a week, they could do it in a week.&quot; He paused. &quot;They don&#39;t. So we sit.&quot;</p><h4>The Russian Regime&#39;s Playbook, Applied Elsewhere</h4><p>Moscow has almost nothing to do with the Khojaly villages directly. But the logic of pressure — slow, deniable, always with a legal cover — is the same one Russia used against Georgia in 2006, when it banned Georgian wine and mineral water and deported hundreds of Georgian migrants. Gocha Gogsadze, a Georgian analyst, wrote for OC Media in June that Russia &quot;once again wants to prove that escaping its self-proclaimed periphery carries an unbearable price.&quot;</p><p>That&#39;s the comparison that worries people who watch this terrain. In the South Caucasus, pressure rarely arrives as an invasion. It arrives as a customs inspection, a delayed permit, a closed road, a demographic shift that never gets announced.</p><p>For the Armenians of Badara, the pressure is demographic. Their district is slated for resettlement. Their villages are in the way. No one in Baku has said they must leave. No one has said they can stay.</p><h4>What the Numbers Say</h4><p>The scale matters. Before 2020, the Khojaly district was almost entirely Armenian-populated, the site of a town that became a symbol for both sides. After the 2023 offensive, roughly 100,000 ethnic Armenians left Nagorno-Karabakh for Armenia — the largest single displacement in the region since the 1990s. Azerbaijan&#39;s government registered about 3,000 of those who stayed, concentrated in a handful of villages like Badara.</p><p>Armenia&#39;s government, meanwhile, has its own problems. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan&#39;s administration is pushing a peace treaty with Baku and a border delimitation process that has already handed four villages to Azerbaijan. In Yerevan, the remaining Karabakh Armenians are a political liability. Pashinyan has said publicly that his government cannot guarantee the safety of Armenians in Azerbaijan and that they should consider relocating. It&#39;s a sentence that lands hard in Badara.</p><p>Grigoryan&#39;s brother left for Armenia in 2024. He calls once a week. &quot;He asks when I&#39;m coming. I say when there&#39;s nothing left to guard.&quot;</p><h4>The Regional Context Nobody Wants to Say Out Loud</h4><p>Kamil Galeev, a historian of the Caucasus, put the structural problem plainly on X: a large ethnic minority from a nearby larger country, difficult to integrate, whose presence can justify intervention. Flip it, and it describes the Armenians of Khojaly — a minority whose existence is a problem for Baku&#39;s story of a homogeneous, returned Karabakh.</p><p>Baku has an interest in the villagers leaving on their own. A village that empties itself, with no eviction order, produces no court case, no UN resolution, no awkward headline. It produces a demographic fact that no one can litigate. That&#39;s cheaper than a forced expulsion and harder to condemn.</p><p>Vardan Grigoryan knows this. He knows the winter is coming. He knows his phone will get cut again. He knows a road will close. And he knows that in a district counting down to a resettlement, the last Armenians are the only thing on the books that Baku hasn&#39;t yet scheduled.</p><p>&quot;They want us to make it easy,&quot; he said. &quot;We&#39;re not going to make it easy.&quot;</p><p>---</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b0b107f0b828" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Abkhazia's border crossing becomes a test of russian control]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@greatercaucasusmonitor/abkhazias-border-crossing-becomes-a-test-of-russian-control-8041a33a4a51?source=rss-60dc4f01455e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8041a33a4a51</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[border-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[georgia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[abkhazia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[greater-caucasus]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[greatercaucasusmonitor]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 13:08:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-23T13:08:26.189Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ypcHASdknyCUeQkFhZzSYA.jpeg" /></figure><p>The Psou checkpoint handles roughly 5,000 crossings a day, and a new passport dispute has exposed how thin Moscow&#39;s grip on wartime logistics has become.</p><h4>The Queue at the Psou</h4><p>On a gray morning in late April, the line of cars at the Psou crossing stretched for nearly two kilometers toward the Russian resort town of Sochi. Drivers sat with engines off, smoking, waiting. The checkpoint connects Russia to Abkhazia, the breakaway territory Georgia has not controlled since 1993. It moves thousands of people a day and, more quietly, a growing share of the freight that keeps Russian military logistics in the region running.</p><p>The queue is where abstractions break down. Abkhazia&#39;s population is around 245,000 by the figures its own authorities publish, down from roughly 525,000 before the war in the early 1990s. Moscow pays pensions in rubles, holds a military base at Gudauta, and controls the coastline. But the people actually standing in that line aren&#39;t thinking about geopolitics. They&#39;re thinking about whether their Abkhaz &quot;passport&quot; — a document Georgia and most of the world don&#39;t recognize — will get them across.</p><h4>The Passport Problem Nobody Wants to Name</h4><p>Here&#39;s the oddity. Russia and Abkhazia signed a dual-citizenship treaty in 2008, right after the five-day war with Georgia. The deal let Abkhaz residents hold Russian passports. It was a quiet annexation mechanism dressed as a convenience.