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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Greymatter Capital on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[FTX (FTT) Analysis and Valuation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@greymattercap/ftx-ftt-analysis-and-valuation-911e9c369fed?source=rss-572b0ef6d16c------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Greymatter Capital]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2020 16:25:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-01-03T22:10:33.975Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4EY_Eya3bz6bdBzoUUTiQg.png" /></figure><p>By John Todaro, James Todaro and Joseph Todaro</p><p><a href="https://ftx.com/">FTX</a> is a leading derivatives and spot market exchange for trading digital assets and other selected commodities and products. The FTX team’s commitment to the accelerated release of innovative products as well as aggressively managing the user experience will allow FTX to continue to expand market share in the competitive digital asset exchange space. Our assessment of FTX’s ability to capture users and drive platform liquidity as well as our findings through a discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis indicate that the FTX exchange token (FTT) is an attractive opportunity.</p><p><strong>FTX Playbook: Driving Liquidity</strong></p><p>The competitive landscape for exchanges continues to heighten. Exchange users have minimal, if any, brand loyalty and will quickly move if more favorable trading opportunities are presented elsewhere. Exchanges are non “sticky” businesses in which users generally have the ability to establish accounts on competing platforms fairly easily. While users have the ability to operate across many different exchanges, significant pools of liquidity often only aggregate to a few exchanges. The strong network effects based on concentrated liquidity greatly minimize the number of concurrently successful exchanges with high user volumes — liquidity brings about more liquidity. This tends to result in relatively few exchanges capturing the majority of trading volume across users.</p><p>While the majority of liquidity is concentrated among a select few exchanges, there is still some degree of exchange turnover as competitive new entrants wrestle market share from the more established participants. Users looking for the most favorable trading experience migrate to exchanges offering the greatest market opportunities. As users begin to shift to different platforms, liquidity is affected which results in degradation of the trading experience and a further decrease in user demand and liquidity.</p><p>The interplay between liquidity and user satisfaction often results in a swift en masse departure of exchange users as liquidity begins to drop. This reality was observed in 2017 as users deserted the once market dominant exchanges Poloniex and Bittrex resulting in a <a href="https://twitter.com/JamesTodaroMD/status/1186329292763996161?s=20">downward spiral of liquidity</a>. Insufficient user satisfaction along with limited asset and product offerings due in part to strict regulatory oversight resulted in reduced liquidity as users shifted to more regulatory laissez faire exchanges such as Binance.</p><p>Adding to the exchange turnover is the continued maturation of digital assets as an established asset class. Each market cycle begets the arrival of more sophisticated and professional investors followed by more competent and higher quality exchanges. Currently we are observing the rise of the next generation of high competency exchanges that will subsequently attract users and liquidity away from the more established but less competent exchanges.</p><p><strong>Early Liquidity</strong></p><p>The barrier to entry in the derivatives market is entirely dependent on the ability to effectively source liquidity. This strong need for liquidity is due to the use of leverage within the derivatives market. Without significant pools of liquidity, derivatives exchanges cannot properly manage certain positions — resulting in the higher likelihood that effected trading accounts will ultimately have negative market value. This is different from unlevered spot exchanges, in which user balances cannot become negative.</p><p>While spot exchanges obviously also benefit greatly as liquidity increases, they are not as dependent on liquidity as derivatives exchanges. Insufficient liquidity on a spot exchange results in price slippage and less competitive asset prices but not outright losses for the exchange or users as occurs in the crypto derivatives market. These losses arise when there is inadequate liquidity to properly manage positions forcing some accounts into negative balances.</p><p>With minimal ability to collect these losses from the losing accounts themselves, as is done in the traditional market, many crypto derivatives exchanges are designed as a last resort to perform asset <em>clawbacks </em>or<em> auto-deleveraging</em> (ADL) events. ADL or clawbacks essentially socialize these losses against other users as profitable positions are force closed or realized profit is decreased. This results in financial losses to users who were on the winning side of the trade. In order to help protects against ADL/clawback events crypto derivative exchanges often have ‘insurance funds’. However, insurance funds in no way completely protect users from these such events and historically these funds on many exchanges have often been completely depleted during intensely volatile times.</p><p>Given the reality of how crypto derivatives markets operate, the importance of deep exchange liquidity cannot be overstated. This liquidity requirement difference between spot and derivative exchanges is why we see the long tail of low liquidity spot exchanges while we do not see this same long tail with derivatives exchanges.</p><p>The need for early liquidity within derivatives exchanges creates a certain moat around exchanges that can effectively source this liquidity. FTX was able to generate ample liquidity at launch through its closely related incubator firm, Alameda Research, a quantitative trading fund and liquidity provider. Alameda is one of the largest liquidity providers with estimates of <a href="https://www.alameda-research.com/">$100 million</a> assets under management and daily trading volumes over <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-13/billion-dollar-a-day-crypto-trader-finds-accolades-top-anonymity">$1 billion</a> across a multitude of exchanges.</p><p>The instant access to liquidity through Alameda allowed the FTX exchange to break into the derivatives industry more easily than for other competing exchanges. With Alameda as a liquidity provider, FTX could offer competitive futures products while minimally exposing their users and themselves to potential exchange wide losses due to insufficient liquidity.</p><p><strong>Product Innovation</strong></p><p>The FTX team has also demonstrated their commitment to continuously launching innovative trading products. While these more differentiated product offerings by themselves often see muted volume relative to more commonly traded products, such as Bitcoin perpetual futures, differentiated products act as the hook which brings in higher volume user activity to other products. The newly acquired users initially brought in by specific trading products not offered elsewhere, often consolidate their trading accounts and migrate their higher volume trading activities to exchanges that offer a more expansive range of products. These users then provide liquidity to the more commoditized markets like bitcoin futures. In such a way, differentiated product offerings act as a funnel which drives increased liquidity to the higher volume but less differentiated markets.</p><p>Since its launch in May of 2019, FTX has arguably been the leading derivatives exchange in bringing new products to market. They continue to display an exceptional ability to develop and launch intricate products in minimal time allowing FTX to offer products ahead of competing exchanges. Many of these products are largely pioneered and developed by FTX themselves. Two such examples are hash rate futures and leverage tokens.</p><p>Hash rate futures are products that allow users to bet on bitcoin difficulty levels — indicative of hash rate — at a given future date. Despite long held acknowledgement as a market of interest for traders and miners alike, hash rate markets did not exist in any capacity among exchanges. The implications of launching an entirely new unexplored market with unknown user demand left many exchanges rather hesitant. On the other hand, FTX leaned into the challenge of launching a new product with the hopes of differentiating themselves from other less innovative and aggressive exchanges.</p><p>Leverage tokens are another unique product that was brought to the spotlight by FTX. Leverage tokens act to offer leveraged exposure to specific assets while abstracting away trade maintenance requirements normally present with positions on margin. These leverage tokens have become rather popular resulting in competing exchanges launching their own leverage tokens following the success of those first offered by FTX.</p><p>Among derivative exchanges, FTX arguably has the widest range of products including other compelling offerings such presidential markets, options, volatility markets, various token baskets, oil markets and innovative algorithmic trading tools.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/557/1*Dj3eHM2pzGnaHbQSpah4Og.png" /><figcaption><strong>Figure 1: FTX presidential market</strong></figcaption></figure><p>This consistent introduction of new products entices traders to migrate to FTX for specific trading products not offered on any other exchange. This bump in liquidity, as new traders migrate over, is then further used to appropriately attract more traders creating a liquidity feedback loop.</p><p><em>Products bring traders. Traders bring liquidity. Liquidity brings more traders.</em></p><p>These product examples showcase the understanding and commitment from the FTX team to continuously offer compelling new products to expand their user base driving exchange liquidity and increasing market share. This strategy has largely been successful for FTX as it has seen an incredible amount of growth in its brief year of existence as it now ranks near the top five largest derivatives exchange by daily volume.</p><p><strong>FTT Token Valuation</strong></p><p>Given the unique token structure of FTT, including the buyback and burn schemata, the FTT token cannot be valued conclusively using existing financial analysis framework. However, to ensure that the FTT token does maintain a level of intrinsic value, we must build out an absolute valuation model in order to find a basis for the token’s intrinsic valuation. As such, we will borrow from the traditional financial markets in analyzing a valuation model for FTT. It is important to note that traditional financial models, including ours, do not fit exactly in valuing the token and so should not form a complete basis for assessing the value of the asset — but the valuation model can offer a sanity check.</p><p>We specifically use an <a href="https://medium.com/@john_19547/valuing-crypto-assets-using-a-dcf-model-bc6297b0bd25">absolute valuation model</a> in order to derive an intrinsic value for the FTT token. Relative valuation models, such as a multiple comparison between FTT and competitor exchange tokens, fail to identify an intrinsic value for the FTT token. While relative valuation may suggest the FTT token is cheaper compared to competitors, both sets of tokens may be overvalued on an absolute basis. The absolute valuation model of choice in analyzing the FTT token is constructed from a discounted cash flow analysis (DCF).</p><p><strong>Discounted Cash Flow Analysis</strong></p><p>The FTT token accretes value from token buybacks in which the exchange uses a portion of revenues to buyback and burn tokens in the open market on a weekly basis. In the figure and model below we present the bull case for FTT. The <a href="https://ftx.com/ftt">exchange uses revenue</a> derived from the following to buy back tokens:</p><ul><li>33% of all fees generated on FTX markets</li><li>10% of net additions to the insurance fund (‘Socialized Gains’)</li><li>5% of fees earned from other uses of the FTX platform</li></ul><p>While buybacks are different from dividends and token holders do not maintain the same rights as shareholders, including voting rights, we model buybacks equivalently to company generated cash flows in our DCF calculation. Our model assumptions are outlined below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/479/1*z9ZZrkJ3lVja8GNoeSpSZQ.png" /><figcaption><strong>Figure 2: Assumptions table</strong></figcaption></figure><p>Using the formula for DCF calculation, PV = [CF1 / (1+r)1] + [CF2 / (1+r)2] + … + [CFn / (1+r)n] + TV, we can discount our cash flows back to the present day to arrive at a Present Value (PV) for the FTT token.</p><p>PV = Present cash flow value</p><p>CF1 = Cash flow at the end of year 1</p><p>CF2 = Cash flow at the end of year 2</p><p>CFn = Cash flow at n specified year</p><p>r = Discount or required rate of return</p><p>TV = Terminal Value</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/616/1*9TBJamcYYsNuv_iiTm2TVw.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3: FTX financial model</figcaption></figure><p>As demonstrated in the model above, in our bull case, the intrinsic value of the token is $24.20 and $6.66 on a fully diluted basis. The intrinsic market value is $2.3 billion. Our discount rate of 12% is appropriate given the increased risk the FTT token represents relative to the equity and bond markets. This valuation is somewhat in line with equity valuations for the private company behind the FTX exchange. Prior <a href="https://www.theblockcrypto.com/daily/56519/crypto-derivatives-exchange-ftx-15-million-1-billion">reports</a> put the equity valuation around $1–2 billion.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>Both spot and derivative market exchanges continue to mature as digital asset investing becomes an ever larger industry with more sophisticated participants. With this maturity comes exchange churn as the less competitive platforms lose market share to newer more competitive entrants.</p><p>The newer entrants that will be best positioned to attract users and gain market share are those that have compelling new product offerings and deep order book liquidity. FTX, with its increased product offerings and unique liquidity set-up, will be able to gain considerable market share resulting in increased token buybacks, allowing for increased value accretion to the token holder.</p><p><strong>Disclaimer</strong></p><p>The managing partners do not endorse or recommend any investment action in FTX exchange token (FTT). This document should not be regarded as investment advice, offering document, or as a recommendation regarding a course of action. These views are those solely of the managing partners of Greymatter Capital and do not represent the views of the FTX team.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=911e9c369fed" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Projections on Hash Rate and Bitcoin Price Post-Halving]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/greymatter/projections-on-hash-rate-and-bitcoin-price-post-halving-705122e18285?source=rss-572b0ef6d16c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/705122e18285</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[price]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hash-rate]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mining]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Greymatter Capital]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 30 Apr 2020 23:36:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-30T23:36:52.604Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By Joseph Todaro, John Todaro and James Todaro</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ipwdt4IFPp5fLFKK97IB1Q.jpeg" /></figure><p>Every four years the bitcoin network undergoes a pre-set inflation adjustment that results in a fifty percent reduction in the block reward. This event is appropriately referred to as the <strong>halving</strong>.<strong> </strong>The 2020 halving is set to occur in approximately two weeks in mid-May at block height 630,000 and will mark the third such event since the launch of the bitcoin network over a decade ago. This reduction in new token supply has a direct impact on mining revenue and consequently network hash rate. We expect that if the market price of bitcoin does not rise above key levels, there will likely be a significant but temporary decline in hash rate following the halving. This decline may spur bearish narratives including the ‘mining death spiral.’ Further, we find the mining death spiral theory to be unfounded but if misappropriated may place downward sell pressure on bitcoin.</p><h3>A Decline in Bitcoin Mining Profitability</h3><p>Bitcoin mining profitability will likely decline following the bitcoin halving as revenues decrease resulting from a reduction in the block reward. Bitcoin miners are currently estimated to break-even (BE) between ~$6,000–7,500 per BTC, assuming the below assumptions. A full in depth description of the following mining assumptions can be found here: <a href="https://tradeblock.com/blog/analyzing-bitcoin-miner-costs-from-previous-halvings-as-a-comparison-for-the-2020-halving">https://tradeblock.com/blog/analyzing-bitcoin-miner-costs-from-previous-halvings-as-a-comparison-for-the-2020-halving</a></p><ul><li>Blended mining device costs: $1,000 per device</li><li>Avg. device hash rate: 40 TH/s</li><li>Avg. device useful lifespan: 2 years</li><li>Avg. power consumption: 2200 W</li><li>Electricity costs: $0.06 kWh</li></ul><p>Currently, miners are likely operating above BE, as the market price of bitcoin moves in range between $7,500-$9,000 per BTC. If we assume the bitcoin network hash rate remains the same, or even rises modestly, and the market price of bitcoin remains range bound at current levels, then following the halving, miners will be operating at negative margins as mining BE costs rise to <a href="https://twitter.com/TradeBlock/status/1225849717747261440?s=20">$12,000–$15,000</a> per BTC. We may expand the lower end of this range to ~$10,000 to appropriately account for the possible existence of uniquely efficient mining operations and variable factors like the low cost of electricity during the Chinese wet season and the acquisition of mining hardware at cost.</p><p><strong>However, if the price of bitcoin does in fact rise within range of these key price thresholds, the majority of the mining network will likely be operating in profit post halving and we may not observe any significant decrease in network hash rate.</strong></p><h3>Post Halving Hash Rate Decline</h3><p>Assuming the price of bitcoin stays range bound, given the above BE estimates following the halving, higher cost miners will look to take rigs offline as they operate at considerably negative mining margins. As such, we would expect a decline in the overall network hash rate as hash power is reduced. This would also lead to a consolidation in hash power market share as less scalable mining operators exit. The network hash rate is closely related to miners’ profit margins as the number of resources, in aggregate, committed to securing the network through mining activities rises, the costs associated with mining rise as well.</p><p>This would not be the first time the bitcoin network saw a reduction in hash rate. In March 2020, following a sharp market price correction in bitcoin after a COVID-19 inspired sell-off, the network saw its <a href="https://twitter.com/JohnTodaro1/status/1240810568782688258?s=20">second largest mining difficulty adjustment</a> ever as operators took rigs offline. Note that the price of bitcoin fell to around $4,500-$5,500 per coin, below then BE estimates of around $6,000–$8,000 per coin. Additionally, the bitcoin network also saw a temporary hash rate reduction in 2018 as the market price of bitcoin declined from all time highs to a low of ~$3,500 per coin in late 2018 and early 2019.</p><p>In order to limit a disruption in business, mining operators may maintain accelerated hash power after the halving and operate at negative margins for a percentage of time. Due in part to more robust lending markets for bitcoin miners, operators may have enough cash to operate at a loss for a limited amount of time. Nonetheless, if market prices do not rise above BE in a timely manner, then mining operators — starting with the least efficient — will likely begin to shutter mining rigs, reducing network hash power. With the resulting decreases in hash rate and miner revenue, there may be a resurgence in narratives challenging the miner-based economics of bitcoin’s Proof-of-Work (PoW) security model, one of which is the mining death spiral.</p><h3>Unwinding the Mining Death Spiral</h3><p>The <strong>mining death spiral</strong> <strong>(MDS)</strong> is the theory that a sudden drop in miner participation will result in a cascading effect that will bring the bitcoin blockchain to a prolonged standstill. <strong>While the MDS theory paints a rather catastrophic image, we have not found sufficient merit in its arguments.