<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by griffey on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by griffey on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@griffey?source=rss-91d14dc8d95a------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 09:13:42 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@griffey/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Breeding Cobras…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/berkman-klein-center/breeding-cobras-b082bf50ec8e?source=rss-91d14dc8d95a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b082bf50ec8e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[incentives]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iot]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[libraries]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[griffey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 12 Nov 2017 18:15:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-11-12T18:15:47.948Z</atom:updated>
            <cc:license>https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/</cc:license>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This post is a short excerpt from my upcoming <a href="https://journals.ala.org/index.php/ltr/issue/archive">Library Technology Report</a> on Smart Buildings. I recently attended <a href="http://forum.lita.org/">LITA Forum 2017</a>, and was disappointed in the lack of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problematization">problematization</a> of data collection, retention, and analysis…especially as it relates to the “Internet of Things” and the coming flood of data from IoT.</p><p>This excerpt contains no solutions, only questions, concerns, and possible directions. If anyone has thoughts or would like to start a dialogue about these issues, I’d <a href="http://jasongriffey.net/contact/">love to talk</a>. The full Library Technology Report on Smart Libraries will be published by ALA TechSource in the next few months.</p><p>The end-game of the Internet of Things is that computing power and connectivity is so cheap that it is literally in every object manufactured. Literally everything will have the ability to be “smart”; Every chair, every table, every book, every pencil, every piece of clothing, every disposable coffee cup. Eventually the expectation will be that objects in the world know where they are and are trackable and/or addressable in some way. The way we interact with objects will likely change as a result, and our understanding of things in our spaces will become far more nuanced and details than now.</p><p>For example, once the marginal cost of sensors drops below the average cost for human-powered shelf-reading, it becomes an easy decision to sprinkle magic connectivity sensors over our books, making each of them a sensor and an agent of data collecting. Imagine, at any time, being able to query your entire collection for mis-shelved objects. Each book will be able to communicate with each book around it, with the wifi basestations in the building, with the shelves, and be able to know when they are out of place. Even more radical, maybe the entire concept of place falls away, because the book (or other object) will be able to tell the patron where it is, no matter where it happens to be shelved in the building. Ask for a book, and it will be able to not only tell you where it is, it can mesh with all the other books to lead you to it. No more “lost books” for patrons, since they will be able to look on a map and see where the book is in their house, and have it reveal itself via an augmented reality overlay for their phone.</p><p>The world of data that will be available to us in 10–20 years will be as large as we wish it to be. In fact, it may be too large for us to directly make sense of it all. My guess is that we will need to use machine learning systems to sort through the enormous mounds of data and help us understand the patterns and links between different points of data. The advantage is that if we can sort and analyze it appropriately, the data will be able to answer many, many questions about our spaces that we’ve not even dreamed of yet, hopefully allowing the designing of better, more effective and useful spaces for our patrons.</p><p>At the same time, we need to be wary of falling into measurements becoming targets. I opened the larger Report with <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goodhart%27s_law">Goodhart’s Law</a>, credited to economist Charles Goodhart and phrased by Mary Strathern, “<strong>When a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure.</strong>” We can see this over and over, not just in libraries, but in any organization. <strong>An organization will optimize around the measures that it is rewarded by, often to negative effects in other areas</strong>. This is captured in the idea of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perverse_incentive"><strong>perverse incentives</strong></a>, where an organization rewards the achievement of an assessment, only to realize that the achievement undermines the original goal. The classic example of this is known colloquially as the “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cobra_effect"><strong>Cobra effect</strong></a>”, named after the probably-apocryphal story of the British colonizers in India rewarding citizens for bringing in dead cobras in an attempt to control their deadly numbers in cities. Of course, the clever people of India were then incentivized to breed cobras in secret, in order to maximize their profits….</p><p>Libraries should be wary of the data they gather, especially as we move into the next decade or two of technological development. The combination of <a href="https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/03/data_is_a_toxic.html"><strong>data being toxic</strong></a> to the privacy of our patrons and the risks of perverse incentives affecting decisions because of measure’s becoming targets is dangerous to libraries. Libraries that wish to implement a data-heavy decision making or planning process need to be extraordinarily aware of these risks, both acute and chronic. I believe strongly in the power of data analysis to build a better future for libraries and our patrons. But used poorly or unthoughtfully, and the data we choose to collect could be secretly breeding own set of cobras.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b082bf50ec8e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/berkman-klein-center/breeding-cobras-b082bf50ec8e">Breeding Cobras…</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/berkman-klein-center">Berkman Klein Center Collection</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[About FaceID]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/berkman-klein-center/about-faceid-8691c741780a?source=rss-91d14dc8d95a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8691c741780a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[iphone-x]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[face-id]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[apple]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[griffey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 15 Sep 2017 13:51:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-09-15T13:51:44.909Z</atom:updated>
            <cc:license>https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/</cc:license>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/625/1*tSmLfmb3o9414tSBsZbhnw.jpeg" /></figure><p>I’ve seen the hottest of terrible hot-takes over the last couple of days about Apple’s announcement this past Tuesday (although <a href="https://www.macrumors.com/2017/09/10/ios11-gm-faceid-apple-pay-a11/">leaked a few days before</a>) that their new flagship iPhone, the <a href="https://www.apple.com/iphone-x/">iPhone X</a>, will use a biometric system involving facial identification as the secure authentication mechanism for the phone. No more TouchID, which uses your fingerprint as your “key” to unlock the phone, we are now in the world of <a href="https://www.apple.com/iphone-x/#face-id">FaceID</a>.</p><p>Let’s get this out of the way early in this essay: <strong>biometrics are for convenience, passcodes are for security</strong>. This doesn’t mean that biometrics aren’t secure, but they are secure in a different way, against different threats, for different reasons. The swap of FaceID for TouchID does nothing to lessen the security of your device, nor does it somehow given law enforcement or government actors increased magical access to the information on your phone.</p><p>You’d have thought, from the crazed reactions I’ve seen on Twitter and in the media, that Apple had somehow neglected to think of all of the most obvious ways this can be cheated.</p><blockquote><em>FaceID could potentially pose some pretty serious security problems </em><a href="https://t.co/xnHx6Lob1C"><em>https://t.co/xnHx6Lob1C</em></a></blockquote><blockquote><em>— WIRED (@WIRED) </em><a href="https://twitter.com/WIRED/status/907893111141093376"><em>September 13, 2017</em></a></blockquote><blockquote><em>So how worried should we be about Apple’s Face ID </em><a href="https://t.co/IA9bEbyv1D"><em>https://t.co/IA9bEbyv1D</em></a></blockquote><blockquote><em>— DO ENGINEERING (@doengineering) </em><a href="https://twitter.com/doengineering/status/908525787816632321"><em>September 15, 2017</em></a></blockquote><blockquote><em>Apple’s FaceID Could Be a Powerful Tool for Mass Spying </em><a href="https://t.co/Xfy81NkDcx"><em>https://t.co/Xfy81NkDcx</em></a><em> </em><a href="https://t.co/Zg9bSbxaiy"><em>pic.twitter.com/Zg9bSbxaiy</em></a></blockquote><blockquote><em>— Technology Bits (@Technology_Bits) </em><a href="https://twitter.com/Technology_Bits/status/908525819424673793"><em>September 15, 2017</em></a></blockquote><p>and my personal favorite</p><blockquote><em>With FaceID, cops can just point your phone at your face while they have you in handcuffs then look through your phone without a warrant.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>— Jerrah Mormont (@BostonJerry) </em><a href="https://twitter.com/BostonJerry/status/907673044461768707"><em>September 12, 2017</em></a></blockquote><p>The Wired article above, by Jake Laperuque, includes the breathless passage:</p><blockquote><em>And this could in theory make Apple an irresistible target for a new type of mass surveillance order. The government could issue an order to Apple with a set of targets and instructions to scan iPhones, iPads, and Macs to search for specific targets based on FaceID, and then provide the government with those targets’ location based on the GPS data of devices’ that receive a match.</em></blockquote><p>If we’re throwing out possibilities…any smartphone could do that _right now_ based on photo libraries. If there was a legal order to do so. And IF the technology company in question (either Google or Apple, if we’re sticking to mobile phones as the vector) did indeed build that functionality (which would take a long, long time) and then did employ it on their millions and millions of phones (also: long time), it would involve an enormous amount of engineering resources. Coordination of the “real” target vs family members who just happened to have photos on their phones of Target X should be fairly easy to do via behavioral profiling and secondary image analysis.</p><p>But that, like the FaceID supposition above, is bonkers to believe. If anything, FaceID is more secure in every way than the equivalent attack via standard photo libraries. If a nation-state with the power to compel Apple or Google into doing something this complicated and strange really wanted to know where you were…they wouldn’t need Apple or Google’s help to do so.</p><p>The truth of the matter is that FaceID is no less secure than the systems we have now on Apple devices (here I am not including Android devices as there are simply too many hardware makers to be certain of the security). TouchID, the fingerprint authentication process that is available for use on every current iPhone (and the new iPhone 8 and 8 plus), every current iPad, and multiple models of MacBook, uses your fingerprint as the “key” to a hash that is stored on a hardware chip known as the Secure Enclave on the phone. When you place your finger on the TouchID sensor, it isn’t taking a picture of your print, or storing your print in any way. The information that is stored in the Secure Enclave isn’t retrievable by anything except your phone. Your fingerprints aren’t being stored at Apple Headquarters on some server. There is no “master database” of the fingerprints of all iPhone users. The authentication is entirely local, as witnessed by the fact that you have to enroll your print on every iOs device separately.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/0*QVRu07zviNlglxJx.png" /></figure><p>FaceID appears to be exactly the same setup, with exactly the same security oversight as TouchID. It’s entirely local to the phone, and all of the information (a “hash” of information about your face…it’s really not fair to call it a “picture”) is stored on the Secure Enclave within the iPhone. We haven’t seen the full security report on FaceID and iOS 11 yet, but I am certain it will be available soon (<a href="https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf">iOS 10 and TouchID is available here</a>). Given the other well-considered aspects of security on iOS 11 that we have seen, such as requiring a passcode before trusting an untrusted computer, I am confident that iOS 11 and FaceID will be at least as secure as their previous iterations.