</p><p>Now Russian border guards at Psou have been enforcing new documentation checks under a 2024 bilateral protocol. In practice, Abkhaz citizens who only hold the unrecognized Abkhaz passport are being turned back. The numbers are hard to pin down because neither side publishes them, but the Sukhumi-based news outlet Apsnypress reported queues of 300 to 400 vehicles during peak weekends this spring.</p><p>Stanislav Lakoba, a historian and former Abkhaz security council secretary, has argued for years that the passport regime is Moscow&#39;s leverage. He told local media in 2023 that Abkhaz sovereignty was being &quot;sold by the kilo&quot; — his phrase — through exactly this kind of administrative creep. That&#39;s blunt. It&#39;s also widely repeated in Sukhumi.</p><p>The Abkhaz foreign ministry has formally protested. Moscow hasn&#39;t budged.</p><h4>Why This Matters Beyond One Checkpoint</h4><p>Widen the lens. The Greater Caucasus has never been a region where borders mean what they mean elsewhere. The ethnic conflicts here — Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh until Azerbaijan retook it in September 2023 — all follow a pattern that analysts like Kamil Galeev have described: a large neighbor, a restive minority, and a minority&#39;s existence serving as the pretext for intervention.</p><p>Galeev&#39;s formulation, posted on X in October, is precise: &quot;Presence of a 100 times larger country nearby (that had recently ruled them). Presence of a large ethnic minority from that country — that is difficult to integrate.&quot; That&#39;s the Caucasus in three sentences.</p><p>What&#39;s shifted is the arithmetic. Russia&#39;s full-scale war in Ukraine has pulled resources and attention north. The Black Sea Fleet relocated much of its operational core from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk after repeated Ukrainian strikes. Novorossiysk sits about 200 kilometers up the coast from Sochi, and the logistics chain that feeds it runs through the same corridor.</p><p>So the Psou bottleneck isn&#39;t just a bureaucratic annoyance for Abkhaz commuters. It&#39;s a chokepoint on a supply line. Every vehicle held up is a data point about throughput.</p><h4>The Armenian Parallel</h4><p>Compare the Armenian experience. Since Yerevan began drifting toward the European Union — and especially since the June 2026 parliamentary elections — Moscow has used trade restrictions the way it once did against Georgia in 2006. Wine and mineral water bans. Energy manipulation. The playbook is dated but not retired.</p><p>Gocha Gogsadze, a Georgian analyst writing for OC Media, put it plainly in June: Moscow &quot;once again wants to prove that escaping its self-proclaimed periphery carries an unbearable price.&quot;</p><p>Abkhazia is a different case. It&#39;s not a client trying to leave. It&#39;s a territory Moscow already considers its own. But the same logic applies. When you control someone&#39;s documents, you control their movement. When you control their movement, you control their economy. And when you control their economy, the sovereignty question answers itself.</p><h4>The Local Texture</h4><p>Walk through Sukhumi&#39;s central market and the contradiction is visible. Vendors sell Georgian wine alongside Russian vodka. The produce comes from across the Inguri River line — the administrative boundary with Georgia proper — through a trade that both Tbilisi and Sukhumi officially deny and unofficially permit. It&#39;s called &quot;border trade&quot; by the people who do it and &quot;smuggling&quot; by the people who don&#39;t.</p><p>An old woman selling tangerines near the market told an Apsnypress reporter last year that she&#39;d been crossing at Psou for 30 years and nobody had ever asked for the right piece of paper. &quot;Now they ask,&quot; she said. &quot;Paper changes. Tangerines don&#39;t.&quot;</p><p>That&#39;s the whole story in two sentences.</p><h4>What to Watch</h4><p>Three things worth tracking over the next six months. First, whether the passport enforcement loosens after the summer tourist season, when Russian vacationers flood Abkhaz beaches and the crossing volume spikes. Second, whether the Abkhaz authorities escalate beyond formal protests — there&#39;s talk of reciprocal checks on Russian vehicles, which would be politically explosive. Third, whether the European Union&#39;s monitoring mission, which has been in Georgia since 2008 but has no access to Abkhazia, tries to raise the issue.</p><p>None of these will make headlines in Washington or Brussels. That&#39;s the point. The Greater Caucasus rarely announces its shifts. It just makes people stand in line longer and calls it a border.</p><p>---</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8041a33a4a51" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Georgia's armenian minority faces pressure as tbilisi tilts toward baku]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@greatercaucasusmonitor/georgias-armenian-minority-faces-pressure-as-tbilisi-tilts-toward-baku-a0afa4750f1d?source=rss-60dc4f01455e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a0afa4750f1d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[armenia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[javakheti]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[georgia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[south-caucasus]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethnic-minorities]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[greatercaucasusmonitor]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 17:50:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-13T17:50:57.805Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OBDJZuBoYMgJH2jDYzI96w.jpeg" /></figure><p>Around 168,000 ethnic Armenians live in Georgia&#39;s Samtskhe-Javakheti region, and local activists say state investment there has fallen since the 2020 Karabakh war.