<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Florian Glatz on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Florian Glatz on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@heckerhut?source=rss-926c6a0ae253------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 23:41:54 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@heckerhut/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[DAOs are Dead! Long live DAOs!]]></title>
            <link>https://heckerhut.medium.com/daos-are-dead-long-live-daos-50de94e8ee1e?source=rss-926c6a0ae253------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/50de94e8ee1e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[web3]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dao]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[community]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Florian Glatz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 17 May 2023 14:04:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-06-06T18:25:51.891Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote>This article was funded by the <a href="https://app.cg/c/G1YnQr6cz7/">CollectiveBrain community</a>. Join the community to become a paid knowledge contributor or start out as an apprentice to get access to exclusive knowledge shared by experts.</blockquote><h3>Introduction</h3><p>I chose the title of this article to describe my personal journey in the DAO space, which has started in earnest around the year 2020. Although I have been researching, writing and speaking about DAOs for much longer, I truly jumped into this curious subset of the wider crypto ecosystem only quite recently. The article is heavily biased and influenced by my own personal experience and shall in no way make a general claim about the reality of DAOs.</p><h3>Beginnings</h3><p><em>“If it is correct — as I believe it is — that a fundamental element of human nature is the need for creative work, for creative inquiry, for free creation without the arbitrary limiting effects of coercive institutions, then of course it will follow that a decent society should maximize the possibilities for this fundamental human characteristic to be realized. That means trying to overcome the elements of repression and oppression and destruction and coercion that exist in any existing society — ours for example — as a historical residue. Now, a federated decentralized system of free associations incorporating economic as well as social institutions would be what I refer to as anarcho-syndicalism and it seems to me that it is the appropriate form of social organization for an advanced technological society in which human beings do not have to be forced into position of tools, of cogs in the machine; in which the creative urge that I think is intrinsic to human nature will in fact be able to realize itself in whatever way it will.” </em>— Noam Chomsky in conversation with Michel Foucault in 1971 [1]</p><p>Decentralized Autonomous Organizations — or DAOs for short — have been a topic of discussion for decades. I first stumbled upon the idea ten years ago, when Daniel Larimer framed Bitcoin as a Decentralized Autonomous Corporation (DAC). [2] Shortly after, young Vitalik Buterin attempted to systematize different forms of organization, autonomy and agency, introducing the term DAO for the first time [3].</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3IDcQk4Ide70iVm5i4VEvQ.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/05/06/daos-dacs-das-and-more-an-incomplete-terminology-guide">https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/05/06/daos-dacs-das-and-more-an-incomplete-terminology-guide</a></figcaption></figure><p>In 2016, a team of early Ethereum developers formed around Christoph Jentzsch, to put the idea of a deliberately designed DAO to the test and coining the infamous sentence “Code is Law”. While the experiment of “TheDAO” failed spectacularly due to an exploit in the code [4], the idea of DAOs had been spread around the world. [5]</p><p>A year later, MakerDAO — who’s origins go back as early as 2014 — officially launched to the world, setting themselves up to become the largest and arguably most impactful DAO to date.</p><p>Today, DAOs are an active internet subculture, that attracts exactly the free, creative minds that Chomsky predicted back in 1971. According to the industry website DeepDAO, there are currently more than 12.000 organizations that identify with the term DAO, managing a collective wealth of $ 28 billion USD in cryptocurrencies. With 6,8 million holders of voting rights in these organizations and 2 million active voters &amp; proposal makers, DAOs have taken on a life of their own.</p><h3>What’s a DAO in 2023?</h3><p>At Common Ground we’ve started out with the vision to build communication and coordination software for communities. Back in 2021 when we conceptualized the idea, our ideal customer was a DAO. A year and a half later, we’ve revisited our initial assumptions and made a few adjustments to account for the reality of 2023. What happened?</p><h3>Hallucinations</h3><p>It’s not just Large Language Models that suffer from hallucinations. At the peak of the last bull market, many believed that DAOs would experience a cultural breakthrough similar to what NFTs had achieved in the world of art and pop culture. We saw experiments like ConstitutionDAO emerge, which were able to fundraise a staggering $ 40 million USD for the noble goal of taking one of the last two privately owned original copies of the US constitution out of the market and into a public, collective form of ownership in the hands of a DAO. An ecosystem calling itself “ReFi” — short for regenerative finance — grew to a significant size, exploring new pathways to sustainable governance and financing of community-owned infrastructure.</p><p>Shortly after, however, the crypto industry got hit by a few major setbacks: the new industry giants that were produced by the last funding cycle imploded one by one. It started with the algorithmic Stablecoin terraUSD, whose death spiral wiped out $ 45 billion USD of market cap in less than a week. As a consequence, major players like 3 Arrows Capital and Voyager Digital filed for bankruptcy. A few months later, the leading exchange FTX blew up in a massive fraud scandal, destroying any trust the general public had established in the wider ecosystem.</p><p>While the implosion of centralized institutions like FTX, 3AC and Voyager should have reaffirmed the importance of decentralized, transparent organizations, a lasting depression replaced the enthusiasm that had once surrounded the crypto ecosystem. After the burst of the 2017 ICO bubble, the funding mechanism for crypto startups had been captured by traditional Venture Capital — which — with the end of <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/031815/what-zero-interestrate-policy-zirp.asp">ZIRP</a> - became very conservative when deploying capital into new ventures. Investments today are mostly directed at core infrastructure plays like layer1 or layer2 blockchains, based on the concept of zero-knowledge tech. Social experiments in the form of DAOs are not <em>en vogue</em> at the moment. The quarter-over-quarter doubling of new DAOs as witnessed in 2021/2022, came to a screeching halt.</p><h3>Cultural appropriation</h3><p>Despite the premature end to the DAO spring we had seen in 2021, there was at least some level of cultural penetration the ecosystem had achieved. Of those 12.000+ DAOs listed by DeepDAO, a significant number *does not* adhere to the strict definition of a DAO.</p><p>In the original meaning of the term, DAOs are a necessary outcome of a higher-level artifact, namely a decentralized protocol that requires continuous governance as an input to keep going. In that sense, a DAO is a means to an end. MakerDAO is a great example for that: Maker the protocol would not work without continuous adjustments to some parameters of the system. [7] In order to keep adjusting these parameters without becoming a regulated financial intermediary, Maker necessarily has to make these adjustments in a decentralized fashion based on votes. There is no way not to be a DAO.</p><p>Ignorant of this puristic view of DAOs, a lot of projects and communities started to refer to themselves as DAOs before the big bust of 2022, despite not having any technological artifacts to take care of. The point of them identifying with the term “DAO” was to signal a certain set of values to members and potential contributors. I would summarize these projects as online communities that have a purpose and goals they want to achieve, that are governed by their members through votes and that (may eventually) have a treasury to pay their contributors. Sometimes, these community DAOs incorporate legal entities to disambiguate any questions on tax and legal liability.</p><p>Some people get really mad about this form of cultural appropriation. Here’s an example:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/792/1*3wMus12wRRS4F9VXJYlo2g.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://twitter.com/lex_node/status/1642936303942615048?s=20">https://twitter.com/lex_node/status/1642936303942615048?s=20</a></figcaption></figure><p>Personally, I don’t see this form of appropriation of the term DAO as a problem. Sure, it does make some discussions more cumbersome because you never know what kind of DAO a person means when engaging in a debate. Do they mean the general, values-based form of a DAO, or do they mean an autonomous piece of software that depends on continuous governance as an input for its functioning?</p><p>On the other hand, it’s cool that a broader cultural circle is absorbing the values and principles behind decentralized organizations. This is what mainstream adoption will look like. Watch this video of a bunch of e-sports commentators grappling with the phenomenon of NounsDAO.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*v4ypR63vQSLg6XOnEpPE8w.png" /><figcaption>Link to watch the video: <a href="https://twitter.com/punk4156/status/1644662999234355200">https://twitter.com/punk4156/status/1644662999234355200</a></figcaption></figure><p>Which begs the question: is NounsDAO a DAO in the strict meaning of the term? In my assessment it’s not. Although NounsDAO is to my knowledge an unincorporated non-entity that purely operates on-chain, it doesn’t govern a separate technical artifact, it’s raison d’être, like an on-chain marketplace or stablecoin. It’s not a means to an end — unlike MakerDAO, Aave, Compound or Uniswap. Sure, there is a continuous auction of new Nouns NFTs being maintained as a technical artifact. But this is a purely self-referential piece of code. It has no extrinsic purpose, except to grow the treasury and membership base of the project.</p><p>Famously, NounsDAO only governs itself. So in the end, NounsDAO is exactly a DAO of the less strict kind: an online community that is governed by its members through votes and that has a treasury to pay its contributors [6].</p><p>Interestingly, NounsDAO even started without an express purpose and with no defined governance system. The whole point of Nouns is to find its purpose over time and to not rush into governance too quickly.</p><p>So does that make Nouns less of a DAO? Certainly not. It’s probably the “realest” DAO of all. It has virtually no purpose except to be itself. It doesn’t have to make an on-chain service work, there is no pressure to perform, there is no need for back channeling or other clandestine stakeholder coordination for governance votes to pass in a seemingly “decentralized” way. Nouns is a large-scale experiment in being really what it claims to be. That’s a first for the crypto space.</p><h3>DAOs for the rest of us</h3><p>So, how have we adjusted our vision of the ideal customer on Common Ground? In 2021 we started out believing our ideal customer was a DAO. In 2023, we believe our ideal customer is a community regardless of whether they call themselves a DAO or not and regardless of whether they know what Web3 is. We strongly believe that over time, all of these communities will benefit from some of the innovations that DAOs have uncovered in the last decade. For me, some of those innovations include:</p><ul><li>community bank accounts aka multisig wallets</li><li>uncensorable payments and donations with low transaction fees</li><li>digital collectibles aka NFTs</li><li>quantifiable reputation as a means to build trust in communities</li><li>self-sovereign identities and portable social graphs</li><li>strong identities with (decentralized) proof of personhood</li><li>democratic community moderation and collective decision-making</li><li>community-owned platforms and infrastructure</li><li>coops operating at “web-scale”</li></ul><p>This may not sound like a tectonic shift and in a sense it’s not. But the ramifications for how Common Ground will present itself to the outside world are significant.</p><h3>Conclusions</h3><p>In summary we can say that DAOs exist on a spectrum. Of course, the transition between these can be fluid.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/990/1*TxjhA7tCiBcD5Gan8TpD5A.png" /></figure><p>If you liked this article, <a href="https://app.cg/community/G1YnQr6cz7">join CollectiveBrain for more good stuff</a>.</p><h3>Footnotes</h3><p>[1] <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xpVQ3l5P0A4">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xpVQ3l5P0A4</a></p><p>[2] Unfortunately, the original material seems to have vanished. I believe that he introduced the idea in an episode of Let’s Talk Bitcoin, an early Bitcoin Podcast with Andreas Antonopoulos.</p><p>[3] <a href="https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/05/06/daos-dacs-das-and-more-an-incomplete-terminology-guide">https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/05/06/daos-dacs-das-and-more-an-incomplete-terminology-guide</a> and <a href="https://medium.com/@VitalikButerin/i-invented-the-term-in-2013-and-daniel-larimer-came-up-with-dacs-s-organization-corporation-a-ef86db1524d5">https://medium.com/@VitalikButerin/i-invented-the-term-in-2013-and-daniel-larimer-came-up-with-dacs-s-organization-corporation-a-ef86db1524d5</a></p><p>[4] The hack even made it into the New York Times, which was a big deal back then <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/18/business/dealbook/hacker-may-have-removed-more-than-50-million-from-experimental-cybercurrency-project.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/18/business/dealbook/hacker-may-have-removed-more-than-50-million-from-experimental-cybercurrency-project.html</a></p><p>[5] See for example the famous SEC report on TheDAO <a href="https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf">https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf</a></p><p>[6] Here’s a list of parameters that are continuously fine-tuned by MakerDAO governance <a href="https://makerburn.com/#/changes">https://makerburn.com/#/changes</a></p><p>[7] There is a treasury with a net worth of about $ 60 million USD on the Ethereum blockchain <a href="https://etherscan.io/tokenholdings?a=0x0BC3807Ec262cB779b38D65b38158acC3bfedE10">https://etherscan.io/tokenholdings?a=0x0BC3807Ec262cB779b38D65b38158acC3bfedE10</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=50de94e8ee1e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[2023 — Starting a New Chapter]]></title>