</p><p>Is it possible that Apple, the most valuable technology company in the world in large part due to their ability to development hardware and software in concert with each other, completely missed something in making FaceID? Of course it’s possible. But all of the ways that technology of this sort has failed from other companies (racial bias, poor security models, data leakage) have not yet been true for TouchID. I do not believe they will be true for FaceID either.</p><p>Even setting aside the purely technical aspects, legally there is no difference in the risks of using FaceID over using TouchID. In the tweet above about police holding your phone up to your face to unlock it, it would be important to note that they can compel a fingerprint now. It is entirely legal (with a lot of “if”s and “but”s) for a police officer to force your finger onto your phone to unlock it. No warrant is necessary for that to happen. FaceID is exactly the same, as far as legal allowances and burden of proof and such, as TouchID is now. In the case of preventing law enforcement access to your phone, the only answer is a strong password and your refusal to give it to someone.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/448/0*qDmcgQtfqxp59W7l.png" /></figure><p>It isn’t clear to me if FaceID is going to be a good user experience…without devices in user’s hands, we have no idea. But the knee-jerk response that somehow Apple is building a massive catalog of faces is neither true, nor possible given the architectures of their hardware and software.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Tl65u8zicME6GdPd.jpg" /></figure><p>This isn’t to say that there isn’t some real danger somewhere:</p><blockquote><em>Apple does FaceID fairly well — local data+secure enclave, etc. Not the issue. We’re building the infrastructure of authoritarianism. That is.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>— Zeynep Tufekci (@zeynep) </em><a href="https://twitter.com/zeynep/status/907952921723019264"><em>September 13, 2017</em></a></blockquote><p>I think Zeynep has this (as most things) exactly right. This technical implementation is really quite good. The normalization of the technology in our culture may well not be…but this is why I am so vehement about defending this positive implementation as positive. Let Apple’s method of doing this be the baseline, the absolute minimum amount of care and thought that we will accept for a system that watches us. They are doing it well and thoughtfully, so let’s understand that and not let anyone else do it poorly. And for goodness sake don’t cry wolf when technologies understand their risks and are built securely. Because just like the story, when the real wolves show up, it will be that much harder for those of us paying attention to raise the alarm.</p><p>EDIT: After writing this entire thing, I found <a href="https://www.troyhunt.com/face-id-touch-id-pins-no-id-and-pragmatic-security/">Troy Hunt’s excellent analysis</a>, which says many of these same things in a much better way than I. Go read that if you want further explication of my take on this, as I agree with his essay entirely.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8691c741780a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/berkman-klein-center/about-faceid-8691c741780a">About FaceID</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/berkman-klein-center">Berkman Klein Center Collection</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Personal International Infosec]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/berkman-klein-center/personal-international-infosec-c3ddb60a5de9?source=rss-91d14dc8d95a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c3ddb60a5de9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[passwords]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[travel]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[griffey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 14 Mar 2017 15:23:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-03-14T15:23:51.576Z</atom:updated>
            <cc:license>https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/</cc:license>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This year I have a small number of international speaking engagements, and I just returned from the first of those in 2017…which means it was the first since the recent spat of <a href="https://www.propublica.org/article/can-customs-border-protection-search-phone-legal-rights">increased DHS and Customs enforcement</a>. It was also my first trip to a Muslim-majority country, and while not one on <a href="http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2017/03/11/its-still-a-muslim-ban-trump-executive-order/">the magic list</a>, it still made me consider my re-entry into the US and the possible attention therein. These things combined to make me far more attentive to and aware of my personal information security (infosec) than every before. This post will be an attempt to catalog the choices I made and the process I used, as well as details of what actual technological precautions I took prior to leaving and when actively crossing the border.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*jtzjJy31MNjddgBk.jpg" /></figure><p>This trip was to the <a href="http://www.slaagc2017.org/index.php/2016-main-page">SLA Arabian Gulf Library Conference</a>, held this year in Manama, Bahrain, where I was on a panel discussing future tech. This means flying internationally through a major city, which for me meant flights from Nashville to JFK to Doha International Airport in Qatar, then finally to Manama, Bahrain. The return was was the same, with the exception of flying back into the US via O’Hare in Chicago rather than JFK. This meant crossing into at least 2 foreign countries physically on each leg of the trip, although in Qatar I remained in the international section of the airport and didn’t go through customs and enter the country proper. Still, there were LOTS of checkpoints, which meant lots of potential checks of my luggage and technology.</p><h3>Threat Model</h3><p>What was my concern, and why was I thinking so hard about this prior to the trip? After all, I’m a law-abiding US citizen, and as the saying goes, if you’ve nothing to hide, why worry? First off, the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nothing_to_hide_argument">“if you’ve nothing to hide” argument is dismissible</a>, especially given the last 6 weeks of evidence of <a href="http://www.theverge.com/2017/2/12/14583124/nasa-sidd-bikkannavar-detained-cbp-phone-search-trump-travel-ban">harassment and aggression at the US border</a>. I am a citizen of the US, but I have also been very outspoken online regarding my feelings for the actions of the current administration. On top of that, information security isn’t just about the individual…it’s about everyone I’ve exchanged email with, texted, messaged on Facebook, sent a Twitter DM, and the like….the total extent of my communications and connections could, if dumped to DHS computers, theoretically harm someone that isn’t me, and that was not ok in my book. A primary goal was to prevent any data about my communications or contacts from being obtained by DHS.</p><p>DHS and Border Control has <a href="https://www.aclu.org/other/constitution-100-mile-border-zone">very, very broad powers</a> when it comes to searching electronic devices at the border. I was not certain of the power granted to Border Agents in Qatar and Bahrain, but my working assumption was they had at least the powers that the US Agents did. I also assumed that the US agents would probably have better technological tools for intrusion, so if I could protect my data against that threat, I was safe for the other locations as well.</p><p>A secondary goal in my particular model was to attempt to limit the possibility for delay in my travels. If I could comply with requests up to a certain point without breaking my primary goal of data protection, that would likely result in less delay. When considering these levels of access, I thought about questions like: could I power on my devices without any data leakage? Could I unlock my devices if requested and allow the Agent to handle my phone, for instance, without risking data leakage? Could I answer questions about my device and the apps on it (or other apps in question, for instance social media accounts such as Facebook or Twitter) honestly without risking data leakage?</p><p>With all of that in mind, here’s how I secured my technology for border crossing. Your mileage may vary, as your threat model may be very different, and the manner in which you choose to answer the various questions above may be different. If everything had gone south and my devices were impounded, I’d be writing a very different post (and <a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/02/invasive-digital-border-searches-tell-eff-your-story">contacting the EFF</a>). But for this particular trip, this is my story.</p><h3>What to Take</h3><p>First off, I decided quickly that I wasn’t going to travel with my MacBook Pro. I was lucky enough that I didn’t need it for this trip, because there wasn’t any work that I would be doing on the road that necessitated a general purpose computer. I had work to do, but it all involved writing…some email, some writing text for a project, some viewing of spreadsheets and analysis of them. Simple and straightforward things that luckily could easily be done with a tablet and a decent keyboard. I already had an iPad with the Apple keyboard case, which made for an easily-carried and totally capable computing device for the trip. I could load some movies and music on it, fire up a text editor, answer email, and generally communicate without issue. It’s also iOS based, which makes it <a href="https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf">enormously more secure than Mac OS from first principles</a>.</p><p>Since both my main computing device and my phone ran the same OS, I was able to also double-up any planning and efforts in security, as any decision I made could be equally applied to both devices. This turned out to be very, very convenient, and saved me time and effort.</p><p>The first thing that I did was backup the both the iPad and iPhone to a local computer here at my house (not iCloud) and ensure that those backups were successful. I stored those backups on my home network to ensure their safety…if anything went wrong later, these would be my “clean” images that I could revert to upon returning home. Then I used Apple Configurator 2 to “pair lock” my devices to my laptop, which would remain at home.</p><h3>Pair Locking</h3><p>This process was best described <a href="https://www.zdziarski.com/blog/?p=2589">back in 2014 by security researcher Jonathan Zdziarski</a>. While his instructions are fairly out of date, the general idea is still there and still works in iOS 10 and Apple Configurator 2. Basically, pair-locking an iOS device is a method by which the device is flashed with a cryptographic security certificate that prevents it from allowing a connection to any computer that doesn’t have the other half of the cryptographic pair on it. This means that once locked to my laptop (which, again, wasn’t in my possession and was still at my home), my iPhone and iPad would simply refuse to connect to any other computer in the world…whether that was someone that stole it from me and and attempted to reflash it using iTunes on their computer, or whether that is a diagnostic device being used by law enforcement.</p><p>This process is designed with the concept of using it for enterprise installation of iOS devices that need high security procedures to prevent employees from being able to connect their home computer to their work phone and retrieve any information. But it works very well for the purposes of preventing any possible attacker from accessing the phone’s memory directly through it’s lightning port. This processes ensures that even if the phone is unlocked and taken from my possession, DHS or other attacker cannot dump the memory directly or examine it using typical forensic information gathering devices.</p><h3>Password Manager</h3><p>Once both devices were pair-locked, I was left with two freshly installed iOS devices that I needed to reload with apps and content that would be useful for me. After loading a set of games and apps that would allow me to pass the time and still get some work done, as well as media I might want to consume on the road, I loaded my password manager (I use and am very happy with <a href="https://1password.com/">1Password</a>) and created a very, very long and complicated vault password that there was no possibility I could remember. I recorded that password on paper (left at home in a fireproof safe) and gave it to a trusted person that had instructions not to give the password to me until I had cleared the border and only over a secured channel.</p><p>I then changed the 1Password vault password to be that password plus a phrase that I knew and could remember (a sort of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salt_(cryptography)">salt</a>). 1Password was set up to allow me to login with TouchID, so I could still operate normally (logging into services and such) until such a time as that TouchID credential <a href="https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201371">was revoked</a>. Once revoked, I would be completely locked out of my passwords, with no ability to access them, until through a pre-arranged time and secure channel I got the vault password from either of the mentioned trusted sources. Those trusted sources, meanwhile, couldn’t access my password vault either, since the salt was resident only in my head.