</strong></p><p>The MDS theory adheres to the following thought process: after a sudden fall in the price of bitcoin or a drop in block reward following the halving, bitcoin miners will become largely unprofitable. Miners will react to this unprofitability by immediately powering down their mining rigs resulting in a sudden and significant reduction in hash rate. This will result in the lengthening of the time required to find any given block and extend difficulty adjustments times. Difficulty adjustments are dictated by hash rate and happen approximately every 2 weeks or more precisely every 2016 blocks―essentially regulating the cost of mining. As miners continue to shutter due to unprofitability, the block confirmation time and difficulty adjustment intervals continue to increase. This then results in extended periods of miner unprofitability which results in more miners powering down further extending difficulty adjustment intervals and block confirmation times. In the MDS theory, this process continues to <em>spiral</em> down resulting in a complete standstill of the bitcoin blockchain.</p><p>In this report, we will not detail the specific nature of mining operations. We have found that these factors have been appropriately addressed elsewhere and offer substantial cost-driven evidence against the MDS theory. However, we do think the following high-level response may offer supplemental value to the more specific cost-based analyses of mining operations addressed elsewhere.</p><p>For the benefit of simplicity, we will divide miners into two categories: those who are inefficient and poorly capitalized we will call <strong>opportunistic miners </strong>and those who are highly efficient and well capitalized we will call <strong>committed miners</strong>.</p><p>The opportunistic miners often quickly shutter, powering down their rigs as mining BEs are approached and profits turn negative. This resulting decrease in hash rate can be observed throughout the history of bitcoin around sudden price moves that make profitable mining unrealistic for opportunistic miners. The opportunistic miners often wait for difficulty adjustments or price appreciation to bring profitability back before restarting rigs. This usually results in temporary alterations in hash rates and miner participation.</p><p>The committed mining operations have larger margins, greater efficiency and operate with sufficiently long time frames. These qualities allow them to more easily weather bouts of high volatility unlike the opportunistic miners. During high historical volatility in both 2018 and 2020 when bitcoin saw downward price movements of nearly 50%, roughly similar to the impact of the halving event, the network hash rate only declined by 37% and 24%, respectively. These modest corrections in hash rate offer a strong indication of the behavior of committed miners during decreased or negative profitability. Furthermore, the volatility that makes opportunistic miners unprofitable, at times, allows committed miners to grab a larger share of the resulting block reward often increasing long term marketshare. This utilization of longer time frames by committed miners signals their high conviction in the future profitability of bitcoin mining. For this reason, maintaining operations even during times of short term unprofitability — allowing for difficulty adjustments that return operations to profitability — is part of a longer term bet on future cash flows. This is likely why throughout bitcoin’s history we have never seen sustained hash rate drawdowns and why we do not anticipate any change to that dynamic now.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>The 2020 halving is a highly anticipated event that will likely have an impact on both the hash rate and the price of bitcoin. We expect a temporary decline in hash rate following the halving provided the price of bitcoin does not reach key thresholds that allow for widespread miner profitability.</p><p>This drop in hash rate and miner participation following the halving may revive the mining death spiral theory. However, we have found little evidence suggesting merit in this theory and view any downward impact this has on the price of bitcoin as the market’s misunderstanding of miner economics.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=705122e18285" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/greymatter/projections-on-hash-rate-and-bitcoin-price-post-halving-705122e18285">Projections on Hash Rate and Bitcoin Price Post-Halving</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/greymatter">Greymatter Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Zcash: A most private revolution]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/greymatter/zcash-a-most-private-revolution-215e7ac9fce9?source=rss-572b0ef6d16c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/215e7ac9fce9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[zcash]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[banking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Greymatter Capital]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Sep 2019 19:16:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-09-13T19:23:39.730Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By James Todaro, Joseph Todaro and John Todaro</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/755/1*f5JS-qmF9mujdU7DYDUCgQ.png" /></figure><h3><strong>An iteration on bitcoin’s privacy</strong></h3><p>The creation of money outside the control of sovereign states is inextricably linked to privacy. Satoshi Nakamoto recognized this when he carefully maintained his own anonymity, and dedicated an entire section of the Bitcoin white paper to privacy. Any amount of privacy previously associated with bitcoin has been all but eradicated by tightening identity requirements for cryptocurrency exchanges and bitcoin’s permanent ledger of on-chain transaction history. <strong>In essence, anyone who has executed a bitcoin transaction from an exchange registered in their legal name likely has most of their transaction history and bitcoin holdings reconstructed and recorded in an institutional database.</strong></p><p>This was not the “peer-to-peer electronic cash system” that Satoshi envisioned. Satoshi encouraged privacy through the use of new key pairs, while acknowledging that this practice was suboptimal.</p><blockquote>“As an additional firewall, a new key pair should be used for each transaction to keep them from being linked to a common owner. Some linking is still unavoidable with multi-input transactions, which necessarily reveal that their inputs were owned by the same owner. The risk is that if the owner of a key is revealed, linking could reveal other transactions that belonged to the same owner.”</blockquote><p>Financial privacy is a fundamental right. Personal net-worth and asset holdings are a taboo subject, and unwelcome disclosure can have financial and reputational repercussions. Nearly 80% of <a href="https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/news/2012/sep/20126375.html">private companies do not share quarterly or annual financial reports</a> with employees for risk of information leaking to competitors. Investment funds often invest privately to avoid revealing strategies. The litany of reasons for financial privacy is exhaustive, and most agree it should remain the status quo.</p><p>There is also a fundamental right to financial privacy from the state. In the US, this was formalized in the <a href="https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/compliance/manual/8/viii-3.1.pdf">Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978</a>, which gave US citizens some protection from surreptitious government investigations into personal financial information. Over the years, amendments to this privacy act, particularly the Patriot Act of 2001, have weakened it considerably.</p><p>It is critical that bitcoin does not facilitate any further erosion of financial privacy from the state. As bitcoin continues to capture value, it challenges the dominance of state-controlled currencies in what Nic Carter calls <a href="https://medium.com/@nic__carter/a-most-peaceful-revolution-8b63b64c203e">a most peaceful revolution</a>. While simmering below the surface for years, this revolution erupted into the public spotlight in July 2019 when the POTUS delivered a tweet storm specifically addressing cryptocurrency, stating that the USD instead of bitcoin or any other cryptocurrency is the world’s dominant currency.</p><h3>Donald J. Trump on X (formerly Twitter): &quot;I am not a fan of Bitcoin and other Cryptocurrencies, which are not money, and whose value is highly volatile and based on thin air. Unregulated Crypto Assets can facilitate unlawful behavior, including drug trade and other illegal activity.... / X&quot;</h3><p>I am not a fan of Bitcoin and other Cryptocurrencies, which are not money, and whose value is highly volatile and based on thin air. Unregulated Crypto Assets can facilitate unlawful behavior, including drug trade and other illegal activity....</p><h3>Donald J. Trump on Twitter</h3><p>Similarly, Facebook Libra&#39;s &quot;virtual currency&quot; will have little standing or dependability. If Facebook and other companies want to become a bank, they must seek a new Banking Charter and become subject to all Banking Regulations, just like other Banks, both National...</p><h3></h3><p>and International. We have only one real currency in the USA, and it is stronger than ever, both dependable and reliable. It is by far the most dominant currency anywhere in the World, and it will always stay that way. It is called the United States Dollar!</p><p>Bitcoin continues to face escalating regulatory scrutiny, which has been manifested in <a href="https://cointelegraph.com/news/us-congressional-hearing-on-cryptocurrencies-witness-profiles">numerous US congressional hearings</a>, by the <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/fatf-crypto-travel-rule">FATF’s new banking guidelines</a> surrounding the storage and transfer of cryptocurrencies, and <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/cryptocurrency-in-china-over-the-counter-under-the-table">cryptocurrency exchanges banned in China</a>. Just recently, Elvira Nabiullina, head of the Bank of Russia, said <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/news/russia-criminalize-bitcoin-use-money-substitute-putin-roll-out-laws/">she and the Russian Finance Ministry oppose the use of virtual currencies</a> “as private money and money surrogates,” saying “this is necessary to protect the ruble as the single legal [means of] payment in Russia.”</p><p>In an increasingly adversarial relationship with central banks and governments, the state’s attempts to exploit bitcoin’s weaknesses will intensify. Bitcoin’s lack of privacy is one of its most critical vulnerabilities and is already being exploited by sovereign states and incumbent institutions with advances in blockchain analysis and KYC/AML identity requirements.</p><h4><strong>Blockchain analysis</strong></h4><p>Blockchain analysis software continues to improve and become standard of industry for cryptocurrency exchanges and centralized wallets. The potentially malicious nature of this evolving standard became most apparent when Coinbase acquired the very controversial and aggressive blockchain analysis firm <em>Neutrino</em> in early 2019. The movement #DeleteCoinbase began trending when bitcoiners discovered the checkered past of <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-delete-coinbase-neutrino-crypto">Neutrino executives who previously sold offensive spyware to governments involved in human rights abuses</a>, including the Saudi Arabian government allegedly involved in the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.</p><p>Coinbase is not the first to deploy offensive blockchain analysis monitoring. In late 2018, in addition to its in-house compliance team, <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/crypto-exchange-binance-adds-compliance-tools-from-chainalysis">Binance partnered with leading blockchain analysis firm Chainalysis</a> to better enforce compliance and AML/KYC laws with live transaction monitoring. Chainalysis markets itself to exchanges, institutions and governments, and currently boasts <a href="https://www.theblockcrypto.com/genesis/38793/u-s-government-agencies-paid-nearly-10m-for-blockchain-analysis-led-by-irs-fbi-and-ice/">partnerships with the IRS, SEC, FBI, DEA and ICE</a> in the USA. Other prominent exchanges such as Bitstamp and Bitfinex use Irisium’s blockchain analysis platform while <a href="https://blog.kraken.com/post/1561/krakens-position-on-regulation/">Kraken claims 25% of its entire workforce deals with compliance</a>. Even LocalBitcoins, what used to be a safe haven for privately trading bitcoin, <a href="https://localbitcoins.com/blog/id-verification-update/">recently instituted a robust new identity verification system requiring ID verification</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*d7wkZn3ybiPUgeehu1gyNA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Blockchain analysis, image courtesy of Thomas Silkjaer</figcaption></figure><p>This erosion of financial privacy should worry you. In his well-written piece, <a href="https://medium.com/@nic__carter/a-most-peaceful-revolution-8b63b64c203e">A most peaceful revolution</a>, Nic Carter eloquently states,</p><blockquote>“Bitcoiners chose to abandon the rules of engagement and began work on a monetary system totally outside the purview and supervision of the State, entirely without restriction…And it is a rebellion, make no mistake. Cryptocurrency, despite the earnest protests of some of its lily-livered adherents, remains manifestly independent and ultimately hostile to the State.”</blockquote><p>As many defenders of the <a href="https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amendment/amendment-ii">US Constitution’s Right to Keep and Bear Arms</a> frequently recite, registration is often the first step toward confiscation. This was most apparent in Germany and Russia in the mid-20th century where registration of arms quickly led to disarmament of the people and, subsequently, oppression and unspeakable atrocities.</p><p>Today, besides the few with the technological competence and patience to diligently strive for privacy with mixing services and private networks, nearly everyone has effectively registered their cryptocurrency transaction history with institutions. It is just a matter of time — if it has not happened already — before this data is shared with governments and sold off to data analysis and brokerage firms like <em>Cambridge Analytica</em>.</p><p>The first to suffer will be those individuals in countries already openly hostile to bitcoin ownership (e.g. Venezuela, China, Iran and North Korea). As bitcoin captures greater value though, eventually further challenging sovereign currencies and the USD, it is likely that even democratic states will become belligerent to bitcoiners.</p><h4><strong>Fungibility</strong></h4><p>Although ruminated on for years now as a hypothetical, the possibility of the bitcoin market dividing into ‘black-listed’ and ‘white-listed’ coins may be approaching reality with the new guidelines instituted by the FATF. The guidelines require that institutions engaged in the exchange of cryptocurrencies <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/fatf-crypto-travel-rule">must link all transaction originator and beneficiary blockchain addresses with a name, date of birth, national identity number and physical address</a> in order to process transactions.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*_mAy3MtnaEgrpdy1" /><figcaption>2019 FATF guidelines, Coindesk</figcaption></figure><p>This means, for example, that to withdraw bitcoin from your Coinbase account to a private wallet, you must prove that you control the keys to said private wallet, or, if sending to another individual, he/she must be a ‘beneficiary’ who is also registered with an FATF compliant institution. Of course, for verification purposes, this also necessitates that all FATF compliant institutions must share customer data in a global, centralized database.</p><p>No doubt, some will opt-out of this closed institutional bitcoin economy, effectively resulting in white-listed and black-listed bitcoins that are valued differently. Even for those who elect to opt-out by moving from white-listed to black-listed coins, the path is not risk-free. The most popular mixing services only add a layer of privacy as opposed to providing any assurance of absolute privacy. Moreover, most mixing services are centralized, which makes them subject to both sudden regulatory seizure as well as corruption by mixing service operators.</p><p>It is no surprise that Satoshi acknowledged the importance of privacy in the creation of Bitcoin. We think most bitcoiners would agree that if a better privacy and fungibility option existed in 2009, Satoshi would have implemented it.</p><p><strong>Zcash offers that level of privacy.</strong></p><p>After years of research and development, Zooko Wilcox and his team iterated on bitcoin’s core design by integrating privacy at the protocol layer. In our opinion, which is shared by many with a deep technological understanding of digital currency protocols, the Zcash cryptographic scheme has achieved a level of privacy that is unrivaled.</p><p>Zcash may be the much needed deterrent to government overreach. Even the mere existence of a thriving Zcash network may discourage governments and regulatory bodies from tightening controls on bitcoin. State authorities may realize that imposing restrictive, intrusive and onerous KYC/AML controls could push bitcoiners to the far more private network, Zcash, where the state would have much less ability to eavesdrop and regulate.</p><p><strong>Instead of an adversarial relationship with bitcoin, a growing Zcash network is actually supportive.</strong> As long as Zcash has an active community, decent distribution and liquidity, and value capture for ZEC, it will be available as a viable network for a medium of exchange and/or store of value if governments antagonize bitcoiners excessively.</p><h3><strong>Era of secret offshore banking ends</strong></h3><p>Offshore banking has existed since the late 1700s as families and merchants in wealthy European nations, such as France and England, sought to safe-guard their wealth in locations and jurisdictions ‘offshore’ from their countries of residence during periods of political strife. By the mid 1800s, this practice became more widespread with the neutral European nation, Switzerland, burgeoning as the optimal safe haven for securing wealth.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*jh1su3jOqX_-ltBd4ipDEg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Bank vault</figcaption></figure><p>Today, offshore banking still represents a large percentage of the global financial system. According to a report conducted by the Tax Justice Network and McKinsey &amp; Co., there is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/jul/21/global-elite-tax-offshore-economy">estimated to be upwards of 32 trillion USD in assets held in offshore accounts</a>.</p><p>Traditional offshore banking has allowed certain protections for safe-guarding wealth, including less regulatory restrictions, reduced transparency, protection from local government instability, enhanced access to deposits/withdrawals, and lower tax obligations from offshore financial trusts.</p><p>Over the past decade though, increased regulation has diminished most of the former benefits of offshore accounts — most notably in terms of privacy, seizure and access to assets. In 2018, after facing immense pressure for years from foreign governments, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-swiss-secrecy/era-of-bank-secrecy-ends-as-swiss-start-sharing-account-data-idUSKCN1MF13O">Switzerland began automatically sharing privileged client information with foreign governments and tax authorities</a>.</p><p>Stricter capital controls now prevent even the initial offshore transfer of assets. Beginning in 2017, Chinese citizens are limited to exports under 50,000 USD annually. Argentina also imposed capital controls recently by limiting its citizens to purchases less than 10,000 USD monthly amid political turmoil that resulted in the<a href="https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/argentina-on-brink-of-financial-crisis-market-rout-election-surprise-2019-8-1028443209"> Argentine stock market falling 48% and the Argentine peso losing 15% of its value versus the US dollar</a>.</p><p>Is it really possible though that a 200+ year history of private off-shore banking is ending? Will a new means of securing wealth supplant traditional digital banking, vaults and safety deposit boxes, thereby circumventing laws that depend on the cooperation of centralized banks and financial institutions?</p><p>Rising to the occasion, cryptocurrency is rapidly becoming the ‘Swiss bank account’ of the 21st century. With minimal effort, one can secure any amount of cryptocurrency without the approval of any bank or government — foreign or domestic. Billions of dollars can be safely secured in a string of words. Nevertheless, without privacy, bitcoiners will always be vulnerable to what is commonly referred to as the ‘$5 wrench attack.’