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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Chris Wray on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Law and global trade in the era of blockchain]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/humanizing-the-singularity/law-and-global-trade-in-the-era-of-blockchain-2695c6276579?source=rss-9c0459a84c65------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iofa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mattereum]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Wray]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 09 Apr 2018 22:34:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-04-09T22:34:24.696Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>On February 23rd, </em><a href="https://mattereum.com/"><em>Mattereum</em></a><em> hosted the second </em><a href="http://internetofagreements.com/"><em>Internet of Agreements</em></a>®<em>(IoA) conference at the UK Government’s Digital Catapult in London. IoA</em>®<em> is a vision for global supply chains and logistics, integrating national laws and regulation with international commerce through the application of technology such as blockchains and smart contracts.</em></p><p>The conference brought together some of the best minds from areas of law, supply chain, and fintech to discuss the intersections of blockchain and global trade.</p><p>The legal panel session opened with an analysis of business and trade using concepts from the law of contract, followed by a discussion of how information technology has allowed increasingly global trade, with commercial relationships between businesses that are more distant from one another both geographically and also psychologically, in terms of the degree of mutual trust. The panellists addressed the questions of how blockchain differs from previous information technology in terms of its potential impact on global trade, and whether “trustless” systems are adequate for commercial relationships generally.</p><p>The answers included: that parties trust the enforceability of their agreement; that in some cases, performance may be automated, such as by a smart contract running on a permissionless blockchain; but that where a dispute concerns goods or services in the material world, the power of the state acting through national courts is still a necessary last resort. The use of escrow could allow on-chain enforcement in some cases, but for global trade it would not always practical to tie up operating capital in escrow. So in resolving disputes there would still be a need for impartial human judgment that is binding on the parties, such as an arbitrator’s decision that is ultimately enforceable in national courts.</p><p>Participants: Clive Freedman (3 Verulam Buildings), Stephen Palley (Anderson Kill), Tju Liang Chua (Chris Chua &amp; Associates), Adam Sanitt (Norton Rose Fulbright), and myself, Christopher Wray (Chief Legal Officer, Mattereum)</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FdqK51UBslUc%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DdqK51UBslUc&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FdqK51UBslUc%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/cdcc83173a55abee842ef72feed6ee3b/href">https://medium.com/media/cdcc83173a55abee842ef72feed6ee3b/href</a></iframe><p>Transcript:</p><p><strong>Law and Global Trade</strong></p><p>Chris: I have a very esteemed panel of legal minds here this morning. I will let them introduce themselves in a moment, and then maybe have a 2–3 minute introduction, to frame the discussion this morning. But we’re going to keep it pretty open, so if you have questions as we go through, please do ask them. I won’t necessarily allow an answer at that time; it depends how salient I think your question is. So, if you’d like to just introduce yourselves in a few sentences, just who you are, and maybe just a little about your experience in this space? Stephen.</p><p>Steve: Hi, I’m Steve Palley, I’m a lawyer. You can tell by my accent that I’m from the United States. My practice, I’ve been a trial lawyer, a litigator. I started out at an interesting time in the practice of law, where you still used books and you weren’t allowed to use electronic research until you learned how to use the book. I was also the first person in my firm to have Internet access. I had to explain what an email address was and why I needed one, and I had a Mosaic browser. I was the first person to have an Internet and a web browser in my law firm.</p><p>I’ve had a very traditional practice, I spent about a month in trial against your friends here in London, Lloyd’s, in September, dealing with 40-year-old insurance policies and telexes. But at the same time, I was sort of an amateur hacker as a kid, I taught myself to program on a TRS-80, writing adventure games in BASIC. I lost that, I came back to it, and then about five years ago I ended up developing a dispute resolution platform, using Ruby on Rails and a centralised database using PostgreSQL, and I realised the problem with my database was trust.</p><p>I was like, “Other lawyers out there must be interested in software,” so I did a little googling and I ran across a fellow named Casey Coleman, whom I’m sure some of you know, and he introduced me to blockchain and I discovered Bitcoin, I think it was Ripple, actually. Independently, I was trying to figure out how to escrow money without holding it myself, and I kind of went down that rabbit hole; I still practice law, but have clients who are trying to build blockchain technology that is legally compliant. I love what Vinay and Rob and the Mattereum team are doing, the Internet of Agreements, the idea of actually baking in… I think the term, I tweeted it, what Vinay said was, “You do you, wherever you are, and the software will figure out regulatory compliance,” I think that’s very, very cool. I’m happy to talk about legal developments in the US too, if folks have questions.</p><p>Clive: Morning everybody. I’m Clive Freedman, I’m a barrister, an arbitrator and a mediator, in the chambers called 3 Verulam Buildings. I’ve been interested in anything to do with IT for many, many years. More recently, I’ve been very interested in blockchains, and in particular how one resolves disputes that arise because people are using blockchains and smart contracts, and the kind of arbitration systems one might need in order to help people resolve those disputes.</p><p>Tju: Hi, I’m Tju Liang Chua, I’m a corporate transactions lawyer from Singapore. I’ve spent most of my career working in frontier and developing jurisdictions, which, for anyone who has spent time there will know, is a trustless space, and so the excitement of really being involved in blockchain and in the crypto environment as a solution to implement what, as a practicing lawyer, the issues I’ve been facing over my career has been exciting. I’ve spent the last year working in this space, working on blockchain implementation projects as well as ICOs, and it’s a good time to be in the space.</p><p>Adam: Hello, I’m Adam Sanitt, I’m a disputes lawyer at North Rose Fulbright. My background is a banking lawyer and a disputes lawyer. I’m also part of the fintech practice at Norton Rose Fulbright, that’s been going for about five years and it’s evolved through that time, from cryptocurrency through to blockchain, distributed ledger, and that’s a very active group now at Norton Rose Fulbright. Personally, to a degree, apart from my practice as a lawyer, I also research and publish in other areas, including mathematics, medical statistics, open source system code and C++, so I try and provide a slightly different perspective to the group there.</p><p>Chris: Thank you very much. I’m Christopher Wray, Chief Legal Officer at Mattereum, and everything we talk about today is what I do, so I won’t say anything more right now.</p><p>The conference topic is blockchains and world trade. What is trade? What is business? I think a way to frame this is that trade is the negotiation of reciprocal promises that are enforceable. Obviously any lawyer is going to recognise that I’m giving a sort of coded legal analysis here in terms of the law of contract. This is a legal panel, and I think this is a very helpful and, to the general public, not an intuitive way to look at what trade is, what business is.</p><p>First, negotiation. It can be in some kind of public forum or marketplace. Originally, it would be local; technology enables much more remote and perhaps larger scale marketplaces that may be more complex. Secondly, reciprocal promises. What do I mean by that? I just mean that I’ve traded something — where I do something for you, and you do something for me. I promised to deliver to you a tonne of wheat or to translate your documents, and you promised to give me $500. Thirdly, these promises are enforceable, which means if I don’t deliver your tonne of wheat or I don’t competently translate your document by the deadline that we agreed, then you’re able to force me to compensate you for what you’ve lost, as a result of that broken promise.</p><p>So, businesses are negotiated reciprocal promises that are enforceable. This is what trade is, and world trade just happens on a larger scale and across borders. As I said, technologies enable that: communications technology, transportation technology, legal technology — something like the idea of using arbitration. Now, the parties can agree that a specific individual with a certain kind of expertise will solve a dispute they may have and decide who should be compensated what; in a place of their choosing; in a language of their choice; interpreted in accordance with the law that they choose to govern their promises. And now of course we have, in the last few decades, information technology that has also started to affect world trade and the ability to do these kind of deals internationally.</p><p>We’ll start with trying to put blockchain technology in this historical context. It is another form of information technology system; perhaps that’s not an adequate description, but that’s a starting point. Information technology systems have brought, in particular, advances in the automation of performing these promises. Perhaps the negotiating may well be automated — algorithmic trading systems take this to an extreme — but also the carrying out of those promises, actually performing them, especially in relation to financial transactions or settlement. Maybe less impact on the settlement side from information technology systems.</p><p>My first question for the panellists is what’s new here? What’s new about blockchain? To what extent does this change the kind of things that can go right with trade and the kind of things that can go wrong? Clive, I might ask you to have a few words on what could go right and what could go wrong.</p><p>Clive: Well, let’s begin by looking at the possibility of putting your contracts on a blockchain, so that software can be used to trigger an action when another event takes place, perhaps based on ascertaining a fact at a particular time; for example, the price of Brent Crude at 12:00 noon today. The most obvious risk of putting your contract in computer software is the fact that a judge can’t read the software and decide what you’ve agreed. There are several ways of dealing with that. One way of dealing with it would be to add comment lines to the computer software in ordinary English or some other language, but that may still be hard to understand, and there’s a risk that the comment lines may not be consistent with the code that follows them, or the comment lines may be insufficient, without further explanation.</p><p>A better way of dealing with it would usually be for a computer software expert to explain how the code operates and how it amounts to an agreement in an expert’s report, but again that’s adding an extra layer of complexity to the steps required to resolve a dispute, if a dispute should arise. The best method of dealing with it is to supplement the smart contract with an ordinary, written agreement. That can set out each party’s rights and obligations, it can state that in the event of inconsistency the natural language agreement should prevail, or the reverse, but that would probably be unusual. It can contain additional terms which would be important if a dispute arises, for example dispute resolution, whether a dispute should be decided by arbitration or expert determination, as opposed to by the judges in the courts; how the arbitrator should be selected, in order to ensure that you do choose as your arbitrator somebody who understand the technology; whether the parties must try to reach a settlement by mediation first and the governing law that should apply; which court system should have jurisdiction in the event of disputes generally or disputes about an arbitration. That’s how you can supplement the software that contains the contract with terms &amp; conditions that can be enforced in a court of law or an arbitration, should that be necessary.</p><p>Let’s look at the problems that might occur, taking the example I used at the outset, of action B triggered by event A or fact A. A number of problems could occur, because things don’t happen how they’re expected to happen. First of all, the computer, which is supposed to report that event A has occurred might fail to do so. The oracle or factual source which is used to determine fact A might be unavailable at the time that it’s needed. Action B might not take place. Using computers without blockchains, the computer that is supposed to perform action B might be out of action or have no Internet connection. But with blockchains you’ve got the advantage that there isn’t a single computer, but you’ve got multiple computers in multiple locations, so that reduces the risk that the computer performing event B won’t do its job. Using smart contracts, if action B doesn’t take place, it’s likely to be because of a software error, and that of course is again a source of possible disputes.</p><p>The fourth situation is that, for whatever reason, action B might be performed when it should not have been performed. Or, fifthly, a fact might be recorded on a blockchain which should not have been recorded on a blockchain; that point perhaps applies particularly to blockchains which are being used more as a ledger than for smart contracts or cryptocurrencies. But when I was making this list of things that could lead to disputes, I had in mind initially that these might be disputes specifically related to the use of blockchains, or smart contracts as we call them, but then I found myself thinking, “Actually, they could all occur without blockchains.” The first simple example is a margin call made by a commodities broker, that’s been happening for decades. More recently obviously computers have been used to do it, but it’s all been happening day to day, without blockchains or smart contracts.