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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Grace J  on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Grace J  on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Grace J  on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Week 7 logbook]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@grj/week-6-logbook-7cf0d7a31baa?source=rss-28d4d24aa597------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7cf0d7a31baa</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Grace J ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 03 Dec 2017 15:56:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-12-03T16:01:35.474Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What role does consciousness have in our freedom?</p><p>Sartre’s view on freedom is that humans have metaphysical freedom. Note that this freedom is not political, social or the everyday use of the word freedom. For Sartre, our existence precedes our essence. In other words, we are born into the world, and then we create ourselves, we shape our identities. This is opposing the essentialist view of the world, where it is believed that we are born with a set of properties. Metaphysical freedom is the idea that we have no constraints whatsoever to do any act we wish to do, however we must also bear the full burden of the consequences that come from that act. We must create our own moral codes for ourselves, we must choose what to do, and we must bear the consequences of our actions. Which is why Sartre is so opposed to the notion of “bad faith” as it imposes on our sense of absolute freedom. The problem Sartre faces with bad faith is that we make ourselves believe our freedom is then confined in these situations, whereas above we have shown that this is not true. We are able to escape the notion of bad faith by accepting the responsibilities of the choices we have made, and thus accept that it was due to our freedom of choice to feel or do a certain thing. Therefore, we are able to overcome the notion of bad faith by accepting that we were free to make the choices and take responsibility for doing so.</p><p>Sartre begins by distinguishing between the for-itself and the in-itself. The notion of the for-itself links with Sartre’s notion of consciousness of human beings, and the notion of in-itself links with non-consciousness of human beings. Sartre describes the two as interlinked as the for-itself is just the negation of the in-itself. Freedom plays an important role then for Sartre as it is linked to the for-itself. Sartre concludes in <em>Being and Nothingness </em>that the for-itself is “nothing but a pure nihilation of the in-itself; it is like a hole of being in the heart of Being”(Sartre:2003:637). The for-itself then nihilates itself so it is able to bring out the possibility of nothingness, The nothingness of consciousness thereby enables the for-itself to define itself, having complete freedom to create itself. Consciousness is dependent for its existence upon its objects, it intends its objects. It is, however, separate from its objects and its actions which are outside of it and thus consciousness is empty. The in-itself is an object of consciousness. Because consciousness cannot be its object or its actions, it realises what it is not and this negation of its being (the in-itself) implies nothingness. Once the in-itself has been negated there is no object of consciousness and hence a nothingness arises. Consciousness can be viewed as the means by which nothingness comes into the world.</p><p>Sartre then believes that “freedom is the human being putting his past out of play by secreting his own nothingness” (Gardner:2009:159). Due to consciousness being nothingness, there are then no factors that prevent the for-itself from being absolutely free. Sartre states that “human freedom precedes essence in man and makes it possible”(Sartre:2003:49) meaning that freedom is our existence in the world, as our mode of being has no essence, due to our consciousness being a nothingness. We are then able to define ourselves in any moment, by taking up fundamental projects. Sartre separates the nothingness of the for-itself by distinguishing between time and freedom. Consciousness is separated by its past and present due to the nothingness of its being. By having consciousness as an empty phenomena, the for-itself is able to break away from its time constrains, and redefine its self in the future, and differentiate itself from the past. This is due to Sartre’s notion that ‘an act is a projection of the for-itself toward what it is not, and what is can in no way determine by itself what it is not(Sartre:1969:435).</p><p>For Sartre it is the “act that is the expression of freedom”(Sartre:1969:438). Sartre goes onto coin two terms in relation to freedom, the facticity of freedom and its situation.