</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/928/1*Q3GUovs-_ky4CjoxMQVhkg.png" /><figcaption>Wrench attack cartoon</figcaption></figure><p>A ‘wrench attack’ can be performed by not just an intruder, but also a hostile government threatening prison or even death. Privacy/anonymity is the first layer of protection against this threat.</p><p>As addressed previously, blockchain analysis tools and stringent identity requirements for cryptocurrency exchanges are eroding bitcoin’s privacy. If this trajectory continues, privacy at the protocol layer with Zcash may become the most viable option for a truly private and seizure-resistant ‘Swiss bank account’ in the 21st century.</p><h3><strong>Informal economy</strong></h3><p>In the history of money, citizens and participants in the global economy enjoyed the ability to transact privately in the form of precious metals and physical cash. In just the past two decades, the number of global digital transactions processed by financial institutions has exploded. In Sweden, nearly <a href="https://sweden.se/business/cashless-society/">80% of the population uses a credit/debit card or mobile apps for payments</a> as it accelerates toward a ‘cashless society’. For many businesses, physical cash is no longer a payment option. In many ways, this is a convenient and welcome progression. Digital transactions offer numerous benefits, such as access to larger amounts of capital than can be carried in physical cash, some safety from theft, faster transactions and remote payments. The convenience of digital payments comes at a price though — privacy.</p><p>The ever tightening controls on financial transactions threaten fundamental assurances of participation in free trade and commerce without fear of monetary, economic or other physical repercussions from transactional information disclosure. As the right to transactional privacy is degraded, the ability for citizens to wholly participate in free trade is sacrificed.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/477/1*o1lXff8MZAhfw876HsByWA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Street vendors in India</figcaption></figure><p>Increasing regulation and government restriction on free trade resulted in what is known as the ‘informal economy’. The informal economy is a diverse collection of economic activities, enterprises, jobs, and workers that operate outside the purview of the state. The black market or shadow economy is a single sector of this informal economy. The informal economy, however, is also comprised of less ominous sounding markets including street vendors that sell food, clothing, mobile phone minutes and other digital/physical goods and services. While this may be difficult to appreciate in first world countries, in emerging and developing countries, it is far more apparent. It is estimated that <a href="https://www.ilo.org/stat/Publications/WCMS_234413/lang--en/index.htm">street vendors and home-based workers alone account for upwards of 10% to 15% of total urban employment</a>. These vendors operate with minimal, if any, government oversight. Although global estimates vary greatly, it is estimated that <a href="https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_627189/lang--en/index.htm">nearly 2 billion people are employed in the informal economy</a> and <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/underground-economy.asp">accounts for 10% to 30% of the global GDP</a>.</p><p>The persistence of the informal economy is threatened in an age where cash is rapidly extracted from society as digital transactions increasingly dominate commerce. Most recently, in a sudden dramatic move, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/08/india-withdraws-500-1000-rupee-notes-fight-corruption">India removed the 500 and 1,000 rupee banknotes from circulation in 2016</a>. This forced anyone storing wealth privately in these notes to register with banks in order to exchange old notes for new legal tender. In an economy that operates largely in cash, this was an aggressive attempt by the Indian government to curtail participation in the informal economy. No doubt, participants in the informal economy will seek alternative options as states become increasingly aggressive.</p><p><strong>Cryptocurrency could be that alternative. Over time, as the global user base becomes more comfortable operating within the cryptocurrency economy, it may become possible to make purchases and transact entirely within this ecosystem.</strong></p><p>The use of bitcoin within the informal economy, and more specifically within dark markets, was one of the first markets that gave bitcoin utility. Unsurprisingly, this market is excluded from most investment theses. While there is an obvious propensity to distance bitcoin from negatively perceived narratives such as dark markets, there is still an obligation to address the entire value proposition of cryptocurrency as an investment. The reality is that bitcoin and cryptocurrencies are positioned to become ever more relevant in the informal economy. While the primary value proposition of cryptocurrencies is not limited to the informal economy, we must acknowledge the current and future role they may have within the over 10 trillion USD informal economy.</p><p>Traceability, or lack thereof, will be paramount for the adoption of cryptocurrency within the informal economy. Digital assets that carry a permanent history of transaction data could easily fall victim to a ‘tainted’ label given inspection over a significant timeline. Cash, on the other hand, carries no history. To replicate the privacy properties of cash, transaction data should not be linked to every address/account. To date, Zcash eliminates any transaction history through the use of shielded z-addresses.</p><h3><strong>Technology</strong></h3><p>Arguably the most significant challenge to the bitcoin network is user privacy. For an asset that exists outside of state control and captures value as censorship resistance, sound money, disclosure of its users’ entire transaction histories is an undeniable limitation.</p><p>Today, privacy options for bitcoin are restricted to mixing services and wallets that offer layers of transactional obfuscation and/or deniability in the form of centralized mixers and trustless wallet-based mixers. The shortcomings of centralized mixers are abundant, and include the sale of transactional history to third parties, theft of bitcoin, regulation and state seizure of assets. One recent example was the seizure and take down of <a href="https://cointelegraph.com/news/europol-shuts-down-200-million-crypto-mixing-service-bestmixer">BestMixer by Europol and Dutch authorities</a>, one of the largest centralized bitcoin mixing services that reportedly processed over 200 million USD in cryptocurrencies. It is unlikely that centralized mixers will remain a long-term viable option.</p><p>Trustless wallet-based mixers, such as Wasabi Wallet, also have significant weaknesses. First, the transaction history of what addresses join the mixing service is susceptible to blockchain analysis. This means that it can be determined if tainted bitcoins enter the service with a chance of redistribution to non-nefarious addresses. This may be concerning to law-abiding users who are seeking transactional privacy, but are not interested in dramatically upping the stakes by potentially mixing their bitcoin with government sanctioned bitcoin addresses, such as <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/us-regulators-tie-two-bitcoin-addresses-to-iranian-ransomware-plot">the OFAC-sanctioned addresses of two Iranian residents</a>. Secondly, the ability to truly anonymize transactions within mixing services is questionable. For example, it may be possible for malicious parties to participate in the mixer in a way that de-obfuscates transactions, a reported concern with Wasabi Wallet.</p><h3>Samourai Wallet on Twitter</h3><p>PSA There exists an entity operating as a de-anonymizing &quot;hot wallet&quot; present within transactions by Wasabi since June 1, 2019. This entity has been clustered very easily due to flagrant address reuse, and downright bizarre behavior. This impacts ALL users since June. 👇👇</p><p>Furthermore, with continual advances in blockchain analysis software, it is possible that transactions mixed today could be de-anonymized at a future date.</p><p>Thirdly, as transaction fees rise, mixing services and wallets become increasingly more expensive, eventually making privacy unaffordable. Earlier this year, Adam Ficsor, the leading software engineer for Wasabi Wallet, openly stated that rising transaction fees on bitcoin will eventually price-out privacy on bitcoin’s main chain.</p><h3>nopara73 on Twitter</h3><p>@girevik_ @wasabiwallet Compared to privacy coins Wasabi is just a temporary hack. I think without Confidential Transactions, as the transaction fees grow, privacy will be priced out of Bitcoin&#39;s main chain.</p><p>Moving beyond mixing services, there are a few cryptocurrencies that offer privacy at the protocol layer, which include Monero, Grin and Beam. Monero utilizes ring signatures to conceal both the sender and recipient addresses along with the amount transacted. Grin uses a multi-faceted approach to privacy, including Confidential Transactions, Dandelion Relay and Cut Through to help obfuscate IP leakage and cut-out inputs and outputs from the blockchain as they are being spent. The general consensus within the crypto community though is that the Zcash cryptographic scheme is the superior technical protocol when using z-addresses. In a <a href="https://unchainedpodcast.com/moneros-riccardo-spagni-aka-fluffypony-on-how-he-feels-about-monero-being-used-for-crime-ep-93/">podcast with Laura Shin on <em>Unchained</em></a>, Riccardo Spagni of Monero stated,</p><blockquote>“Zcash also does all of these. It also focuses on the first three pillars that Monero focuses on, and it does so in, you know, like, in terms of obscuring where transactions are going to, in terms of obscuring the transaction amount, it has the same strength, I guess, is probably the best way to describe it, when it comes to how private it is. The only aspect where it is much stronger is in the hiding the transaction graph, so, where transactions are coming from.”</blockquote><p>Later in that same interview, Riccardo Spagni addresses Grin and Beam, which are developed on the MimbleWimble protocol. “At Monero, we’re interested in MimbleWimble not as a base layer, but as a sidechain, because whilst it has weaker privacy than Monero, it has much stronger scalability…”</p><p>Utilizing zero-knowledge proofs, the cryptographic scheme of Zcash offers superior privacy. It is no surprise that the software development teams of an ever growing number of projects are looking to implement Zcash’s zero-knowledge cryptographic scheme into their own projects (e.g. Ethereum, Tezos, Quorum and Ren).</p><h3><strong>State of the Market</strong></h3><p>Currently trading at ~44 USD, ZEC is near its all-time-low. ZEC has admittedly been one of the worst performing large cap assets in 2019, and is approaching meme status on Crypto Twitter.</p><h3>Needacoin on Twitter</h3><p>Can&#39;t believe $zec has gone 6 days without hitting an ATL. This has gotta be a record.</p><p>Cryptocurrencies with high inflation perform notoriously poorly in bear markets. With a rate of inflation between 80% and 36% since its all-time-high back in January 2018, Zcash has seen a higher rate of inflation during this time than any other large cap cryptocurrency. This relentless emission of Zcash likely exhausted early appetites for Zcash during the bull market of 2017, where investors afterwards watched their investment lose 95% of its value.</p><p>There may, however, be a fresh influx of capital interested in investing in Zcash. Many technical indicators suggest that bitcoin is in an early bull market. In 2019, after a precipitous 84% correction from all-time-high, bitcoin recovered from 3200 USD to surpass 10,000 USD, forming a golden cross between the EMA50 and EMA200 on the daily chart back in April and on the 3-day chart in July. Even some of the most steadfast bears calling for bitcoin under 4,000 USD have reversed their projections to bullish. Historically speaking, bitcoin leads the market, drawing fresh capital flows to the rest of the cryptocurrency market.</p><p>Lastly, we cannot neglect the fact that it is just over a year before Zcash’s first halving, where inflation in October 2020 will be only 12.5%, a significant decrease from today’s 36%. The timely coincidence of Zcash’s first halving in an early cryptocurrency bull market could result in demand for ZEC vastly outpacing supply.</p><h3><strong>Come regulation or revolution, Zcash will be there</strong></h3><p>It is very possible that bitcoin remains the dominant cryptocurrency and goes on to capture trillions of dollars of value to become the largest global reserve currency. If this comes to pass, we hope the result is a freer world with less global conflict and greater opportunities for all. The path to this reality is more peaceful if bitcoin is private and bitcoiners are able to retain financial privacy from both the state and public. If state authorities ever push too hard against financial privacy though, the most private cryptocurrency in existence is here — Zcash.</p><h3>Disclaimer</h3><p>The managing partners of Blocktown Capital own Zcash and bitcoin. We do not endorse or recommend any investment action in Zcash. This document should not be regarded as investment advice. These views are those solely of the managing partners of Blocktown Capital and do not represent the views of the Zcash Foundation or Electric Coin Company.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=215e7ac9fce9" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/greymatter/zcash-a-most-private-revolution-215e7ac9fce9">Zcash: A most private revolution</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/greymatter">Greymatter Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[ZIP: 10% of the block reward to a 2-of-3 multisig agreement between the ECC, ZF and a third entity]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/greymatter/zip-10-of-the-block-reward-to-a-2-of-3-multisig-agreement-between-the-ecc-zf-and-a-third-entity-3c208f0bdea4?source=rss-572b0ef6d16c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3c208f0bdea4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[zip]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[founders-reward]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[zcash]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Greymatter Capital]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 30 Aug 2019 14:42:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-08-30T14:42:57.970Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CAOVG_S_aNmCGu4006Uj0w.png" /></figure><h3>Terminology</h3><p>The key words “MUST”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “MAY”, “RECOMMENDED”, “OPTIONAL”, and “REQUIRED” in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2119">1</a>].</p><p>The additional terms below are to be interpreted as follows:</p><ul><li><strong>Mining</strong> refers to the actions of processing transactions, which include processing transactions in a Proof-of-Stake or Proof-of-Work/Proof-of-Stake hybrid system, in the event Zcash implements either at a future date.</li><li><strong>Mining software</strong> refers to pool software, local mining software or staking software.</li><li><strong>Mining rewards</strong> or <strong>block rewards</strong> refer to both network transaction fees and coinbase rewards (e.g. newly issued ZEC associated with block generation).</li><li><strong>Network Upgrade</strong> refers to any change to the Zcash software, introduced as part of the standard Zcash Network Upgrade Pipeline [<a href="https://electriccoin.co/blog/the-zcash-network-upgrade-pipeline/">2</a>] or otherwise.</li><li><strong>Founder’s Reward</strong> refers to the 20% ZEC from mined blocks allocated to the Electric Coin Company (ECC), Zcash Foundation (ZF), employees, investors and/or other entities prior to the expected first halving in October 2020.</li><li><strong>Zcash Development Fund</strong> refers to transparent address(es) controlled jointly by the Electric Coin Company, Zcash Foundation, and a “Third Entity”. The fund is intended for research, development, maintenance, and other technical work directly connected to the Zcash protocol, as well as non-technical initiatives (including design, marketing, events, regulatory outreach, education, governance, and any other form of business or community development) that contribute to the long-term success of the Zcash network. In the context of this proposal, the Zcash Development Fund consists of 10% of newly issued ZEC from block rewards between the first and second halvings of the Zcash network.</li><li><strong>Applicant</strong> refers to any individual, group, or entity that seeks funding from the Zcash Development Fund.</li><li><strong>Recipient</strong> refers to any individual, group, or entity that receives funding from the Zcash Development Fund.</li></ul><h3>Abstract</h3><p>This proposal puts forward the financing mechanism and fundamental rules of governance for the creation of a Zcash Development Fund.</p><h3>Specification</h3><h4><strong>Funding mechanism of the Zcash Development Fund:</strong></h4><ul><li>This funding mechanism MUST be hard-coded so that 10% of newly issued ZEC from block rewards are automatically directed to the transparent address(es) of the Zcash Development Fund;</li><li>The above requirement MUST be met between the first halving (block height 840,000) and second halving (block height 1,680,000). Upon the second halving, future governance decisions MAY result in a further decrease of the Zcash Development Fund to 5% of newly issued ZEC from block rewards, or alternatively MAY result in another percent allocation which includes the possibility of a system whereby 100% of block rewards go to miners;</li><li>The two aforementioned requirements above MUST remain regardless of any additional Network Upgrades or changes to mining or mining software prior to the second halving;</li><li>The Zcash Development Fund MAY outlive the period of its initial funding mechanism, either through the appreciation in the price of ZEC, or from alternative funding sources upon the second halving in 2024;</li><li>The hard-coded transparent address(es) of the Zcash Development Fund MAY be periodically rotated for operational security purposes to decrease the risk of any potential loss of funds associated with the address(es). The ECC, ZF, and/or “Third Entity” described below SHOULD take any possible precautions within the confines of this <em>Specification</em> section to avoid loss of funds.</li></ul><h4><strong>Governance of the Zcash Development Fund:</strong></h4><ul><li>Funds allocated to the Zcash Development Fund MUST be used only for their intended purpose as defined in the following <em>Rationale</em> section of this proposal;</li><li>The transparent address(es) of the Zcash Development Fund MUST be jointly controlled by the ECC, ZF, and Third Entity, and all funds transferred from the Zcash Development Fund MUST be publicly confirmed in an official manner by a majority decision among the ECC, ZF, and Third Entity–commonly referred to as “2-of-3 multisig”. That is, funding decisions MUST be put to an officially documented vote which MUST NOT pass unless at least 2 of the 3 entities above vote approvingly;</li><li>Prior to any movement of funds from the Zcash Development Fund, the ZF and ECC MUST coordinate with each other and the community to establish the Third Entity that will be involved in governance of the Zcash Development Fund. The process of determining the exact initial composition and rules of governance of the Third Entity MUST involve the Zcash community at large in a process similar to that outlined in the section <em>How the Foundation will select a particular proposal</em> in the ZF’s August 6, 2019 statement [<a href="https://www.zfnd.org/blog/dev-fund-guidance-and-timeline/">3</a>];</li><li>Any decision to alter the governance of the Zcash Development Fund as described in this proposal and in final detail by the ECC, ZF, and Third Entity MUST involve the Zcash community at large, similar to the process outlined in the ZF’s August 6, 2019 statement [<a href="https://www.zfnd.org/blog/dev-fund-guidance-and-timeline/">3</a>];</li><li>All transfers from the Zcash Development Fund MUST be in full accordance with the requirements described in this proposal.</li></ul><p><strong>The governance rules of the Third Entity MUST include the following:</strong></p><ul><li>All decision-making and other governing processes of the Third Entity MUST be independent of the ECC and ZF, and MUST include measures that are necessary to avoid conflicts of interest in relation to the ECC and ZF;</li><li>At creation, the Third Entity MUST include an uneven number of at least 5 individuals with independent previous affiliations, each having a single vote. All such decisions MUST have majority support within the Third Entity to result in an overall approving vote by the Third Entity;</li><li>Once the Third Entity is established, it MAY decide to change its rules of governance (e.g. simple majority versus supermajority rules), but any such change MUST be preceded by the involvement of the Zcash community at large, similar to the process outlined in the ZF’s August 6, 2019 statement [<a href="https://www.zfnd.org/blog/dev-fund-guidance-and-timeline/">3</a>];</li><li>Once the Third Entity is established as a self-governing body, it SHOULD evolve toward a system whereby ZEC holders have a direct role in determining votes and internal governance of the Third Entity;</li><li>The Third Entity MAY apply for funding from the Zcash Development Fund, if deemed appropriate by its governing body. This would be subject to a majority vote by the ECC, ZF and Third Entity.