</p><p>It may be obvious, but I also ensured that everything in my life that was accessed with a password had a very strong one that was held by 1Password, and that I didn’t know and couldn’t memorize even if I tried. My bank, social media, dropbox…everything that could get a password, had a very, very secure one. Any service that supported 2-factor authentication had said 2 factor turned on, with the second factor set to an authentication app that supports a PIN (or, in the case of Very Important Accounts, a physical Yubikey that was left in TN as well). This is security 101, and not directly related to my border crossing…but if you don’t have the basics covered, nothing else really matters.</p><h3>Sanitization</h3><p>I made sure that iOS had most iCloud sync services off….no contact syncing, no calendar syncing, really the only thing I left syncing was my photo gallery. I did not install any social media apps (no Facebook app, no Twitter app, etc) and only logged in and out on the websites in question. The browser on both devices was set to not remember passwords, and I clear cache and history regularly when traveling. As far as I could, I eliminated anything that stored conversations or messages between myself and others…no Facebook Messenger app, etc. I deleted my email app, and didn’t enter my account information for email into the standard iOS mail app.</p><p>This was, keep in mind, just for the transit period. Once in country and across borders, I could use <a href="https://www.tunnelbear.com/">a VPN</a> to connect to the ‘net and download any apps needed, log into them after retrieving the password from one of the trusted sources, and effectively use both devices normally (with basic security measures in place all the time, of course).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*T4praxX3vu6v5j8s.jpg" /></figure><h3>Crossing Borders</h3><p>At this point, I had a device that couldn’t be memory dumped, that had very little personal information on it, and even less information about my contacts on it. It mostly acted normally for me, because 1Password handled all of my logins and I used TouchID during daily usage…right up until I needed to cross a border. Before I did so, I deleted my TouchID credentials via Settings (by deleting the fingerprint credential), and powered-cycled my phone. Those two actions did several things all at once:</p><p>The first was that it prevented me from being able to know or retrieve any passwords for anything in my life. That’s a pretty scary situation, but I knew it was fixable in the future (this wasn’t a permanent state). It also meant that if I were asked to unlock my phone, I could do so pretty much without anything of interest being capable of access. Without the ability to dump the phone forensically, officers could ask me for passwords for accounts and I could truthfully say that I had no way of telling them, because the password manager knew them all and I didn’t. And I couldn’t give them the password vault login because I literally didn’t know it.</p><p>The idea with all of this was to create a boundary of information access beyond which, if DHS wanted to try and access, they would need to impound the phone and potentially subpoena the information from me with a warrant. My guess (which turned out to be correct) was that they would ask to have it powered on, and maybe they would ask to see it unlocked, but that would be it. If they pried further, well…I was prepared to tell them truthfully that I didn’t know, that I couldn’t know. And I would <a href="https://www.aclu.org/files/kyr/kyr_english_5.pdf">call a lawyer if detained</a>, and proceed from there.</p><p>The worst case scenario for me was minimal delay and discomfort. I am enormously privileged in my position to be able to think about this sort of passive resistance without actual fear for bodily harm or other forms of retribution. For me, the likely worst case, even if things had escalated to asking for social media passwords, would have been the confiscation of my devices and my being detained for a time. <strong>This is assuredly not the worst case for many, and it is extraordinarily important that each person judge their own risks when deciding on security practices.</strong></p><p>For some, it is far better to simply not carry anything. Or to carry a completely blank device. Or purchase an inexpensive device when you arrive in the country of your destination. For me, I had the ability to prepare and be ready for resistance if needed. Your mileage may, and should, vary.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>The results of all this thought and effort? Nothing at all. Not a single bit of attention was paid to me at the various border crossings, by either US or foreign agents. On the leg of my flight leaving Qatar, I went through no fewer than 4 security checkpoints from the time I landed until getting onto the plane taking me to O’Hare, and at each one there was a baggage scanner and metal detector, agents pulling people out of line for additional screening, and the like. When I finally got to my gate, it had its own private security apparatus, again with metal detector and baggage X-ray. At this security checkpoint, I was randomly selected for additional screening, but the agent in question (a Qatar security agent) was incredibly professional, thorough, and neither invasive nor abusive. I got a pat down (much less severe than those I’ve been given at US airports), and they asked to look inside my carryon…they even asked me to power on my iPhone and iPad. But they didn’t ask to unlock them, and they didn’t ask for passwords of any type.</p><p>When entering into the US at O’Hare, the plane was greeted by DHS agents at the gate, who asked to check passports upon exiting the plane. The agent I was greeted by barely had time to glance at my US Passport before waving me through…again, the privilege of my appearance and nationality was evidenced by the fact that several of my fellow passengers were not waved through so easily. The last thing I heard as I walked up the jetway towards Customs was a DHS Agent saying to the robed gentleman behind me “So you don’t speak very much English, huh….”</p><p>The current state of our country cannot stand. We are a nation of immigrants, and a nation that believes in the privacy of our affairs and effects. This concern I had for my own and my friends’ information shouldn’t have been necessary. We should be able to be secure in our possessions, even and especially when those possessions are information about ourselves and our relationships to others.<strong> I do not want to be in a position where I have to threat model crossing the border of my own country</strong>. And yet, here we are.</p><p>I’d love any thoughts about the process described above, especially from security types or lawyers. Any holes or issues, any thoughts about what was useless, anything at all would be great to hear. I hope, as I so often hope these days, that all of this information never becomes applicable to you and that you never need to use it. But if you do, I hope this helped in some way.</p><p><em>This post was originally published at </em><a href="http://jasongriffey.net/wp/2017/03/14/personal-international-infosec/"><em>Pattern Recognition</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c3ddb60a5de9" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/berkman-klein-center/personal-international-infosec-c3ddb60a5de9">Personal International Infosec</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/berkman-klein-center">Berkman Klein Center Collection</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Libraries & Immigration Actions: Plans and Resistance]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/berkman-klein-center/plan-prepare-act-cd145fbf70f7?source=rss-91d14dc8d95a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cd145fbf70f7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[immigration]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[academic-libraries]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[libraries]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[public-libraries]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[griffey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 22 Feb 2017 16:45:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-02-22T16:45:52.612Z</atom:updated>
            <cc:license>https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/</cc:license>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Warning: This is a very long post. There are lots of resources mentioned, laws referenced, and opinions given. If you’re looking for a TL;DR version for a tweet, here you go:</p><blockquote>Recent immigration enforcement efforts by the current administration should be alarming to libraries &amp; we need to have action plans in hand.</blockquote><p>Read on for lots, lots more.</p><h3>Table of Contents</h3><p><a href="#ed19">Libraries and Immigration</a><br><a href="#aa89">Threat Models<br></a><a href="#6d1a">Why Libraries?</a><br><a href="#de31">How to Prepare<br></a><a href="#5148">Laws Regarding Resistance<br></a><a href="#fdfb">Call to Action</a></p><h3>Libraries and Immigration</h3><p>With the release on Feb 21st of <a href="https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/02/21/us/politics/dhs-immigration-trump.html?emc=edit_na_20170221">Department of Homeland Security (DHS) memos</a> (<a href="https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-the-Immigration-Laws-to-Serve-the-National-Interest.pdf">one</a> and <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Implementing-the-Presidents-Border-Security-Immigration-Enforcement-Improvement-Policies.pdf">two</a>) detailing <a href="http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/02/21/516433342/homeland-security-outlines-new-rules-tightening-enforcement-of-immigration-law">increased efforts</a> relating to the efforts of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and related federal offices (Customs and Border Control ((CBP)) and the like), the threat that there may be immigration raids in libraries continues to grow. I have been trying to gather information about such threats since the initial increase in ICE raids began just a few weeks ago, and here is what I’ve discovered, links to resources, and some of my thoughts on the matter.</p><p>Since Trump took office, ICE and CBP have been on a much, much looser leash when it comes to the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/federal-immigration-raids-net-many-without-criminal-records-sowing-fear/2017/02/16/a37e5e76-f486-11e6-a9b0-ecee7ce475fc_story.html?utm_term=.446f16815a90">allowances they have to question, detain, and remove non-citizens from the US</a>. Reports of <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/15/us/colorado-mom-vizguerra-ice-trnd/index.html">mothers being removed from their children</a>, <a href="http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2017/02/16/ice_agents_arrest_alleged_victim_of_domestic_violence.html">removal of someone after a court appearance,</a> <a href="http://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/ICE-Agents-Arrest-Men-Leaving-Alexandria-Church-Shelter-413889013.html">arresting people leaving church-based hypothermia shelters</a>, and the like have shown a willing disregard for humanitarian instincts and that no location should consider itself safe from the threat of immigration officers entering your space, questioning individuals, and potentially removing them for deportation.</p><h3>Threat Models</h3><p>As I see it, there are two threats for libraries that emerge from the current reimagining of US immigration policy. The first is similar to the threat that the PATRIOT act and other historical efforts have illustrated: the use of library-gathered information to target or identify an individual or group of people. That information could be circulation records, attendance lists for library programs, library card records, and the like. Libraries are aware of the threat to these sorts of records, there are State laws that outline limitations and protections for that information, and we have a history of protecting it. There are myriad resource that will give libraries tips on how to manage their technology in such a way to limit the information they keep, and action plans that outline how to react to an information request.</p><p>The second threat is, however, a new(ish) one. That threat is to the patrons inside or around your library, and the threat that an “enforcement action” could result in ICE agents entering your building, asking patrons for proof of citizenship, detaining those that cannot provide such, and expeditiously moving those patrons into “detention centers” and from there to deportation and out of the US entirely. If we protect patrons information so closely, with so much effort and vigor, how much more effort must we put forth in protecting the patrons themselves? What are the limits of protecting individuals in your community?</p><h3>Why Libraries?</h3><p>Given <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/citizenship/organizations/libraries">libraries’ efforts in assisting immigrant populations of the US</a>, and <a href="http://www.spl.org/audiences/literacy-esl-and-citizenship/citizenship-help">that</a> <a href="http://www.bklynlibrary.org/citizenship">many</a> <a href="https://www.nypl.org/help/community-outreach/immigrant-services/citizenship">libraries</a> <a href="http://nashvillepubliclibrary.org/newamericanscorner/citizenship-immigration/">provide</a> <a href="http://www.colapublib.org/citizenship/">citizenship</a> <a href="https://www.chipublib.org/becoming-a-citizen/">assistance</a>, we should be very aware of the potential for a visit by ICE officers. Public libraries in particular should have an action plan for this, in the same sort of way that we had action plans for an <a href="http://www.ala.org/Template.cfm?Section=ifissues&amp;Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&amp;ContentID=32307">FBI visit post-9/11 in regards to the PATRIOT act</a>.