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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Horkos on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Horkos on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@horkos?source=rss-7510089dd2e8------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Horkos on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@horkos?source=rss-7510089dd2e8------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Burning and Bridges II: Turla Boogaloo]]></title>
            <link>https://horkos.medium.com/burning-and-bridges-ii-turla-boogaloo-45ab90a1a567?source=rss-7510089dd2e8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/45ab90a1a567</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[five-eyes]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[counterintelligence]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Horkos]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 09 May 2023 23:19:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-06-15T04:32:24.227Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/352/1*vAMiAVP55cOp24B9XBE7wA@2x.jpeg" /><figcaption>Credit to the <a href="https://infosec.exchange/@activemeasuresllc">LLC</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>A few years ago, I wrote a <a href="https://horkos.medium.com/burning-and-bridges-c92531b0e8a0">short piece</a> about how a joint U.S.-U.K. disclosure about Turla operations targeting OilRig resources represented a nifty piece of offensive counterintelligence. Given today’s multi-lateral <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-129a">reporting on</a>, and <a href="https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/justice-department-announces-court-authorized-disruption-snake-malware-network">disruption of</a>, Turla’s <em>Snake</em> malware, I felt a sequel was in order.</p><p>While I can’t necessarily offer the same level of exegesis on this case, there are some transferable lessons to start with. Such as: this likely represents the last twist of the knife in an extended counterintelligence effort against Turla. Such as: that said twist of the knife likely only occurred after every last drop of value was squeezed out of the U.S. government’s <a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/23808245-23-mj-0428-affidavit">apparent ability</a> to clandestinely compromise the integrity of <em>Snake </em>infections and infrastructure dating back years (see points 21, 23–26, <strong>41</strong>, 44–50). Such as: that the timing of the disruption operation (aka MEDUSA) is important, given it was scheduled for 8 May and Russia celebrates <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victory_Day_(9_May)">Victory Day</a> on 9 May.</p><p>In terms of analysis more specifically applicable to this case, let’s start by putting it in perspective alongside the earlier Turla/OilRig disclosure. Compared to 2019, the Five Eyes (FVEY) intelligence alliance now apparently feels comfortable attributing Turla — via <em>Snake</em> specifically — to Center 16 of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB). This is the second operational element that the U.S. has <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/four-russian-government-employees-charged-two-historical-hacking-campaigns-targeting-critical">attributed</a> to Center 16 in as many years. And while the activity attributed in 2022 was significantly more historical and is described in the MEDUSA affidavit (page 8, footnote 1) as an operational element distinct from Turla within Center 16, those indictments form part of the broader constellation of acknowledged actions taken against the FSB’s cyber operations enterprise in recent years.</p><p>Here is where I go into &lt;&lt;&lt;Angleton Mode&gt;&gt;&gt; and speculate (wildly?) about the particular intention behind what is shaping up to be — in my eyes — a multi-year degradation campaign, formal or ad hoc, against Center 16. What message is the United States and FVEY alliance are trying to send to the Russians today? My guess:</p><blockquote>“We have been watching your <em>Snake</em> operations for years, but it’s up to you to figure out how many. We clearly have watched, and siphoned from, your collection during that time. We also have likely interfered in that collection without you knowing it. Anything particularly juicy you got from that collection is something you now must eye with suspicion. Are you wondering what else we’ve got into over the last decade? Did the CI investigation into how we pulled off the visibility enabling our 2019 disclosure even wrap up yet? Are you ready for the absolute migraine of CI scrutiny and internal investigations you’re about to endure behind what we did today, all while you go through a whole new set of tool and access development cycles? We know you’re looking at this as conspiratorially as possible because you’re Chekists and that’s how you think; if you could, this is something you’d like to do to us but we’re doing it to you and we’re doing it out in the open because — and we cannot stress this enough — fuck you. Hope you feel confident about the integrity of whatever you field next, boyos.”