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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Guillermo Pineda on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Guillermo Pineda on Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[Cactus WHID Restoration & Flashing Guide (Updated 2026)]]></title>
            <link>https://meetcyber.net/cactus-whid-restoration-flashing-guide-updated-2026-fbf783e53f5b?source=rss-2e7c36c9ea72------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fbf783e53f5b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[whidninja]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hardwareforhacking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Guillermo Pineda]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 17 Sep 2026 06:19:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-17T06:19:24.824Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/0*VvOWhmVNOSTgaIwf" /></figure><p>I have owned this device for a few years, but during a test, it got misconfigured and stuck in a bad state. While trying to follow official sources and various online tutorials to recover it, I realized that many of the available guides were outdated or missing critical steps. I created this updated, end-to-end document to help anyone facing the same issue fully restore their Cactus WHID to factory settings.</p><p>you might need to open 3 different files in the following order</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*taCcwKetTDtdvxLuZ3w0xA.png" /></figure><h3><strong>Step 0: Prerequisites &amp; Initial Setup</strong></h3><p>1. Download the official repository from GitHub: <a href="https://github.com/whid-injector/WHID">https://github.com/whid-injector/WHID</a> and extract the ZIP file.</p><p>2. Open Arduino IDE 1.8.19.</p><p>3. Configure board support for ESP8266:</p><p>· Go to File &gt; Preferences.</p><p>· In Additional Boards Manager URLs, paste:</p><blockquote>http://arduino.esp8266.com/stable/package_esp8266com_index.json</blockquote><p>and click OK.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*d8GXFqaH9V0Q4SvKA-EB0Q.png" /></figure><p>· Go to Tools &gt; Board &gt; Boards Manager…, search for ESP8266, and install version 2.3.0.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UiBKxDEaBmfMjf89o3FRsg.png" /></figure><p>4. Plug your Cactus WHID into a USB port on your computer.</p><h3>Step 1: Upload the Bridge Sketch (esp8266Programmer)</h3><ol><li>Open esp8266Programmer.ino located at the folder:</li></ol><p><em>WHID-master\ESPloitV2_whid\flashing\esp8266Programmer</em></p><p>2. In Arduino Tool Go to <strong>Tools &gt; Board &gt; Arduino AVR Boards</strong> and select <strong>LilyPad Arduino USB</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6meNWFAeVH79gYXcE12lIg.png" /></figure><p>3. Under <strong>Tools &gt; Port</strong>, verify that the system detects the COM port where your Cactus WHID is connected (e.g., COM9 (LilyPad Arduino USB)).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eUAaKTTA8N1WHV_cnyLNpw.png" /></figure><p>4. Click <strong>Sketch &gt; Upload</strong> or press Ctrl + U to flash the bridge code. This prepares the ATmega processor to forward commands to the ESP module.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/645/1*gu9LvF65SfURSDebhT6MJw.png" /></figure><h3>Step 2: Compile the ESP8266 Binary</h3><ol><li>Open ESP_Code.ino located at:</li></ol><p>WHID-master\ESPloitV2_whid\source\ESP_Code</p><p>2. Go to <strong>Tools &gt; Board &gt; ESP8266 Modules</strong> and select <strong>Generic ESP8266 Module</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VI6vTLO82f8DoebIeKFaEQ.png" /></figure><p>3. Configure the <strong>Tools</strong> menu options precisely as follows:</p><ul><li><strong>Upload Speed:</strong> 115200</li><li><strong>CPU Frequency:</strong> 80 MHz</li><li><strong>Flash Size:</strong> 4M (1M SPIFFS)</li><li><strong>Flash Mode:</strong> DIO</li><li><strong>Flash Frequency:</strong> 40MHz</li><li><strong>Reset Method:</strong> ck</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/785/1*OHWrkkHwbq8Y3QzowasKFQ.png" /></figure><p>4. Go to <strong>Sketch &gt; Export Compiled Binary</strong> (or press Ctrl + Alt + S).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/635/1*2Tv5f8UOpZyXY9mJMbXekA.png" /></figure><p><em>This generates the ESP_Code.ino.generic.bin file inside the WHID-master\ESPloitV2_whid\source\ESP_Code folder.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*N4qxqvHetut1c6QXNzoIfA.png" /></figure><h3>Step 3: Flash the ESP8266 Firmware using ESP8266Flasher</h3><ol><li>Run <strong>ESP8266Flasher.exe</strong> located in WHID-master\tools.</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mNfGIhQqKCHXSNwTR3tqvg.png" /></figure><p>2. Go to the <strong>Advanced</strong> tab and ensure the settings match:</p><ul><li><strong>Baudrate:</strong> 115200</li><li><strong>Flash size:</strong> 4MByte</li><li><strong>Flash speed:</strong> 40MHz</li><li><strong>SPI Mode:</strong> DIO</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/572/1*JwPDAnk4bHT5PsDC2opUfQ.png" /></figure><p>3. Switch to the <strong>Config</strong> tab:</p><ul><li>Click the gear icon on the first row.</li><li>Browse and select the .bin file generated in the previous step (e.g., …/ESP_Code/ESP_Code.ino.generic.bin).</li><li>Ensure the checkmark is active and the Offset is set to <strong>0x00000</strong>.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DHknpb8bhixSxtWVjWhkRw.png" /></figure><p>4. Switch to the <strong>Operation</strong> tab:</p><ul><li>Under <strong>COM Port</strong>, select the same port where the Cactus WHID is connected (keep it plugged into USB).</li><li>Click <strong>Flash(F)</strong> and wait for the process to complete.</li></ul><p>5. Check the <strong>Log</strong> tab to verify that the operation finished successfully.</p><h3>Step 4: Upload the ATmega32U4 Microcontroller Firmware</h3><ol><li>Open Arduino_32u4_Code.ino located at:</li></ol><p>WHID-master\ESPloitV2_whid\source\Arduino_32u4_Code</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2qGPBJGU7-pV_ozuxStjsQ.png" /></figure><p>2. Ensure <strong>Tools &gt; Board</strong> is set to <strong>LilyPad Arduino USB</strong> and the correct COM port is selected.</p><p><strong>Fixing the missing </strong><strong>FingerprintUSBHost.h library error:</strong></p><p>If compilation fails due to a missing library error:</p><ul><li>Download the ZIP file from the official repository: <a href="https://github.com/keyboardio/FingerprintUSBHost">https://github.com/keyboardio/FingerprintUSBHost</a></li><li>In Arduino IDE, go to <strong>Sketch &gt; Include Library &gt; Add .ZIP Library…</strong> and select the downloaded ZIP file.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5XFlRzxqznhik085rFDLOg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/987/1*V6AScJfFqwedu51uQGN1bg.png" /></figure><p><strong>Fixing COM port disconnection errors during upload:</strong></p><p>If the port disconnects during upload, simply click <strong>Upload</strong> again. This triggers the bootloader reset and completes the upload process (<em>Done uploading</em>).</p><h3>Step 5: Verification &amp; Initial Access</h3><p>Leave the Cactus WHID connected to the USB port and wait about <strong>1 minute</strong>:</p><ol><li>On your phone or laptop, scan for available Wi-Fi networks. Look for the SSID named <strong>Exploit</strong>.</li><li>Connect using the default password: <strong>DotAgency</strong>.</li><li>Open a web browser and navigate to: [http://192.168.1.1](http://192.168.1.1)</li><li>Log in using the default administrative credentials:</li></ol><ul><li><strong>Username:</strong> admin</li><li><strong>Password:</strong> hacktheplanet</li></ul><p>Your Cactus WHID is now fully restored to its working factory condition.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/487/1*JhjemEjq4RPOIbLB5L6atQ.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fbf783e53f5b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://meetcyber.net/cactus-whid-restoration-flashing-guide-updated-2026-fbf783e53f5b">Cactus WHID Restoration &amp; Flashing Guide (Updated 2026)</a> was originally published in <a href="https://meetcyber.net/">MeetCyber</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Hacking the Human Mind]]></title>
            <link>https://meetcyber.net/hacking-the-human-mind-dffaa248d84c?source=rss-2e7c36c9ea72------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dffaa248d84c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethical-hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyberattack]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Guillermo Pineda]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 19 Jul 2026 17:17:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-19T17:55:33.839Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4><em>The Invisible War in Cyberspace’s Cognitive Layer</em></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PxeLxCoM3O82Z_80MbWzJw.png" /></figure><p>When we think of cyberspace, we usually picture lines of code, glowing servers, and sophisticated malware breaching firewall defenses. We treat it as a realm of machines. But this narrow view misses the ultimate target of modern conflict: the human mind.</p><p>To truly understand the battlefield of the 21st century, we have to look at how cyberspace is actually built. According to foundational military doctrine — specifically the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff’s <strong>Joint Publication 3–12 (JP 3–12), <em>Cyberspace Operations</em></strong> — the cyber realm is not a single digital void, but a complex architecture composed of three distinct layers:</p><ul><li><strong>The Physical Layer:</strong> The tangible infrastructure — fiber-optic cables, satellites, routers, and physical servers — that anchors the digital world to the earth.</li><li><strong>The Informational Layer:</strong> The traditional software domain where data is created, stored, and processed, and where the vast majority of today’s network vulnerabilities exist.</li><li><strong>The Cognitive Layer:</strong> The human element. This is the space where users, decision-makers, and entire populations perceive, interpret, and act upon the information flowing through the other two layers.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/833/0*FWf0M-WWbqKABmIf.png" /></figure><p>While the cybersecurity industry pours billions of dollars into defending the informational layer, and nations increasingly worry about physical attacks on critical infrastructure, the cognitive layer remains dangerously exposed and all of us are in the line of fire.</p><p>Cyberattacks are no longer just about crashing a server or stealing credit card data. Today, malicious actors are leveraging the speed and reach of the informational layer to execute high-precision operations where <strong>human thought itself is the objective</strong>. By manipulating perception, exploiting psychological biases, and weaponizing disinformation, cognitive cyber warfare bypasses firewalls entirely — hacking the user rather than the machine, and altering reality without leaving a single trace of traditional malware.</p><h3>Taxonomy of Cognitive Attacks</h3><p>The manipulation of human perception is not a new invention. From the boardrooms of modern corporate marketing to the battlefields of state-sponsored Psychological Operations (PSYOP), shifting how humans think has always been a powerful tool of influence.</p><p>However, the dawn of the social media age has fundamentally broken the traditional boundaries of these operations. What used to require massive physical printing presses, radio towers, or expensive media campaigns has now shifted into a digitized environment. Today, cognitive operations utilize global social networks as a highly accelerated distribution medium. They operate at blinding speed, scale instantaneously across borders, and cost virtually nothing to execute. It is an environment of maximum impact at near-zero friction, turning every digital screen into a weapon delivery system.</p><p>To understand how modern adversaries exploit this boundary, we must dissect the four core technical dimensions of cognitive cyberattacks:</p><h3>1. Information Environment Manipulation</h3><p><em>Perception &amp; Reality Distortion</em></p><p>This technique aims to poison the digital ecosystem surrounding the target (action, person or organization), creating artificial consensus or shifting reality so that users draw flawed conclusions. Rather than targeting an individual directly, the attacker manipulates the overall narrative architecture.</p><h3><strong>Narrative Engineering &amp; Laundering:</strong></h3><p>Systematically creating a false or distorted narrative and passing it through multiple layers of media (from anonymous forums to fringe blogs, and finally to mainstream outlets) to obscure its malicious origin. A classic manifestation of this technique is explored in cultural critiques like <em>“A Look At How The Media Controls The Narrative”</em> by <em>The Informed Youth of America</em>, which illustrates how mainstream distribution networks can systematically filter reality, sanitize information, and engineer public perception before the audience even has a chance to think for themselves.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2F84M6w3QO7yE%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D84M6w3QO7yE&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2F84M6w3QO7yE%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/02d24c383859f47ed097763543f511ac/href">https://medium.com/media/02d24c383859f47ed097763543f511ac/href</a></iframe><h3><strong>Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB):</strong></h3><p>Deploying botnets and automated sockpuppet networks across social platforms to artificially inflate trends, mimic public outrage, or simulate consensus.<br>Here is some examples of this tactic being exploited in the wild.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*S14a3ED3sBdQHYj_1z_dhA.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://disinfocode.eu/reports/meta/8?commitmentId=388&amp;chapterId=80">https://disinfocode.eu/reports/meta/8?commitmentId=388&amp;chapterId=80</a></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/831/1*EIzB1-n6Ig1_DvePl39BKA.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/29768624251369784">https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/29768624251369784</a></figcaption></figure><h3><strong>Algorithmic Polarization Exploitation:</strong></h3><p>Reengineering content to weaponize platform recommendation algorithms, ensuring radicalizing or emotionally volatile content gets maximum organic distribution.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/773/1*Xjpr2M3gOoSarrhlP8agCw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2025.1718396">https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2025.1718396</a></figcaption></figure><h3><strong>Astro-Turfing:</strong></h3><p>Disguising a highly coordinated, top-down propaganda campaign to make it appear as a spontaneous, organic, grassroots movement from everyday users.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/765/1*VaqmYCw8xE7fBRyTTHIAiA.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://legalclarity.org/nayirah-testimony-the-pr-campaign-exposure-and-legacy/">https://legalclarity.org/nayirah-testimony-the-pr-campaign-exposure-and-legacy/</a></figcaption></figure><h3><strong>Information Laundering via Data Poisoning:</strong></h3><p>Intentionally altering open-source datasets or public information repositories so that subsequent automated systems, AI models, or journalists pick up corrupted facts.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/647/1*VEALkVptNL6HT1A25X-2Fw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/blog/2009/may/29/wikipedia-bans-scientology">https://www.theguardian.com/technology/blog/2009/may/29/wikipedia-bans-scientology</a></figcaption></figure><h3><strong>Hyperstition Inoculation:</strong></h3><p>Injecting predictive fictions or constructed conspiracy theories into the cultural bloodstream so deeply that target audiences begin altering their real-world economic or political behavior to match the fiction.</p><p>One the best examples of this is the well known “this bank has no money left” and customers run to cash out their accounts and actually drive the target to a bankrupt, like Silicon Valley Bank collapsing in 2023.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/784/1*Vm2daxcMYpskeXH3XC68Yw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.38.1.133">https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.38.1.133</a></figcaption></figure><h3>2. Advanced Social Engineering</h3><p><em>Targeted &amp; AI-Powered Deception</em></p><p>This involves direct, high-precision deception targeting individuals or organizations. By leveraging OSINT (Open Source Intelligence), algorithmic profiling, and generative AI, attackers exploit deep-seated human trust and cognitive biases.</p><h3><strong>Micro-Targeted Cognitive Profiling:</strong></h3><p>Scraping OSINT, breach data, and digital footprints to build psychographic profiles of specific high-value targets (HVTs) to identify their exact emotional and ideological vulnerabilities.</p><p>The best example so far is the Cambridge Analytica scandal:</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2F7aZSxnMcuuI%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D7aZSxnMcuuI&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2F7aZSxnMcuuI%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/54a33ef597afffdc0c0bd589146c04eb/href">https://medium.com/media/54a33ef597afffdc0c0bd589146c04eb/href</a></iframe><h3><strong>Generative Adversarial Deepfakes:</strong></h3><p><strong><em>(Vishing/Phishing)</em></strong></p><p>Utilizing real-time AI voice cloning and video synthesis to impersonate trusted authorities during live communications. One of the best examples is the fraud made in Hong Kong in 2024.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nzDIhWCYRq4LQDiUMvYfHA.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/04/asia/deepfake-cfo-scam-hong-kong-intl-hnk">https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/04/asia/deepfake-cfo-scam-hong-kong-intl-hnk</a></figcaption></figure><p>and a practical but scary use is an interview with Vladimir Putin while someone was impersonating him with AI model.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FKbaKTz9FW2E%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DKbaKTz9FW2E&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FKbaKTz9FW2E%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/930430eb6dff234e7ff869396425bbbb/href">https://medium.com/media/930430eb6dff234e7ff869396425bbbb/href</a></iframe><h3><strong>Contextual Spear-Phishing :</strong></h3><p><strong><em>(Watering Hole Manipulation)</em></strong></p><p>Compromising or mimicking niche online resources like: websites or forums frequented by specific groups to inject subtle, highly tailored disinformation or specific messages into their trusted professional workflows.