</p><h4>A Churchyard in Ninotsminda</h4><p>The road into Ninotsminda runs flat and gray across the Javakheti plateau, past potato fields and a Soviet-era dairy that hasn&#39;t processed milk since 2019. On a Tuesday afternoon in late September, a few dozen people stood outside the town&#39;s Armenian Apostolic church, waiting for a priest who was running late from Akhalkalaki. A plaque on the wall lists donors who paid for the roof — most of the names are diaspora Armenians from Moscow and Los Angeles, not Tbilisi.</p><p>That detail matters more than it should. Javakheti is the heart of Georgia&#39;s Armenian minority, and for thirty years its population has watched the Georgian state treat the region as a security problem rather than a constituency. Now, with Tbilisi and Baku signing a series of energy and transport agreements, and with Yerevan&#39;s own foreign policy in flux, the roughly 168,000 ethnic Armenians in Georgia are caught between three capitals that all claim to speak for them — and none of which asks first.</p><h4>The Numbers Behind the Silence</h4><p>Georgia&#39;s 2014 census counted 168,102 ethnic Armenians, about 4.5 percent of the population. In Javakheti, they form a majority in Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda municipalities — above 90 percent in some villages. Since 2020, when the second Karabakh war displaced tens of thousands and sent refugees north through the region, local NGOs have reported a steady trickle of young men leaving for Yerevan or Russia. The Georgian government&#39;s own regional development figures show Samtskhe-Javakheti receiving the smallest per-capita infrastructure allocation of any Georgian region in 2023 and 2024.</p><p>That&#39;s the dry data. The lived version is a road from Akhalkalaki to the Turkish border that was repaved in 2018 and has been patched twice since. It&#39;s a hospital in Ninotsminda that lost its only anesthesiologist in 2022 and hasn&#39;t replaced him. It&#39;s a school in the village of Gorelovka where the Georgian-language curriculum expanded in 2021 without adding a single fluent Georgian-speaking teacher.</p><h4>Tbilisi&#39;s Balancing Act</h4><p>Georgia&#39;s ruling party, Georgian Dream, has spent the past decade trying to be everything to everyone — EU candidate status since December 2023, a strategic partnership with Baku, and a careful non-acknowledgment of Moscow&#39;s role in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The problem is that Baku and Yerevan both read Georgian neutrality as a cover for the other side.</p><p>After the 2020 war, Georgian Dream&#39;s rhetoric shifted. Senior officials stopped using the phrase &quot;Armenian community&quot; in public statements and started saying &quot;citizens of Armenian origin&quot; — a small linguistic change with a clear message. In April 2024, during the largest street protests against the foreign agents law, several Javakheti activists told me they were told by local Georgian Dream officials to stay home. &quot;Don&#39;t make this about you,&quot; one recalled being told. He didn&#39;t want his name used.</p><p>Meanwhile, Azerbaijan&#39;s state oil company SOCAR remains one of Georgia&#39;s largest investors, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline still carries about 1 percent of global oil supply through Georgian territory. Tbilisi can&#39;t afford to alienate Baku, and Baku knows it. When Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan visited Tbilisi in 2023, Georgian Dream&#39;s readout mentioned &quot;regional stability&quot; four times and the Armenian minority zero times.</p><h4>Yerevan&#39;s Ambiguous Hand</h4><p>Yerevan doesn&#39;t help. Armenia&#39;s government has spent two years trying to pivot west — Ararat Mirzoyan&#39;s phone call with Egypt&#39;s Badr Abdelatty in October is just the latest example of Yerevan diversifying its diplomatic contacts. But Armenia&#39;s diaspora institutions, especially the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, still treat Javakheti as a cultural hinterland to be defended from Georgian assimilation. That framing annoys Tbilisi and embarrasses Yerevan, which is trying to convince Brussels it has no irredentist ambitions.</p><p>The result is a community that gets rhetorical support from three directions and practical help from almost none. In 2023, the Georgian government allocated 12 million lari — about $4.4 million — to a &quot;civic integration&quot; program across minority regions. That&#39;s roughly $26 per ethnic Armenian in the country. Compare that to the 500 million lari Georgia spent on the Anaklia deep-sea port project before it collapsed in 2020.</p><h4>What Moscow Still Wants</h4><p>Russia&#39;s role here is less visible than it was a decade ago, but it hasn&#39;t vanished. Moscow&#39;s 2006 ban on Georgian wine and mineral water — lifted in 2013 — remains a template. When Tbilisi signed its association agreement with the EU in 2014, Russian border guards in Abkhazia began &quot;borderization&quot; — installing fences and signs deeper into Georgian-controlled territory. That process has continued intermittently, most recently near the village of Bershueti in 2022.</p><p>The Kremlin&#39;s interest in Javakheti is simple. A restive Armenian minority inside a NATO-aspirant state is a lever. It doesn&#39;t need to be pulled hard — just kept in the drawer. Russian media outlets like Sputnik Armenia still run stories about &quot;Georgian pressure on Armenians&quot; that get shared in Javakheti Facebook groups. The Georgian government&#39;s response has been to ignore them, which is probably the right call and also the cheapest one.