</p><p>The facticity of freedom, is quite simply, the fact that human beings are not “free to cease to be free”(Sartre:1969:439) Human beings do not have the freedom of choosing whether or not they are free — they simply are, “condemned to be free”(Sartre:1969:439). This sounds like a great thing, but on a darker tone we are forced to be free, Sartre claims even when we do not want to. The facticity of freedom is fundamentally what allows Sartre to build up his concept of bad faith, which is our attempt to avoid our own freedom by “lying” to ourselves. If we do not wish to own up to our own essential freedom, we treat ourselves as an in-itself, by explaining something as determined by our past, or by saying that something is foreordained for the future.</p><p>Sartre uses the term of the situation to complete his view of freedom in everyday life. He uses the term situation to explain how “freedom is precisely the nothingness which is made-to-be at the heart of man”(Sartre:1969:440) which forces us to make ourselves. As it is through freedom we continuously choose our goals or projects and it is this choice that controls the way that we interpret the objects that we deal with in everyday life. As a consciousness that is always redefining its project, which continually projects itself towards its chosen end, we frame our understanding of what we encounter in the world in terms of this choice.</p><p>Bibliography</p><p>Gardner, S (2009) <em>Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, </em>Continuum</p><p>International Publishing Group</p><p>Sartre, J.P (1969) <em>Being and Nothingness</em>, trans. Hazel Barnes, London: Methuen</p><p>Sartre, J.P (2003) <em>Being And Nothingness : An Essay On Phenomenological Ontology</em>, n.p.: trans Hazel Barns, London : Routledge</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7cf0d7a31baa" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Week 6 logbook]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@grj/week-6-logbook-3a99b65cec8a?source=rss-28d4d24aa597------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3a99b65cec8a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Grace J ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 13 Nov 2017 15:06:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-12-03T15:55:21.725Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What is Sartre’s notion of “bad faith” and what are its implications?</p><p>Sartre begins in <em>Being and Nothingness</em> by defining what he calls consciousness. Consciousness is a “nothingness”(Sartre:1969:109), it is a hole in the world, but it is always conscious of something. As Sartre explains consciousness is “negation”(Sartre:1969:109). Sartre is concerned with the essence of a unified consciousness and disregards Freudian notions regarding the separation of the ID, Ego and Super Ego.</p><p>Sartre goes onto develop the notion of what he calls “bad faith” which is consciousness “directing its negation”(Sartre:1969:110) inward as opposed to outwards. A common misconception of bad faith is that it is identified with “falsehood”(Sartre:1969:110) or with the notion of lying and being a liar. The notion of lying to yourself relates to bad faith in the sense that it is hiding the “complete possession of the truth”(Sartre:1969:110). Bad faith is then more a distraction of our freedom and truth within the world, which is why Sartre believes it to be bad. Sartre states that “bad faith implies an essence of a single consciousness”(Sartre:1969:110) as it is not a state but “consciousness affects itself with bad faith”( Sartre:1969:110) due to its distracting tendencies. Sartre also finds bad faith an issue due to it making freedom be somewhat confined, as you make yourself believe you are not free when you have absolute freedom. We have the choice in circumstances to do as we please, but it is the denial that the choice was due to our own choice which is what leads us into bad faith.</p><p>Sartre goes onto say that bad faith also imposes on the notion of freedom as we deny ourselves the truth in order to distract ourselves from its responsibility. As in order to be in bad faith we must “know the truth in order to conceal it”( Sartre:1969:110) Sartre opposes the Freudian separation of consciousness as in order to be in bad faith, we must be conscious of the fact we are in bad faith since “the being of consciousness is consciousness of being”( Sartre:1969:110). Sartre uses several examples to explain the notion of how people can be in bad faith. Sartre uses an example of sadness to explain bad faith. Sartre begins that most people assume a person is sad because they are in the “mode of being what I am”(Sartre:1969:116). However this is not correct according to Sartre, as being “sad” is not a part of our being, it is “consciousness that affects itself with sadness”(Sartre:1969:116). Sartre goes onto say that upon meeting a stranger the person who is sad “assumes a lively cheerfulness”(Sartre:1969:116) and thus is no longer sad, but schedules an “appointment”(Sartre:1969:116) to be sad later. The sadness example highlights how a person can be in bad faith as they are denying their freedom by saying they are sad, as it is in their being. However, once a situation arises the person chooses to not be sad or appear as sad. Therefore they are in bad faith as they are not recognising they have the choice to be sad or not, thus restricting our freedom into thinking we have no choice but to be sad.