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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Abdulrahman Heza on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[CyberDefender SOC T2–DumpMe Lab Walkthrough]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@hezaabdo344/cyberdefender-soc-t2-dumpme-lab-walkthrough-09c19ead9d78?source=rss-a6fe0b89b89c------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[memory-forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyberdefenders-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyberdefender-soc-t2]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdulrahman Heza]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 21:19:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-19T21:39:05.648Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>In this write-up, we’ll explore the DumpMe Lab, categorized under Endpoint Forensics</h3><p>If you find this write-up intriguing, don’t forget to check out my other articles on <a href="https://medium.com/@hezaabdo344"><strong><em>my-profile</em></strong></a> . And remember to follow me for more exciting investigations!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4SRHXV2EShqRsC0dIZ_J0Q.webp" /></figure><h3>Category:</h3><p><strong>Endpoint Forensics</strong></p><h3>Tactics:</h3><p>Execution, stealth, Command and Control</p><h3>Recommended Tools:</h3><p>Volatility V2 , sh1sum</p><p><strong>Difficulty:</strong> Mediuem</p><p><strong>link: </strong><a href="https://cyberdefenders.org/blueteam-ctf-challenges/dumpme/">https://cyberdefenders.org/blueteam-ctf-challenges/dumpme/</a></p><blockquote><strong>Scenario:<br>A SOC analyst took a memory dump from a machine infected with a meterpreter malware. As a Digital Forensicators, your job is to analyze the dump, extract the available indicators of compromise (IOCs) and answer the provided questions.</strong></blockquote><p>hello <strong>defenders</strong>, hope you’re all doing well ! Today’s lab need a bit of focus, so let’s start, Bism Allah</p><blockquote><strong>Q1:What is the SHA1 hash of Triage-Memory.mem (memory dump)?</strong></blockquote><p>To ensure the integrity of the memory dump before starting the forensic analysis, we calculate its cryptographic SHA-1 hash using the sha1sum utility in Linux:</p><pre>sha1sum /65-DumpMe/temp_extract_dir/Triage-Memory.mem</pre><p><strong><em>Answer: C95E8CC8C946F95A109EA8E47A6800DE10A27ABD</em></strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q2:<br>What volatility profile is the most appropriate for this machine? (ex: Win10x86_14393)</strong></blockquote><p>before running any analysis plugins in Volatility 2, we need to identify the exact operating system version and architecture of the memory dump. We use the imageinfo plugin to scan the image and suggest the appropriate kernel profile:</p><pre>python2.7 vol.py -f /65-DumpMe/temp_extract_dir/Triage-Memory.mem imageinfo</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Qyeqf8J8xQsXw5I4pInA0A.png" /></figure><p>From the Suggested Profile(s) output, we will take the first suggestion, <strong>Win7SP1x64</strong>, as it is the most accurate profile for this memory image</p><p><strong><em>Answser: Win7SP1x64</em></strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q3:<br>What was the process ID of notepad.exe?</strong></blockquote><p>To list the active processes running at the time of the memory capture and locate notepad.exe, we use the pslist plugin and pipe the output to grep to filter specifically for the target process</p><pre>python2.7 vol.py -f /65-DumpMe/temp_extract_dir/Triage-Memory.mem --profile=Win7SP1x64 pslist | grep &quot;notepad&quot;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qrtnzqwyf_K8wDkSJvhygA.png" /></figure><p>From the PID column in the output, we can see the exact Process ID assigned to notepad.exe</p><p><strong><em>Answer: 3032</em></strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q4:<br>Name the child process of wscript.exe.</strong></blockquote><p>To identify the parent-child relationship and trace what wscript.exe executed, we run the pstree plugin and filter for wscript.exe to find its Process ID (PID):</p><pre>python2.7 vol.py -f /65-DumpMe/temp_extract_dir/Triage-Memory.mem --profile=Win7SP1x64 pstree | grep &quot;wscript.exe&quot;</pre><p>From the output, wscript.exe is running with PID <strong>5116</strong>. Next, we filter the pstree output using PID 5116 to locate any child processes spawned under it:</p><pre>python2.7 vol.py -f /65-DumpMe/temp_extract_dir/Triage-Memory.mem --profile=Win7SP1x64 pstree | grep &quot;5116&quot;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UqUI9ET_omKf12XUF5e94w.png" /></figure><p><strong><em>Answer: UWkpjFjDzM.exe</em></strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q5:<br>What was the IP address of the machine at the time the RAM dump was created?</strong></blockquote><p>To inspect active network connections, listening sockets, and determine the local IP address assigned to the compromised host, we run the netscan plugin:</p><pre>python2.7 vol.py -f /65-DumpMe/temp_extract_dir/Triage-Memory.mem --profile=Win7SP1x64 netscan</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*F9YhSkJ2e27DPSd3MVTWpw.png" /></figure><p>Examining the Local Address column across active connections (such as established TCP sessions), we identify the machine&#39;s <strong>private IPv4 address.</strong></p><p><strong><em>Answer: 10.0.0.101</em></strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q6:<br>Based on the answer regarding the infected PID, can you determine the IP of the attacker?</strong></blockquote><p>From our previous process tree investigation, we identified the malicious child process UWkpjFjDzM.exe running under PID <strong>3496</strong>. To uncover any Command and Control (C2) communication initiated by this process, we use netscan and filter specifically for PID 3496:</p><pre>python2.7 vol.py -f /65-DumpMe/temp_extract_dir/Triage-Memory.mem --profile=Win7SP1x64 netscan | grep &quot;3496&quot;</pre><p>Alternatively, we can filter netscan for active ESTABLISHED connections to pinpoint outbound C2 sessions:</p><pre>python2.7 vol.py -f /65-DumpMe/temp_extract_dir/Triage-Memory.mem --profile=Win7SP1x64 netscan | grep &quot;ESTABLISHED&quot;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*T0mkD4szlUQXSOhc7p-qKQ.png" /></figure><p>The output reveals an active outbound TCP connection from UWkpjFjDzM.exe (PID 3496) to the remote IP <strong>10.0.0.106</strong> over port <strong>4444</strong>. Further confirming this malicious activity is the destination port itself—port 4444 is one of the most well-known default ports used for reverse shells and exploitation frameworks (such as Metasploit/Meterpreter).</p><p><strong><em>Answer: 10.0.0.106</em></strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q7:<br>How many processes are associated with VCRUNTIME140.dll?</strong></blockquote><p>To identify all running processes that have loaded VCRUNTIME140.dll into their memory space, we run the dlllist plugin and pipe the output to grep -i for a case-insensitive search:</p><pre>python2.7 vol.py -f /65-DumpMe/temp_extract_dir/Triage-Memory.mem — profile=Win7SP1x64 dlllist | grep -i &quot;VCRUNTIME140.dll&quot;</pre><p>To get the exact count of matching lines directly from the terminal, we pipe the filtered output into wc -l:</p><pre>python2.7 vol.py -f /65-DumpMe/temp_extract_dir/Triage-Memory.mem — profile=Win7SP1x64 dlllist | grep -i “VCRUNTIME140.dll” | wc -l</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AsdO-4TAAzAl-8LuTgJqIw.png" /></figure><p>The command returns <strong>5</strong>, indicating that five distinct processes have VCRUNTIME140.dll loaded.</p><p><strong><em>Answer: 5</em></strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q8:<br>After dumping the infected process, what is its md5 hash?</strong></blockquote><p>To extract the malicious executable (UWkpjFjDzM.exe, PID 3496) from memory for static analysis and hash verification, we use the procdump plugin and specify the output directory (-D dump)</p><pre>python2.7 vol.py -f /65-DumpMe/temp_extract_dir/Triage-Memory.mem --profile=Win7SP1x64 procdump -p 3496 -D dump</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AWiPCjwJbnScPUJcZ3hcOA.png" /></figure><p>Volatility extracts the binary as executable.3496.exe. Next, we navigate into the dump directory and compute its MD5 hash using md5sum</p><pre>cd dump<br>md5sum executable.3496.exe</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*oNayx0OWUMLaMrVHZCRvjQ.png" /></figure><p><strong><em>Answer: 690ea20bc3bdfb328e23005d9a80c290</em></strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q9:<br>What is the LM hash of Bob’s account?</strong></blockquote><p>To extract local user password hashes (both LM and NTLM) stored in the SAM registry hive from memory, we use the hashdump plugin:</p><pre>python2.7 vol.py -f /65-DumpMe/temp_extract_dir/Triage-Memory.mem --profile=Win7SP1x64 hashdump</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*A4Ivg0rIG317pb2l9mm80w.png" /></figure><p>The output displays user accounts formatted as Username:RID:LM_Hash:NTLM_Hash:::. Locating the entry for the user <strong>Bob</strong>, we extract the first hash field (the LM hash)</p><p><strong><em>Anwser: aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee</em></strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q10:<br>What memory protection constants does the VAD node at 0xfffffa800577ba10 have?