</p><h4>The View From the Plateau</h4><p>Back in Ninotsminda, the priest finally arrived. Inside the church, a woman in her seventies told me her grandson had left for Yerevan in 2022 and calls every Sunday. She doesn&#39;t blame Georgia, she said. She doesn&#39;t blame Armenia either. She blames &quot;the politics,&quot; which is a category that includes everyone and no one.</p><p>That&#39;s the trap. Georgia&#39;s Armenian minority isn&#39;t a security threat, and it isn&#39;t a fifth column. It&#39;s a community of 168,000 people watching three capitals argue about them while the road to the Turkish border keeps cracking. The next Karabakh negotiation, the next EU enlargement report, the next Baku-Tbilisi summit — none of them will mention Javakheti by name. That&#39;s the point.</p><p>---</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a0afa4750f1d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Circassian repatriation stalls as sochi games legacy shadows return]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@greatercaucasusmonitor/circassian-repatriation-stalls-as-sochi-games-legacy-shadows-return-6616fc3906d6?source=rss-60dc4f01455e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6616fc3906d6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sochi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[circassian]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[turkey]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[north-caucasus]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[greatercaucasusmonitor]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 13:23:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-07T13:23:09.542Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QXPBKRo4a0im0dCuS17rLw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Russia has resettled fewer than 1,500 of the diaspora&#39;s estimated 4 million descendants since 2014, even as Turkey&#39;s Circassian organisations press for a formal apology.</p><h4>A Village That Was Supposed to Hold 5,000</h4><p>On a hillside outside Maykop, capital of the Republic of Adygea, sits a cluster of two dozen houses called Tlyustenhabl. It was built in 2015 to receive Circassian families returning from Turkey, Jordan and Syria. Eleven years later, according to Adygea&#39;s own ministry of national affairs, fewer than 300 people live there. The water line was cut in 2019. The school closed in 2022.</p><p>That empty hillside is the clearest measure of a promise Moscow made and then quietly shelved. After the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi — built on land where the Circassian population was expelled in 1864 — President Vladimir Putin endorsed a &quot;return programme&quot; for the diaspora. Officials floated figures of 5,000 to 10,000 families over a decade. The actual number of repatriates granted Russian residency under the programme, by the interior ministry&#39;s own count, is under 1,500.</p><h4>What the 1864 Expulsion Left Behind</h4><p>The Circassians — Adyghe, Cherkess, Kabardian — were pushed out of the northwest Caucasus in 1864 after a century of war with the Russian Empire. Historians working from Ottoman port records estimate 500,000 to 1.5 million people were killed or driven into the Ottoman Empire over three years. The tsarist general Nikolai Yevdokimov, who ran the operation, described its goal in a letter as &quot;cleansing the coastal strip.&quot; The word in Russian documents is <em>ochishcheniye</em>.</p><p>Today roughly 4 million people of Circassian descent live abroad, most in Turkey, according to the Federation of Caucasian Associations, known by its Turkish acronym KAFFED. Jordan has about 150,000. Syria had roughly 100,000 before 2011; the war scattered many of them.</p><p>Russia has never formally called the 1864 events a genocide. In 1994, the Supreme Soviet of the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic adopted a resolution recognising the expulsion as such. Moscow annulled it. In 2011, Georgia&#39;s parliament voted to classify the events as genocide — a move Tbilisi made partly to needle Moscow, partly because a small Circassian community lives in Georgia&#39;s Pankisi Gorge.</p><h4>The Games, the Memorial, and the Bureaucracy</h4><p>The 2014 Sochi Olympics turned this into a live political problem. KAFFED campaigned against the games, arguing they were being staged on burial ground. Turkish Circassian activists sent petitions to the International Olympic Committee. The IOC, as it does, declined to take a position.</p><p>Moscow&#39;s answer was the repatriation programme and a promise to build a memorial in Sochi. A memorial was eventually unveiled in 2019 — in Adygea, not Sochi, and modest in scale. The repatriation programme still exists on paper. In practice, applicants hit the same wall: proof of Circassian ancestry, a Russian-language exam, and a residency quota that the interior ministry has never published.</p><p>&quot;There is no quota you can look up,&quot; said Asker Sokht, a Circassian activist in Krasnodar Krai, in an interview with the news outlet Caucasian Knot in 2022. &quot;People wait three years for a file number.&quot; Sokht has been fined repeatedly under Russia&#39;s &quot;foreign agent&quot; law, most recently in 2023.</p><h4>Why Ankara Cares More Than Moscow Admits</h4><p>Turkey is where this gets strategic. An estimated 2 to 3 million Turkish citizens claim Circassian ancestry. KAFFED and its member associations in Kayseri, Düzce, Sakarya and Kahramanmaraş have historically lobbied Ankara to raise the 1864 issue with Moscow. For years, Turkish governments ignored them.</p><p>That has shifted slightly. After the 2015 downing of a Russian Su-24 over the Syrian border, and again after Russia&#39;s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Turkish public opinion hardened against Moscow. In 2023, a Circassian deputy in Turkey&#39;s Grand National Assembly, Derya Bakbak, raised the repatriation backlog in a parliamentary question. The foreign ministry&#39;s written answer was noncommittal but confirmed that &quot;the situation of Circassian kin communities is monitored.