</p><p>Another example which I’ve been looking at recently is online platforms for selling customer invoices to investors. Nowadays, if you’re a retailer that has lots of invoices that maybe are being paid in 30 days, you can upload the details of those invoices to a platform, and investors can buy small proportions of those invoices to spread their risk. All that is taking place without blockchains, or what we call smart contracts.</p><p>In these contexts, at any rate, where English law applies and English lawyers have got involved, there’s likely to be a 20–30-page English language contract which the lawyers have drafted, which hopefully provides the answer to the problem without there being a dispute, or,, at the very least, if there is a dispute, it tells you how the dispute should be resolved.</p><p>I think the point that could be made from these examples is that if blockchains start to be used widely in international trade, we may see disputes arising from the complicated examples that I’ve given happening more frequently, and there’s a danger that people may be over-reliant on the smart contracts which trigger the events, without spending enough time on the accompanying natural language contracts.</p><p>Chris: Thank you. Any other feelings about what might be new here? In sense, we have here that this is something that is very much staying the same.</p><p>Steve: What I would say is everything is different, nothing is different. The idea of an automated contract, if you think about the notion of a letter of credit, that is something that’s been around for a long time: if an external event happens, you have an unconditional right to pay. Now, the problem of course with a letter of credit is bank solvency. I had a case in 2008, and we settled a case in a very creative way, and it required funding a settlement with a letter of credit, and the plaintiff’s lawyer in that case, he must have known someone or something, he knew the jockey, and he insisted that we… the only bank that he would allow us to use was… I want to say it was JP Morgan. So, there’s a problem,, and I think one of the things that blockchain theoretically can solve is potentially credit risk. The problem that you face though, if you rely on blockchain to solve a credit risk problem, is you still have to have an asset, and you have to believe that asset is going to be worth something in the future.</p><p>So to my mind, what’s most interesting to me as a disputes lawyer about blockchain, and what got me interested in this space, as you mentioned, is the notion of guaranteed enforceability. I’ve gotten judgements against defendants… I had a client who had a lease with someone, and the person didn’t pay the lease: we sued them, pierced the corporate veil, got a personal judgement against this guy and against this company, but there was no way to collect it; you could get a judgement, without being able to collect it. Theoretically, a blockchain technology can perhaps, if not guarantee enforcement, provide a better enforceability mechanism. That’s one of the things that you mentioned in your introduction, that one of the components of blockchain that’s interesting from a contract standpoint is guaranteed enforceability.</p><p>If you think about contract law itself, if you go back a couple of thousand years, contract law itself was I would say an important if not technological innovation but an important knowledge innovation. It was the idea that instead of relying on self-help to resolve disputes you could rely upon state power. I guess the question is will blockchain be able to take contractual relationships and move enforcement away from state power to something else? I don’t think we will get entirely away from state power. I think there are certain areas of dispute that we’re going to have to default to court systems or to arbitrators.</p><p>I had someone call me, an insurance broker. I’ve started to get… I can tell that this technology means something, I have 10 presentations in the next two months that were scheduled for me while I was in London, my marketing person just started setting things up. Defence contractors, insurance brokers, I get calls from people, saying… An insurance broker two days ago, “My client, big energy, gas &amp; oil company, they’re doing something blockchain related. They’re going to close soon on this deal. Does insurance cover that? What are the risks?” so I had to explain to her… She had heard a presentation that I had given, and I had to explain to her what a fork was. How do you deal with fork risk? What happens if you’ve got a smart contract that is on a blockchain and it’s forked multiple times, and that contract can trigger payment from an external bank account? How do you hedge against that?</p><p>How much money is frozen in Parity, was it $150 million in crypto? Maybe that all gets sorted out, but let’s say you’ve got a billion dollars that’s tied up because of a software glitch, because someone who has commit access to a repository they shouldn’t have changes the code. It’s only a matter of time before that ends up in front of a judge. So I think we probably don’t get completely away from state power enforcing contracts, but we move in that direction.</p><p>Adam: I agree with both of those comments, and there’s a qualified optimism there. I’d like to highlight a point, if you like, underneath the smart contract layer, which is the ability to have trustless transactions using blockchain. The paradigm for trade is that you are standing in front of someone, and you give them the money and they give you the goods at the same time. That is a trustless transaction that occurs in physical reality, because we can physically transfer these things, independently of any record of that taking place. The problem with international trade is that you are necessarily divorced in geography, in time, and we can assume because of that there is no trust there. You are trying to move sometimes information but often physical items of value over time, and the techniques that we have in international trade at the moment try to replicate that trustless situation by using trusted intermediaries, letters of credit for instance or bills of lading, to try and replicate the physical aspect of handing something over. What you’re able to do of course with blockchain is to have the analogue of that standing in front of someone and swapping something, but you’re creating a digital record in a trustless way. On top of that you can build smart contracts.</p><p>Particularly for international trade, if what the record is is itself there, exists in the blockchain, you’ve got a complete analogue or physical reality, you’ve got that automatic enforcement. But often what you’re looking at is a record of something that physically exists, and then you have all the issues that Clive pointed out. I think of them collectively as reality mismatch errors, that the blockchain is absolutely correct in the record that it’s created; unfortunately, it’s just reality that is at fault, and the two have, in some way, to be reconciled. And I think sometimes it’s not clear to people, so it’s important to stress, that there is in fact no way to avoid these reality mismatch errors. The underlying physical goods, maybe they catch fire and disappear. If the underlying physical good is a diamond, maybe someone cuts the diamond in half so you’ve now got two diamonds. Physical circumstances can change.</p><p>The other sort of reality mismatch is a problem with the event that you’ve created. You’ve said that I’m transferring this, that record exists, but perhaps that transfer is induced by a fraudulent misrepresentation, perhaps someone is pointing a gun at your head and saying, “Create this record.” In those cases, courts will reverse that transfer; in physical reality, in blockchain reality, they will do that.</p><p>So although the trustless transaction is going to help with automatic enforcement and resolve a lot of disputes — and save a huge amount of costs, as Vinay talked about initially — you are going to have these reality mismatch errors, and you are going to need the dispute resolution that Clive talked about. I’ll finish with, and I don’t know if it’s a slightly fanciful analogy, but I think of the invention of writing, several thousand years ago people saying, “Great, finally we can write down our agreements. They’ll be set out there, there will be no problem, they’ll be enforced automatically, and we won’t even need lawyers anymore, because everything will just be written down.” It didn’t quite work out like that, but it certainly did help; I think the same with blockchain.</p><p>Chris: Vinay is reminding me that the reality mismatch error is what we often talk about as delamination — this coming apart of the representation in software, and the reality. So, we’ve heard a couple of times, from Clive and from others, about this need for some kind of record of the contractual agreement, of the terms of an agreement, in addition to a piece of software that’s implementing it. I don’t think there’s any voice on the panel saying that you might be able to do away with that completely.</p><p>Steve: You could.</p><p>Chris: Okay, so let’s talk a bit about this. This is the idea that a lot of our work is based on, this concept of Ricardian contracts that Ian Grigg developed originally (our Chief Scientist). You will have a piece of software which is representing value and transfers of value, but that is going to be accompanied by a natural language, a written set of terms that describe the agreement between the parties, the agreement that can actually be enforced, the intentions that they’re bound by.</p><p>Let’s think about, in the context of blockchain, what this might start to look like. Yes, we want to do business, we want to do trade with one another, we’re making promises to one another, we have written agreements that lay out what it is that we’re promising to do, and now we have perhaps smart contracts on blockchains or other pieces of blockchain technology, distributed ledger technology, that are automating part of the performance of these contracts. Perhaps also automating the enforcement of these contracts, or at least automating performance in such a way that once might would have to have been enforced, and now it doesn’t, because it has been automated.</p><p>And yet, on the other hand, you can have both automated actions, or automated states of affairs which do not involve a required action, where the automation is generating a need for enforcement. Something has happened in an automated way, or has not happened, in accordance with a piece of software, and that is not in accordance with the intentions of the people who’ve made that deal, and now we have this issue of how to enforce the deal if the software hasn’t automated it.</p><p>Steve: A couple of years ago you would see… a frequent meme was code eats law, code is law, code will get rid of lawyers. It’s easy to dismiss that, and I think I will probably be the last buggy whip maker, I’ll be around, but it’s an interesting thought experiment. Contracts have not existed for… If you go back 100,000 years ago, we didn’t have contracts, maybe 10,000 years ago… I don’t know when the first contract was, maybe the Phoenicians created the first contract… Contracts are an artefact of trade, it’s a way to memorialise what counterparties have agreed to do. But can we imagine a future in which we don’t need contracts? That would be a future in which you were able to solve an assent, agreement, you were able to create a system that removed any possibility of disagreement about what parties intend to do. The problem there is that sometimes you actually want ambiguity in an agreement, but let’s assume hypothetically there are certain agreements in which you don’t want ambiguity.</p><p>If you can imagine a scenario in which intent and assent, or agreement, can be perfectly captured, and which performance can be, for all practical purposes, guaranteed, perhaps you don’t need contracts, and perhaps you don’t need people like us to go into court and to argue with a judge. I would say that remains hypothetical, but perhaps that’s the… If you look at the horizon of blockchain technology and you look at… I don’t actually like the term “smart contracts”, because, as a thousand other people have said, they’re not either. But maybe in the future there can be such a thing, and that thing could actually get rid of the need for a contract. Maybe we won’t need to have something called a Ricardian contract, maybe we won’t need contract law. Fanciful, but possible.</p><p>Clive: Fanciful. [laughter] Let’s take the example of two cavemen. One of the cavemen has got more grain than he needs, the other caveman has got more animal skins than he needs. They meet in a cave, one hands over some grain and the other hands over some animal skins. You may say that’s not a contract, but it is a contract. Because both of them are making an implicit promise that what they’re handing over is worth having and that it is in satisfactory condition. Let’s suppose that the grain is all in a sack, and although when he puts his hand in and he takes a sample out, that looks okay, and he gives it a sniff, at the bottom of the sack there’s a whole lot of not grain. You’ve got a dispute.</p><p>Chris: But not a Ricardian contract.</p><p>Steve: If I may, there’s a difference between an agreement and a contract and a dispute. A contract presupposes enforceability by a third party. The elements of a contract in the United States are offer, acceptance, mutuality of consideration, and something that can be enforced. In that situation with the cavemen, they enforce it by hitting each other over the head with a stick, and the innovation that law provided and that courts provided was we don’t want people to hit each other over the head with sticks; we want to have Solomon decide, “Okay, split the baby,” you have a neutral arbiter decide.</p><p>Now, the question is, and I will readily admit that it’s a thought experiment, let’s fast-forward 100–200 years from now. Is it possible to imagine… Just like those cavemen could not imagine being able to go to a court and have a judge decide something for them, relying on a body of cases and case law, can we imagine what a system would look like where we’re beyond enforceability, where we don’t actually have to have a person decide that the agreement was enforceable? I think it is fanciful right now, I don’t think we have any worries about job security, but I wonder what that would look like.