            <link>https://heckerhut.medium.com/2023-starting-a-new-chapter-708152926981?source=rss-926c6a0ae253------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/708152926981</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[future-of-work]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[social-media]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[web3]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Florian Glatz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 29 Dec 2022 00:16:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-12-29T15:44:20.740Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>2023 — Starting a New Chapter</h3><p>Eight years ago, in December 2014, I published my first blog post on Medium, to give an account of <a href="https://heckerhut.medium.com/whats-a-smart-contract-in-search-of-a-consensus-c268c830a8ad?source=user_profile---------10----------------------------">Smart Contracts</a> and their meaning from a legal perspective. Albeit being quite explorative, that post has been shared and read tens of thousands of times across the Internet and hopefully helped some fellow lawgens get excited about <a href="https://trends.google.de/trends/explore?date=2014-12-12%202022-12-28&amp;q=blockchain%20law">blockchain and law</a>.</p><p>Not only did I discover that I really enjoyed blogging back then but I became obsessed with thinking deeply about what crypto and blockchain would mean for an information-based society. In the two years following my first blog post, I wrote about</p><ul><li><a href="https://medium.com/p/1833629f379b?source=post_stats_page-------------------------------------">modes of contractual governance in an on-demand service economy</a> (2015), proposing on-chain social graphs and reputation systems to solve platform lock-in for workers in networked digital environments, a phenomenon that’s just now taking off;</li><li>about <a href="https://medium.com/p/7fffc75423a2?source=post_stats_page-------------------------------------">the political economy of computing</a> (2015), scoping new forms of regulation in the age of platforms, now a hot topic with the EU’s <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/digital-markets-act-ensuring-fair-and-open-digital-markets_en">Digital Market Act</a>;</li><li>about <a href="https://medium.com/p/c3d30f5182a6?source=post_stats_page-------------------------------------">smart contracts, platforms and intermediaries</a> (2015), where I predicted MEV in the Ethereum blockchain, <a href="https://www.paradigm.xyz/2020/08/ethereum-is-a-dark-forest">5 years before it arose</a>;</li><li>and about <a href="https://medium.com/p/fadf5c56139a?source=post_stats_page-------------------------------------">a blockchain token taxonomy</a> (2016), where I explained why tokens were the single most important social innovation in blockchain, foreshadowing NFTs, and some reasoning why the Metaverse will only become real with blockchains, now being discussed as web4 — or the spatial web among researchers.</li></ul><p>Looking back, I’m quite proud of these reflections, since they essentially captured the evolution of the crypto space for the years to come. You could say I was ahead of my time.</p><h3>Get ready for the next chapter 📖</h3><p>The internet has become <a href="https://stratechery.com/2021/internet-3-0-and-the-beginning-of-tech-history/">political</a>. Social movements are the new change agents, fundamentally transforming work, politics, community, how we live and everything else.</p><p>That’s why I’ve decided to build <a href="https://commonground.cg/">Common Ground</a> - a web3-powered platform for collectives of all kinds, helping them grow and collaborate.</p><p>Behind Common Ground stands an incredible team of builders, investors and communities, that are united by a shared vision of a better internet.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HRN5b8BAueclAtNwMdVLBQ.png" /><figcaption>Check out <a href="https://commonground.cg/">https://commonground.cg/</a></figcaption></figure><p>Common Ground brings together essential features for communities, including chat, voice, blogging and much, much more. Hence, I’m moving my blog there. I’ve already published one significant post under my new moniker “ada” about what I call the “Builder-Operator-Separation”, explaining how builders in the web3 space can create extralegal spaces with radical decentralization.</p><p>The platform has been in closed alpha since June 2022 and will be open to the public later in January 2023. If you want an invite to get early access, <a href="https://t.me/+CAedj5NPkV9jZmFi">join our telegram group</a> and ask for a referral link. You’re very welcome!</p><p>So long, fellow traveler. See you on the other side.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=708152926981" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Can the Wikipedia-model be applied to Public Policy-Making?]]></title>
            <link>https://heckerhut.medium.com/can-the-wikipedia-model-be-applied-to-public-policy-making-ff4444a2ff60?source=rss-926c6a0ae253------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ff4444a2ff60</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[crowdsourcing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decentralization]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Florian Glatz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 03 Feb 2021 17:20:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-02-03T17:20:07.737Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>In this post I argue why public policy-making is broken and propose a new model of how it could be fixed. To test these ideas in practice, I’ve started </em><a href="https://poli.cy/"><em>poli.cy</em></a><em>.</em></p><h3>What is public policy?</h3><p>According to Wikipedia “public policy is the process by which governments translate their political vision into programmes and actions to deliver ‘outcomes — desired changes in the real world’”. The making of public policy “can be characterized as a dynamic, complex, and interactive system through which public problems are identified and resolved”.</p><blockquote>Today, public policy-making is in a failed state in most Western countries. While politicians enviously look at the Chinese model of policy making — which seems to be more effective in producing decisions (and even good ones, if we consider e.g. electric transport) — the real problem lies elsewhere.</blockquote><p>Having been involved in public policy-making for the past 4 years with regards to regulation of digital technologies such as blockchain and cryptocurrencies, but also from having talked to people in other fields such as climate change, my impression is that one of the key problems why <em>better policies </em>are so rarely discussed and implemented these days, is simply because making good policies is pretty hard and gets harder as the world becomes more complex, driven by technology, globalization and other societal macro trends. And when political discourse doesn’t reward investments in good policy proposals but is biased towards superficial ideological debates or other off-topic trivia, then good policy proposals won’t get developed, much less discussed.</p><h3>Why policy-making is broken</h3><p>Making good policies is a truly interdisciplinary endeavor, operating at the cross section of many expert domains, such as technology, finance, IP, data protection, healthcare, energy, climate, supply chain and many other.</p><blockquote>Law-makers have been ridiculed for paying hundreds of millions of Euros to private consulting companies. But where else would governments get the expertise of how to regulate the most in-depth matter across all fields of the economy and beyond?</blockquote><p>The problems with outsourcing policy-making to the “Big Four” of the consulting world are obvious:</p><p>First, having looked inside these corporate organisms myself, it’s clear that even <em>their</em> competency in understanding complex subject matters is severely limited, especially when it comes to new developments in deeply technology-driven fields but surely also in many other fields which I know nothing about.</p><p>Second, the Big Four are called that because they represent the interest of the biggest, most powerful corporations in our economy. They are literally reselling the influence they gain in the policy-making processes to their corporate clients — as the cherry on top, justifying the monthly retainers paid to them.</p><h3>How to make better policies</h3><p>So, what is a better approach towards public policy-making? Let’s remind ourselves again of the key problems we’re facing:</p><ol><li>Developing good policies for the 21st century is hard, because it requires an enormous amount of expert knowledge in a vast field of domains</li><li>Neither in ministries nor other governmental organizations, nor in those consulting enterprises that are haled to be “the best”, is enough raw competency accumulated to solve the challenges presented by (1.)</li></ol><p>Having these problems in mind, the solution seems fairly obvious.</p><p>When <em>describing</em> the modern world in its full breadth became intractable for organizations that had traditionally been tasked with the job, such as the publishers of <em>Encyclopedia Britannica</em> or <em>Brockhaus</em>, we barely noticed it, because their job had already been taken over by Wikipedia — the native knowledge resources of the information age.</p><p>How then, could not <em>describing</em>, but constructively <em>interfering</em> with the world so as to change it towards some desired goal, be any less difficult, if not impossible, to solve by a single institution — be it an elected government or a privately contracted consulting firm?</p><blockquote>Wikipedia has shown that when a problem is too hard to solve by a single institution, no matter how powerful, the only way left to solve it is through the self-governed coordination of millions of peers.</blockquote><p>Wikipedia is based on what academics call <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commons-based_peer_production"><em>commons-based peer production</em></a><em>, i.e. </em>a model of socio-economic production, that is defined by the openness of its outputs as well as by a decentralized, participant-driven method of working. Although analyzed ad nauseum for two decades, it has never been truly understood how to transplant the success of Wikipedia to other domains. It may be argued that this problem can be reduced to the more general case of building any self-sustaining community of content-generating users on the internet, capable of producing outputs that matter to orders of magnitude more people than were involved in producing it.</p><h3>Where the Wikipedia-model fits to the problem of public policy-making</h3><h4>Description vs. Interference</h4><p>Building anything, requires an accurate model of the problem domain. Creating good public policies is the act of “building” a better world, by giving the agents inside of it a superior set of rules to act by. In order to achieve that aim, whoever creates such public policy necessarily requires an accurate model of the world they attempt to remake.</p><p>This is where the first set of commonalities arises. Wikipedia is a <em>knowledge resource</em> that describes the world. Policies can be considered as <em>coordination resources</em> that interfere with the world based on a certain model or description of it, as laid down e.g. in Wikipedia. This begs the question:</p><blockquote>If the knowledge resource that describes the world the best is produced by an instance of <em>platform-mediated commons-based peer-production</em>, wouldn’t the formulation of policy changes be also suited to such a process?</blockquote><h4>How to get the best minds to solve public issues</h4><p>What can be said with certainty about Wikipedia, is that the platform discovered a superior knowledge production model that satisfies the same demand that had previously been served by traditional publishers of encyclopedias.</p><p>What is astonishing about this simple, matter-of-fact statement, is in <em>how</em> Wikipedia functions as an organization. Wikipedia has, outside the foundation steering the infrastructure on which the online encyclopedia runs, no employees. It has no organized roles around knowledge production or provides systems of information access for research. Wikipedia instead encourages volunteers to contribute knowledge from inside their fields of expertise free of charge, to jointly create a globe-spanning knowledge resource.</p><blockquote>How did the contributions to Wikipedia reach both the breadth and depth required to serve as a useful, up-to-date, authoritative knowledge resource for the information age, obliterating its antiquated predecessors?</blockquote><p>Contributing to Wikipedia has its own set of incentives, that don’t speak to the vast majority of people consuming the resource produced by its community. In fact, unlike the typical 80/20 distribution of internet platforms like Reddit, <a href="http://www.aaronsw.com/weblog/whowriteswikipedia">Wikipedia has more like a 98/2 distribution of consumer vs. </a><a href="http://www.aaronsw.com/weblog/whowriteswikipedia">producer</a><a href="http://www.aaronsw.com/weblog/whowriteswikipedia"> (2006)</a>.</p><p>Although this has been a common criticism directed at Wikipedia, it seems unsurprising that not many people find pleasure in engaging in the kind of work necessary to write down an accurate description of some subject matter detail, including sources, that satisfy the standards set by the community. The threshold of contributing successfully to Wikipedia is much higher that e.g. posting a cat picture on Reddit.</p><p>The same would be true for public policy creation. Indeed, even fewer experts would possibly be interested in engaging in the tedious work of formulating coherent policy proposals that make sense on the many levels at which they will have to, from legal dogmatics to whatever expert matter they regulate about the economy or life in contemporary society.</p><p>This isn’t a problem though, as long as at least one unbiased expert is convinced that they should share their insights in the form of policy proposals. What, if only biased experts take up the work? Well, then what have we lost?</p><h3>Shouldn’t democracy function like that anyway?</h3><p>Thanks for asking. Of course, yes. We intuitively know this to be true:</p><blockquote>If the smartest people in the world magically came together and worked out the best possible set of policies to fight climate change effectively, we would have no good reason to reject them, or say, call up our representatives and convince them to vote for them on our behalf.</blockquote><p><em>Or would we?</em></p><p>Democracy is messy, even more so in an age where the sheer concept of truth has evaporated before our eyes, amongst other reasons as a result of individualized news feeds, with high-resolution, pay-per-view write access for “advertisers”, which in election year are drowned by political interest groups, operating with money of questionable origin.</p><p>Playing Devil’s advocate, we could go as far as saying that the biggest challenge to good policies today, is not whether we can reach consensus on what the best policies are. In fact, the only fact on which there is consensus nowadays, is that there is no consensus on facts anymore. So, if the facts aren’t clear, what is the point of proposing policies, let alone sensible ones, for which <em>facts</em> are nothing short of the fundamental axioms under which they operate?</p><p>Reality is, of course, more nuanced. And I truly believe there is a legitimate recognition of quality and substance still in existence across the wider public, especially when the labor is born in a fundamentally democratic, bottom up process by, what are essentially strangers on the internet, like you and me.</p><blockquote>More to the point: let’s assume that climate change is in fact real and that there is a set of policies available that if we were to adopt them today, we could still prevent the worst effects of climate change.</blockquote><p>First of all, what would those policies look like? One thing I’d bet on, is that they would forbid or reduce a lot of the things we enjoy today as consumers in Europe, US and many other parts of the world, such as cheap flights, cars, global trade, meat and lots of other agricultural products, possibly data centers, other infrastructure, etc. If we’d be really serious about stopping climate change, we’d be having that conversation.</p><p>If we are to seriously adopt such radical policies within the next ten years or so, is there even another way imaginable than one where we, the consumers, lay these restrictions upon us <em>ourselves? </em>No elected official has the incentive to propose such policies themselves, since it would be their guarantee not to be reelected. It is only the people themselves that can agree to such far-reaching disruptions to modern consumer lifestyle.</p><p>Whether to bother building such a Wikipedia for public policy proposals even if there is not even agreement on facts, reduces to the question whether, given that climate change could be real and there could in fact be reasonable policies waiting to be developed and adopted that would prevent the worst effects, it is worth to fight for those policies to be developed, debated and implemented. To me, that answer is yes.</p><h3>The Recipe</h3><p>To transplant the success of Wikipedia in producing a publicly-trusted, continuously updated canon of facts about the world, to the domain of public policy-making, is a creative challenge.</p><h4><strong>Embracing plurality</strong></h4><p>Any platform serious about solving the public policy crisis has to embrace the one remaining fact, namely, that people differ in their <em>opinions</em> about facts, i.e. what is <em>true</em>. To some, this development is still a bitter pill to swallow. Yet, I think the phenomena around #<em>fake news</em> we’re observing are an uncomfortable transition on our path towards a new equilibrium.