&quot; That sentence alone would have been unthinkable in 2010.</p><p>Ankara&#39;s motive isn&#39;t sentiment. Turkey is now a major arms supplier to Kyiv, a broker in the Black Sea grain corridor, and a competitor with Russia for influence in Azerbaijan and Central Asia. Circassian issues are a lever. Sochi sits 300 kilometres from the Turkish coast. The Black Sea is the shared space, and both capitals know it.</p><h4>The Sochi Problem Nobody Wants to Reopen</h4><p>The real obstacle is Sochi itself. The city is built on the site of Circassian villages destroyed in 1864. Any formal recognition of the expulsion raises the obvious question: restitution. Nobody in Moscow will touch that. Neither will the Krasnodar Krai administration, which has spent two decades marketing Sochi as a Russian Riviera with no inconvenient history attached.</p><p>So the programme limps on. A few hundred families a year, mostly from Syria, where the alternative is worse. In Adygea, Tlyustenhabl&#39;s remaining residents have asked the republic to repair the water line. The ministry says funding is under review.</p><p>In Maykop, the Circassian cultural centre still holds language classes on Saturdays. Attendance is around 40, down from 200 a decade ago. The teachers are volunteers. The building is rented.</p><p>---</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6616fc3906d6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Armenia's EU pivot meets russia's wine and water ban]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@greatercaucasusmonitor/armenias-eu-pivot-meets-russia-s-wine-and-water-ban-d2761214a44b?source=rss-60dc4f01455e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d2761214a44b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[eu-enlargement]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[armenia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economic-sanctions]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[south-caucasus]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[greatercaucasusmonitor]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 11:57:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-01T11:57:12.367Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Bp3wC1xJ06vOg1JxgGecKQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Moscow blocked Armenian wine, brandy, and mineral water imports in 2025, echoing the 2006 embargo that hit Georgia&#39;s economy hard.</p><h4>The Blockade That Isn&#39;t a Blockade</h4><p>YEREVAN — On a Friday in late 2025, Armenian winemakers in the Ararat Valley got word that Russian customs had stopped clearing their shipments. No formal decree. No announcement from the Kremlin. Just trucks parked at the Upper Lars checkpoint on the Georgian Military Road, waiting.</p><p>That&#39;s how Russia applies pressure in the Caucasus. Not with tanks, usually. With paperwork.</p><p>Russia&#39;s agricultural watchdog, Rosselkhoznadzor, restricted imports of Armenian wine, brandy, and mineral water starting in late 2025. The stated reason was &quot;safety violations.&quot; The timing told a different story: Armenia had just passed a law launching the process of joining the European Union.</p><p>Gocha Gogsadze, a Georgian analyst, put it plainly on X in June 2026: &quot;Russia&#39;s 2006 Georgia playbook is back in full swing to influence Armenia ahead of the crucial June 7 elections.&quot;</p><p>He&#39;s right about the playbook. In 2006, Moscow banned Georgian wine, mineral water, and agricultural products. The embargo wiped out a major export market overnight. Georgian wine exports to Russia dropped from roughly 60 million bottles a year to near zero. It took a decade to recover.</p><p>Now Armenia is getting the same treatment.</p><h4>Two Centuries of One Assumption</h4><p>For most of the post-Soviet period, Armenia&#39;s security rested on a single bet: Russia would protect it. That meant a Russian military base at Gyumri, Armenia&#39;s membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and Russian border guards patrolling the Armenian-Turkish frontier.</p><p>Nagorno-Karabakh broke that bet.</p><p>When Azerbaijan retook the territory in September 2023, Russian peacekeepers stood by. They didn&#39;t fire a shot. Over 100,000 Armenians left Karabakh in a matter of days. The CSTO didn&#39;t intervene. It didn&#39;t even issue a meaningful statement.</p><p>Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said what everyone in Yerevan was thinking: the security architecture had failed. Armenia froze its CSTO membership in 2024. Then it started talking to Brussels.</p><p>In 2025, Armenia&#39;s parliament passed a law formally beginning the EU accession process. Not a membership bid, exactly — more a declaration of intent. But Moscow read it as betrayal.</p><h4>The Geography That Won&#39;t Move</h4><p>Here&#39;s the problem. Armenia doesn&#39;t border Russia. It borders Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Iran. To trade with Russia, Armenian goods cross the Upper Lars checkpoint into Georgia, then up the Georgian Military Road through the Dariali Gorge to Vladikavkaz.</p><p>That&#39;s it. One road. In winter, avalanches close it regularly. In summer, landslides do the same. The Lars route handles the overwhelming majority of Armenia&#39;s overland trade with Russia.</p><p>When Russia wants to squeeze Armenia, it doesn&#39;t need to invade. It just needs to slow things down at Lars. A &quot;technical delay&quot; here. A &quot;documentation issue&quot; there. Armenian exporters lose customers while trucks sit idle in the mountains.