</p><p>Chris: Adam, to your point earlier, I think the key parts here, in the Ricardian contract concept, are yes, some software that automates something. But the other part is that, the invention of writing, it’s the clear written record of what it is that was agreed. So while we can most definitely have contracts without a written record of what was agreed… It may be unwise, because it may be rather difficult to persuade this state power that’s going to enforce something against you that that was indeed what the other person agreed to give you. So the question here I think is, more precisely, if our automation gets good enough, would we be willing to do away with a clear written record of what we’d agreed to do?</p><p>Tju: At some point you’d still need enforcement, and that does come down to power. When we evolved beyond the two cavemen hitting each other with sticks, what happened then was that they went to the village chief who then had the entire village’s worth of clubs. At the end of the day, there needs to be a resource, some form of state power, the centralised group power, whatever you call it, that is able to enforce the promises. So while I do see that we may move away from the static environment of a contract that goes directly to a court, the question of a dispute resolution mechanism will always need to be there, and it can be pre-agreed, we can pull up structures, we can move it away from the jurisdictions we’re talking about.</p><p>One of the things I do… And we’re in the Stone Age here, we do this by hand, but if you do joint venture contracts in developing jurisdictions, one of the big questions of cooperating with Chinese companies, that comes up every time, is am I going to be able to enforce my IP? I can get a judgement, I can get arbitral law and I can bring it to China. Will I be able to enforce it? One of the things blockchain does is change the mindset around it. Right now we do this by hand, we design the relationship in such a way that the reference to state power isn’t in China; you put the IP and the joint venture entity in Hong Kong or Singapore where you can rely on the courts. Restructuring the entire arrangement so that you do not rely on unreliable enforcement, state power, in a jurisdiction but move it somewhere else.</p><p>Or, for that matter, the question of designing smart contracts and matching them to law, my view is that you have really got to do those two in conjunction. The programmer will be able to develop a piece of software that automates things. Who tells the programmer how the program ought to be designed? What scenario, what treatment should the contract flow take, if event A occurs? That’s still a design that’s being advised by the lawyers drafting the contract. You can convert the natural language contract into code. I’d say that law is code, rather than code is law. In order to properly draft a contract, you do need to have a mindset of the flowchart of event A occurring leads to consequence B which leads to consequence C, which leads to a form of these possible events… That flow of work and thought process, and the understanding of the market environment and the legal conditions in each of the places where you’re operating is necessary in order to develop the software in the first place.</p><p>Chris: This is another interesting angle, and matches our own experience in initial work with clients, that the legal input in some ways is about design, it’s designing the relationship and the space of possibility in which events might unfold, what constraints do we wish to place on how things may play out. What the automation that you can have with smart contracts adds to it is that it’s not simply about saying, “Well, here’s our preferred path forward. You do exactly what you promised, I get exactly what you promised to pay me — great,” but we’re also designing in non-preferred paths through the system. It’s starting to scenario plan and figure out various things that may happen, and to some extent those can then be considered in advance rather than as a surprise, and to some extent the appropriate response is if something isn’t quite right can be programmed in, can be designed in.</p><p>It’s something that ought to have always happened. Lawyers always should have been, but probably didn’t have the opportunity to — and I won’t explore where the incentives might lie — but didn’t have the opportunity to design business arrangements in such a way that a dispute was less likely to arise in the first place, because something had been anticipated and provided for in the contract.</p><p>Steve: One of the reasons I’m not too worried about job security is I think you scratch a law firm now and you’ll find they’ve got an innovation lab or somebody who’s talking about lawyers learning how to code. As long as we exist in jurisdictions where there are laws, there will be a need for lawyers to provide input, and ultimately the lawyers are going to learn how to program, so a future lawyer… You might not have people who go to court — which is sad, because going to court is fun, juries are awesome… You don’t have civil juries in England, and they probably doesn’t make any sense, but it’s great fun — but I think our jobs will morph, and there’s something about law and design that’s very, very interesting, I think we’ll see more and more of that. Maybe eventually where it’s like Hermann Hesse and it’s like the <em>Glass Bead Game</em> and we move beyond law and to some sort of existence where we play complex mathematical games all day… I don’t see that happening anytime soon. So as long as we have law, we’ll definitely have to have designers who have legal training, or lawyers who have design training.</p><p>Tju: Steve, I’ve never been to court so unfortunately it’s not an exciting life that I lead. But to your point, contract drafting today is exactly like programming, it’s an iterative process. Each time Steve thinks up some new loophole that the contract does not cover, the next round we negotiate the contract has a new clause that matches that. We’re bug fixing, and I don’t see that the shift to coding is going to change that work away from lawyers.</p><p>Steve: It changes what we do. There’s someone here from Etherisc… I don’t know if folks know about this company, but what Etherisc has done is it’s one of the very few production blockchain applications that does something, and I think it’s basically Ricardian in nature. What Etherisc does is it guarantees… It’s a flight insurance application, single trigger. You go to a website, you pay, and if your flight is late, you get paid automatically. I’m an insurance coverage lawyer, I sue insurance companies for a living, and often that’s because insurance companies, it’s shocking, they don’t pay. Where is Lloyd’s from here, in which direction? That way? Hello, Lloyds! It’s Palley, I’m here! [laughter] What that does is that gets rid of certain kinds of disputes, but probably a) you need to have lawyers provide input into the design, into the construction.</p><p>Also, what’s interesting about Etherisc is they actually have an insurance policy, so it’s Ricardian in that there is actually an insurance policy written by a Maltese insurer, it’s some sort of actual insurance company, so you’ve got the paper component and then you’ve got the payment automation piece. What that will do, the trajectory there is you need to have lawyers involved in… You’ll still need folks involved in creating the contracts, but you end up moving certain things away from disputes. It’s very interesting, and I think you’ll see hopefully more applications moving in that direction.</p><p>Chris: We’ve had this “code is law”, but I think we’re missing something there. Code is just code; law is systems design. There isn’t just one practice of software engineering; there are different scales or levels at which you can carry out that kind of task. So I don’t think lawyers of the future will necessarily be coding, but they might well be designing the architecture of systems which some people do indeed then go and write up in code.</p><p>Adam: I think we’ve maybe morphed slightly from the future of law to the future of lawyers, which is of great importance to everyone on the panel and we could talk about for a long time. [laughter] To your point, you said it’s important to view that hypothetical of the code and just the code, whether it’s the lawyers doing it or not. I think where it may become important is for a lot of contracts and a lot of international trade are in fact right now not enforceable, in the sense that it is simply not worth it for the people doing the trade to enforce the contract. If you’re buying something worth £100 from China, you will very quickly find out the costs of trying to complain and obtain legal recourse — it is simply not worthwhile.</p><p>So there’s a huge mass of un-lawyered, effectively unenforceable contracts in the international trade space, and where we talk about this code creeping up and trying to cover the most common situations, that may well be where it enables international trade to flourish and slowly moves its way up the value chain. Yes, the larger disputes will remain the same, but I think it will still be very important. But I think that meme that we don’t need the law, even going up the value chain, I’m not sure that that is dead. We think it is maybe as lawyers up here, but I’d be interested to hear contrary views, if there are any, in the audience.</p><p>Comment: It seems to me that the other key aspect to any of this working is something that I think is inescapable, which is consent. I don’t think you can ever have anything that’s truly trustless, because the trust simply moves, because both parties still have to consent to take part in and be subject to the contract, whether it happens digitally or not. At that point trust becomes “I trust this person, because they’ve consented to agree to these terms,” and I think you can never remove that, and lack of trust means they don’t want to play by these rules, so you’re going to be wary of doing business with them, if they seem to be unwilling to play the game, to participate. So at that point trust simply becomes generated by the consent and the willingness to engage in and participate in the contract, whether it happens in meat space or whether it happens in digital.</p><p>Chris: Let’s not drop this point about how much of trade today is not practically enforceable, and how much trade is potentially not happening, because if you were to try and do a deal of that nature, it would not be practically enforceable.</p><p>Comment: Loved Tju’s comment about clubs and the pooling of clubs, the village elder. My take on it is humans have two mechanisms of enforcement: violence and discretion. Legal systems make use of violence; it’s a pooled violence, it’s according to processes, etc., but it’s still violence. We also use discretion. One of the wonderful demonstrations of a discretion-based system working in contexts where the legal system does not operate, for the very reason that just got brought up, is eBay and ratings systems. These are systems that have enforcement that has to do with your opportunity to interact with future parties, and whether that opportunity gets altered based on how you show up this time. I think that if there is a threat to law, it’s the rise of a more functional discretion-based system. It doesn’t necessarily mean law goes away entirely, but it may shift significantly.</p><p>Chris: Let me just speak to that first, because I think that’s a very important point. I do think we need to draw a distinction here between the consumer level, retail, and business-to-business, like trade at slightly higher values. For one, we lose the possibility of using escrow when we go to world trade. There’s always going to be that opportunity to tie some…</p><p>Steve: Why do you say that?</p><p>Chris: Because I don’t see that if you’re running supply chains where liquidity is at a premium that you can afford to tie up significant chunks of cash. Quite the opposite. I would say in this context enforceable legal contracts are a form of trade finance, they precisely allow you to avoid to tie up a big chunk of operating capital in escrow.</p><p>Tju: I kind of agree with Steve there. I’m actually working with a team that’s looking to build a blockchain trade finance platform for Africa, and that’s a space where the current estimates are hundreds of billions of unmet trade finance needs, because the legal systems are not… It’s a systems design question. The legal systems are such that enforcement is pretty much impossible on the ground in Africa; you have security over the asset, but there’s no way to enforce that security. There are ways to design a system where you are taking escrow, you’re taking say a crypto token escrow in lieu of a letter of credit, reducing transaction costs, structuring the… As you mentioned, systems design: thinking through how the platform works, how the incentives run, such that it does become legally enforceable in a jurisdiction where you can rely on state power.</p><p>In terms of kind of a B2B and B2C differential, I’m not sure that the reputation scores on eBay are any different from credit ratings.</p><p>Steve: The word “trustless” has always bothered me, actually. I think I came up with this, that trust didn’t go away, it just moved. What you’re doing fundamentally is you’re moving trust to Vitalik Buterin and to a four-year-old experimental blockchain. So it’s not that these systems are… I think what it means is you’re moving the trust between counterparties to trust brilliant programmers, in a system that doesn’t really have an established governance. You’re taking one set of problems and potentially creating another one. I’m very bullish on blockchain incidentally, it’s not a criticism; it’s just a practical reality of where we are.</p><p>Tju: Steve, I would say the purpose of trustless is to move the trust to someone who doesn’t have an incentive in the system. If we’re doing a trade together, if I need to trust you, you have an embedded interest in the system; but if you trust a judge, then he’s got no particular stake one way or another. That is the extent of moving things away from the need to trust counterparties in the system and move it to a reliable source, whether that reliable source is the group at large so that there’s a consensus algorithm, or whether, in current times, we use state power and appeal to courts.