</strong></blockquote><p>To inspect the Virtual Address Descriptor (VAD) tree entries and check the memory protection flags assigned to the specific VAD node at address 0xfffffa800577ba10, we run the vadinfo plugin and filter the output using grep:</p><pre>python2.7 vol.py -f /65-DumpMe/temp_extract_dir/Triage-Memory.mem --profile=Win7SP1x64 vadinfo | grep -i -A 5 &quot;0xfffffa800577ba10&quot;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-vEqhVC1Auyjl7RDp1b62g.png" /></figure><p><strong>-A 5</strong>: Displays the <strong>5 lines after the match</strong>, allowing us to see the full VAD details including the Protection field., ensuring we capture the full VAD metadata block (including Tag, Flags, and Protection fields) rather than just the header line containing the address.</p><p>Looking at the Protection field in the output</p><p><strong><em>Answer: PAGE_READONLY</em></strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q11:<br>What memory protection did the VAD starting at 0x00000000033c0000 and ending at 0x00000000033dffff have?</strong></blockquote><p>To check the memory protection flags assigned to the specific Virtual Address Descriptor (VAD) range starting at 0x00000000033c0000 and ending at 0x00000000033dffff, we run the vadinfo plugin and filter for those exact start and end boundaries:</p><pre>python2.7 vol.py -f /65-DumpMe/temp_extract_dir/Triage-Memory.mem --profile=Win7SP1x64 vadinfo | grep -i -A 5 &quot;Start 0x00000000033c0000 End 0x00000000033dffff&quot;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Vzxj8onmHVIhXS2gsPT1fA.png" /></figure><p>inspect the Protection field</p><p><strong><em>Answer: PAGE_NOACCESS</em></strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q12:<br>There was a VBS script that ran on the machine. What is the name of the script? (submit without file extension)</strong></blockquote><p>Since we previously identified wscript.exe (Windows Script Host) running in the process tree, we can inspect the command-line arguments passed to active processes using the cmdline plugin and filter for .vbs files:</p><pre>python2.7 vol.py -f /65-DumpMe/temp_extract_dir/Triage-Memory.mem --profile=Win7SP1x64 cmdline | grep -i &quot;vbs&quot;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3DEMIyyUyO00eprrdzJ_1g.png" /></figure><p>The command-line output for wscript.exe (PID 5116) reveals the full path of the executed VBScript</p><p><strong><em>Answer: vhjReUDEuumrX</em></strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q13:<br>An application was run at 2019–03–07 23:06:58 UTC. What is the name of the program? (Include extension)</strong></blockquote><p>To track historical program execution artifacts stored in the Windows Application Compatibility Cache, we use the shimcache plugin and filter the output for the exact target timestamp 2019-03-07 23:06:58:</p><pre>python2.7 vol.py -f /65-DumpMe/temp_extract_dir/Triage-Memory.mem --profile=Win7SP1x64 shimcache | grep &quot;2019-03-07 23:06:58&quot;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*aaYMtpsYnc7sjVzNMPgj_Q.png" /></figure><p>The matching Shimcache entry reveals the full file path of the executable associated with that timestamp</p><p><strong><em>Anwser: Skype.exe</em></strong></p><p><strong>Q:14<br>What was written in notepad.exe at the time when the memory dump was captured?</strong></p><p>From <strong>Q3</strong>, we found that notepad.exe was running with PID <strong>3032</strong>. Since Notepad stores unsaved text buffers directly inside its process memory space using UTF-16LE (little-endian) encoding, we first dump the addressable memory of PID 3032 using the memdump plugin:</p><pre>python2.7 vol.py -f /65-DumpMe/temp_extract_dir/Triage-Memory.mem --profile=Win7SP1x64 memdump -p 3032 -D dump</pre><p>Next, we extract human-readable 16-bit little-endian Unicode strings (-el) from the dumped memory file (3032.dmp) and filter for the keyword flag:</p><pre>cd dump<br>strings -el dump/3032.dmp | grep -i &quot;flag&quot;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*c3zQA3f02b2BRvA4ebS8xA.png" /></figure><p>The output reveals the exact text that was typed inside the open Notepad window at the time of capture:</p><p><strong><em>Answer: flag&lt;REDBULL_IS_LIFE&gt;</em></strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q15:<br>What is the short name of the file at file record 59045?</strong></blockquote><p>To inspect NTFS Master File Table (MFT) entries cached in memory and retrieve metadata for file record 59045, we run the mftparser plugin and filter the output using grep -C 20 (which displays <strong>20 lines before and 20 lines after</strong> the match to capture the entire $FILE_NAME attribute block):</p><pre>python2.7 vol.py -f /65-DumpMe/temp_extract_dir/Triage-Memory.mem --profile=Win7SP1x64 mftparser | grep -C 20 &quot;59045&quot;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*psiEf1xzDKAvU2MTVWZXLA.png" /></figure><p>Examining the $FILE_NAME table within the matched MFT record (Record Number: 59045), we locate the 8.3 short filename entry (EMPLOY~1.XLS for Employee_Information.xlsx).</p><p><strong><em>Answer: EMPLOY~1.XLS</em></strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q16:<br>This box was exploited and is running meterpreter. What was the infected PID?</strong></blockquote><p>Following the execution chain from wscript.exe (PID 5116), we inspect the process hierarchy using pstree and filter for 5116 to locate the spawned malicious payload:</p><pre>python2.7 vol.py -f /65-DumpMe/temp_extract_dir/Triage-Memory.mem --profile=Win7SP1x64 pstree | grep -i &quot;5116&quot;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cqEXafFvDWAHGdH3Q3CU9Q.png" /></figure><p>The output shows that wscript.exe (5116) spawned a child executable with a randomized name, <strong>UWkpjFjDzM.exe</strong>, running under PID <strong>3496</strong>. This process is the Meterpreter payload communicating back to the attacker&#39;s machine.</p><p><strong><em>Answer: 3496</em></strong></p><p>Thanks for following along through the <strong>DumpMe</strong> investigation! If you enjoyed this breakdown, hit the clap button 👏 and stay tuned for more hands-on SOC and memory forensics labs. 🔍</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=09c19ead9d78" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[CyberDefender SOC T2–BlackEnergy Lab Walkthrough]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@hezaabdo344/cyberdefender-soc-t2-blackenergy-lab-walkthrough-f311515cc0d6?source=rss-a6fe0b89b89c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f311515cc0d6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[memory-forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyberdefender-soc-t2]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyberdefenders-writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdulrahman Heza]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 05:27:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-19T21:39:27.981Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>In this write-up, we’ll explore the BlackEnergy Lab, categorized under <strong>Endpoint Forensics</strong></h3><p>If you find this write-up intriguing, don’t forget to check out my other articles on <a href="https://medium.com/@hezaabdo344"><strong><em>my-profile</em></strong></a> . And remember to follow me for more exciting investigations!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4SRHXV2EShqRsC0dIZ_J0Q.webp" /></figure><h3>Category:</h3><p><strong>Endpoint Forensics</strong></p><h3>Tactics:</h3><p>Privilege escalation, stealth</p><h3>Recommended Tools:</h3><p>Volatility V2</p><p><strong>Difficulty:</strong> Mediuem</p><p>link: <a href="https://cyberdefenders.org/blueteam-ctf-challenges/blackenergy/">https://cyberdefenders.org/blueteam-ctf-challenges/blackenergy/</a></p><blockquote><strong>Scenario:</strong></blockquote><blockquote><strong>A multinational corporation has suffered a cyber attack, resulting in the theft of sensitive data. The attack employed a previously unseen variant of the BlackEnergy v2 malware. The company’s security team has obtained a memory dump from the infected machine and is seeking your expertise as a SOC analyst to analyze the dump in order to understand the scope and impact of the attack.</strong></blockquote><p>hello <strong>defenders</strong>, hope you’re all doing well ! Today’s lab need a bit of focus, so let’s start, Bism Allah</p><h3>Overview of BlackEnergy</h3><p><strong>BlackEnergy</strong> is known to drop a malicious driver with a randomized or unfamiliar name inside the <strong>(drivers)</strong> directory to achieve kernel-level privileges, maintain full system control, and evade detection.</p><blockquote><strong>Q1:<br>Which volatility profile would be best for this machine?</strong></blockquote><p>To determine the correct operating system profile for the memory dump, we run the imageinfo plugin, which analyzes kernel structures and suggests compatible profiles:</p><pre>python2.7 vol.py -f CYBERDEF-567078-20230213-171333.raw imageinfo</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TgZ1VZxiS_XOmhPlrgGj4Q.png" /></figure><p>Although Volatility suggested multiple profiles (WinXPSP2x86 and WinXPSP3x86), <strong>WinXPSP2x86</strong> is listed first as the primary recommendation, matching the exact Service Pack 2 kernel structures found in the dump</p><p><strong>Answer: WinXPSP2x86</strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q2:<br>How many processes were running when the image was acquired?