</p><p>The Department of Homeland Security does specify “<a href="https://www.ice.gov/ero/enforcement/sensitive-loc">Sensitive Locations</a>” within which ICE must meet a higher degree of legal proof before they are empowered to enter, question, detain, or remove someone. These include schools, hospitals, churches, and more:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*NfYy3c3N4zeC403q.png" /></figure><p>it is worth noting that libraries are NOT called out in this list. It’s possible that they could be construed as part of “educational-related activities,” but in practice that refers to school activities that may take place after official school hours. I do not believe that any of the above categories affirmatively includes libraries.</p><p>Even if libraries WERE to be construed as Sensitive Locations, that designation only protects what ICE refers to as an “enforcement action”:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*j5X04JDYTHt8AT8P.png" /></figure><p>The question of what powers ICE and CBP can bring to bear is a complicated one. Within the borders of the US, ICE has particular limits to their operations. They cannot enter a private home without permission or a warrant, for example. However, there is special legal dispensation given in US law to what is commonly known as the <a href="https://www.aclu.org/other/constitution-100-mile-border-zone">100 Mile Zone</a>, that is, any area within 100 miles of the border of the US.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/702/0*M88kOarW4qthPnLa.png" /></figure><p>As you may note, that 100 mile zone includes enormous sections of the population of the US, including the entirety of Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, and most of the largest cities (New York, Los Angeles, Houston, Chicago, Miami, San Francisco, and more. Within this zone, CBP has more authority to pursue immigration issues. The memos linked above direct ICE to hire an addition 10,000 agents, and CBP to hire an addition 5,000 agents, in order to pursue immigration issues more aggressively. I hope that it is obvious why this might be worrisome.</p><p>Finally, while we are seeking things to worry about, there’s the <a href="https://www.ice.gov/factsheets/287g">Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g)</a>. This allows the Department of Homeland Security to “partner” with local and/or state law enforcement and thus allow the local officers to act on immigration issues…effectively, a form of ICE deputization. The memos linked above also direct ICE to more regularly use this in their enforcement efforts, increasing the number of officers available to detain and arrest immigrants even further.</p><h3>How to Prepare</h3><p>Given the combination of the broad powers assigned to DHS and the zeal with which the current administration appears to be going after immigrants, I believe strongly that it would be a dereliction of our duty to our communities to not consider how to respond to the potential of immigration officer activity in your library. This is a situation of not if, but when.</p><p>The resources linked below are almost all available in both English and Spanish, and most of those that are designed to be handed out to patrons are available in several languages.</p><p>A first step is being the information resource that your patrons need. <a href="http://unitedwedream.org/thank-deportation-defense-card-handy-phone/">Print and distribute rights cards for your patrons</a>, so that they understand what their rights are here in the US, and how they should and shouldn’t interact with ICE agents. <a href="https://www.nilc.org/get-involved/community-education-%20resources/know-your-rights/raids/">Here is a page with even more resources for patrons</a>, many of which you could provide in your buildings.</p><p>This <a href="https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/raids_checklist_firm_2007-04.pdf">Community Raid Preparedness Checklist</a> is a fantastic resource (with <a href="http://www.immdefense.org/raids-toolkit/">more coming from the same group</a>), and outlines several steps that libraries should be looking at as quickly as they possibly can. NILC also has a presentation called <a href="https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Field-Call-2.13.17.pdf">Raids: What is Happening and How to Respond</a> that was put together jointly with the <a href="https://www.splcenter.org/">Southern Poverty Law Center</a>, and other stakeholders just a week ago that outlines the current state of things as well as possible responses.</p><p>The National Immigration Project has <a href="https://nationalimmigrationproject.org/tools.html">a variety of other amazing resources that libraries should have on hand, discuss, and implement where they can</a>, including <a href="https://nationalimmigrationproject.org/PDFs/community/2017_25Jan-ijn-faq.pdf">this FAQ that answers questions in a framework</a> that I feel is very useful for libraries.</p><p>Finally, the most thorough response document I have found is this one, the <a href="http://www.nnirr.org/drupal/sites/default/files/ice-raid-toolkit-011117-w_o-appendices.pdf">Defend Against ICE Raids and Community Arrests toolkit</a>, which has well-considered suggestions, resources, and ideas in it. It focuses on home raids, but much of the advice can be adjusted and used for public places.</p><h3>Laws Regarding Resistance</h3><p>In classic Internet style, here is where I remind you that<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IANAL"> I Am Not A Lawyer</a>. Luckily, my friend <a href="http://twitter.com/kylekcourtney">Kyle K. Courtney</a> <em>is</em> a lawyer, and a damned good one. He is, however, not <em>your</em> lawyer, and this section is meant as a summary of possibly applicable laws and cases regarding interfering with federal officers. The more you know, the better off you are in developing your action plan. Take it away, Kyle:</p><p><em>The concept of resisting, opposing, impeding, intimidating, or interfering with federal agents’ duties has been considered by the courts for decades, and is governed by federal statutes. It is important that you know and understand the law surrounding these actions. While we outline some of the major laws here, there are usually a large segment of ways you can be held or, of course, simply detained and later charged with misdemeanors.</em></p><h3>Main Federal Statutes</h3><p><strong>18 U.S.C.A. § 111</strong></p><p>This federal statute makes it a crime for anyone forcibly to assault, resist, oppose, impede, intimidate, or interfere with certain enumerated federal officers and employees while they are engaged in the performance of their official duties.</p><p>Note also that 18 U.S.C.A. § 1114 is critical to determining the official status of the person assaulted, so, in order to fall within the scope of 18 U.S.C.A. § 111, the person assaulted must be within the definition of government officers, etc. as defined in § 1114.</p><p>The statute provides for two offense levels:</p><ul><li>simple assault — a misdemeanor</li><li>forcible assault — a felony</li><li>Enhanced penalty for a forcible assault that involves use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or one that inflicts bodily injury.</li></ul><p>The elements of the offense of an assault on a federal officer are:</p><p>(1) a forceful assault;<br>(2) committed voluntarily and intentionally;<br>(3) against an officer employed by the federal government who was then engaged in the performance of an official duty or on account of the performance of official duty.</p><p>*Cases have found that § 111 does not require that the assailant be aware that the victim is a federal officer.</p><p>* The scope of what a federal officer is “employed to do,” for purposes of determining whether an officer is engaged in the performance of official duties within the meaning of the statute, <em>is not defined by whether the officer is abiding by the laws and regulations in effect at the time of the incident</em>, nor is the touchstone whether the officer <em>is performing the functions covered by his or her job description</em>. Rather, the test is whether the officer was <em>engaged in what he or she was employed to do </em>rather than being on what the courts refer to as a “personal frolic.” There is no bright-line test, it is a case-by-case factual judgment.</p><p><strong>28 U.S.C.A. § 1501</strong></p><p>There is also a lesser offense of willful and knowing obstruction defined in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1501, making it a misdemeanor to obstruct, resist, or oppose any officer of the United States in attempting to serve or execute any legal or judicial writ or process.</p><p>A § 1501 violation contains all of the elements of a § 111 violation, except the element of force is required for a conviction under § 111.</p><p><strong>18 U.S.C.A. § 1071</strong></p><p>§1071 makes it a federal offense for a person to harbor or conceal any person for whose arrest a warrant or process has been issued under the provisions of any law of the United States, so as to prevent that person’s discovery or arrest, after notice or knowledge that a warrant or process has been issued for his arrest.</p><p>The federal offense of harboring or concealing a fugitive so as to prevent his discovery and arrest may be viewed as being comprised of three elements. Thus, in order for § 1071 to be applicable there must be:</p><p>(1) an act or acts of harboring or concealing done so as to prevent the discovery and arrest of an individual;<br>(2) a warrant or process issued under the provisions of any law of the United States for the arrest of the individual who is harbored or concealed; and<br>(3) notice or knowledge on the part of the person who performs the act or acts of harboring or concealing, before the performance of such act or acts, that a warrant or process has been issued under the provisions of any law of the United States for the arrest of the individual who is harbored or concealed</p><h3>Sample Cases</h3><p>The following caselaw is a sample of the enforcement of the federal statutes listed above. Some are specific to immigration and border patrol officers, while other are interpretations of the statutes for any enumerated federal officers and employees. There are even a few cases where third parties attempt to resist, oppose, impede, intimidate, or interfere with federal officers that are engaged in the performance of their official duties, namely arresting another party.</p><p><strong>CASE CITATIONS &amp; SUMMARY</strong></p><p><strong>Bennett v. U.S., 285 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1960)</strong></p><p>In a prosecution for assault on an immigration officer, it is not necessary to prove scienter, that is, that the accused knew the object of the assault was a federal officer (Border Patrol officers in plain clothes on horseback)</p><p><strong>U.S. v. Varkonyi, 645 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1981).</strong></p><p>It is no defense that the accused was attempting to protect his or her private property from trespassers who were immigration officers.</p><p><strong>United States v. Vigil, 431 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970)</strong></p><p>Third person does not have right to assist in resisting the arrest of another if third person knows or has good reason to believe the person making arrest is government official authorized to make arrest and official is not clearly using unnecessary force.</p><p><strong>United States v. Ulan, 421 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1970)</strong></p><p>Demonstrating bystander, who voluntarily intervened and struck federal deputy marshal in attempt to prevent arrest of co-demonstrator was found guilty of assaulting and interfering with federal deputy marshal in performance of his official duties</p><p><strong>U.S. v. Davis, 690 F.3d 127 (2nd Cir. 2012)</strong></p><p>Evidence was insufficient to support defendant’s conviction for misdemeanor of resisting arrest which showed only that defendant ran from a DEA agent and, when tackled to the ground, struggled against being handcuffed, primarily by putting their hands under their stomach. There was no evidence that defendant engaged in any conduct that demonstrated a desire to injure an agent or would cause an agent to apprehend immediate injury.</p><p><strong>U.S. v. Steele, 550 F.3d 693 (8th Cir. 2008)</strong></p><p>When defendant’s mother gave federal officer permission to enter her house and defendant was extremely angry and made threatening gestures, a reasonable juror could determine that defendant was not justified in using force to resist arrest.</p><p><strong>U.S. v. Span, 970 F.2d 573 (9th Circ. 1992)</strong></p><p>Defendants do not have a right to resist arrest by federal officers even if supported by probable cause</p><p><strong>U.S. v. Cunningham, 509 F.2d 961 (D.C. 1975)</strong></p><p>Federal officers engaged in performance of their duty may not be forcibly resisted; the subject of officers’ action must submit peaceably and seek legal redress thereafter.</p><p><strong>U.S. v. Beyer, 426 F.2d 773 (2nd Cir. 1970)</strong></p><p>Even if warrant of arrest or arrest itself had been invalid, defendant was not entitled to resist arrest by physically assaulting federal officer executing warrant</p><p><strong>Darrah v. City of Oak Park, 255 F.3d 301 (6th Cir. 2001)</strong></p><p>Federal court (applying state law) found that while arrestees have the right to use physical force to resist an unlawful arrest, third-party intervenors do not have the same right.