</p><p>Steve: I mean, I kind of like court more than I like the EIP situation right now. My point is it’s not trustless. You’re trusting people who you don’t know, they have a financial interest in the value of a cryptocurrency, and you’re also trusting miners… What I’m trying to explain to clients who are going into these things is you’re taking one set of trust problems and potentially creating another. Which isn’t a bad thing, it’s just a question of looking at it with both eyes open.</p><p>Chris: To put in a word for the legal tradition, I think the fact that you have, at least in some jurisdictions, those relatively neutral third-party institutions, the courts, that can be relied upon is a major service.</p><p>Adam: Trust has come up a few times, and trustlessness, and I sort of put it front and centre at the start. Obviously you’re moving the trust, you’re moving it to a sort of collective endeavour, and it depends on which blockchain exactly, but I think there is still more to it and there is still a genuine trustlessness that you created. We could debate exactly how that worked or exactly where you’ve moved to, maybe that’s a bit technical.</p><p>But to pick up just on the reputation side, the reputation remedy, if you like, is complementary to the trustless nature of blockchain. You don’t need blockchain to have a reputation system, and a reputation system can replace that, if you can’t achieve trustlessness. Perhaps the analogue for the reputation type remedies within the blockchain system is the ability to exclude bad players as a punishment for breaking the rules, so a type of enforcement which can be done without recourse to the legal system, where you say you are no longer allowed to transact on this blockchain, you are excluded from it in some way. That can be very powerful, that can be done internally to the blockchain. It raises lots of other issues when you’re dealing with multilateral as opposed to bilateral situations. You’ve now got more than two people involved, you have the whole system involved. How do you obtain consent to that, how does that work? I think those sorts of remedies will be important in future blockchain systems.</p><p>Chris: Would you prefer a neutral independent party, or would you prefer a popularity contest? We did have a question at the back there.</p><p>Question: What confuses me in terms of this contract is the enforceability. I understand binary, one-off payments, options, futures, all of that, but how does it work in a more complex contract? You mentioned IP rights and enforceability. What’s the point of me having an IP right, if I can’t within the code of the contract ensure that the PRC will enforce in Shanghai my rights. It’s that break with the reality that I… Can you please speak to that?</p><p>Chris: Yes, thank you — I think that’s one of the most important points we can make this afternoon. Yes, there will be things that we can fully automate. If I’m going to sell you some Ether and you’re going to send me some Bitcoin, those are digital assets and the transactions can happen immediately. If I’m supposed to have the right to receive some oil physically from some location for a period of time, it doesn’t really matter what any software system says, if I stop receiving my oil from that location.</p><p>Steve: The distinction I make is between single trigger payment, where you’re relying on a trusted data source — I don’t like “oracle”, because the word means the opposite of what people intend — that’s one thing. But the question is how do you automate performance using a smart contract?</p><p>I think actually some fairly complex automation is possible. Do people know what a quantity take-off is in construction? Quantity take-off is when you’re doing excavation, you’ve got to pay for the cost of the amount of dirt that you remove, and one of the most common disputes in American construction projects is the amount of the quantity take-off. How do you figure that out? Do you weigh the soil? Do you eyeball it? How would you automate that? I thought about this, I did a presentation for the ABA three years ago, we brought a drone in, nobody showed up. I actually talked about Ethereum and I spelled it wrong, I’m still kind of embarrassed, in my white paper. What we discovered was you can actually automate something that seems very performance related, quantity take-off, and you would use a drone that uses photogrammetry to look at the earth, measure the amount of soil that’s removed — you can do that actually more precisely using technology than you can using a scale, which has to deal with the variable weight of a truck — the drone can then send that information to a smart contract which can then automate payment.</p><p>The problem with trying to drain the ocean at once is it becomes impossible; you have to think about it from an iterative standpoint. So what I would do in your situation is take the most complex performance issue that you have that’s something that you want to try and automate, speak with programmers, and basically you break it into the smallest possible pieces. With construction, which is one of the things that I focus on, I would begin with excavation, quantity take-off, and then you look at things that are more complicated. How do you figure out if the millwork was installed per plan, per spec and done on time? Can you automate that? I think what you find is if you break things down into their component pieces, you can actually begin to automate fairly complex performance requirements as well.</p><p>Chris: My follow-on to that, and then we’ll come to your question, is consequential damages, consequential loss. This is the thing: it’s one thing to have a contract where we can automate enforcement, we can take something that would have perhaps required enforcement action, you’ve delivered short, and we’ll reduce the payment accordingly. That no longer needs to be enforced, because that’s now a non-preferred pathway system that can be automated. But, if you knew full well that I needed that delivery from you because a whole series of other things depended on it, it’s going to be potentially what I owe you to make good for me breaking my promise is more than you’re ever going to pay me, had I delivered. In these kind of contexts, it’s hard to see how any kind of escrowing solution can work. I think that’s an interesting question, what the economy looked like, when nobody can get consequential loss.</p><p>Vinay: This seems like this is where we get into this very fuzzy middle ground, where reputation, insurance and escrow all begin to interconnect to each other: network escrow, trade associations, various ways of doing long-term accountability. It seems like we’ve seen over many different technological substrates many different ways of approaching those problems, and David Friedman’s <em>The Machinery of Freedom</em> illustrates a whole bunch of examples. I tend to think that reputation systems are very fragile, I’d much prefer things like insurance and escrow. But is there any work, does anybody know of any work that looks on these things on a spectrum, on a network, that has some kind of nomenclature and analysis of how we move systems from an escrow norm to an insurance norm for example? There must be academic work on it, I just don’t know where you would find it. That might be a question for the audience as much as the panel.</p><p>Steve: Escrow and insurance are bonding in the United States, they’re different things. Escrow is a payment guarantee, it’s a two-party payment guarantee; insurance is contingent risk, you pay a premium to a third party, so you’re pulling the asset. I don’t know that you would necessarily ever move entirely from escrow to insurance, or from insurance to escrow, I think they serve… If somebody has a different opinion, maybe I’m wrong, but I think fundamentally they’re different relationships, one is tri-party and the other is probably two-party, and I think they serve different risk functions, but I don’t know.</p><p>Tju: Well, certainly from the buyer standpoint they serve one and the same thing, which is “I want to get paid.” Whether it’s through escrow, whether it’s from insurance, whether it’s from offloading the asset to a third party market, I just want to get paid. So as long as the system is designed correctly for the result that I need, the mechanism, as a participant in the system, is, frankly, irrelevant. In the M&amp;A context for instance, there’s been an increasing market for insurance over breach of reps and warranties. You’d think that that’d be the most absurd thing in the world, but there’s a market for it, because it’s priceable; where it’s priceable, there’s a deal to be done.</p><p>Question: I’m not a lawyer, so excuse me for maybe a slightly basic question, but I get extremely upset when people talk about trustless trust, without actually defining what it means. People like Chris Dixon of Andreessen Horowitz recently published an hour-long podcast where he mentioned trustless trust at least 50 times, saying it’s going to change everything, without actually specifying what it does change. As an ex-banker, when I look at trustless trust, these types of contracts, agreements simply look to me as fully collateralised agreements. In the context of things like B2B, or essentially trade financing, that’s why banks came into existence, to provide trust into contracts, where otherwise you would need huge amounts of collateral. Could you in a way help clarify, from your perspective, does trustless trust actually mean anything? Specifically, does it lead to disintermediation of the framework otherwise surrounding these contracts?</p><p>Chris: Excellent question, thank you.</p><p>Adam: We brought up trustlessness at the start, and it is important, and we’re not in a sort of nihilistic worldview where there is no trust in anything. To go back to the first example of swapping the goods for the money, there is a trust there, there is a trust in the fiat currency that you’re handing over, a trust that that system exists and that that currency has value. I think you can sort of go down the rabbit hole trying to locate where this trust has moved to. It has in some sense moved to a collective system, but I’m slightly reluctant to go more into that, just because you can spend hours looking at podcasts. I wonder if we could stipulate here that the trust has moved so that, as you said, you are able to disintermediate, without getting into a sort of theological debate as to the nature of that trustlessness. Would that help?</p><p>Comment: Picking up on that point, I have a slightly challenging view for you guys, which is that actually as a lawyer you learn eventually or quickly that contracts are really about relationships, and most contracts aren’t actually enforced, and they’re certainly not enforced in accordance with their terms. There’s a lot of anthropological evidence that suggests that societies have prospered the most where there’s not just been the ability to trade but there’s been trust, and I think this idea of trustlessness as a goal, beyond payment and cryptocurrencies, is not necessarily a good thing.</p><p>The legal systems which have proved most useful for trade are Anglo-Saxon legal systems, not civil law legal systems, and Anglo-Saxon legal systems have always baked in discretion. You aren’t held to your promises. That’s why you don’t have specific performance, you have damages as a remedy, that’s why there are equitable remedies. The fact that you won’t necessarily be held to your performance is actually part of what builds the trust in the relationship, people have to be almost able to not perform or decide not to perform, and that builds the trust. So I’m not convinced that using blockchain technology is necessarily a good on its own just because it enables trustlessness. I think we want to encourage trust between people, not make them feel that the world would be better if they could trade trustlessly.</p><p>Chris: I don’t disagree with you. I think one of the nice applications of blockchain technology, in a Ricardian contract context, is supporting this. “Trust but verify” might be the slogan. If you have scenario planned, if you’ve actually done a bit of design about the kind of relationships you want, and you have an idea about what’s going to happen and when, and what kinds of evidence there would be of performance as this contractual performance unfolds, you can take those pieces of evidence, you can hash them, you can put the hashes on a blockchain. That’s a really nice way of ensuring that everyone knows that if there were to be a dispute, any neutral party coming in to resolve it is going to have a nice chronology, and it’s going to be very difficult to resile from those notices that were sent, and you don’t even need a…</p><p>Comment: It’s not about disputes though, is it? It’s about relationships. The world changes, people decide to do things in different ways, and a contract is kind of a background to how you have that discussion or how you have that relationship. In the real world it’s not a contract that gets enforced; it’s more “What’s the reason? How can I help you? What we can do about that?” That’s how business really works.</p><p>Tju: I would have to disagree with that actually, as a systems design question. Because trust has a scaling problem. You can trust the people you know, you trust the immediate people you trade with, you can discover whether or not you can trust a long-term partner. But when you buy a random item that you want off eBay, you’re trusting eBay because you have the relationship; you’re not trusting the seller, because you don’t know the seller. So a system that allows the shifting of trust to a mechanism that you can build a one-on-one connection with enables global trade, without which we’d all just be trading with our five nearest neighbours.</p><p>Steve: The same thing with insurance policies. I’ve been dealing with insurance companies for 20 years, and insurance companies don’t treat everybody the same way. Insurance companies aren’t all bad, we need them in order to operate, but there is a different relationship there than you have between maybe two commercial entities who are doing business, maybe a developer and a contractor. If I go back to my example of the quantity take-off automation, I think that that can help build trust. It removes one of the areas of dispute that you can possibly have and facilitates maybe a stronger relationship, so where there are those moments where you do need discretion, where you say, “You know, I know I don’t really owe you $100,000. Maybe you take 50 and I’ll throw the next job to you?” You’re right, that’s partly how business gets done. You’ve got the contract, but if you want to maintain a mercantile relationship, sometimes discretion is the thing that allows business to proceed.