</p><p>Bad faith has several implications for mental health issues. As the notion of simply distracting yourself is not an explanation as to why people have mental health issues, such as that of depression. As bad faith implies that we can choose to get out of the situation, whereas those who are depressed would not agree. However, Sartre would respond by saying this is simply a misunderstanding of bad faith. As we always have the freedom to do something but we may not necessarily have the power to get out of situations. So in the instance of the person that is depressed, they want to get better but they are unable to do so on their own accord.</p><p>Possible issues arise against the notion of bad faith, as firstly is it possible to be in “bad faith” by denying ourselves the truth. As Sartre states, we must know the truth in order to conceal it, so is it then how is it possible to deny the truth to ourselves? Sartre argues in the beginning of <em>Being and Nothingness </em>that there are two parts to consciousness; the self-referential and pre-reflective. Due to the nature of consciousness we can “wish to not see a specific aspect of our being”(Santoni:1978:3) only if we know what we wish to not see. Santoni then argues that Sartre himself leads into bad faith as “we cannot avoid knowing from what we are fleeing”(Santoni:1978:3). Which I feel disregards Sartre’s concept of bad faith as it does not seem plausible to fall into the notion of being in bad faith. As we always know the essence of what is true and of what our actions are. However, Sartre would put forward that although this is correct, bad faith is possible as it is our denial of responsibility that is at stake. Additionally, Sartre’s example of sadness causes possible issues for mental health. As if being in bad faith is simply not realising it is your choice to do certain actions, what does it say for the likes of depression. As if someone were to be depressed they would not see themselves able to stop being “sad”, even if they have the freedom to do so. It then seems bad faith is simply “a matter of belief”(Santoni:1997:64) and leads Sartre into cynicism regarding our freedom, which he tries to deny. As we do not have complete “clarity with respect to the truth”(Santoni:1997:65) as if we have absolute freedom we would not need to be in bad faith.</p><p>Bibliography</p><p>Sartre, J.P (1969) <em>Being and Nothingness</em>, trans. Hazel Barnes, London: Methuen</p><p>Santoni, R.E (1997): “On Monasterio’s “Vindication” of Sartre.” <em>Sartre Studies International</em> 3, no. 2 63–71. <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/23512934">http://www.jstor.org/stable/23512934</a></p><p>Santoni, R.E. (1978): “Bad Faith and `Lying to Oneself’.” <em>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</em> 38, no. 3 384–98. doi:10.2307/2107007.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3a99b65cec8a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
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            <title><![CDATA[Logbook Week 5]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@grj/logbook-week-5-d5b398092165?source=rss-28d4d24aa597------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d5b398092165</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Grace J ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 11 Nov 2017 14:55:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-11-11T14:55:05.564Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>What is “Death” according to Heidegger</strong></p><p>The term death for humanity can be understood in the notion of time coming to an end. Normally when we refer to death we are implying that our time has “run out”, and we must depart this life in death. Heidegger begins in <em>Being and Time </em>that “the end of being-in-the-world is death”(BAT p224 reader 74). However, If we want to understand Heidegger’s notion of death, it means to live an “authentic life”.</p><p>The main problem for Dasein is that is has no structural limit, and as long as Dasein is a being it has never attained in its wholeness”(BAT p228 reader 75) due to being unable to know itself as a whole as it is constantly out there in the world. Heidegger coins the notion “being-towards-death” as it is essential that we constantly project our lives onto the horizon of our death. If our being is finite, then an authentic life can only be found by confronting finitude and trying to make a meaning out of the fact of our death. As Heidegger states that once Dasein attains its wholeness it “loses the being of there”(BAT p229 reader 75) suggesting that once Dasein understands the wholeness of itself it no longer needs to be there in the world as it understands its death. Which is why Heidegger believes that “every Dasein must take dying upon itself in every instance”(BAT p229 reader 75). Fundamentally Dasein’s lack of “wholeness finds its end in death”(BAT p233 77). This is due to Dasein “stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-of-being”(BAT p241 reader 81) meaning it is thrown back onto itself to attain its wholeness, and thus understands its death. Death then for Heidegger is “the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein”(BAT p241 reader 81) Heidegger states that dying is the “way of being in which Dasein is towards its death”(BAT p238 reader 80) thus he says Dasein never perishes as such. Dasein “only demises if it dies”(BAT p238 reader 80).