</strong></blockquote><p>To list the processes present in memory, we use the pslist plugin. In the output table, active (running) processes are distinguished by having <strong>no timestamp </strong>in the Exit column, whereas terminated processes display an exit time.</p><p>To quickly count the lines and then subtract the header lines and any terminated processes, we can pipe the output to wc -l:</p><pre>python2.7 vol.py -f CYBERDEF-567078-20230213-171333.raw --profile=WinXPSP2x86 pslist</pre><pre>python2.7 vol.py -f CYBERDEF-567078-20230213-171333.raw --profile=WinXPSP2x86 pslist | wc -l</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-yBSCUHIQnSt7FrNHimVww.png" /></figure><p><strong>Answer: 19</strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q3:<br>What is the process ID of </strong><strong>cmd.exe?</strong></blockquote><p>Looking back at the previous pslist output, we can locate cmd.exe in the process list and check its corresponding PID column.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ajMhtJUn_Csr6AEZ_0Ja-g.png" /></figure><p><strong>Answer: 1960</strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q4:<br>What is the name of the most suspicious process?</strong></blockquote><p>To identify the most suspicious process, we focus on <strong>explorer.exe</strong> (PID 1484), as attackers frequently leverage or execute payloads through the Windows Explorer user session to launch attacks.</p><p><strong>Method 1: Filtering </strong><strong>pslist by </strong><strong>explorer.exe PID (</strong><strong>1484)</strong> We can filter the process list using grep &quot;1484&quot; to inspect all child processes spawned by explorer.exe:</p><pre>python2.7 vol.py -f CYBERDEF-567078-20230213-171333.raw --profile=WinXPSP2x86 pslist | grep &quot;1484&quot;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qrljSwpWNl5GqFxUReDAlw.png" /></figure><p>Inspecting the child processes under explorer.exe immediately reveals a blatantly malicious executable: <strong>rootkit.exe</strong> (PID 964).</p><p>What is Rootkit?<br>Rootkit is a dangerous type of malware designed to hide its presence and the presence of any attacker’s processes or files within the system, often operating with high powers or injecting its code into legitimate system processes (such as svchost.exe) to remain hidden</p><p><strong>Method 2: Using </strong><strong>pstree for an Accurate Process Hierarchy (More Precise)</strong> For a clearer and more structured parent-child hierarchy, we use the pstree plugin filtered by PID 1484:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*D9C_aAHFpdoN0diHnriWqg.png" /></figure><p><strong>Answer: rootkit.exe</strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q5:<br>Which process shows the highest likelihood of code injection?</strong></blockquote><p>To detect hidden or injected code within running processes, we use the malfind plugin, which scans for memory regions marked with suspicious permissions (such as PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE) and inspects their headers for injected Portable Executable (PE) files:</p><pre>python2.7 vol.py -f CYBERDEF-567078-20230213-171333.raw --profile=WinXPSP2x86 malfind</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KoesfcOOfttTtc5HHTKd6g.png" /></figure><p><strong>Analysis &amp; Key Findings:</strong></p><p>Looking through the malfind output, we search for injected executable signatures—specifically the magic bytes <strong>4d 5a</strong> in Hex, which translate to <strong>MZ</strong> in ASCII (the standard DOS header signature for Windows .exe and .dll files).</p><p>We clearly observe an injected PE payload residing inside <strong>svchost.exe</strong> (<strong>PID 880</strong>) at base address <strong>0x980000</strong> with <strong>PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE</strong> protection. This confirms that <strong>svchost.exe</strong> is the target process hosting the injected malicious code.</p><p><strong>Answer: svchost.exe</strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q6:<br>There is an odd file referenced in the recent process. Provide the full path of that file.</strong></blockquote><p>To inspect the open file handles associated with the compromised svchost.exe process (PID 880), we use the handles plugin filtered for File objects—either by piping to grep &quot;File&quot; or natively using Volatility&#39;s -t File flag</p><pre>python2.7 vol.py -f CYBERDEF-567078-20230213-171333.raw --profile=WinXPSP2x86 handles | grep &quot;File&quot;<br><br>or<br><br>python2.7 vol.py -f CYBERDEF-567078-20230213-171333.raw --profile=WinXPSP2x86 handles -t File</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*P_oDPoSbOA_lfsqVVfswIA.png" /></figure><p>While several standard system files and named pipes appear in the output, one entry immediately stands out inside the target directory we highlighted earlier in our <strong>BlackEnergy</strong> overview (WINDOWS\system32\drivers).</p><p>As established, <strong>BlackEnergy</strong> drops a malicious kernel-mode driver with an unfamiliar name inside the drivers directory to achieve kernel-level privileges and evade detection. Here, we clearly spot</p><p>\Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\str.sys</p><p>Translating \Device\HarddiskVolume1\ to the standard Windows drive letter (C:\) gives us the full path of the malicious driver.</p><p><strong>Answer: C:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\str.sys</strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q7:<br>What is the name of the injected DLL file loaded from the recent process?</strong></blockquote><p>In the normal case, any DLL file is downloaded legitimately within any process (Process) in Windows, the operating system records it in 3 internal lists within the <strong>PEB (Process Environment Block) </strong>in order to track its status:</p><ol><li><strong>InLoad (InLoadOrderModuleList)</strong>: Records the order in which the DLL is loaded into memory.</li></ol><p>2.<strong> InInit(InInitializationOrderModuleList)</strong>: Records the initialization order (Initialization) and operation of the file’s DllMain function.</p><p>3. <strong>InMem (InMemoryOrderModuleList)</strong>: Records the order in which the file exists in memory.</p><p>When an attacker performs DLL Injection (malicious injection) or Unlinking, the malicious code is injected directly into memory (VAD) <strong>without being registered in these 3 lists</strong>, or the malware deletes its name from them in order to hide</p><p>To uncover hidden or injected DLLs inside the compromised svchost.exe process (PID 880), we use the ldrmodules plugin filtered for svchost</p><pre>python2.7 vol.py -f CYBERDEF-567078-20230213-171333.raw --profile=WinXPSP2x86 ldrmodules -p 880 | grep &quot;svchost&quot;<br># Alternative: Filtering directly by the injected base address (0x980000)<br>python2.7 vol.py -f CYBERDEF-567078-20230213-171333.raw --profile=WinXPSP2x86 ldrmodules -p 880 | grep &quot;0x00980000</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NRH9N045Sh4s8Sc3WHC-cA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LaWFJqBnzKgz73d175RxeQ.png" /></figure><p>Legitimate DLLs loaded by Windows are registered across three PEB linked lists (InLoad, InInit, and InMem), displaying True for all three columns.</p><p>When a DLL is stealthily injected or unlinked to evade detection, it exists in the process’s memory space (VAD) without being listed in the PEB structures, resulting in False across all three columns</p><p>Inspecting the entry at base address 0x00980000 reveals <strong>False False False</strong> pointing directly to</p><p><strong>Answer: msxml3r.dll</strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q8:<br>What is the base address of the injected DLL?</strong></blockquote><p>We already identified the base address in the previous ldrmodules output right next to msxml3r.dll (0x00980000)</p><p>To double-check and confirm this finding, we can refer back to our malfind output from <strong>Q5</strong> (or run it specifically for PID 880)</p><pre>python2.7 vol.py -f CYBERDEF-567078-20230213-171333.raw --profile=WinXPSP2x86 malfind -p 880</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*t2X3ghB5yJJJDk3aBtFpHg.png" /></figure><p><strong>Anwser: 0x980000</strong></p><p>Thank you for reading! If you found this write-up helpful, feel free to give it a clap 👏 and follow for more cybersecurity lab walkthroughs and threat investigation content❤️‍🩹</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f311515cc0d6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[CyberDefender SOC T1–PsExec Hunt Lab Walkthrough]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@hezaabdo344/cyberdefender-soc-t1-psexec-hunt-lab-walkthrough-387f11eddd3f?source=rss-a6fe0b89b89c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/387f11eddd3f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[incident-response]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyberdefenders-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[network-forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[threat-hunting]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdulrahman Heza]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 07 Nov 2026 20:34:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-07T20:34:31.060Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In this write-up, we’ll explore the <strong>PsExec Hunt Lab</strong>, categorized under <strong>Network Forensics</strong></p><p>If you find this write-up intriguing, don’t forget to check out my other articles on <a href="https://medium.com/@hezaabdo344"><strong><em>my-profile</em></strong></a> . And remember to follow me for more exciting investigations!