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/618/1*UJxHEpZwCMocVLpqb88_KQ.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.cybercom.mil/Media/News/Article/3895345/russian-disinformation-campaign-doppelgnger-unmasked-a-web-of-deception/">https://www.cybercom.mil/Media/News/Article/3895345/russian-disinformation-campaign-doppelgnger-unmasked-a-web-of-deception/</a></figcaption></figure><p>in the other hand, a video of an Ukrainian soldier infiltrating a Russian recruitment meeting in an university is also an example of this type of attack.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FPQc4He8EgMY%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DPQc4He8EgMY&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FPQc4He8EgMY%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/fe17a714392e03049be85826bce52fe9/href">https://medium.com/media/fe17a714392e03049be85826bce52fe9/href</a></iframe><h3><strong>Pretexting via Synthetic Personas:</strong></h3><p>Creating multi-year, highly detailed digital personas (complete with simulated employment histories and active social posting) to slowly build trust with targets before launching an exploit.</p><p>There is several cases today thanks to AI, but one of the most popular is the one involving the actor Brad Pitt.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FryOKnKCj3as%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DryOKnKCj3as&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FryOKnKCj3as%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/698994bc30471fbc3c277f360b6aa4d8/href">https://medium.com/media/698994bc30471fbc3c277f360b6aa4d8/href</a></iframe><h3><strong>Authority Bias Weaponization:</strong></h3><p>Creating highly sophisticated, fake regulatory or compliance portals to trick professionals or executives into bypassing standard security protocols out of fear of institutional penalties.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ZWQTWGy2SxoPF8BrUcfsAQ.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices/albany/news/fbi-warns-of-scammers-spoofing-fbi-albany-phone-number-in-government-impersonation-scam">https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices/albany/news/fbi-warns-of-scammers-spoofing-fbi-albany-phone-number-in-government-impersonation-scam</a></figcaption></figure><h3>3. Cognitive Overload &amp; Decision Degradation</h3><p><em>Denial of Service on the Mind</em></p><p>The objective here is not necessarily to implant a specific lie, but rather to disrupt the target’s decision-making process. By overwhelming the human brain with noise, the attacker forces psychological exhaustion and decision paralysis.</p><h3><strong>Cognitive Flood / Information Chaff:</strong></h3><p>Injecting massive amounts of contradictory data, conflicting reports, and sensory noise during a critical event to trigger decision paralysis and exhaust the target’s cognitive capacity.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/1*w_t5RqAYkWFdT1wGjG_8qA.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/erciyesiletisim/article/1137903">https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/erciyesiletisim/article/1137903</a></figcaption></figure><p>Not only during wars, this technique is widely use during elections everywhere.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5qlovw1FBE3VtG-4gNUlKw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.brennancenter.org/election-misinformation">https://www.brennancenter.org/election-misinformation</a></figcaption></figure><h3><strong>Vigilance Fatigue Exploitation:</strong></h3><p>Artificially triggering non-critical security alerts or operational anomalies over an extended period, conditioning operators to ignore warnings right before the actual, destructive attack occurs.</p><p>This is one of the most common techniques used by cyber criminals to defeat unaware blue teams all around the world.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/739/1*n5vuBD-bBUfgg2VPUSZIbw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.ibm.com/think/topics/alert-fatigue">https://www.ibm.com/think/topics/alert-fatigue</a></figcaption></figure><h3><strong>Semantic Noise Injection:</strong></h3><p>Deliberately introducing confusing, overly technical, or highly ambiguous terminology into communication channels during a crisis to slow down the target’s response time and execution of procedures.</p><p>This one is usually done by ‘insiders’ since a long time ago, actually this technique was unclassified from the CIA files of 1944.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/837/1*RHSpD2MIU8yJSHZnkwkztQ.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.corporate-rebels.com/blog/cia-field-manual">https://www.corporate-rebels.com/blog/cia-field-manual</a></figcaption></figure><h3><strong>OODA Loop Disruption:</strong></h3><p>Systematically feeding a decision-maker fast-paced, conflicting inputs to trap them in a permanent cycle of <em>Observing</em> and <em>Orienting</em>, completely preventing them from ever <em>Deciding</em> or <em>Acting</em>.</p><p>The famous <em>‘flood the seeker with information’</em>… so effective that anti malware solutions or even Rick cannot deal with it.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FXN1bJ7ffBQQ%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DXN1bJ7ffBQQ&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FXN1bJ7ffBQQ%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/b1a44e4b06abcb4eabfce125735f2470/href">https://medium.com/media/b1a44e4b06abcb4eabfce125735f2470/href</a></iframe><h3><strong>Sensationalist Desensitization:</strong></h3><p>Flooding a specific population with highly emotionally charged content until the collective audience develops psychological numbness, lowering their resistance to subsequent hostile actions.</p><p>the famous <em>‘the victim became the aggressor’</em> widely use in several cases, you already know the best example for this.</p><h3>The Neurochemical Exploit</h3><p><em>Interface &amp; Neurochemical Manipulation</em></p><p>The true danger of cognitive cyberattacks does not lie in the genius of the threat actors, but in the structural design of the architecture they exploit. Modern social media platforms were not designed to be battlefields, but they were built as highly optimized machines for capturing human attention. To achieve this, engineers engineered a profound vulnerability into the human operating system: the exploitation of our own neurochemistry.</p><p>Every scroll, like, and notification on a digital screen triggers a micro-dose of <strong>dopamine</strong> — the neurotransmitter responsible for motivation, reward, and anticipation. This biological feedback loop was deliberately designed by platforms to keep users engaged, creating a state of continuous, hyper-reactive distraction. However, in maximizing engagement, algorithms quickly discovered that nothing drives user attention quite like tribalism, fear, and moral outrage. The prefrontal cortex — the part of the brain responsible for critical thinking, fact-checking, and rational deliberation — is effectively bypassed. When a user is flooded with adrenaline and cortisol from an outrageous post or a deeply polarizing meme, their brain enters a primitive “fight-or-flight” cognitive state.</p><p>This is the ultimate neurochemical exploit. Cognitive threat actors do not need to build complex software code to breach an organization or a nation; they simply leverage the existing infrastructure of the attention economy. By injecting engineered narratives, deepfakes, and astro-turfed movements into feeds already optimized for outrage, they turn the human brain against itself.</p><p>As cyberspace continues to expand, we must come to a stark realization: the most critical vulnerability in any network is no longer a patch missing from a server or a flaw in a software firewall. <strong>The most vulnerable endpoint in the digital age is the human mind.</strong> Until we begin defending the cognitive layer with the same urgency, resources, and technical rigor that we apply to the informational and physical layers, we will remain completely exposed to an invisible war where our own thoughts are the ultimate prize.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dffaa248d84c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://meetcyber.net/hacking-the-human-mind-dffaa248d84c">Hacking the Human Mind</a> was originally published in <a href="https://meetcyber.net/">MeetCyber</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The colors of hacking]]></title>
            <link>https://meetcyber.net/the-colors-of-hacking-535e4780a74d?source=rss-2e7c36c9ea72------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/535e4780a74d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-security-awareness]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethical-hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Guillermo Pineda]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 18:50:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-19T13:23:58.019Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*j-36M9Br97WCYmyTMox1NQ.png" /></figure><h3>Introduction</h3><p>In cyberspace, concepts often have such a high level of abstraction that there is no widespread agreement even on the fundamentals; such is the case with the word “hacker” and, in greater detail, the different types that exist today. While concepts evolve and adapt to the environments that use them, attribution in cyberspace is very difficult to define because it is usually done by custom, or until someone takes the trouble to appropriate a topic (and then someone else does the same, returning us to the discrepancies we initially mentioned).</p><p>In this article, we conducted research across different forums, groups, publications, and other digital environments where the community gathers. We searched for definitions, refined them slightly, applied logic, validated some variations, and presented them here for your own validation.</p><p>As mentioned previously, these definitions can be considered opinions, and it will be up to the user’s discretion whether to accept them, modify them, or reject them outright, as is commonly done in cyberspace.</p><h3>History</h3><p>The hacker world we know today began almost alongside computer science itself. It has a not-too-distant ancestor in the telephone networks when they became automated, opening up opportunities for the curious to find mechanisms to exploit those automations. One of the most popular figures of this era, and an inspiration for future hackers, was John Draper AKA Captain Crunch, who discovered that it was possible to bypass security controls on telephone networks using a 2600 Hz frequency. He achieved this using a whistle offered as a free prize inside the cereal box that gave him his AKA. This inspired other curious individuals with both good and bad intentions to venture into the world of telephone networks and see what else could be discovered. Among the renowned figures here, we have Steve Wozniak, co-founder of Apple Computers, who also designed the Blue Box — a device used to generate the tones necessary to navigate these telephone networks. Following a press article that dubbed these individuals Phreakers (or telephone line hackers), a culture parallel to computer science was born, governed by curiosity, technical skill, and initially divided by the ethics of those who practiced it.</p><p>A summary of the early years of hacking, its inspiration, and the first discrepancies in the definition of a Hacker (by those who, we could say, witnessed its birth) can be found in the following documentary video on the subject.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FFufYSx2_6Bg%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DFufYSx2_6Bg&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FFufYSx2_6Bg%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="640" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/b4a4e504244dc04763f65e04aacd2d9f/href">https://medium.com/media/b4a4e504244dc04763f65e04aacd2d9f/href</a></iframe><p>Even in documents presented as official, we find the same discrepancies. For example: The Internet Glossary (RFC 1392, dated 1992) initially defined it as:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/622/1*3-2ZTE44ufn_srNVtvf-0A.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1392/">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1392/</a></figcaption></figure><p>Later, RFC 4949, dated 2007 as an update to 1392, updated this definition into 3 concepts:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*DPvKLU_ba1OScV1hNT6kgw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4949">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4949</a></figcaption></figure><p>This last one has unfortunately been used maliciously by different entities to refer to this group of people — entities such as NIST or the Royal Spanish Academy (Real Academia Española).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ekWtNhzKmdUKvyh0_7yqgA.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/hacker">https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/hacker</a></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Tk5F6bPC6Gkv5H0Sina3bw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://dle.rae.es/j%C3%A1quer">https://dle.rae.es/j%C3%A1quer</a></figcaption></figure><p>Here we see that a primary need to differentiate arose among those who used their skills based on ethics.</p><p>Taking inspiration from Hollywood westerns, where the bad guys regularly wore a black hat and the heroes or good guys wore a white hat, we directly obtain 2 classifications:</p><p><strong>Black hat hackers</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uCc21JqDvbRXAIGk2sxGog.png" /></figure><blockquote>Highly skilled computer enthusiasts who use their knowledge for unethical or illegal activities.</blockquote><p><strong>White hat hackers</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QnFDBdqbAHmdu4EGsBZq9Q.png" /></figure><blockquote>Individuals who use their skills for “good” or cause no harm; they simply enjoy their computer skills either to improve designs, learn more, or for the sheer pleasure of doing so, in an ethically manner.</blockquote><p>Naturally, we see that a third definition can be (and was) generated: those who were not entirely bad or entirely good. Depending on their mood or affiliation, they could use their skills to jump between what is moral, ethical, and legal at their own convenience.</p><p><strong>Gray hat Hackers</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dCeT71zB-RZSoxI1W_kV5w.png" /></figure><blockquote>Individuals not bound to a specific moral code who can use their skills for both legal and ethical activities, as well as those that are not. Their actions can vary over time, mood, or objective.</blockquote><h3><strong>Hackers in the industry</strong></h3><p><em>If you can’t beat your enemy, join them.</em></p><p>Although the hacker culture was born as a counterculture to corporate, government, and clearly military environments, sooner rather than later they ended up joining forces. Today, it is very common for White hat hackers to work as such across different industries and organizations. Given the vast number of activities to be managed — ranging from monitoring, hunting, threat intelligence, and incident response — new terms emerged to link all these professionals together, including the “blue team.” A couple of additional concepts were also defined to describe the actions of these individuals within an organizational structure:</p><ul><li><strong>Cybersecurity</strong> (for the civilian environment) and <strong>Cyberdefense</strong> (governments and military entities)</li><li><strong>Offensive Security</strong> (aka red teams — civilian environment) and <strong>Offensive Cyber Operations</strong> (governments and military entities)</li></ul><p>Here, large industry organizations like Microsoft and government entities (such as the GSA with the FedRAMP program in 2012) began accepting and hiring external consultants to test services and products for vulnerabilities before they were launched.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/782/1*zbdYFy5p1AM4-y3XWz9Ojw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20121006183025/http://www.gsa.gov/portal/category/102371">https://web.archive.org/web/20121006183025/http://www.gsa.gov/portal/category/102371</a></figcaption></figure><p>Based on the color concept previously mentioned among the group of defenders, the color for the following classification was adopted. Although their actions could be confused with those of a normal (Alpha/Beta) tester, their core focus remains entirely on cybersecurity testing.</p><p><strong>Blue hat hacker</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eOcuehgJNii8v7OkpBdF7w.png" /></figure><blockquote>An external cybersecurity professional or ethical hacker hired by an organization to test a system or software for vulnerabilities before it is launched.</blockquote><p>This concept could be extended to what we also know as a Bounty or Bug hunter: individuals dedicated to identifying flaws in applications or companies for legal and recognized financial gain — a legal alternative at the service of industries.</p><p>Its counterpart, naturally, should be the Red hat hacker, who ought to be an expert in offensive operations. However, in this field, the community bestowed this title upon cybercriminal hunters — essentially a digital vigilante, whether known or anonymous.</p><p><strong>Red Hat Hacker</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*09hYUX1fnR_5XIfGhPR28A.png" /></figure><blockquote>Is a cybersecurity vigilante who uses aggressive, offensive tactics to hunt down and disrupt malicious hackers (black hats). Rather than just reporting cybercriminals, they often launch counterattacks to take down the criminals’ servers, disable their networks, and destroy their malicious resources.</blockquote><p>Here, their actions can easily be confused with hacktivism, as they share a similar objective and approach: taking matters into their own hands and acting under what they deem appropriate. However, they differ in focus, since the objective for the red hat hacker is usually destructive, rather than spreading a message as hacktivists typically aim to do.</p><p>Now, if we try mixing colors — as happened previously with white and blue to define an ethically based application — we should find a middle ground between the two. However, since mixing red and blue actually classifies the focus of skills (Defensive Blue — Offensive Red) regardless of moral intent, the result generates a type of hacker that is less popular but highly validated within the guild: a hacker who can actively test the security of assets within their reach, extending attacks outside the digital spectrum and adding non-traditional security layers for organizations.