<br><br>The Wikipedia equivalent of public policy has to give every opinion voiced in the form of a proposal equal representation on its platform. There must not be any <em>a priori</em> editorial attempt at forging an “objective canon of good policies” as one might naively assume when transposing the Wikipedia idea to public policy making.<br><br>The platform should be based on creative commons licenses like Wikipedia, and be easily linked to with permanent links, potentially including content-addressed hashes, to serve as a reliable resource for debates in external fora over long periods of time.</p><h4>Quality-control &amp; discovery</h4><p>At Wikipedia, most contributions are rejected based on their lack of form alone. The effort of creating something worthy of inclusion into a resource as well-groomed as Wikipedia, exceeds the payoff of most types of abuse.</p><blockquote>Ultimately, the hardness of the problem to be solved acts like a noise filter.</blockquote><p>Of course, corporate whitewashing or concealing, tuning of biography pages or other kinds of more subtle abuse, are harder to detect. Yet, Wikipedia has found a way to stay unbiased enough to be relied upon by millions, maybe billions by now. This feat is due to a combination of technical policies governing write access to the Wikipedia knowledge resource, as well as social protocols and personal ethics shared by community members.</p><p>For a public policy platform, a number of strategies might be available to surface quality while staying neutral as a platform. Unsophisticated algorithms are available that may allow users of such a platform to surface the most discussed, most lengthy, most requested policy proposals on the platform. Such a “dashboard” may even be their primary way of accessing the resource. Yet the platform takes no preferred stance towards any proposal.</p><h4><strong>Relationship to constitutional policy-makers: or <em>how to get political traction</em></strong></h4><p>From our initial definition of <em>public policy</em>, i.e. a “dynamic, complex, and interactive system through which public problems are identified and resolved”, we can deduce that constitutional policy-makers are one of many pieces to a bigger puzzle. There are many forms in which influence is exerted on policies that are formally adopted by national and international legislative bodies. What is typically referred to as lobbying, is a practice that is not accounted for in the formal protocols that govern write access to a nation’s policy resource. Yet, it is a real phenomenon we’re all familiar with or at least exposed to, if we want it or not.<br><br>In the same vein, the Wikipedia of public policy — or rather the content thereon — would slowly but surely exert its influence onto constitutional policy-makers. Why, you ask? Because the platform offers <em>qualitatively superior </em>policy proposals free of charge to its audience, among which are the very policy-makers that today are contracting out that job to clueless consultants for millions of Euros.<br><br>The equivalent to the publishers of encyclopedias which Wikipedia diminished to mere printing presses of internet content slowly over years, would be national and international legislative bodies to Wikipedia’s public policy counterpart.</p><h3>What should such a platform look like?</h3><p>Before we talk about looks, let’s talk about functionality. In that respect, the platform should provide the following resources:</p><ol><li>a public repository and version control system for any policy that shapes life in contemporary society, from traditional laws to the terms of service of popular internet platforms and critical infrastructure providers</li><li>a set of tools empowering every citizen or interest group, including governments themselves, to monitor and formally propose a change in or addition to current policies pertaining to a particular territory or service</li><li>community-guided, public discourse and structured discussion venues for debating arguments and different perspectives among stakeholders around policy implementations, connected goals and underlying values as well as voting tools to gauge movements in opinion and consensus</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1018/1*kVQ1n33xwujNNEo1Xy8hvQ.png" /></figure><p><em>Poli.cy is a non-commercial, open source platform for drafting policy proposals, monitoring current and future policies, and expert debate on policies.</em></p><p><em>The platform is aimed at policy-makers, interest groups, NGOs, citizens, journalists, information brokers, consultants, students, etc</em></p><p>To stay informed on the developments, sign up to the mailing group over at <a href="https://poli.cy/">poli.cy</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ff4444a2ff60" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Calling all legal professionals and tech innovators]]></title>
            <link>https://heckerhut.medium.com/calling-all-legal-professionals-and-tech-innovators-838fe178a617?source=rss-926c6a0ae253------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/838fe178a617</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[innovation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Florian Glatz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Jul 2018 16:22:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-07-17T10:04:24.535Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4><strong>Join us at the Swiss Legal Tech Hackathon &amp; Conference 2018</strong></h4><p>The upcoming Swiss Legal Tech 2018 aims to rethink, reshape and refresh the legal industry. It’s the second Swiss edition of a series of European legal tech events that are unique in the way they bring together legal<strong> </strong>practitioners, software developers and digital innovators. The Legal Tech Hackathon is our unique signature.</p><p>The Legal Tech Hackathon will kick off on September 17th. For two intense days, lawyers and hackers will join forces to create the next generation of legal tech products. Legal professionals, who want to mix hacking and learning, can on September 18th book additional workshops centered around key issues like contract automation, smart contracts and blockchain basics.</p><p>On September 19th, the Swiss Legal Tech 2018 will be rounded off with a full-day conference, where all stakeholders are invited to present thought-provoking ideas and challenge common wisdoms in the industry. The Swiss Legal Tech draws in international talent and industry pioneers from all over the globe, including the U.S. Africa and Asia. Many European countries are also represented.</p><p><a href="http://swisslegal.tech/2018"><em>Get your Ticket here for Conference and Hands-On Workshops, or apply for our free, all-inclusive Hackathon</em></a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*L5uGxgwHCvHcTN5MD-VbjA.png" /></figure><p><a href="http://swisslegal.tech/2018"><em>Get your Ticket here for Conference and Hands-On Workshops, or apply for our free, all-inclusive Hackathon</em></a>.</p><h3><strong>Will you take part in the growing legal tech community?</strong></h3><p>By participating all three days, or at the conference or workshops alone: you will find like-minded peers eager to explore new ideas with you. At the hackathon and workshops, we will deal with challenging topics in the most reflective and creative ways. The hackathon is divided into the three building blocks: Idea Hacking, Prototype Hacking and Idea Competition. Our workshops are centered around hands-on practical understanding of emerging trends and technologies. And lastly, the conference unites all stakeholders to find a consensus on where the industry as a whole is headed and where new challenges and opportunities are awaiting us.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nRKNRynO7ewIz8jJ8hf1nA.jpeg" /></figure><h4>Day 1: Let’s REthink Law</h4><p>Collaboration and knowledge sharing are key when rethinking the status quo. On the first day of the hackathon, we bring together interdisciplinary teams of legal practitioners, software developers and digital innovators in order to build bridges between law, tech and business. It’s an international atmosphere with event participants from India, Africa, Australia, U.S.A., South America and most of Europe. All teams will be working with collective brainstorming, idea structuring and team building. The goal is to identify problems and search for solutions. We call it Idea Hacking<strong> </strong>— and we believe that it’s the recipe for creating innovative legal tech output.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xOFFRqtDGTsPePoOQcmCIQ.jpeg" /></figure><p><a href="http://swisslegal.tech/2018"><em>Get your Ticket here for Conference and Hands-On Workshops, or apply for our free, all-inclusive Hackathon</em></a>.</p><h4>Day 2: Let’s Reshape</h4><p>The second day of the hackathon is dedicated to what we call Prototype Hacking<em>. </em>It’s not the technology in itself that will reshape the legal industry — <strong>it’s your involvement. </strong>All participants in the hackathon will be actively involved in coming up with new ideas and problem solutions.</p><p>In <strong>separate workshops</strong> that deal with the integration of legal tech into daily work or using AI in client work, we enable legal professionals to become legal tech entrepreneurs themselves and enhance their firm’s productivity and ability to service its clients.</p><p>During the hackathon, the teams will be working on developing their ideas further into functioning prototypes. These prototypes could win your team some attractive prizes. At the Idea Competition, three winning ideas will be decided upon by an expert jury on the basis of their levels of creativity, practicality, social impact, etc.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Mv4qNT0gFcO9JKsbG5-7HA.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3YpVttqVIzmo-Jo7Cz0mBw.jpeg" /></figure><h4>Day 3: Let’s come together</h4><p>The subsequent conference presents renowned speakers who will provide their thoughts on the digital future of the legal industry. In addition, the three winning teams of the hackathon will present their ideas to the conference audience.</p><p>You can find more information about the hackathon, the workshops and the conference on <a href="https://swisslegal.tech/2018/">https://swisslegal.tech/2018/</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yCFDpH38Ju3odNgTFigbCw.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1Z5FpLjnDk6ajDs1f9WX_g.jpeg" /></figure><h4>How do I participate, you ask?</h4><p>You purchase your <a href="https://www.ticketino.com/de/Event/SWISS-LEGAL-TECH-HACKATHON-CONFERENCE-2018/74585">ticket(s)</a> to participate in the conference on September 19th and to enhance your skills in our hands-on workshops on September 18th (available as a separate ticket or together with the conference).</p><p>In addition to that, you can <a href="https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSfcJdp6k8joGvwoGJ2rvAkBB_bGKUT8YTZAXA7iy4_ojhxYMw/viewform">apply</a> to join the interdisciplinary teams for the hackathon days from Sep. 17th– 18th. Don’t worry. We strive for a mix of talents. You do not need prior experience in hackathons or software development to be considered for participation. But you should bring a host of ideas and motivation to the table to be competitive for one of the spots at the hackathon. Overall, we expect <strong>more than 100 legal hackers</strong> to come together on September 17th and 18th 2018.</p><p>The event will be held at the <a href="https://www.nationalmuseum.ch/d/zuerich/">Swiss National Museum</a>. We look forward to having you onboard as a fellow legal tech community member.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=838fe178a617" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Berlin Legal Tech 2017 Hackathon: Retrospective and Future Roadmaps]]></title>
            <link>https://heckerhut.medium.com/the-berlin-legal-tech-2017-hackathon-retrospective-and-future-roadmaps-88f50d45aac8?source=rss-926c6a0ae253------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/88f50d45aac8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[legaltech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hackathons]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[access-to-justice]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[innovation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Florian Glatz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 12 Feb 2017 15:33:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-02-16T09:14:28.227Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*taXey05Vh_3e1Hn1-Xf3TA.png" /><figcaption>A Legal Hacker, thinking about Problems, Services and Solutions. Fotos by Merav Maroody.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dkfLt5Xaj4GFreXVIcNEtA.png" /></figure><p>While my mind is still trying to grasp the magnitude of the last three days, I feel compelled to share a first glimpse into what happened here on our blog.</p><p>To condense it into one sentence: the Indian goddess that we chose to represent the event, unleashed her full creatively destructive energy.</p><p>For two days, more than a hundred Legal Hackers created a unique atmosphere of collaboration and knowledge exchange.</p><h4>DAY 1 — Wednesday, February 8th</h4><p>On February 8th a crowd of 100–120 legal hackers gathered for the first <a href="http://hacking.law/">hacking.law</a> <strong>Legal Tech Hackathon </strong>at the Berlin office of our awesome sponsor <a href="http://iotatoken.com/">IOTA Foundation</a>.</p><h3>Florian Glatz on Twitter</h3><p>Impressions from an incredible first day at our legal tech Hackathon https://t.co/JBFs3DM5Ga 100+ people, 10+ teams, thousands of ideas</p><p>After a healthy breakfast, Stephan and me welcomed the gathered crowd and invited them to disperse throughout the office, where we had prepared various rooms according to our three pillars of technology-driven innovation in law: <strong>Blockchain, AI and Industrialization.</strong></p><h3>Markus Hartung on Twitter</h3><p>Start der Berlin Legal Tech 2017 @MMBues @MarcusCJung @MichaGrupp @mschafhausen</p><p>Our <strong>Idea Hacking Process</strong> was designed to generate ideas from our legal hackers’ creative input, structure them according to a pre-defined set of categories with the help of the legal engineers present and to yield the spontaneous formation of teams around common ideas, goals and visions.</p><p>My friend and partner in crime <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/gernot-halbleib-1750a026/">Gernot Halbleib</a> together with whom I had come up with the specific process design, compared the concept with the <strong>self-organized formation of stable molecules</strong> based on the attraction of individual atoms.</p><h4>Legal Engineering done right</h4><p>Legal Engineers is what we called those participants that are both lawyers and tech-savvy and the same time. Despite the bad rep that lawyers have gained in the IT domain, there is a growing number of such <strong>unicorns</strong> that are both mastering digital tools and capable of legal reasoning.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Ei3mcDBrV0ku1SwRdF4JnA.png" /><figcaption>The hacking.law community connects lawyers, developers and legal engineers.</figcaption></figure><p>To do <strong>Legal Engineering </strong>right, however, it needs more than just Legal Engineers. According to our vision of how Legal Engineering will unlock new levels of <strong>access to justice and the scalability of law</strong> itself, a positive digitale future requires the collaboration of Lawyers, who are the domain experts, Developers, who are masters at digital tools and Legal Engineers, who are the translators between the other two.</p><p>We were very positively surprised when a survey among our group of participants shortly before the event yielded the following statistics in terms of the self-identified skillset of our participants:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1PLQiweBkHje7BxxiR7cMA.png" /><figcaption>Distribution of self-identified skillset of our Hackathon participants</figcaption></figure><h4>Idea Hacking</h4><p>Our Idea Hacking sessions enabled all participants to get into a creative mood. Guided by legal engineers and legal tech pioneers, ideas were categorized, channeled and sharpened.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*C8t9TalLg1jWcBp49IKCqA.jpeg" /><figcaption>One of six different rooms around our three pillars of technology-driven innovation in law. Fotos by Merav Maroody.