</blockquote><p>It is also worth keeping in mind that the information released today almost certainly doesn’t represent the totality of FVEY knowledge or capabilities associated with this case. More than likely, we’ve been treated to what could be published without putting sources, methods, and other ongoing operations at risk. So the totality of imposed effects likely extends beyond the specific instances cited publicly. Furthermore, that ambiguity may be intended to cast greater doubt in the minds of the FSB about precisely what the U.S. and its partners accomplished up until now or could accomplish in the future with regard to penetration of Russian operations. That would account for the fact that if you are going to burn an adversary service like this, you have to understand not only how the burned element reacts but how the element tasked to investigate the burning will react.</p><p>As I drafted this, <a href="https://www.cyberwarcon.com/michael-van-landingham">Michael van Landingham</a> pointed out that I may be overestimating how introspective the FSB might be about this whole thing given its general shift in organizational culture post-2014 towards a Global War on Terror-esque focus on battlefield support in arenas like Ukraine and elsewhere. Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan have also <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/12/17/russias-secret-organizations-are-not-secret-anymore-it-seems-they-dont-care-a72393">written</a> about the growing, likely-related disregard for exposure exhibited by the Russian Intelligence Services in recent years.</p><p>So, I may be wrong. I may be crazy. But this just might be the lunacy FVEY’s been looking for. <a href="https://youtu.be/ilsv0C1-aBw">Who’s to say?</a></p><p><em>Post-script : </em>For a more expert perspective on how these events likely affect Turla in the broader context (versus my CI-focused take above), check out this Twitter thread.</p><h3>InstaCyber @instacyber@infosec.exchange on Twitter: &quot;Fun to see the #turla #snake releases today, finally getting a (public) notch on the belt against an actor that has been part of my career for almost 2 decades - when variants used to spoof ALTAVISTA... 😳 1/n / Twitter&quot;</h3><p>Fun to see the #turla #snake releases today, finally getting a (public) notch on the belt against an actor that has been part of my career for almost 2 decades - when variants used to spoof ALTAVISTA... 😳 1/n</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=45ab90a1a567" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Cyber(war) Persuasion Fatigue]]></title>
            <link>https://horkos.medium.com/cyber-war-persuasion-fatigue-4b60c2005f6?source=rss-7510089dd2e8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4b60c2005f6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-threat-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ukraine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[intelligence]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Horkos]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 06 May 2023 22:12:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-05-09T04:14:25.740Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/641/1*UZHwd66aCHz0NYboQWS7pw@2x.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Artwork courtesy of </em><a href="https://infosec.exchange/@russell_j"><em>Russell Johnson</em></a><em>.</em></figcaption></figure><p>I am getting exhausted by the continued insistence that the Russians successfully executed strategically meaningful “cyberwar” in Ukraine since the February 2022 invasion and the accompanying accusation that anyone who disagrees is incorrectly applying Western standards of success regarding effects that do not align with the thinking of the Russian Intelligence Services (RIS; a.k.a, GRU, SVR, FSB).</p><p>The recent <a href="https://irregularwarfare.org/podcasts/the-digital-bear-in-ukraine-russian-cyber-operations-since-2014/">Irregular Warfare podcast appearance</a> by <a href="https://infosec.exchange/@kikta">Jason Kikta</a> and <a href="https://mstdn.social/@gavinwilde">Gavin Wilde</a> pretty much laid out the case for sanity. Russia thought the invasion would be over in a matter of days and also did not properly brief their own forces in advance. So the initial computer network operations (CNO) observed in January and then February 2022 ended up being about first demoralizing the Ukrainian population prior to the invasion and then only one confirmed instance of successful computer network attack (CNA) to disrupt communications in concert with the initial military push (i.e., <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/russia-behind-cyber-attack-with-europe-wide-impact-an-hour-before-ukraine-invasion">Viasat</a>). The commander of the U.S. Cyber National Mission Force even <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220505202439/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-05/u-s-sent-cyber-team-to-lithuania-over-threat-of-russian-hacking">said</a> of this period that “There doesn’t appear to me that there was a coordinated plan, which surprised us.”When the war effort writ large failed spectacularly, the RIS CNO teams shifted gears and went on to focus on two things: (1) modest-at-best wiper operations in order to look busy in the eyes of leadership through the contribution of doctrinally aligned “psychological effects” that in reality amounted to very little in terms of facilitating the war effort, (2) and the traditional intelligence collection that is cyber operations’ actual strong suit.</p><p>In only one post-Viasat case could a disclosed operation—<a href="https://cert.gov.ua/article/39518">CrashOverride 2.0.