</p><p><strong>Purple hat hacker</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jCO0djmfG9VQ-1dFUiToYg.png" /></figure><blockquote>A cybersecurity professional who bridges the gap between offensive (Red Team) and defensive (Blue Team) security. By combining both skill sets, they simulate real-world attacks while simultaneously optimizing defense mechanisms, fostering collaboration to improve an organization’s overall security posture.</blockquote><p><strong><em>NOTE:</em></strong><em> This last role has also been assigned the context of being the person who helps bridge the work between the red and blue teams, serving as a sort of manager and facilitator. For this latter task, it was also proposed to change the color to Orange when adding coordination with development teams, as presented by April Wright at the 2017 Black Hat conference (“Orange is the new purple”). However, this is more of a description oriented toward work teams rather than specific individuals, and it often generates confusion.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tp_HHqwMJA4NeoYkWQT3Bw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://blackhat.com/docs/us-17/wednesday/us-17-Wright-Orange-Is-The-New-Purple.pdf">https://blackhat.com/docs/us-17/wednesday/us-17-Wright-Orange-Is-The-New-Purple.pdf</a></figcaption></figure><h3>Defined by knowledge</h3><p>Speaking of skills, we all know that two extremes of learning exist: the novice and the expert.</p><p>However, on the front line of action, we have novices who want to learn out of genuine curiosity, and those who want to learn simply to draw attention and gain acceptance from third parties for their self-proclaimed skills. Instead of receiving positive recognition from the industry, they are given pejorative names like: <strong>Haxor, Lammer, Script Kiddie (or Skid), Luser</strong>, as well as any of their v4r1at10n3s in l33t speak. As if all these terms weren’t enough, in some forums they are called Pink hat hackers.</p><p><strong>Pink hat hacker</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*slMpmQs6EKInlwitRqSz_Q.png" /></figure><blockquote>They are individuals (often teenagers) who buy or download ready-made hacking tools, malicious code, or ransomware from the Dark Web without truly understanding how they work.</blockquote><blockquote>It is a visual mockery; it represents a Black Hat that “faded” or someone who lacks the maturity and technical level to be considered a serious threat or a true Black Hat. When they execute an attack, they are usually caught quickly due to their own logical errors.</blockquote><p><strong><em>NOTE:</em></strong><em> This color has also been sought after as a designation for women involved in the hacker world, serving as a distinction that breaks away from the classic hacker stereotype (the hooded man in a dark basement) and encourages more girls and women to become interested in STEM disciplines and digital security. Some sites reference them as an innocent novice, but that concept is already covered in the following classification.</em></p><p>To refer to novices who have the right reasons for learning hacking, the community has agreed to distinguish them with the green hat.</p><p><strong>Green hat hacker</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dIk9Xsn5lISSlHh1TYim2g.png" /></figure><blockquote>A cybersecurity enthusiast who is starting their learning path for the pleasure of gaining knowledge, rather than seeking immediate recognition or pretending to possess skills that don’t yet understand.</blockquote><p>On the other hand, internationally renowned hackers celebrated for their developments or exploits are classified as <strong>Elite (leet / l33t), Wizard</strong> (because their solutions seem like magic), or <strong>Guru</strong>. In less formal circles, they are called silver hats, denoting the gray hair they wear as veterans of the industry.</p><p><strong>Silver hat hacker</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sM2_zqLyWsm3-_leVzATEA.png" /></figure><blockquote>A cyberspace professional with years of experience in the industry; they do not necessarily have to be internationally recognized.</blockquote><p>Following the thread of precious metals, there are also references to hackers who generate vastly important developments for the industry, such as tools, techniques, procedures, etc., contributing to the community and asking for nothing in return. These are known as Golden hats due to their valuable contributions to the industry at large.</p><p><strong>Golden hat hacker</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*N-zmoDU05yHGRAmXLJwOSw.png" /></figure><blockquote>An expert who generates content for the cyber world, solves problems, gives away tools, PoC, etc., in a way that benefits the community without asking for anything in return.</blockquote><h3>The ‘not so precise’ ones</h3><p>Now let’s focus on the most vulnerable link: humans. Since Kevin Mitnick popularized (but did not invent) the term “Social Engineering,” he also opened the door to a new type of attack in cyberspace that escapes traditional digital security. To date, its use has expanded so much that it enjoys various techniques such as:</p><ul><li><strong>Pretexting</strong></li><li><strong>Tailgating</strong></li><li><strong>Piggybacking</strong></li><li><strong>-ishing</strong> (phishing, smishing, vishing)</li><li><strong>Shoulder surfing</strong></li><li><strong>Dumpster diving</strong></li><li><strong>Quid pro Quo</strong></li><li><strong>Baiting</strong></li></ul><p>Ironically, for this type of hacker — possessing social and psychological skills that diverge from technical skills — there is no generalized classification regarding hats. They are usually called <strong>Human hackers</strong> and publicly seek to identify as White hackers. However, it is clear that these activities are not solely at the service of ethical consultancies. In very niche spaces, and fighting over the name with other definitions, they have been referred to as Orange hat hackers. They are also defined as facilitators of cybercrime due to the use of their skills to obtain secrets or access that would be very difficult to acquire through technical means alone.</p><p><strong>Orange hat hacker</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5MclEbPSE7ofdWMKNfQHAg.png" /></figure><blockquote>A professional in the art of social engineering whose skills transcend the technical. They focus on the psychological and social manipulation of individuals or groups of people to obtain secrets or access that would be very difficult to achieve through technical means.</blockquote><p><strong>NOTE:</strong> There are other definitions that adopt this color that are also worth mentioning:</p><p><strong>The “Education Hacker” (Academic Proposal)</strong></p><blockquote>They possess the technical knowledge of an advanced hacker, but their sole mission is pedagogical: designing labs, teaching legal penetration tactics, raising awareness among university students, and training the next generation of security professionals.</blockquote><p><strong>The “Obsessive” or Single-Focus Hacker (The most widespread in forums)</strong></p><blockquote>They do not hack randomly, nor do they look for easy money. They can spend months or years studying the infrastructure of a single corporation, a specific video game, or a particular government system until they find a way in. Their motivation is the intellectual challenge and the personal satisfaction of defeating that specific rival. Their ethics may vary (they can act as white or black), but they are defined by their hyper-focus.</blockquote><p><strong>Yellow Hat Hackers</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*q6SyecFvU-_k9pkIDiHHZA.png" /></figure><p>In cybersecurity culture, the color yellow is usually associated with warning, prevention, and source code analysis. Two main definitions exist on the web:</p><p><strong>“Malware Hunters” and Code Analysts</strong></p><blockquote>They do not dedicate themselves to launching simulated attacks (like the Red Team) or monitoring networks in real-time (like the Blue Team). Their job consists of auditing the source code of applications to find flaws before the software is compiled or released. It also includes malware analysts who isolate viruses in controlled environments (sandboxes) to study their behavior and create vaccines.</blockquote><p><strong>The Socially Responsible or “Low Profile” Hacker</strong></p><blockquote>In certain discussion forums, they are defined as a middle point between White and Gray. These are hackers who discover a vulnerability and, instead of seeking public fame or aggressively pressuring a company, notify the flaw in a strictly confidential manner and collaborate patiently with the developers. They are called yellows due to their focus on caution and diplomacy.</blockquote><p><strong>Brown hat hackers</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Nqd2w1p3bmVPWN21-4hwSw.png" /></figure><blockquote>More of an inside joke than a real definition of a hacker, as it would be the opposite of a hacker (skilled or smart). They are those who, clumsily or unexpectedly, generate catastrophic failures or make major discoveries. It is also used in some environments to define opportunistic attackers who had a stroke of luck, generating undesired behavior or obtaining an unexpected reward. some use children who innocently made significant findings as an example, such as the 5-year-old child who bypassed Xbox security (Kristoffer Von Hassel).</blockquote><h3><strong>Cyber Security Hat Matrix</strong></h3><p>As a summary here is a presentation of the previously mentioned hat colors.</p><p><strong>The ethical distribution</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/715/1*5H-Nbbw_CU7HkwFdLtL1BQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>The large environment</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/710/1*jKhhCMwkQ_xRFYIA_0uUMQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>The knowledge base</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/717/1*PkiGkqoDmu3DZQPejnz8pA.png" /></figure><p><strong>The ‘not so’ exactly</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/1*CVIyP5gnh3d7U9RaxqdorQ.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=535e4780a74d" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://meetcyber.net/the-colors-of-hacking-535e4780a74d">The colors of hacking</a> was originally published in <a href="https://meetcyber.net/">MeetCyber</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How to Hack a Country: A Research Overview of the Vectors Used to Destabilize Nations]]></title>
            <link>https://meetcyber.net/how-to-hack-a-country-a-research-overview-of-the-vectors-used-to-destabilize-nations-8831aafcfd43?source=rss-2e7c36c9ea72------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8831aafcfd43</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-security-awareness]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cibersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-operations]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Guillermo Pineda]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 12 Apr 2026 10:55:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-04-12T10:55:57.822Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>By Guillermo Pineda</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*nsYmthtAU_wKpi6W01a6Uw.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>This article is oriented toward a brief but comprehensive research overview of the attack vectors used to date to cause national-scale disruption — covering all known vectors, both external and internal, from infrastructure sabotage and BGP hijacking to psychological warfare, meme operations, and digital censorship. It is written for intelligence professionals, security researchers, policymakers, and anyone who wants to understand what modern conflict actually looks like before the first tank crosses the border.</em></p><h3>Introduction: The New Battlefield Has No Front Line</h3><p>In the 20th century, attacking a country meant mobilizing armies, launching missiles, or imposing naval blockades. The rules of engagement were visible. The damage was measurable. The attacker was identifiable.</p><p>None of those assumptions hold anymore.</p><p>Today, a coordinated cyberattack can paralyze a national parliament before a single soldier moves. A piece of malware planted months in advance can detonate the moment tanks begin to roll. A disinformation campaign seeded through social media can turn citizens against their own government without a single shot being fired. And when a government wants to hide atrocities from the world, it can simply turn off the internet.</p><p>Hacking a country is no longer exceptional — it is doctrine. It has been tested, refined, and deployed repeatedly over the past two decades, by nation-states, criminal groups, ideologically motivated hacktivists, and governments against their own populations. The tools are increasingly accessible. The attribution is deliberately murky. And the damage is real.</p><p>This article maps the full attack surface of a modern nation-state: from network-level hijacking and critical infrastructure sabotage to psychological operations, meme warfare, and digital censorship. Every section is grounded in documented, real-world cases.</p><h3>I. Estonia 2007 — The First Cyber War the World Noticed</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/716/0*IjtdFC1CG5_Keigs" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/francistapon/2018/07/07/the-bronze-soldier-statue-in-tallinn-estonia-give-baltic-headaches/">Image from www.forbes.com</a></figcaption></figure><p>On the night of April 26, 2007, Estonia moved a Soviet-era war memorial — the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn — from the center of the city to a military cemetery. Within hours, a cyber campaign began that would last 22 days and permanently reshape how NATO thought about national security.</p><p>Estonia was an ideal target, and not just politically. By 2007, it was one of the most digitally integrated societies in Europe — internet banking, e-government, digital voting, and online public services were deeply embedded in daily life. That interconnection was also a profound vulnerability.</p><p>The attacks came in three waves. The first began the night of the statue’s removal: defacement of government websites, DDoS floods targeting the parliament and ministries, pro-Russian messages injected into the Reform Party’s website. The second wave peaked on May 9th — Victory Day in Russia — using rented botnets assembled from compromised computers across multiple continents to overwhelm banking and telecommunications infrastructure. The third, smaller wave came on May 18th. In total, 128 confirmed DDoS attacks disrupted the Estonian parliament, banks, media outlets, telecom providers, and emergency services. The estimated cost ranged from $27 to $40 million.</p><p>The Russian government denied any involvement. Attribution was nearly impossible by design — the botnets used computers in Vietnam, the United States, and Peru, with attack instructions circulated in Russian-language forums. One ethnic-Russian Estonian national was eventually convicted. Kremlin-linked youth movement leader Konstantin Goloskokov of Nashi later claimed partial personal responsibility — while insisting he acted without official orders. This deliberate ambiguity — what strategists call “plausible deniability” — would become a defining feature of the decades of hybrid warfare that followed.</p><p>It is worth emphasizing, however, that <strong>Estonia 2007 was not the first time a nation was targeted through cyberspace</strong>. It was simply the first time the world paid attention, and the event that opened cyberspace as a recognized domain of warfare in the eyes of governments and military planners globally. The United States Air Force conducted offensive cyber operations during the Gulf War as early as 1991. The NSA ran signals intelligence and network exploitation programs against foreign governments throughout the 1990s. In 1999, hackers linked to Serbia conducted rudimentary DDoS attacks against NATO websites during the Kosovo air campaign. In 2003, Chinese hackers associated with the People’s Liberation Army conducted a sustained intrusion campaign against U.S. defense contractors — a campaign that later became known as Titan Rain. What made Estonia different was the scale, duration, geopolitical context, and above all the fact that it happened to a NATO and EU member state in full public view, with no available legal or military framework to respond. Estonia forced the world to confront a question it had been avoiding: what does “an act of war” mean when the weapon is a botnet?</p><p>The direct institutional consequence was the creation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn and, later, the Tallinn Manual — the first serious attempt to apply existing international law to cyber warfare.</p><p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_cyberattacks_on_Estonia">2007 Cyberattacks on Estonia — Wikipedia</a> <br><a href="https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/Ottis2008_AnalysisOf2007FromTheInformationWarfarePerspective.pdf">Estonia Attack Analysis — CCDCOE/Ottis 2008</a></p><h3>II. Silencing a Nation — National-Scale Denial of Service</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*B79T8nkuFtQAYe_v" /><figcaption>taken from <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/videos/us/2015/01/02/tsr-dnt-acosta-obama-north-korea-sanctions.cnn">CNN</a></figcaption></figure><h3>The Sony Chain Reaction</h3><p>In November 2014, a group calling itself the Guardians of Peace infiltrated Sony Pictures Entertainment, stole 100 gigabytes of internal data, and threatened to attack movie theaters if Sony released <em>The Interview</em>, a comedy depicting the assassination of Kim Jong-un. Sony initially shelved the film. President Obama publicly criticized the decision and pledged a “proportional response” to what he called “an act of cyber vandalism” attributable to North Korea.</p><p>Days later, on December 22nd, 2014, North Korea went offline.</p><p>Internet monitoring firm Dyn Research documented the outage in real time. North Korea’s entire internet access — routed almost entirely through a single Chinese provider — became unstable on December 19th and went completely dark by December 22nd. The network failure was consistent with a DDoS attack targeting the country’s routers. Doug Madory, director of internet analysis at Dyn Research, described it as North Korea being “erased from the global map of the internet.” Representative Michael McCaul, chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, later stated at a CSIS event that the outage was indeed a retaliatory measure — without identifying the responsible agency.