</figcaption></figure><p>Ideas were collected on huge amounts of paper, which we then plastered all over the beautiful walls of our space.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tbKPEY6eA12hPAaN1F85-A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Fotos by Merav Maroody.</figcaption></figure><p>Ultimately though, it were the voices of our legal hackers that guided the idea finding process.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cny86rIe6tUrkOTPWeVz9A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Fotos by Merav Maroody.</figcaption></figure><h4>Team Building</h4><p>Repeatedly during the Idea Hacking phase, our legal hackers gathered for idea pitching sessions, both to sharpen their own concepts as well as to inspire others to collaborate further on their idea. Dozens of ideas were pitched, sometimes repeatedly as they evolved.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2SOSAeW8h7u7ia9ZhF_rbQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Philipp pitching his idea which would later become RenoJane and win the Hackathon! Fotos by Merav Maroody.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*q7WXTGJvg1U_2ghC8Y5X4A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Our team that flew in from Ukraine that would late become the <a href="http://consumeranger.space/">ConsumeRanger</a>! Fotos by Merav Maroody.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qyyJMwR2Nj0g3Dm8iKWBWw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Our American lawyer Stuart Mast pitching his online abitration idea, which would later get a special mention by the jury at our Pitching &amp; Award Ceremony. Fotos by Merav Maroody.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Ommq_ktI2-bMKIrkPEWQTQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Tanya, about to gather one of two big privacy groups that we had at the Hackathon, one of which would win second prize. Fotos by Merav Maroody.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*EHuvh8EB6XxAur7TSyL8nA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Lukas, who got people interested in his idea of rebuilding corporate entities on a Smart Contract basis. Fotos by Merav Maroody.</figcaption></figure><h4>Prototype Hacking</h4><p>A core tenet of Hackathons is the “getting-your-hands-dirty” part, where you go from<strong> idea to prototype.</strong> The huge motivation we felt from our participants made it easy to make that jump. According to plan, groups emerged that perfectly mirrored the overall distribution of skillsets: interdisciplinary groups of lawyers, developers and legal engineers gathered around the dozen+ tables we had spread throughout the IOTA Foundation’s Office.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-b7GGZSTT1ZGE7D31UD_vA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Fotos by Merav Maroody.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ASu97uiyFgf-fyzzQmi02Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>Fotos by Merav Maroody.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jeWzjNEnElXUwFXHuy5qJA.jpeg" /><figcaption>The space was fully packed, but left enough room to breath. Thanks again to IOTA Foundation for giving us their beautiful office. Fotos by Merav Maroody.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iLHJA6Wz8cTl4aaElUKzqw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Fotos by Merav Maroody.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*T2KhjRvdI_R1AAc-mY_XfA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Our London Team! Shoutouts to <a href="https://twitter.com/legal_kimia?lang=de">Kimia</a>. Fotos by Merav Maroody.</figcaption></figure><p>One of the masterminds behind the scenes that made all of this possible, Natalie Eichler ❤</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UHj16WgSvFLhQAWKst6SFA.png" /><figcaption>Fotos by Merav Maroody.</figcaption></figure><p>Our Team Building was concluded with each team filling out an idea sheet, that provoked them to rethink and sharpen the outcome of their collaborative work process.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HTjJrya0VbIQZQQADw04tg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Hauke filling out an idea sheet. Fotos by Merav Maroody.</figcaption></figure><h4>Workshops</h4><p>In some industries, Hackathons are a well-established concept. Accordingly, Hackathons become more focused on high-stake awards and exposure to media and investors. In our case, it was the very first Hackathon-like event that many of our participants, especially the lawyers, attended. Therefore, it wasn’t that much about competition but rather <strong>collaboration</strong>.</p><p>Based on principles of inclusion and self-organized knowledge-transfer, we offered a set of external stimuli to kickstart the desired processes. On the first day, we offered a set of on-site <strong>Bootcamp Prototyping Workshops</strong>, that helped our non-technical participants to get some useful guidelines of how to get from idea to prototype.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zte2ucwE4_8yQ0w2Y8QNKQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>UX Designer <a href="https://www.behance.net/rashagen">Erasmus Hagen</a> shares basic concepts of UX and UI designs. Fotos by Merav Maroody.</figcaption></figure><p>Another course held by Gernot Halbleib introduced several hands-on examples of what can be done with leading document automation tools such as <a href="http://xpressdox.com/">XpressDox</a> and <a href="http://abbyy.de/">Abbyy</a>, two of our Technology Partners. Fittingly, the course introduced basics of algorithmic thinking to lawyers, as well as typical workflows in legal practice to the developers present.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dkCZqT_YYh9JI-vXKTYkLg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Gernot Halbleib demonstrates how to work and conceptualize processes with document automation tools. Fotos by Merav Maroody.</figcaption></figure><p>On the second day, Thursday Februrary 9th, we had a <strong>full-day workshop track</strong> in a second space, thanks to support from <a href="http://legalbase.de/">legalBase</a>. You can rewatch the morning sessions on <a href="https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL3bvPCw5QCLJukbfwnu3hvtXX89wCDPWW">Youtube</a> or watch it right here right now in the embedded video player below:</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2Fvideoseries%3Flist%3DPL3bvPCw5QCLJukbfwnu3hvtXX89wCDPWW&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fplaylist%3Flist%3DPL3bvPCw5QCLJukbfwnu3hvtXX89wCDPWW&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2Fw-GgrZ2s5W8%2Fhqdefault.jpg%3Fcustom%3Dtrue%26w%3D120%26h%3D90%26jpg444%3Dtrue%26jpgq%3D90%26sp%3D68%26sigh%3D0qH3YTBLfCGoj6V-eXAjCPZTPWQ&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="853" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/61b1f047e6b0ba291af0f47094cdaacb/href">https://medium.com/media/61b1f047e6b0ba291af0f47094cdaacb/href</a></iframe><h4>Overnight Hacking</h4><p>Our hacking space was open 48hours for our Legal Hackers, complete with free food and drink supplies for 100+ people. Thanks to our <a href="http://hacking.law/#sponsors">sponsors</a> for making this possible!!</p><p>Our Legal Hackers used the opportunity and stayed overnight, hacking away on their ideas, prototypes and presentations.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XSWEnl06DwYGD96x2VWqXQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>The amazing Schönheitsreparaturklauseln Team, developing a sophisticated algorithm to predict the validity of specific contract clauses. Fotos by Merav Maroody.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eQToJdqp9P6Up6LKIAoLFQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Make Zeitarbeit great again — our team that unbundled temporary work relationships based on blockchain principles. Fotos by Merav Maroody.</figcaption></figure><h4>Final Pitches &amp; Award Ceremony</h4><p>Towards the end of the second day, a big bus drove all our Legal Hackers to Ahoy! Berlin, for the final pitches in front of a jury, as well as some after show party with networking, drinks and some good old Berlin techno.</p><h3>Florian Glatz on Twitter</h3><p>If this bus crashes, #legalTech is dead: a bis full of legal hackers, ready to pitch their ideas!!! #hackingLaw https://t.co/JBFs3DM5Ga</p><h3>Florian Glatz on Twitter</h3><p>Our legal hackers preparing for the big pitch at Ahoy! Berlin #hackingLaw https://t.co/JBFs3DM5Ga</p><p>In front of a crowd of roughly 100 people, including a jury of four, comprised of <a href="http://hacking.law/#our-team-2">community figures, legal tech entrepreneurs and VCs</a>.</p><h3>Florian Glatz on Twitter</h3><p>Crowd awaiting the pitches at https://t.co/JBFs3DM5Ga</p><p>The outcome was simply incredible. Our interdisciplinary teams had managed to build really sophisticated implementations of their ideas in form of apps, websites and function algorithms.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*D2NUYKj5IcObsfi4Ra_bKg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Fotos by Merav Maroody.</figcaption></figure><p>The audience was stunned, when a virtual legal secretary suddenly started to speak and organize documents and emails in front of the audience’s eye.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0V0uvlRL5d7dJETr0gJWsw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Philipp presenting RenoJane — the virtual legal assistant, with a stunning live product demo. Fotos by Merav Maroody.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BgsndG3Ak5820Vf8CnuC3Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>Our Jury Members, paying close attention to the ideas that are being pitched. Fotos by Merav Maroody.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*__mq5TM2bwExz3vcs8L7aA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Another team that got a special mention for working out a sophisticated model of how to unbundle three-sided work relationships. Fotos by Merav Maroody.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5ehuIqUbo5Ur8lImTMtwJQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>The Dataprotectionbuddy that won second prize for its very practical use case. Fotos by Merav Maroody.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6f-jo7PDHIXgeygAJD93MA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Our Ukrainian Team that worked all night to present an impressive demo of a chatbot that solves legal problems of consumers at very low cost. Fotos by Merav Maroody.</figcaption></figure><h3>The Road Ahead</h3><p>Our first but certainly not last Legal Tech Hackathon was an incredible event — a feeling that was shared by many participants. The positive atmosphere emerging from constructive, thoughtful interactions between more than a hundred like-minded Legal Hackers created a breeding ground for ideas and collaborations that will outlast the two-days for which the often-untapped potential realized itself somewhere in a West-Berlin apartment.</p><p>We invite everyone who is inspired by what we do to <strong>join our Community.</strong></p><p>You can<strong> </strong><a href="http://join.hacking.law/"><strong>Join our Slack Channel</strong></a><strong> </strong>(<em>that link might load a little while)</em></p><p>Or get in touch directly at <a href="/service/mailto:we.are@hacking.law">we.are@hacking.law</a></p><p>We are looking for collaborators world-wide to create many more events like this and people interested in volunteering for various community tasks.</p><p>If you’re interested in making your own Legal Tech Hackathon, <a href="/service/mailto:we.are@hacking.law">get in touch </a>with us so we can exchange helpful tipps.</p><p>If you’re interested in contributing content to this blog, get in touch via Slack or<a href="/service/mailto:we.are@hacking.law"> shoot us a mail</a></p><h4>hacking.law podcast | coding the future</h4><p>We’ve planned a series of podcasts, for which we did filmed many interviews at the Hackathon. Our hacking.law journalist <a href="https://twitter.com/AliceKohn">Alice Kohn</a> has led our media team at the event and travelled to various Blockchain hotspots in the world and gathered material from there as well. You can expect two full episodes soon on our <a href="http://hacking.law/">hacking.law website.</a></p><p>I guess that is my first retrospective. Looking forward to what’s to come!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=88f50d45aac8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[A Blockchain Token Taxonomy]]></title>
            <link>https://heckerhut.medium.com/a-blockchain-token-taxonomy-fadf5c56139a?source=rss-926c6a0ae253------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fadf5c56139a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Florian Glatz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 10 Sep 2016 00:33:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-09-10T00:38:47.084Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Tokens were one of the first applications based on a blockchain infrastructure that pushed the technology beyond its original use as an accounting ledger for a public blockchain network’s base currency. Tokens are themselves units of account, used to keep track of who owns how much of some quantity other than the underlying ledger’s native crypto currency.</p><p>Tokens started as meta-information encoded in simple Bitcoin transactions, thereby taking advantage of the Bitcoin blockchain’s strong immutability. At a protocol layer, tokens were outsourced extensions to Bitcoin’s core protocol. Instead of being integrated as a feature on a software level, the first tokens were created based on misappropriating data fields in Bitcoin transactions (such as encoding data in the <em>amount or op_return fi</em>eld). That strategy of extending Bitcoin’s feature set came at the cost of having to develop an additional set of stand-alone client software that implemented the protocol needed to decode the meta-information hidden in Bitcoin transactions.</p><p>From there, tokens have evolved significantly, thanks to the shift from blockchains understood as dumb accounting ledgers towards general-purpose state machines with arbitrarily complex (turing-complete) state transition rules. Smart contracts, which are another name for transition rules of distributed state machines, enable the creation of tokens with complex behaviors attached, easily from within the core protocol. Instead of having to develop standalone software for different operating systems in order to allow people to make use of tokens, they can now be created and handled from within all clients supporting the core protocol of such a new type of blockchain (heralded by Ethereum, invented by Vitalik Buterin).</p><p>Today, the token concept is central to most social and economic innovations developed with blockchain technology. Something about tokens makes them an ideal proxy to understand the disruptive effects blockchain technology has on the status quo.</p><blockquote><em>What is a token?</em></blockquote><p>A first line to draw is the difference between tokens that are fungible and those which are not. In a strict definition of the term token, the non-fungible variant may be no token at all. But I will rely on a broad definition in the rest of this text.</p><p>From a technical perspective, a fungible token is implemented as a list of blockchain addresses (user accounts) that have a number (quantity) associated with them, together with (1) a set of methods used to manipulate that list, such as ‘transfer <em>n</em> tokens from address <em>a</em> to address <em>b</em>’, and (2) rules to determine <em>who</em> can manipulate that list in <em>which way.</em></p><p>Orthogonally, a non-fungible token is <em>its own</em> smart contract that inherits from a given template every time a new instance of such a token is created and where every running instance of such a token contract contains a globally-defined <em>owner</em> address field.</p><blockquote>A question of context</blockquote><p>Although smart contracts can be programmed to create any kind of token, they cannot be programmed to understand <em>what a token is</em>. The social context necessary to understand what a token represents can, ultimately, only exist in the human mind. A token is a socio-technological construct. It has a technological part, as an entry in a blockchain database and a social part — it’s raison d’être. The social component of a token is defined by an agreement between a group of people. In such an arrangement, tokens represent some aspect of the relationships between individual members of the group. Tokens derive value from faithfully reflecting the changes in those relationships over time.