</a> — be considered a meaningful attempt at substitution of CNA for kinetic effects, and that failed. And as far as the unclassified world knows, something similar has not been re-attempted while there have continued to be a deluge of still more janky wiper operations (<a href="https://cert.gov.ua/article/3718487">Ukrinform</a> most notably comes to mind).</p><p>To <a href="https://infosec.exchange/@WylieNewmark/109881491490895364">my eye</a>, the war that Russia’s cyber operators chose to fight was one of “look busy, the boss is coming and I don’t want to die in a trench in Ukraine” and “keep spying because it’s what we’re best at anyway”. Then they justified all of that behind information confrontation doctrine, which is not difficult to do, and kept chugging along. If you ask me, if Russia chose to fight a war where they relegated cyber to “85% intel collection, 10% jank-ass wipers deployed via GPO, and 5% real CNA that was only 1% well-executed”, that seems like a pretty shitty way to choose to conduct a “cyberwar”.</p><p>We shouldn’t pretend that just because Russian military theory differs from Western military theory that the Russians have somehow fulfilled some grand “cyberwar” plan when hard data and a nuanced understanding of how organizations function points to the contrary in numerous ways. I am saying all of this with the explicit intention of separating a theory of standards of success based on Russian military doctrine from what I perceive as the more likely operational reality of what has been happening and continues to happen at the functional level inside RIS cyber elements. I am explicitly not applying Western standards of success with regard to effects. I am explicitly acknowledging the foundation that doctrine plays in strategic culture but then realizing that doctrine is not the water’s edge of same. There are in fact many drivers that alter the reality of organizational realization of strategic culture between the writing of doctrine and the execution of frontline activity.</p><p>Using a foreign country’s military doctrine to reframe fuck-ups as successes — here, that the Russians’ real operations have had the intended effects — boils down to doing a GRU colonel’s work for him; placating Gerasimov about whether or not the O6&#39;s department has contributed to winning the war, <a href="https://infosec.exchange/@WylieNewmark/109911082905075150">among other things</a>.</p><p>At the end of the day, unless CNA operations are being used to enable, facilitate, replace, or otherwise directly support kinetic effects inside a conflict zone then I do not see the presence of cyberwar — only that of cyber during wartime.</p><p>For more on this line of thinking, check out these resources (presented in chronological order):</p><ul><li>Microsoft, “<a href="https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RE4Vwwd">An overview of Russia’s cyberattack activity in Ukraine</a>”, 27 April 2022</li><li>Suzanne Smalley, “<a href="https://cyberscoop.com/cybersecurity-experts-question-microsofts-ukraine-report/">Cybersecurity experts question Microsoft’s Ukraine report</a>,” <em>CyberScoop</em>, 1 July 2022</li><li>Gavin Wilde and Jon Bateman, “<a href="https://youtu.be/8PdOZHeynv8">Were Russian cyber operations militarily effective in Ukraine? If not, why?</a>”, <em>CYBERWARCON</em>, 10 November 2022</li><li><em>The Economist</em>, “<a href="https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2022/11/30/lessons-from-russias-cyber-war-in-ukraine">Lessons from Russia’s cyber-war in Ukraine</a>”, 30 November 2022</li><li>Gavin Wilde, “<a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/12/12/cyber-operations-in-ukraine-russia-s-unmet-expectations-pub-88607/">Cyber Operations in Ukraine: Russia’s Unmet Expectations</a>”, <em>Carnegie Endowment for International Peace</em>, 12 December 2022</li><li>Jon Bateman, “<a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/12/16/russia-s-wartime-cyber-operations-in-ukraine-military-impacts-influences-and-implications-pub-88657">Russia’s Wartime Cyber Operations in Ukraine: Military Impacts, Influences, and Implications</a>”, <em>Carnegie Endowment for International Peace</em>, 16 December 2022</li><li>Joe Slowik, “<a href="https://pylos.co/2023/02/16/what-have-we-learned/">What Have We Learned?</a>”, <em>Stranded On Pylos</em>, 16 February 2023</li><li>State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine, “<a href="https://cip.gov.ua/en/news/russia-s-cyber-tactics-lessons-learned-in-2022-ssscip-analytical-report-on-the-year-of-russia-s-full-scale-cyberwar-against-ukraine">Russia’s Cyber Tactics: Lessons Learned in 2022</a>”, 8 March 2023</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4b60c2005f6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Stop Huffing About Cyber Retaliation]]></title>