</p><p>Why was it so easy? North Korea’s entire internet infrastructure consisted of roughly 1,024 IP addresses — fewer than many university campuses.</p><p><a href="https://time.com/3644632/north-korea-internet-sony/">North Korea Internet Outage — TIME</a> <br><a href="https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2015/03/18/North-Korea-Internet-outage-was-payback-for-Sony-hack-US-official-says/7261426693793/">North Korea Outage Confirmed Retaliatory — UPI</a></p><h3>The Syrian Accident</h3><p>A parallel case — genuinely accidental — illustrates the same fragility. According to documents disclosed by Edward Snowden and reported by <em>The Guardian</em>, NSA operators from the elite Tailored Access Operations (TAO) unit attempted in 2012 to remotely install an exploit in one of Syria’s core internet routers. Something went wrong, and the router was bricked — rendered completely inoperable — taking the entire country offline. Inside the TAO operations center, the incident was described as an “oh shit” moment. The team could not fix the problem remotely. They were powerless. “If we get caught,” someone joked at the time, “we can always point the finger at Israel.” The Syrian government blamed “terrorists” for the outage. Nobody suspected the NSA. The event revealed that even a state’s core internet routing infrastructure can be rendered inoperable by a single misplaced packet from a sufficiently positioned actor — with no DDoS required.</p><p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/13/snowden-nsa-syria-internet-outage-civil-war">Snowden: NSA Accidentally Caused Syria’s Internet Blackout — The Guardian</a></p><h3>III. BGP Hijacking — Stealing the Road, Not the Car</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*-kTWIxR3nzcERA-n.png" /><figcaption>taken from <a href="https://blog.cloudflare.com/bgp-hijack-detection/">cloudflare.com</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>BGP (Border Gateway Protocol)</strong> is the routing protocol that determines how data moves between the autonomous systems that make up the internet. BGP has no built-in authentication. It was designed in an era when every internet node was assumed to be operated by a trustworthy institution. A BGP hijack occurs when a network announces routes for IP address blocks it doesn’t own — silently redirecting enormous volumes of internet traffic in seconds.</p><h3>Pakistan Telecom vs. YouTube (2008)</h3><p>On February 24, 2008, the government of Pakistan ordered all domestic ISPs to block YouTube due to a video deemed offensive. Pakistan Telecom implemented the block by announcing a more specific route for YouTube’s IP prefix — intending only to redirect Pakistani users to a dead end. The announcement leaked to upstream provider PCCW Global in Hong Kong, which propagated the route globally. Within two minutes, YouTube’s traffic was being directed to Pakistan for a significant portion of the internet. For approximately two hours, YouTube was unreachable for users across much of the world — not because YouTube was attacked, but because its address had been quietly stolen and buried.</p><p>📎 <a href="https://www.ripe.net/about-us/news/youtube-hijacking-a-ripe-ncc-ris-case-study/">Pakistan Hijacks YouTube — RIPE NCC</a></p><h3>China Telecom (2010) and Belarus (2013)</h3><p>In April 2010, China Telecom leaked routes that caused approximately 15% of global internet traffic to be routed through Chinese networks for 18 minutes. The affected traffic included connections to the U.S. Senate and the Department of Defense. In 2013, security researchers documented the first confirmed BGP-based man-in-the-middle attack: traffic from major U.S. credit card companies and government networks rerouted through a Belarusian ISP in recurring 30-second windows designed to capture data without triggering monitoring thresholds.</p><p>📎 <a href="https://www.kentik.com/blog/a-brief-history-of-the-internets-biggest-bgp-incidents/">BGP Hijacking History — Kentik Blog</a></p><h3>Russia Tries to Silence Twitter (2022)</h3><p>On March 28, 2022, Russian ISP RTComm (AS8342) hijacked a prefix belonging to Twitter in an attempt to block access to the platform following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — a BGP-level censorship move consistent with the earlier Myanmar coup playbook. The hijacked route propagated through MTS, one of Russia’s largest telecoms, briefly affecting Twitter traffic outside Russian borders before being corrected.</p><p>📎 <a href="https://www.kentik.com/analysis/bgp-hijack-of-twitter-by-russian-isp/">BGP Hijack of Twitter by Russian ISP — Kentik</a> 📎 <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BGP_hijacking">BGP Hijacking — Wikipedia</a></p><h3>IV. Critical Infrastructure — Where Bits Become Casualties</h3><p>Critical infrastructure is where cyberattacks stop being inconveniences and start costing lives.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nb5Z_RFNMmHTDgI4_pf_mQ.png" /><figcaption>taken from <a href="https://www.wired.com/video/watch/watch-hackers-take-over-a-ukranian-power-station">wired.com</a></figcaption></figure><h3>Energy</h3><p><strong>Ukraine 2015 — The First Confirmed Cyberattack on a Power Grid:</strong> The group Sandworm, linked to Russia’s GRU, spent months inside Ukrainian energy company networks using BlackEnergy malware. In a coordinated action on December 23, 2015, they opened circuit breakers across 30 substations, deployed KillDisk to render workstations inoperable, and flooded customer service lines. 230,000 homes lost electricity during a Ukrainian winter. It was the first confirmed cyberattack to cause a physical power outage in history. A year later, Sandworm returned with CrashOverride/Industroyer, a more sophisticated malware purpose-built to attack industrial control systems. A second blackout followed in Kyiv.</p><p><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-110a">Russian Cyber Threats to Critical Infrastructure — CISA</a></p><p><strong>Colonial Pipeline, USA 2021:</strong> On May 7, 2021, Colonial Pipeline — supplying 45% of East Coast fuel — shut down after a DarkSide ransomware infection accessed via a single compromised VPN password with no multi-factor authentication enabled. President Biden declared a state of emergency. Gas stations ran dry across the eastern seaboard. Colonial paid $4.4 million in Bitcoin within 24 hours.</p><p><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/attack-colonial-pipeline-what-weve-learned-what-weve-done-over-past-two-years">Colonial Pipeline Attack — CISA</a></p><h3>Water</h3><p>In February 2021, a supervisor at the water treatment facility in Oldsmar, Florida, watched someone remotely control his mouse via TeamViewer and raise the concentration of sodium hydroxide in the drinking water supply from 100 parts per million to 11,100 parts per million — a caustic, potentially lethal level. He corrected the settings immediately. A second attempt followed.</p><p><a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-117hhrg45085/html/CHRG-117hhrg45085.htm">Oldsmar Water Treatment Cyberattack — Congressional Record</a></p><h3>Healthcare</h3><p><strong>WannaCry vs. the NHS (2017):</strong> The WannaCry ransomware worm — attributed to North Korea’s Lazarus Group — infected over 200,000 computers in 150 countries. Approximately 80 NHS trusts were affected: hospitals locked out of patient records diverted ambulances and cancelled surgeries.</p><p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/health-39899646">WannaCry Attack on NHS — BBC News</a></p><p><strong>Düsseldorf University Hospital (2020):</strong> A ransomware attack caused cascade failure of IT systems at the height of COVID-19. A woman in critical condition was diverted to a hospital 32 kilometers away and died before reaching care — potentially the first documented case of a cyberattack directly linked to a patient death.</p><p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/sep/18/hospital-ransomware-attack-led-to-death-of-patient-german-officials-say">Düsseldorf Hospital Ransomware Patient Death — The Guardian</a></p><h3>Transport: When a Software Update Grounds the World</h3><p>On July 19, 2024, CrowdStrike distributed a faulty update to its Falcon Sensor security software. The result was the largest IT outage in history: approximately 8.5 million Windows systems crashed simultaneously worldwide. Airlines were among the hardest hit. The FAA ordered a global ground stop for American, Delta, and United. More than 5,000 flights were cancelled globally and over 40,000 delayed. Delta alone cancelled more than 7,000 flights over five days, suffering an estimated $550 million in losses. Airports across the US, Europe, Asia, and Australia were paralyzed. It was not a cyberattack in the traditional sense — but it demonstrated with remarkable clarity how a single point of failure in a widely deployed security product can cascade into national and global transport collapse, precisely the kind of scenario a deliberate supply chain attack would seek to replicate.</p><p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_CrowdStrike-related_IT_outages">2024 CrowdStrike-Related IT Outages — Wikipedia</a></p><h3>V. The Five Domains of War — Cyber as the Opening Act</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*8FAslkY0KnO3x4SM.png" /><figcaption>taken from <a href="https://parallaxresearch.org/">https://parallaxresearch.org/</a></figcaption></figure><p>Modern military doctrine recognizes five domains of warfare: land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. In practice, operations in cyberspace have become the preliminary domain — the battlefield preparation layer that shapes conditions before conventional forces ever engage.</p><p>No conflict has illustrated this more clearly than Russia’s campaign against Ukraine, which began not on February 24, 2022, but years earlier.</p><h3>Ukraine: Eight Years of Cyber Preparation</h3><p>The war didn’t start in 2022. It started in 2014:</p><ul><li><strong>2015:</strong> BlackEnergy/KillDisk attacks on power distribution companies. First-ever confirmed grid blackout via cyberattack.</li><li><strong>2016:</strong> CrashOverride/Industroyer deployed against Kyiv’s transmission network. Second blackout.</li><li><strong>2017:</strong> NotPetya — initially targeted at Ukrainian accounting software MeDoc — detonated on June 27th, wiping systems at Ukrainian banks, newspapers, and government agencies before spiraling catastrophically across global supply chains. Maersk lost 45,000 PCs and 4,000 servers. Total global damage: an estimated $10 billion. It remains the most financially destructive cyberattack in history.</li></ul><p><a href="https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/">NotPetya — Wired</a></p><p>Then came the precision preparation for the 2022 invasion:</p><ul><li><strong>October 2021:</strong> IssacWiper malware compiled, according to code timestamps — four months before deployment.</li><li><strong>November 2021:</strong> Russian GRU-linked actors build cloned Ukrainian government websites with embedded malware.</li><li><strong>December 2021:</strong> HermeticWiper development completed.</li><li><strong>January 14, 2022 — WhisperGate:</strong> Seventy Ukrainian government websites defaced with: “Be afraid and expect the worst.” Beneath the defacement: a wiper destroying the master boot record of infected machines.</li><li><strong>February 15–16, 2022:</strong> DDoS attacks against the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and the country’s two largest banks.</li><li><strong>February 23, 2022–5:00 PM:</strong> HermeticWiper detected simultaneously on hundreds of systems across five major Ukrainian organizations, hours before the invasion.</li><li><strong>February 24, 2022–4:00 AM:</strong> Russian forces cross the border. Simultaneously, a cyberattack against Viasat’s KA-SAT satellite broadband service causes widespread communications outages. Ukrainian officials described it as “a huge loss in communications in the very beginning of the war.”</li></ul><p><a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/cyber-war-and-ukraine">Russia’s Pre-Invasion Cyber Campaign — CSIS</a> <br><a href="https://www.welivesecurity.com/2023/02/24/year-wiper-attacks-ukraine/">Wiper Attacks Timeline Ukraine — ESET</a> <br><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-057a">HermeticWiper — CISA Advisory</a></p><h3>When Civilians Join the Battle: Hacktivists as Irregular Forces</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*XrpzgDM9HDZOZQ9T.png" /><figcaption>taken from www.storyblocks.com</figcaption></figure><p>The war in Ukraine demonstrated something new at scale: civilian hacktivists voluntarily integrating their operations with military objectives — blurring the line between civil society and irregular warfare in the cyberspace domain.</p><p><strong>Anonymous #OpRussia (2022):</strong> One day after the invasion began, the decentralized collective Anonymous “declared war” on the Russian state. Affiliated actors claimed to have leaked internal documents from Roskomnadzor, accessed files from the Russian Ministry of Defense, disrupted RT state broadcaster, hijacked Russian television signals to broadcast footage of the war in Ukraine, and accessed databases from Gazprom and the Russian Central Bank.</p><p><a href="https://www.cfr.org/articles/tracking-cyber-operations-and-actors-russia-ukraine-war">Tracking Cyber Operations Ukraine — CFR</a></p><p><strong>The Belarusian Cyber Partisans:</strong> In January 2022, the Belarusian Cyber Partisans encrypted servers managing the Belarusian state railway network — specifically targeting the systems controlling train switching and routing — to slow the movement of Russian military equipment and personnel toward the Ukrainian border. This was one of the first documented cases of hacktivist operations producing measurable effects on actual military logistics. Railway operations were degraded in the critical pre-invasion window.</p><p><a href="https://www.cfr.org/articles/tracking-cyber-operations-and-actors-russia-ukraine-war">Belarusian Cyber Partisans Railway Attack — CFR</a></p><p><strong>KillNet:</strong> Pro-Kremlin hacktivists conducted DDoS campaigns against healthcare systems, airports, and government portals in NATO member countries throughout 2022–2023 — including hospitals in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands.</p><p><strong>Anonymous #OpIsrael:</strong> The Ukraine conflict is not the only example of hacktivists targeting a state. Since 2013, the hacktivist collective Anonymous has conducted annual operations against Israel (#OpIsrael), coordinated to coincide with Holocaust Remembrance Day. The recurring campaigns have involved DDoS attacks against Israeli government, banking, and academic sites, website defacements, and data leaks — explicitly framed as protest against Israeli policy in Palestinian territories. In subsequent years, the campaign has attracted participation from dozens of hacktivist groups and has expanded to target entities in countries perceived as supporting Israel. Security researchers have also documented possible ties between some participating groups and state-level actors from Iran, Pakistan, and Lebanon.</p><p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OpIsrael">#OpIsrael — Wikipedia</a><br><a href="https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/hotforsecurity/anonymous-targets-500-israeli-web-sites-over-gaza-conflict">Anonymous Targets 500 Israeli Sites over Gaza — Bitdefender</a></p><p><strong>Anonymous #OpColombia:</strong> In May 2021, as protests erupted across Colombia against a controversial tax reform and amid accusations of police brutality against demonstrators, Anonymous declared war on the government of President Iván Duque. Hackers disabled the Colombian military’s website, released personal data of 168 military officials including emails and passwords, temporarily took down the websites of the Colombian Senate and the presidency, and leaked classified files from the national police. Anonymous also manipulated Google Maps to rename protest sites in honor of killed demonstrators, and tampered with Twitter’s search algorithm so that searches for “asesino” (murderer) returned the Colombian president and his predecessor as the top results. The campaign illustrated how hacktivist operations can be deployed not only against foreign governments but in support of domestic civil unrest — functioning as an irregular force multiplier for social protest movements.</p><p><a href="https://youthjournalism.org/anonymous-hackers-attack-colombian-government/">Anonymous Hacks Colombian Government — Youth Journalism International</a> <br><a href="https://globalvoices.org/2021/05/24/hacker-group-anonymous-leaks-colombias-police-and-army-files-amid-protest-crackdown/">Anonymous Leaks Colombia’s Police and Army Files — Global Voices</a></p><h3>VI. Attacking the Population — The Softest Target</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*xrZaExFnP_9Grpjt.png" /><figcaption>taken from iranhumanrights.com</figcaption></figure><p><em>Infrastructure attacks are loud. Psychological operations are quiet, cumulative, and in many respects more dangerous — because the population never knows it is under attack.</em></p><h3>A. Narrative Warfare and Manufactured Panic</h3><p>Social media gave political and military actors something they had never had before: direct, real-time, scalable access to foreign civilian populations. Russia’s Internet Research Agency (IRA) operation against the United States during the 2016 presidential election is the most thoroughly documented case. Senate Intelligence Committee reports confirmed that IRA operatives created fictitious American personas across Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube, generating content targeting Black voters, Christian conservatives, gun rights advocates, immigration opponents, and progressive activists simultaneously — not to advance a single viewpoint, but to maximize polarization and distrust regardless of which side a user was on.</p><p><a href="https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/publications/report-select-committee-intelligence-united-states-senate-russian-active-measures">Senate Intelligence Report on Russian Social Media Operations</a></p><p>Viral panic campaigns have also been used to generate economic disruption. False rumors that major banks have run out of cash — seeded through messaging apps and amplified by bots — can trigger real-world queues and capital flight within hours, causing actual financial damage without any compromise of financial system infrastructure. Similar campaigns were deployed in Ukraine in the days before the 2022 invasion.