</p><p>There are 3 different criteria in Heidegger’s conception of being-towards-death: it is “non-relational”, “insuperable” and “ownmost”. Firstly, death is non-relational in the sense in standing before death one has cut off all relations to others. Death cannot be experienced through the deaths of others, but only through my relation to my death. Secondly, death is ownmost in the sense that death belongs to my own Dasein. This is where I begin to disagree with Heidegger on this concept of Death. As I feel this has links to “non-relational” aspect of death as we are able to begin to understand what death is through others, as we become aware of the notion of death. For example, when my grandmother died I became aware of the concept of the death of another Dasein, but not through my own Dasein. So I do not believe Heidegger is correct in saying that death is “non relational” as we are able to somewhat understand death through another. Thirdly, death is insuperable (or certain) that we are going to die. Although one might evade or run away from the fact, no one doubts that life comes to an end in death. Most people desire a long and full life, but we can never know when the grim reaper is going to knock at our door, therefore it is certain but also uncertain at the same time.</p><p>It seems for Heidegger that in death we experience our own sense of individuality and is where Dasein fulfils its wholeness and completeness of being. However the major criticism to this idea is that how is Dasein able to feel its wholeness or completeness through death? As how is Dasein able to reflect upon its own existence if it is “dead”.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d5b398092165" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Week 4 Logbook]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@grj/week-4-logbook-7b76c66f7c18?source=rss-28d4d24aa597------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7b76c66f7c18</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Grace J ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 24 Oct 2017 19:30:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-10-24T19:30:58.843Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Explain Heidegger’s view on truth</strong></p><p>Heidegger beings in section 43 of <em>Being and Time</em> by reiterating what we already know regarding the notion of Dasein. He writes “an understanding of being belongs”(BAT p193) to Dasein, and our analysis of the “disclosedness”(BAT p193) of Dasein reveals it “equiprimordially”(BAT p193) by its way of being-in-the-world. Heidegger then goes onto say that it is through the disclosedness of the world that “innerworldly beings are also discovered”(BAT p193), as it is through Dasein we are able to explore and uncover the truths of the world. World is said to be “discovered with the disclosedness of world”(BAT p195) which is “essentially disclosed <em>with the being </em>of Dasein”(BAT p195). Therefore Dasein has this important role regarding truth within the world, as it is through Dasein we come to know truths regarding the world through the disclosedness of Dasein.</p><p>Heidegger’s explanation for truth greatly differs from the traditional view on truth. Correspondence theories of truth state that we discover truth as there is a coherence between representations with one another, as we are unable to check the relations with things. For instance there is a relationship between my mind and the way the world is. Kant supports this by stating “the agreement of knowledge with its objects will be here granted and presupposed”(BAT p207), also Kant requires “proof for the existence of things outside of me”(BAT p196). Heidegger sees this as problematic as he calls it a “scandal in philosophy”(BAT p197) as “Dasein defies such proofs”(BAT p197) because it is always already in the world, therefore there is no problem with how the outside world relates to the “in me”, as it is not agreement between the two, as Dasein discovers the world. It is also only through that being is “in consciousness”(BAT p200) that it is intelligible in Dasein, and thus Dasein is able to understand and conceptualise “characteristics of being”(BAT p200) such as in itself in reality. In terms of reality for Heidegger innerworldly beings are “ontologically comprehended”(BAT p201) only when innerworldliness has been clarified, which belongs to the “phenomenon of <em>world</em>”(BAT p201) which in turn belongs to Dasein. As Dasein is an “essential structure of being-in-the-world”(BAT p201).