</li></ul><p><strong>Prior to any transfer of funds from the Zcash Development Fund, the ECC, ZF, and Third Entity MUST specify, approve, and make public the final rules on applying for and receiving funding from the Zcash Development Fund, including the details of the decision-making process for approving or rejecting funding requests. These rules MUST apply equally to all Applicants, including the ECC, ZF, and Third Entity, and MUST include the following:</strong></p><ul><li>Funding from the Zcash Development Fund MUST be available to not only the ECC, ZF, and Third Entity but also to other individuals, groups, or entities that could make technical and/or non-technical contributions to Zcash as described in the <em>Rationale</em> section of this proposal;</li><li>To receive funding from the Zcash Development Fund, all Applicants MUST follow the rules described in the <em>Specification</em> section of this proposal and in final detail by the ECC, ZF, and Third Entity;</li><li>As part of an application, each Applicant MUST produce a public overview of the activities and projected costs for which they are seeking funds;</li><li>Each funding decision MUST be preceded by a community review period of reasonable length to be determined by the ECC, ZF and Third Entity in which Zcash stakeholders and community members can familiarize themselves with the Applicant’s request and make suggestions, or raise objections;</li><li>In situations of overwhelming opposition from Zcash stakeholders and community members to requests from Applicants, the ECC, ZF, and Third Entity SHOULD NOT approve the request before striving to address stakeholders and community concerns, and modifying the request, if appropriate, to assuage concerns;</li><li>Each funding decision MUST be accompanied by an easily referenced joint public statement by the ECC, ZF, and Third Entity, which MUST include the final tally of the relevant vote, as well as the votes of the three involved entities. As part of this statement, each of the three entities MUST provide explicit justification for its respective vote;</li><li>The ZF MUST ensure that all Zcash Development Fund votes and the accompanying justifications described previously remain archived and easily accessible online by Zcash community members, stakeholders and the general public;</li><li>The ECC, ZF, and Third Entity MAY approve funding requests on a rolling basis, but all funding requests MUST be revisited and voted on at a minimum of every 6 months to receive renewed approval;</li><li>Recipients MUST publicize at minimum quarterly progress updates on their activities funded from the Zcash Development Fund. In the case of short-term assignments (less than 6 months), a single report upon completion of the project is sufficient. Standard reporting requirements MUST be specified by the ECC, ZF, and Third Entity prior to any approved requests from the Zcash Development Fund and additional requirements MAY be introduced as needed;</li><li>Depending on the nature of each request, funds MAY be disbursed in a single payment or incrementally, subject to objective milestones and/or other performance metrics.</li></ul><p><strong>Issues not addressed in this proposal:</strong></p><ul><li>Details of the decision-making process for supporting or rejecting this or other relevant proposals by the ECC, ZF, and/or other Zcash stakeholders. We do maintain, however, that any decision by the ECC and/or the ZF on the issue described in the <em>Motivation</em> section below SHOULD be preceded by the procedures for measuring community sentiment as outlined in the ZF’s August 6, 2019 statement [<a href="https://www.zfnd.org/blog/dev-fund-guidance-and-timeline/">3</a>];</li><li>Additional methods for measuring community sentiment MAY include a way for ZEC holders to signal their support of specific proposals;</li><li>Matter of whether the ECC should reorganize itself into a non-profit or remain for-profit, as addressed by the ZF in their August 6, 2019 statement [<a href="https://www.zfnd.org/blog/dev-fund-guidance-and-timeline/">3</a>]. The current proposal is neutral on this matter, and funding from the Development Fund would be available for non-profit and/or for-profit entities. We consider the governance rules of the Development Fund outlined in this <em>Specification </em>section adequate for transparency and accountability.</li></ul><h3>Motivation</h3><p>The Zcash network is scheduled to undergo its first halving in October 2020, per current protocol specifications. At the time of the first halving, the codebase dictates that the Founder’s Reward, which consists of 20% of the ZEC from every block reward, will be terminated. Without codebase modification in the upcoming fourth network upgrade (NU4), 100% of block rewards would be claimed by miners thereon.</p><p>The two organizations presently leading development and maintenance of the Zcash network receive funds from the Founder’s Reward. These organizations, the ECC and ZF, have recently requested a source of funding after the first halving in order to continue operations for the foreseeable future. The source of funds could theoretically be from either a modification to the codebase dictating a Zcash Development Fund from block rewards or, alternatively, from external sources. The ECC has indicated though that it would “wind down or pivot” rather than accept funding from any sources that would give “special interests” control over the ECC [<a href="https://electriccoin.co/blog/ecc-initial-assessment-of-community-proposals/">4</a>].</p><p>Based on the ECC’s demands, the block reward appears to be the most agreeable source of resources for a Zcash Development Fund.</p><p>This proposal, originally published in the Zcash Community Forum on August 14, 2019 [<a href="https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/proposal-for-the-zcash-2020-network-upgrade/34503">5</a>] and formalized further in a blog post on August 23, 2019 [<a href="https://medium.com/blocktown/blocktown-proposal-for-zcash-2020-network-upgrade-fdec1e9d507c">6</a>], outlines the funding mechanism and governance of such a Zcash Development Fund. Herein, we propose a feature of NU4 whereby 10% of the ZEC from every new block reward between the first halving (block height 840,000) and second halving (block height 1,680,000) would be directly deposited in a Zcash Development Fund.</p><p>For the period between the launch of the Zcash network in 2016 and the first halving, there has been a centralized 20% fee known as the Founder’s Reward taken from the block reward. Other active ZIP drafts advocate a Zcash Development Fund of 20% allocation from the block reward after the first halving. We believe that a cumulative eight years of centralized fees from the block reward at the identical rate of 20% would ultimately result in a narrow community that accepts the likelihood of a <em>perpetual 20% fee</em> on the Zcash network.</p><p>With a Zcash Development Fund that is only 10% of the block reward, a precedent will be set that a large centralized fund is not indefinite and will decrease faster than simply the rate of block reward halvings. Although this proposal specifically addresses the period between the first and second halving, this proposed feature may set a precedent whereby the percent fee from block rewards allocated to a Zcash Development Fund continually decreases every halving, e.g. 20% (FR) from 2016–2020, 10% from 2020–2024, 5% from 2024–2028, 2.5% from 2028–2032 (effectively quartering the ZEC allocated to a development fund every four years). We believe that this social contract could restore the community’s faith in the decentralization of Zcash as the network incentives align more closely with that of bitcoin’s over time. Alternatively, it is not unreasonable for the Zcash governance system to elect a 0% allocation for the Zcash Development Fund upon the second halving. For a more detailed exploration regarding the selection of 10%, please review the blog post Proposal for the Zcash 2020 Network Upgrade by Blocktown Capital [<a href="https://medium.com/blocktown/proposal-for-the-zcash-2020-network-upgrade-fcd320a5d6f5">7</a>].</p><p>Of note, we are not suggesting or implying that the funding from the Founder’s Reward and a Zcash Development Fund would be managed in a similar way or have similar directives. The Zcash Development Fund feature that we propose for NU4 does not allocate any funds to former angel investors, VCs or vested employees. Furthermore, the Zcash Development Fund would be subject to more explicit and transparent rules of governance, as outlined in the <em>Specification</em> section of this proposal.</p><h3>Rationale</h3><p>The rationale behind this proposal is as follows:</p><ul><li>To provide financial resources for research, development, and any other technical work connected to software upgrades/maintenance of the Zcash protocol, as well as non-technical initiatives including marketing, design, events, regulatory outreach, education, governance, and any other form of business that contribute to the success of the Zcash network;</li><li>To increase decentralization and network security of the Zcash network;</li><li>To increase decentralization through greater community involvement in Zcash governance and resource allocation;</li><li>To establish basic rules of governance and accountability regarding the deployment of funds in the Zcash Development Fund;</li><li>To encourage transparency and cooperation among Zcash stakeholders and strengthen the community’s governance capabilities moving forward.</li></ul><h3>Discussion</h3><p>Recognized objections to this proposal include:</p><ul><li>This proposal is not in accordance with the current Zcash protocol, which is programmed to allocate 100% of the coinbase to miners upon the first halving in 2020. However, at least during the next few years of Zcash’s infancy, we believe it is advantageous to have a funded and dedicated development team.</li><li>The funding mechanism in this proposal is a Zcash Development Fund consisting of 10% of newly issued ZEC from block rewards after the first halving. This is in contrast to other proposals that allocate 20% of the mining rewards to the Zcash Development Fund–presumably a popular selection because the original Founder’s Reward was also set at 20%. For reasons we have explored in depth [<a href="https://medium.com/blocktown/proposal-for-the-zcash-2020-network-upgrade-fcd320a5d6f5">7</a>] and summarized [<a href="https://medium.com/blocktown/executive-summary-blocktown-proposal-for-zcash-2020-network-upgrade-84ff20997502">8</a>], we believe 10% instead of 20% is superior for network security, decentralization, uniting the Zcash community and renewing interest in ZEC.</li><li>Various parameters of governance in approving Applicant requests for funding from the Zcash Development Fund.</li><li>The inclusion of a third entity in governance. One notable objection is the possibility of collusion between Third Entity and either the ECC or ZF that would result in a “usurped” Zcash Development Fund. We believe that the process for a community elected Third Entity, however, will mature over time–giving the community and Zcash stakeholders that important third opinion in deciding the proper allocation of funds. As demonstrated by the resilience of the bitcoin network and community, well-formed communities tend to resist any collusion with corporations and controlling entities that do not promote the direct success of the network. Moreover, the inclusion of a Third Entity has the advantage of offering a “tie-breaker” in the event of a deadlock vote between the ECC and ZF and/or a situation where one entity holds the other hostage, which is a possible scenario in a 2-of-2 multisig agreement.</li><li>This proposal does not have a clause dictating that a Recipient must abstain from voting. If a Recipient must abstain from voting in a 2-of-3 multisig governance system, then this could–as in the case of 2-of-2 multisig–result in an entity holding another hostage. For example, if the ECC refuses to fund the ZF until the ZF complies with the ECC’s demands, then the ECC has the power to deadlock any vote to fund the ZF, which requires the ECC and Third Entity to both vote approvingly.</li></ul><h3>References</h3><p>Aspects of this proposal, particularly the <em>Terminology</em> and <em>Specification</em> sections, were adapted and expanded definitions and concepts put forth in Placeholder’s dev fund proposal from August 22, 2019 [<a href="https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/dev-fund-proposal-20-to-a-2-of-3-multisig-with-community-involved-governance/34646/60">9</a>].</p><p>[1] <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2119">Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</a></p><p>[2] <a href="https://electriccoin.co/blog/the-zcash-network-upgrade-pipeline/">The Zcash Network Upgrade Pipeline</a></p><p>[3] <a href="https://www.zfnd.org/blog/dev-fund-guidance-and-timeline/">Zcash Foundation Guidance on Dev Fund Proposals</a></p><p>[4] <a href="https://electriccoin.co/blog/ecc-initial-assessment-of-community-proposals/">ECC Initial Assessment of Community Proposals</a></p><p>[5] <a href="https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/proposal-for-the-zcash-2020-network-upgrade/34503">Proposal for the Zcash 2020 Network Upgrade (topic on the Zcash community forum</a>)</p><p>[6] <a href="https://medium.com/blocktown/blocktown-proposal-for-zcash-2020-network-upgrade-fdec1e9d507c">Blocktown Proposal for Zcash 2020 Network Upgrade</a></p><p>[7] <a href="https://medium.com/blocktown/proposal-for-the-zcash-2020-network-upgrade-fcd320a5d6f5">Proposal for the Zcash 2020 Network Upgrade</a></p><p>[8] <a href="https://medium.com/blocktown/executive-summary-blocktown-proposal-for-zcash-2020-network-upgrade-84ff20997502">Executive Summary: Blocktown Proposal for Zcash 2020 Network Upgrade</a></p><p>[9] <a href="https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/dev-fund-proposal-20-to-a-2-of-3-multisig-with-community-involved-governance/34646">Dev Fund Proposal: 20% to a 2-of-3 multisig with community-involved governance</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3c208f0bdea4" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/greymatter/zip-10-of-the-block-reward-to-a-2-of-3-multisig-agreement-between-the-ecc-zf-and-a-third-entity-3c208f0bdea4">ZIP: 10% of the block reward to a 2-of-3 multisig agreement between the ECC, ZF and a third entity</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/greymatter">Greymatter Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Blocktown Proposal for Zcash 2020 Network Upgrade]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/greymatter/blocktown-proposal-for-zcash-2020-network-upgrade-fdec1e9d507c?source=rss-572b0ef6d16c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fdec1e9d507c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[governance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[zcash]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[zec]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Greymatter Capital]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 23 Aug 2019 14:50:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-08-23T14:50:49.972Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By James Todaro, MD and Joseph Todaro</p><p>This serves as Blocktown’s proposal for Zcash’s fourth network upgrade (NU4). Last week we published a <a href="https://medium.com/blocktown/proposal-for-the-zcash-2020-network-upgrade-fcd320a5d6f5">Full Report</a> and <a href="https://medium.com/blocktown/executive-summary-blocktown-proposal-for-zcash-2020-network-upgrade-84ff20997502">Executive Summary</a> supporting our selection of a 10% allocation of the miner’s reward for a “Development Fund” that will go into effect after the halving in October 2020 and replace the soon to be terminated 20% Founder’s Reward (FR).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*388wCvqKZhb98W78Yygp_Q.png" /></figure><h3>Proposal for a Development Fund — not a Founder’s Reward</h3><p>For the past 3 years, the majority of the 20% fee taken from the miner’s reward was allocated to early investors and vested employees in a “Founder’s Reward.” This was compensation for those who took either time and/or monetary risk on Zcash without knowing if Zcash would capture value or even successfully launch. The FR is hardcoded to terminate at the time of the first halving in October 2020.</p><p>We are in agreement with the vast majority of the community when we advocate termination/no extension of the Founder’s Reward at the time of the first halving. That is, the Development Fund we propose for NU4 does not allocate a single dollar to angel investors, VCs or vested employees. We consider that debt to be paid in full by October 2020.</p><h4>TLDR</h4><p><strong>The NU4 Development Fund will be strictly allocated toward the advancement of the Zcash network and ZEC currency, and not for the enrichment of equity investors, VCs or vested employees.</strong></p><h3>10% allocation toward Zcash Development Fund</h3><p>For reasons articulated <a href="https://medium.com/blocktown/proposal-for-the-zcash-2020-network-upgrade-fcd320a5d6f5">here</a>, an allocation of 10% of the miner’s reward toward a Zcash Development Fund — instead of 20% or 0% — will unite the community and provide sufficient resources for continued development while maintaining the network security and decentralization characteristics of bitcoin. This proposed 10% allocation would be hardcoded in the Zcash codebase for the approximate years 2020–2024 (period between first and second halvings).</p><p>A Development Fund of 10% will set a precedent for a more mature “social contract” whereby the allocation toward a Zcash Development Fund rapidly decreases every halving. We believe that this is superior to extending the 20% allocation that is currently in place. If a 20% allocation is integrated in NU4, there would be an 8-year precedent of a FR/Development Fund at the same rate. Eight years in cryptocurrency is nearly the entire lifespan of bitcoin. Another 4 years at 20% will likely result in part of the community coalescing around a social contract of a <em>perpetual 20% allocation</em> toward a Development Fund while alienating a significant minority of the community. Most agree though that a perpetual 20% allocation is not suitable for a decentralized, privacy-centric cryptocurrency such as Zcash.</p><p>We want to re-emphasize that our proposed 10% allocation would be hardcoded in NU4 to terminate by the second halving in 2024. It will be up to Zcash’s decentralized governance model to reach consensus on additional funding as the second halving approaches. Nevertheless, following the precedent of halving the percent allocation, every halving event could result in the following Zcash Development Fund timeline:</p><ul><li>2016–2020: 20% (FR)</li><li>2020–2024: 10%</li><li>2024–2028: 5%</li><li>2028–2032: 2.5%</li><li>2032–2036: 1.25%…</li></ul><h4><strong>TLDR</strong></h4><p><strong>We propose that 10% of the miner’s reward should be allocated to a Zcash Development Fund in NU4. This allocation will be hardcoded to terminate at the time of the second halving in 2024.</strong></p><h3>Zcash Foundation and Electric Coin Company</h3><p>The Zcash Foundation (ZF) and Electric Coin Company (ECC) are best positioned to advance development and exposure for the Zcash network over the next several years. We propose allocating the entirety of Development Fund to the ECC and ZF.</p><p>As the ECC and ZF mature with dedicated funding, it is likely that their missions will evolve over time. For this reason, it is not reasonable to formally decide today exactly how the funds will be divided between both entities (e.g. 70/30 split). Nevertheless, during Zcash’s infancy, we do attribute greater importance to advancing protocol development, which supports a greater proportion of funds allocated to the ECC. We hope though that the ZF and ECC will work synergistically toward the shared goal of increasing value capture of the Zcash network and ZEC currency as greater clarity on the division of resources develops.</p><h4>TLDR</h4><p><strong>The entirety of the Development Fund should be allocated to the ECC and ZF.</strong></p><h3>Decentralized governance</h3><p>Sound money should be resilient and resistant to change. This has been one of the most important characteristics of the Bitcoin network — effectively resisting any increases in block size or coinbase cap.</p><p>In his article on governance <a href="https://www.zfnd.org/blog/multisig-governance/">Zcash Governance: A Step Toward Decentralization</a>, Josh Cincinnati provides an insightful analogy between decentralized governance and American democracy. With a largely 2-party system — Democrats and Republicans — , power in the American democratic system is divided such that radical changes are effectively vetoed by the opposing party, much to the frustration of passionate constituents in either party, but likely for the good of the entire democracy.