</p><p><strong>The Zelensky Deepfake:</strong> On March 16, 2022, hackers breached the Ukrainian television station Ukraine 24, injecting a deepfake video of President Volodymyr Zelensky into the station’s live broadcast ticker and website — appearing to show him calling on Ukrainian soldiers to lay down their arms and surrender. The video was crude: his head was visibly misaligned with his body, and his voice sounded stilted. It circulated on social media, was viewed hundreds of thousands of times on Twitter, and was amplified on Russia’s VKontakte before being removed. Zelensky immediately posted a rebuttal video from his own phone. Security researcher Sam Gregory of Witness described it as “the first deepfake used in an intentional and broadly deceptive way” in a modern conflict. Its purpose was not to fool every viewer — only to create enough uncertainty for a few critical hours.</p><p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/03/16/1087062648/deepfake-video-zelenskyy-experts-war-manipulation-ukraine-russia">Deepfake Zelensky Surrender Video — NPR</a> <br><a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/hacked-news-channel-and-deepfake-of-zelenskyy-surrendering-is-causing-chaos-online/">Hacked News Channel and Deepfake Causing Chaos — VICE</a></p><h3>B. The Meme War</h3><p>Memes are not trivial. They are ideological delivery mechanisms wrapped in humor, and they operate precisely because they bypass critical reasoning. A meme does not ask you to accept an argument — it invites you to laugh at one, normalizing the underlying premise in the process.</p><p>The systematic use of memes as influence operation tools has been documented by Stanford Internet Observatory, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, and Meta’s security team.</p><p>A clear domestic example unfolded in the United States in mid-2025: multiple media analysts, Democratic strategists, and political scientists observed a statistically significant pattern in the Trump administration’s social media activity — waves of provocative, distracting posts (AI-generated videos, memes attacking political opponents, announcements about NFL team names, immigration crackdown visuals) appearing in concentrated bursts precisely during periods of peak pressure over the Epstein files. Researchers at Stanford published quantitative research analyzing the pattern, finding that a one-standard-deviation increase in Epstein-related media coverage was associated with measurably higher novelty in Trump’s Truth Social posts over the following four-day window.</p><p>The underlying mechanism is informational: each time congressional pressure or media coverage of the Epstein files intensified, a flood of attention-grabbing content — ICE raid videos, Venezuela operations, threats against Iran — dominated social media feeds and cable news cycles, displacing the original story.</p><p><a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/trump-goes-manic-meme-posting-081626673">Trump Goes on Meme Posting Spree to Distract from Epstein — Yahoo/Daily Beast</a><br><a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-steer-conversation-away-jeffrey-epstein/story?id=123927092">Critics Say Trump Trying to Distract from Epstein — ABC News</a><br><a href="https://newrepublic.com/post/198057/donald-trump-create-distraction-epstein-files">Trump Scrambles to Distract from Epstein Files — The New Republic</a><br><a href="https://www.democracynow.org/2026/1/20/trump_epstein">Distraction from Epstein Files? — Democracy Now!</a></p><p>This is exactly how operations work in the cognitive layer of the conflict space: not by lying directly, but by controlling what people are looking at. Any political actor with a large platform and an understanding of social media algorithms can deploy meme warfare as a distraction mechanism — regardless of nationality, ideology, or state sponsorship.</p><p><strong>Iran’s Embassy Meme Campaign (2026):</strong> When U.S. President Trump issued a profanity-laden threat demanding Iran “open the Strait” during escalating tensions in April 2026, Iranian embassies — in London, Pretoria, New Delhi, Moscow, Zimbabwe, Bulgaria, and South Africa — launched a coordinated satirical response across X. The Iranian embassy in Zimbabwe replied: “We’ve lost the keys.” South Africa: “Shh… the key’s under the flowerpot. Just open for friends.” Bulgaria’s embassy linked the thread directly to Epstein: “Doors open for friends. Epstein’s friends need keys.” The campaign spread globally within hours, requiring no military asset and costing nothing beyond a social media account.</p><p>Media psychologist Pamela Rutledge of the Media Psychology Center told USA TODAY: “These memes normalize a hypermasculine, militarized response and encourage people to automatically accept policies that would look very different in a sober news briefing.”</p><p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/7/get-a-grip-how-iranian-embassies-mocked-trumps-vulgar-threat">‘Get a grip’: How Iranian Embassies Mocked Trump’s Vulgar Threat — Al Jazeera</a> <br><a href="https://www.bangordailynews.com/2026/04/07/nation/us-government-iran-meme-warfare/">US Government and Pro-Iranian Voices Wage Memetic Warfare — USA TODAY / Bangor Daily News</a> <br><a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/5805249-iran-war-propaganda-memes/">Pro-Iran Memes Go Viral, Striking Back at Trump — The Hill</a></p><p>The mechanics are the same regardless of which side deploys them: a meme is created associating a political figure or institution with a negative archetype, it migrates outward through irony-coded communities, and over time a population’s baseline attitudes shift — without any individual being able to identify when or why.</p><h3>C. When Governments Attack Their Own People</h3><p>The most intimate form of national-scale cyber attack is a government severing its own population from the internet — not to protect them, but to prevent the outside world from witnessing what is being done to them.</p><p><strong>Iran, November 2019:</strong> When the Iranian government announced a surprise fuel price increase, protests erupted nationwide. The government’s response was a near-total internet shutdown — blocking approximately 96% of outbound internet traffic for five days — specifically to prevent documentation of the security forces’ response and to block coordination between protest organizers. According to Amnesty International, at least 304 people were killed during the crackdown.</p><p><a href="https://netblocks.org/reports/iran-internet-shut-down-as-protests-spread-across-the-country-eby9djB7">Iran Internet Shutdown 2019 — NetBlocks / Amnesty International</a></p><p><strong>Myanmar, February 2021:</strong> Following the military coup, the junta imposed rolling internet shutdowns progressing from nightly blackouts to extended nationwide outages. Facebook — the primary communications infrastructure for a large portion of the population — was blocked using BGP-level route manipulation, with spillover effects that briefly affected users in neighboring countries.</p><p><a href="https://netblocks.org/reports/facebook-twitter-instagram-and-whatsapp-blocked-in-myanmar-amid-unrest-eBpQqg88">Myanmar Internet Shutdowns After Coup — NetBlocks</a></p><p><strong>Cuba, July 2021:</strong> The July 11 protests — the largest in decades — were documented almost entirely through mobile phone video. The government cut mobile internet access within hours to eliminate the only independent broadcast mechanism available to citizens.</p><p><a href="https://netblocks.org/reports/cuba-internet-disruptions-amid-historic-protests-98B8oqB2">Cuba Internet Cuts During July 2021 Protests — NetBlocks</a></p><p><strong>Russia’s RuNet:</strong> Russia’s 2019 sovereign internet law created the legal and technical infrastructure to disconnect the RuNet from the global internet at will, requiring all ISPs to install deep packet inspection hardware controlled by Roskomnadzor. Russia has publicly tested RuNet isolation on multiple occasions. It represents the most advanced government-controlled internet architecture outside of North Korea’s complete separation.</p><p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_censorship_in_Russia">Russia Internet Censorship and RuNet — Internet Censorship in Russia, Wikipedia</a></p><h3>VII. Attack Vectors You May Have Missed</h3><p>Beyond the headline cases, several additional vectors deserve serious attention in any comprehensive threat model.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ro0WCqwuwPvwwNdc.jpg" /><figcaption>taken from youtube.com</figcaption></figure><h3>Supply Chain Attacks: Hack the Vendor, Own the Customers</h3><p>The SolarWinds compromise of 2020 established the template for the most scalable attack vector in modern cybersecurity. Russian SVR actors inserted malicious code into a legitimate software update for SolarWinds’ Orion IT monitoring platform — used by 18,000 organizations worldwide. Roughly 100 were actively exploited, including nine U.S. federal agencies: the Departments of Defense, Treasury, State, Homeland Security, and others. The attackers had undetected access for nine months. The target simply updated its software — and the attack delivered itself.</p><p><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/joint-statement-federal-bureau-investigation-fbi-cybersecurity-and-infrastructure-security">SolarWinds Hack — CISA</a></p><h3>Chinese Kill Switches in Solar Inverters</h3><p>In May 2025, a Reuters investigation revealed that U.S. energy security officials had discovered hidden communication devices — undocumented cellular radios — inside Chinese-made solar power inverters deployed across American solar farms. These devices could be activated remotely to disable or manipulate the inverters, potentially causing widespread blackouts. One source described the finding as “a built-in way to physically destroy the grid.” The three dominant Chinese manufacturers — Huawei, Sungrow, and Ginlong Solis — together control a significant portion of the global solar inverter market. The discovery illustrates strategic patience: not an attack triggered immediately, but leverage sitting dormant inside critical infrastructure, awaiting activation.</p><p><a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/chinese-kill-switches-found-us-122555351.html">Chinese Kill Switches Found in US Solar Farms — Yahoo News/Reuters</a> <a href="https://securityaffairs.com/178005/hacking/rogue-devices-in-chinese-made-power-inverters-used-worldwide.html">Rogue Devices in Chinese-Made Power Inverters — Security Affairs</a></p><h3>TikTok, Huawei, and the Digital Supply Chain War</h3><p>The banning of Huawei and TikTok in the United States is not primarily a story about two companies — it is a story about governments recognizing that the technology stack running inside their borders constitutes an attack surface.</p><p>Huawei was effectively blacklisted from U.S. government networks beginning in 2018 and banned from selling new telecommunications equipment in the U.S. in 2022, following findings that its 5G infrastructure could provide Chinese intelligence services with persistent access to communications networks. TikTok, with approximately 170 million U.S. users, was subject to a law signed by President Biden in April 2024 — the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act — upheld unanimously by the Supreme Court in January 2025. The stated justification: ByteDance is subject to Chinese laws requiring it to “assist or cooperate” with Chinese intelligence and to ensure the government has “the power to access and control private data” it holds.</p><p><a href="https://jsis.washington.edu/news/u-s-tiktok-ban-national-security-and-civil-liberties-concerns/">TikTok Ban — National Security Analysis, University of Washington</a> <br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Restrictions_on_TikTok_in_the_United_States">Efforts to Ban TikTok — Wikipedia</a></p><h3>“The Big Hack”: Spy Chips in the Manufacturing Chain</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*vV4BVqhbYr_OH-Wy.gif" /><figcaption>taken from bloomberg.com</figcaption></figure><p>In October 2018, Bloomberg Businessweek alleged that Chinese intelligence services infiltrated the manufacturing process of server motherboards produced by Super Micro Computer Inc., inserting rice grain-sized chips that created backdoors into the data centers of approximately 30 U.S. companies — including Amazon and Apple — as well as government contractors. Apple, Amazon, and Supermicro all issued categorical denials. The NSA said it was “befuddled.” Bloomberg never retracted the story and doubled down in 2021, citing FBI counterintelligence investigations and DoD network mapping anomalies dating to 2010.</p><p>Whether or not the specific chip allegations are fully verified, the story’s significance lies in what it revealed: the entire global electronics manufacturing supply chain, predominantly located in China, represents a theoretically exploitable vector for hardware-level compromise that no software security tool can detect or patch.</p><p><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-10-04/the-big-hack-how-china-used-a-tiny-chip-to-infiltrate-america-s-top-companies">The Big Hack — Bloomberg (2018)</a> <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2021-supermicro/">Supermicro <br>Follow-up — Bloomberg (2021)</a></p><h3>When the Tech Company Is the Vector: PRISM and Corporate Surveillance Pipelines</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*slTJ8RxtSDtqvwH3.jpg" /><figcaption>taken from <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM#/media/File:PRISM_Collection_Details.jpg">Wikipedia</a></figcaption></figure><p>Edward Snowden’s disclosures in June 2013 revealed that the U.S. government had established a systematic pipeline — codename PRISM — directly into the servers of the largest technology companies in the world. Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, PalTalk, AOL, Skype, YouTube, and Apple were all participating, providing the NSA and FBI with real-time access to stored and live communications: audio and video chats, photographs, emails, documents, and connection logs — under compelled, secret orders they were forbidden to disclose.</p><p>Since a large portion of the world’s internet traffic passes through U.S.-based infrastructure and services, PRISM effectively gave U.S. intelligence agencies surveillance reach far beyond American citizens. Brazil cancelled a state visit to the United States. Germany — where Chancellor Merkel’s own phone had been tapped — began systematically reviewing its dependence on American technology.</p><p><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html">PRISM Program — Washington Post original report</a> <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM">PRISM — Wikipedia</a></p><p>The international response led governments to seek digital sovereignty. The German state of Schleswig-Holstein announced in 2024 a transition of 30,000 government PCs from Microsoft Windows to Linux and LibreOffice, explicitly citing data sovereignty and concerns over foreign surveillance. Their minister-president stated: “Ensuring digital sovereignty is at least as important as energy sovereignty.” For secure communications beyond corporate surveillance reach, systems like Tails OS — a Linux distribution that runs entirely from a USB drive, leaves no trace on the host machine, and routes all traffic through Tor — became critical tools. Tails was listed as one of the NSA’s most-wanted surveillance targets in leaked Snowden documents. It is also the OS Snowden himself used to communicate with journalists while preparing the disclosures.</p><p><a href="https://theregister.com/AMP/2024/04/04/germanys_northernmost_state_ditches_windows">German State Ditches Windows for Linux — The Register</a> <a href="https://www.pcworld.com/article/427506/tails-14-polishes-up-the-privacy-obsessed-linux-os-trusted-by-edward-snowden.html">Tails OS — Snowden’s Privacy Tool — PCWorld</a></p><h3>The Encryption Backdoor Push: EARN IT and the Golden Key Problem</h3><p>Since 2020, the U.S. Congress has repeatedly introduced the EARN IT Act — officially framed as a child exploitation prevention measure, but characterized by security experts and civil liberties organizations as a structural mechanism to pressure technology companies into building encryption backdoors: master keys that would allow law enforcement to decrypt private communications.</p><p>The act was introduced in 2020, reintroduced in 2022, and introduced again in 2023. It has not passed. But the attempt itself is the story.</p><p>The fundamental problem with government-mandated encryption backdoors is mathematical: you cannot create a backdoor that only works for authorized government actors. A backdoor built for the “good guys” exists for everyone who discovers it. This was proven in practice in late 2024, when the Chinese-government-backed hacking group Salt Typhoon breached the exact “lawful intercept” systems that U.S. telecom providers (Verizon, AT&amp;T, Lumen Technologies) had installed to give law enforcement access to user data. The backdoor built for the FBI became the backdoor used by Beijing.</p><p>Senator Ron Wyden summarized the mathematical reality: “You can’t only build a backdoor for the good guys. Once you weaken encryption with a backdoor, you make it far easier for criminals and hackers and predators to get into your digital life.”</p><p><a href="https://www.internetsociety.org/resources/internet-fragmentation/earn-it-act/">EARN IT Act — Internet Society</a> <a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/12/defending-encryption-us-and-abroad">Defending Encryption in 2024 — EFF</a> <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EARN_IT_Act">EARN IT Act — Wikipedia</a></p><h3>Conclusion: Hacking a Country Is No Longer Exceptional — It Is Doctrine</h3><p>The cases documented in this article span more than two decades, six continents, and the full spectrum of actors — from nation-state intelligence services to teenage hacktivists with IRC channels and official government embassy accounts posting memes. What they share is this: <strong>in the 21st century, the most effective opening moves of a conflict are digital, invisible, and deniable.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*TmM7fPm3SYIMfMNkmPf9Uw.jpeg" /></figure><p>A country can be attacked through its routing infrastructure before its citizens notice anything is wrong. Its power grid can be taken down by malware compiled months in advance and detonated on command. Kill switches embedded in solar inverters and spy chips in server motherboards sit dormant inside critical infrastructure, awaiting conditions under which they might be activated. Apps and networking equipment carry legal obligations to share data with foreign governments. Laws designed to compel technology companies to weaken encryption create the very backdoors they claim only the “good guys” will use.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*cPbJTpD_ou6AyDLDE3KYsQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>And the cognitive layer — narrative, meme, distraction — has become a fully operational domain. The Iranian embassies posting jokes about lost keys during an active military conflict, and the waves of distracting memes deployed during domestic political pressure, are not peripheral phenomena. They are operations in the information space, where attention itself is the resource being contested and narrative is the weapon deployed to control it. Both sides of any conflict now fight there, routinely, at zero marginal cost.</p><p>The population is no longer just the protected — it is the target. Governments that shut down the internet to hide atrocities from the world, and governments that flood their citizens’ social media feeds with distraction when accountability pressure peaks, are operating in the same domain, using the same logic.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*C52a1d0Cm4At1xfELRjkxg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Security is no longer an IT department’s problem or a military’s problem. It is a societal infrastructure problem — one that requires digital literacy, institutional resilience, international norms, and the kind of informed public awareness that makes deception harder to sustain.</p><p>Understanding these vectors is not alarmism. It is the prerequisite for any serious defense.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8831aafcfd43" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://meetcyber.net/how-to-hack-a-country-a-research-overview-of-the-vectors-used-to-destabilize-nations-8831aafcfd43">How to Hack a Country: A Research Overview of the Vectors Used to Destabilize Nations</a> was originally published in <a href="https://meetcyber.net/">MeetCyber</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[OSINT for National-Level decision making: How Open Intelligence is reshaping Government and…]]></title>