            <link>https://horkos.medium.com/stop-huffing-about-cyber-retaliation-fa410164b2dc?source=rss-7510089dd2e8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fa410164b2dc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[counterintelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[deterrence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ransomware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Horkos]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 13 Jul 2021 15:32:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-07-26T02:21:11.151Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/1*4W7jVtEaZNXiJEo5kplB4Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>None of us like you when you’re up there.</figcaption></figure><p>I should’ve be asleep when I saw this tweet and accompanying <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/empty-threats-and-warnings-cyber">Lawfare article</a>:</p><h3>David Priess on Twitter: &quot;&quot;The persistent braggadocio about how powerful our capabilities are and how we will use these weapons if Russia does something bad,&quot; @jacklgoldsmith writes, &quot;is met, time and time again, with another Russian operation, and then more warnings and threats.&quot;https://t.co/Mq2GY1XSsi / Twitter&quot;</h3><p>&quot;The persistent braggadocio about how powerful our capabilities are and how we will use these weapons if Russia does something bad,&quot; @jacklgoldsmith writes, &quot;is met, time and time again, with another Russian operation, and then more warnings and threats.&quot;https://t.co/Mq2GY1XSsi</p><p>The issues with unfulfilled threats of cyber retaliation are not primarily about international law, the comparative vulnerability between the United States and those it would inflict costs upon, or conflict escalation — all of which that article posits. Sure, those elements do matter. But there’s a more fundamental variable at play and that is an underlying misunderstanding of the dynamics governing cyber contests between states.</p><p>The fact of the matter is that the majority of discourse surrounding <strong>state-nexus cyber operations</strong> is conducted through the lens of use of force — which, as it turns out, is actually state-spectrum cyber’s least ubiquitous manifestation. Take the list of known incidences of malicious cyber activity conducted by state-nexus actors that have manifested the same kind of impacts as to pass the <a href="https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5858&amp;context=fss_papers">“use of force” effects test</a> (such as Ukraine 2015/2016, Shamoon, OlympicDestroyer, etc.) and stack them up against all the cyber activity that amounted to either espionage or information operations (such as the SolarWinds campaign, the hack-and-leak operation against the DNC, the many network intrusion campaigns of China’s Ministry of State Security, etc.). There is just no comparison: the latter dwarfs the former by orders of magnitude. More often than not — and especially until recently when the Colonial Pipeline incident made ransomware a national issue — the cyber activity that people expect the US government to respond to with bellicosity boils down to traditional intelligence activities (including covert action) that just happen to be manifested via cyber means.</p><p>As a result, this misapplied “use of force” lens has totally skewed the general public’s and even policymakers’ expectations about how dynamics work in cyber contests between states, with everyone taking their cue from warfare rather than an <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2019/09/cyber-war-as-an-intelligence-contest/">intelligence contest</a>. Imagine how silly it would’ve been if the US government’s counterintelligence strategy had been to meet every Soviet active measure or HUMINT penetration during the Cold War with some kind of tough talk about retaliation. It would’ve been farcical, which is where things are with cyber now.</p><p>Whenever a major cyber incident with even the slightest nation-state angle occurs, both the media and Beltway demand blood for the Blood God — i.e., proclamations about some kind of deterrence-via-punishment capacity and the willingness to use it to “impose costs” — as proof that whomever is in power is taking national security seriously. The problem is that, until extremely recently with regard to ransomware incidents (albeit ironically ones that have not demonstrated any evidence of being state-directed), these retaliation proclamations were demanded and made in response to what amounts to traditional intelligence activities of the 21st century.</p><p>Herein is why all the US government’s “braggadocio” has amounted to diddly-squat in the minds of the general public and specialist commentator alike: because no matter how much you want to be reassured by the idea, the US government is not likely to replace counterintelligence with warfare. If you’re disappointed by the lack of visible US follow-up on threats of cyber retaliation, open your eyes: historically, you’ve been asking for the misapplication of traditional connotations of deterrence (i.e., those grounded in warfare) to what amounts to a predominantly counterintelligence problem. <a href="https://horkos.medium.com/the-incoherence-of-cyber-deterrence-c78253372eb1">The answer to counterintelligence threats is you can shape them, but not deter them</a>; effects-oriented counterintelligence is also rarely conducted in public.</p><p>Ransomware is admittedly a different issue, as it could be deemed as passing the “use of force” effects test and is predominantly a weapon of cyber-criminals rather than states. So in that regard, threats of retaliation for the Colonial Pipeline incident or Kesaya incident should be viewed differently than — rather than conflated with — those for the SolarWinds campaign. In both cases, threats of retaliation have political value; however, <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20210713064525/https://twitter.com/voodoodahl1/status/1413553478736166913">the former represents a developing space where direct application of cyber offense is likely to have any meaningful impact</a>, while the latter is just a new face of an old counterintelligence problem. Even with regard to ransomware, direct offensive cyber operations against non-state actors amount to degradation rather than neutralization and <a href="https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/wizard-spider-adversary-update/">at best is a necessary holding action</a> to buy time for policymakers and private industry alike to affect long-term changes required to truly enhance digital security writ large. So even against criminal ransomware actors, retaliation still is not a silver bullet — although <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-seizes-23-million-cryptocurrency-paid-ransomware-extortionists-darkside">it can hurt</a>.