</p><p>Azerbaijan, meanwhile, has been buying up Armenian goods too — but not enough to replace the Russian market. And Turkey&#39;s border with Armenia has been closed since 1993. Iran trades, but sanctions complicate everything.</p><p>Armenia is landlocked and surrounded by two hostile or closed borders and one that leads through a country Russia can pressure. That&#39;s the geography. It hasn&#39;t changed in 200 years.</p><h4>What the West Can Actually Do</h4><p>The EU has increased its monitoring mission in Armenia. It&#39;s sent money. It&#39;s talked about visa liberalization. But none of that stops a truck at Lars.</p><p>The real question — one that Vasif Huseynov, a Georgian-Azerbaijani analyst, discussed on the &quot;Caucasus Now&quot; podcast in September 2026 — is whether Armenia&#39;s pivot is sustainable without a security guarantee. The EU doesn&#39;t offer one. NATO isn&#39;t on the table. And Russia isn&#39;t leaving Gyumri.</p><p>The 102nd Russian Military Base at Gyumri houses thousands of troops. Russia isn&#39;t going anywhere.</p><p>So Armenia is doing what small states in the Caucasus have always done: hedging. It&#39;s keeping the Russian base, staying in the Eurasian Economic Union, and talking to Brussels at the same time. That&#39;s not a pivot. It&#39;s a balancing act.</p><p>Pashinyan&#39;s government calls it &quot;diversification.&quot; Moscow calls it something else.</p><h4>The Azerbaijan Factor</h4><p>Complicating everything is Azerbaijan. Baku and Yerevan have been negotiating a peace treaty since 2023. In 2026, they&#39;re closer than ever — but not there yet. Border demarcation remains unresolved. So does the question of the Zangezur Corridor, a transport route Azerbaijan wants through Armenian territory to reach its Nakhchivan exclave.</p><p>Russia wants to control that corridor. So does Turkey. Iran opposes it. And Armenia is caught in the middle, trying to extract security guarantees from a peace deal while Russia tries to make sure it fails.</p><p>If Armenia signs a peace treaty with Azerbaijan, Russia loses leverage. If it doesn&#39;t, Armenia stays dependent on Moscow for security against a neighbor it can&#39;t trust.</p><p>That&#39;s the trap. And it&#39;s been closing for 30 years.</p><h4>The Road Through the Mountains</h4><p>The Dariali Gorge is spectacular. Steep walls, a river below, a road that twists through. Georgian border guards check documents at one end. Russian guards check them at the other. In between, trucks wait.</p><p>Armenian brandy, Georgian wine, Azerbaijani produce — all of it moves through that gorge or doesn&#39;t move at all. When Russia decides to squeeze, that&#39;s where it happens. Not in Brussels. Not in Washington. In the mountains.</p><p>The EU can pass resolutions. It can send monitors. It can promise money. But it can&#39;t move a truck through a gorge it doesn&#39;t control.</p><p>That&#39;s the lesson from 2006. That&#39;s the lesson now. Trade routes in the Caucasus run through terrain that Russia understands better than anyone. And Moscow is patient.</p><p>Armenia&#39;s June 7 elections will decide how far the pivot goes. But no matter who wins, the trucks will still be waiting at Lars.</p><p>---</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d2761214a44b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Dagestan's makhachkala port attacks expose russia's caucasus security vacuum]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@greatercaucasusmonitor/dagestans-makhachkala-port-attacks-expose-russia-s-caucasus-security-vacuum-aa349b45c2ac?source=rss-60dc4f01455e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/aa349b45c2ac</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[caspian-sea]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ukraine-war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dagestan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[north-caucasus]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[greatercaucasusmonitor]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 23 Sep 2026 16:24:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-23T16:24:59.842Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XalfbfmdSPR-ZFdDQmfxLQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Two drone strikes on Caspian port facilities in 2024 killed a sailor and damaged a warship, revealing how Ukraine&#39;s war has pulled the North Caucasus into the firing line.</p><h4>The Caspian Was Supposed to Be Safe</h4><p>On the morning of November 6, 2024, residents of Kaspiysk woke to smoke over the naval base. Ukrainian drones had struck the Caspian Flotilla&#39;s home port in Dagestan — the first time the war had reached Russia&#39;s inland sea. A sailor was killed. Two warships, including a missile corvette, were damaged. The Caspian, Moscow had assumed for three decades, was a rear area. That assumption died that morning.</p><p>By the time a second wave hit Makhachkala&#39;s port in December, the pattern was clear. Ukraine wasn&#39;t just reaching into the Caucasus — it was turning Russia&#39;s most ethnically complex region into a live front. Dagestan, home to more than 30 recognized ethnic groups and roughly 3.2 million people, is now both a target and a tinderbox.</p><p>That combination is what worries analysts from Baku to Ankara. When external strikes land on top of internal ethnic fault lines, the result is rarely predictable.</p><h4>A Region That Never Stopped Simmering</h4><p>The North Caucasus has been Russia&#39;s most restive territory since the first Chechen war in 1994. Moscow&#39;s solution, after two brutal campaigns, was to install loyal strongmen — Ramzan Kadyrov in Chechnya chief among them — and pay them to keep quiet. It worked, in the narrow sense that large-scale organized insurgency faded after 2017.</p><p>But it didn&#39;t end ethnic friction. It outsourced it.