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4SRHXV2EShqRsC0dIZ_J0Q.webp" /></figure><h3>Category:</h3><p><strong>Network Forensics</strong></p><h3>Tactics:</h3><p>Execution, Defense Impairment, Discovery, Lateral Movement</p><h3>Recommended Tools:</h3><p>Wireshark</p><p><strong>Difficulty:</strong> Easy</p><p>link: <a href="https://cyberdefenders.org/blueteam-ctf-challenges/psexec-hunt/">https://cyberdefenders.org/blueteam-ctf-challenges/psexec-hunt/</a></p><h3>Scenario:</h3><blockquote><strong>An alert from the Intrusion Detection System (IDS) flagged suspicious lateral movement activity involving PsExec. This indicates potential unauthorized access and movement across the network. As a SOC Analyst, your task is to investigate the provided PCAP file to trace the attacker’s activities. Identify their entry point, the machines targeted, the extent of the breach, and any critical indicators that reveal their tactics and objectives within the compromised environment.</strong></blockquote><p>hello <strong>defenders</strong>, hope you’re all doing well ! Today’s lab need a bit of focus, so let’s start, Bism Allah</p><h3>PsExec Hunt Lab Overview</h3><p>Before diving into the questions, let’s have a quick overview of what this lab is about.</p><ul><li><strong>What is SMB2? SMB2 (Server Message Block Protocol Version 2)<br></strong> is a <strong>network file sharing protocol</strong> used in Microsoft Windows environments. It allows systems within the same network to read, write, and communicate with files and shared resources, as well as interact with remote services like the Service Control Manager. In corporate environments, attackers frequently leverage SMB (ports 445/139) for lateral movement and remote service execution.</li><li><strong>What is PsExec tool ?</strong><br>is a legitimate administrative tool originally developed by Sysinternals (and now part of Microsoft) that allows administrators to execute processes on remote systems using command-line prompts. However, due to its powerful capabilities (such as authenticating via SMB and creating remote Windows services like Psexesvc), threat actors and APT groups frequently abuse it for <strong>lateral movement</strong>, credential dumping, and executing payloads across internal network hosts.</li><li><strong>Lab Objective:</strong> In this <strong>Network Forensics lab</strong>, our goal is to analyze captured network traffic (PCAP) to hunt for suspicious administrative activity, track PsExec execution artifacts, examine SMB traffic anomalies, and extract actionable Indicators of Compromise (IoCs).</li></ul><h3>Initial Traffic Reconnaissance</h3><p>Before diving into specific questions and filtering packets, it is a best practice in network forensics to inspect the overall protocol distribution to identify the dominant protocols used in the capture.</p><p>Open the PCAP file in Wireshark , navigate to <strong>Statistics</strong> -&gt; <strong>Protocol Hierarchy , </strong>Review the breakdown of protocols, packets, and bytes</p><p><strong>Observation:</strong> As highlighted in the protocol hierarchy statistics, <strong>SMB2 (Server Message Block Protocol version 2)</strong> accounts for the vast majority of the TCP traffic (approximately <strong>93.5%</strong> of total packets). This immediately indicates that our investigation should heavily focus on SMB sessions, session setups, and remote service interactions (which aligns perfectly with PsExec activity)</p><blockquote><strong>Q1:<br>To effectively trace the attacker’s activities within our network, can you identify the IP address of the machine from which the attacker initially gained access?</strong></blockquote><p>Open the PCAP file in Wireshark, Navigate to <strong>Statistics</strong> -&gt; <strong>Conversations</strong> and select the <strong>IPv4 tab</strong> then Sort the conversations by the <strong>Packets column</strong> in descending order to spot abnormal traffic volume or heavy internal communication between specific hosts</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/442/1*lzneMEYFXdadRLkymo3YRA.png" /></figure><h3>Identifying the Compromised Host (Initial Access)</h3><p>From the conversation statistics and packet analysis, we notice significant traffic activity between internal IP addresses:<strong>10.0.0.130</strong> is communicating heavily with <strong>10.0.0.133</strong> and <strong>10.0.0.131</strong></p><p>Since <strong>Initial Access</strong> refers to the very<strong> first internal machine</strong> that the attacker <strong>compromised and controlled inside the network </strong>(acting as the foothold or pivot point), we can determine that <strong>10.0.0.130</strong> is the initial target/compromised host within the internal subnet.</p><p><strong>Answer: 10.0.0.130</strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q2:<br>To fully understand the extent of the breach, can you determine the machine’s hostname to which the attacker first pivoted?</strong></blockquote><p><strong>What does “First Pivoted” mean?</strong> After gaining initial access to a machine (the foothold), the attacker uses that compromised host as a launching pad or proxy to move deeper into the internal network and target other systems. The machine they moved to next is the first pivot target.</p><p>To find the hostname of the machine to which the attacker first pivoted, we inspect the SMB/NTLM authentication traffic in Wireshark: Look for<strong> NTLM authentication packets </strong>in the packet list</p><p>Filter or search for the NTLMSSP challenge field, specifically <strong>ntlmssp.challenge.target_name</strong></p><p>which reveals the <strong>NetBIOS domain name </strong>or <strong>computer name</strong> involved in the challenge-response authentication.<br><strong>Right-click on the relevant packet</strong>, select <strong>Follow</strong> -&gt; <strong>TCP Stream</strong> to examine the full session details</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yzTg-LR75ARO2wOaKFUQZg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bAi6B75oKhaVH6GYIZSHnQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Observation:</strong> As highlighted in the TCP stream data, we can clearly notice the target hostname associated with the NTLM challenge-response:</p><p><strong>note:</strong> If the target hostname is not immediately visible or clear within the TCP stream, you can perform a deep packet inspection of the SMB2 protocol hierarchy using the <strong>Packet Details pane</strong></p><p>Expand the <strong>SMB2 (Server Message Block Protocol Version 2)</strong> tree in the Packet Details pane.<br>Expand further until you reach <strong>NTLM Secure Service Provider</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gpFQ-sORjqcP0qV29RzUXw.png" /></figure><p><strong>answer: Sales-PC</strong></p><blockquote><strong><em>Q3:<br>Knowing the username of the account the attacker used for authentication will give us insights into the extent of the breach. What is the username utilized by the attacker for authentication?</em></strong></blockquote><p>Apply the <strong>smb2</strong> filter in Wireshark, Locate the <strong>NTLMSSP AUTH</strong> packet immediately following the session setup exchange identified in the previous step (as visible in packet #132 in our capture).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*m67aLrytNwKNDIcrr9QBXw.png" /></figure><p>Look at the packet list summary, where the username (\ssales ) is directly</p><p>To verify this further, select the packet and expand the <strong>NTLM Secure Service Provider</strong> section in the <strong>Packet Details pane</strong> at the bottom.<br>Locate the <strong>User name</strong> field, which explicitly confirms the authenticated account.</p><blockquote><strong>Q4:<br>After figuring out how the attacker moved within our network, we need to know what they did on the target machine. What’s the name of the service executable the attacker set up on the target?</strong></blockquote><p>Continue reviewing the SMB2 packet flow following the authentication steps (around packets #144 and #145)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8HH54Kj_9k44h_g-tED-tQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Observation:</strong> As highlighted in the packet capture, we can clearly see a Create Request for the file <strong>PSESEXSVC.exe</strong> (PsExec Service executable) being created and executed on the target host via SMB.</p><p><strong>Answer: psexesvc.exe</strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q5:<br>We need to know how the attacker installed the service on the compromised machine to understand the attacker’s lateral movement tactics. This can help identify other affected systems. Which network share was used by PsExec to install the service on the target machine</strong>?</blockquote><p><strong>What is </strong><strong>IPC$ and </strong><strong>ADMIN$?