</p><p>If you still insist on demanding the US government cyber saber-rattle in the direction of a foreign capitol, why not pay a little more attention to the fact that Iran has apparently gotten into the disruptive ransomware game? At least <a href="https://www.clearskysec.com/pay2kitten/">two</a> <a href="https://labs.sentinelone.com/from-wiper-to-ransomware-the-evolution-of-agrius/">vendors</a> and <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20210621183910/https://irancybernews.org/news/malware-iranian-isp-spearphished-to-spread-awareness-of-irgc-activity/">one mystery party</a> have taken note, but the pundits don’t seem to have gotten the memo yet. One wonders why.</p><p><em>Postscript: My wife, who has an eye for understanding human nature, offered this astute observation on a key psychological dynamic at play when someone is suddenly exposed to the bleak— albeit banal — reality of how pervasive intelligence contests actually are:</em></p><h3>Horkos @ the Centre for Unilateral Analysis on Twitter: &quot;The general public is largely unaware of the scale &amp; scope of clandestine intelligence contests between states via HUMINT, SIGINT, etc.; public disclosure of cyber espionage brings that contest into view, and b/c its unfamiliar, all people see is an &quot;attack&quot; requiring a response. pic.twitter.com/xXofng9nT9 / Twitter&quot;</h3><p>The general public is largely unaware of the scale &amp; scope of clandestine intelligence contests between states via HUMINT, SIGINT, etc.; public disclosure of cyber espionage brings that contest into view, and b/c its unfamiliar, all people see is an &quot;attack&quot; requiring a response. pic.twitter.com/xXofng9nT9</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fa410164b2dc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Cyber Espionage as Mischief Managed]]></title>
            <link>https://horkos.medium.com/cyber-espionage-as-mischief-managed-626a510182e7?source=rss-7510089dd2e8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/626a510182e7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[harry-potter]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[threat-hunting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[threat-intelligence]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Horkos]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 02 Apr 2021 22:39:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-04-03T05:58:52.469Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*SUmCz1-PEmTwmRgyv7gbeg.jpeg" /><figcaption>“Just stay under yer invisibility cloak!”</figcaption></figure><p>On 2 April 2021, CNN <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/02/politics/russian-hackers-target-us-cyber-hunters-solarwinds/index.html">published a story</a> describing certain actions undertaken by the likely Russian actors reportedly responsible for recent supply chain compromise activity that affected multiple parts of the U.S. government. Specifically, those actors allegedly targeted the user and email accounts of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) threat hunters — likely as a means to provide an early warning and intelligence feedback loop to enable the actors to escape detection for as long as possible. That story elaborated on an <a href="https://www.cyberscoop.com/solarwinds-hack-russia-spying-microsoft/">earlier piece</a> from CyberScoop. If these press reports are true, I feel this behavior implies something about such actors:</p><h3>Horkos @ the Centre for Unilateral Analysis on Twitter: &quot;The precise and early targeting of DHS threat hunting personnel suggests an actor that is not only is (A) exceptionally OPSEC conscious, but (B) also has a strong counterintelligence influence - offensive &amp; defensive - on its operational culture. (1/2) https://t.co/yM1WqDfOFc / Twitter&quot;</h3><p>The precise and early targeting of DHS threat hunting personnel suggests an actor that is not only is (A) exceptionally OPSEC conscious, but (B) also has a strong counterintelligence influence - offensive &amp; defensive - on its operational culture. (1/2) https://t.co/yM1WqDfOFc</p><p>For the sake of argument, let’s hypothesize that these reports are accurate (even though I honestly don’t know if they are). If you already have deep and persistent access to a target organization, it’s not hard to dump the victim’s active directory database and Crtl+F for distros that contain phrases like “hunt” or “SOC” or “cybersecurity” to find specific individuals — you don’t even need LinkedIn! So, then the potential for insight here is derived <em>not</em> from the actors’ ability to target these individuals, but <em>rather</em> their choice to do so.