</p><blockquote>As an American, I’ll be the first to admit that we have political problems, but the law grinds slowly for a reason. Systems that can be changed suddenly or drastically are risky in multiple ways, and especially dangerous if a tyrant can gain control.</blockquote><blockquote>-Josh Cincinnati, Executive Director, Zcash Foundation</blockquote><p>We agree that 2-of-2 multisig consent by the ECC and ZF for changes to the Zcash protocol is superior to 1-of-1 consent. That said, the alternative 2-of-3 multisig consent is another viable option gaining traction in the community with the advantage of offering a “tie-breaker” in the event of an impasse or deadlock. Prior to creating a formal ZIP, we are open to further discussion on these two viable options.</p><p>Over time, more sophisticated and complex solutions for greater decentralization may emerge, but for now this division of power should be sufficient while reducing any unforeseen technical or fragmented consensus risks.</p><h4>TLDR</h4><p><strong>Decentralized governance for changes to the Zcash protocol should be made in either a 2-of-2 multisig consent by ECC and ZF or a 2-of-3 multisig consent between the ECC, ZF, and a third entity (to be specified at a future time).</strong></p><h3>Issues and Discussion</h3><p>This proposal is not in accordance with the current Zcash protocol, which is currently programmed to allocate 100% of the coinbase to miners indefinitely upon the first halving in 2020. However, at least during Zcash’s infancy, we believe it is advantageous to have a funded and dedicated development team.</p><p>On the other hand, likely because the original Founder’s Reward was set at 20%, a number of proposals have also chosen 20% as the allocation for the new Development Fund. For reasons we have <a href="https://medium.com/blocktown/proposal-for-the-zcash-2020-network-upgrade-fcd320a5d6f5">explored in depth here</a> and <a href="https://medium.com/blocktown/executive-summary-blocktown-proposal-for-zcash-2020-network-upgrade-84ff20997502">summarized here</a>, we believe 10% instead of 20% is superior for network security, decentralization and uniting the Zcash community.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Herein we outline a proposal for 10% of the miner’s reward to be allocated toward a Zcash Development Fund after the first halving in October 2020 that will terminate by the second halving in 2024. Funds would be allocated to the ECC and ZF. The two viable options for decentralized governance are either 2-of-2 or 2-of-3 multisig consent between ECC, ZF and potentially a third entity.</p><p>Of course, prior to formalizing a ZIP, we welcome all feedback and assistance from the Zcash community and other interested parties!</p><h3>Disclaimer</h3><p>The managing partners of Blocktown Capital do not endorse or recommend any investment action in Zcash or ZEC. This document should not be regarded as investment advice. The managing partners of Blocktown Capital own ZEC. These views are those solely of the managing partners of Blocktown Capital and do not represent the views of the Zcash Foundation or Electric Coin Company.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fdec1e9d507c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/greymatter/blocktown-proposal-for-zcash-2020-network-upgrade-fdec1e9d507c">Blocktown Proposal for Zcash 2020 Network Upgrade</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/greymatter">Greymatter Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Executive Summary: Blocktown Proposal for Zcash 2020 Network Upgrade]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/greymatter/executive-summary-blocktown-proposal-for-zcash-2020-network-upgrade-84ff20997502?source=rss-572b0ef6d16c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/84ff20997502</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[zcash]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[zec]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Greymatter Capital]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 15 Aug 2019 19:53:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-08-15T19:53:16.839Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By Joseph Todaro and James Todaro, MD</p><p>Our in-depth proposal is available <a href="https://medium.com/blocktown/proposal-for-the-zcash-2020-network-upgrade-fcd320a5d6f5">here</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/697/1*baWTKWn8XvKnPLGE78qfWQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Bitcoin introduced the world to the liberating properties of a decentralized, censorship resistant, sound money. The creation of censorship resistant money is inextricably linked to privacy. In our opinion, Zcash has achieved a level of unparalleled privacy. In the upcoming weeks, the Zcash network faces a critical decision regarding the expiration of its “Founder’s Reward.”</p><p><strong>We propose a continuation of the Founder’s Reward, albeit marked by a reduction from the current 20% allocation of mining rewards to a more modest 10% allocation. </strong>We believe this will afford continued development of the Zcash network while simultaneously strengthening the ZEC currency itself with greater censorship resistance and community unity.</p><h3>Censorship Resistance, Decentralization and Network Security</h3><p>Money laundering, black market activities and terrorism are common regulatory talking points that put privacy-centric currencies like Zcash in the crosshairs of governments and institutions. Prohibition of privacy-oriented currencies will likely tighten with growing adoption. <strong>To withstand this pressure, Zcash’s greatest strengths are its decentralization and network security.</strong></p><p>The Founder’s Reward weakens both decentralization and network security. It should be minimized and not utilized to sustain a bloated budget — a practice that is rampant in early stage companies flush with funding.</p><h4><strong><em>Decentralization</em></strong></h4><p>Bitcoin has survived because it has no central point of failure. The Zcash network must strive to operate as closely as possible to the proven network effects that allow bitcoin to flourish. A large foundation with continual, algorithmically driven funding over 4 years is an attack vector. The Zcash Foundation and Electric Coin Company (ECC) are central points of failure vulnerable to subpoenas, indictments and regulatory attack.</p><h4><strong><em>Network Security</em></strong></h4><p>Chain security is equally important to maintain censorship resistance. Bitcoin allocates 100% of the coinbase rewards to miners — making bitcoin the most secure and resilient PoW chain. Zcash currently allocates only 80% of rewards to miners.</p><p>Over the next 5 years, we could see Zcash move from an experimental blockchain project to an established means of privately storing wealth and transferring value. With this expansion of economic utility, pressure will come from regulators and institutions alike as they lose the ability to monitor and control the movement of wealth. Aggressive regulatory attack is a likely outcome and could manifest itself in a 51% attack if mining rewards are too low. We believe a continuation of the full 20% Founder’s Reward unnecessarily weakens Zcash network security and departs too greatly from the proven bitcoin mining reward model.</p><h3>Projected Value of Founder’s Reward</h3><p>As of August 2019, the cumulative Founder’s Reward is estimated to be 1.4M ZEC, which, if sold on the corresponding days it was received, <strong>aggregates to 250M USD</strong>. At today’s low ZEC price of 55 USD, the Founder’s Reward still amounts to 80k USD daily or <strong>30M USD annually</strong>.</p><h4><strong><em>Current State of the Market</em></strong></h4><p>ZEC has been one of the worst performing large cap digital assets in 2019 — vastly underperforming bitcoin and most large cap altcoins, including privacy coins Dash and Monero. Sentiment for ZEC investors and the Zcash community is likely near an all-time low. We must be cautious making projections on the USD value of an extended Founder’s Reward at such a time.</p><h4><strong><em>ZEC Projections</em></strong></h4><p>It would be a mistake to make projections on the USD value of the Founder’s Reward based on the speculation that the exchange price of ZEC will remain in the vicinity of 50 USD over the next 5 years.</p><p>Bitcoin’s history has shown us that a decrease in the USD value of mining rewards after halvings is short lived. Actually, USD denominated rewards are often magnitudes higher merely a year or two after halving events (Figure 4).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MRRGxBsrk4phsezUvj0Zhg.png" /><figcaption>USD value of mining rewards increases after halvings</figcaption></figure><p>A magnitude peak increase of 10x for ZEC from present value within the next 5 years would result in a 10% Founder’s Reward valued at a projected <strong>37M USD annually and aggregated sum of 150M USD</strong>.</p><h4><strong><em>Fiscal Responsibility</em></strong></h4><p>While the efforts by the Zcash Foundation and ECC this past year — specifically in research and development — deserve applause, we find recent expense reports released by the Zcash Foundation and ECC concerning.</p><p>In late 2018 and early 2019, most blockchain and cryptocurrency companies dramatically downsized operations. <strong>While operating at a loss, the Zcash Foundation and ECC, <em>increased</em> operations and expenses during this time.</strong> We are concerned that this spending behavior is reminiscent of that of state departments and governments. That is, a nation state will be spiraling into debt, yet state departments rapidly exhaust resources near spending deadlines in order to justify budget renewals/increases and avoid spending cuts.</p><p>It is the community’s responsibility to ensure that this behavior does not plague the Zcash Foundation and ECC at the expense of network decentralization and security. Decreasing the Founder’s Reward to 10% would be a step in the right direction.</p><h3><strong>Social Contract</strong></h3><p>A sustainable social contract is critical for decentralized projects. We agree that Zcash will benefit from a continued source of funding dedicated toward development of a young, evolving cryptocurrency. However, we also believe that this social contract should set a sustainable precedent. If the social contract is such that the Founder’s Reward is simply extended at its current rate of 20%, then the precedent for future halvings will be set for a perpetual extension of the Founder’s Reward at this rate. Most of the community agrees though that an indefinite 20% reward is inappropriate.</p><p>By decreasing the Founder’s Reward to 10%, the precedent is set that the Founder’s Reward is not indefinite and will rapidly decrease over the next decade.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>In an environment where governments and banks are increasingly hostile to privacy-centric cryptocurrencies, decentralization and network security need to be strengthened as opposed to weakened. An extended Founder’s Reward comes at the cost of decentralization and chain security, and should be minimized as much as possible.</p><p>We propose a decrease in the Founder’s Reward from 20% to 10% of the miner’s rewards. Zcash price appreciation over the coming 5 years should mitigate concerns regarding development funding. Furthermore, this proposal could offer greater consensus by uniting the Zcash community with a compromise between terminating the Founder’s Reward altogether and extending the full 20% reward. The outcome would be a stronger community and social contract, increased network security and decentralization, and greater adoption for the Zcash network.</p><h3>Disclaimer</h3><p>The managing partners of Blocktown Capital do not endorse or recommend any investment action in Zcash or ZEC. This document should not be regarded as investment advice. The managing partners of Blocktown Capital own ZEC. These views are those solely of the managing partners of Blocktown Capital and do not represent the views of the Zcash Foundation or Electric Coin Company — although we hope they will agree with this proposed course of action.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=84ff20997502" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/greymatter/executive-summary-blocktown-proposal-for-zcash-2020-network-upgrade-84ff20997502">Executive Summary: Blocktown Proposal for Zcash 2020 Network Upgrade</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/greymatter">Greymatter Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Proposal for the Zcash 2020 Network Upgrade]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/greymatter/proposal-for-the-zcash-2020-network-upgrade-fcd320a5d6f5?source=rss-572b0ef6d16c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fcd320a5d6f5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[zcash]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decentralized]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[zec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Greymatter Capital]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 14 Aug 2019 19:18:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-12-21T22:18:34.192Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Proposal for 10% Dev Fund in Zcash 2020 Network Upgrade</strong></h3><p><strong>Considerations on decentralization, network security, projected value and consensus</strong></p><p>By Joseph Todaro and James Todaro, MD</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/697/1*baWTKWn8XvKnPLGE78qfWQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Bitcoin introduced the world to the liberating properties of a decentralized, censorship resistant sound money in 2009. In a little over a decade, bitcoin demonstrated the tremendous power of a marriage between a decentralized network and money. This marriage is what first caught our attention and personal investment in 2013.</p><p>The creation of sound, censorship resistant, global money has always been inextricably linked to privacy. Satoshi Nakamoto carefully maintained his/her own anonymity, and dedicated <a href="https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf">Section 10 of the Bitcoin white paper</a> to privacy. Satoshi encouraged the use of new key pairs for every transaction in an attempt for greater privacy, but acknowledged that this was suboptimal. It was the best technological solution available at the time though.</p><p>In 2016, after years of research and development, Zooko Wilcox and his team iterated on bitcoin’s core design by integrating privacy at the protocol layer. In our opinion, Zcash has achieved a level of privacy that is unparalleled — entrenching itself as a vital piece of cryptography infrastructure.</p><p>Fast forward nearly 3 years to present day, the Zcash network faces a critical decision regarding the possible extension of its “Founder’s Reward.” A decision is to be made by October 2019 to expire, alter or extend the Founder’s Reward in the form of a network upgrade at the time of Zcash’s first halving in October 2020.</p><p><strong>Herein, we advocate a continuation of the Founder’s Reward, albeit marked by a reduction from the current 20% allocation of mining rewards to a more modest 10% allocation. </strong>We believe this will afford the continued success of the Zcash network without undue burden on future development while simultaneously strengthening the ZEC currency itself with greater censorship resistance and community unity.</p><h4><strong>Censorship Resistance, Decentralization and Network Security</strong></h4><p>Financial privacy in a cryptocurrency carries regulatory risks. It should be no surprise that a global, censorship resistant network allowing for the private transfer of wealth may not be embraced by governments and banks. Fear of money laundering, black market activities and terrorism are already becoming common regulatory talking points regarding cryptocurrencies. With the strongest privacy solution, Zcash could become a primary target of these attacks as adoption expands and ZEC increasingly captures value.</p><p>We are already seeing initial responses to the privacy component of the Zcash network by US regulated exchanges (e.g. Coinbase) that limit Zcash transactions to transparent “t-addresses.” Governments (e.g. Japan) have pressured exchanges to prevent the purchase and exchange of untraceable, privacy focused cryptocurrencies and, just recently, Coinbase UK delisted ZEC from its exchange among speculation regarding banking regulations.</p><p>The prohibition of privacy-centric cryptocurrencies will only continue to tighten with adoption. <strong>To withstand this pressure, Zcash’s greatest strengths are its decentralization and network security.</strong></p><blockquote>The decision to weaken decentralization or network security jeopardizes the longevity of Zcash and could render it a technical milestone in a footnote on the history of digital currencies.</blockquote><p>As we explain in the subsequent sections, the Founder’s Reward weakens both decentralization and network security. It should be minimized and should not sustain a bloated budget — a practice that is rampant in early stage companies flush with funding.</p><p><strong><em>Decentralization</em></strong></p><p>Bitcoin has survived because it has no central point of failure. This is evident as history has shown that all of bitcoin’s predecessors were rapidly dismantled by government regulation and indictments (e.g. E-gold). Decentralization allowed bitcoin to persist and, some would argue, even forced governments to adapt more lenient regulations.</p><p>A large foundation with continual, algorithmically driven funding over 4 years is an attack vector. While the implications of an underfunded Zcash Foundation have been addressed in other proposals, the ramifications of an “overfunded” foundation have been largely unexplored.</p><p>The Zcash network must strive to operate as closely as possible to the proven network effects that have allowed bitcoin to flourish. The Zcash Foundation and Electric Coin Company (ECC) are central points of failure vulnerable to regulatory action.</p><p>We do believe the continued development of Zcash is important and merits funding. Moreover, Zooko and his development team have proven themselves to be incredibly competent and the “best fit” for continuing development on the Zcash network beyond the year 2020. <strong>For the sake of decentralization though, we implore the community to understand that every extra dollar allocated to the Founder’s Reward comes at the cost of widening this attack vector.</strong></p><p><strong><em>Network Security</em></strong></p><p>Perhaps as important as minimizing central points of failure is chain security. Proof-of-Work blockchains are largely secured by two fundamental components: the social contract of the network’s users and the economic incentives of mining. Bitcoin allocates 100% of the coinbase rewards to miners — making bitcoin the most secure and resilient PoW chain by many orders of magnitude. Currently, Zcash miners earn only 80% of the mining rewards.</p><p>At an annual new issuance rate of ~36%, Zcash has a proportionately greater miner’s reward-to-market cap ratio than bitcoin has today. This could lead one to argue that the Zcash network is presently “over-secured” in relation to its market cap. We believe that a proportionately greater block reward in a young cryptocurrency serves a dual purpose though: rapid decentralized distribution of coins <em>and</em> increased security during the vulnerable early years.</p><p>While an attack on Zcash may not be a profitable move, one could imagine that if the cost is low enough, a government or institution could see an opportunity to harm the Zcash network with an early attack. For this reason, we believe that the Zcash network is not, in fact, over-secured from this standpoint, especially given the controversial nature of privacy.</p><p>Over the next 5 years, we could see Zcash move from an experimental blockchain project to an established means of privately storing wealth and transferring value. With this expansion of economic utility, pressure will come from regulators and institutions alike as they lose the ability to monitor and control the movement of wealth. Aggressive regulatory attack is a likely outcome. With this understanding, it is imperative that network security is maximized through mining rewards. We believe a continuation of the full 20% Founder’s Reward unnecessarily weakens security of the Zcash network and departs too greatly from the proven bitcoin mining reward model.</p><h4><strong>Projected Value of Founder’s Reward</strong></h4><p>As of August 2019, the cumulative Founder’s Reward is estimated to be 1.4M ZEC, which, if sold on the corresponding days it was received, <strong>aggregates to 250M USD</strong>. This breaks down to a Founder’s Reward averaging 90M USD annually since the launch of Zcash in October 2016.</p><p>At today’s low ZEC price of 55 USD, the Founder’s Reward still amounts to 80k USD daily or <strong>30M USD annually</strong>.</p><p><strong><em>Current State of the Market</em></strong></p><p>Sentiment in the altcoin market is low, and it’s even lower for the Zcash community. ZEC has been one of the worst performing large cap assets in 2019. Below are a few statistics highlighting ZEC’s subpar performance.