</strong></p><ul><li><strong>IPC$ (Inter-Process Communication share):</strong> Used by Windows clients to communicate with remote servers, establish named pipes, and handle administrative RPC sessions (such as authentication and service control manager communication).</li><li><strong>ADMIN$ (Administrative share):</strong> A hidden network share mapped to the C:\Windows directory, which administrative tools like PsExec abuse to upload and install remote service binaries (like PSESEXSVC.exe).</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gM0KH2kl89d8xZCtNi9row.png" /></figure><p><strong>Observation:</strong> As highlighted in the packet capture:</p><ul><li>Packet #134 shows a Tree Connect Request to \\10.0.0.133\IPC$.</li><li>Packet #139 shows a subsequent Tree Connect Request to \\10.0.0.133\ADMIN$, which is the exact administrative share utilized to upload the service executable.</li></ul><p><strong>answer: ADMIN$</strong></p><blockquote>Q6:<br>We must identify the network share used to communicate between the two machines. Which network share did PsExec use for communication?</blockquote><p><strong>Observation:</strong> As we discussed in the previous step, while the ADMIN$ share is used to upload and install the service executable (PSESEXSVC.exe), the <strong>IPC$</strong> (Inter-Process Communication) share is specifically used as the named pipe communication channel to execute commands, manage service control requests, and facilitate remote interaction between the two hosts.</p><p><strong>answer: IPC$</strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q7:<br>Now that we have a clearer picture of the attacker’s activities on the compromised machine, it’s important to identify any further lateral movement. What is the hostname of the second machine the attacker targeted to pivot within our network?</strong></blockquote><p>Recall from our initial IPv4 conversation statistics that the compromised host (10.0.0.130) communicated significantly with two primary internal IP addresses: 10.0.0.133 (which we analyzed as Sales-PC) and 10.0.0.131.</p><p>To isolate the authentication and traffic related to this second target, we can apply an advanced Wireshark display filter to search for NTLM challenge target names while filtering out the first target IP:</p><p><strong>Filter:</strong> ntlmssp.challenge.target_name and ip.addr != 10.0.0.133 <br>(or inspecting conversations specific to 10.0.0.131).</p><p>Select the relevant NTLM challenge packet involving the second internal IP (10.0.0.131).<br>Expand the <strong>NTLM Secure Service Provider</strong> section in the Packet Details pane and check the <strong>Target Name</strong> field.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*am39BwvThV2EzlGcuAeGPg.png" /></figure><p><strong>Observation:</strong> As highlighted in the packet details bytes and decoded fields, the target NetBIOS computer name for the second compromised host is clearly revealed:</p><p><strong>answer: Marketing-PC</strong></p><p>Thank you for reading! If you found this write-up helpful, feel free to give it a clap 👏 and follow for more cybersecurity lab walkthroughs and threat investigation content❤️‍🩹</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=387f11eddd3f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[CyberDefender SOC T1–3CX Supply Chain Lab Walkthrough]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@hezaabdo344/cyberdefender-soc-t1-3cx-supply-chain-lab-walkthrough-9dcf94a4dbaf?source=rss-a6fe0b89b89c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9dcf94a4dbaf</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[malware-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyberdefenders-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[soc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[threat-intelligence]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdulrahman Heza]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 00:55:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-03T00:55:40.079Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>CyberDefender SOC T1</strong>–<strong>3CX Supply Chain Lab Walkthrough</strong></p><p>In this write-up, we’ll explore the <strong>3CX Supply Chain Lab</strong>, categorized under <strong>Threat Intelligence</strong></p><p>If you find this write-up intriguing, don’t forget to check out my other articles on <a href="https://medium.com/@hezaabdo344"><strong><em>my-profile</em></strong></a> . And remember to follow me for more exciting investigations!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4SRHXV2EShqRsC0dIZ_J0Q.webp" /></figure><h3>Category:</h3><p>Threat Intel</p><h3>Tactics:</h3><p>Execution, Stealth, Discovery</p><h3>Recommended Tools:</h3><p><a href="https://www.virustotal.com/gui/home/upload">VirusTotal</a>, <a href="https://www.zscaler.com/">zscaler.com | redcanary</a> ,<a href="https://bazaar.abuse.ch/browse/">MalwareBazaar</a>, <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/">MITRE ATT&amp;CK®</a>,</p><p><strong>Difficulty:</strong> Easy</p><p>link: <a href="https://cyberdefenders.org/blueteam-ctf-challenges/3cx-supply-chain/">https://cyberdefenders.org/blueteam-ctf-challenges/3cx-supply-chain/</a></p><h3>Scenario:</h3><blockquote>A large multinational corporation heavily relies on the 3CX software for phone communication, making it a critical component of their business operations. After a recent update to the 3CX Desktop App, antivirus alerts flag sporadic instances of the software being wiped from some workstations while others remain unaffected. Dismissing this as a false positive, the IT team overlooks the alerts, only to notice degraded performance and strange network traffic to unknown servers. Employees report issues with the 3CX app, and the IT security team identifies unusual communication patterns linked to recent software updates.</blockquote><blockquote>As the threat intelligence analyst, it’s your responsibility to examine this possible supply chain attack. Your objectives are to uncover how the attackers compromised the 3CX app, identify the potential threat actor involved, and assess the overall extent of the incident.</blockquote><p>hello <strong>defenders</strong>, hope you’re all doing well ! Today’s lab need a bit of focus, so let’s start, Bism Allah</p><blockquote><strong>Q1:<br>Understanding the scope of the attack and identifying which versions exhibit malicious behavior is crucial for making informed decisions if these compromised versions are present in the organization. How many versions of 3CX running on Windows have been flagged as malware?</strong></blockquote><p>After downloading the ZIP file, extract it and navigate through the folders until you reach the .msi file. Right-click on it, select <strong>Open in Terminal</strong>, and then type the following command:</p><p>‘‘Get-FileHash -path .\3CXDesktopApp-18.12.416.msi -Algorithm md5&#39;’</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iTBzdxMfGlSfBvKTxFGD5Q.png" /></figure><p>Copy the hash and search for it on Google via the Zscaler platform.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*01td4KHt8x0jPoZ4sNUnIw.png" /></figure><p>go to first link then search the <strong>versions</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/695/1*0d-iytS-bpzjdVTgT-TWIw.png" /></figure><p><strong>answer: 2</strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q2:<br>Determining the age of the malware can help assess the extent of the compromise and track the evolution of malware families and variants. What’s the UTC creation time of the </strong><strong>.msi malware?</strong></blockquote><p>Paste the <strong>hash</strong>, analyze it on <strong>VirusTotal </strong>under the <strong>Details</strong> <strong>section =</strong>&gt; <strong>History</strong> =&gt; <strong>Creation Time</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/808/1*eET99z4F0L9QyzufdxOLfg.png" /></figure><p><strong>answer: 2023–03–13 06:33</strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q3:<br>Executable files (</strong><strong>.exe) are frequently used as primary or secondary malware payloads, while dynamic link libraries (</strong><strong>.dll) often load malicious code or enhance malware functionality. Analyzing files deposited by the Microsoft Software Installer (</strong><strong>.msi) is crucial for identifying malicious files and investigating their full potential. Which malicious DLLs were dropped by the </strong><strong>.msi file</strong></blockquote><p>To identify the two .dll files dropped by the .msi installer, we can look for msiexec.exe, go to the <strong>Behavior</strong> tab, then <strong>File System Actions</strong>, and check <strong>File Drops</strong> where we will find multiple .dll files.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3x4FagcviV1MsCOREHzonQ.png" /></figure><p>To identify the two required files, we would take their hashes and check <strong>MalwareBazaa</strong>r to see which ones are malware, <strong>but this method is long.</strong></p><p><strong>The shorter solution</strong> is to go to the <strong>Relations</strong> tab, look at <strong>Bundled Files</strong>, and see which files are flagged as malware.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lfFV8HIvFDX1HVt4lz3CcQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>answers: ffmpeg.dll,d3dcompiler_47.dll</strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q4:<br>Recognizing the persistence techniques used in this incident is essential for current mitigation strategies and future defense improvements. What is the MITRE Technique ID employed by the </strong><strong>.msi files to load the malicious DLL?