            <link>https://meetcyber.net/osint-for-national-level-decision-making-how-open-intelligence-is-reshaping-government-and-ca5c877506c7?source=rss-2e7c36c9ea72------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ca5c877506c7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[osint-investigation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[osint-tool]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[osint]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Guillermo Pineda]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 10:44:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-04-08T17:06:54.346Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>OSINT for National-Level decision making: How Open Intelligence is reshaping Government and Military strategy</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*cF8FlkUoLYQnMLULzReKfA.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>In an era where a civilian researcher can track a military strike in real time using only publicly available tools, the question is no longer whether open-source intelligence matters — it’s whether your organization is paying attention.</em></p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2F0p8o7AeHDzg%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D0p8o7AeHDzg&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2F0p8o7AeHDzg%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/c7f08df288ab7c2140c718671a989819/href">https://medium.com/media/c7f08df288ab7c2140c718671a989819/href</a></iframe><h3><strong>Introduction: How we can do it as well?</strong></h3><p>Intelligence has always been the backbone of national security. For most of history, it was expensive, slow, and exclusively the domain of governments with spy networks, satellites, and signals infrastructure. That world is gone.</p><p>Today, a laptop, an internet connection, and the right set of free tools can reconstruct troop movements, locate hidden military installations, identify the faces of unknown operatives, and map the real-time positions of naval strike groups — all from open, public sources. This is the world of <strong>OSINT</strong>: Open Source Intelligence.</p><p>This article breaks down what OSINT is, how it operates across different levels of military and government decision-making, which AI-powered tools are transforming the field, and why the line between “public information” and “classified intelligence” has never been thinner.</p><h3><strong>What is OSINT?</strong></h3><p><strong>Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)</strong> is the collection, analysis, and exploitation of information obtained from publicly or openly available sources to produce actionable intelligence. It sits alongside other intelligence disciplines in the broader intelligence cycle:</p><ul><li><strong>HUMINT</strong> (Human Intelligence) — agents, defectors, informants</li><li><strong>SIGINT</strong> (Signals Intelligence) — intercepted communications and electronic signals</li><li><strong>GEOINT</strong> (Geospatial Intelligence) — satellite and aerial imagery analysis</li><li><strong>OSINT</strong> (Open Source Intelligence) — fully public, legal, and infinitely scalable</li></ul><p>What makes OSINT uniquely powerful is that it requires no clandestine access, no legal authority to surveil, and no classified infrastructure. Everything it uses is, by definition, already in the public domain. The skill lies entirely in knowing where to look and how to connect the dots.</p><h3>Understanding the Information Spectrum</h3><p>Before diving into applications, it helps to understand how information is classified at the source level. Not all information is created equal:</p><p><strong>Open Information</strong> is publicly accessible to anyone, no registration needed — news outlets, social media (some), public records, commercial satellite imagery, and government publications. This is the raw material of OSINT.</p><p><strong>Restricted Information</strong> has limited access controlled by role or institutional clearance — information that requires an account or specific access to be able to see, usually placed in what internet calls “deep web” (not dark web) and sometimes this is exposed unintentionally.</p><p><strong>Closed Information</strong> is fully classified — information that requires being part of an organization to be able to reach it, sometimes this information is partially released when is ‘declassified’</p><p>The remarkable insight driving modern OSINT is this: <strong>the aggregation of open information can often reveal what closed information was meant to protect.</strong></p><h3>OSINT Across Operational Levels</h3><p>OSINT doesn’t operate the same way at every scale. It functions differently — and reveals different intelligence value — depending on whether you’re operating at the strategic, tactical, or operational level.</p><h3>1. Strategic Level: Satellites, Ships, and Skies</h3><p>At the strategic level, OSINT supports long-range national planning, geopolitical analysis, and the monitoring of potential adversaries over time.</p><p><strong>Satellite Imagery</strong></p><p>Is no longer exclusively a superpower capability. Commercial and open-access satellite platforms now provide analysts with imagery of almost anywhere on Earth, updated frequently enough to detect infrastructure changes, construction of military facilities, and unusual troop concentrations.</p><ul><li><strong>Planet Labs</strong> (<a href="https://www.planet.com/">planet.com</a>) — commercial daily satellite coverage used by journalists and governments alike</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KPFyEqHeLdqNfXoEPIE67w.png" /></figure><ul><li><strong>NASA FIRMS</strong> (<a href="https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/">firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov</a>) — real-time fire and thermal anomaly detection from space, used to detect explosions and strikes</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ZU2vbKUyW0PPge0OPC5yYw.png" /></figure><ul><li><strong>Google Maps</strong> (<a href="https://www.google.com/maps">www.google.com/maps</a>) — Used to locate routes, places, satellite images not in real time but with a set of images from NASA usually for comercial use.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IdtD2-6eQROmY7r7XfNYgQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Aviation Tracking</strong></p><p>Has become one of the most powerful OSINT disciplines. Aircraft transponders continuously broadcast ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast) signals that civilian receivers capture and publish online. These signals reveal flight paths, call signs, altitudes, and speeds — including, critically, military and government aircraft that forget to disable their transponders.</p><ul><li><strong>ADS-B Exchange</strong> (<a href="https://globe.adsbexchange.com/">globe.adsbexchange.com</a>) — unfiltered and uncensored; does not remove aircraft at government request, making it the preferred tool for tracking sensitive flights.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zcl5NzUFPxTK97Fdd9-_8A.png" /></figure><ul><li><strong>Flightradar24</strong> (<a href="https://www.flightradar24.com/">flightradar24.com</a>) — broadest coverage, cleaner interface, superior historical playback.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*81yzPXxkWSiTUZ4wi6hYzA.png" /></figure><ul><li><strong>RadarBox</strong> (<a href="https://www.radarbox.com/">radarbox.com</a>) — includes military aircraft and integrated ATC audio monitoring.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OTq8qsAQjmWXVkeHUODLrQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Maritime Tracking</strong> via AIS (Automatic Identification System) data reveals the positions of naval vessels, cargo ships, and tankers worldwide. When a vessel disables its AIS signal — going “dark” — that absence itself becomes intelligence.</p><ul><li><strong>MarineTraffic</strong> (<a href="https://www.marinetraffic.com/">marinetraffic.com</a>) — the most widely used vessel tracking platform globally</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CzbBz9a0feWhzYcbbHt51g.png" /></figure><ul><li><strong>VesselFinder</strong> (<a href="https://www.vesselfinder.com/">vesselfinder.com</a>) — real-time AIS data with vessel history</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*k0ObHUxbs2iDd_Y4AOpm-A.png" /></figure><ul><li><strong>Global Fishing Watch</strong> (<a href="https://globalfishingwatch.org/">globalfishingwatch.org</a>) — cross-references AIS data to identify illegal fishing and dark-ship behavior</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*f6SxraQRfFtOPSxsSmzRng.png" /></figure><h3>2. Tactical Level: Telegram Channels and Darkweb Forums</h3><p><em>At the tactical level, OSINT focuses on understanding the intent and capability of specific threat actors — terrorist groups, hacktivist collectives, organized crime networks, and hostile state proxies.</em></p><p><strong>Telegram and Encrypted Channels</strong></p><p>Have become the command-and-control infrastructure for extremist groups, criminal networks, and hacktivist collectives. These groups operate openly on public Telegram channels, advertising operations, recruiting members, and coordinating attacks in real time. OSINT analysts monitor these channels to extract threat signals before they materialize.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/605/0*UTeCYzCsZ--evebG.png" /><figcaption>Lapsus$ group telegram message</figcaption></figure><ul><li><strong>Osavul</strong> (<a href="https://osavul.cloud/">osavul.cloud</a>) — specialized Telegram OSINT and monitoring platform for detecting information operations</li><li><strong>IntelligenceX</strong> (<a href="https://intelx.io/">intelx.io</a>) — an archival search engine covering leaked information sold or released public.</li></ul><p><strong>Darkweb and Forum Monitoring</strong></p><p>Exposes the planning and trade of leaked data, zero-day exploits, and coordinated cyberattacks before they reach mainstream news. Advanced platforms translate and index content across hundreds of languages.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/781/0*UgyOGBTB5Ra-FJ8E" /><figcaption>Extracted from Breach forums leaks</figcaption></figure><ul><li><strong>Babel X</strong> (<a href="https://www.babelstreet.com/">babelstreet.com</a>) — multilingual OSINT platform analyzing content in 200+ languages using machine learning and NLP</li><li><strong>DarkOwl</strong> (<a href="https://www.darkowl.com/">darkowl.com</a>) — dark web intelligence platform continuously indexing illicit forums and marketplaces</li></ul><p><strong>Social Media Threat Detection</strong></p><p>Monitors platforms like X/Twitter and Facebook for early indicators of violence, protest, or coordinated disinformation. Operational security mistakes — a geotag here, a visible landmark there — routinely expose actors who believe they are anonymous.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/872/1*3MjYg0uJC2ChsiM6Cmjh0Q.png" /><figcaption>Capture from <a href="https://x.com/YourAnonNews">x.com/YourAnonNews</a></figcaption></figure><ul><li><strong>Dataminr</strong> (<a href="https://www.dataminr.com/">dataminr.com</a>) — real-time AI alerting platform used by governments and newsrooms to surface breaking threats from social media</li><li><strong>Recorded Future</strong> (<a href="https://www.recordedfuture.com/">recordedfuture.com</a>) — AI-driven threat intelligence correlating open-source, dark web, and technical data</li></ul><h3>3. Operational Level: Strava Heatmaps, Shodan, and the Dangers of Digital Exhaust</h3><p>At the operational level, OSINT turns inward — analyzing the inadvertent data generated by personnel, systems, and infrastructure to identify leakages that adversaries could exploit.</p><p><strong>The Strava Heatmap Incident</strong></p><p>Remains the defining case study in operational OSINT. In January 2018, Australian researcher Nathan Ruser was browsing Strava’s newly published Global Heatmap — a visualization of 13 trillion GPS data points submitted by fitness app users worldwide. In the deserts of Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, the heatmap glowed with running paths. These were U.S. and allied military personnel jogging around classified forward operating bases, their fitness data publicly aggregating into a detailed map of secret installations.</p><p>The perimeters of classified bases, patrol routes, supply paths, and daily movement patterns of military contractors were visible to anyone who knew where to look. The Pentagon launched an immediate security review. Strava restricted visibility settings. But the lesson was already written: <strong>the aggregation of innocuous personal data can produce classified-level intelligence.</strong></p><p>The story didn’t end there. In 2024, French newspaper <em>Le Monde</em> ran its <em>#StravaLeaks</em> investigation, revealing that members of President Macron’s presidential security detail were still publicly logging their runs on Strava — inadvertently mapping every hotel, residence, and travel route the French president visited. Israeli military personnel near Gaza had done the same.</p><p>In 2026 same story is repeated but this time leaking the position of the French aircraft carrier.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/948/0*NpVB0h5IeCJ3LZL-" /><figcaption>Capture from news site LE MONDE</figcaption></figure><ul><li><strong>Strava Global Heatmap</strong> (<a href="https://www.strava.com/heatmap">strava.com/heatmap</a>)</li><li><strong>GIJN Strava OSINT Investigation Guide</strong> (<a href="https://gijn.org/stories/investigations-using-strava-fitness-app/">gijn.org</a>)</li></ul><p><strong>Exposed Infrastructure Scanners</strong></p><p>Reveal a parallel vulnerability on the digital side. Governments and critical infrastructure operators routinely leave internet-connected systems exposed — industrial control systems, government login portals, surveillance cameras, SCADA systems, and misconfigured cloud storage. Open scanners index these exposures continuously.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XxWZ7d52aF0xPmqDTj5Caw.png" /><figcaption>capture from shodan.io</figcaption></figure><ul><li><strong>Shodan</strong> (<a href="https://www.shodan.io/">shodan.io</a>) — the original “search engine for the Internet of Things,” indexing exposed devices by port, service, geography, and vulnerability</li><li><strong>Censys</strong> (<a href="https://search.censys.io/">search.censys.io</a>) — host and certificate intelligence platform revealing the digital attack surface of any organization</li><li><strong>FOFA</strong> (<a href="https://en.fofa.info/">en.fofa.info</a>) — Chinese-developed asset discovery scanner widely used in Asian threat intelligence</li><li><strong>Greynoise</strong> (<a href="https://www.greynoise.io/">greynoise.io</a>) — analyzes internet-wide background noise to identify scanning activity and compromised infrastructure</li></ul><h3>AI-Powered OSINT: The Game Changer</h3><p>The tools above are powerful. But the real transformation in OSINT over the last three years has been the integration of artificial intelligence — automating what used to require dozens of skilled analysts working for weeks.</p><h3>Facial Recognition and Person Identification</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6nHO8uOT9RT3WIZYrwVT7A.png" /><figcaption>captures from pimeyes.com</figcaption></figure><ul><li><strong>PimEyes</strong> (<a href="https://pimeyes.com/">pimeyes.com</a>) — internet-wide facial search engine that scans blogs, news sites, and image databases to identify where a person’s face appears online. Used by journalists, law enforcement, and investigative researchers worldwide.</li><li><strong>FaceCheck.ID</strong> (<a href="https://facecheck.id/">facecheck.id</a>) — specializes in social media facial recognition across Instagram, LinkedIn, YouTube, and dozens of other platforms. Upload a face, get linked profiles.</li><li><strong>Clearview AI</strong> (<a href="https://www.clearview.ai/">clearview.ai</a>) — law-enforcement grade platform with a database of over 30 billion images, offering the most comprehensive facial recognition capability currently available to authorized users.</li></ul><h3>Photo Geolocation</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wv9TjcQLsy4RpNooOL4gAA.png" /><figcaption>capture from <a href="https://geospy.ai/">geospy.ai</a></figcaption></figure><ul><li><strong>GeoSpy AI</strong> (<a href="https://geospy.ai/">geospy.ai</a>) — AI-powered geolocation from photographs. Uses environmental markers — vegetation type, architectural style, road markings, signage — to determine where a photo was taken, even when metadata has been stripped.</li><li><strong>Picarta</strong> (<a href="https://picarta.ai/">picarta.ai</a>) — predicts the geographic origin of any photograph using deep learning, producing a probability map of likely locations.</li><li><strong>Google Lens</strong> (<a href="https://lens.google.com/">lens.google.com</a>) — identifies landmarks, objects, and scenes within images, frequently pinpointing locations from a single architectural feature.</li></ul><h3>Network Analysis and Intelligence Automation</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Sv_yWGTTCnj3JNzd.jpg" /><figcaption>capture from Maltego tools</figcaption></figure><ul><li><strong>Maltego</strong> (<a href="https://www.maltego.com/">maltego.com</a>) — the industry standard for graph-based link analysis. Connects domains, IP addresses, email addresses, social media profiles, and organizational identities into interactive relationship maps. Used by Bellingcat, Europol, and law enforcement agencies globally.</li><li><strong>SpiderFoot</strong> (<a href="https://www.spiderfoot.net/">spiderfoot.net</a>) — open-source automation framework with 200+ modules for gathering intelligence on any target. Aggregates data from over 100 public sources, cross-correlates findings, and visualizes connections.</li><li><strong>Recon-ng</strong> (<a href="https://github.com/lanmaster53/recon-ng">github.com/lanmaster53/recon-ng</a>) — modular web reconnaissance framework with a CLI interface, designed for systematic, repeatable intelligence pipelines.</li><li><strong>Babel X</strong> (<a href="https://www.babelstreet.com/">babelstreet.com</a>) — multilingual platform scanning 200+ languages across social media, dark web forums, and public records using NLP to surface the signals that matter.</li><li><strong>Recorded Future</strong> (<a href="https://www.recordedfuture.com/">recordedfuture.com</a>) — enterprise-grade threat intelligence platform correlating open-source, dark web, and technical data for predictive analysis and real-time alerts.</li><li><strong>Dataminr</strong> (<a href="https://www.dataminr.com/">dataminr.com</a>) — real-time AI alerting used by major governments and newsrooms to detect breaking threats from social media and public data feeds before they reach conventional news channels.</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ca5c877506c7" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://meetcyber.net/osint-for-national-level-decision-making-how-open-intelligence-is-reshaping-government-and-ca5c877506c7">OSINT for National-Level decision making: How Open Intelligence is reshaping Government and…</a> was originally published in <a href="https://meetcyber.net/">MeetCyber</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A simple SIEM with Excel]]></title>