</p><p>On this basis, Heidegger wants to challenge the traditional correspondence theory of truth and show how truth is then a process of discovery (through Dasein) rather than a relationship between our minds and the external world, as there is no external world for Heidegger as Dasein is always already present within. Truth, then for Heidegger is “the primordial phenomenon of truth”(BAT p205) becoming visible by Dasein. Heidegger goes onto say that “making statements is a being toward the existent thing itself”(BAT p209) and as a result of this it “<em>discovers </em>the being toward which it is”(BAT p209). Heidegger gives an example of a crooked painting to explain what he means here, as he states that we only understand and know the painting is crooked if we turn around and look at it and see that it is the case. Which is why Heidegger states that “a statement is <em>true</em> means that it discovers the being in itself”(BAT p210). Dasein is then recognised to be the “foundation of the primordial phenomenon of truth”(BAT p210) as being true is only possible on the basis of being-in-the-world. Going back to the notion of an external world, the problem doesn’t raise any issues for Heidegger as Dasein is already present within the world, and what it discloses has truth (or falsity) so what appears is what is there. Dasein can then only discover the world in this way, so there can be no issue regarding whether there is a world.</p><p>Dasein essentially plays the role in truth, as it is considered to be the foundation of truth for Heidegger, as it is our primary mode of being-in-the-world. This key notion links to Heidegger’s view that “being true as discovering is a manner of being Dasein”(BAT p211) and “discovering is a way of being-in-the-world”(BAT p211). Dasein is also said to be “<em>in the truth</em>”(BAT p212). However, the notion that Dasein is in the truth also works in the reverse, as it can be said to be in the “<em>untruth</em>”(BAT p213). As innerworldly beings are always already discovered in Dasein, therefore beings are covered over or disguised as innerworldly beings to be yet discovered, as a result “Dasein is always already in the truth and untruth”(BAT p214). For Heidegger understood in its “most primordial sense”(BAT p217) truth belongs to Dasein, which is an “existential”.</p><p>Ultimately Dasein is essentially in truth (and untruth). There is only truth in so far as there is Dasein. Beings are then only “discovered only <em>when</em> Dasein is and as long as it is” then they are disclosed(BAT p217). Heidegger also presupposes that any truth laid before us (he uses Newton’s laws) is true as long as “Dasein is”(BAT p217). On this basis then, the concept of Newton’s laws were not considered to be true nor false until they were discovered by Dasein. The laws became true as through beings in themselves they became accessible to Dasein, as they were able to show themselves as “the beings they previously already were”(BAT p217). The concept of eternal truths is also considered, as for Heidegger, they will not be accepted until it is “proven that Dasein has and always will be”(BAT p217).</p><p>Ultimately for Heidegger the “being of truth stands in a primordial connection with Dasein”(BAT p220) and as Dasein exists as being-in-the-world, disclosedness is possible to understand. “There is”(BAT p220) being-in-the-world insofar as there truth is, which is only possible due to Dasein, making being and truth “equiprimordial”(BAT p220).</p><p>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7b76c66f7c18" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Logbook Week 3 (redone)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@grj/logbook-week-3-2904f4facfda?source=rss-28d4d24aa597------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2904f4facfda</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Grace J ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 16 Oct 2017 18:51:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-10-29T12:21:10.255Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>What is Heidegger’s notion of dasein and how does it relate to his phenomenology</strong></p><p>Heidegger’s phenomenology is a radicalisation of that of Husserl’s, he expands on Husserl’s notion of phenomenology reduction and creates his own version.</p><p>Within Heidegger’s phenomenology he aims to carry out an investigation on the idea of being, in order for us to understand the world in his terms. Heidegger begins in section 14 of <em>Being and Time </em>that<em> </em>“being-in-the-world is to be made visible with regard to the structural factor “world””(BATp63). He asks the question how it is possible to see the world as a phenomenon, which he believes is done by “letting what shows itself in the “beings within the world be seen”(BATp63). Heidegger creates a distinction between what he calls “ontic” and “ontological” descriptions. The ontic description is describing “the outward appearance of these beings and tell of the events occurring in them”(BATp63). In order to describe the world “phenomenologically” we must use the ontological description, which is what being means; to “categorically and conceptually determine the being of beings present in the world”(BATp63). Heidegger creates a distinction between a being and being, as being is a mode of existence and “things having value”(BATp63), whilst a being is an entity.