</strong></blockquote><p>search for it on Google via the MITRE ATT&amp;CK</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/877/1*3r6OAzso6wHddXsyPqzvBA.png" /></figure><p><strong>answer: T1574</strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q5:<br>Recognizing the malware type (</strong><strong>threat category) is essential to your investigation, as it can offer valuable insight into the possible malicious actions you&#39;ll be examining. What is the threat category of the two malicious DLLs?</strong></blockquote><p>For one of the hashes in Q3, copy the hash of one of the files identified as malware</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Ko19b0zpm6_4RUfgZdjvXw.png" /></figure><p>paste in VirusTotal, navigate to the <strong>Detection</strong> section, to find the threat category<br>note: Save the hash of the ffmpeg.dll file, as we will need it later.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WmPZkLP-rXecM01l3VqPQg.png" /></figure><p><strong>answer: Trojan</strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q6:<br>As a threat intelligence analyst conducting dynamic analysis, it’s vital to understand how malware can evade detection in virtualized environments or analysis systems. This knowledge will help you effectively mitigate or address these evasive tactics. What is the MITRE ID for the virtualization/sandbox evasion techniques used by the two malicious DLLs?</strong></blockquote><p>key: evasion techniques</p><p>tactic: Stealth</p><p>key: virtualization/sandbox evasion</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*witJBhTH8zC5N9_8my7bTw.png" /></figure><p><strong>answer: T1497</strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q7:<br>When conducting malware analysis and reverse engineering, understanding anti-analysis techniques is vital to avoid wasting time. Which hypervisor is targeted by the anti-analysis techniques in the </strong><strong>ffmpeg.dll file?</strong></blockquote><p>copy <strong><em>ffmpeg.dll</em> </strong>file hash</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tL5K5XcT9qH2h_3JFdPE_A.png" /></figure><p>then paste in<strong> VirusToal, </strong>navigate to the <strong>Behaviors </strong>section, and check the MITRE <strong>ATT&amp;CK Tactics and Techniques</strong> tab to find the<strong> virtualization/sandbox evasion techniques </strong>expand it to find <strong>system checks</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LurG_-NPBWwvo9c2EuYbSg.png" /></figure><p><strong>answer: VMware</strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q8:<br>Identifying the cryptographic method used in malware is crucial for understanding the techniques employed to bypass defense mechanisms and execute its functions fully. What encryption algorithm is used by the </strong><strong>ffmpeg.dll file?</strong></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/914/1*FX2jUww4bSGhks8MLLsjNQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7yJ9Vr2Kv9gWoQ4_9NCDzA.png" /></figure><p><strong>answer: RC4</strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q9:<br>As an analyst, you’ve recognized some TTPs involved in the incident, but identifying the APT group responsible will help you search for their usual TTPs and uncover other potential malicious activities. Which group is responsible for this attack?</strong></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4tunweYkpW4kMNT0wjHAug.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JFZErDfVnsKIjzRJZBoaIQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>answer: Lazarus</strong></p><p>Thank you for reading! If you found this write-up helpful, feel free to give it a clap 👏 and follow for more cybersecurity lab walkthroughs and threat investigation content❤️‍🩹</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9dcf94a4dbaf" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[CyberDefender SOC T1 — PhishStrike Lab Walkthrough]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@hezaabdo344/cyberdefender-soc-t1-phishstrike-lab-walkthrough-bbf55a43a2ac?source=rss-a6fe0b89b89c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bbf55a43a2ac</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[phishstrike-lab]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyberdefender-soc-t1]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyberdefenders-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[threat-intelligence]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdulrahman Heza]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 01 Nov 2026 03:58:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-04T16:55:20.985Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>CyberDefender SOC T1 — PhishStrike Lab Walkthrough</strong></p><p>In this write-up, we’ll explore the <strong>PhishStrike Lab</strong>, categorized under <strong>Threat Intelligence</strong></p><p>If you find this write-up intriguing, don’t forget to check out my other articles on <a href="https://medium.com/@hezaabdo344"><strong><em>my-profile</em></strong></a> . And remember to follow me for more exciting investigations!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4SRHXV2EShqRsC0dIZ_J0Q.webp" /></figure><p>hello <strong>defenders</strong>, hope you’re all doing well ! Today’s lab need a bit of focus, so let’s start, Bism Allah</p><h4><strong>Category</strong>:</h4><p>Threat Intel</p><h4><strong>Tactics:</strong></h4><p>Initial Access, Execution, Command and Control, Impact</p><h4>Recommended Tools:</h4><p>Email Header Analyzer, URLHaus, URLScan.io, VirusTotal, MalwareBazaar</p><p><strong>Difficulty:</strong> Medium</p><p>link: <a href="https://cyberdefenders.org/blueteam-ctf-challenges/phishstrike/">https://cyberdefenders.org/blueteam-ctf-challenges/phishstrike/</a></p><h4>Scenario:</h4><blockquote><em>As a cybersecurity analyst for an educational institution, you receive an alert about a phishing email targeting faculty members. The email, masquerading as a trusted contact, claims a $625,000 purchase and provides a link to download an invoice.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>Your mission is to investigate the email using threat intelligence tools. Analyze the email headers, inspect the embedded link for malicious content, and identify any Indicators of Compromise (IOCs). Document your findings to prevent potential fraud and educate faculty on phishing recognition.</em></blockquote><p><strong>Challenge Overview</strong></p><p>Begin by downloading and extracting the challenge archive to locate the target file, <strong>194-PhishStrike.eml</strong>. This lab focuses on email header and MIME structure analysis to uncover social engineering tactics and malicious indicators within phishing attempts.</p><p><strong>Opening the Email</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1001/1*DFmavYKATwDCs0flyMdfog.png" /></figure><ul><li>open the email using the <strong>Thunderbird</strong> mail client (or drag and drop the 194-PhishStrike.eml file directly into the application).</li><li>From the top menu, go to <strong>View</strong> ➔ <strong>Message Source</strong></li></ul><p>Bism Allah, let us begin solving the questions.</p><blockquote><strong>Q1:<br>Identifying the sender’s IP address with specific SPF and DKIM values helps trace the source of the phishing email. What is the sender’s IP address that has an SPF value of softfail and a DKIM value of fail?</strong></blockquote><ul><li>From the message source view, press Ctrl + F to open the search bar.</li><li>Type <strong>“Auth”</strong> in the search field to locate the authentication details.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/872/1*5GMthWZ0eo_d5JQD_lo_sg.png" /></figure><p><strong>anwser: 18.208.22.104</strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q2:<br>Understanding the return path of an email is essential for tracing its origin. What is the return path specified in this email?</strong></blockquote><p>Press Ctrl + F in the message source view and search for <strong>&quot;Return-Path”</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/831/1*vtanRKrOmwgeXNdLQU9ASg.png" /></figure><p><strong>anwser: </strong><a href="/service/mailto:erikajohana.lopez@uptc.edu.co"><strong>erikajohana.lopez@uptc.edu.co</strong></a></p><blockquote><strong>Q3:<br>Identifying the source of malware is critical for effective threat mitigation and response. What is the IP address of the server hosting the malicious file related to malware distribution?</strong></blockquote><p><strong>Hover your mouse cursor </strong>over any word or link in the email, and you will find the destination IP or URL displayed in the bottom-left corner of the window</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*A2ISDrLg6C0LF3trRYonFQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>anwser: 107.175.247.199</strong></p><h3>another method:</h3><p>Alternatively, you can open the <strong>message source</strong>, press Ctrl + F, and search for <strong>&quot;http&quot;</strong> to locate URLs and extract the server IP address directly.