</p><p>Adam: Not only are most contracts not enforced, but most contracts are never actually read. [laughter] Usually when we have a dispute, they bring out the thousand pages of contractual documentation from a drawer where they’ve been gathering dust, and no one has actually looked at them or conducted their relationship in accordance with that contract, and no one looked at it until there was actually a dispute. So yeah, there’s certainly some truth to that. I would just say I think it’s important to distinguish the ability to create a record, let’s say to know what’s in a bank account, without having to trust a third party bank to have those records, in the same way that you can transfer something to someone when you meet them face to face. It’s important to distinguish that and to recognise that advance from the trust in the underlying relationship. We’re not advocating a lack of trust there; we’re just adding some new things that can be done that seem particularly relevant for international trade, where you are separated by geography and language and time and in a different trust arena. But how it will work I think depends on the factors that you bring up.</p><p>Question: Thank you, Chris. I’m the leading member of the Vinay fan club [laughter], and Dominick, my co-director next to me, not to exclude you, his fan club too. This is really for Mr Palley. I was an American and international lawyer. I don’t practice anymore, I went into financial services and fintech some time ago. But when I was a lawyer, I wrote a professional… I’m conscious, having lived here for many years, that everything we’re talking about is in the context really of the UK or other countries. So when what we’re talking about today — Mattereum, Internet of Agreements — is resolved, that will be the situation, the law in a nation state, it will be the law of the land; not so in the States, and that’s what I’d like to ask you about. Years ago I wrote a professional law review paper, which somehow became the bleeding authority for something like 10 years on international letters of credit, and people asked me to be part of a working group and we put together something very similar to what’s being done here. But despite the uniform commercial code — you’re smiling already — the 50 states, by the time they were through, tore it to pieces and there was absolutely no uniformity of anything. So whatever this august body comes up with in time will be the law in the UK, in France, in Estonia, in wherever. But please, tell us what happens when it gets to the United States.</p><p>Steve: The United States is not unique in having a federal system, but it does create… It creates opportunities, but it’s complex. Every state has its own legislature and has control over certain bodies of law. Contract law, for the most part, in the United States is a matter of state law, and what the law is in Utah about contract law isn’t necessarily what the law is in Idaho. It’s particularly nettlesome for insurance, because of something called… There’s a statute that basically says that insurance is regulated by the state. Every single state in the United States has its own insurance commissioner, and if you want to be an insurance company in the United States, unless you’re a certain type of health insurer, you can’t write insurance for the entire country, so if you want to write insurance policies… I don’t know if folks know about Lemonade, it’s an interesting insurance company that’s launched in the US, they’ve got a very famous behavioural scientist involved in it, but they had to start in New York.</p><p>So I think you’re right, what happens in one state in the United States doesn’t necessarily happen everywhere else. Unless Congress takes something away from the state and that’s not challenged by the Supreme Court, we don’t have the same national uniformity.</p><p>Chris: The final comment should be though, with all this talk of fragmentation, let’s not forget the wonders of arbitration. This is about world trade, it is rather wonderful that you can choose your law and specify the kind of expertise you want your arbitrator to have, and have somebody competent decide what it was that you agreed and what damages who should pay to whom, based on a law that you expected to be applied by someone with the relevant skills. Arbitration is a wonderful thing.</p><p>Thank you very much to my panellists. That was, I hope you’ll agree, a very interesting session — let’s give the panellists a round of applause, please. [applause]</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2695c6276579" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/humanizing-the-singularity/law-and-global-trade-in-the-era-of-blockchain-2695c6276579">Law and global trade in the era of blockchain</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/humanizing-the-singularity">Mattereum - Humanizing the Singularity</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Internet of Agreements conference — legal panel]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/humanizing-the-singularity/internet-of-agreements-conference-legal-panel-dadfd7e7ac52?source=rss-9c0459a84c65------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dadfd7e7ac52</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[arbitration]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[smart-contracts]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Wray]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 15 Dec 2017 22:02:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-12-16T13:13:19.515Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3PQqBiuofzCeV4iDz5Q7Dg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo credit <a href="http://somethingtoseehere.com/">Rachel Megawhat</a></figcaption></figure><p><em>On October 13th-16th, </em><a href="https://mattereum.com/"><em>Mattereum</em></a><em> hosted the first </em><a href="http://internetofagreements.com/"><em>Internet of Agreements</em></a><em>™ (IoA) conference at the UK Government’s Digital Catapult in London. IoA™ is a vision for global supply chains and logistics, integrating national laws and regulation with international commerce through the application of technology such as blockchains and smart contracts. This is the first in a series of posts that will serve as a refresher for those who attended the conference and as a briefing for those who did not. The success of the IoA project requires engagement from experts in business, law, media, technology and government; similarly, these posts will play their part in propagating the vision of the Internet of Agreements.</em></p><p>Over the last day of the conference various experts discussed how the future of finance, law and trade is being reshaped by blockchains, AI and automated logistics. Smart contracts can help create financial instruments and align incentives, automate paperwork and reduce transaction costs, for example. On that day we also held a panel on dispute resolution and various topics at the intersection of law and blockchain technology. The panel comprised:</p><ul><li><a href="http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/people/106098/adamsanitt"><strong>Adam Sanitt</strong></a>, Head of Disputes Knowledge at Norton Rose Fulbright.</li><li><a href="http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/people/99329/harrietjonesfenleigh"><strong>Harriet Jones-Fenleigh</strong></a>, a litigation and dispute resolution lawyer based in London, specialising in cross-border commercial, banking, and finance litigation.</li><li><a href="https://twitter.com/harshcopywriter"><strong>Christopher Wray</strong></a>, Mattereum’s Chief Legal Officer, a lawyer and mediator with experience in company law, intellectual property and legal project management.</li><li><a href="http://www.3vb.com/our-people/jc/clive-freedman"><strong>Clive Freedman</strong></a>, a barrister, arbitrator and mediator specialising in commercial law; his practice covers information technology, banking and engineering, to name a few.</li><li><a href="https://www.hendersonchambers.co.uk/barristers/peter-susman-qc/"><strong>Peter Susman, Q.C</strong></a><strong>.,</strong> a barrister and arbitrator specialising in contract litigation, especially in complex commercial and high technology areas.</li></ul><p>Harriet and Adam gave a quick overview of smart contract dispute resolution and some scenarios that Norton Rose Fulbright has considered, and the panellists then covered various topics in dispute resolution, blockchain law, and liability for errors arising from smart contracts.</p><p>You can see the full video of the panel or read the transcript below.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DIqb4NE5uXU0&amp;src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FIqb4NE5uXU0&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/0d869655315a7b6f9514be52a17c6138/href">https://medium.com/media/0d869655315a7b6f9514be52a17c6138/href</a></iframe><p><strong>Transcript:</strong></p><p><strong>Harriet</strong>: Adam and I specialise in commercial dispute resolution, and in the next 10 minutes, before we move on to a bit of a Q&amp;A session, we wanted to start by trying to bust a couple of myths regarding smart contracts and dispute resolution, and then look at what mechanisms we might use to resolve smart contract disputes, and then finally turn to a few scenarios to illustrate how even if everything is perfectly coded, real life can intrude and disputes might arise, even if everything else is operating perfectly. If there’s one point I think we wanted to emphasise is that although I think there is plenty of scope for disputes to arise in relation to smart contracts, if you identified those potential disputes when you’re setting up the system and take legal advice, that there are many ways that you can mitigate those risks.</p><p>The first myth really that we wanted to debunk is that smart contracts will entirely prevent disputes arising. People often say to us that lawyers will be redundant, because code is essentially contract and nothing could go wrong. Certainly decentralisation and automation can reduce a large number of types of risks, reduce certain types of counterparty risk, create indelible records obviously and avoid single points of failure existing in centralised networks. But the technology does at the same time raise some fairly novel legal issues and potential for new types of disputes to arise. We’ve identified on this slide what we see as the five principal potential disputes and risks in relation to smart contracts, and the first and most fundamental is really whether a legally binding contract or contracts exist.</p><p>Obviously there’s the question as to whether legally binding contracts exist in relation to the smart contract, but there’s also another layer above that, as to whether there is a binding legal contract between participants in relation to the blockchain, so between miners and users and administrators. And that uncertainty exists, because in many common law jurisdictions a contract can only be valid if it’s entered into by a person, so a human or a legal person with legal capacity to do that. In addition, there may be certain requirements as to formality in local jurisdictions. For example, there might be a rule that a contract can’t arise if there’s insufficient certainty as to who the contracting parties are.</p><p>Even if you’ve got a legally binding smart contract, there’s uncertainty as to whether there are any non-contractual duties, both as between those parties but also as between the miners and users and administrators who might be involved in the system. Now, in English law certainly there is a well-established legal test for establishing whether one party owes non-contractual duties to another, even though they’re not parties to a contract, but there’s definitely considerable scope for argument as to how those principles would map onto decentralised ledgers, especially where participants stay anonymous. That’s the second big risk from our perspective. The third is that if something goes wrong, I think one of the questions earlier alluded to this, it’s difficult to know who you should sue, either because it’s not clear factually who is responsible for what has gone wrong, whether it’s a loss that’s been caused by a bug in the operating system, or defective code, or, more fundamentally, just because it’s difficult to identify the person behind it and sue them.</p><p>The fourth risk that we’ve identified is really the risk of satellite disputes around dispute resolution. The decentralised nature of blockchain means that there is a real risk of satellite disputes about which courts have got jurisdiction to decide a blockchain dispute and what law they should apply to decide it. That’s still a relevant issue, even if your smart contract provides for arbitration methods, like we were discussing yesterday, because where that arbitration is seated, where it’s located, will often be subject to the law of that jurisdiction. Even if you’ve got an arbitration mechanism, the arbitrator’s powers will be subject to the supervising jurisdiction of the court. So arbitration is potentially a large part of the answer but not the whole answer. Finally, there’s the question of trust boundaries. Obviously smart contracts will often need to interact with other systems or oracles, and even where the agreement between the participants to a smart contract is working perfectly and has got a dispute resolution mechanism like an arbitration mechanism, there’s going to be a question over how that applies across the trust boundary. If an oracle malfunctions, what mechanism do you use to resolve those disputes, even though as between you and your counterparty you’ve agreed on a mechanism? That’s the first myth that we wanted to talk about.</p><p>The second is this idea that the courts somehow can’t intervene in the operation of smart contracts or resolve smart contracts and other DLT disputes. Certainly the legal uncertainties that we’ve mentioned and the novel fact patterns involved in smart contracts present some real challenges for the courts, but certainly the English courts are pretty adept at applying established legal principles to new fact patterns; the difficulty is that there tends to be a period of uncertainty, both while they get up to speed with the technology and also while the common law develops precedents in relation to new fact patterns. So I think it’s just important to keep reflecting on the fact that smart contracts don’t exist in a judicial vacuum. Having said that, a lot of those risks can be mitigated by some careful drafting at the front end, and ensuring that where you’ve got a smart contracts within a permissioned or a hybrid system, you ensure that the participation agreement sets out the participant’s rights and obligations, and the mechanism for resolving disputes as between them, and that also smart contracts are either guided by some kind of master agreement with a dispute resolution mechanism, or incorporate one into individual contracts.