</p><blockquote><em>Four dimensions of a token</em></blockquote><p><strong>Digital</strong><br>Tokens are the digital identity of something that can be owned by someone. Based on that premise, tokens can have a representational dimension, stretching into the physical, the virtual or the legal realm respectively.</p><p>A token can be described as purely digital, if it has no such representational dimension. That’s the case for any blockchain’s base currency (i.e. bitcoin, ether, etc.) as well as for DAO-style tokens. The latter kind of tokens are used for different purposes within the organizational ruleset of a DAO. They can represent voting rights, ownership shares in the ‘company’, virtual stock options, and whatever else one might think of. However, those are just <em>labels</em>, applied after the fact. From a causal perspective, the functionality of those tokens is <strong><em>immediately</em></strong><em> </em>and<em> </em><strong><em>exclusively</em></strong><em> </em>defined within the smart contract where they are created, or within the network of smart contracts within which such a token can be transferred. In contrast, multi-dimensional tokens might have rather generic methods attached to them that do not disclose their true intent within the code in which they are implemented, but which defer that responsibility to an off-chain agreement instead.</p><p><strong>Physical<br></strong>Tokens can be bound to physical objects through a combination of software and hardware, or through contractual agreements respectively. Because physical objects are not always <em>legally fungible</em>, they may either be implemented with a <em>list-based</em> or a <em>contract-based </em>approach (v.s.).</p><p>Tokens that are tied to physical objects through software + hardware, are referred to as <strong>smart property </strong>or<strong> smart objects. </strong>Smart objects are IoT devices that have an always-on connection to a network, through which they can communicate with (a subset of) the outside world. Additionally, they are capable of controlling their own usability through a combination of hardware and software features. A typical example for such an arrangement would be anything that can be controlled through an access mechanism such as a physical lock, as found in cars, buildings and many other kinds of physical infrastructure.</p><p>For lack of a better position at which to place digital media files and software in general within the suggested token taxonomy, I am mentioning them under the category <em>physical</em>. Media files are controlled through access mechanisms as much as physical infrastructure, implemented, however, as ‘digital right management’ software, running on the appliances used to render digital media files consumable for human sensory organs.</p><p>Tokens that are tied to physical objects <em>merely </em>through contractual agreements, rely on the legal system as the ultimate enforcement layer to sync on-chain and off-chain ownership of a given physical good. A good example would be many of the public services that may one day be offered on a blockchain-based infrastructure.[1] Land registries are such an example, that is already being worked on. Since nation states are the ultimate regulators of physical space, they will have a tendency towards generic token manipulation rules, serving merely as simplistic functions to document the result of complex off-chain decision processes.</p><p><strong>Virtual<br></strong>The virtual-reality dimension of a token is interesting because it reveals something fundamental. It is best explained with a comparison. Before the wide-spread diffusion of the PC and broadband internet access, the legal concept of copyright could be regulated through controlling physical media carriers as proxies (such as books, CDs, etc.). However, recent history taught us that intellectual goods such as films and books were only incidentally tied to physical objects. It turned out that the law, in a fundamentally phenomenological approach towards regulation, assumed that any intellectual good was at the same time an individual physical object that could be treated as such. Digitalization taught us that this assumption only holds true in a pre-digital world, which we have left forever behind. The Internet, for the first time since the invention of copyright, transformed intellectual property as a whole into its <em>state of nature</em>. Long before the zero marginal cost of reproduction became an economic reality, it was assumed that intellectual goods were at their core non-rivalrous, ubiquitous goods, i.e. something that cannot be localized in time or space, nor be exclusively ‘owned’ in the way physical goods are. However, because intellectual goods were tied to physical carrier objects by necessity, those properties were never actually realized in practice. Only when personal digital reproduction technology became <em>ubiquitous</em>, could intellectual goods become ubiquitous themselves.</p><p>Virtual reality may, in case of a similar mass adoption as it happened with smartphones, disrupt another fundamental assumption in contemporary society. The assumption being, that the provision of digital infrastructure can be organized on today’s <em>centralized </em>techno-economic architecture of platform intermediaries. The reason why it cannot, is because private-access database silos are fundamentally incapable of mirroring our common notion of <em>ownership</em> and <em>control.</em> No prescription of “data portability” as envisioned in various regulatory models of platform intermediaries can sufficiently ensure the degrees of freedom physical space affords the human species, in the context of which our relevant notion of ownership originally evolved.</p><p>It doesn’t actually need virtual reality as the ‘ultimate conclusion of digital’ to prove my point.[2] Already today the incompatibilities of our common notion of <em>ownership </em>in relation to digital resources is starting to show. One example is the use of artificial geo-fencing in the digital content market. Digital content providers create geographically-gated communities of users, each with their separate catalogue of available content. This creates friction when users travel across national boarders and are being served different content based on their geographical location. The European Commission now tries to control this phenomenon through a directive on the sale of digital goods and services. The suggested regulation would legally force service providers to more closely align themselves with their users’ understanding of <em>ownership </em>of digital resources.</p><p>In that sense, virtual reality may become alongside IoT one of the fundamental driving forces of blockchain technology towards mainstream adoption. By tying virtual reality objects to blockchain-based tokens a realistic model of ownership with all the degrees of freedom available in physical space (and more) may be created.</p><p><strong>Legal<br></strong>Lastly, tokens can represent property rights granted by law such as intellectual property rights, or contractually-defined rights established between two or more parties. In fact, those two kinds of tokens are closely linked when looking at e.g. intellectual property licensing databases, which are currently being built and popularized as a great match for blockchain technology. In their case, the same token represents a property right when resting with its creator and a contractual claim when resting with a licensee.</p><p>Maybe the most relevant example though for tokens representing contractual claims are financial instruments implemented on a blockchain infrastructure. Currently, virtually every financial institute experimenting with blockchain technology is developing some form of a token contract. The only differences between them concern their permission rules and the types of transactions that can be performed on them.</p><blockquote>A need for legal recognition?</blockquote><p>The concept of blockchain tokens embodies the full potential of blockchain technology. Especially tokens that possess one of the representational dimensions laid out before, are closely linked to the traditional legal system. In order for blockchains to unfold their full potential with regard to reinventing <em>ownership</em> in the digital realm, the technology needs to be recognized<em> de lege ferenda </em>as a system capable of creating an objectively new ontological category. A new kind of <em>thing</em>, which deserves its own regulatory framework that reflects the unique affordances and constraints of blockchain technology.</p><p>Footnotes</p><p>[1] Simply to set my mark with regards to public services on blockchain infrastructure, I’ve been arguing in favor of such an approach towards provision of critical digital infrastructure, also understood as a new form of ‘techno-regulation’ / regulation through architecture, <a href="https://medium.com/@heckerhut/the-political-economy-of-computing-7fffc75423a2#.nfodkoyxw">for over a year now.</a></p><p>[2] Virtual is digital, perceived as physical.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fadf5c56139a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[How we use Smart Contracts at SatoshiPay to change the Internet’s economy forever. Today!]]></title>
            <link>https://heckerhut.medium.com/how-we-use-smart-contracts-at-satoshipay-to-change-the-internet-s-economy-forever-today-777988a868d?source=rss-926c6a0ae253------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/777988a868d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[smart-contracts]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Florian Glatz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 01 Feb 2016 15:45:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-02-01T15:47:26.273Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>How we use Smart Contracts at SatoshiPay to change the Internet’s Economy <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WEkuqv1V4n4&amp;feature=youtu.be&amp;t=158">forever</a>. <a href="https://dashboard.satoshipay.io/sign-up">Today</a>!</h3><h4>About the Author</h4><p>Florian Glatz is a lawyer and software developer based in Berlin. At SatoshiPay he develops both software and legal solutions based on Blockchain technology. You can find out more about him at <a href="http://blockchain.lawyer/">blockchain.lawyer.</a></p><h4>Introduction</h4><p>Much has been talked about <a href="https://medium.com/@heckerhut/whats-a-smart-contract-in-search-of-a-consensus-c268c830a8ad#.omtm3341w"><em>Smart Contracts</em></a>, the curious idea of machine-readable, auto-enforceable agreements between two or more parties. Originally conceived as a theoretical exercise by interdisciplinary legal scholar <a href="https://twitter.com/NickSzabo4">Nick Szabo</a> in the early nineties, in an attempt to understand how legal contracts may be transposed into the digital age, they unexpectedly became a “real thing” with the advent of Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin.</p><p>However, until today, there has been a noticeable lack of real-world implementations of the technology. As intriguing as some potential applications may be, <a href="https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Contracts">most of them</a> have yet to be built. <a href="https://copay.io/">Multi-signature wallets</a> and Blockchain-based <a href="https://www.bitrated.com/">escrow services</a> have been the most sophisticated examples of Smart Contract applications until now.[1]</p><h4>How SatoshiPay uses Smart Contracts</h4><p>At SatoshiPay, we are big fans of Bitcoin, the most stable and secure <a href="http://gendal.me/2015/03/30/bitcoin-as-a-smart-contract-platform/">Smart Contract Platform</a> out there. Although Bitcoin may seem primitive to those focusing on next-generation platforms such as Ethereum, we believe that most of Bitcoin’s potential for complex contracting is yet to be uncovered.</p><p>Through a sophisticated mix of proven web technologies[2], public-key cryptography and the Bitcoin Blockchain, a new class of innovative, scalable web services can be built and deployed <em>today</em>, bringing the advantages of decentralization and financial self-reliance to the unwashed masses of the Internet.</p><p>In effect, what we built at SatoshiPay, is a new type of web-based intermediary, which I’m calling <strong>trustless intermediary. </strong>The SatoshiPay service mediates contractual negotiations and performance between buyers and sellers of digital goods, without those parties having to trust the service with their money.[3]</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/502/1*38k0dOwQsQhT37-i-MkEVw.png" /><figcaption>To understand the lower half of the graphic, read <a href="https://medium.com/@heckerhut/smart-contracts-platforms-and-intermediaries-c3d30f5182a6#.lhx3xzgsx">this</a>.</figcaption></figure><h4>Bitcoin micro-payment channels as a scalable web service</h4><p>The sophisticated mix of proven web infrastructure, cryptography and the Bitcoin Blockchain we implemented at SatoshiPay in form of a scalable web service has been known for many years by Bitcoin aficionados under the name <a href="https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Contract#Example_7:_Rapidly-adjusted_.28micro.29payments_to_a_pre-determined_party">“micro-payment channels”</a>. The key features of which are:</p><ol><li><a href="https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Multisignature#Multisigniture_Addresses">2-out-of-2 multi-signature addresses</a> and</li><li>the <a href="https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/NLockTime">nLockTime</a> property.</li></ol><p>Combining those features enables us to act as a trustless intermediary between buyers and sellers of digital goods. More specifically, we employ three distinct transaction types to offer our service in a trustless manner:</p><p><strong>Commitment Transaction<br></strong>The commitment transaction specifies the maximum amount of bitcoins a buyer is going to spend in a single “session” (also called a “channel”). The commitment transaction sends the specified amount from the buyer’s wallet to a 2-out-of-2 multi-signature address, based on the buyer’s and seller’s public key. The effect of which is, that only together buyer and seller can move any of the committed funds (in the world of legacy banking, this is called a joint account with the option ‘both or all to sign’). The maximum duration of a session is specified by the nLockTime property attached to the refund transaction (see below).</p><p><strong>Payment Transaction<br></strong>The payment transaction is constantly re-negotiated between the parties, thereby incrementally transferring some of the committed bitcoins from the multi-signature address to the seller. Over the course of a session, the amount transferred from buyer to seller can increase in arbitrarily small steps, thereby enabling what we call <strong>nano-payments</strong> of as little as 1 satoshi (~0.000004 USD at the time of writing). Since only the very last payment transaction of a complete payment session is ever published to the Bitcoin blockchain, our service is detached from Bitcoin’s current scalability problems to a major extent.</p><p><strong>Refund Transaction<br></strong>The refund transaction is the buyer’s insurance policy: before the buyer actually commits any funds to the multi-signature address, the seller signs a transactions that transfers all of the yet-to-be-committed funds back to the buyer. Should the seller disappear after commitment, the buyer can get his money back, provided that the refund transaction’s lock-time has expired.</p><h4>Machine-to-Machine Payments</h4><p>Admittedly, it would be a bit much to require the end-users of our service to understand all the technical nitty-gritty. Quite the contrary, one of our main goals was to design a completely frictionless experience for the users of our service, thereby increasing our publishers conversion rate.</p><p>So instead of teaching users how to negotiate and perform on Bitcoin-based Smart Contracts, we are teaching their browsers how to do it. Consequently, we’ve built a cutting-edge <strong>machine-to-machine payment platform</strong>. And thanks to Bitcoin, every step of the way can be completely automated, relieving end-users from the requirement to understand what’s happening at the technical layer.