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/515/1*3OJ0Ck5BTHZLBpqdBiC7Xg.png" /></figure><p><strong>anwser: 107.175.247.199</strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q4:<br>Identifying malware that exploits system resources for “cryptocurrency mining” is critical for prioritizing threat mitigation efforts. The malicious URL can deliver several malware types. Which malware family is responsible for cryptocurrency mining?</strong></blockquote><p>Use the <strong>URLhaus</strong> platform or another to search for the <strong>malicious</strong> <strong>URL or IP</strong> and check the associated payload details to identify the malware family responsible for cryptocurrency mining</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pP34mv8OXNfoJryy7ocwiA.png" /></figure><p><strong>anwser: CoinMiner</strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q5:<br>Identifying the specific URLs malware requests is key to disrupting its communication channels and reducing its impact. Based on the previous analysis of the cryptocurrency malware sample, what does this malware request the URL?</strong></blockquote><p>Copy the <strong>payload hash</strong> associated with the <strong>CoinMiner</strong> from the analysis results</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jng-AuX0U6uk4yEI6tHXRw.png" /></figure><p>Paste the <strong>payload hash</strong>, analyze it on <strong>VirusTotal </strong>under<br>the <strong>Behavior</strong> <strong>section =</strong>&gt; <strong>Network Communication</strong> =&gt; <strong>HTTP Requests</strong>, and you will find that the malware disguises its request by masking itself as an image URL</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/696/1*cA2Cfu9Mi-3XpaAJa9C5Mw.png" /></figure><p><strong>answer: </strong><a href="http://ripley.studio/loader/uploads/Qanjttrbv.jpeg"><strong>http://ripley.studio/loader/uploads/Qanjttrbv.jpeg</strong></a></p><blockquote><strong>Q6:<br>Understanding the registry entries added to the auto-run key by malware is crucial for identifying its persistence mechanisms. Based on the BitRAT malware sample analysis, what is the executable’s name in the first value added to the registry auto-run key?</strong></blockquote><p>To identify how the malware ensures persistence across system reboots, copy the <strong>payload hash</strong> associated with <strong>BitRAT </strong>from the <strong>URLhaus</strong> platform</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_9G5VJJVJylcfWyeGceq7g.png" /></figure><p>Go to <strong>VirusTotal</strong>, paste the hash into the search bar</p><p>note: The malware places its executable file path in Auto-run’s Registry keys, forcing the operating system to execute this file and set it to work immediately after the user logs in or the system boots.</p><p>The following paths are typically targeted to ensure the virus works with each reboot:<br>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</p><p>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</p><p>To find the registry key in <strong>VirusTotal</strong>, go to the <strong>Behavior</strong> tab, look for <strong>Registry keys set</strong> (or <strong>Registry Activity</strong>), and search for the target path</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eBtzD68rOmVU-bpVXpkijg.png" /></figure><p>Quick solution: Go to <strong>VirusTotal</strong>, paste the hash into the search bar, navigate to the <strong>Details</strong> section, and check the <strong>Names</strong> tab to find the<strong> executable</strong> filename ending with .exe</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/741/1*7wmZdSLN7B4nEIssP1rTcA.png" /></figure><p><strong>answer: Jzwvix.exe</strong></p><h3>another Method:</h3><p>Alternatively, you can go to the <strong>MalwareBazaar</strong> platform, paste the payload hash into the search bar, open the resulting details page, navigate to the <strong>Vendor Threat Intelligence</strong> section, and open the provided external link for further analysis</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Lf2Ck06fwi3ktutOWWuU-g.png" /></figure><p>after opening the analysis site, navigate to the <strong>Results</strong> section, select <strong>Text Report</strong>, and search inside for the <strong>Registry Activity</strong> section.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uztnlIZ6j1GPytZLVQz40g.png" /></figure><p>Inspect the logged processes to find the path ending with the Run key (HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run), where you will find the executed .exe file</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*R67lMlL4XhszGXmx6r9Lwg.png" /></figure><p><strong>answer: Jzwvix.exe</strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q7:<br>Identifying the SHA-256 hash of files downloaded from a malicious URL is essential for tracking and analyzing malware activity. Based on the BitRAT analysis, what is the SHA-256 hash of the file previously downloaded and added to the autorun keys?</strong></blockquote><p>As we already discovered in the<strong> previous question </strong>using the <strong>URLhaus</strong> platform, <strong>the SHA-256 hash</strong> is readily available in the analysis details</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*_9G5VJJVJylcfWyeGceq7g.png" /></figure><p><strong>answer: BF7628695C2DF7A3020034A065397592A1F8850E59F9A448B555BC1C8C639539</strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q8:<br>Analyzing the HTTP requests made by malware helps in identifying its communication patterns. What is the URL in the HTTP request used by the loader to retrieve the BitRAT malware?</strong></blockquote><p>Paste the previous hash into <strong>VirusTotal</strong>, navigate to the <strong>Behavior</strong> tab, select <strong>Network Communication</strong>, then <strong>HTTP Requests</strong>, and search for the request targeting the .exe file used by the loader to retrieve the BitRAT malware</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/632/1*z3sXkOnX2aVj1LnpTkkz7A.png" /></figure><p><strong>answer: </strong><a href="http://107.175.247.199/LOADER/SERVER.EXE"><strong>http://107.175.247.199/LOADER/SERVER.EXE</strong></a></p><blockquote><strong>Q9:<br>Introducing a delay in malware execution can help evade detection mechanisms. What is the delay (in seconds) caused by the PowerShell command according to the BitRAT analysis?</strong></blockquote><p>To find the execution delay caused by the <strong>PowerShell</strong> command, navigate back to the <strong>Processes</strong> tab in <strong>ANY.RUN</strong> and locate the <strong>PowerShell</strong> process</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JcmrTCBeyyjlS1AOqtqrZg.png" /></figure><p>another site: Go to <strong>VirusTotal</strong>, navigate to the <strong>Behaviors</strong> section, <strong>Behaviors Process and service actions </strong>and check the <strong>Shell commands</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*oigYTswg2l-tIl8igdm6Ig.png" /></figure><p>locate the <strong>PowerShell</strong> process, where you will find it encoded as <strong>enc</strong> (short for <strong>-EncodedCommand</strong>, which allows running Base64-encoded scripts to bypass basic filters)</p><p>take that encoded string, paste it into <strong>CyberChef</strong>, and decode it to reveal the delay value (in seconds)</p><p>“Drag <strong>From Base64</strong> to the recipe, then drag <strong>Decode text</strong> and change the encoding format to <strong>1200</strong> (UTF-16LE)”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2Vqj6ys3uZB0PDpgK2ckRg.png" /></figure><p><strong>answer: 50</strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q10:<br>Tracking the command and control (C2) domains used by malware is essential for detecting and blocking malicious activities. What is the C2 domain used by the BitRAT malware?</strong></blockquote><p>Navigate to the <strong>DNS Requests</strong> tab in <strong>ANY.RUN</strong> to inspect the resolved network traffic and identify the Command and Control (C2) server domain used by the BitRAT malware</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/912/1*Vv4H3JCB-cirrHZ5pq0nYg.png" /></figure><p><strong>answer: gh9st.mywire.org</strong></p><blockquote><strong>Q11:<br>Understanding how malware exfiltrates data is essential for detecting and preventing data breaches. According to the AsyncRAT analysis, what is the Telegram Bot ID used by this malware?</strong></blockquote><p>Go to the <strong>Tria.ge</strong> platform ([https://tria.ge/]).