</p><p>On this basis Heidegger coins the term Dasein in his phenomenology. Da-sein translates to Da meaning there in the world and sein meaning to be (being). The notion of Dasein is to be understood in the sense that Dasein is “the overall phenomenon, consisting entirely of its individual “occurrences,” and yet prerequisite for any of them being what it is”(Dasein Disclosed (DD) p9). It is “me” (and you). It is through Dasein (our own way of being-in-the-world) that we are able to make sense of the world, as Dasein is able to “discover beings”(BAT p65) as it is in the world. Dasein makes it possible to discover the world, as “worldliness is an ontological factor and designates structure”(BAT p65) of being-in-the-world. As world is a “characteristic of Dasein itself”(BAT p65). As for Heidegger “<em>The “essence” of Dasein lies in its existence.</em>”(DD p11) due to Dasein being present within the world, it makes it accessible. Hence why Heidegger explains that we miss the phenomenon of the world if no one “see[s] the constitution of Dasein as being-in-the-world”(BAT p65). Heidegger sees Dasein as the most important concept within his phenomenology as it accounts for us “being-in-the-world” and why we are then able to understand and comprehend the notions of phenomena, as “the closest world of everyday Dasein is the <em>surrounding world</em>”(BAT p66).</p><p>We seek the worldliness of the surrounding world by an “ontological interpretation”(BAT p66) of encountering the surrounding world. This notion of encountering the surrounding world is done “under the guidance of everyday being-in-the-world”(BAT p66) — also referred to as Dasein — which Heidegger refers to as “<em>dealings in </em>the world <em>with </em>innerworldly beings”(BAT p66) . It is then stated that “pre-thematic beings”(BAT p67) what is used and produced in the world, become accessible to us when we take card in the world. Dasein however, is “alive in everyday dealing with beings”(BAT p67). Heidegger believes that due to Dasein already being present within the world, we do not need to put ourselves in to take care of it, unlike other beings. Dasein allows us to make use of things in the world, by understanding how innerworldly objects relate to Dasein.</p><p>Heidegger argues that things in the world have a referential structure, how the things show themselves to us. Strictly speaking there is no such thing as a “useful thing”(BAT p68), there is just a “totality of useful things”(BAT p68) which useful things can be what they are. We call how useful things reveal their kind of being to us, their “handiness”(BAT p69). Heidegger argues that there can be no one single useful thing, as their character of utility is “<em>in terms </em>of their belonging to other useful things”(BAT p68), hence why no one single thing shows itself, they all relate to a series of networks of utility. Dasein links into this process, as Dasein is able to discover the world by experiencing individual things which become part of greater things, due to the structure of innerworldly things being in the world. Nature is also discovered in the “use of useful things”(BAT p70), as the surrounding world is discovered and everything else along with it. Studying the “handiness” enables an “categorical definition of beings as they are in themselves”(BAT p71), and it is through “this totality, world makes itself known”( BAT p74).</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2904f4facfda" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Week 2 Logbook]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@grj/week-2-logbook-phenomenology-and-existentialism-cf88ecd9912f?source=rss-28d4d24aa597------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cf88ecd9912f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Grace J ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Oct 2017 20:51:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-10-13T20:52:24.516Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Explain Husserl’s process of phenomenological reduction.</strong></p><p>Following on from Husserl’s account of how we experience objects in the world, he develops the process called “phenomenological reduction”. This process as Husserl explains is designed to define the pure essence of phenomena. The idea behind this process is that it enables a radical standpoint whereby we are able to look at perspectives of the world that we can judge and ground against this process.</p><p>The phenomenological reduction, or epoché, is a suspension of judgments about the existence or non-existence of the external world. For Husserl, we are normally in the “natural attitude,” which is defined in the surrounding world we live in, with physical objects, people, numbers etc. A general characteristic of the natural attitude is that is always involves “positing” (what is and is not the case). This notion is thus the basis for empirical sciences for judging what is the case in different “domains of sense”. Therefore phenomenology must put aside “positing” and stop trying to determine what is and is not the case. Instead Husserl aims for a pure description and analysis for structures of domain of sense, escaping the issue of what is and is not the case in each domain.