</p><p>When undertaking a cyber espionage operation, each line of activity initiated after an intrusion begins raises an actor’s potential for being detected. Tautologically speaking, if an actor’s initial activity doesn’t get them caught immediately, then the most likely thing that will burn them is deviating off of their core kill chain. The farther an actor strays inside a network, the more risk they incur. Thus, if an actor’s intention is the collection of specific information on a given network, targeting that network’s defenders early on in the operation is a double-edged sword: it may provide an early warning system, but it stills amounts to additional activity that in itself raises the likelihood of detection — not least of which because that activity is being directed against individuals responsible for interdicting malicious actors.</p><p>In my experience, most state-nexus actors early on in an operation would rather go for low-hanging fruit to generate fallback access mechanisms rather than risk detection by attempting to watch the watchers. Some state-nexus actors, however, take a very counterintelligence-oriented approach to operations. This tends to occur when an actor’s explicit goal is not immediate acquisition of specific information, but rather is wide-ranging and persistent access over the long term. In their minds, to safeguard continuing access — which is their operational raison d’être — they <em>need</em> that eye on blue team personnel not just as an early warning mechanism, but also to inform any counter-defensive moves necessary to forestall or otherwise complicate an incident response. Herein lies the insight: actors that choose to accept the risk of acquiring blue team surveillance are likely after long-term access rather than fulfilling immediate collection requirements, and actors that can pull this off tend to be mature, disciplined, and counterintelligence savvy.</p><p>During the course of knocking this perspective around with someone smarter than myself, we arrived at a neat metaphor: Harry Potter and his invisibility cloak. Let’s say Harry is our threat actor, and his goal is to get into Professor Snape’s office to get the answers to an upcoming Potions exam. Harry’s inside Hogwarts already and is moving to Snape’s office under his invisibility cloak. At this point, there are two primary ways Harry could get caught:</p><ol><li>Something unexpected happens (e.g., someone bumps into Harry; he makes a mistake that draws attention, like sneezing; Mad-Eye Moody is patrolling the halls and sees through Harry’s cloak with his magic eye; etc.)</li><li>He’s caught doing something (e.g., someone sees Harry when he reaches out of the cloak to open a door, move something out of his way, takes something, etc.)</li></ol><p>In either case, if Harry is disciplined, the latter case is the more likely scenario of him getting caught…but it’s also really the point of using the cloak to begin with. When he sticks part of his body outside the cloak for any reason, Harry really needs to make it count because that’s when he’s at his most vulnerable to detection. In terms of tradecraft, Harry wants to reach out from the cloak as few times as possible <em>and</em> he wants to avoid putting himself in proximity to people who might be on the lookout for anything abnormal unless absolutely necessary. There are some surprisingly clean parallels to cyber operations here:</p><ul><li>Someone bumping into Harry is analogous to a lucky blue teamer happening to catch something in the network that just seems “off”.</li><li>Harry making a mistake that draws attention is similar to an actor having an OPSEC failure or getting snagged in a technical detection.</li><li>Mad-Eye Moody’s eye can be seen as akin to threat intelligence being used to correlate indicators of compromise.</li></ul><p>But it all comes back to Harry knowing that sticking his arm out is the period of greatest danger during his hijinks, because that’s when he’s taking himself outside the parameters of what should be generally safe for him. And it would be exponentially more risky to do so in the vicinity of Mad-Eye Moody, the guy whose eye can see through invisibility cloaks!</p><p>The imperfection of this example is that Harry already has persistent access to Hogwarts by virtue of being a student and his risk of loss of general access (i.e., expulsion) is comparatively low. For Harry, it makes operational sense to limit the scope of his individual hijinks inside the grounds and it’s an unnecessary risk to try and acquire some kind of visibility into the school’s security when he already has basic tools to defeat it as long as he’s disciplined in how he uses them.</p><p>Things look very different if you’re a Death Eater team tasked by Voldemort to develop persistent access to Hogwarts so as to achieve long-term visibility on multiple, co-located, high-value targets like Harry and Professor Dumbledore. In that situation, the end goal — a state of continuing access, rather than the immediate acquisition of specific data — also carries perpetual risk of detection. To mitigate that risk both at the early and later stages of an operation, it would naturally behoove the Death Eaters to be able have some kind of insight into what Hogwarts security — like Mad-Eye — is up to.</p><p>From the outside, Hogwarts is a pretty hard target. To attempt such an operation, the Death Eaters involved would need extremely disciplined OPSEC and to have an intimate understanding of what and who they are going up against before ever mounting the intrusion. And they should know the risks associated with getting any closer than absolutely necessary to those tasked with keeping them out, especially the paranoid ex-cop with a magical eye. So if the Death Eaters are to have any chance at success, they need to be — like I said before — mature, disciplined, and counterintelligence savvy.