</p><p>So, what we wanted to do now is I think Adam is going to speak briefly about some potential options for dispute resolution mechanisms that you might want to think about.</p><p><strong>Adam</strong>: Thank you. So, let’s assume you recognise that you might actually have a dispute and you realise you do need some sort of dispute resolution mechanism. I’m just here really going to queue them up in a sort of list format — some of them already exist, some are coming into play at the moment — and then after that we’ll look at a few example scenarios, and hopefully that will stimulate some questions and discussion and we can look at how these mechanisms might work, so this is really just a quick laundry list at the start.</p><p>Firstly, permissioned blockchain, that’s a separate and discreet point. While they perhaps might not be in the spirit of a lot of different blockchains, there are a lot of use cases around permissioned blockchains at the moment. This is a blockchain where in order to participate there is some sort of mechanism to obtain permission, there is some sort of relationship between the parties involved, and there is a consensus mechanism that therefore is finite and is constrained, and one assumes it’s either implicitly or explicitly under the control of a particular party, the one who has set it up, let’s call them the administrator. Here if you have some sort of dispute and something that needs to be resolved involving the blockchain, in one sense you’ve got a very simple answer: you can go to the administrator, and they, in a sense, let’s assume, have godlike powers, and it becomes easier to deal with disputes in reality apart from the permissioned blockchain; they could just decree that things should be so. On the one hand that sounds very simple, but if you’re an administrator, you’d be very reluctant to do that. With that great power comes great responsibility, but also liability that the administrator would have for interfering, how would that affect how the blockchain as a whole works. So you would need to look quite carefully at the start at how they become part of that mechanism, how you set up the different responsibilities, but nevertheless, that’s the way that it would proceed with a permissioned version.</p><p>With a non-permissioned version, the blockchain generally, obviously you’ve got the option of litigation. Litigation doesn’t necessarily know about the blockchain, there may or may not be expertise there, but in fact judges, particularly in English courts, are used to dealing with highly technical areas that are not necessarily within their expertise but they can get expert evidence on, so we could assume that in fact they could come to grips with some of the issues. But bear in mind that they won’t actually care about the blockchain in terms of how they resolve the dispute, they will just care about reality, and the intersection between those two could cause some problems, really perhaps with the blockchain more than for the court side of things, but we could come to that later.</p><p>So what you may want is something that is a bit more of an intersection between reality and the blockchain, something that you set up in advance, some sort of arbitration mechanism or some form of alternative dispute resolution, and you need to decide, for that arbitration, how much you’re going to build into the smart contract, and you want to build it in to some extent to make it work efficiently: how decentralised it will be, who the arbitrators will be, all those sorts of questions, but the key one is how it fits in, how it intersects. Do you want to set it up so that you could just stop the execution of the smart contract and go off to some other code pile if you like, if you’ve got arbitration? Does that mean the contract isn’t smart or automated anymore? That’s one end of the spectrum. The other end is you don’t really allow the autonomy of the smart contract to be interfered with, but how are you going to enforce the arbitration? In between those two you have some sort of mechanism set up, multisig or something like that, to allow an arbitrator to be appointed, to allow them to do things on the blockchain. That’s probably the sweet spot, how you would want things to work, how you would want them to be resolved, but there’s a lot of detail there that needs to be worked out between the coders and the lawyers to make that work effectively.</p><p>I’ve just queued up that list; here’s a huge number of issues there, but I don’t want to take up all the time. I think we can take questions generally on anything that’s blindingly terribly wrong with what we’ve said so far, or we can queue up some of our example scenarios which will hopefully challenge some of the preconceptions and make you believe that some of these disputes really can come up in reality.</p><p>[Scenario #1]</p><p><strong>Chris</strong>: Thank you. Why don’t we spell out some of these scenarios.</p><p><strong>Harriet</strong>: Certainly. The first scenario: a platform is working perfectly, but the trader’s three-year-old walks into the room when he’s on the phone, presses the button, executes a trade, and that trade executes automatically. Now, the reason that we’ve chosen this scenario is I think it’s a nice example of how even when everything is operating perfectly technically, real life can sometimes intervene. Here the question is: is Y bank bound by this transaction that was entered into by a three-year-old by mistake? From an English law perspective, you’d argue that that that child didn’t have legal capacity to enter into that transaction. Y Bank would want to unravel that trade. So even though it’s something that’s indelibly recorded on the blockchain, what does Y Bank do? Well, depending on what dispute resolution mechanism is built into the platform, it may well find itself going to court and arguing, “Well, this transaction is void. Even though it’s been executed, we should be able to unwind it.”</p><p><strong>Adam</strong>: I think this one is why you need a dispute resolution mechanism. Kudos to the people who wrote this software, it’s perfect, there are no flaws in any of the code, everything is 100% exactly; we need these people, they’re better than NASA or whoever. So let’s assume that everything is perfect, that it is all working properly. We could have the legal discussion up here as to whether it’s valid or not, that would be very interesting for us but perhaps not for all of you, so let’s assume that in fact the contract is valid: despite your best efforts, because the button has been pressed by the three-year-old, there isn’t a contract from a legal point of view.</p><p><strong><em>Comment</em></strong>: Surely this is a system flaw: a three-year-old should not be able to execute that trade, they’re not authorised to do so. If the system enables “hit Enter” to execute an extremely large trade, that’s a system flaw.</p><p><strong>Adam</strong>: Yeah. Well, the trader did use the iris and retina scan and everything else, but at that precise moment that he’d gone through the several-factor authentication, he just had to rush out for some emergency and his daughter rushed in… That’s what happened.</p><p><strong>Chris</strong>: Well, that may be a little unlikely, but we can imagine certain other scenarios, like fraud: somebody might indeed have access, and the company fully intended that they have access, but the subsequent actions resulted in there being no valid contract.</p><p><strong>Adam</strong>: I think there is an argument there in terms of let’s try and push these fact scenarios out to the margin so much that we can just say the cost of having them we just accept, and let’s just go with the code because it’s 100% and ignore these odd fact patterns if you like. That is an argument that’s made, it’s the argument for when you stop at the red traffic light in the middle of the night, you should still stop, even though you know there’s no traffic coming the other way, the philosophical side of things, but it’s not the way that legal systems will work. We’ve got other examples, apart from this, and you will be able to come up with fact patterns where you’ve done everything right, but something else supervenes, fraud being an example. We can look at another example scenario, but this is trying to make the point that even if you do it perfectly, you might not have a valid contract. How do you deal with that?</p><p><strong>Vinay Gupta</strong>: It’s very clear that there is so much, for example, unreliable hardware, there’s human error, and this stuff has happened in live trading systems that were non-blockchain a number of times; we know that the real world works this way.</p><p><strong>Adam</strong>: Yeah, fat finger trades happen all the time.</p><p><strong><em>Question</em></strong>: So legally speaking, who actually executed the trade? Because we’ve been talking a lot this weekend about what is identity in the blockchain. Would it be the identity of the person logged in, or would it be the three-year-old who actually executed the trade?</p><p><strong>Adam</strong>: That’s a good question, it’s an interesting question, it’s going to depend on the particular facts, but I don’t want to get too bogged down in that.</p><p><strong>Clive</strong>: I’m going to give a very short answer to the question, which is that this is exactly the sort of question that needs to be considered at the contract negotiation stage, and you need to have an expressed term in the contract which says, for example, that any trade executed on the system using this security mechanism will be binding on the person whose identity was used to make a trade, even if they want to contend that it was actually the three-year-old. The answer is you need to think about that in advance and have clauses in the contract which tell everybody what the answer is without needing to have a dispute or an arbitration.</p><p><strong>Peter</strong>: I think it’s interesting that the technical reaction to this is it shouldn’t happen. Clyde’s reaction is the contract should take care of it, and I agree with both. But there is a third scenario, which is that look at this as an example of something which is completely unexpected. Maybe this is not a good example of something which is completely unexpected, but at some stage something will happen that is unexpected and is not dealt with by the contract, and then the lawyer says, the judge or the arbitrator. “We must deal with this situation which has arisen, which nobody has anticipated.” Well, you can deal with it in a number of ways: you can say the onus was on the person who built the system to make sure it didn’t happen, that nothing unexpected happened. You could say that the onus was on the person working at home, to make sure that his child or his dog or his budgerigar didn’t get in contact with the machine. Or you can say this is something that should be dealt with by insurance. But as far as the law is concerned, the law would struggle to come up with a just solution. I don’t think it’s up to us to say what the solution would be, but it just underlies the fact that you cannot anticipate everything that can go wrong.</p><p><strong><em>Question</em></strong>: Isn’t that the situation we’re in today, with our current system, with or without crypto?</p><p><strong>Peter</strong>: Yes, exactly.</p><p><strong><em>Question</em></strong>: So why do you expect to all of a sudden solve it overnight?</p><p><strong>Peter</strong>: The point about having the smart contract is more things will be anticipated: the solution that will be imposed will be better, and hopefully it will be cheaper to get going, and therefore cheaper in the long run because you won’t have to spend so much money on getting the problem resolved.</p><p><strong><em>Comment</em></strong>: I completely agree, but these are all relative terms. We’re not going to solve it overnight, and that’s okay.</p><p><strong><em>Question</em></strong>: In terms of avoiding these situations going to arbitration, is there going to be some sort of mechanism where something like this might happen, we’ll go to arbitration. When the result of the arbitration is made clear, will that then feed back into the system so the thinking would have been done in this case, where the child has done it, and everyone will be able to see this is what the outcome is going to be, because it has already been arbitrated, so both sides will know what to expect.</p><p><strong>Adam</strong>: Exactly. The idea is that if you have unexpected situations that you need to deal with that go to the arbitrator, that the intersection between what the arbitrator can do in a smart contract allows them to automatically then enforce what that decision is. If here say the decision is to cancel the trade, the idea would be that the arbitrator, appointed according to the dispute resolution mechanism, once he has come to that view is then able to, by virtue of their appointment, to actually execute that on the blockchain so that it’s still smart in that sense, that the dispute is then resolved, that the assets, money or whatever, flow through to the right person as part of that smart contract dispute resolution mechanism.</p><p><strong><em>Comment</em></strong>: All future smart contracts to know that that is the case</p><p><strong><em>Comment</em></strong>: Does it become precedent basically is the question.</p><p><strong>Adam</strong>: The actual decision?</p><p><strong><em>Comment</em></strong>: Yeah.</p><p><strong>Adam</strong>: Well, you’ve still got I suppose a legal case behind it. You’re sort of into the law of arbitration there, where it doesn’t necessarily set a precedent, it won’t necessarily be publicised, it could be confidential, it could be on the blockchain, could set a precedent…</p><p><strong>Clive</strong>: There are two strands to this question. The first strand is to what extent are the decisions going to be made public so that other people know about them. The second strand is once they are made public, are they going to be binding for future cases, which raise the same sort of problem.