</p><p>Thinking of the emerging Internet of Things, this seems like a good idea. Now, if only <a href="https://twitter.com/heckerhut/status/649893759891709952">the law</a> is catching up quickly enough...</p><h4>Involving humans in negotiation and performance through UX: Or how to reduce mental transaction cost while keeping the user in control</h4><p>Enabling browsers to become autonomous agents that negotiate and perform on contracts for their users, naturally raises the question of how much control should rest with the user and how much should actually be automated. To complicate matters further, micro-payments are plagued by what Szabo calls <a href="http://szabo.best.vwh.net/micropayments.html">“mental transaction cost”</a>, i.e. the cognitive overhead for users to constantly evaluate if they want a certain transaction to be performed or not.</p><p>At SatoshiPay, we’ve realized early on that this is a serious problem that needs solving. So that’s what we did. Our solution consists of multiple steps:</p><ol><li>No sign-up or login for end-users to start paying with our service.</li><li>Users don’t have to understand our tech. Instead, we teach their browsers.</li><li>Users determine initially the maximum amount of money they are willing to spend in an individual session.</li><li>By enabling individual payments as low as 1 satoshi (~0.000004 USD) we encourage our publishers to sell content for really tiny amounts, so that users do not have to regret a singular purchase-decision.</li><li>A payment is performed by a single click or tap, nothing more.</li><li>Instant feedback: a one-click purchase leads to the immediate delivery of the desired product. Moreover, we provide a visual overview of our users funds in form of an abstract progress-bar. No complicated text or numbers to parse.</li><li>Auto-pay: users can enable “auto-pay mode”, thereby letting their browser take full control if they wish.</li></ol><h4>Challenges we faced when building SatoshiPay</h4><p>When we started building SatoshiPay, there was no working implementation of Bitcoin micro-payment channels available for web browsers. Only Mike Hearn’s BitcoinJ implementation contained some mention of it, though Java obviously didn’t cut it. So we went ahead and built our own implementation of the micro-payment channel protocol in Javascript. It was great fun and <a href="https://blog.coinbase.com/2015/07/02/coinbase-announces-winners-of-bithack-v2/">we won some laurels along the way</a>.</p><p>Another major headache was the lack of reliable Blockchain infrastructure. Virtually every external Blockchain API we tried failed at some point, leaving us with no choice but to build it ourselves. Now we’re running a redundant number of bitcoind nodes, which ensures reliable read/write access to the Blockchain.</p><h4>Intrigued?</h4><p>Test our service now at <a href="https://satoshipay.io/">satoshipay.io</a> or <a href="https://dashboard.satoshipay.io/sign-up">signup</a> to our publisher platform to monetize your own content within minutes.</p><p>Footnotes</p><p>[1] In late 2013, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethereum">Ethereum</a> happened. In an attempt to honor the visionary work of Szabo, Ethereum’s original inventor <a href="https://twitter.com/VitalikButerin">Vitalik Buterin</a> named the programs running on Ethereum’s distributed virtual machine <em>Smart Contracts, </em>despite them having nothing much to do with the original vision of Szabo. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Y3fWXA6d5k&amp;feature=youtu.be&amp;list=PLJqWcTqh_zKHQUFX4IaVjWjfT2tbS4NVk&amp;t=639">In a friendly move</a>, Szabo now embraces both definitions of smart contracts, the original one being a direct analog to traditional, paper-based legal contracts and the “new one” describing long-lived processes running on a trustless, distributed virtual machine. <strong>In this essay I stick to Szabo’s original definition of Smart Contracts.</strong></p><p>[2] Our backend is comprised of a multitude of micro-services written in NodeJS, deployed as Docker containers, orchestrated by <a href="http://tutum.co/">Tutum</a>. Our paywall widget uses websockets to talk to our backend.</p><p>[3] Trust, of course, is not “0 or 1” but a spectrum. More specifically, SatoshiPay still is a trusted code-delivery platform.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=777988a868d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Quiet Death of Ripple’s Codiu§ Project]]></title>
            <link>https://heckerhut.medium.com/the-quiet-death-of-ripple-s-codiu-project-782c11a17c02?source=rss-926c6a0ae253------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/782c11a17c02</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Florian Glatz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 13 Jun 2015 22:50:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-06-17T16:51:44.025Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Why decentralized infrastructure has still a long way to go</h3><p><a href="https://www.ripplelabs.com/">Ripple Labs Inc</a>, steward of the <a href="http://ripple.com/">Ripple Protocol</a> and manager of the second largest cryptocurrency by market capitalization after Bitcoin, has quietly shelved the open source project Codius, which it had founded <a href="http://github.com/codius/codius">about a year ago</a> and actively maintained ever since. Although the code was eventually versioned to a symbolic “1.0”, the project never gained much more than the curious attention of some hardcore enthusiasts.</p><p>Now, <a href="https://twitter.com/justmoon">Stefan Thomas</a>, CTO of Ripple Labs, has outlined the future of Codius in a <a href="https://codius.org/blog/codius-one-year-later/">recent blog</a> post:</p><blockquote>[…] we’ve realized that Codius is an optimization and — right now, with a small and nascent decentralization market — a premature one. <strong>We have no plans to work on a Codius 2.0</strong>, instead we are building our own decentralized applications “manually” as described above.</blockquote><p>Of course, the code behind the Codius project is up for the taking to anyone able to type <em>git clone. </em>But the project didn’t hit EOL prematurely because of a lack of developer resources — quite the contrary. Rather, the feedback of the community was simply not strong enough to justify the expenditure.</p><p>Ripple Lab’s decision is interesting for many reasons. Most importantly though, should this event be a warning to all those currently investing their time and money into building a global and decentralized infrastructure?</p><h4><strong>The idea behind Codiu§</strong></h4><p>Codius is an answer to the following question:</p><blockquote>How to execute software in an untrusted environment and still be able to trust whatever the software has computed?</blockquote><p>There are different ways to answer that question and each one comes with a specific set of systemic compromises. Codius was interesting in that it delivered a complementary set of such advantages and disadvantages vis-a-vis the popular Blockchain infrastructure that solves the problem of trusted code execution for networks such as Bitcoin, Ethereum and many more.</p><p><strong>Same Same But Different<br></strong>Codius too leverages <em>the principle of distributed consensus</em> to achieve the desired trust property of its system. However, whereas Bitcoin &amp; Co build a completely separate communication infrastructure on top of the TCP/IP stack, thereby slowing the network’s computational power down by <a href="#">a factor of ~10000</a>, Codius leverages existing commodity webhosting infrastructure to run arbitrary code at normal speeds and at much cheaper cost than a “Virtual Blockchain Computer” could ever dream to accomplish.</p><p>The difference lies in the size of the consensus pools when comparing Codius’ and e.g. Bitcoin’s consensus scheme. In the Codius world, there is no ‘global’ consensus pool as there is in Bitcoin, for the simple reason that a Codius pool does not drive a global payment network. A Codius consensus pool is better compared to &gt;&gt;YOU&lt;&lt; doing some google searches for the purpose of finding the cheapest vendor of a certain tech gadget you plan to purchase. Once you’ve found enough websites referring e.g. to Amazon as the cheapest supplier of the desired product, you’ll eventually settle on making your order in their store.</p><p><em>Congratulations.<br>You have reached an inner consensus.</em></p><p>The number of google searches you would perform until you’ve decided <em>where</em> to purchase can be roughly compared to the number of Codius instances you would spawn into a specific consensus pool, whose quorum decision you would entrust to perform certain sensitive operations in your name, such as ordering a product on amazon, or paying recurring subscription fees to various services.[1]</p><h4>Codius in a Blockchain Ecosystem: Local vs. Global</h4><p>In order to understand the purpose that Codius was intended to serve in the wider Blockchain ecosystem, one has to understand the systemic limitations of the latter. For all the security that Blockchains are able to generate through their crypto-economic governance and incentive scheme, they suffer from inherent slowness when it comes to <em>general-purpose</em> computation[2], as well as from an inherent blindness when it comes to incorporating rich information about the outside world.</p><p>This is where Codius’ complementary infrastructure decisions unfold their beneficial value to Blockchain-driven networks. Whereas Blockchains are good at delivering <strong>global consensus</strong> among thousands to millions of nodes, Codius’ solution is intended to deliver <strong>local consensus </strong>relevant only to specific individuals.[3]</p><p>The affordances of <strong>local consensus</strong> schemes lie mainly in two areas:</p><p><em>Computational Complexity and Data Richness.</em></p><p>Since instances of the Codius execution environment are hosted on cheaply available infrastructure they can perform resource-intensive general-purpose computation at a fraction of the cost than a “Blockchain Computer” ever could. Same goes for incorporation of outside information, since unlike a Blockchain, a Codius instance has unfiltered access to the whole internet.</p><p>From a Platform vs. Services perspective, the relationship between Blockchains and Codius looks like this:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/501/1*k-u8b0QF3Ty2QmpkMwQdNw.png" /><figcaption>The Blockchain Platform Model as envisioned by Codius</figcaption></figure><p><em>If you want to better understand the lower half of the graphic, I advise you to </em><a href="https://medium.com/@heckerhut/smart-contracts-platforms-and-intermediaries-c3d30f5182a6"><em>read this</em></a><em>. This post focuses on the upper half, i.e. the Codius service layer.</em></p><p>From a Blockchain-centric viewpoint, Codius constitutes, what is commonly referred as an “Oracle”, i.e. an information gateway between a Blockchain and the outside world. Because the information feed provided by a given Codius oracle has been independently validated by a number of distributed instances, it serves to complement a Blockchain’s inherent trust model.</p><h4>Why Codius’ Trust Model failed</h4><p>It is mostly unfair to claim that Codius’ trust model <em>really </em>failed — rather: it has <em>actually</em> never been put to the test. The reason for this is what I initially hinted to as the “community feedback”, which was in some sense lacking.</p><p>An implicit yet fundamental requirement of Codius’ trust-enabling infrastructure is the existence of a functioning ecosystem of competing hosting-providers that offer the execution of Codius-style containers/vm images. Only if such a market with a functioning competitive landscape is available, does the trust property of Codius’ infrastructure emerge.[4]</p><p>Codius’ notion of validating outside information works by assuming that although not any singular Codius instance may be trusted, a certain majority quorum of <em>independent instances</em> may indeed be considered trustworthy. As it turns out, the requirement of <em>independence</em> equates to the existence of a complex market-based ecosystem for Codius-style infrastructure provision. An ecosystem that didn’t evolve despite Ripple Labs’s best efforts in terms of generating publicity for the project.</p><h4>What this means for the Decentralization Landscape</h4><p>In terms of interpreting Codius’ early exit from the landscape of decentralized service providers, two things come to mind.</p><p>Firstly, the difference between centralized and decentralized service provision is not valued by a significant share of consumers and businesses in and outside the wider Blockchain ecosystem. Just look at the existing market of <em>centralized</em> service providers for Blockchain-based networks, which is already struggling to find an audience for its products. Conceptually, a centralized service is still much easier to grasp than a decentralized one. Codius never even left the world of command line interfaces.</p><p>Secondly, the difference between Codius-like oracles and classic centralized services providers is not just an “optimization problem” as Stefan Thomas likes to put it. It is connected the fundamental question of how much power we want to give to users and how much control should reside with the tech firms that increasingly regulate our daily lives.</p><p>Footnotes</p><p>[1] Personal Autonomous Agents anyone?</p><p>[2] As opposed to the much more limited domain of <em>fiduciary code</em>, to which Blockchains are essentially limited to. There is currently no other, equally significant <em>type of code</em> in sight, which would justify the investment of similar economic resources as is done e.g. in the case of Bitcoin’s Blockchain, which runs the currency’s internal <em>fiduciary code</em>).</p><p>[3] Vitalik Buterin talks about three kinds of facts: (1) mathematical, (2) global and (3) local. Blockchains excell at (1) but are completely helpless regarding (2) and (3).</p><p>[4] To the extent, the decision any miner or mining pool in the Bitcoin network implicitely or explicitely makes, namely whether to use its resources to <em>serve </em>or to <em>attack</em> the network, is an economic one, the same goes for hosters of codius instances. Therefore, only if the business of running such instances in an ‘honest fashion’ is economically more desirable than starting to tamper with the computational processees of individual instances (because the hoster <em>somehow</em> profits from a specific outcome), is the <em>emergence</em> of trust feasable.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=782c11a17c02" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Smart Contracts, Platforms and Intermediaries]]></title>