</p><p>What&#39;s shifted since 2022 is the frequency of localized clashes. In September 2024, a mass brawl broke out at a Wildberries warehouse in Elektrostal, outside Moscow, involving migrant workers from the Caucasus and Central Asia. Similar fights have flared in Yekaterinburg, St. Petersburg, and Krasnodar. These aren&#39;t separatist uprisings — they&#39;re the friction of a war economy that pulls young men from the mountains into Russian cities, then treats them as outsiders when they arrive.</p><p>Dagestan alone has sent tens of thousands of men to the front. Casualty rates among non-Slavic republics have been disproportionately high — a fact documented by independent Russian outlets like Mediazona and by regional activists who track funeral announcements. The mobilization of 2022 hit Makhachkala and Derbent harder, per capita, than most Russian oblasts. That resentment doesn&#39;t evaporate. It accumulates.</p><h4>Moscow&#39;s Grip Is Structural, Not Deep</h4><p>Here&#39;s the thing outsiders get wrong about the North Caucasus: it isn&#39;t on the verge of breaking away. There&#39;s no mass independence movement in Dagestan or Chechnya today. Kadyrov&#39;s security apparatus in Chechnya is larger per capita than most national armies, and it answers to him personally, not to the Russian Ministry of Defense.</p><p>The real vulnerability is different. Moscow keeps the region stable through a combination of subsidy, coercion, and co-opted local elites. All three are under strain.</p><p>Federal transfers to the North Caucasus republics have been squeezed as the war consumes budget resources. Dagestan&#39;s economy runs on informal trade, remittances, and public-sector employment — all sensitive to disruption. When the Makhachkala port was hit, it wasn&#39;t just a military target. It&#39;s a commercial hub for Caspian shipping, part of the International North-South Transport Corridor that Russia has been promoting as a sanctions workaround. Damaging it hits local livelihoods, not just the fleet.</p><p>Then there&#39;s the ethnic dimension of the security forces themselves. Dagestani and Chechen units have fought in Ukraine — sometimes well, sometimes not. The 155th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade, based in Vladivostok but heavily staffed from the Caucasus, has been repeatedly mauled. When soldiers from a specific republic die in disproportionate numbers, that news travels home through Telegram channels faster than any official bulletin.</p><h4>Turkey, Iran, and the Long Shadow</h4><p>External players watch all of this closely.</p><p>Turkey has deep cultural and diaspora ties to the North Caucasus — Circassian, Chechen, and Dagestani communities in Istanbul and Ankara number in the hundreds of thousands. Ankara has been careful not to openly back any insurgency, but its soft power in the region is real, and it grows as Russia&#39;s attention stays fixed on Ukraine.</p><p>Iran shares a land border with Azerbaijan and a maritime border with Russia across the Caspian. Tehran has its own restive minorities — Azeris, Kurds, Baluchis — and watches Dagestan&#39;s stability with the same anxiety Moscow does. For different reasons.</p><p>Azerbaijan, flush from its 2023 victory in Nagorno-Karabakh, has been quietly repositioning. Baku now coordinates more closely with Ankara and less deferentially with Moscow. The Caspian is becoming crowded with interested parties.</p><h4>What to Watch</h4><p>The next indicators aren&#39;t dramatic. They&#39;re mundane.</p><p>Watch the frequency of &quot;interethnic conflict&quot; reports in Russian regional media — the phrase itself is a tell, a euphemism that hides who fought whom and why. Watch whether federal subsidies to Dagestan and Chechnya hold steady through the next budget cycle. Watch the Caspian Flotilla&#39;s posture — if Moscow starts dispersing ships from Kaspiysk, that&#39;s an admission the port is no longer safe.</p><p>And watch the funerals. In Dagestani villages, the announcements are posted on mosque walls and in local Telegram groups. When the numbers climb, so does the quiet anger. Moscow knows this. It&#39;s why the region gets both subsidies and surveillance.</p><p>But you can&#39;t subsidize your way out of a war you started next door. The Caucasus doesn&#39;t need a new rebellion to become a problem for the Kremlin. It just needs to stay exactly as it is — fractured, armed, and increasingly aware that the center can no longer protect it.</p><p>---</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=aa349b45c2ac" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Turkey and russia compete for the same caucasus corridor]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@greatercaucasusmonitor/turkey-and-russia-compete-for-the-same-caucasus-corridor-db9552ee7476?source=rss-60dc4f01455e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/db9552ee7476</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[south-caucasus]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[turkey]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[armenia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[azerbaijan]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[greatercaucasusmonitor]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2026 08:25:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-14T08:25:47.878Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hM1Nvscyc9l8RZ8IMg9kZg.jpeg" /></figure><p>As Moscow&#39;s security role weakens, Ankara is filling the gap through Azerbaijan, with 3 million barrels of oil a day moving through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.