</p><p><strong>United States v. Heliczer, 373 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1967)</strong></p><p>Bystander was guilty of assaulting a federal narcotics agent and interfering with agent’s performance of official duties because bystander attempted to kick one of the agents, even though bystander had opportunity to inquire of the agents about the arrest of another party, but did not do so.</p><p>“[A]s a general rule, he has no right to intervene if in fact a lawful arrest is being made by a federal agent, whether the bystander knows it or not, because, like the person being arrested, he is subject to [other caselaw] and to a great degree takes a chance in assisting another to resist arrest.”</p><p><strong>Amaya v. U.S., 247 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1957)</strong></p><p>Defendants, suspected to be aliens by an immigration officer, were found guilty of who 18 U.S.C.A. § 111, when immigration officer entered a public café and commenced asking persons therein suspected to be aliens as to their place of birth. The officer was struck by the first defendant while questioning the man, who was edging toward the front door. As the officer attempted to handcuff the first defendant, a co-defendant jumped the officer and took his gun.</p><p><strong>U.S. v. Cho Po Sun, 409 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1969)</strong></p><p>Two immigration officers, employed to assist in obtaining compliance with immigration laws, were assaulted by the defendant when they went into the kitchen of a restaurant where six Asian employees were present and asked the defendant questions as to his citizenship status.</p><p>*Note: The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the officers had no right to interrogate him, since he was neither an alien nor a person reasonably believed to be an alien whom they were authorized by 8 U.S.C.A. § 1357 to interrogate.</p><p><strong>United States v. Cain, 413 F. Supp. 2d 197 (W.D.N.Y. 2006)</strong></p><p>U.S. Marshals were arguably engaged in the performance of official duties when they were allegedly assaulted while assisting state officers in executing a state arrest warrant, acting pursuant to a MOU where state and federal officers worked together in apprehending persons with outstanding state and federal bench warrants.</p><h3>Call to Action</h3><p>I feel strongly that the aggressive pursuit and removal of immigrants, in the manner of the current administration, is morally wrong and inhumane. It is driven by racism and xenophobia, and has at its base some of the ugliest of human beliefs. In <a href="http://jasongriffey.net/wp/2016/12/16/stand-fight-resist/">Stand, Fight, Resist</a> I wrote:</p><blockquote>Libraries are powerful forces for good. Now is the time to muster our powers, to stand brave against the people who seek to limit and reduce our rights and our understanding of the world….This country, and the people in it, deserve a better world than the one that is currently being forced upon them. Use your power as pillars of your communities, as the guardians of knowledge and the providers of help, use that power now to resist the normalization of fascism and bigotry, of hate and fear and greed. Stand for truth and knowledge, justice and equity for all. Stand for facts, and stand for those who are most at risk. Stand against the horrorshow revealing itself to us, and fight with those who are determined to create equity among people, justice in the face of the unjust, and love out of hate.</blockquote><p>I’m not sure how to say it better than that. Libraries must stand for justice and freedom for all people, for the best parts of our republic. We need to continue to fight on the information front, to show that immigrants who come to this country bring with them the strength that will make the US better than it is now.</p><p>Concretely, libraries need a clear and direct set of policies that outline their response to an immigration enforcement action. We need to have those in place now, as quickly as possible. There needs to be a clear set of directives for your staff, meetings to gather feedback and to clarify your local threat model (libraries on borders will have very different sets of threats than non-border libraries), and connections made with local civic and non-profit groups that are already active in this space. You need to have meetings with your Mayor, City Council, and local representatives about this issue. We need to be ready to protect our communities.</p><p>As bad as things are in this moment, they are going to get much, much worse. The administration has a stated goal of the removal of all undocumented immigrants in the US, which amounts to over 10 million people. There is no way to do this humanely, or with respect for human dignity and agency. It is the equivalent of rounding up, processing, and deporting every single person in New York City and Chicago, combined. It is easy on the Internet to fall into <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Godwin&#39;s_law">Godwin’s Law</a>, and until recently one could expect that comparison of a current practice to the Nazi Party was, in fact, somewhat hyperbolic. Rounding up 11 million people, placing them into “detention centers” and attempting to remove them from our society…I’m not sure there are comparisons other than the Nazis that make any sense of it.</p><p>We are better when we embrace differences, when the marketplace of ideas is a bustling <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mercado">mercado</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Souq">souq</a>. None of us is as smart as all of us, and we are going to need all of us if we are to find that future where the United States is still a shining city upon the hill. That light is dimmed now, and sputtering, but it isn’t dark just yet. Libraries are partial keepers of this flame, and we need to be prepared to protect the people in our communities when they are threatened, however and whenever we can.</p><p><a href="http://jezebel.com/a-list-of-organizations-dedicated-to-helping-immigrants-1791772883">Plan</a>. <a href="http://lifehacker.com/how-to-protest-safely-and-legally-5859590">Prepare</a>. <a href="http://everylibrary.org/everylibrary-join-one-america-coalition-immigrant-rights/">Act</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cd145fbf70f7" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/berkman-klein-center/plan-prepare-act-cd145fbf70f7">Libraries &amp; Immigration Actions: Plans and Resistance</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/berkman-klein-center">Berkman Klein Center Collection</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Libraries and the State of the Nation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/berkman-klein-center/libraries-and-the-state-of-the-nation-146b9b72a95c?source=rss-91d14dc8d95a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/146b9b72a95c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[libraries]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[griffey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 20 Dec 2016 00:58:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-12-20T00:58:00.144Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The idea that libraries are neutral spaces has been <a href="https://chrisbourg.wordpress.com/2015/01/28/never-neutral-libraries-technology-and-inclusion/">well and disabused over the last few years</a>. From the services we offer to the collections that we curate, the decisions that libraries and librarians make are political ones that reflect values. Sometimes those are the values of the organization, sometimes the values of the individuals, and sometimes they are the values of the communities that the library serves. Those values are illustrated by our technologies, our ontologies, and our descriptors. Those who attempt to hold that “neutrality” of information access is an ideal for which to strive have had a hard time holding to that stance as increasing numbers of librarians question and deconstruct our profession. I would like to suggest something even stronger…that even if it were possible for libraries to be neutral spaces, that to create such a space would be morally questionable, and potentially actively morally wrong.</p><p>I say this as someone who firmly believes in the maxim of combating bad speech with more speech. I am not here advocating controls or restrictions on speech. But it is not the responsibility of every library to collect and distribute literature of hate, or falsehoods, or lies. Some libraries do need to collect everything, the good and the bad, for archival and historical study purposes, but those libraries are fairly obviously identified in practice and the vast majority of libraries should and could take a stand with their actions, programs, policies, and collections to be on the side of justice and scientific fact.</p><p>Neutrality favors the powerful, and further marginalizes the marginalized. <strong>In the face of the current political climate, with the use of opinions as bludgeons and disinformation as the weapon of choice for manipulation and intellectual coercion, it is up to those who value fact and believe in the care of those in need to stand up and positively affirm that to do otherwise is evil.</strong></p><p>For libraries and librarians, that means:</p><ul><li>Making the physical space of the library safe for those that need it by publicly stating your stance on the targeting of marginalized communities <em>and then following up with actions and policies that back up those statements</em></li><li>Protecting your patrons from targeting and oppression, even in the face of possible governmental pressures, by resisting calls for information about your patrons at every level</li><li>Making your digital spaces safe for you patrons by limiting the data you collect, eliminating the data that you store, encrypting your communications at all levels and importantly <em>insisting that your vendors do the same</em></li><li>Running programs that actively provide support for your at-risk patrons, whatever that looks like in your community</li><li>By being the voice of reason and compassion when dealing with your city or county government, and by modeling the same by advocating for those at risk</li></ul><p>These things are vital and necessary. Especially now.</p><p>It has been barely more than a month since Election Night 2016, and the normalization of the President-Elect and his positions have already taken hold. Major media outlets report his actions but don’t follow up to question his statements or refute his words. When one of his key surrogates, Scottie Neil Hughes, <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-surrogate-claims-no-facts_us_58408f8ee4b0c68e047fd952">says that facts aren’t real anymore</a>, we that live in the real world must not simply accept these types of statements.</p><p>This moment in history is not the time for neutrality, it is not the time for libraries to quietly serve their communities. When I say that the next 4 years may be the most important in the history of our country, I am not doing so metaphorically or in an attempt at hyperbole. I sincerely believe that the fate of the republic is potentially at hand, and that the threat of fascism is real and imminent. In the face of such potential, the library is both refuge and target, bastion against disinformation and simultaneously at risk of being trampled under the boot of anti-intellectualism.</p><p>Neutrality should be abandoned, and we must stand positively against the threat of the removal of rights of citizens and noncitizens alike. We must eschew presenting false equivalency between two opposing explanations about the world when one is evidence-based and the other is not. We must continue to defend a fact-based world, rooted in the scientific method of understanding, an understanding of reality that is testable, refutable, and <a href="http://www.stephenjaygould.org/ctrl/popper_falsification.html">falsifiable </a>. We must build collections that reflect the scientific consensus about the world, and not fall prey to the rhetoric of “balance” and “opinion”. <strong>Opinion does not hold once it begins impinging upon the personhood of others, nor when it stands in opposition to accepted scientific facts</strong>. We must be the defenders of fact and reason.</p><p>Maya Angelou said “when someone shows you who they are, believe them the first time.” Our President-Elect has shown us who he is: a shallow, ignorant man who surrounds himself with those who seek power at the expense of the marginalized and will use every opportunity to demonize in order to dehumanize those they wish to trample. Our government will soon be composed of those who want to actively harm LGBTQ people among us, that wish to hunt down and persecute people for their religion, that have such base misunderstandings of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights that they are prepared to roll back hard-won freedoms for the sake of their own comfort and power. If history shows us anything about those that seek this sort of power, it is that it is best for a society when that power is held in check and they are not allowed to be overly comfortable.</p><p>The library must be a space for all and everyone, but most importantly those at most risk, both now in the future. It must be a positive force for our understanding of the world and our compassion for the people within it. Neutrality and balance are not the way forward. We must resist the forces that seek to normalize segregation, aggression, and ignorance.</p><p>Libraries are powerful forces for good. Now is the time to muster our powers, to stand brave against the people who seek to limit and reduce our rights and our understanding of the world. Let us throw off the false cloak of neutrality and work to embrace and support a world of social justice, equity for all, and scientific understanding. This country, and the people in it, deserve a better world than the one that is currently being forced upon them. Use your power as pillars of your communities, as the guardians of knowledge and the providers of help, use that power now to resist the normalization of fascism and bigotry, of hate and fear and greed. Stand for truth and knowledge, justice and equity for all. Stand for facts, and stand for those who are most at risk. Stand against the horrorshow revealing itself to us, and fight with those who are determined to create equity among people, justice in the face of the unjust, and love out of hate.</p><p><a href="https://togetherlist.com/">Stand</a>. <a href="https://docs.google.com/document/d/1DzOz3Y6D8g_MNXHNMJYAz1b41_cn535aU5UsN7Lj8X8/preview">Fight</a>. <a href="https://ssd.eff.org/">Resist</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=146b9b72a95c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/berkman-klein-center/libraries-and-the-state-of-the-nation-146b9b72a95c">Libraries and the State of the Nation</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/berkman-klein-center">Berkman Klein Center Collection</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Disaster Scenario Part One]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@griffey/disaster-scenario-part-one-fcf50bfebf17?source=rss-91d14dc8d95a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fcf50bfebf17</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[libraries]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[self-driving-cars]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[griffey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 24 Oct 2016 14:30:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-10-24T14:30:48.002Z</atom:updated>