            <link>https://heckerhut.medium.com/smart-contracts-platforms-and-intermediaries-c3d30f5182a6?source=rss-926c6a0ae253------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c3d30f5182a6</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Florian Glatz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 18 May 2015 18:36:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-09-09T17:11:41.242Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2>Smart Contracts, Platforms<br>and Intermediaries</h2><h4>Abstract</h4><p>Crypto Economics as a mixed human-machine system that is fueled by economic incentivisation mechanisms displays an interesting approach to an organizational problem, that is currently solved through a monolithic platform approach. The new model carries its own governance problems, when it comes to establishing a clear separation of concerns between the meaning and the processing of data. Economic incentives as a base line coordination mechanism within mixed human machine systems have their limits with regard to outside information. Diverging consensus groups may however be able to fork off and restabilize, if certain conditions are met.</p><h4>Introduction</h4><p>One of the more interesting insights produced by research in Bitcoin and the contemporary <em>Cryptoverse, </em>is concerned with our traditional notion of internet platforms. Whereas much of the discussion in the blockchain community still focuses on the varying degrees of (de)centralization at the computational layer, the economic and organizational implications are just as interesting.</p><p>Looking at current-day internet platforms through the <a href="https://medium.com/@heckerhut/modes-of-contractual-governance-in-an-on-demand-service-economy-1833629f379b#44c6-5310e0f093b7">lens of contract</a>, especially at platforms concerned with the trading of goods and services in horizontal networks of buyers and sellers, we can differentiate two phases of contracting between those economic actors: the pre and the post contractual phase.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/442/1*CRRgDz78LN-Otvy5rgGg-Q.png" /><figcaption><a href="http://szabo.best.vwh.net/phases.html">Nick Szabo</a>’s temporal model of contracting, derived from standard economic models</figcaption></figure><p><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transaction_cost">Transaction cost economics</a> tells us, that each of those activities entails certain costs. The economic role of a platform is to reduce each of those expenses as far as possible. Today, platforms are based on a monolithic approach, that can be described as a <strong>full integration</strong>: in order to enjoy a platform’s network of users willing to engage in trade, one has to buy into the governance of both the pre and the post contractual phase on the platform’s terms. This gives the platform provider, <em>the</em> <em>firm</em>, an arguably unproportional amount of influence over broad ranges of economic activities.</p><p>In effect, the platform model of today proves increasingly incompatible with some fundamental values modern societies hold dear, such as freedom of speech and the right to privacy. In case of platforms focused on economic trade, the very notions of private autonomy and freedom of contract are called into question.</p><p>Since the invention of Bitcoin and the Blockchain, there is a new organizational model of how to reduce transaction costs effectively, while yielding vastly different results with regards to the protection of the fundamental rights affected by the deep diffusion of technology in modern day society.</p><h4>Splitting the atom</h4><p>A fundamental assumption behind <a href="https://medium.com/@heckerhut/whats-a-smart-contract-in-search-of-a-consensus-c268c830a8ad">Szabo’s idea of smart contracts</a>, is a <strong>plurality of intermediaries</strong> for coordination tasks such as search and negotiation or performance and settlement.</p><blockquote>Smart contracts often involve trusted third parties, exemplified by an intermediary, who is involved in the performance, and an adjudicator, who is invoked to resolve disputes arising out of performance (or lack thereof). Intermediaries can operate during search, negotiation, commitment, and/or performance.</blockquote><p>Today, however, nearly twenty years later, the development of the internet as a medium of significant economic trade appears to have turned out differently: instead of a multitude of competing service providers for the different phases of contracting, all contractual phases happen within the confines of one monolithic platform. A platform in the hands of a private firm, governing both through technical means (software and services) and legal means (terms of service).</p><p>In the<strong> Blockchain model</strong>, the notion of mediation services in both the pre and post contractual phase is split off from the idea of a<strong> public settlement layer</strong> on which changes in ownership of assets and other fundamental state variables are recorded. As a result, there are less opportunities for any of the service providers involved in the different phases of contracting to create the typical <em>lock-in effects</em> that we can observe with today’s platforms.</p><p>The blockchain model accomplishes this functional reconstruction of existing techno-economic infrastructure with an impressive feat: it creates a sort of secondary economy around the provision of <em>computational resources</em>. That is, the technical peer-to-peer protocol that coordinates the construction of a <em>blockchain-type computer </em>provides economic incentives for people to provide resources for said infrastructure. Those incentives are in turn disconnected from the semantic meaning of the data those resources are used to process (separation of concerns).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/501/1*wQsQY6IWfO-c5th7vBF-qg.png" /><figcaption>The Blockchain Model</figcaption></figure><p>As shown in the picture, mediation services interact with the Settlement Layer, but they don’t “own it”, i.e. it is not integrated in their infrastructure and therefore accessible to everyone else. In effect, it creates an open environment for competition to blossom.</p><p>There might still be lock in effects in phases such as search because of classical <em>network effects</em>. But the pace of those network effects cannot be forced through technological <em>lock-in effects </em>as its done today. Moreover, switching costs are minimal between providers of mediation services because data portability is mostly a non-issue: the data is kept in publicly accessible blockchain databases. Most interestingly, this data may also include reputation and other forms of <a href="https://medium.com/@heckerhut/modes-of-contractual-governance-in-an-on-demand-service-economy-1833629f379b#1937-862eedbc2093"><em>social capital</em></a><em>.</em></p><h4>Separation of Concerns</h4><p>Let’s have a closer look at what can be said to be <em>the magical effect</em> of blockchains, that got everyone hooked. It is what I refer to in this post as a <strong>separation of concerns.</strong> In Bitcoin it is referred to as <strong>fungibility</strong>. It is the idea, that the semantics of a transaction, i.e. the humanly-associated <strong>meaning of data</strong>, is disconnected from the <strong>processing</strong> of the data. This separation is the making and breaking of a functioning blockchain-based ecosystem.</p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/adam3us">Adam Back</a> talked about this problem in terms of fungibility in his <a href="https://letstalkbitcoin.com/e77-the-adam-back-interview/">LTB episode</a>. <strong>In case of a monetary system, the separation of concerns afforded by a crypto economic incentive regime guarantees that each bitcoin is worth exactly 1 bitcoin, no more and no less.</strong> Or in other words: there is no possible reason why you wouldn’t exchange a specific set of <a href="https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Transaction#general_format_.28inside_a_block.29_of_each_output_of_a_transaction_-_Txout">utxos</a> for another set of utxos if the cumulative output amount were exactly the same.[1]</p><p>That problems can in fact arise is an undisputed wisdom in the Bitcoin community. Andreas Antonopoulos and Adam Back talked about this in terms of the usefulness of zero-knowledge proof systems, which would ensure perfect fungibility on a mathematical level. Back also supports weaker measures such as dark wallets and laundry services before working proof systems with the desired characteristics are in a useably state of development. The discussion shows that a working separation of concerns is the achilles heel of a functioning blockchain ecosystem.</p><p>In case of a general purpose crypto economic computing platform such as <a href="http://ethereum.org/">Ethereum</a>, the situation becomes even more delicate. Besides the fungibility problem with regard to the platform’s base layer currency, complex techno-economic constructs (so-called ‘smart contracts’ or better ‘software agents’[3]) process incoming data in form of transactions and spit out data — in form of transactions. Those transactions have to go through the <strong>crypto economic underbody</strong> displayed in the picture above. Compared to a simple monetary system, there is an even bigger variety of potential reasons why the separation of concerns may break down and the semantics of a transaction may suddenly become relevant to those investing computational resources into the maintenance of the Ethereum Settlement Platform.</p><h4>Grim’s Trigger and Consensus Pooling</h4><p>The separation of concerns between the meaning and the processing of data can also be described as a <a href="https://medium.com/@heckerhut/the-political-economy-of-computing-7fffc75423a2#cb7b-d54e8c17e1e7"><em>causal closure</em></a>, i.e. a boundary across which information does not, or only very controllably, travel. Interestingly, in case of the Blockchain model, the boundary is <strong>not fully technological<em> </em>in nature</strong>, i.e. sealed off through a digital access control mechanism, but is arguably a new form of <a href="http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/5331/4090">heteromation</a>, i.e. a mixed human-machine process.</p><p>In effect, the separation of concerns is constructed through an integration of humans and machines by means of an economic incentive regime. The involvement of humans, however, always comes at a cost, if information access and control is at stake. The boundary that defines the separation of concerns is weak, when information is accessible to humans and gets mixed up with other information, external to the crypto economic closure of the Settlement Platform.[4]</p><p><a href="http://de.slideshare.net/ethereum/vitalik-buterin-cryptoeconomic-protocols-in-the-context-of-wider-society">Vitalik Buterin</a> gives us two ways to look at this problem more closely. One is the game theoretic strategy called <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grim_trigger">Grim’s Trigger</a>, the other the concept of <a href="https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/11/13/scalability-part-3-metacoin-history-multichain/">Multichains</a>.</p><p><strong>Grim’s Trigger</strong><br>In terms of the Blockchain’s crypto economic model, Grim’s Trigger stands for the fundamental incentive of anyone who has some form of ‘buy in’ into the functioning of the crypto economic machine to not undermine its working condition by attacking it in some unaccounted way. The motivation being, that if such an attack succeeded, the overall situation would get worse for everyone, including the attacker and nothing would have been won.</p><p>It is a bold claim and there are certainly scenarios where Grim’s Trigger is not a relevant consideration for potential attackers. Such would be the case, e.g. when a substantial amount of time lies between the rewards of an attack and the upcoming punishment. This may explain the current state of regulation through economic incentive regimes in <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/clima/consultations/docs/0005/registered/9825553393-31_friends_of_the_earth_europe_en.pdf">the field of environmental protection</a>.</p><p>Grim’s Trigger serves us, however, as a measurement tool to examine along which lines the techno-economic closure of a Blockchain system may break.</p><p><strong>Consensus Pools and Strong Subjectivity<br></strong>Where Grim’s Trigger fails as a motivational tool to keep players faithful, an <strong>antifragile defense mechanism</strong> may be built into Blockchain-based systems, thanks to the peer-to-peer nature of the underlying technology stack. The mechanism in question has been talked about in the form of consensus pools and strong subjectivity[5] and may be considered a sort of relief valve for dissenting groups.</p><p>A general purpose crypto economic network may be able to account for <strong>consensus plurality</strong>, i.e. the co-existence of multiple groups with related but competing histories enshrined in their collectively maintained virtual state machines. <a href="http://www.bitcoin.fr/public/divers/docs/sidechains.pdf"><strong>Sidechains</strong></a> are essentially just another variation of the same idea, implemented across different protocols. In the event of a historical fork within an existing consensus group, market exchanges or merge mining may start to replace the preceding consensus-based integration of group members.</p><h4>Summary</h4><p>Crypto Economics as a mixed human-machine system that is fueled by economic incentivisation mechanisms displays an interesting approach to an organizational problem, that is currently solved through a monolithic platform approach. The new model carries its own governance problems, when it comes to establishing a clear separation of concerns between the meaning and the processing of data. Economic incentives as a base line coordination mechanism within mixed human machine systems have their limits with regard to outside information. Diverging consensus groups may however be able to fork off and restabilize, if certain conditions are met.</p><p>Footnotes</p><p>[1] Let’s disregard properties such as transaction age, which influence fee calculation according to standard bitcoind.</p><p>[2] In a very, very relative frame of reference :-)</p><p>[3] Smart contracts are a term coined by Nick Szabo. The Ethereum version of smart contracts is an appropriation of the original term through Vitalik Buterin, who now sort of regrets his naming decision because of a certain set of differences between his and Szabo’s concept.</p><p>[4] The closure of an economic incentive regime breaks down when new and unaccounted for incentives enter the stage.</p><p>[5] As opposed to <a href="https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/11/25/proof-stake-learned-love-weak-subjectivity/">weak subjectivity</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c3d30f5182a6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Political Economy
of Computing]]></title>
            <link>https://heckerhut.medium.com/the-political-economy-of-computing-7fffc75423a2?source=rss-926c6a0ae253------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7fffc75423a2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Florian Glatz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 13 May 2015 12:55:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-09-15T10:18:40.742Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Taking technological change seriously in the social sciences.</h3><p><em>F.G.</em></p><p>This article makes no specific claim about what the <em>social sciences</em> are and which disciplines do or do not fall under its name. The perspective I take is situated at the <em>“intersection between information theory, cryptography, sociology, epistemology, politics and economics”[1].</em></p><p>What research has been conducted so far at this complex intersection of multi-layered systems that can tell us how to understand technology and technological change and how it relates to us as individuals and as a society?</p><h4>The Political Economy Of Computing</h4><p>One scholar whose exceptional work deserves highlighting is <a href="http://www.lse.ac.uk/researchandexpertise/experts/profile.aspx?KeyValue=j.kallinikos%40lse.ac.uk">Janis Kallinikos</a>. He calls his research perspective <a href="http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/5331/4090">the political economy of computing</a><em>, </em>which</p><blockquote><em>“takes into account the broader socioeconomic drivers of change in the relationship between humans and machines. Rather than focusing on the characteristics of the technology, on individual dealings with machines, or on organizational implications of technology, </em><strong><em>this perspective views technological change within the purview of sociohistorical developments, socioeconomic systems, legal and regulatory frameworks, environmental impacts, governance structures, and large–scale government policies and agendas.</em></strong><em>”</em></blockquote><p>Kallinikos’ concerns stretch mainly into two of the called upon topoi: that of <em>sociohistorical developments</em>, with a focus on the transformation of labor and the entailing social changes, and that of <em>governance structures in socioeconomic systems</em>.</p><h4>Regulation Through Technology</h4><p>In <a href="http://personal.lse.ac.uk/kallinik/NEW/Kallinikos_and_Hasselbladh.pdf">a paper</a> contributing to his study of organizational theory and governance structures, Kallinikos defines regulation through technology as a <em>“combination of strategies and principles deploying </em><strong><em>material objectification</em></strong><em>, </em><strong><em>functional simplification</em></strong><em>, </em><strong><em>closure</em></strong><em> and </em><strong><em>automation</em></strong><em>”</em>.</p><p><strong><em>1. Functional Simplification<br></em></strong>Regulation through technological means starts with the act of <strong>functional simplification</strong>, that is the re-engineering of human-centric processes that were formerly based on <em>formal role systems</em> in a way that allows for the introduction of technology as a mediation and control structure between the different parts of the re-engineered process which are left to human discretion. The guiding objective of technology-driven functional simplification is the placement of <strong>technological artifacts and control structures</strong> at the center of a process, where the former key players are pushed outwards into functionally discrete roles, that permit no technical room nor economic incentive for defection[2].