            <link>https://meetcyber.net/a-simple-siem-with-excel-896c14080b72?source=rss-2e7c36c9ea72------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/896c14080b72</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-defense]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[siem]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blueteamlabs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Guillermo Pineda]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 01 Jul 2025 12:20:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-01T12:20:31.855Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*rLVmScvHiv-q5r_HqKDD4Q.png" /><figcaption>SIEM in Excel</figcaption></figure><p>I have always taught my students that if they handle the fundamental concepts, they can make their own tools.</p><p>Today I bring you a brief project with which you will be able to visualize the data of a log file with Excel, for which we will need:</p><p>1. Log file (in this example we use a CSV)</p><p>2. Excel (licensed preferred)</p><p>3. Creativity, patience and tolerance for mistakes.</p><p>4. Desire to learn</p><p>With everything ready we are going to put our elements together, we start by creating a sample file .csv with information.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*1tAjuPCNfFhh4XjnoIiShw.png" /><figcaption>.CSV example file</figcaption></figure><p>From the Data tab in Excel we can see what can be done with this extension and many other ways (we will keep it simple because it is the first time)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*TTg1doB5xASMFyHw9PlooQ.png" /><figcaption>Importing data from files</figcaption></figure><p><strong>NOTE: </strong>Remember that even Windows events can be exported in this format and used in this handcrafted SIEM if necessary.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/976/1*nZWWc5Okia6ZM30wsEzbgw.png" /><figcaption>Saving Windows events as CSV files</figcaption></figure><p>Once we select our sample file to load it as data (Data &gt; GetData &gt; From File &gt; From Txt/CSV) A window will appear that will be responsible for organizing our information and delimiting it according to what it detects in the first 200 lines of information (the process of parsing and formatting data)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*J8gYI5rTdQG2qlfKcK5F2A.png" /><figcaption>Loading log entries in Excel</figcaption></figure><p><strong>NOTE:</strong> If for some reason our information is not organized correctly we do not need to adjust it further, there are the options of File Origin, Delimiter and Data Type Detection to improve this process.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*Npr5B7q9fRPeHMiBqRH2mQ.png" /><figcaption>Importing options</figcaption></figure><p>Once we are happy with our organization of the information, we click on the “Transform Data” button in this window.</p><p>Once this is done, the “Power Query Editor” window will appear</p><p><strong>NOTE: </strong>Power Query Editor is a tool in Excel that allows you to import, clean, and transform data before analyzing it. It has been available as an add-in since Excel 2010 and was integrated natively starting with Excel 2016.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*RkR3iqXEzsvf-clLIATYcw.png" /><figcaption>Power Query Editor window</figcaption></figure><p>Here we can make additional adjustments if we require access settings, display, etc. I recommend taking a few minutes to review everything it allows us to do and understand it with some calm.</p><p>But what matters to us in this case for our project is that the types of values of our data are correct, the dates as dates and times, the IPs as text, EventID as numbers, etc and this can be validated in each of the names of the columns.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*xJyBt81tKH5T59cTNz2Qnw.png" /><figcaption>Columns and data types</figcaption></figure><p>Technically we will not have to make any or major changes because the tool is very efficient in this area, once organized we only have to click on the “Close &amp; Load” button and on the “Close &amp; Load to” button.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/598/1*AUrt5e91HSifwFXIGN_xhw.png" /><figcaption>Loading data to Excel</figcaption></figure><p>The different options that we have available will appear, in our case we are going to select “Table” since we want to generate a master table from which we can make several transformations later.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/441/1*0a_HIQW6T_aZr9BFqtM6Eg.png" /><figcaption>Selecting the type of presentation for the information in Excel</figcaption></figure><p>We click OK and we will have a table with the information of our log file organized, we can see in the top bar a space to change the name of this table if we want to avoid confusion later.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*eDq1D7XmYX4Av7KXCjM7aQ.png" /><figcaption>Loaded entries in Excel’s table</figcaption></figure><p>To make the SIEM update automatically, let’s select Refresh &gt; Connection properties. Then we tell it to cool down every 1 minute or whatever we decide. Also enabled by default is the “Refresh this connection on Refresh All” option which we will talk about later.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VR5BQWkDOzsBysmXenkf8g.png" /><figcaption>Refreshing the information</figcaption></figure><p>Once this is done we can start creating our Pivot tables and our charts.</p><ol><li>Select any cell in your main table.</li><li>Go to <strong>Insert</strong> &gt; <strong>PivotTable</strong>.</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/491/1*itzgm_rV8JZt58oAUxI-zQ.png" /><figcaption>Inserting Pivot Tables</figcaption></figure><p>3. Make sure your main table is selected, and check:</p><p>— New Worksheet</p><p>4. Click <strong>OK.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*UG-jvvZHXe5_-z6VShiIHA.png" /><figcaption>Selecting the data for the Pivot Table</figcaption></figure><p>5. In the right pane (<strong>PivotTable Fields</strong>):</p><ul><li>Drag Severity to <strong>Rows</strong></li><li>Drag EventID to <strong>Values</strong> (Excel will do “Count of EventID”)</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*tQTNHdx52lJ02UhAJwY51g.png" /><figcaption>Selecting the fields for the Pivot table</figcaption></figure><p>6. Go to the <strong>PivotTable Analyze</strong> tab → <strong>PivotChart</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*1sT8L_Ab0bB-YH8veojYoA.png" /><figcaption>Creating the Charts from the Pivot Tables</figcaption></figure><ul><li>Choose <strong>Column chart</strong> and press <strong>OK.</strong></li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/499/1*cJo1MLJe-wmKfL5Uxi5trg.png" /><figcaption>Selecting the chart’s type.</figcaption></figure><p>You already have the first graph.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*NHsNod4iu3AkpEap_Wef1Q.png" /><figcaption>Personalized graph</figcaption></figure><p>Go back to our main table and repeat the process of inserting a Pivot Table, a new tab will load with another table in which we can filter the information we want as we did before, this process can be repeated as many times as we want. (Also you can repeat the full process to get more file sources)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/864/1*wAu2yVTNUEUHOR6630gpKw.png" /><figcaption>Pivot tables</figcaption></figure><p>In another sheet called “Dashboard” cut the graphs you have generated and paste them there in an organized way, modify the legends of these graphs and voila, you will have your SIEM ready.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*jmi4GRDdkkrnlwX2f8SbUQ.png" /><figcaption>Overview of the simple SIEM in Excel</figcaption></figure><p>Remember that in the Data tab, you can manually refresh the information in your graphs and tables whenever you want.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/964/1*luKX7tiFQWB6ytANTK9XZQ.png" /><figcaption>Manually refreshing the information</figcaption></figure><p>You can also create buttons, alerts and so on, remember that Excel has the option to automate functions.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*Zd_xyuxHGrhKoFSaKyFHUA.png" /><figcaption>Automation in Excel</figcaption></figure><p>It has an integrated VBS engine to create “macros” and also integrates Python among other things, literally your imagination is the limit.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dpOmTFj3nW-iNlwOnGkPKQ.png" /><figcaption>Additional options to improve the SIEM</figcaption></figure><p>I hope you enjoyed this small project as much as I did. Remember, to be an expert, you don’t need to know how to use every tool — you need to understand how tools solve problems. With that knowledge, you can even create your own.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=896c14080b72" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://meetcyber.net/a-simple-siem-with-excel-896c14080b72">A simple SIEM with Excel</a> was originally published in <a href="https://meetcyber.net/">MeetCyber</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Your Windows events can be leaking credentials (or more)]]></title>
            <link>https://meetcyber.net/your-windows-events-can-be-leaking-credentials-or-more-1e72ea5e78fa?source=rss-2e7c36c9ea72------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1e72ea5e78fa</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[windows]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[leaks-forum]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Guillermo Pineda]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 19 Jun 2025 10:28:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-06-19T10:28:14.915Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Extracting credentials from running processes, log files, or configuration files is an almost routine task for red teamers. Today, I want to share with my friends on the blue team a not-so-popular vector of this activity that they may want to keep in mind.</p><p>While exploring Sysmon64.exe and its well-known configuration file sysmonconfig-export.xml which can be downloaded from: <br><a href="https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config/blob/master/sysmonconfig-export.xml">https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config/blob/master/sysmonconfig-export.xml</a> <br>I realized that, beyond the security benefits this duo can provide when installed on a system, it can also become a source of critical information leakage, such as credentials.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/949/1*2-6LU2a2YpoOxJClMl56Qw.png" /><figcaption>Example of executable with a confidential parameter.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/973/1*QE-oihpxG0wyCh1y5Y2Esg.png" /><figcaption>Logged information y the Sysmon Operational event.</figcaption></figure><p>Let’s not forget that there are very common commands where credentials are passed as parameters, for example:</p><p><em>net use \\192.168.1.10\share /user:domain\user MyPassword123<br>PsExec.exe \\target -u domain\user -p MyPassword123 cmd.exe</em></p><p><strong>So, if you don’t have installed Sysmon are you safe? short answer: No.</strong></p><p>This issue isn’t limited to this particular case. Standard Windows event logs such as <strong>Event ID 4688</strong> from the <strong>Security event</strong>, or even entries in <strong>Application</strong> <strong>event </strong>(if a specific application writes its own logs), and logs under <strong>Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational</strong>, may also expose these values.</p><p>This perspective is so underrecognized that in a brief and admittedly informal investigation, I found only a few public references mostly pointing to a user named <em>pracsec</em> on various sites. For example, in this post, he even shows how a PowerShell script can be used to extract such credentials:<br><a href="https://practicalsecurityanalytics.com/extracting-credentials-from-windows-logs/">https://practicalsecurityanalytics.com/extracting-credentials-from-windows-logs/</a></p><p>The “good” news is that, according to Windows security permissions, the <strong>Security</strong>, <strong>Sysmon</strong>, and <strong>System</strong> events can only be accessed by <strong>Administrators</strong>. This leaves only <strong>Application logs</strong> and <strong>scheduled task logs</strong> as potential sources of leaked credentials accessible to <strong>non-administrator users</strong>.</p><h3>From an enterprise perspective</h3><p>Most organizations rely on third-party tools to monitor and manage their endpoints. Among SIEM, EDR, and XDR solutions, the following either <strong>install Sysmon as part of the agent</strong>, or <strong>make use of it if it’s already present</strong>:</p><ul><li><strong>Wazuh</strong> — Installs Sysmon (optional)</li><li><strong>Splunk</strong> — Does not install it, but supports it via an Add-On</li><li><strong>Graylog</strong> — Uses it if installed alongside NxLog or Winlogbeat</li><li><strong>Velociraptor</strong> — Uses it if already present</li><li><strong>CrowdStrike</strong> and <strong>SentinelOne</strong> — Do <strong>not</strong> use Sysmon</li></ul><p>The remaining risk then lies in <strong>how secure these agents are</strong>, how <strong>secure the transmission</strong> is between the endpoints and their central servers, and once the data arrives, <strong>how ethical the Level 1 analysts </strong>reviewing this information are, since they will be the first to see any credentials exposed in clear text in these logs.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*CIObhU6pOyiNBSAZEL_w2g.png" /><figcaption>Example of Splunk revealing passwords from Sysmon registries.</figcaption></figure><p>Lastly, let’s not forget that cybercriminal groups like<strong> Lapsus$ </strong>have actively encouraged insiders to leak this kind of information in the past.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*cx7cZazZ4by8D9wM0SIekQ.png" /><figcaption>Lapsus$ asking for access to big companies</figcaption></figure><p>This problem does not only belongs to Windows, Linux and MacOS have similar behavior that probably I’ll explore in a future article.</p><p>Happy hunting.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1e72ea5e78fa" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://meetcyber.net/your-windows-events-can-be-leaking-credentials-or-more-1e72ea5e78fa">Your Windows events can be leaking credentials (or more)</a> was originally published in <a href="https://meetcyber.net/">MeetCyber</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Activate Windows (legally) for your cybersecurity labs]]></title>