            <cc:license>https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/</cc:license>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I was honored to give the opening keynote for the <a href="http://nova.campusguides.com/seflinvc2016">SEFLIN 2016 Virtual Conference</a>, entitled “Innovation &amp; Disruption: Past, Present, Future” where I talked about why innovation is important in libraries, how structures disempower innovation, and what technologies I am watching for their capacity for disruption.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fspeakerdeck.com%2Fplayer%2F12a741f1e8ec4f41a498ee3d3dc81b19&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fspeakerdeck.com%2Fgriffey%2Finnovation-and-disruption-past-present-future&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fspeakerd.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpresentations%2F12a741f1e8ec4f41a498ee3d3dc81b19%2Fslide_0.jpg&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=speakerdeck" width="710" height="463" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/fbf6e4b04e56c211b3166677551bbede/href">https://medium.com/media/fbf6e4b04e56c211b3166677551bbede/href</a></iframe><p>It was this last topic that garnered the most comments during the talk, and even afterwards via email and twitter.I have come to believe that we’re on the cusp of some truly weird societal changes due to the exponential growth of technology. AI/Machine Learning, Robotics, ubiquitous presence and sensornets via the Internet of Things, decentralization….all of these things are beginning to turn the corner from interesting ideas into realized technologies in the world. A couple of them in particular that I spoke about have what I think are truly frightening outcomes over the next decade, and I’m hoping to expand my thinking on why and how here. Let’s start with robots, in the form of autonomous automobiles.</p><p>Robots, in the form of self-driving or autonomous vehicles, are going to <a href="http://www.latimes.com/projects/la-fi-automated-trucks-labor-20160924/">transform the US economy</a> in ways that, for certain populations, may be disastrous. I think it’s fairly clear at this point that we are moving towards autonomous vehicles at breakneck speeds, and there seems to be a pretty clear map that gets us from the current state of somewhat-partial autonomy to <a href="https://www.trucks.com/2016/08/16/otto-autonomous-truck-tech/">autonomous-on-interstates</a> and finally to fully doesn’t-need-a-human vehicles. The consensus among people who do this stuff is that the easiest problem to solve is that of long-distance interstate or highway travel, and the largest target for disruption to this type of driving is that of commercial trucking.</p><p>When it comes to automation, <a href="http://www.freightlinerinspiration.com/">commercial trucking</a> has a lot of things going for it. From the perspective of the companies doing the movement of goods around the country, <a href="https://www.trucks.com/2016/04/07/autonomous-trucks-improve-safety-fuel-economy/">fewer drivers is better in almost every way</a>: fewer accidents almost assuredly, but also lower fuel costs (as computers are very, very good at optimization algorithms), fewer delays (same reason), and over time huge costs savings…robots do not yet require health coverage and retirement plans. There are benefits of partial autonomization as well…we <a href="https://intheblack.com/articles/2016/07/01/how-driverless-trucks-will-change-the-economy">don’t have to have fully self-driving trucks for there to be huge benefits for the companies involved</a>, since the reduction of humans in the equation will garner cost savings immediately, and one can easily imagine a pathway that begins reducing drivers gradually: instead of needing 3 drivers for 3 trucks heading across country, 1 driver in the first truck acting as “lead” could be followed by 2 robotic trucks in sort of psuedo-autonomous caravan.</p><p>This move from One-Human-per-Truck to One-Human-per-X-Trucks to No-Human-At-All is going to happen over the course of the next 5–10 years. Currently, one of the most common middle-income jobs in the entire US is that of a truck driver…not always over-the-road, but again as we move from pseudonymous to autonomous the disruption will happen at ever-more-local levels. <a href="https://medium.com/basic-income/self-driving-trucks-are-going-to-hit-us-like-a-human-driven-truck-b8507d9c5961#.lf1qhwd2d">As this job is displaced by automation, there will be larger and larger numbers of workers that go from middle-income to greatly reduced or no income over the course of the next decade</a>. These workers disproportionately live in rural areas of the country, and are the most vulnerable economically as there are fewer secondary labor options for them.</p><p>The people in rural areas often also have higher than average relocation burdens to overcome. Simply “moving to where the jobs are” isn’t really an option at all, for both emotional and practical reasons. In my areas of interest (KY, TN, the rural South) there is a huge emotional and psychological connection to the place and the community…getting out has a huge cost and those that do move to more economically vibrant areas are seen as deserters or traitors. More practically, there is a cost-of-living gap between the rural US and cities/suburbs that is a barrier for movement for many. When you sell your $50,000-$100,000 home and the land that your great-grandfather settled and was passed down to you, the move to any city is simply impossible financially. The math just doesn’t work to be able to reasonably move your family into a home even in the suburbs for that much, and trading the stability of a mortgage for renting an apartment when the entire reason you are moving is wage depression and loss…well, it just isn’t possible.</p><p>We have a situation where, over the course of the next decade, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jun/17/self-driving-trucks-impact-on-drivers-jobs-us">one of the most common middle-income jobs in the rural US could disappear</a>, and it could mostly affect areas where the secondary job market for these workers is very constrained. The social services for everything to information about re-skilling to job application fulfillment will fall to the public library in their communities, as they are very often the only easily accessible and well-trusted governmental program in rural areas.</p><p>In addition to largely helping to deal with this crisis on an individual level, libraries will be stuck with ever-decreasing budgets in areas where said budgets are based on local taxes. The slow-motion economic collapse of rural america that has played out in the areas that I care about the most (the rural south, Eastern Kentucky, Middle Tennessee) will accelerate, and as these jobs collapse, families will be devastated and the tax base for library support will dwindle.</p><p>Libraries will be in a situation where they are asked, yet again, to do more for their local communities when the very communities that they are trying to save can’t possibly contribute to their budgets.</p><p>Since we love to argue with each other, when I pointed out on Twitter than I thought this round of economic upheaval due to automation was different, Tim Spalding of Librarything said:</p><h3>Tim Spalding on Twitter</h3><p>@griffey If that argument held water, we should have had one in 1790. @jill_hw</p><p>Tim points out a common refrain from people who are skeptical of the ability of automation to “take jobs” from humans. He’s right to be skeptical, as every previous time this has happened, the overall economy has grown and individuals have re-skilled and found new jobs. Automation hasn’t, in the past, actually ended in a removal of jobs on average from a country, nor has it decreased average earnings.</p><p>The problem with that argument is that it generalizes from large-scale to small-scale. On average, the numbers for the US might still look ok…but the small towns, the places that are only still places at all because of their ready access to an interstate, those places and the people in them are going to have a very rough time of it. There are more jobs in the energy sector than ever before, but that doesn’t help the coal miners in Appalachia.</p><p>This highly localized effect will disproportionately affect the rural parts of the US, and thus will also disproportionately affect the libraries in those areas….libraries that are often already vulnerable to small changes in budget. My concern is that as this change begins, we will see a sort of wave of challenges: first the trickle of job loss, which begins to put pressure on local economies, and as the trickle becomes a swell and then a wave the combination of decreasing wages and localized economic depression will increase the movement out of rural areas. This will further depress the tax base, and rural library systems will see an ongoing downwards slope of budget.</p><p>There is an admitted problem of <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-05-27/when-will-self-driving-trucks-destroy-america-">what the timeline looks like for this entire process</a>. The automation of trucking is likely to begin affecting local economies in the next 5–10 years, but the rest of my prediction (the increased exodus of youth from rural areas, the mobility of those that can move quickly as opposed to the generational resettling that this movement begets) will take perhaps decades to fully unfold.</p><p>Is it possible that there will be <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/self-driving-trucks-will-be-great-for-truckers-for-now_us_5637984ce4b00aa54a4eded9">a counter-balancing effect of some type that maintains the economy of these areas</a>? Some form of job replacement that offsets, even partially, the jobs lost to autonomous trucks? For the country as a whole, of course there will be. There are going to be yet-unimagined new opportunities. As depressing as this possible-future is for rural America, I am overall a technological utopianist. I think that big-picture, we are moving in positive directions. If nothing else, I would absolutely be willing to trade localized economic disruption for the massive savings of human life that we will see as humans are replaced as drivers.</p><p>But the places that I love are going to be hurt. And even when I know that the good outweighs the bad, the bad is still bad.</p><p>How can libraries make a difference? Simply being aware of this possible future is the first step, and watching for leading indicators in their communities. Strategically, getting in front of the job loss wave by preparing for re-skilling and educational opportunities, making connections with other community resources in those arenas as well as other governmental offices that will be needed could be a way of preparing to be of the most use to the community. Rural libraries should have a relationship with their nearest community colleges or other formalized higher education options and should have strategies in place that help people move into formalized training or other economic recovery options.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fcf50bfebf17" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[A Special Obligation to the Future]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@griffey/a-special-obligation-to-the-future-2027969fac9a?source=rss-91d14dc8d95a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2027969fac9a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[internet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[libraries]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decentralization]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[griffey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 28 Mar 2016 23:23:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-03-30T13:15:17.348Z</atom:updated>