</p><p>In the Death Eaters’ case, given their goal, targeting blue assets for surveillance makes sense but requires some serious Dark Arts skill to pull off. But for Harry, it’s a task that more than likely exceeds his capabilities — not to mention his core operational requirements — and fundamentally amounts to a deviation from discipline that puts him at extreme hazard of getting caught.</p><p>Unless Hermoine’s doing his CONOPS for him. Then maybe he has a shot.</p><p><em>Acknowledgements: My thanks to the anonymous friend who helped develop this idea, without whom this blog wouldn’t have been written.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=626a510182e7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Giving the Adversary an Extra Vote]]></title>
            <link>https://horkos.medium.com/giving-the-adversary-an-extra-vote-48f4e871b884?source=rss-7510089dd2e8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/48f4e871b884</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vulnerability]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[influence-operations]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Horkos]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 08 Mar 2021 05:07:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-03-10T06:52:56.053Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/725/1*aVz2qGhg62RTvdJERTEXEA.jpeg" /><figcaption>So please, get off the furniture.</figcaption></figure><p>Whenever the cybersecurity community — technical analysts, policy wonks, government officials, journalists on the beat, etc. — talk about how we perceive or interpret a threat publicly, we are providing material that could be exploited by the responsible adversary in a feedback loop. This feedback loop may inform how that adversary conducts its future operations, to include how it determines what goals and effects are attainable. This dynamic is not limited to cyber threats: the adage that “The enemy gets a vote” is as ubiquitous as it is old for a reason. But I believe <strong>in the case of state-nexus cyber threats</strong>, the manner in which some of the loudest voices in our field discuss threats currently is so distortive as to outright enable a degree of adversary advantage.</p><p>Just over two months ago, I said this in response to the tone of how a major outlet was covering a large-scale campaign of cyber espionage:</p><h3>JavaScript is not available.</h3><p>The continued inability for the American body politic (media/politicians/public) to accept a cyber espionage campaign as just that - intel collection - shows we aren&#39;t talking about the actual op anymore. We are talking to ourselves about ourselves. And adversaries are listening.</p><p>In that outlet’s latest <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/07/us/politics/microsoft-solarwinds-hack-russia-china.html">reporting</a> regarding U.S. government responses to multiple instances of malicious state-nexus cyber activity — none of which has involved a demonstrated attack component (i.e., disruption, denial, degradation, or destruction initiated and performed via cyber means) — two statements caught my eye: first, the current state of affairs was described as one of “escalating cyberconflict”; and second, recently disclosed <a href="https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/">China-nexus activity</a> was characterized as potentially “a prelude to far more destructive activity”.</p><p>In short, both of these characterizations are — in my opinion — dangerously incorrect.</p><p>Despite high-profile disclosures related to supply chain compromise activity or the exploitation multiple zero-days in a key piece of software, neither of these things are signs of conflict escalation. What they are is reflections of what has been the state of play for quite some time, except now the mainstream discourse happens to be paying closer attention. Non-Five Eyes (FVEY) governments have and will continue to pursue espionage objectives through cyber operational means, often without the kind of target discrimination that Western audiences feel amounts to “playing fair” despite the fact that FVEY governments (including the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/23/opinion/russia-united-states-hack.html">U.S.</a>) do similar things.</p><p>Certain hostile activity may be exceptionally sophisticated or large in scale and scope, but what we’ve seen over the last several months is by no means tactically unprecedented or even particularly vicious by existing standards. For example, neither of these developments involved denying critical infrastructure to human beings (see: Ukraine, 2015 &amp; 2016) or disrupted a significant global event (see: the PyeongChang 2018 Olympics). Instead, media reporting and statements by political figures have sought to frame activity as escalatory — if not down right threatening — purely on the basis of scale. What has taken shape appears to be the pursuit of adversary parity in operational discrimination on the basis of histrionics.</p><p>Now take the recently-disclosed China-nexus activity, wherein multiple zero-day vulnerabilities were (and are) being exploited to compromise Microsoft Exchange servers. Here’s what that initial activity boils down to in terms of “escalation”:</p><h3>JavaScript is not available.