</p><p><em>ZEC YTD performance is </em><strong><em>down 1% </em></strong><em>(USD denomination, Figure 1)</em></p><ul><li>The average YTD performance of the top 20 large cap altcoins is <strong>up 99%</strong></li><li>Competitor privacy-centric coins, Dash and Monero, are <strong>up 31% and 89%</strong>, respectively</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Apo_9yEnoYqwi0RHoW6yqw.png" /><figcaption>ZEC underperforms most altcoins in 2019</figcaption></figure><p><em>ZEC is </em><strong><em>down 94%</em></strong><em> from ATH (USD denomination, Figure 2)</em></p><ul><li>The average large cap altcoin publicly traded since 2017 or earlier is only <strong>down 83%</strong> from ATH</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*475W90KjKc1PbqYW_vsM0w.png" /><figcaption>ZEC is down 94% from ATH in January 2018</figcaption></figure><p><em>ZEC is </em><strong><em>down 66%</em></strong><em> YTD (BTC denomination, Figure 3)</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1f1FHc6nAnO7G8pyjdxrdQ.png" /><figcaption>ZEC underperforms bitcoin in 2019</figcaption></figure><p>In summary, ZEC has vastly underperformed most large cap altcoins in 2019, including privacy coins Dash and Monero, as well as bitcoin. Sentiment and interest in Zcash are likely near an all-time low.</p><p>We followed advancements in zero-knowledge proofs long before the Zcash network was launched in 2016. We are invested in ZEC. We staunchly believe that privacy is fundamental to cryptocurrencies and have a positive outlook for Zcash. We point out the above statistics not to dishearten the Zcash community and ZEC investors, but rather to highlight that the despondent state of Zcash may affect the community’s projections on the future value of ZEC.</p><p><strong><em>ZEC Projections</em></strong></p><p>In the cryptocurrency sector, 5 years is not an insignificant amount of time. It is nearly half the lifespan of bitcoin. Entire market cycles in cryptocurrency last less than 5 years, with the most recent cycle, peak-to-peak, lasting about 4 years (Q4 2013 — Q4 2017). Looking forward, it is probable that a bull market will come to pass before the second halving of Zcash in Q4 2024, especially considering that we are already over 1.5 years out from the end of the last bull market in January 2018. We believe that it would be a mistake to make projections on the USD value of the Founder’s Reward based on the speculation that the exchange price of ZEC will remain in the vicinity of 50 USD over the next 5 years.</p><p>Moreover, bitcoin’s history has shown us that a decrease in the USD value of mining rewards after halvings are short lived. Actually, USD denominated rewards are often magnitudes higher merely a year or two after halving events (Figure 4).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MRRGxBsrk4phsezUvj0Zhg.png" /><figcaption>USD value of mining rewards increases after halvings</figcaption></figure><p>A magnitude peak increase of 10x for ZEC from present value after the halving would result in a Founder’s Reward averaging an estimated <strong>75M USD annually</strong> for an aggregate sum of <strong>300M USD</strong> from the years 2020–2024 if the Founder’s Reward is extended at its current rate of 20%. Mind you, this conservative scenario would result in a peak price of ZEC of only ~600 USD — still far from its former ATH of 920 USD.</p><p><strong>If, however, we reduce the Founder’s Reward to 10% of the miner’s reward, there would still be a projected <em>37M USD annually</em> and an aggregate sum of 150M USD. </strong>We have yet to see a budget proposal from the Zcash Foundation that necessitates more funding than this, nor do we think more funding than this is fiscally responsible.</p><p><strong><em>Fiscal Responsibility</em></strong></p><p>First, it is our understanding that after the halving in 2020, the new “Founder’s Reward” will be entirely allocated to funding research and development as well as any other direct efforts to advance the Zcash network. That is, funding will no longer be allocated to early investors in Zcash. This alone should increase funds available for the Zcash Foundation and ECC to continue operations after 2020.</p><p>Secondly, at risk of ad nauseam, we want to stress that every dollar allocated toward the Founder’s Reward decreases decentralization, chain security, and ultimately, censorship resistance. While the efforts by the Zcash Foundation and ECC this past year — specifically in research and development — deserve applause, we find recent expense reports released by the Zcash Foundation and ECC concerning.</p><p>In late 2018 and early 2019, most blockchain and cryptocurrency companies dramatically downsized operations. <strong>While operating at a loss, the Zcash Foundation and ECC, <em>increased</em> operations and expenses during this time.</strong> We are concerned that this spending behavior is reminiscent of that of state departments and governments. That is, a nation state will be spiraling into debt, yet state departments rapidly exhaust resources near spending deadlines in order to justify budget renewals/increases and avoid spending cuts.</p><p>It is the community’s responsibility to ensure that this behavior does not plague the Zcash Foundation and ECC at the expense of network decentralization and security. Decreasing the Founder’s Reward to 10% would be a step in the right direction.</p><h4><strong>Social Contract</strong></h4><p>The importance of the social contract cannot be understated in decentralized projects. Technology can be replicated, communities cannot. Each cryptocurrency has a certain set of rules. Altering these rules can fracture a community, especially a community that’s had a few years to coalesce around the social contract. It is incredibly important to establish a sustainable social contract as early as possible for decentralized projects.</p><p>The social contract for Zcash was a Founder’s Reward of 20% for 4 years, but failed to definitively address the Founder’s Reward after the first halving. Just recently, as the first halving approaches, Zooko and the Zcash Foundation proposed extending the Founder’s Reward at its current rate.</p><p>For reasons well-articulated in the <a href="https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/placeholder-considerations-resources-governance-and-legitimacy-in-nu4/34045">proposal by <em>Placeholder</em></a>, we agree that Zcash will benefit from a continued source of funding dedicated toward development and other necessities of a young, evolving cryptocurrency. However, we believe that this social contract should set a sustainable precedent. If the social contract is such that the Founder’s Reward is simply extended at its current rate of 20%, then the precedent for future halvings will be set for a continuous extension of the Founder’s Reward at this rate. Most of the community would agree though that an indefinite 20% reward is inappropriate.</p><p>By decreasing the Founder’s Reward to 10%, the precedent is set that the Founder’s Reward is not indefinite and will decrease faster than simply the rate of halving. This social contract will restore the community’s faith in the decentralization of Zcash in respect to the following points.</p><ul><li>Zcash Foundation compromised to reach the greatest community consensus possible</li><li>The Founder’s Reward will continue to decline over the next decade if this same approach is taken in the second halving in 2024</li><li>Greater clarity on a sustainable social contract regarding the Founder’s Reward</li></ul><p>Lastly, it is indeed possible that the majority of the community may vote for a simple extension of the Founder’s Reward at 20%, as proposed by the Zcash Foundation. However, a simple majority may not be the optimal choice. What about the remaining 20%, 30% or 49% of the Zcash community who supported decreasing the Founder’s Reward? What about all those who were initially excited about Zcash in 2016 but became estranged when the Zcash Foundation and ECC created the Founder’s Reward? By decreasing the Founder’s Reward to 10%, there is a good chance that minority voters will feel validated even if extending the Founder’s Reward was not their first choice. Perhaps some of the harshest critics of Zcash will see a decreasing Founder’s Reward as a path toward the level of decentralization and chain security of bitcoin and rekindle their interest in Zcash.</p><h4><strong>Conclusion</strong></h4><p>The founding Zcash team has accomplished a tremendous feat by integrating privacy with decentralized money. With the upcoming expiration of the Founder’s Reward, the community is now responsible for deciding the most appropriate path forward to ensure continued development, strengthened security, and ultimately user growth and value capture of Zcash.</p><p>In an environment where governments and banks are increasingly hostile to privacy-centric cryptocurrencies, decentralization and network security need to be strengthened as opposed to weakened. An extended Founder’s Reward comes at the cost of decentralization and chain security, and should be minimized as much as possible.</p><p>As early Zcash investors and fervent supporters, we believe that Zcash will undergo significant price appreciation over the coming 5 years mitigating today’s concerns regarding development funding. Although speculative, bitcoin’s history has demonstrated that miner’s rewards denominated in USD increase after halvings — easily absorbing the decreased output of the native asset. We see no reason that Zcash will significantly deviate from this trajectory provided a reasonable decision is made regarding the Founder’s Reward.</p><p>Finally, we believe that a decrease in the Founder’s Reward from 20% to 10% will unite the Zcash community by offering a compromise between terminating the Founder’s Reward altogether and extending the full 20% reward. This compromise may rekindle interest from parties who were originally alienated by the initial, unilateral decision of a large Founder’s Reward. The outcome would be a stronger community, increased network security and decentralization, and greater adoption for the Zcash network.</p><h4><strong>Disclaimer</strong></h4><p>The managing partners of Greymatter Capital do not endorse or recommend any investment action in Zcash or ZEC. This document should not be regarded as investment advice. These views are those solely of the managing partners of Greymatter Capital and do not represent the views of the Zcash Foundation or Electric Coin Company — although we hope they will agree with this proposed course of action.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fcd320a5d6f5" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/greymatter/proposal-for-the-zcash-2020-network-upgrade-fcd320a5d6f5">Proposal for the Zcash 2020 Network Upgrade</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/greymatter">Greymatter Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Blocktown Tracks Three Indexes in Crypto]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/greymatter/blocktown-tracks-three-indexes-in-crypto-a072cef44167?source=rss-572b0ef6d16c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a072cef44167</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[index-funds]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investment]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Greymatter Capital]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 02 May 2019 23:54:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-05-03T00:13:17.368Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*i1HaQ_zzSNAinOliRK7I2w.png" /></figure><p>Since January 1, 2019, Blocktown Capital created and tracks three indexes in the cryptocurrency space that will be benchmarks for performance analysis across varying assets in the upcoming years.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2F8WRYbdHXnBI%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D8WRYbdHXnBI&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2F8WRYbdHXnBI%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/a1d03fd0f2c25e63a1351c0ebb893493/href">https://medium.com/media/a1d03fd0f2c25e63a1351c0ebb893493/href</a></iframe><p>The three indexes are <em>Currency Index</em>, <em>Protocol Token Index</em> and <em>Bitcoin</em>. We believe these indexes will perform very differently over the next three to four years. Index methodology, inclusion criteria and composition are described below.</p><h4>Currency Index</h4><p><em>Constituents:</em></p><ul><li>Bitcoin Cash</li><li>Litecoin</li><li>Monero</li><li>Dash</li><li>Zcash</li></ul><p><strong>Eligibility Criteria: </strong>Inclusion requires the currency to maintain its sole purpose as a medium of transaction, and not for utility on a designated platform, contract, enterprise or other ecosystem. Index excludes Bitcoin and is limited to the largest 25 currencies by market capitalization as reported by <a href="https://coinmarketcap.com/">CoinMarketCap</a>. Cumulative daily spot trading volume on “Real 10” exchanges must exceed an average daily notional trade volume of 1 million USD determined on a weekly basis. Currencies failing to meet this criteria for two consecutive months will be removed from the index at time of rebalancing. New currencies meeting above criteria are added at time of rebalancing.</p><p><strong>Methodology and Reports:</strong> Index was launched at initial price of 100.00 and weighted by market cap according to CoinMarketCap with maximum weight limit of 50% for any single currency. When necessary, rebalancing weighted by market cap occurs on the 1st of the month at 14:00 hours UTC. Any currency greater than 50% of the index as priced in USD on the 1st of the month will be be rebalanced to 40% allocation. Reports on the performance of the index will be released on the first day of the month prior to rebalancing.</p><h4>Protocol Token Index</h4><p><em>Constituents:</em></p><ul><li>Ethereum</li><li>EOS</li><li>Cardano</li><li>TRON</li><li>Cosmos</li><li>Tezos</li><li>NEO</li><li>IOTA</li><li>Ontology</li></ul><p><strong>Eligibility Criteria: </strong>Inclusion requires the protocol token to maintain smart contract functionality which does not rely upon and/or is not secured by a secondary blockchain. Limited to top 20 largest assets according to market capitalization as reported by CoinMarketCap. Cumulative daily spot trading volume on “Real 10” exchanges must exceed an average daily notional trade volume of 1 million USD determined on a weekly basis. Tokens failing to meet this criteria for two consecutive months will be removed from the index at time of rebalancing. New tokens meeting above criteria are added at time of rebalancing.</p><p><strong>Methodology and Reports:</strong> Index was launched at initial price of 100.00 and weighted by market cap according to CoinMarketCap with maximum weight limit of 50% for any single protocol token. When necessary, rebalancing weighted by market cap occurs on the 1st of the month at 14:00 hours UTC. Any protocol token greater than 50% of the index as priced in USD on the 1st of the month will be be rebalanced to 40% allocation. Reports on the performance of the index will be released on the first day of the month prior to rebalancing.</p><h4>Bitcoin Index</h4><p><em>Constituents:</em></p><ul><li>Bitcoin</li></ul><p><strong>Methodology and Reports:</strong> Index was launched at initial price of 100.00 and tracks performance of Bitcoin based on price according to <a href="https://messari.io/onchainfx">OnChainFX</a>. Reports on the performance of the index will be released on the first day of the month.</p><h4>About Blocktown Capital</h4><p>Blocktown Capital is an investment fund focused exclusively on blockchain ventures, digital currencies and application tokens. For more information, visit <a href="https://blocktown.capital/">https://blocktown.capital</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a072cef44167" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/greymatter/blocktown-tracks-three-indexes-in-crypto-a072cef44167">Blocktown Tracks Three Indexes in Crypto</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/greymatter">Greymatter Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Republic Protocol: Analysis and Valuation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/greymatter/republic-protocol-analysis-and-valuation-e73fab4c32fc?source=rss-572b0ef6d16c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e73fab4c32fc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin-mining]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptoasset]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decentralized-exchange]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Greymatter Capital]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 02 Jun 2018 17:47:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-06-02T17:47:16.184Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Full Report by James Todaro, Joseph Todaro and John Todaro</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PRjbOOjvE5TJTGRgMl1XFg.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Disclaimer:</strong> The managing partners of Blocktown Capital own Republic Protocol token (REN).</p><p>Moniker: <strong>Republic Protocol</strong></p><p>Ticker symbol: <strong>REN</strong></p><p>Current price per token: <strong>0.096 USD</strong></p><p>Current market cap: <strong>49,887,123 USD</strong></p><p>Blocktown Capital is bullish on Republic Protocol as we expect the platform to gain significant market share in the growing yet nascent sector of dark pool digital asset exchanges.</p><ul><li>In traditional equity markets, dark pools constitute about 15% of total market volume.</li><li>As institutional and high net worth investors enter digital assets, the demand for dark pools will increase.</li><li>Republic Protocol will be the first decentralized dark pool with an anticipated launch in Q3 2018.</li><li>With an ICO raise of 35MM USD as well as strategic partnerships with institutional funds such as Polychain Capital, Republic Protocol has the resources to launch and grow a viable platform.</li><li>Our valuation model implies that the Republic Protocol token REN currently trades significantly below its fair value assuming reasonable adoption of the platform.</li></ul><p><strong>Background</strong></p><p>Republic Protocol is an open-source, decentralized blockchain protocol facilitating private, over-the-counter (OTC) trades of digital assets on a hidden order book. In traditional markets, dark pools are private exchanges or forums for the transfer of large blocks of securities, usually equities, by institutional investors and high networth individuals (HNWI). It is estimated that up to 15% of all equity trades are executed in dark pools. Employing Ethereum smart contracts and secure multi-party computations, Republic Protocol provides an anonymous orderbook and asset transfer algorithm with the goal of launching the first decentralized dark pool for digital assets.</p><p>The founding company of 13 team members is based in Singapore with most of the team residing near Canberra, Australia. Development on the Republic Protocol commenced in Q4 2017, and in February 2018, Republic Protocol sold out their ICO for 35MM USD, distributing 60.2% of the fixed supply of REN to investors, which notably included Polychain Capital, FBG Capital, Signum Capital, ZhenFund and Huobi Capital along with a few others. REN is currently traded on OKex, IDEX and Liqui with average total daily volumes between 1MM and 4MM USD.</p><p>The Republic Protocol is still under development with the upcoming launch of its platform on public testnet in June of 2018 and mainnet launch in Q3 2018.</p><p><strong>Protocol</strong></p><p>The stated objective of the Republic Protocol is to create a decentralized, hidden order book which allows for the matching of orders from two or more parties without revealing any information regarding specific assets, participating parties or order size. In order to construct such a protocol, Republic is utilizing secure multi-party computations and a cryptographic concealment scheme known as <em>Shamir Secret Sharing</em>. Additionally, zero-knowledge proofs are used to verify the secure multi-party computations which occur without revealing underlying information to the computing parties or other observing parties. In the Republic Protocol, the computing parties are decentralized nodes, essentially high-speed order matching engines, which act to locate and match orders based on asset type, quantity and price.</p><p>These nodes that run the Republic Protocol network are labeled <em>darknodes </em>as they do not reveal any information about the underlying orders they match. Any individual or group of individuals can obtain a darknode as long as they acquire and stake at least 100,000 REN. These darknodes will earn fees for matching orders on the network. The Republic Protocol has an upper limit of 10,000 darknodes. Darknodes will also need a high speed internet connection and some basic hardware to remain competitive as they will compete amongst each other to match orders and, therefore, collect fees. It is reasonable to assume that as the Republic Protocol order book grows, the standard equipment needed to run a darknode may increase.