            <cc:license>https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/</cc:license>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I have written many, many words and spoken many, many more about the future of libraries. No matter how many times people point out the <a href="http://www.ala.org/research/librariesmatter/taxonomy/term/143">necessity of libraries in their communities</a>, or how many <a href="http://www.ala.org/research/librariesmatter/taxonomy/term/129">studies about the ROI for local communities are done</a>, there is an ongoing public relations war that has to do with believing that libraries <a href="http://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/05/07/do-we-still-need-libraries/">are no longer needed</a>.</p><p>Anyone that works in libraries has a laundry list of why that’s not true, and it usually boils down to the least powerful among us; the single parents, the homeless, the immigrant, the minorities that have been systematically disadvantaged through ongoing prejudice in America. These and so many more groups depend on libraries as their only information source in many ways, whether that information need is filled by being the place they go to read books, access the Internet, or go for assistance with interactions with scary governmental agencies like the IRS or Immigration services.</p><p>Libraries are the center of their communities. They are in many ways the exemplar of the democratic ideal; everyone has equal access to the knowledge contained within the library. Libraries are also, as I’ve said in many presentations, the memory of their local area. The public library becomes, over years, the memory storage unit for genealogical information, local newspapers, repositories for the papers for their most-well-known citizens, archives of local government, and a myriad of other bits of ephemera that add up to the most robust collection of the physical items of the now and near-past that future historians will likely be able to get their hands on.</p><p>But this hyperlocality is also a downside for libraries. There is no overarching story or connector between all libraries that’s easy to communicate, especially as you move from public libraries to school libraries to academic/research libraries, not even mentioning corporate, legal, or other highly-specialized libraries. If you zoom out away from the hyperlocal, everyone has good feelings about libraries because they recall their own interactions with them, but if you asked them what all libraries have in common the best they’d likely come up with is that they share books with people. And trying to explain what the through-line is when people ask librarians themselves about their jobs is truly bewildering in the 21st century. The children’s librarian that organizes programming for kids, does story hours, and understands developmental progress in literacy acquisition and can work with parents on pedagogical approaches for a variety of literacies is so far from something like a IT systems librarian that they literally may have not a single thing about their job in common. But they share a professional identity in the eyes of the public…we’re all librarians.</p><p>I have suggested in the past that the common thread that deliniates “librarian” from non-librarian isn’t the degree, but an understanding of the ethics and underlying professional responsibilities to the larger world of information and access. Librarians are the people that go to jail to protest unlawful access to reading records, they are the people that lobby for more rational copyright laws, they protect access to information that is challenged. These ethical positions and the understanding of the deeper reasons behind them are what separate librarian from non-librarian.</p><p>The American Library Association Code of Ethics document, specifically this passage from the 8th edition of the Intellectual Freedom Manual, says:</p><blockquote><em>“We significantly influence or control the selection, organization, preservation, and dissemination of information. In a political system grounded in an informed citizenry, we are members of a profession explicitly committed to intellectual freedom and the freedom of access to information. We have a special obligation to ensure the free flow of information and ideas to present and future generations.”</em></blockquote><p>I could not agree more wholeheartedly with this statement, and it underlies huge amounts of the work that I find valuable in librarianship.</p><p>So how do we extend these professional ethics into the library itself? Can we find a broader way of characterizing the library that gets away from the hyperlocal and gives us a story to tell that ties them together? I think we can, and I think we should. The key to this future of the library is, I’m becoming more and more convinced, as the primary provider of infrastructure for the coming decentralization of the Internet.</p><p>Of course, in its initial incarnation, the Internet was decentralized. Some portions of the infrastructure still are, but the last 15 years or so has illustrated a surprisingly powerful force for centralization…it just wasn’t the one we expected. When John Perry Barlow wrote in his Declaration of Independence of Cyberpace:</p><blockquote><em>“I declare the global social space we are building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You have no moral right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of enforcement we have true reason to fear.”</em></blockquote><p>The expectation of those of us that read these words at the time was that the greatest threat to this nascent new world was governmental interference. As it turns out, commerce and capitalism are the forces that have led us to extreme consolidation of the major services of the Internet. Turns out that cyberpunk had it right all along, and it’s the corporate-state that has acted upon this “civilization of the Mind in Cyberspace” and not the over-reaching hand of government control.</p><p>There is an enormous amount of effort being focused at the problem of centralization of power on the Internet. Not just of services such as Facebook, Twitter, and Google and their command and control of user’s information, but also in the fundamental architecture of the DNS system and network routing. Decentralization is also a high priority in any situation where anonymity and security are concerns, as illustrated by Bittorrent, Tor, or Bitcoin. The commonality that appears in all distributed networks is the need for shared infrastructure to carry the service or traffic involved.</p><p>In most cases, the individuals who serve to gain something through the distributed network are the ones who also donate a portion of their own infrastructure to the network in question. Bitcoin miners act as bitcoin nodes for communication at the same time they give computing power to the network in order to try and profit through the rewards system built in to the cryptocurrency network. In other instances, individuals donate bandwidth or computing cycles because they support the ideology of the service, such as Tor.</p><p>Other decentralized systems under development, such as <a href="http://www.csail.mit.edu/solid_mastercard_gift">Tim Berners-Lee’s Solid project</a>, are hoping to replace the data layer underlying the typical silos of personal information with distributed data that individuals can control. It’s doing so using a distributed file system and a linked-data structure that would look very familiar to metadata librarians. But it, too, will need hardware and bandwidth if it is to become a usable tool for pulling power back to the edges.</p><p>The future of innovation on the Internet will revolve around these distributed, decentralized systems…both the ones mentioned above and those yet to be designed. These systems will provide the information and services of the next big shift in computing. As we move to the so-called “internet of things” and more and more distributed computing, having nodes already in place through which these micro-networks can communicate will mean that whoever is prepared will be a key player in how that future is shaped.</p><p>Not only that, but one of the core reasons to move to these more distributed networks is that they are more robust against censorship, against control, and resistant to corporate whims. Services could fade away from disuse, but couldn’t be pulled out from under users as they can be currently (I’m looking at you, Google Reader). Services could have their own norms and controls built by users, rather than languishing under seemingly uncaring masters (talking about you, Twitter and your lack of abuse controls).</p><p>Libraries could be part of this future that I’ve outlined, and not just as consumers or users of the services, but as infrastructure that allows these services to grow and flourish. The amazing work that the <a href="http://libraryfreedomproject.org/">Library Freedom Project</a> undertook at <a href="https://libraryfreedomproject.org/torexits/">Kilton Library in Lebanon, New Hampshire to install a Tor relay node</a> (and eventually an exit node) was the result of a long effort to get libraries to recognize the value of their infrastructure in service of a larger idea…helping protect the communication of the entire world. Alison Macrina, the director of the Library Freedom Project, and Nima Fatemi, the technical lead, did amazing work shepherding the project and showing that a library can both serve their immediate community and serve the world at large.</p><p>What I’m hoping is that libraries can see the next step in this process. Libraries are legion, in every city, in every county, at every university and more. Tor was first, and it’s possible that Bitcoin/Blockchain systems are the next, but what I want is for libraries to embrace this distributed future, to volunteer their spare cycles and bandwidth to enable these next stages of the evolution of the Internet. Libraries are ideally designed for the needs of these services, speaking both to our ethical stance as well as playing to the strength of our infrastructure.</p><p>Supporting these technologies isn’t just an opportunity for libraries to be pioneers of this new distributed platform for communication. It is also a way for libraries to double-down on our ethics. Our special obligation to the future is to ensure that communication remains free, not only for our local communities, but also for the world at large. Participation in these services makes a measurable and meaningful difference to the people that rely on them everywhere in the world. If every library ran a Tor node, everyone that relied on Tor for communication would be safer and more secure…the journalist trying to get news out of repressive governments, the LGBTQ teen who is trying desperately to find information without fear of reprisal, the activist who is sharing information about illegal practices. All of these individuals would be fundamentally safer if every library was a participant in their safety.</p><p>The future will bring many more of these services, decentralized and controlled by the users, relying on each node to be an active participant to keep the whole healthy and functional.</p><p>Each of these services would be better if libraries were using their position and expertise to help create the future we want to see. The world at large would be a better place if we use our resources to create that future. The way we make a difference, the way we help to build the things we want in the world, is to participate in their creation. This new decentralized world that is being built gives us more opportunity to do this creation than we have had in more than a decade online. We missed the opportunity to influence current power centers by abdicating our expertise to corporations, and the world we live in is lesser for it.</p><p>Let’s not do that again. Let’s emphasize our ethics, become participants in this next stage of communication, and use our resources to make the world a better place. A futurenet full of decentralized services that have libraries as participants and players is a world that is way more interesting than the one we live in now.</p><p>If we can do this, if libraries can embrace these technologies now, before they are commonplace, they can become an integral part of the decentralized web. They could be a needed and necessary component in the future of communications, the future of financial services, the future of any decentralized service. The <em>story of the future of libraries</em> can simply be the <em>story of the future</em>, full stop. But this opportunity won’t be around forever, because as these services start coming online, there will be other answers if we aren’t there.</p><p>Let us, as a community, embrace these technologies. If every library in the country was running a Tor node and a Bitcoin node, both of those projects would be stronger and more robust than they are now, and when the next big service comes along we would be ready for it. There would be a model, and we could implement it quickly. Let’s start now so that when the future comes knocking, we’ve already set a place at our table and it’s as easy as opening the door and inviting it in.