</p><p>Another way to look at functional simplification is handed to us by <a href="https://books.google.de/books?id=l21zCBp-cbYC&amp;lpg=PP1&amp;dq=luhmann%20risk%20sociology&amp;hl=de&amp;pg=PA83#v=onepage&amp;q=luhmann%20risk%20sociology&amp;f=false">Luhmann</a>, who describes technology as a</p><blockquote><em>“ […] </em><strong><em>functioning simplification in the medium of causality</em></strong><em>. We could also say that within the simplified area strict (functioning under normal circumstances, recurrent) </em><strong><em>couplings</em></strong><em> are established. This is, however, possible only if interference by external factors is to a large extent excluded. Technology can therefore also be understood as the extensive </em><strong><em>causal closure</em></strong><em> of an operational area”.</em></blockquote><p>Whereas Kallinikos talks about “function<em>al</em> simplification”, Luhman talks about “function<em>ing</em> simplification”. Despite the slight difference which is owed to reasons irrelevant for the analysis at hand, both talk about <strong>technology as re-engineering and simplifying pre-existing processes.</strong> From the perspective of a process designer, the challenge of re-engineering is one of approximation and compromise, at least when aiming to recreate every aspect of the status quo antes[3].</p><p><strong><em>2. Material Objectification<br></em></strong>The technological artifacts and control structures around which processes become redesigned are what Kallinikos referres to as <strong>material objectification</strong>. According to him</p><blockquote><em>“Material objectification takes predominantly the form of elaborate technical codification (such as software code and relations between data tokens)”.</em></blockquote><p>The <em>complexity</em> of the software involved, must not be mistaken for a contradiction with the <em>simplification</em> described before. To the contrary, the complexity of software is hidden behind a <em>causal closure,</em> i.e. a boundary with a purposefully crafted interface towards the environment it has been placed in. Kallinikos calls this <strong>black boxing</strong>.</p><p>One interesting observation that is never explicitly mentioned neither by Luhmann nor by Kallinikos is the <strong>interdependence<em> </em>between material objectification and functional simplification</strong>. This is because networked communication systems as a base layer technology and rich software environments on top of it carry their own <em>affordances and constraints</em>. Those in turn are <em>imprinted</em> on the functionally redesigned and simplified processes that are built around technological artifacts and systems. It may be objected that this is a rather obvious statement to make — however I conjecture that it is a vital insight for future regulators[4].</p><p><strong>3. Closure<br></strong>As I discussed in terms of functional<em> </em>simplification, both Luhmann and Kallinikos regard technological artifacts as closed systems, impenetrable to external causes and effects.<strong> Closure denominates the boundary at which a technological system and the environment its embedded in meet and interface with each other</strong>.</p><p>Black boxing is another word for this phenomenon, though with a decidedly more political connotation. Recently, <a href="https://www.law.umaryland.edu/faculty/profiles/faculty.html?facultynum=984">Frank Pasquale</a> used the term in his book ‘<a href="http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674368279">The Black Box Society</a>’ as a model to describe, more broadly, a veil of secrecy around the inner workings of the most successful firms and economic sectors in general, such as finance, search and other. At least part of that secrecy is, according to Pasquale, owed to <em>“The Secret Judgments of Software”. </em>More specifically he says that <em>“authority is increasingly expressed algorithmically”</em>.[5]</p><p><strong>4. Automation<br></strong>Automation refers to <em>“technological operations [</em>which<em>] unfold in self- firing, chained sequences” (</em>Kallinikos). Automation is necessary both for engineering a causal closure that removes any external (human) influence from within its boundary as well as the orchestration of cross-systems communications that is typical for a networked environment.</p><p>Kallinikos contrasts automation with the workings of prior, human-centric systems:</p><blockquote>“<strong><em>Formal roles systems</em></strong><em> are generally mapped onto </em><strong><em>the task segmentation</em></strong><em> and standardization upon which they bear […], but the two systems </em><strong><em>remain separate</em></strong><em>. By contrast, </em><strong><em>technological objectification</em></strong><em> is both exclusive and expansive. It tends to translate or </em><strong><em>replace altogether formal role systems with technological sequences</em></strong><em>. This may and often does imply the regulation of technology through higher order technologies, in a cascade or even </em><strong><em>hierarchy of technological systems.”</em></strong></blockquote><h4><strong>From Prescription to Possibility</strong></h4><p>Talking about governance structures, law and technology both become first-class citizens. Looking at <a href="https://medium.com/@heckerhut/modes-of-contractual-governance-in-an-on-demand-service-economy-1833629f379b">current trends</a>, however, it seems that technological governance is overtaking the legal domain. <a href="http://www.vermontlaw.edu/directory/person?name=Goodenough,Oliver">Oliver Goodenough</a>, a contemporary advocate of <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2538224">software-driven legal innovation</a>, put it in those terms at <a href="https://conferences.law.stanford.edu/futurelaw2015/materials/">Stanford’s Future Law Conference</a>:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/592/1*QwG_UIcsXPqFTNtv-h-_Zg.png" /></figure><p>Quite drastic, to say the least! But what exactly is this <em>“something else” </em>that is going to replace the “<em>rule of law</em>”?</p><p><a href="https://www.kcl.ac.uk/law/people/academic/rbrownsword.aspx">Roger Brownsword</a> at King’s College London put it as a transition from <strong>prescription as a mechanism of governance to one of possibilities</strong><em>:</em></p><blockquote><em>“the law does not have to bear all, or even any, of the regulatory burden. […]<br>where code is used, the regulatory signal can change to one of possibility”</em></blockquote><p>Kallinikos comes to the same conclusion:</p><blockquote><em>“Software technology is fairly complex in technical terms but relies on the significant streamlining and simplification (occasionally referred to as reengineering) of the tasks and operations that constitute its target domain.<br></em><strong><em>In this respect, functional or procedural simplification must be understood as an instance of a selection, accomplished out of much a broader set of possibilities.</em></strong><em>”</em></blockquote><p>Tying it all together then, we arrive at <strong>a comprehensive theory</strong>:</p><ol><li>Technology exists as a bounded structure in the <strong>medium of causality</strong> (Luhmann).</li><li>The medium of causality is a <strong>set of possibilities</strong> (Kallinikos)</li><li>The design of a technology-enabled process involving human actors is the <strong>selection of a subset</strong> from the set of all possibilities (Kallinikos)</li><li>The dominant mode of “regulation” changes from <em>normative prescription </em>to the technique of pre-selecting a (narrow) set of <em>possibilities </em>from the range of all possible “moves” an actor could make (Brownsword).</li></ol><h4>From Market Behavior to Market Access</h4><p>At this point, we are left with a multitude of possible directions in which we could conduct further research. One such direction would be to ask what the <em>functional role </em>of law becomes, when its responsibility in the regulation of behavior is increasingly waning.</p><p>An interesting perspective on this question comes from <a href="http://www.eui.eu/DepartmentsAndCentres/Law/People/Professors/Micklitz.aspx">Hans Micklitz</a>, Law Professor at the European University Institute, who conducts research with regards to <a href="http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/22415/LAW_2012_15_ERPL_02.pdf?sequence=1">the transformation of private law</a> in Europe. According to him, the functional role of law becomes one of <strong>controlling market access</strong>. He calls this governance technique <em>Intrusion and Substitution.</em> Although Micklitz establishes his theory before the backdrop of EU private legal order vs. national legal orders of European member states, the parallel development of regulation through technology and the emergence of a European private legal order that encapsulates rules focused on controlling market access in sectors such as <strong>telecommunications, financial services, health and safety regulation, </strong>seems to be more than mere coincidence.</p><p>How can we find the links necessary to prove or disprove a definitive connection between the development of the European private legal order to one of market access rules and the emergence of technology as a preferred mechanism in governing market behavior?</p><p>An interesting parallel can be drawn to the <strong>copyright wars</strong>. Much during the millennium’s first decade, copyright law and its actual practice were representative of the clash between modern information technology and established <strong>principles of nature themselves. </strong>Today, the war is mostly over. The one critical characteristic of digital information, which caused havok ten years ago, was transformed into the <strong>zero marginal cost</strong> business model, which is by now <a href="https://stratechery.com/2014/business-models-2014/">common widsom</a>. But what enabled business to adapt to the changed conditions with regards to copyrighted material in the digital information age?</p><p><strong>The consumption of digital media happens in an electronic environment: an environment that is amenable to rule-based, hierarchical governance structures expressed through the means afforded by software and rich, networked execution environments.</strong></p><p>So what has become of <em>the law</em> in the copyright discourse? Looking at Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Union ‘on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society’ from a technology-focused lens, Article 6 appears paradigmatic:</p><blockquote><em>“Member States shall provide adequate legal protection against the circumvention of any effective technological measures, which the person concerned carries out in the knowledge, or with reasonable grounds to know, that he or she is pursuing that objective.”</em></blockquote><p>Here, the role of law becomes one of a fall-back mechanism and basic protection, whereas the governance through the technology itself is left to the software maintainer.</p><p>To summarize: modern information technology first wreaked havoc in copyright, then transformed the industry into one where the zero marginal cost of reproduction was successfully exploited economically, by regulating the behavior of their contractual counter parties not through <em>prescription</em> but through <em>possibilities</em>. The role of statutory law became one of structural, base-level control.[6]</p><h4>Multi-Stakeholder approach to Behavioral Regulation</h4><p>So who sets the gears when it comes to this new mode of regulation through technology? For me, there are three main strands of thought to answer that question:</p><ol><li>All hail to our new platform overlords<br>This view is very popular among young people, who <em>grew up </em>in the age of platforms such as Google, Facebook, Apple, Amazon and others. It is based on the belief that regulation in the digital realm has long since shifted completely to a few private digital monopolies. Michael Seemann writes greatly about this in <a href="http://networkcultures.org/blog/publication/no-09-digital-tailspin-ten-rules-for-the-internet-after-snowden-michael-seemann/">his book</a>.</li><li>The Multi-Stakeholder approach to Internet Governance<br>This view originates partially from academia and in other parts from a set of regular conferences that take places on an international level, e.g. the <a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/">Internet Governance Forum</a> and many others. The proponents of the multi-stakeholder approach argue, that the classical mode of governance, i.e. through national state regulation in the form of laws and administrative orders is passé when it comes to the internet. For them, <em>Internet Governance</em> is mainly concerned with critical infrastructure such as the Domain Name System. Although they do take the role of technology seriously, <em>by definition, </em>they disregard the software-based regulation that happens on top of the infrastructure they are concerned with. I argue that the upper layers are more important when it comes <em>“to channel the conduct of their regulatees” </em>(Brownsword)<em>.</em></li><li>The State as a Platform Provider<br>Others believe that the state, in order to remain the dominating regulator despite the transition to technology-driven systems, needs to develop <em>regulatory means and reach </em>in the digital sphere itself. In essence, <a href="http://chimera.labs.oreilly.com/books/1234000000774/ch02.html">the state has to become a platform provider itself</a> and enforce its regulation through code.</li><li>( Everybody else )<br>The (inofficial) fourth and most regrettable train of thought lives in complete ignorance of the observations made in this post and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ZaaSC7Eg4s">occupies mostly important political functions in any given institution.</a></li></ol><p>All stated approaches are interesting and pose exciting research challenges on their own.</p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/heckerhut">Follow me on twitter</a></p><p>Footnotes</p><p>[1] Aptly put by <a href="https://about.me/vitalik_buterin">Vitalik Buterin</a>.</p><p>[2] In a game theoretical understanding of the word. Here<em>: </em>deviating from the intended behavior from the perspective of the system’s designer.</p><p>[3] CodeX Fellow <a href="http://codex.stanford.edu/people/">Harry Surden</a> of <a href="http://lawweb.colorado.edu/profiles/profile.jsp?id=316">Colorado Law School</a> tries to capture (and overcome) the problems in re-engineering a human-centric process through computation and software in his essay the <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1800174">Variable Determinacy Hypothesis</a>, in which he argues that <em>“legal outcomes in certain contexts are determinate enough to be amenable to resolution by computers”.</em></p><p>[4] This is where Szabo’s notion of smart contracts fits in. Whether intentionally or not, Szabo based his idea of <a href="http://szabo.best.vwh.net/formalize.html">how to secure private relationships on public networks</a> on a notion of <strong>public computational base-layer-services </strong><a href="https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/04/13/visions-part-1-the-value-of-blockchain-technology/">that have only recently started to be developed</a>.</p><p>[5] We have to forgive Pasquale for falling into the trap of using the term “algorithm” in a rather unreflected way. In actuality, algorithms, in a technical sense, are just one aspect of complex software systems, which, because of the <em>causal closure, </em>are not sensibly amenable to dissection into functionally discrete parts.</p><p>[6] Interestingly, the last time the national German legislator tried to regulate market behavior in the copyright sphere, by passing a law that forced crawlers such as Google to pay for linking to content of news publishers, Google simply excluded those affected publishers from its search results. <a href="http://www.zeit.de/digital/internet/2014-11/springer-verlag-google">Even before those changes to Google’s search results went live, the publishers revoked their claim for compensation</a>. This is quite an interesting demonstration of how far we have come in terms of technological governance vs. the factual and functional role of law.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7fffc75423a2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>