</p><p>The Republic team will launch the first decentralized darkpool exchange, RenEx, that taps into the underlying network of darknodes to match orders. Additionally, 3rd parties will also be able to launch their own darkpool exchanges that utilize the Republic Protocol darknodes. In accordance with standard exchange practices, darknodes will be compensated with a fee equal to a given percentage of value traded across all darkpool exchanges on the network following a basis point system (bps). These fees are set by the darkpool exchange and are awarded to the darknodes that match orders. RenEx will utilize the fee model of 0.2% (20 basis points) per trade. Since each side of a trade will pay 20 bps on any given trade, darknodes will receive 40 bps per trade. The darknode operators who participated in matching a trade evenly split the fee amongst themselves. Approximately ⅔ of all active darknodes at any given time need to participate in matching order fragments to complete an order. This reduces the collusion attack vector as bad actors will need to control a supermajority of the darknodes in order to obtain significant information about the hidden order book. On the other hand, setting the fraction of darknodes required to match any given order too high would make the network susceptible to sudden darknode <em>drop-off</em> <em>attacks</em>. In this scenario, either maliciously or unintentionally, if too many darknodes were to fail or abandon computations at a similar time, there would be insufficient fragments available to successfully discover matching orders. With the percentage of computationally truthful nodes set to a supermajority, up to ⅓ of nodes could fail to execute appropriate computations and the network would still be able to truthfully match orders.</p><p>Prior to the matching process, each order is fragmented and encrypted whereby no underlying information is able to be discerned. Once orders are matched, assets are manually swapped via Republic Protocol’s decentralized exchange network. The asset exchange is then settled on the blockchain of the underlying assets (i.e. settled on the native blockchain of the digital assets that were traded). Once the asset swap is publicly initiated, this information becomes observable and can be identified by examining the underlying blockchain.</p><p>In order to better understand Republic Protocol’s concealed order book, we must first understand <em>Shamir Secret Sharing</em>. Adi Shamir pioneered this cryptographic approach to sharing sensitive information in 1979 while a faculty member at MIT. This cryptographic scheme allows for the fragmentation and dispersal of secret information within a network. Each participant is given a unique part with some number of the given parts necessary to reconstruct the original secret. Mathematically, we can diagram this secret sharing scheme as such. Any given secret, <em>x</em> is divided into <em>n</em>fragments where <em>k</em> is the number of fragments required to reconstruct the original secret. The fragments are then randomly distributed to participants within the network to maintain a sufficient amount of randomness so that any one group of related participants does not hold a large number of fragments for any one secret. Given that each participant holds one fragment from secret <em>x</em>, a number greater than or equal to <em>k</em> participants (or fragments) is then required to reveal the secret.</p><p>While regulated markets have specific laws in place to prevent various false order tactics (to varying degrees of success), decentralized platforms must have built in mechanisms to prevent this behavior. <em>False orders</em> are a specific attack vector conducted by traders attempting to reconstruct a portion or the entirety of the hidden order book. This attack is conducted by submitting many orders to the network at varying prices with the hope of discovering matches from within the orderbook. Once an order match is found, some pricing information can be assumed by each trader participating in that match. The nefarious trader could then abandon the order thereby never completing the asset swap. This attack allows nefarious actors to gather information about the order book regarding specific assets and prices listed without actually completing an asset swap.</p><p>The Republic Protocol is able to limit this attack vector by requiring all traders to post bonds in REN as collateral for each order they open. This bond requirement places nefarious actors at risk of significant capital loss. A trader’s bond may be temporarily locked, slashed or forfeited if they fail to follow through with an asset swap once an order pair is matched. Furthermore, negligent traders who abuse or ignore general trading parameters, such as failing to swap matched orders in a timely or appropriate manner, may have their REN bond temporarily locked or slashed by darknode owners as well. In this way, darknode owners act to punish traders who misuse the network. This misuse could be through simple negligence or the intentional abuse of darknode computational resources. Darknodes are fully intended to have the ability to punish nefarious traders. Although, at this time, the precise governance model which underlies this process has not yet been publicly detailed by the team.</p><p><strong>Dark Pools</strong></p><p>Dark pools are liquidity providing services offered by alternative trading systems (ATSs), electronic communications networks (ECNs), and broker-dealers, which are often Wall Street banks. Dark pools do not publish real-time bid/ask information or size, thus concealing trade details from other market participants. In traditional US equity markets, dark pool prices must occur at, or inside, the National Best Bid Offer (NBBO) so that prices do not widely differ from those on public exchanges, such as the NYSE or Nasdaq. Dark pool operators are required to report trade details to the consolidated tape, and thus become public information within 90 seconds post-transaction. Dark pools have become attractive alternative sources of liquidity as they offer opportunities for reduced market impact, lower transaction fees, and less information leakage — thus concealing market participants’ intentions and strategies.</p><p>As of 2016, dark pools accounted for 14.49% of equity volumes as reported by <a href="http://www.cowen.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/2017-01-23-Cowen-Volume-Liquidity-Update.pdf">Cowen &amp; Co</a> while total off exchange volume hit 36%. Off-exchange volume includes not only dark pools, but also internal trades on behalf of two separate trading desks within the same bank, high touch cash block OTC trades, and wholesale retail trades. With increased regulatory scrutiny over the past several years, growth in traditional dark pools has slowed, resulting in a market share loss for dark pool servicers.</p><p>In the digital asset sector, there are a handful of centralized OTC trading platforms, which include ItBit, Genesis, Circle, Gemini and Binary Financial. Although exact volumes are not published, spokespersons for Genesis and Circle report recent average daily volumes between 50MM and 100MM USD or about 2B USD per month. There are even fewer dark pools, which most prominently include Kraken and Bitfinex. Although trading volumes are unpublished, Kraken is the most well known dark pool offering a hidden order book for Bitcoin orders over 450,000 USD.</p><p><em>Decentralized</em> dark pools can mitigate several of the risks that accompany centralized dark pools. Firstly, decentralized dark pools are less susceptible to regulatory restrictions, which has adversely impacted market share in traditional equity dark pools. Additionally, extensive regulations often require expensive intermediaries that drive up trading fees. We assume the Republic fee structure will ultimately be lower than those accompanying centralized dark pools.</p><p>Secondly, decentralized dark pools are not reliant on a single operator who may act nefariously. In 2016, several US regulatory bodies fined Barclays and Credit Suisse more than 150MM USD for misrepresenting efforts to police their dark pools from predatory trading, overriding their own surveillance tools on various occasions, and misleading subscribers about their data feeds. In the digital asset sector, centralized dark pools face the same risks as those faced by centralized exchanges, which include token theft, hacking, corruption and government takeover. The effects of previously compromised centralized exchanges still impact the market to this day (e.g. MtGox, BTC-e, Bitfinex and Cryptsy).</p><p><strong>REN Token Valuation</strong></p><p>The value of REN is derived from trading fees and bonds. Fees are paid by traders to darknodes in exchange for processing orders. Bonds are submitted in REN by both darknodes and traders in order to utilize the network. Fees and bonds are interconnected such that each darknode is required to hold a bond of 100,000 REN to gain access to the network and receive fees for processing orders. With this information and some basic market assumptions, we can diagram base and bull case scenarios for the potential value of REN.</p><p><em>Assumption #1: The digital asset market will continue to mature with increasing annual trade volumes</em></p><p>Since 2015, the annual total trade volume of digital assets continues to increase, as shown in the graph below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*nl_WCAp8Oy0f5iTx" /></figure><p>In the year 2017, a total of 2T USD in digital assets was traded on public exchanges. As we approach the close of Q2 2018, over 4.5T USD has already traded this year. Conservatively, we project that about 8T USD in digital assets will be traded on exchanges by the end of 2018. Of note, these numbers do not include the unreported off-exchange volumes traded in OTC deals. Based on our market analysis, we perceive the last three years as periods of exceptionally rapid expansion of the digital asset sector. It is not reasonable to assume that the annual trade volumes will continue to grow at the rate shown in the chart above. If it did, the annual trade volume of digital assets would approach the 100T total annual trade volume of equities in 2019 and far surpass it in 2020. We think that it is unlikely that digital asset trades will exceed the global equity trading volume that soon. Instead, we will assume that the digital asset trade volume will grow at a more sustainable rate of 75% in 2019, 50% in 2020, 35% in 2021 and 25% in 2022. Based on these projections, the annual trade volume of digital assets will be about 35T in 2022.</p><p><em>Assumption #2: Trading fees on the Republic Protocol exchange, RenEx, will start at 20 bps for buyer and 20 bps for seller (40 bps collected per trade) and trend down over time.</em></p><p>The Republic Protocol team has specified that the fee rate for their exchange, RenEx, will be set to 20 bps for each buyer and seller. We will further assume that fees will trend down to remain competitive with other newly launched 3rd party darkpool exchanges. To support this assumption, we examined a few current market metrics. One of the largest, most liquid digital asset exchanges, Binance, has trading fees of 10 bps for each buyer and seller (5 bps during the promotional period). Another well known exchange, Bittrex, charges fees of 25 bps each. With lower liquidity in dark pools and OTC platforms, it is reasonable to expect higher trading fees. As a representative example, Circle generally collects between 25 and 50 bps from the bid/ask spread (12.5 to 25 bps each for the buyer and seller) in every trade.</p><p>The most popular decentralized exchange is currently IDEX with fees of 10 bps for market makers and 20 bps for market takers (30 bps per trade). As a decentralized dark pool, the Republic Protocol will initially have higher fees than its counterpart decentralized exchanges while simultaneously desiring to remain competitive with OTC platforms like Circle. At 20 bps for buyer and 20 bps for seller (40 bps per trade), the Republic Protocol will have initial trading fees higher than those on IDEX, but comparable to those of Circle.</p><p>Finally, we will also assume that on average 5,000 darknodes will be participating in order matching and earning fees. Although there are many factors that will dictate the precise number of darknodes that are active on the network at any given time, we feel comfortable modeling our assumption off other projects that have had similar node requirements.</p><p><em>Assumption #3: Dark pools will approach 15% of total digital asset trading volume.</em></p><p>As expounded upon in the previous section, dark pools constitute about 15% of the total volume in traditional equity markets. We believe that 15% is also a fair estimate for the eventual growth of digital asset dark pools. On the one hand, many digital asset traders gravitate toward options that allow greater privacy and anonymity, perhaps even more so than traders in traditional equity dark pools. This suggests that digital asset dark pools may capture more than 15% of the market. On the other hand, there are seemingly more retail investors in digital assets than in the equity markets, which could put a ceiling on the demand for OTC and dark pool trading options. For this reason, we will stick to the assumption that digital asset dark pools will mature to capture 15% of total trade volume.</p><p>Based on the above assumptions, we can now estimate a valuation of REN from the utility of the network in base and bull case scenarios. We are intentionally excluding a bear case scenario. As most decentralized projects including Republic Protocol are still in their infancy, we believe that the bear case valuation of these projects approaches zero over about 5 years, as historically demonstrated for a number of digital assets (<a href="https://coinmarketcap.com/historical/20131117/">historical snapshot from November 2013 of previously well known digital assets</a>).</p><p><strong><em>Bull Case Scenario</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/714/0*FxFuxbubCnIWVHaG" /><figcaption>Table 1. Annual revenue per darknode in a bull case scenario</figcaption></figure><p>Before addressing the bull case, we would like to clarify our interpretation of this scenario. <em>The bull case scenario is the upper limit of what REN could be worth assuming they achieve success to the very highest of expectations.</em> We think this is an important metric to consider given the rampant euphoria in digital assets and blockchain projects. Many digital assets have reached markedly inflated market capitalizations predicated almost entirely on speculation. In some cases, the price of the tokens is so inflated that it approaches or even surpasses the token value as if the platform has already achieved successful adoption (while in reality the platform is still pre-launch or with minimal adoption). Knowing the upper limit of a token’s potential value is extremely helpful in screening tokens that may already be overvalued. For this reason, our bull case scenario is the upper limit of what each REN could be worth assuming the highest realistic success.</p><p>In our bull case scenario, we add one assumption to the above list, which is the market capture of the Republic Protocol. As shown in the table above, we assume negligible volume in 2018 as the platform will only first launch in Q3 2018. The market capture then trends up to 1.7% by 2022, estimating that the Republic Protocol will capture about 1/10th of the total volume of dark pools. In favor of this bull case scenario is the likelihood that the Republic Protocol will be the first mover in decentralized dark pools.</p><p>With this final assumption, we can calculate a price of REN based on the network fees paid to darknodes, the largest holders of REN tokens.</p><p>Given REN’s network incentivization, namely fee generation, we have decided that the best valuation method would be a discounted cash flow analysis (DCF). Fees, which are to be paid in ETH, BTC, or other ERC-20 tokens, can be substituted for a cash dollar amount in a typical DCF model. Similarly, one can envision a fee generating node as a dividend paying stock or an annuity paying bond that lasts into perpetuity (less the costs associated with the electricity and hardware used to run nodes).</p><p>Using the formula for DCF, PV = [CF1 / (1+r)1] + [CF2 / (1+r)2] + … + [CFn / (1+r)n] + TV, we can discount our cash flows back to present day to arrive at a Present Value (PV) for the REN network.</p><p>PV = Present cash flow value</p><p>CF1 = Cash flow at the end of year 1</p><p>CF2 = Cash flow at the end of year 2</p><p>CFn = Cash flow at <em>n</em> specified year</p><p>r = Discount or required rate of return</p><p>TV = Terminal Value</p><p>Before continuing further, we must assign a specific discount rate, <em>r</em>. Presently, there is no appropriate risk rate in the digital asset marketplace that can be used as a benchmark. As such, we will borrow from other financial markets to ascertain an acceptable discount rate. The risk free rate is typically deemed to be the return rate on US treasury bonds — a return which is considered to be devoid of risk of loss. Moving along the risk spectrum to a more appropriate discount rate, we arrive at funding costs for start-up companies. In Series A equity funding rounds for venture capital, the generally accepted rate is between 30–50% per annum. As a digital asset platform with certain technological components that remain unproven, Republic Protocol has a relatively high risk profile and we believe that it is reasonable to assign a discount rate that is similar to that of a Series A round for a startup. Given this information, we have decided to settle on a discount rate of 40%.</p><p>Using our estimates of fees paid to REN nodes from Table 1 above, we can plug these CF values into our formula.</p><p>PV = 0/(1.40)¹ + 84,000,000/(1.40)² + 321,300,000/(1.40)³ + 822,150,000/(1.40)⁴ + 1,506,093,750/(1.40)⁵ + TV</p><p>Lastly, we need to include those fees paid after the five year period. We model the REN platform to last into perpetuity, as is appropriate in the equity markets. To do this, we use the Gordon Growth Method to find a Terminal Value, <em>TV</em>. We conservatively model out a sustained growth rate of 2% (g = 0.02), in-line with mature company estimates.</p><p>TV = [year 5 cash flow * (1+g)/(r-g)]</p><p>TV = 1,506,093,750*(1.02)/(0.4–0.02) = 4,042,672,697</p><p>Adding up our yearly cash flows and terminal value, we arrive at the below summation:</p><p>0 + 42,857,142 + 117,091,836 + 214,012,390 + 280,034,686 + 4,042,672,697 = 4,696,668,753</p><p>Finally, by dividing our total network cash value (4,696,668,753) by the number of circulating tokens (519,094,022), we arrive at a dollar price per REN of 9.05 USD. That is, with our assumptions and best case scenario forecasts, REN could achieve a value of 9.05 USD per token. This represents an upside of ~94x (9,300% gain) from its current price of 0.096 USD.</p><p><strong><em>Base Case Scenario</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/715/0*vN3-8Kk5Q3p8Z0Ur" /><figcaption>Table 2. Annual revenue per darknode in a base case scenario</figcaption></figure><p>In the table above, we forecast out our base case assumptions. As in our bull case scenario, the only assumption we adjust in this scenario is the REN market capture rate. Using more conservative projections for our base case, we model the platform to capture trading volumes that are more in line with numbers for decentralized exchanges such as IDEX, DDEX and the Waves DEX. IDEX, which presently has the greatest market share, captures about 0.06% of daily digital asset trading volume.</p><p>For the sake of brevity, we will not detail the DCF calculation as we did before. In this base scenario though, the resulting price per REN is 1.84 USD. This represents ~19x (1,800%) increase from its current price.</p><p>In summary, assuming a successful launch of the Republic Protocol platform and increasing interest in trading digital assets, the price of REN falls somewhere between 1.84 USD and 9.05 USD, respectively a 1,800% to 9,300% increase from its current price of 0.096 USD.</p><p><strong>Competitors</strong></p><ul><li>Circle</li><li>Gemini</li><li>Kraken</li><li>Airswap</li><li>Loopring</li><li>Enigma</li><li>0x</li></ul><p>Republic Protocol faces competition from digital asset exchanges and OTC platforms. Republic Protocol’s main competitors can be bifurcated into two groups: centralized platforms and decentralized platforms. Republic Protocol’s centralized competitors include Circle, Gemini, Kraken and soon Coinbase. One of the greatest centralized competitors to Republic Protocol is Circle, which makes markets for institutions and HNWI in many of the top 20 digital assets including Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash, Ethereum, Litecoin and Zcash. Circle is also flexible as it will attempt to work a client order in almost any digital asset. While orders are not executed via a dark pool, private OTC trades such as those provided by Circle, often reveal little information to exchanges and other market participants. Circle relies on its relationships with other institutions such as hedge funds and HNWIs to execute agency trades on behalf of clients looking for liquidity in large block OTC trades. Additionally, when Circle cannot find the other side of a trade for a client, they can buy/sell OTC blocks using their own proprietary capital. Circle charges no fees on trades, but maintains a bid/ask spread. Circle’s bid/ask spread is typically less than 50 bps, depending on the liquidity of the digital asset. The higher the liquidity, the tighter the spread. Given that Republic Protocol is a decentralized platform, it relies less on a dedicated sales force which interacts with institutions to drive flows, and more on increased security and anonymity, while maintaining lower fees to drive new flows.