</p><p><em>A highly edited and condensed version of this essay was published on </em><a href="https://boingboing.net/"><em>BoingBoing</em></a><em> as </em><a href="https://boingboing.net/2016/03/28/how-libraries-can-save-the-int.html"><em>How Libraries Can Save the Internet of Things from the Web’s Centralized Fate</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2027969fac9a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[TSA Master Keys, Threat Models, and Encryption]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@griffey/tsa-master-keys-threat-models-and-encryption-8920eba07ee8?source=rss-91d14dc8d95a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8920eba07ee8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[surveillance]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[griffey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2015 01:35:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-10-26T01:35:00.357Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Earlier this year, someone noticed that the Washington Post had published a story with the following picture:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/635/0*hKuJQx7XKhiDayVA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Once that photo was noticed, a few intrepid hackers began a search for higher resolution photos, which <a href="http://imgur.com/a/JQD7l">weren’t long in coming</a>. From those photos, they reverse-engineered CAD files of the keys, and the results are STL files for the 7 Master Keys that the TSA has for luggage locks in the US. Here are <a href="https://github.com/Xyl2k/TSA-Travel-Sentry-master-keys">two</a> <a href="https://github.com/MS3FGX/TSA-Travel-Sentry-master-keys">different</a> Github repos with the downloadable files.</p><p>On Saturday, Oct 17 2015, while testing the setup of a new 3D printer, I decided to see how easy it would be to use one of these keys on a TSA approved lock. There happened to be a luggage lock laying around the <a href="https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/">Berkman</a> Fellows room that no one knew the combination of, so I had a test subject within easy reach. Within about 15 minutes, I had a key printed. I spent about 2–3 minutes cleaning it (smoothing edges and picking off rough spots in the printing). Maybe 2 minutes after that, I had the lock open.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FKUSHTzEPk0s%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DKUSHTzEPk0s&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FKUSHTzEPk0s%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/882e311800de5b2ba01f7f7c6b5a7dcc/href">https://medium.com/media/882e311800de5b2ba01f7f7c6b5a7dcc/href</a></iframe><p>This is the perfect illustration of why security that has backdoors for law enforcement isn’t actually security. Once there is an intentionally created hole in your security strategy, you should assume that anyone that you are attempting to prevent accessing your luggage/email/passwords will ALSO have access to your intentionally created security hole. This is the same concept that <a href="https://www.eff.org/press/releases/cory-doctorow-rejoins-eff-eradicate-drm-everywhere">Cory Doctorow uses in his condemnation of DRM</a> (you can’t lock something up with a key and then give the key to the person you are trying to prevent accessing your thing) as well as the argument against giving backdoor access keys for encryption algorithms to governmental agencies. It is simply impossible to have security, whether that term is used for physical objects, communication, storage of information, or anything else, and also to have holes intentionally added to the system for the benefit of “the good guys”. Once the key exists, anyone can make their own copy of it.</p><p>With <a href="http://boingboing.net/2015/01/13/what-david-cameron-just-propos.html">government around the world</a> <a href="http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2015/01/19/obama_wants_backdoors_in_encrypted_messaging_to_allow_government_spying.html">arguing for technology companies</a> to build in “golden keys” for encryption used on phones and other digital devices, we need to be wary of anyone that believes that such access would only be used for good, or only by the right groups.</p><p>Why is strong and reliable encryption so important? I think <a href="https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/06/why_we_encrypt.html">Bruce Schneier said it most plainly</a>:</p><blockquote><em>If we only use encryption when we’re working with important data, then encryption signals that data’s importance. If only dissidents use encryption in a country, that country’s authorities have an easy way of identifying them. But if everyone uses it all of the time, encryption ceases to be a signal. No one can distinguish simple chatting from deeply private conversation. The government can’t tell the dissidents from the rest of the population. Every time you use encryption, you’re protecting someone who needs to use it to stay alive.</em></blockquote><p>This is why the <a href="https://libraryfreedomproject.org/">Library Freedom Project</a> and their work to put <a href="https://libraryfreedomproject.org/torexitpilotphase1/">Tor Nodes in Libraries</a> is so important. It’s why libraries <a href="https://libraryfreedomproject.org/ourwork/digitalprivacypledge/">should be moving all of their services to encrypted channels</a>. In many ways, this isn’t just about protecting our patron’s information (although that is a good and sufficient reason to use these services and to be worried about electronic security).</p><p>Encryption is like vaccination…we shouldn’t be driven to do it because it helps us. We should be driven to do it because it helps the world.</p><p>There is also an argument for libraries to use and support strong encryption for free speech reasons, but that will take another post and a more subtle argument.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://jasongriffey.net/wp/2015/10/19/tsa-master-keys-threat-models-and-encryption/"><em>jasongriffey.net</em></a><em> on October 19, 2015.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8920eba07ee8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Flags & Speech & Hate & Fear]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@griffey/flags-speech-hate-fear-8ac95b658b52?source=rss-91d14dc8d95a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8ac95b658b52</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[griffey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 27 Jul 2015 02:02:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-07-28T01:14:31.013Z</atom:updated>
            <cc:license>https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/</cc:license>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I’ve been thinking a lot lately about identity, specifically about Southern identity, and even more specifically about my own identity as a Southerner. As <a href="http://jasongriffey.net/wp/2015/02/23/poverty-libraries-jobs-me/">I’ve blogged about previously</a>, I’m originally from Eastern Kentucky (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Olive_Hill,_Kentucky">Olive Hill</a>, in Carter County to be precise), spent the majority of my 20s in Chapel Hill, NC, and since then have been living in rural Tennessee. I have effectively never lived outside the South, except for a brief period during a failed PhD bid at the University of Maryland at College Park.</p><p>For those of you that know me as a librarian, you’ve probably seen me speak at one of the dozen or so talks I do a year…at state conferences, consortial gatherings, national and international conferences. Keynotes. Invited talks about technology and change and the near future of libraries; these are the mainstays of my career as someone who stands on a stage and entertains and educates. Sometimes before these talks, or sometimes after, the organizing committee will very kindly take me to lunch or dinner, and we’ll talk about the job and technology and the future. Almost without fail, if this talk is not in The South, I will get asked “Where are you from?”, meaning, usually, where I was born. When I say Kentucky, I normally expand to say what I said above…then NC, then mostly TN. Always The South, always Dixie. Invariably this provokes the response “Oh! Well, you don’t <em>sound</em> Southern…”</p><p>This is a code, a way of telling me what their expectations of the South are…backwards, uneducated, unsophisticated. I have a fairly neutral accent for the South, not a slow drawl, nor the mumbled vowels of some. The biggest tell in my accent is that I lengthen the long I’s in my speech, and if you are expecting <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foghorn_Leghorn">Foghorn Leghorn</a>, you may be disappointed. Every time someone says it, I realize a bit more the way the rest of the country views the South.</p><p>And now there is the Flag. The Flag that has mattered in the South for 150 years, paraded across media screens. The flag that once hung in my teenage bedroom, not because of pride or race or considered speech, but just because it was an object that belonged to my Uncle, who died too soon and I idolized as a ghost. When the Flag hung in my bedroom I wasn’t thinking about its history, the legacy of hate and violence, the considered hatred for others that it was coded to communicate. It was an omnipresent object, as benign as a Starbucks sign, and through its overwhelming numbers we were numbed to it. The privilege of the poor white South, to have a totem.</p><p>Today I sat in a restaurant with my wife and daughter, and through the window I could see a truck pull to a stop across the way, in another parking lot. Mounted on the bumper of this truck were two 8 foot poles, one flying the Confederate Flag and the other the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gadsden_flag">Gadsden Flag</a>. As I watched, the boys in the truck (not men, not yet, but soon to be) parked and got out, standing proudly beside their banners. Then there were two, then three trucks, all with a single pole, all with the Flag announcing their arrival. Then four. Then five, gathered in a neat circle on a sunny Sunday afternoon in the parking lot of a strip mall. I looked around, and there we sat, among the 5 or 6 other families enjoying their meal. Every other face in the restaurant was Black. I couldn’t explain to my daughter why I was watching outside, what I was looking for, why I was suddenly not listening to her story. I cannot imagine, simply cannot, what those other fathers and mothers must have been thinking. The boys drove away, off to practice their braggadocio in another place. Nothing happened. Except it did.</p><p>Tonight I am sad, and angry. At the stupid boys, yes, playing at understanding and “heritage” and culture. But mostly I am sad and angry at my past self, who came to understand the hate and racism of my South much later in life than I should have. It is the definition of racial privilege that I was able to be a white man in the South, and not have the Flag be a slap to my face every time I saw it. I am ashamed of the teenage me, who was unaware of the hidden, coded speech of having the Flag in my bedroom. That was almost 30 years ago, and I am ashamed of the ignorance and privilege. Long after I took the flag down, I came to realize that those that held it up as a symbol were, almost without exception, horrible human beings. But I still refused to see it as a symbol of the South, refused to accept what it symbolized and indicated to the non-privileged.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*rLA_jCUCLvHhaJbEBolIAQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Skimming and stirring boiling sorghum, from <a href="https://thelibrary.org/lochist/periodicals/ozarkswatch/ow3i306.jpg">https://thelibrary.org/lochist/periodicals/ozarkswatch/ow3i306.jpg</a></figcaption></figure><p>Because that is not my South. My South is sweet tea &amp; juleps, fried chicken &amp; barbecue, honeysuckle &amp; wild blackberries, banjo &amp; mountain dulcimer. Hot summer days with feet in the creek, and my great-uncles at the kitchen counter burning off their moonshine jars to see whose is the best. Boiling sorghum and skimming the foam to taste, like the Earth’s own cotton candy.</p><p>But my South is a lie.</p><p>It’s a fiction that I’ve told myself, and it’s a fiction that is built upon the foundation of the privilege that I have too long accepted. It’s a lie that I can’t tell myself anymore, and a lie that I can’t tell to my daughter. The hidden costs of this lie, of my privilege, are a history of pain and horror that I get to avoid because of the color of my skin. I can’t lie to myself any longer about my South. What I can do is say true things about the history of racial hatred, fear, and segregation that built this land where we live to myself, to my daughter, and to others. I can say true things about this place that I love, and I can ask others who want a better place than the one we inherited to do the same.</p><p>It is time for the South to get past this totem, to throw away their banner. The flag of the confederacy is a symbol that no one should glorify, because its history is one of bigotry and terror. To those that are flying it now out of fear and hate, you will lose. It will fade, history has turned and will continue to turn, and hate will die out as more and more voices rise to say that we will not accept it. The Confederate Flag should fade into history, just as the slow march of the present into history is grinding away at inequalities that seemed as if they might last forever. No State should fly it, no government should have it as a part of their flag, it needs to be removed as a totem of racism, slavery, and terror.</p><p>My South may be a lie that privilege has told me, but I refuse to let those that hate continue to tell those lies. Instead<a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/tanehisi-coates-between-the-world-and-me/397619/"> I will read and talk about the truth of our history</a>, and I will <a href="http://aaihs.org/resources/charlestonsyllabus/">hope that you do the same</a>.</p><h3>Related</h3><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://jasongriffey.net/wp/2015/07/06/flags-speech-hate-fear/"><em>jasongriffey.net</em></a><em> on July 6, 2015.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8ac95b658b52" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>