<br>Paste the file hash into the search bar to open the analysis report, Navigate to the <strong>Network</strong> tab and inspect the <strong>HTTP GET requests</strong>, where you will find the <strong>Telegram Bot ID</strong> used for data exfiltration embedded directly in the request path</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NAUek32A848C1VJuQPBsVg.png" /></figure><p><strong>answer: bot5610920260</strong></p><p>Thank you for reading! If you found this write-up helpful, feel free to give it a clap 👏 and follow for more cybersecurity lab walkthroughs and threat investigation content❤️‍🩹</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bbf55a43a2ac" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[OSINT — MITRE (3) Lab | Incident Response & Threat Hunting Walkthrough]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@hezaabdo344/osint-mitre-3-incident-response-threat-hunting-walkthrough-9bbb962b9bba?source=rss-a6fe0b89b89c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9bbb962b9bba</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[soc-analyst]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[threat-hunter]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mitre-attack]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[incident-response]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdulrahman Heza]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 25 Oct 2026 19:40:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-29T21:40:48.557Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In this writeup, we will solve the <strong>OSINT — MITRE (3)</strong> challenge on <strong>Cyber Haze</strong>. The lab focuses on analyzing threat scenario text and mapping adversary behaviors to their exact <strong>Tactics</strong>, <strong>Techniques</strong>, and <strong>Sub-techniques</strong> in the <strong>MITRE ATT&amp;CK Framework</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/738/0*3IlGTOQ__kfG5BaO" /></figure><p>Lab Details:</p><ul><li><strong>Platform:</strong> Cyber Haze</li><li><strong>Challenge:</strong> OSINT — MITRE (3)</li><li><strong>Difficulty:</strong> Medium</li><li>Lab Link:</li></ul><p><a href="https://cyberhaze.io/challange-details/6a02fcc0a677aef98ea51234">https://cyberhaze.io/challange-details/6a02fcc0a677aef98ea51234</a></p><p>hello guys, hope you’re all doing well ! Today’s lab need a bit of focus, so let’s start, Bism Allah</p><p><strong>Q1:<br> The investigation revealed that a large spike in network traffic originated from an external IP address. The majority of this traffic was generated by a suspicious user-agent string: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Nmap Scripting Engine;) and appears to be aimed at identifying vulnerabilities. What is the ID of this specific sub-technique?</strong></p><p>first we need analyzing this scenario, a few key indicators immediately stood out:</p><p>key: Nmap Scripting Engine</p><p>Here, the attacker scans the network, attempts to gather information, and searches for vulnerabilities.</p><p><strong>What is a tactic ?</strong></p><p><strong>Tactic:</strong> <strong>Reconnaissance</strong></p><p>then we look at the key tactics from the <strong>MITRE ATT&amp;CK </strong>website to search for the appropriate technique.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Y0wQ5rS6W8tXzP3CQregXQ.png" /></figure><p>We have determined that the appropriate technique is <strong>active scanning.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/921/1*3l1hVCpypz-lVylSki3j8A.png" /></figure><p>To determine the appropriate <strong>sub-technique</strong>, we need to read and understand each one in order to arrive at the most accurate answer.</p><p>But before we read, there is a<strong> key</strong> in the<strong> question</strong> that speeds up and simplifies the search.</p><p>key : identifying vulnerabilities</p><p><strong>What is a sub-technique id?</strong></p><p>sub technique: vulnerabilities Scanning</p><p>ID: T1595.002</p><p><strong>Q2: What is the name of the main technique this falls under?</strong></p><p>main technique: Active Scanning</p><p><strong>Q3:<br>The SOC later discovered that the adversary exploited one of the organization’s external software applications through an SQL injection vulnerability. What is the MITRE technique ID that led to the attacker’s initial access?</strong></p><p>The question here indicates that the tactic is <strong>“initial access”</strong></p><p>then we look at the tactics from the <strong>MITRE ATT&amp;CK </strong>website to search for the appropriate technique.</p><p>key: external software applications through an SQL injection vulnerability</p><p>note: <strong>SQL Injection (SQLi)</strong> occurs when an attacker injects malicious SQL queries through the application’s user interface (UI) to interact directly with the backend database. In this scenario, the adversary exploited this web application flaw to breach the system, gaining an initial foothold into the network</p><p><strong>What is a technique id?</strong></p><p>technique: Exploit Public-Facing Application</p><p>ID: T1190</p><p><strong>Q4:<br>It was later discovered that the SQLmap tool was used to automate the process of detecting and exploiting the SQL injection vulnerability. What is the MITRE ID pertaining to this piece of software?</strong></p><p>key<strong>: </strong>SQLmap tool</p><p>first search First, search for the SQLmap tool on <strong>MITRE ATT&amp;CK </strong>website.</p><p><strong>What is the MITRE ID pertaining to this piece of software?</strong></p><p>ID: S0225</p><p><strong>Q5:<br>After achieving remote code execution through the SQL injection vulnerability, the attacker created a remote reverse shell on the server by initiating a cmd.exe process. What sub-technique ID does this relate to?</strong></p><p>key: execution through the SQL injection vulnerability</p><p><strong>What is a tactic ?</strong></p><p>Tactic: Execution</p><p>key: created a remote reverse shell on the server by initiating a <strong>cmd.exe</strong> process</p><p>then we look at the key from the <strong>MITRE ATT&amp;CK </strong>website to search for the appropriate technique.</p><p><strong>What is a technique ?</strong></p><p>technique: Command and Scripting Interpreter</p><p>key: cmd.exe</p><p><strong>What is a sub-technique id?</strong></p><p>sub technique: Windows Command</p><p>ID: T1059.003</p><p><strong>Q6:<br>The attacker escalated privileges by impersonating an administrator user’s security token and abusing the SeImpersonatePrivilege. According to MITRE, what is one of the API calls that can be monitored to detect this behavior?</strong></p><p>key: <strong>escalated privileges</strong></p><p>tactic: Privilege escalation</p><p>key: administrator user’s security token</p><p>technique: Access Token Manipulation</p><p>sub technique: Token Impersonation/Theft</p><p>key: detect this behavior</p><p>Look for the detection section; you will find some tokens — select one of them.</p><p><strong>what is one of the API calls that can be monitored to detect this behavior?</strong></p><p>API Call: ImpersonateLoggedOnUser</p><p><strong>Q7:<br>During the initial live incident response triage, a responder noticed that an existing Windows service had its image path modified to point to the attacker s malicious reverse shell payload — likely to establish persistence. What is the ID of this sub-technique?</strong></p><p>key: establish persistence</p><p>tactic: Persistence</p><p>key: image path modified to point to the attacker’s malicious reverse shell payload</p><p>technique: Create or Modify System Process</p><p>key: windows service</p><p><strong>What is a sub-technique id?</strong></p><p>ID: T1543.003</p><p><strong>Q8:<br>Around the same timeframe, endpoint logs in the SIEM reported that the system’s Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tool was turned off and disabled. What sub-technique ID is this event likely referring to?</strong></p><p>key: Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tool was turned off and disabled</p><p>tactic: defensive impairment</p><p>technique: Disable or Modify Tools</p><p><strong>What is a sub-technique id?</strong></p><p>ID: T1562.001 this is old id</p><p><strong>Q9:<br>The ccf32 software was transferred to the host shortly after the initial compromise. What tactic ID is this software likely used for?</strong></p><p>key: <strong>ccf32 software</strong></p><p>we look at the key from the <strong>MITRE ATT&amp;CK </strong>website to search for the software</p><p><a href="https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1043">ccf32</a> is data collection malware that has been used since at least February 2019, most notably during the <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0007">FunnyDream</a> campaign; there is also a similar x64 version</p><p>tactic: collection</p><p><strong>what is the tactic id?</strong></p><p>id: TA0009</p><p><strong>Q10:<br>After staging sensitive data, files, and intellectual property, the attacker exfiltrated the data by pushing it to a public GitHub repository. What mitigation ID could the organization have implemented to prevent the use of unauthorized external services?</strong></p><p>key: the attacker exfiltrated the data</p><p>tactic: Exfiltration</p><p>key: by pushing it to a public GitHub repository</p><p>technique: Exfiltration Over Web Service</p><p>key: GitHub repository</p><p>sub-technique: Exfiltration to Code Repository</p><p>Look for the mitigation section.</p><p><strong>What mitigation ID?</strong></p><p>ID: M1021</p><p><strong>Q11:<br>To complete the adversary’s Actions on Objectives, the organization’s public-facing corporate website was modified to display propaganda messages during the attack. What is the full sub-technique ID of this attack?</strong></p><p>key: <strong>adversary’s Actions on Objectives</strong></p><p>tactic: impact</p><p>key: organization’s public-facing corporate website was modified to display propaganda messages during the attack</p><p>technique: Defacement</p><p>key: public-facing</p><p>sub-technique: External Defacement</p><p><strong>What is a sub-technique id?</strong></p><p>ID: T1491.002</p><p>Thank you for reading! If you found this write-up helpful, feel free to give it a clap 👏 and follow for more cybersecurity lab walkthroughs and threat investigation content❤️‍🩹</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9bbb962b9bba" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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