</p><p>While Republic Protocol is slated to be the first decentralized dark pool operator, the platform will likely face competition from decentralized exchanges, such as trading platforms built on 0x, as well as other OTC decentralized platforms including Airswap, Enigma, and Loopring. Enigma potentially will offer anonymous smart contracts while Loopring acts as a pooled liquidity provider. If Loopring is overlaid on top of the enigma platform, one could envision a decentralized anonymous pool of liquidity which could challenge Republic Protocol. Airswap offers private OTC transactions on a decentralized network. Airswap aims to build out a peer-to-peer trading platform that allows for off-chain negotiations between buyers and sellers. Airswap has a very similar market profile to Republic Protocol. Airswap raised 32.5MM USD in their ICO which was backed by prominent investors including, Michael Novogratz, and currently trades at a market cap around 40MM USD. Airswap will likely be the leading challenger to Republic Protocol, and both platforms will need to market aggressively to capture new adopters. However, in its current capacity, the Airswap order book is not hidden and can be pieced together by attempting to place orders. Additionally, in its current state, the Airswap orderbook is entirely comprised of a small number of approved liquidity providers. Lastly, the 0x Project which powers many decentralized exchanges could eventually have a decentralized darkpool solution with the use of zkSNARKS. However, similar to some of the aforementioned platforms, this too is not currently functional and could be quite awhile before a detailed roadmap or product release is seen.</p><p><strong>Risks</strong></p><p><em>Inadequate Go-to-Market Strategy</em></p><p>The team currently maintains no dedicated marketing personnel which is often needed to grow user adoption rates on the platform. In the early stages, if resources are limited, it is essential to focus on development and less on marketing. However, after launch it is necessary that services have the ability to attract and retain users. Failure to successfully market the platform could lower estimated growth rates. Because the Republic Protocol is currently pre-product, the lack of a dedicated, strong marketing presence is not deleterious nor a large concern provided they increase marketing efforts in the near future.</p><p><em>Complicated or Slow Token Listing Process</em></p><p>One of the most attractive elements of decentralized exchanges is the ease and efficiency with which new tokens are added and subsequently traded on the platforms. This expedited listing process has the great benefit of attracting and retaining users looking to trade a diverse set of assets, both new and old. There is a risk that Republic Protocol will fail to add new tokens at an appropriate rate or be burdened by an excessively cumbersome process. This outcome could impact user adoption rates substantially as users often seek out those exchanges that add assets the fastest.</p><p><em>Burdened by Centralization</em></p><p>In their analysis of EOS, Multicoin Capital expounded on the difference between sovereign-grade and platform-grade censorship resistance. Although mostly decentralized, Republic Protocol does have a few centralized parts that make it susceptible to sovereign-grade censorship. Of note, early on, the Republic Protocol team will be responsible for listing new tokens to the dark pool. This is especially a concern as many government agencies, most notably the US SEC, are currently scrutinizing many exchange and privately traded tokens to determine classification status. For any tokens classified as securities, any platform trading these tokens could be required to undergo a lengthy and expensive process to obtain special licenses as well as maintain KYC/AML compliance requirements. If the Republic Protocol team controls the listings of tokens in its dark pool, then government agencies may hold the team accountable. Fearful of legal repercussions, the Republic Protocol team may be reluctant to add tokens with unclear statuses to their dark pool. Nevertheless, this may only be a temporary concern as the Republic Protocol allows for 3rd party darkpool exchanges that, we presume, will have control over the assets listed within their exchange. Additionally, 3rd party darkpool exchanges could also adopt a decentralized listing process that is controlled by token holders.</p><p><em>Low Liquidity</em></p><p>Low liquidity is an enormous hurdle for all new exchanges and dark pools. Without a certain threshold of liquidity, exchanges have a difficult time retaining traders. Although not yet disclosed, the Republic Protocol team has indicated that they do have a decentralized approach to bringing liquidity to their platform shortly after launch.</p><p><em>Poor Protocol Incentives</em></p><p>Proper platform incentives are among the most important aspects of protocol design. These incentives are necessary to allow decentralized systems to effectively operate and capture the value of the underlying service while remaining resilient to bad actors who wish to harm, manipulate or control the system. All teams building truly decentralized systems face this particular challenge. While the Republic Protocol has laid out some solutions to many of these potential pitfalls (e.g. darknode fees, traderbonds), building these platforms to operate in a decentralized environment as anticipated is not an easy task. It is a risk that can be mitigated by properly designed protocols that have both sound value capture for the native asset as well as strong incentives for participants within the system. The Republic Protocol team has done a good job of addressing these issues thus far.</p><p><em>Decreased Funding</em></p><p>It is common practice for blockchain companies to maintain some degree of secrecy in the management of the ICO proceeds. Because funding is often received in the form of another digital asset, most commonly ETH, there are important fund management decisions that need to be made. While cautious teams liquidate much of the raise into USD for stability, it is not uncommon for teams to keep a large allocation in Ethereum. This has important implications as the recorded amount raised (e.g. 35MM USD) if kept in the primary form received, Ethereum, could have a drastically different value depending on market conditions. The Republic Protocol team has refrained from commenting on the exact percentage of their ICO raise that was converted from ETH to USD.</p><p><strong>Team</strong></p><p>Republic Protocol was founded by Taiyang Zhang (CEO) and Loong Wang (CTO), and has 13 team members and 5 advisors. This is Taiyang and Loong’s first blockchain and/or digital asset project. Prior to founding Republic Protocol, Taiyang was a founding member of Virgil Capital, a cryptoasset quantitative hedge fund, and prior to that was a director at Neucode for 3 years. As of Feb 4, 2018, Virgil Capital managed ~24MM USD and focused primarily on arbitrage opportunities within digital assets. Prior to co-founding Republic Protocol, Loong was the lead software developer at Neucode for nearly 2 years. Neucode is a small software company based out of Australia with little digital footprint.</p><p><strong>Republic Protocol ICO Details</strong></p><p>An important, yet often overlooked metric in token valuation is the token distribution. This is especially critical in the setting of a recent ICO as token concentration and market manipulation may be a concern. Many token sales have poor token distribution with enormous discounts given to entice high profile advisors or partners in order to boost marketing of the ICO. This does not appear to be the case with Republic Protocol, as outlined below.</p><ul><li>Date of ICO: February 3, 2018</li><li>Token distribution: February 17, 2018</li><li>Total REN (capped): 1B</li><li>Total REN sold in ICO: 602MM (60.2%)</li><li>Presale allocation: 516MM REN (51.6%)</li><li>Main sale allocation: 86MM REN (8.6%)</li><li>Tokens held by founders, team and advisors: 298MM (29.8%)</li><li>Token allocation for community development and partners: 100MM (10%)</li><li>A total of 4075 people participated in main sale without discounts</li><li>Vesting schedule for advisors and team is 6 months and 2 years, respectively</li><li>Presale discounts: 0–15%</li><li>Main sale: no discounts</li><li>Average price of REN ~0.05 USD</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*13QcLBeFSX3OhWhz" /></figure><p>Although CoinMarketCap reports that the total REN in circulation is 519,094,022, the actual number that will be in circulation in the very near future is probably closer to the total REN distributed in the ICO, which is 602MM.</p><p>Regarding vesting schedules, 100MM REN (10%) are locked up until either August 2018 or February 2020 as this is when the 6 months and 2 year vesting schedules conclude. Until August 2018, there should not be any unexpected large influx of REN entering the market assuming the remaining 29.9 million REN set aside for “Reserve,” “Early Adopter Partnerships,” and “Community Development and Partners” are mostly vested.</p><p>Of note, at 0.096 USD, REN is currently trading at just under 2x (92% above) its average ICO price of 0.05 USD.</p><p><strong>Disclaimer</strong></p><p>The managing partners do not endorse, or recommend any investment action in Republic Protocol (REN). This document should not be regarded as investment advice, offering document, or as a recommendation regarding a course of action. The managing partners of Blocktown Capital own Republic Protocol (REN) tokens. These views are those solely of the managing partners of Blocktown Capital and do not represent the views of the Republic Protocol team.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e73fab4c32fc" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/greymatter/republic-protocol-analysis-and-valuation-e73fab4c32fc">Republic Protocol: Analysis and Valuation</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/greymatter">Greymatter Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Republic Protocol: Analysis and Valuation (Executive Summary)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/greymatter/republic-protocol-analysis-and-valuation-executive-summary-cef7c075bbfa?source=rss-572b0ef6d16c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cef7c075bbfa</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptoasset]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decentralization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Greymatter Capital]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 02 Jun 2018 17:44:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-06-02T17:48:23.548Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By James Todaro, Joseph Todaro and John Todaro</p><p><em>Although this executive summary contains the highlights of our analysis, we strongly encourage you to read the </em><a href="https://medium.com/blocktown/republic-protocol-analysis-and-valuation-e73fab4c32fc"><em>full report</em></a><em> that substantiates our valuation of REN.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/380/1*JyKt8cS8yVVnshomaCNpMw.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Disclaimer:</strong> The managing partners of Blocktown Capital own Republic Protocol token (REN).</p><p>Moniker: <strong>Republic Protocol</strong></p><p>Ticker symbol: <strong>REN</strong></p><p>Current price per token: <strong>0.096 USD</strong></p><p>Current market cap: <strong>49,887,123 USD</strong></p><p>Blocktown Capital is bullish on Republic Protocol as we expect the platform to gain significant market share in the growing yet nascent sector of dark pool digital asset exchanges.</p><ul><li>In traditional equity markets, dark pools constitute about 15% of total market volume.</li><li>As institutional and high net worth investors enter digital assets, the demand for dark pools will increase.</li><li>Republic Protocol will be the first decentralized dark pool with an anticipated launch in Q3 2018.</li><li>With an ICO raise of 35MM USD as well as strategic partnerships with institutional funds such as Polychain Capital, Republic Protocol has the resources to launch and grow a viable platform.</li><li>Our valuation model implies that the Republic Protocol token REN currently trades significantly below its fair value assuming reasonable adoption of the platform.</li></ul><p><strong>Background</strong></p><p>Republic Protocol is an open-source, decentralized blockchain protocol facilitating private, over-the-counter (OTC) trades of digital assets on a hidden order book. Employing Ethereum smart contracts and secure multi-party computations, Republic Protocol provides an anonymous orderbook and asset transfer algorithm with the goal of launching the first decentralized dark pool for digital assets. The founding company of 13 team members is based in Singapore with most of the team residing near Canberra, Australia. Development on the Republic Protocol commenced in Q4 2017, and in February 2018, Republic Protocol raised the full amount of 35MM USD through an ICO. REN is currently traded on a number of small exchanges with average total daily volumes between 1MM and 4MM USD.</p><p><strong>Protocol</strong></p><p>The objective of the Republic Protocol is to create a decentralized, hidden order book which allows for the matching of orders from two or more parties without revealing any information regarding specific assets, parties or order size. The network is maintained by darknodes that perform order matching and facilitate the exchange of digital assets. Darknodes are rewarded in trading fees in basis points per trade. Any individual or group of individuals can run a darknode by staking 100,000 REN in a bond.</p><p><strong>Market Vertical</strong></p><p>Republic Protocol operates in an attractive vertical with a ready use case. In the digital asset sector, OTC trading platforms (e.g. Kraken, Bitfinex, ItBit, Genesis and Circle) and dark pools are gaining popularity. Although exact volumes are not published, spokespersons for Genesis and Circle each report recent average daily volumes between 50MM and 100MM USD or about 2B USD per month. A <em>decentralized</em> dark pool can mitigate several of the risks and costs that accompany centralized dark pools and OTC platforms. Firstly, decentralized dark pools are less susceptible to regulatory restrictions, which have adversely impacted market share in traditional equity dark pools. Secondly, compliance with these regulations often require expensive intermediaries that drive up trading fees. Finally, decentralized dark pools are not reliant on a single operator, and avoid the risks that accompany centralized dark pools and exchanges, such as token theft, hacking, corruption and government takeover.</p><p><strong>REN Token Valuation</strong></p><p>The value of REN is derived from trading fees which are paid to darknodes in exchange for processing orders. Bonds are submitted in REN by both darknodes and traders in order to utilize the network. Fees and bonds are interconnected such that each darknode is required to hold a bond of 100,000 REN to access the network and receive fees. With some basic market assumptions, we diagram base and bull case scenarios for the potential value of REN.</p><p>Assuming increasing annual trade volumes of digital assets, trading fees of 40 bps (20 bps each for buyer/seller), a dark pool market capture of 15% of total trade volume and a discount rate of 40%, we employ a DCF analysis model to calculate base and bull cases for REN.</p><p>In our base case, we assume Republic Protocol captures a conservative 0.35% of the total digital asset trade volume by the year 2022. This assumption is in line with decentralized exchanges (DEXs) such as IDEX, DDEX and the Waves DEX, which collectively capture less than 0.2% of today’s market. Of note, DEXs have been growing at a remarkable rate and will likely capture much greater trading volume over the next few years. In this base scenario, the resulting price per REN is 1.84 USD, representing a 19x (1,800%) increase from its current price.</p><p><em>Bull Case Scenario</em></p><p>In our bull case scenario, we assume a more aggressive market capture for Republic Protocol, forecasting a capture 1.7% of the total digital asset trade volume by 2022 (approximately 1/10th of total volume traded in dark pools). Based on the revenue (Table 1) to each node, we find that each REN token could be worth up to 9.05 USD, representing a ~94x (9,300% gain) increase from its current price of 0.096 USD.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/714/0*-FaSBuSKj9gSTcv2" /><figcaption>Table 1. Annual revenue per darknode in bull case.</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Competitors</strong></p><ul><li>Circle</li><li>Kraken</li><li>Airswap</li><li>Loopring</li><li>Enigma</li><li>0x</li></ul><p>Republic Protocol faces competition from both digital asset exchanges and OTC platforms. Republic Protocol’s centralized competitors include Circle, Gemini, Coinbase Pro, and Kraken. REN’s biggest competitor, Circle, makes markets for institutions and HNWI in many of the top 20 digital assets. Circle charges no fees on trades, but maintains a bid/ask spread.</p><p>While Republic Protocol is slated to be the first decentralized dark pool operator, the platform will likely face competition from several OTC decentralized platforms. Republic Protocol’s main decentralized competitor is Airswap which plans to offer OTC transactions on a decentralized network. Airswap has a similar profile to Republic Protocol, having raised ~32MM USD in its ICO with support from highly regarded investors such as Michael Novogratz. However, in its current capacity, the Airswap order book is not truly hidden and can be pieced together by attempting to place orders. Together, Enigma and Loopring are also potential competitors. While not functional yet, Enigma may eventually offer anonymous smart contracts while Loopring can act as a pooled liquidity provider. If Loopring is overlaid on top of the Enigma platform, one could envision a decentralized anonymous pool of liquidity that could challenge Republic Protocol. Lastly, the 0x Project which powers many decentralized exchanges could eventually have a decentralized darkpool solution with the use of zkSNARKS. However, similar to the aforementioned platforms, this too is not currently functional and could be quite awhile before a detailed roadmap or product release is seen.</p><p><strong>Risks</strong></p><p>There exist a number of risks that could prevent Republic Protocol from succeeding. Firstly, compared to many other blockchain projects, Republic Protocol has maintained a fairly low profile. While this may make REN an attractive investment, in the long run if the team does not increase marketing efforts, then it is possible that the platform will receive little interest and adoption. Another risk is the centralization of some aspects of the platform, such as the token listing process. If limited by regulatory concerns regarding securities laws, the team may be reluctant to add new tokens which could substantially temper trading activity. Finally, incentivizing liquidity on exchanges is always an enormous challenge for any new trading platform.</p><p><strong>Team</strong></p><p>Republic Protocol was founded by Taiyang Zhang (CEO) and Loong Wang (CTO), and has 13 team members and 5 advisors. This is Mr. Zhang and Mr. Loong’s first blockchain and/or digital currency project.</p><p><strong>ICO</strong></p><p>Republic Protocol sold 60.2% of its fixed supply of REN in its ICO in February 2018 for 35MM USD. The average ICO price was about 0.05 USD between both the Presale and Public Sale. It attracted prominent institutional investors including Polychain Capital, FBG Capital, Signum Capital, ZhenFund and Huobi Capital. The remaining 39.8% of REN are reserved for the team, advisors and community with a portion of REN vested between 6 months and 2 years.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*gVibkCVdHPegja3r" /></figure><p><strong>Disclaimer</strong></p><p>The managing partners do not endorse, or recommend any investment action in Republic Protocol (REN). This document should not be regarded as investment advice, offering document, or as a recommendation regarding a course of action. The managing partners of Blocktown Capital own Republic Protocol (REN) tokens. These views are those solely of the managing partners of Blocktown Capital and do not represent the views of the Republic Protocol team.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cef7c075bbfa" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/greymatter/republic-protocol-analysis-and-valuation-executive-summary-cef7c075bbfa">Republic Protocol: Analysis and Valuation (Executive Summary)</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/greymatter">Greymatter Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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