</p><p>I think there are three purposes for having an arbitration scheme: the first one is to give the users of the system the confidence to know that if they have a dispute, there are specialist decision makers who will be available to decide their dispute who will have an understanding of the technology. The second aim of an arbitration scheme is so that users of the system, if this is how it’s done, can see that decisions are being made by specialist arbitrators and can see that those are sensible decisions. The third aim to achieve by an arbitration scheme is so that the users of the system can see what’s gone wrong in other cases, can learn lessons from that, and build their systems to prevent the same thing from happening in the future.</p><p>But all those three aims require that there should be some publicity given to what has happened in individual cases. Traditionally, arbitrations don’t happen in public; they happen behind closed doors. But I think we need to consider in this situation possibly having some kind of publicity to the decisions. It can either be full publicity in which everybody knows who all the parties were to the dispute, with their names being mentioned, or they could be anonymised decisions, and there are precedents for this kind of system. The ICC has a system for expert opinions in disputes relating to trade finance, in which the actual experts who are asked to give their opinion don’t know the names of the people involved in the dispute, and they issue an anonymised opinion; it is not in this situation a binding decision, unless the parties want it to be, but they issue an anonymised decision which everybody can see. So those are the three different ways of doing it, that’s the publicity side of it.</p><p>The other side of it is are these decisions going to be binding in future cases? As far as that’s concerned, there’s a real danger with having binding decisions, which is that if a bad decision gets made, you’re stuck with it. There is the risk of that happening in the real world with the court system, and that’s why we have a system of appeals to deal with it. But once you start talking about appeals, you’ve got a greater level of complexity, you’ve got greater cost for the participants. So you have to decide which of these routes you want to take.</p><p><strong>Chris</strong>: If I could just add a fourth aim in this kind of scheme, picking up on the point that Adam made: I think it’s worth emphasising that there’s something quite novel here that wasn’t possible before, and this is the scope for direct enforcement of an arbitration award by the appropriate authorised arbitrator, and this is really quite new and exciting. There are plenty of cases you can point to where a party who was successful with arbitration takes the award to a national court where perhaps there’s some corruption, and for whatever reason they’re unable to have that award enforced. The reason they have to do that is because the asset they wanted to seize to cover their debt, for instance, would have been in a particular jurisdiction, and it’s the court of that jurisdiction that they needed to go to to achieve that enforcement. What we have here now is this interesting possibility that there may be value on the blockchain, something that is there: it might be there’s an escrowed amount, it may be that there’s other trade within the same system, but there might be something available there that has value, against which an award might be enforced. That’s something quite new and I think is especially relevant in cross-border disputes.</p><p>[Scenario #2]</p><p><strong>Adam</strong>: Let’s very briefly look at scenario two. I think it’s almost the same, except we’ve tried to come up with a fact pattern where you’re even more convinced that the trade ought to be cancelled, and where it would be quite difficult I think to set out in a contract to say that it couldn’t be cancelled in those circumstances, although I would be interested to get the other panellists’ views on that.</p><p><strong>Vinay</strong>: This is definitely not LIBOR, right?</p><p><strong>Peter</strong>: It’s good to know that this is not based on an actual scenario. [laughter] There is a doctrine of common law, as applied in this country and other common law jurisdictions, that if something goes horribly wrong and the contract cannot be carried the way it was intended, then it all falls to the ground. It’s called a doctrine of frustration, and there’s a possibility, I won’t say more than that, of applying that solution to this particular situation. Otherwise, it’s merely another example of something unexpected going wrong.</p><p><strong>Adam</strong>: Yeah. I think it raises the point of the previous one, but more extreme. Should we look at the next one? Because that has got a lot of technical bits that I know you’d be interested in.</p><p>[Scenario #3]</p><p>This is where there is a smart contract mechanism, a payment of a million pounds that should be made in US dollars, and unfortunately they do is as a million LBP, Lebanese pounds, and a million Lebanese pounds is about $600 US dollars, so that’s the amount that gets transferred by mistake. This one is illustrating some of the different ways it can go wrong and the different people who might be liable, who might be responsible for it. Someone has mentioned insurance before, which I think is quite important here, and if you decide that it’s just too complicated to deal with, that might be a way out. But I would be interested to have views of the panel and others as to who is responsible for these different sorts of errors, and if you can avoid them.</p><p><strong>Ian</strong>: Clearly the programmer is responsible, because they’re using the words GBP, LBP and so forth; if they were using Ricardian contracts, that mess would never have happened.</p><p><strong>Adam</strong>: Yeah, but when you say the programmer, there would be a number of programmers, wouldn’t there? It may have been an error in the transcription of the code part of the Ricardian contract, it could be that the contract was written out perfectly, but there’s some error in the code in the platform itself that translates it wrongly, the error could be on the buyer side, the seller side…</p><p><strong>Ian</strong>: I grant that there could be a swapping of one hash for another, but even that would be an extremely grave error. I would say that if that is happening, then the programmers are responsible. This the question you’re trying to ask, isn’t it?</p><p><strong>Chris</strong>: Let me generalise this, because this leads to a very interesting discussion. Conventionally in contract you have your two parties and they’re negotiating the contract between them. Let’s take the example where there’s a bug in a smart code, not this kind of grave error but something that was just an unanticipated bug. It may come to light that this bug is there, and indeed there might be a straightforward patch that could be applied as it were. Then the question is how is that going to be achieved with the smart contract on the blockchain? If the two parties are going to have to get together and decide between themselves, “Oh dear, yes, we didn’t really intend that. We better get around to scrapping that and rectifying this situation…” by that time someone may have syphoned off all the value of the smart contract. So I think in this environment, yes, there’s a question of who would be liable for that kind of bug. Somebody has drafted the software. Was it jointly drafted by the two parties? That’s one angle to go down. Another view on it is maybe we should be looking to have third party creators of the software here, so that there’s an unambiguous party both liable for any errors and therefore motivated to maintain it.</p><p><strong>Adam</strong>: There’s a prior question, if you like, which is is anyone liable? You could say, “Well, I wrote this million lines of code, I open sourced it. It was perfectly open to you to see that it would pay in Lebanese pounds in this situation, and therefore everyone should simply be held to the smart contract as reflected in the code and no one is liable for anything.” Would anyone take that view? Or does anyone think there isn’t a problem?</p><p><strong>Peter</strong>: One way of looking at contract law from a jurisprudential point of view, in other words legal philosophy, is that it’s all about allocation of risk. The first point of talking about allocation of risk is what the contract says. Any lawyer faced with this problem looks first at the contract and says, “Does the contract lay out who takes the risk of this happening?” and this is a general approach. If the contract doesn’t, and you go to some other form of dispute settlement mechanism, let’s say an arbitrator, the arbitrator will say, “Well, what would I expect the contract to say about the allocation of risk?” It may be, as has been suggested, that the loss lies where it falls, in other words there’s no specific allocation of risk. It may be that the correct answer is the risk is allocated to one party from the other. It may be that you have a frustration answer, which is that the whole contract falls to the ground and cannot be enforced. Or it may be that the risk is apportioned, partly because it’s the fault of one party, or there may be a contributory fault by another party. But these are all questions that have to be answered in the light of the particular facts, and I don’t think you could just say there’s bound to be one particular answer to one particular problem; everything is fact-sensitive.</p><p><strong>Trent</strong>: In Estonia and elsewhere they were asking this question in the context of self-driving cars. If a self-driving, self-owning car crashes and kills someone, who is responsible? Is it the carmaker? Is it the programmer? Is it one of many other parties? What they arrived at was what if we give the car itself rights, but not just rights but responsibility as well? Because if you send the self-driving car to jail, it won’t care; but if you give it a combination of rights and responsibilities, when it starts to fail you can take away some of those rights or responsibilities. They arrived at this, and then they realised this applies not just to self-driving cars but to broader AI, and this is what we’ve been working on.</p><p>But my point here is many people have framed blockchains as life forms or as AI. This is actually possibly a way forward here as well, where this smart contract, this very minimalist life form maybe has rights and responsibilities. I’d love to hear your take, and whether you see other initiatives beyond that.</p><p><strong>Chris</strong>: I think the thing about lawyers is one of our first questions might be does this life form have any assets? [laughter] Because otherwise there’s no point in suing them.</p><p><strong>Trent</strong>: Well, the answer is yes: 20,000 Euros worth of hunk of metal and silicon.</p><p><strong>Chris</strong>: Right, that’s the thing. If you’ve got assets tied up, whether you characterise it as a thing that has something that might be taken off it, or you characterise it as putting aside funds as a kind of self-insuring policy or whatever it might be…</p><p><strong>Adam</strong>: We’ve actually looked at this in the context of autonomous vehicles, and I think the connection between that scenario and this one isn’t AI but autonomy, the fact that you’ve got an autonomous agent. At first it seems very far-fetched. Then the EU Commission has actually published something on it, putting out the idea of having the sort of autonomous agents given legal personality. I think it still seems far-fetched; the Commission saying something doesn’t necessarily stop it seeming far-fetched, but that’s another issue. What I would say is that over the years the common law in particular has been able to come up with novel ways to incorporate these scenarios and make them work properly in an economic context, and we’ve granted personhood to lots of entities that are not actually natural individuals. So despite sounding far-fetched, it would be about a way of achieving that, that allows you to achieve whatever aims you’ve got in jurisprudence to come up with sensible answers and to allocate risk and liability sensibly.</p><p><strong>Peter</strong>: The way this jurisdiction has solved this problem with regard to uninsured human beings is to deal with the human being not having insurance separately under the criminal law system and by the Ministry of Transport, as it was then, making a deal with the insurance companies to set up the Motor Insurers’ Bureau so that the last insurer on the vehicle is liable for the loss. So a possible solution here would be to make, by a way of statute, it compulsory for the machine to get itself insured, which could be done by programming the machine to take out insurance and arrange for payment by the way of a blockchain mechanism with a default position that a nominated insurer or insurance body or, failing all else, the state would pay the damages.</p><p><strong>Adam</strong>: I think the rest of these are all about allocation of responsibility to different people so they were covered by Peter’s points.</p><p><strong><em>Comment</em></strong>: One final point on the autonomous car, stripping it of rights or something like that. It just seems to me that if there’s no actual repercussions for a non-thinking computational entity… Basically, if the repercussions don’t fall back onto the humans who coded it, you could essentially have a sneaky coder who decides to make a car kill one is every 10 people, and then it’s just the car gets scrapped and it never comes back to the coder.</p><p><strong>Adam</strong>: Yeah, that’s exactly the issue we need to deal with.</p><p><strong><em>Question</em></strong>: I’m interested in the situation where you talk about the kind of blame slinging or risk hot potato. But what if we for a moment assume that there’s no blame whatsoever which was predictable at all in this situation? If the data centre happened to be built on top of a mountain and a cosmic ray hits the register, after all of the protections which have all been put in place, something unexpected happens, and all parties are quite aware of the fact that there is something which is unsatisfactory to all of them, because perhaps the party who fails to deliver the amount that it had expected, their reputation is being damaged by it as well as all the rest of it. Let’s assume that there’s blameless scenario. Should we not be trying to establish some kind of position where blockchains always have a degree of flexibility, able to be engaged by a fair judicial system that they’re founded in?