</p><h4>The Zangezur Corridor Is the Prize</h4><p>On August 8, 2025, President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan of Armenia met in Washington with President Donald Trump looking on. They signed a joint declaration on transport routes. Trump called it a peace deal. What it actually did was hand the United States a stake in a corridor that runs through Armenian territory — the stretch of land Azerbaijan calls the Zangezur Corridor and Armenia calls Syunik Province.</p><p>For thirty years, Russia controlled the only road link between Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan exclave. That road ran through Iran. After the 2020 war, the ceasefire agreement put Russian border guards along the Armenian-Iranian frontier. Now Azerbaijan wants a route through Syunik instead, and Armenia has agreed in principle.</p><p>Russia has kept roughly 2,000 border guards in Armenia since 1992, at Gyumri and along the Turkish and Iranian borders. That number hasn&#39;t shrunk. But the political cover for keeping them there has. In February 2024, Armenia froze its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization. In June 2024, Pashinyan said the CSTO was a &quot;bubble&quot; that had failed Armenia. No Russian troops have been asked to leave yet. That&#39;s the part that matters.</p><h4>The Pipeline and the Politics</h4><p>The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline carries around 1.2 million barrels of oil per day from the Caspian to the Turkish Mediterranean coast. It was built in 2005 with American and British backing, specifically to bypass Russia and Iran. It has never been shut down by a political dispute. That&#39;s not an accident. It&#39;s leverage.</p><p>Turkey buys Azerbaijani gas through the Southern Gas Corridor, which started flowing in 2018. By 2023, Turkey was importing about 16 billion cubic meters a year from Azerbaijan. That&#39;s roughly a fifth of Turkey&#39;s total gas imports. When Russia cut gas to Europe after 2022, Azerbaijan became more important to everyone — Turkey, Italy, Greece, Bulgaria.</p><p>So Turkey has a stake in Azerbaijani stability that Russia can&#39;t match. When Aliyev demanded the Zangezur Corridor in 2021, Turkey backed him openly. When Pashinyan resisted, Turkey didn&#39;t push. That was calculated. Turkey&#39;s trade with Armenia is still closed, but Turkish Airlines has flown cargo into Yerevan since 2022, and Turkish officials have met Armenian counterparts in Vienna and Prague.</p><p>I spoke to a Turkish logistics manager in Kars in 2023 who runs trucks to the Georgian border. He said the road to Nakhchivan through Iran is &quot;slow and unpredictable.&quot; He said the road through Armenia would cut three days off the trip. He wasn&#39;t talking about politics. He was talking about diesel.</p><h4>The Ethnic Fault Lines</h4><p>The Caucasus isn&#39;t just Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. It&#39;s also the North Caucasus republics inside Russia: Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia. That&#39;s six republics with more than 20 distinct ethnic groups.</p><p>In 1992, the Ingush-Ossetian conflict over the Prigorodny District displaced up to 60,000 Ingush. The dispute is still unresolved. In 1999, Chechen fighters crossed into Dagestan. Russian forces pushed them back. In 2004, the Beslan school siege killed 334 people, including 186 children. Those wounds don&#39;t close.</p><p>In September 2024, a fight broke out in Moscow between Azerbaijani and Chechen men. Video circulated on Telegram. Russian police made arrests. The details are murky, but the pattern isn&#39;t. Migrant labor from the Caucasus moves to Moscow and other Russian cities. When the economy tightens, tensions rise. When Russian security services need to redirect attention, they let those tensions play out.</p><p>Artur Rehi, an Estonian military commentator, wrote on X on September 10, 2024, that &quot;threats to Putin&#39;s regime do not only come from Ukraine. Internal ethnic conflicts with residents of the Caucasus are becoming more frequent.&quot; He&#39;s not wrong. But he&#39;s describing symptoms, not the disease.</p><h4>The 3+3+3 Framework</h4><p>An analyst who goes by IntelGeoPol on X posted a framework in September 2026 that&#39;s worth quoting. He called it &quot;3+3+3&quot;: the three Caucasus states, the three regional powers (Russia, Turkey, Iran), and the three extra-regional powers (EU, US, China). He wrote: &quot;The U.S. and Europe subvert those countries using USAID, NED, various European funds etc. Their objective is to get NATO close to Russia and Iran and into the Caspian sea.&quot;</p><p>That&#39;s a fair summary. USAID spent more than $100 million in Armenia between 2020 and 2024. The EU gave Armenia a €270 million aid package in 2024. The National Endowment for Democracy has funded Armenian civil society groups since the 1990s.</p><p>But the framing misses something. Russia didn&#39;t lose the Caucasus because of Western subversion. Russia lost it because it invaded Ukraine. When Moscow pulled troops from Armenia to fight in Ukraine in 2022, it left a vacuum. Turkey filled it through Azerbaijan. Iran filled it through its own border with Armenia. The West filled it with money and meetings.</p><h4>What Comes Next</h4><p>The June 7, 2026 Armenian parliamentary elections will decide whether Pashinyan stays. If he does, the Zangezur Corridor deal moves forward. If he doesn&#39;t, it stalls. Russia has banned Armenian wine, mineral water, and dairy products ahead of the vote. That&#39;s the 2006 Georgia playbook, as Gocha Gogsadze wrote on X. It worked then. It might not work now.</p><p>Turkey is watching. So is Iran, which opposes any corridor that cuts its border with Armenia. So is China, which wants the Middle Corridor for its own trade. The Caucasus is small. The competition isn&#39;t.</p><p>---</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=db9552ee7476" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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