</p><p>The phenomenological attitude or reduction is concerned with solving these issues that the natural attitude creates which results in also solving the issue of how we can acquire knowledge. By adopting this phenomenological reduction / attitude, we are able to rid ourselves of prejudices and differences that the natural attitude enables. By removing these misconceptions we truly discover the essence of the true phenomena we experience, which is Husserl’s aim. Husserl disregards “positing” or “parenthesizing” to peel back pure essence and allow us to experience it in its pure sense, and what that reveals to our consciousness.</p><p>More generally, this is the phenomenological effort to stop shoving theories into our descriptions of experience, as, say, Hume pretty blatantly does when he states outright that our experience is all just impressions and ideas (which are really just faint impressions). It quickly becomes clear that this project of removing all theory from our descriptions is hopeless, but it’s a move in the right direction, in that we want to figure out, at least, what theories are presupposed by experience.</p><p>Eidetic reduction is about analysing essences what makes the thing you’re contemplating what it is. “This is done by theoretically changing different elements (while mentally observing whether or not the phenomenon changes) of a practical object to learn which characteristics are necessary for it to be it without being something else. Essence’s themselves cannot be reduced, thus there would be no subject matter left. In the same way the Pure Ego is not reducible.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cf88ecd9912f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Logbook Week 1]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@grj/logbook-week-1-33d93a240366?source=rss-28d4d24aa597------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/33d93a240366</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Grace J ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Oct 2017 19:36:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-10-03T19:36:07.482Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Describe how you experience an object.</p><p>At the centre of Husserl’s philosophical investigations is the notion of the intentionality of consciousness and the related notion of intentional Objects. In regard to “experiencing” objects when considering Husserl’s phenomenology there are two distinct concepts he refers to as objects. Husserl believes that there are two senses of the word “object”; intentional Objects and external objects. Intentional objects are the Objects which our consciousness are directed at or <em>directed about; which can be the past, present or future and even impossible objects, such as unicorns. W</em>hereas external objects are objects which transcend our own consciousness. For Husserl, intentionality includes a wide range of phenomena, from perceptions, judgments, and memories to the experience of other conscious subjects. Intentionality or intentional Objects are much more than just looking at an object and calling that “experience” like how we can say with external objects. Additionally, Husserl argues that Objects presented to us is done via immanent experience, as that is what is immediately present in our consciousness. Whereas transcendent experience is removing ourselves from this experience regarding external objects.</p><p>To give a description of how I experience an object is not as straightforward as typically saying I “experienced” my iPhone by saying that I saw it with my eyes and felt it with my hands. Experience is much more than that, and can take many different forms. My personal experience covers many forms as it is not just sensory. As I can have an experience of the “Object” of my late dog Jonny, much like that of my phone. When I see my phone I see the white plastic front screen contrasting to its rose gold metallic back. Whereas when I recall the experience of my dog Jonny and how his white and brown fur felt like silk between my fingers, and how he was always so happy to see me. These two experiences seem to differ, not just because one is a present immanent experience and the other is a past memory of immanent experience. But possibly due to the emotions and feelings that the intentional Objects bring, as clearly remembering a late memory is more private and personal than a current physical object in my hand.</p><p>It now seems that regarding my immanent experiences that there is no real meaning to either of them, as no one would be able to experience my iPhone in my hands with my eye, nor they be able to experience the memory of my late dog Jonny. As even if you were to imagine the same experience as what mine would be like, it would never be the same. Thus this view of Husserl’s immanent experience is merely subjective. As one can never have the same experience, while I’m certain that I can have an immanent experience of the intentional Object of my late dog Jonny again, I’m declined to say that it would be the exact same experience as prior ones.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=33d93a240366" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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