</p><p><strong>Harriet</strong>: Ideally yes, but I guess my immediate reaction to that is the more you introduce nebulous concepts like fairness to a smart contract, the greater to scope for dispute. As dispute lawyers, most frequently the things that we see people arguing about are concepts like whether or not a material adverse change has occurred. You might have a contract that says, “In the event that there’s been what’s referred to as a material adverse change or a frustrating event or whatever, then I don’t have to perform my contractual obligations, or I have to use reasonable endeavours,” for example. It’s that kind of language, where it introduces an element of subjectivity, that tends to result in disputes. So I guess that’s the immediate challenge I see with introducing those kind of concepts.</p><p>But I think it’s important to remember that where someone has agreed that they will do something, if it hasn’t happened for reasons outside their control, the chances are that if they could still do it, they will be liable to pay damages to compensate the other party. If they genuinely cannot perform, because of some extraordinary event has occurred, then, as Peter mentioned earlier, they’re probably going to be entitled to treat the contract as having been frustrated and both parties will be able to walk away from it.</p><p>So I think the English law provides some mechanisms to deal with those situations, even if you don’t incorporate them into the contract, if it is English law governed. You don’t need to expressly provide for every scenario; you just need to agree what law will govern any dispute that arises.</p><p><strong>Clive</strong>: I’ll go back to the first answer I gave this afternoon, which is this is the exactly the sort of thing that needs to be thought about at the time the contract is made. We get exactly the question of the unavailable oracle in long-term oil contracts, where somebody agrees to pay for oil over a period of 20 years, and they agree on an indexation clause based on a particular named index, and then you find 10 years down the line that index is no longer available. I myself have advised in a case where in that situation the parties had agreed that there should be an expertdetermination, and the expert should have the power to substitute an alternative index. You can easily build that kind of procedure into these kind of smart contracts.</p><p><strong>Peter</strong>: And I would only add that blame is not a necessary precedent to allocation of risk. In short, you don’t need to find someone to blame before you can say the risk must be allocated in a particular way. The risk can be allocated without anybody being to blame, or the person being to blame is someone you can’t take action against, like a terrorist.</p><p>[Scenario #4]</p><p><strong><em>Question</em></strong>: I’m curious, we assume that there’s a legal intervention in the smart contract, but the smart contract has actually acted and the chain continues. Are there concepts in the legal field like network value? I can agree to be part of a network that contains financial value of let’s say 300,000 Euros, so all transactions that are happening within this network should not exceed 300,000 Euros, and if a failure happens within this network, that this has to be covered within the complete network’s resources. Almost like an industry body that says all arbitration has to happen…</p><p><strong>Peter</strong>: I think what you’re suggesting is the risk can be allocated by a pooled system, that is everybody contributes something, or by limiting the liability of people. I can only repeat that you can allocate the risk any way you like, you just need to have the risk allocated; if you haven’t agreed how to allocate the risk, then that can be resolved by a dispute settlement mechanism.</p><p><strong>Chris</strong>: I think in the blockchain space people are very familiar with the design effort that goes into tokening problems, that is financial incentives for certain kinds of action. I think maybe there’s another piece to this in some sense required, which is the… I don’t know how to describe it… Designing the risk allocation. But just working through where liabilities will fall, and whether that’s where you want them to remain, or whether there should be some kind of allocation to a particular party, whether you want to pool it, whether you’re going to have an insurance scheme… But thought needs to be given to liabilities, not just to incentives.</p><p><strong>Adam</strong>: I think example number four is an interesting one, because there’s no getting around the fact that reality here is different from the blockchain, and, if you had a moment to look at it, the courts or whatever will allocate that ownership of steel to the person they think owns it. If you’ve got what you thought was a proprietary register of steel that you want to use for trading or some other purpose, the problem isn’t with reality; the problem is with you. You, the blockchain, have to deal with the fact that you’re out of sync with reality, and you will need to come up with some mechanism for doing that. You can’t just say, “Well, we trump reality,” or “We didn’t expect reality to get in the way.” The courts will do what they do: they might retransfer the steel, they might award damages… They’re just going to deal with it.</p><p>Can I say, the lawyers definitely wouldn’t have approved the throwing of that thing. [laughter]</p><p><strong><em>Comment</em></strong>: We did a risk assessment.</p><p><strong><em>Question</em></strong>: I have a much more basic question: if I’m trading with somebody via a permissioned blockchain or maybe a public blockchain and there is a dispute, how prepared are the courts in various jurisdictions to actually accept blockchain as evidence, and technically how capable are they of evaluating that evidence?</p><p><strong>Harriet</strong>: It’s just an evidential question. The English courts are very used to receiving expert evidence from things about a thing they know nothing about. What would happen is both parties would appoint an expert, say a coder, and that person’s role would be to explain to the court what they say has happened, their implementation of the facts, explain what the code means.</p><p><strong><em>Comment</em></strong>: That sounds like a lucrative new profession.</p><p><strong>Harriet</strong>: Absolutely. [laughter]</p><p><strong>Clive</strong>: Yeah, but it doesn’t have to be two experts. In many cases, in this kind of scenario, the evidence would be uncontentious and it could be dealt with by a single expert. Or better still, if it is genuinely uncontentious, the parties could agree what the state of affairs is about that evidence without there being any need for an expert witness to be paid to participate in the dispute.</p><p><strong><em>Question</em></strong>: And if it was a closed source private blockchain implementation, do you think the vendor would be obligated to somehow participate in that process?</p><p><strong>Clive</strong>: Nine times out of ten you don’t need to apply somebody to participate in that process, because the very fact of having to participate in it is going to cause an expense, and the risk of having to pay to meet the cost of that expense is a sanction which brings sense to them in the first place.</p><p><strong>Vinay</strong>: The sort of language that we use think about this kind of scenario internally inside of Mattereum is delamination, that you have two layers of reality that are splitting apart, where one party clings to the technical side and the other party points to the steel in the warehouse, and both parties are in fact correct. That seems like the kind of thing that is likely to remain messy and complicated until you get a body of legal precedent. So even if the contracts that are used indicate it is one way or the other way, different parties might adhere… In different situations the contract would fail one way or the other way, or fall on each side of that line, but in the long run the general standardisation of this stuff at a societal level seems likely. Any thoughts on that?</p><p><strong>Harriet</strong>: I think, interestingly, there’s a degree of lamination in the law as well in terms of let’s say ownership of assets. Because if you take this scenario for where there’s a disconnect between what the blockchain says and what the court says, one possible solution to that is for the court to… Ownership can be split into two parts: there’s the idea of being a legal owner, and also the beneficial owner, and it may be that the way of reconciling that scenario with real life is to say, “Well actually, what’s recorded on the blockchain is legal ownership, but in fact the beneficial owner is the one that the court decides has beneficial ownership. In some ways maybe that concept of legal and beneficial ownership can adapt to deal with blockchain type disputes.</p><p><strong>Clive</strong>: My short answer would be there wouldn’t be much prospect of the courts of Kerplakistan saying that the blockchain knows better than it does who the owner is.</p><p><strong>Adam</strong>: Yeah, I think that’s right and it is how you deal with it. To your point about the different layers, I’d put it as a coding analogy, the idea that you solve any programming problem by having an additional layer of indirection. Legal systems do that, as Harriet was saying, that’s the approach that they take, and here’s it’s the dispute resolution mechanism that is that additional layer of indirection that allows you to resolve that mismatch, and at the start you need to decide what powers you’re going to give that additional layer to interfere with your two existing layers, that it doesn’t interfere with the objective of having a smart contract in the first place but is powerful enough to deal with situations like this.</p><p><strong>Clive</strong>: Of course in this situation it may be the case that precisely because the parties are concerned about this sort of thing, they say the contracts should be governed by English law. They may also say that they want neutral arbitrators to decide the case, so that the decision makers are not the courts of Kerplakistan simply saying what they’ve been told to say by their legislature, and there are ways of dealing with these sort of problems in international trade.</p><p><strong>Adam</strong>: Although we tried to pick a situation where simply choosing an English governing law wouldn’t necessarily help, because you’re dealing with steel physically located in a warehouse in Kerplakistan.</p><p><strong><em>Comment</em></strong>: My observation of the last four scenarios, and it goes back the talk that we had earlier about semantics, that the use of the term “smart contract”. Here is nothing smart contract, legally anyway, about the use of the blockchain platform here. What seems to be the case in all four scenarios is that you have a natural language contract which is legally binding, and that the platform is just an execution method or some sort of evidence of that contract, and therefore you have a disconnect. In law you always go to arbitrate the dispute on the terms of the natural language contract, and the only way you could possibly get around that is if you say in the natural language contract if there’s any difference between the wording of the contract and on the platform, you can say that the platform wins or the natural language wins, otherwise there’s nothing smart about what’s going on.</p><p><strong>Chris</strong>: I think one could strive for absolute precision and complete isomorphism between one’s code and one’s prose, but the one thing I don’t yet know is how the code will provide for the reasonable function.</p><p><strong>Adam</strong>: Actually, a lot of problems do come out that way, but I think what we’ve tried to show is actually not all problems do come about from that mismatch. You might say that in this scenario, let’s say there is no natural language, let’s say in some way everything is in the code, you could still get this fact scenario. It is true that irrespective of words or natural language a legal system will impose its own idea of what the contract is over and above the code, and it will have things in it like “If there is a fraud, then we don’t care what the code says. We don’t take what the natural language says.” You will have these problems that you will have to deal with, because you have a legal system which is separate from… It’s not just about natural language.</p><p><strong>Chris</strong>: Ultimately, however precise this language or other way you’ve encoded the intentions, that won’t be sufficient, and then what really counts is the procedure you set to deal with that exception. But if there’s one conclusion I’d like to make is that the procedures for handling the disputes which will inevitably arise are something that you really want to get right.</p><p><strong>Vinay</strong>: Trent made this distinction this morning, suggesting that the automated path was what we would use when everything is fine, and it gets increasingly manual as things begin to go wrong.</p><p><strong><em>Question</em></strong>: The dispute resolution mechanisms that you stated earlier, arbitration and things like that, even if London was the choice of venue that was stated in the contract, what would that do to solve this scenario? Kerplakistan could just say no to this, right? What would Norton Rose or anyone else do about that?</p><p><strong>Harriet</strong>: If your contact said that both parties agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the English court system, and your counterparty started the proceedings in Kerplakistan, then you can phone up the English courts now and try to resolve the situation.</p><p><strong><em>Comment</em></strong>: Yeah, unless they invade Kerplakistan…</p><p><strong>Adam</strong>: You’re right, you would need to go to Kerplakistan, you would need to go there to physically move the steel. You could resolve the dispute without moving the steel in a lot of situations, but if you physica1lly wanted to move the steel, that’s a separate issue.</p><p><strong>Chris</strong>: If you’re going to deal with a party who only has assets in a jurisdiction in which you can’t rely on the local court enforcing arbitration law or doing the right thing, that’s a commercial risk.</p><p><strong>Clive</strong>: No, it’s not completely impossible. You can hope that there’s a bilateral investment treaty between the United Kingdom and Kerplakistan, and then you can start an international arbitration.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dadfd7e7ac52" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/humanizing-the-singularity/internet-of-agreements-conference-legal-panel-dadfd7e7ac52">Internet of Agreements conference — legal panel</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/humanizing-the-singularity">Mattereum - Humanizing the Singularity</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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