            <link>https://meetcyber.net/activate-windows-legally-for-your-cybersecurity-labs-e344d6e13701?source=rss-2e7c36c9ea72------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e344d6e13701</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[activation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[labs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[windows]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Guillermo Pineda]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 16 Jun 2025 07:09:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-06-16T07:09:17.269Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/522/1*2J9nKB5qXsKWHB4awCnSmg.png" /><figcaption>Windows License expired message</figcaption></figure><p>When running <strong>cybersecurity labs</strong> with Windows Server in virtual machines, the system often shuts down after the <strong>evaluation license expires</strong> (typically after 180 days). That’s a major problem for students, instructors, and testers who just want a stable machine for practice.</p><p>In this guide, we’ll show you how to legally convert an <strong>expired Windows Server 2019 Evaluation</strong> into a <strong>fully functional system</strong> using Microsoft’s official KMS keys — even without activating it — to prevent it from shutting down constantly.</p><p>We’ll demonstrate the full process using <strong>Windows Server 2019 Standard Evaluation</strong> as an example.</p><h4>What Are KMS and MAK?</h4><ul><li><strong>KMS (Key Management Service):</strong> Requires a local server to validate Microsoft keys in enterprise networks.</li><li><strong>MAK (Multiple Activation Key):</strong> Used to activate systems online — typically through paid volume licenses.</li></ul><h3><strong>Step-by-Step: Make It Work for Labs</strong></h3><ol><li><strong>In PowerShell (as admin), run:</strong></li></ol><pre>DISM /online /Get-CurrentEdition</pre><p>You should see:<br> Current Edition : ServerStandardEval</p><h4>2. Convert to Full Standard Edition</h4><p>In PowerShell, run:</p><pre>DISM /online /Set-Edition:ServerStandard /ProductKey:N69G4-B89J2-4G8F4-WWYCC-J464C /AcceptEula</pre><p>3. Restart the System</p><h4>4. Check the Activation State</h4><p>After reboot, run:</p><pre>slmgr /xpr</pre><p>You’ll see it’s in <strong>Notification Mode</strong> — not activated, but <strong>no more shutdowns</strong>.</p><h4>5. Activation Attempt (Fails Without KMS Server)</h4><p>If you run:</p><pre>slmgr /ato</pre><p>You’ll get the DNS error 0x8007232B, which just means there’s no KMS server available.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*zHFRYyq-WsG1x1jdhygHbQ.png" /></figure><p>This is <strong>expected</strong> and harmless for your lab.</p><h3>Final Result</h3><p>You now have a <strong>fully usable Windows Server 2019</strong> for cybersecurity labs:</p><ul><li>No forced reboots</li><li>Legally converted with official Microsoft keys</li><li>Great for testing malware, blue teaming, or log collection</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/483/1*1gLqnMy0mhCmciCRjARy_g.png" /></figure><p>Even though the system isn’t activated, it’s <strong>functionally stable</strong> for all lab purposes.</p><p>Now you can save a snapshot and have a <strong>clean state</strong> for your Windows machines.</p><h3>Legal Reminder</h3><p>This method follows <strong>Microsoft’s official documentation</strong> for using KMS client keys. It’s intended only for <strong>temporary lab, academic, or test environments</strong>.</p><p>Reference:<br> <a href="https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/get-started/kms-client-activation-keys">https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/get-started/kms-client-activation-keys</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e344d6e13701" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://meetcyber.net/activate-windows-legally-for-your-cybersecurity-labs-e344d6e13701">Activate Windows (legally) for your cybersecurity labs</a> was originally published in <a href="https://meetcyber.net/">MeetCyber</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The True Costs of Cyberattacks]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@guillopineda/the-true-costs-of-cyberattacks-82fed336c567?source=rss-2e7c36c9ea72------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/82fed336c567</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[spyware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[malware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ransomware]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Guillermo Pineda]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 24 Mar 2025 18:34:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-03-24T18:34:53.467Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This article explores the cost of a cyberattack from the perspective of the attacker, the direct or visible costs to the affected party, and the often overlooked, long-term impact that also affects the target.</em></p><h3>The Cost from Attackers’ Perspective</h3><p>In today’s hyper-connected world, attacking an organization has never been easier for cybercriminals. The growing demand for digital services and constant internet connectivity exposes businesses more than ever before. Attackers can exploit a vast attack surface, leverage AI-driven tools, and even purchase ready-made hacking services, making sophisticated cyberattacks accessible to anyone willing to pay.</p><h4>Attack Surface</h4><p>The attack surface includes all potential entry points where an attacker can attempt unauthorized access to a system, network, or application. The very nature of digital services and the internet inherently exposes organizations, making it easier for attackers to find vulnerabilities. The more interconnected and accessible a system is, the more opportunities it presents for exploitation.</p><h4>Hacking-as-a-Service (HaaS)</h4><p>Cybercriminals now offer hacking tools, techniques, and even full attack services to clients for a fee. This lowers the barrier for inexperienced attackers, creating a broader range of threats.</p><h4>Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS)</h4><p>A growing trend in cybercrime, RaaS allows criminals to provide ransomware tools and infrastructure to other attackers in exchange for a portion of the profits. This model enables large-scale ransomware attacks without requiring deep technical knowledge.</p><h4>Dark LLM</h4><p>Artificial intelligence is now being used by cybercriminals to enhance attacks. Large Language Models (LLMs) trained on dark web data can help attackers generate advanced malware, automate social engineering tactics, and even discover unknown vulnerabilities with ease. These AI-driven tools significantly reduce the time and expertise required to launch successful cyberattacks.</p><h3>Areas of Impact</h3><p>Understanding the full scope of a cyberattack’s impact is essential for accurate damage control and estimating real costs, including potential legal claims. While financial losses are the most visible consequence, businesses must also account for operational disruptions, reputational harm, and regulatory penalties. Below is a breakdown of key impact areas:</p><h4>Financial</h4><p>A cyberattack can have significant financial consequences, impacting businesses through:</p><ul><li>Direct financial losses</li><li>Operational disruption</li><li>Long-term recovery expenses</li></ul><h4>Stolen Money</h4><p>This is the most direct case of all, when the affected target handles digital accounts or money, this is the first to disappear.<br>Example: In 2016, the Bangladesh Bank Heist resulted in the theft of $81 million via fraudulent SWIFT transactions.</p><h4>Ransom Payments</h4><p>Many organizations opt to pay the ransom to minimize downtime, despite no guarantee of data recovery. While negotiating with cybercriminals remains a contentious issue, a niche industry has emerged to mediate these transactions. Specialized firms facilitate negotiations between victims and attackers, allowing organizations to avoid direct engagement and potential reputational damage.<br>Example: Colonial Pipeline (2021) paid a $4.4 million ransom to the DarkSide ransomware group.</p><h4>Cost of Investigations</h4><p>This includes hiring cybersecurity firms, legal advisors, and regulatory compliance teams. <br>Example: Equifax (2017) spent over $1.4 billion on investigation, legal fees, and security improvements after a massive data breach.</p><h4>Downtime and Business Disruption</h4><p>Industries like finance, healthcare, and manufacturing are particularly vulnerable to downtime costs. <br>Example: Maersk (2017) suffered a $300 million loss due to the NotPetya ransomware, which halted global shipping operations.</p><h4>Recovery and Remediation Costs</h4><p>This can include restoring data, upgrading infrastructure, and retraining employees. <br>Example: Sony Pictures (2014) spent millions recovering from a cyberattack attributed to North Korea, including legal fees, security enhancements, and lost revenue.</p><h4>Regulatory Fines and Lawsuits</h4><p>Data breaches can also lead to class-action lawsuits and settlements. Example: British Airways (2018) was fined $230 million under GDPR after a breach exposed 500,000 customer records.</p><h4>Reputational Damage and Long-Term Losses</h4><p>Companies may need to invest heavily in PR campaigns and customer compensation. <br>Example: Yahoo (2013–2014) saw its acquisition price by Verizon drop from $4.6 billion to $350 million after revealing two massive data breaches.</p><h3>The Imperceptible Costs of a Cyberattack</h3><p>The costs of a cyberattack extend beyond financial losses, reaching into social and labor-related consequences. These long-term effects influence the future stability of an organization and its overall cybersecurity posture. Below are some of the key imperceptible costs that organizations must consider:</p><h3>Loss of Human Capital</h3><ul><li><strong>Employee Layoffs:</strong><br> Cyberattacks can lead to significant job losses as organizations downsize to recover from the financial strain. In some cases, employees are laid off due to operational cuts or shifts in priorities following a breach.</li><li><strong>Blame Culture:</strong><br> In the aftermath of a cyberattack, organizations may foster a blame culture where individuals are held accountable for the breach, regardless of their direct involvement. This can create tension, lower morale, and hinder collaboration.</li><li><strong>Fear of Cybersecurity Discussions:</strong><br> After an attack, employees may become fearful of discussing cybersecurity vulnerabilities or incidents, worrying about potential repercussions. This fear can stifle open communication, making it harder for organizations to address weaknesses and improve their defenses.<br>Example: After the 2013 Target breach, the company’s CEO and CIO were forced to resign due to public and shareholder pressure.</li></ul><h3>Lack of Innovation and Technological Growth</h3><ul><li><strong>Lack of Innovation and Technological Growth:</strong><br> Organizations that have suffered a cyberattack may become hesitant to adopt new technologies due to concerns about potential vulnerabilities. This reluctance can hinder progress and limit the organization’s ability to innovate and remain competitive.</li><li><strong>Budget Shifts: Prioritizing Income Over Security:</strong><br> In the wake of a cyberattack, organizations may divert resources away from cybersecurity initiatives to focus on immediate financial recovery. This shift in budget priorities can delay critical security improvements, leaving the organization more exposed to future threats.</li></ul><h3>Breakdown of Cooperation (Internal and External)</h3><p>When a cyberattack occurs, it often creates fear and uncertainty within an organization. Employees may hesitate to report suspicious activities or share security concerns, fearing that they will be blamed or even lose their jobs. This lack of internal cooperation weakens an organization’s ability to respond effectively to future threats.</p><p>Externally, companies that suffer cyberattacks may struggle to maintain business relationships. Partners, suppliers, and clients may perceive them as security risks and choose to disengage, preferring to work with organizations that appear more resilient. Regulatory bodies may also impose stricter requirements, making it harder for affected companies to operate flexibly in their industry.</p><h3>Final Message</h3><p>As is evident, the cost for cybercriminals is becoming increasingly accessible both economically and intellectually, enabling them to execute cybercrimes with greater ease. This threat is now exponentially growing, further amplified by the use of AI.</p><p>Meanwhile, for companies of all sizes, as well as governments across different countries, this very real threat remains an underexplored area, often viewed as a luxury where only a few can afford to defend themselves. The rest are left with no choice but to pay, in one form or another, which keeps the risk open and makes cybercrime one of the most lucrative crimes in the world today.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=82fed336c567" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Principles of Black Hacking]]></title>
            <link>https://meetcyber.net/principles-of-black-hacking-b49a06b9559c?source=rss-2e7c36c9ea72------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b49a06b9559c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[learning]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Guillermo Pineda]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 24 Mar 2025 15:31:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-04-12T09:23:08.684Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VN8p0t9LyYBfEU3kCZcc7A.png" /></figure><p><strong>INTRODUCTION</strong></p><p>This document is written in a style resembling a guide or checklist for engaging in unethical activities in cyberspace. The intent of this approach is to capture the reader’s attention through concise statements highlighting key points.</p><p>Reading a set of principles on this topic will not make you a cybercriminal. However, not knowing them when engaging in dark operations just might.</p><p>If you believe that such readings promote cybercrime, keep in mind that those with enough motivation will act regardless. Keeping these topics in the dark only hinders traditional law enforcement agencies from preparing adequately against the thought patterns of real cybercriminals — those who do not rely on Meterpreter.</p><p>The following sections present a series of principles and recommendations to consider when conducting covert cyber operations safely, categorized into three fundamental areas.</p><p><strong>PREPARATION</strong></p><ul><li>Always remember that covert operations are so named because they must remain undisclosed and untraceable to you under any circumstances. If you seek attention or recognition, focus on sharing knowledge in any medium — unless your intent is self-destructive.</li><li>When selecting a target, consider that governments and large corporations have the resources to track you down if you are not careful. Do not engage with these entities without first gaining substantial experience.</li><li>Acquire second-hand equipment, preferably through black-market channels that cannot be traced to your real identity. Be cautious of surveillance cameras when making purchases. Use accessories like caps, sunglasses, and masks to obscure your identity, but avoid exaggerated disguises, as poor makeup or a hood will only draw more attention.</li><li>If possible, visit multiple internet cafes and collect hair and skin particles left on keyboards by other users. Place these on your working device to create uncertainty about who has used the system.</li><li>If you choose to work with a fixed operating system on your hard drive, infect it with malware that allows remote code execution (RCE). This way, any forensic investigation will indicate prior compromise, suggesting you may have been an unknowing pivot in an attack.</li><li>Educate yourself thoroughly before attempting anything. Novices and careless individuals are the first to be caught. Always have someone enthusiastic but inexperienced in these activities — a “scapegoat” to whom you can delegate noisy tasks as an early warning system.</li><li>Study continuously. The moment you think you know enough, study more. Knowledge is your only real power.</li><li>Train and improve your memory. Use it regularly and avoid writing anything that could be interpreted by others. Develop personal encoding systems that help you remember information without making it easily decipherable.</li></ul><p><strong>WORK ENVIRONMENT</strong></p><ul><li>Conduct wireless network sweeps in areas far from your residence. Ensure these locations are safe for using a computer in plain sight and have security camera blind spots.</li><li>Stay away from windows and reflective surfaces. A single moment of carelessness is all it takes to be intercepted.</li><li>If possible, work from a properly parked vehicle that does not attract attention. Use the car’s radio antenna to extend your Wi-Fi range and its battery to power your equipment. Avoid parking in places where the vehicle can be easily identified or flagged.</li><li>Do not frequent the same locations repeatedly, especially at regular intervals.</li><li>Avoid storing information on physical devices. If storage is necessary, use encrypted cloud services. Never upload anything in plaintext, and trust no system, especially if it is free. Wireless “dead drops” (e.g., Bluetooth-based) are another option.</li><li>Preferably, use amnesic operating systems like LINUX TAILS or a custom OS that erases activity logs. Enable BIOS protection to prevent cold boot attacks.</li><li>Employ multi-layer encryption: encrypt your disk, operating system, folders, and files. Additionally, encode information using multiple personal encryption methods.</li><li>Avoid conspicuous appearances. A hoodie, hacking stickers on your laptop, latex gloves, and other accessories will draw attention. Instead, mimic the behavior and appearance of a graphic design student or another professional accustomed to long computer sessions in public spaces. Few suspect the well-dressed individual using a MacBook.</li><li>After finishing your work, clean your machine both virtually and physically, removing any unwanted fingerprints or hair. Store your tools in a secure location that cannot be easily linked to you. Losing a cheap computer is preferable to losing your freedom over one.</li><li>Physically disable your device’s camera and microphone. If needed, use external peripherals instead.</li><li>Make payments exclusively with cryptocurrencies processed through random wallet exchange systems.</li></ul><p><strong>COMMUNICATIONS</strong></p><ul><li>Use external Wi-Fi antennas that can be easily replaced and discarded. Prefer antennas with SMD connectors for extended range and signal gain.</li><li>Always change your network card’s MAC address before connecting. Never use wired connections.</li><li>Utilize proxy chaining or directly connect through the TOR network. Regularly switch your service provider.</li><li>Never access personal social media accounts, email, or messaging services from your work machine.</li><li>Never carry personal devices when working, especially your cellphone. These can be tracked, and their connection history with provider antennas can reveal your movement patterns during an investigation.</li><li>If leaving messages on a site, use a language other than your native tongue — preferably English. Speak in the third person and reference collectives rather than individual efforts.</li><li>Client communications should always occur in forums, popular online games, or via internet “dead drops” like temporary public email services (e.g., YOPmail). If personalized conversations are necessary, use asymmetric encryption algorithms to ensure confidentiality and verify both parties’ identities.</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b49a06b9559c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://meetcyber.net/principles-of-black-hacking-b49a06b9559c">Principles of Black Hacking</a> was originally published in <a href="https://meetcyber.net/">MeetCyber</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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