</h3><p>Imagine using four 0days to drop *Chopper*</p><p>Now, by no means do I intend to downplay the massive scale of recent Exchange server compromises, the general risks of such compromises (especially should an eCrime actor use one as a foothold for eventual ransomware delivery), or the time and effort that will go into remediating them — “F”s in the chat for the incident response community. But, at the time of this writing, I have seen nothing offered to support the idea that the state-nexus component of this malicious activity has particularly disruptive/destructive intent — latent or otherwise — aside from how large its victim pool is. While the <a href="https://twitter.com/C_C_Krebs/status/1368004411545579525?s=20">precise reason</a> for the speed with which this activity’s volume grew remains unclear, it is apparent to <a href="https://twitter.com/likethecoins/status/1367992657859973123?s=20">knowledgable cybersecurity practitioners</a> that multiple actors are now at work and that not all of them necessarily appear to have a state-nexus.</p><p>As was the <a href="https://twitter.com/WylieNewmark/status/1364275174699368451">case</a> of justifying likely sanctions related to recent supply chain compromise activity, I can only interpret the rush to characterize the Chinese state-nexus exploitation of these vulnerabilities as somehow laced with latent destructive intent as an attempt — yet again — to find a fig leaf with which to condemn something that we shouldn’t be necessarily surprised by.</p><p>And it is in the selection of that fig leaf that we give the adversary an extra vote in how future activity will be dealt with. In two cases of noteworthy intrusion sets, the breaking point by the U.S. government appears to have been defined as: “<em>Absent target discrimination, state-nexus activity at a certain scale is automatically considered to pose a destructive effect risk — no matter what the activity itself actually looks like</em>.” In the wake of events like <a href="https://twitter.com/WylieNewmark/status/1288917877484126208?s=20">NotPetya and WannaCry</a>, such a (gasp) red line does not seem entirely surprising, but it sacrifices reality on the altar of political rationale while expecting <a href="https://twitter.com/jckichen/status/1288911317202423808?s=20">adversaries’ ethics</a> to mirror our own. This presents two risks:</p><ul><li>The U.S. government, itself a fan of cyber operations at scale, incentivizes reciprocal punishment against itself should foreign governments choose to pointedly attribute America cyber activities. Calling another nation hypocritical is something government spokespeople the world over relish, and could be a powerful narrative vehicle for hardliners abroad to justify actions that might actually be reasonably described as escalatory.</li><li>As I’ve said <a href="https://twitter.com/WylieNewmark/status/1345458286095601666?s=20">before</a>, the more we are seen wringing our hands and playing the victim in a game that FVEY nations play at scale regularly, the more we show our adversaries how to manipulate public narratives through future operations that are — in the grand scheme of things — business as usual. <a href="https://twitter.com/jckichen/status/1368323026886873093?s=20">Mature threat actors</a> not only pay attention to the collateral effects of their activity, but the responses to those effects, and incorporate those lessons into future operations.</li></ul><p>This is the truest essence of the “extra vote”. Choosing hyperbolic outrage over nuanced analysis of <strong>what actually happened</strong> in response to an incident weakens our defense against future malicious activity while also reinforcing to adversaries that they can send us into a tailspin of FUD without having to engage in anything more than large volumes of non-disruptive activity. Having written about <a href="https://horkos.medium.com/a-last-clever-knot-26fd26765e8d">what that might look like</a>, I am increasingly concerned that exploitation of exaggerated threat perceptions will be a powerful tactic for adversaries in the years to come.</p><p>The real threat in cybersecurity that I feel deserves more of a “Chicken Little” amount of urgency is the <a href="https://twitter.com/kikta/status/1281397638752088065">code quality problem</a> that quietly persists, continuing to represent an ever-growing boon to state-nexus and eCrime adversaries alike. But that’s not something that can be sanctioned or is likely to sell digital newspaper subscriptions.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=48f4e871b884" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Incoherence of Cyber Deterrence]]></title>
            <link>https://horkos.medium.com/the-incoherence-of-cyber-deterrence-c78253372eb1?source=rss-7510089dd2e8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c78253372eb1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-espionage]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[deterrence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyberattack]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Horkos]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 22 Feb 2021 19:31:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-02-23T06:35:30.856Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*qKFBsZOgyKeKJNDfUj-auA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Did you write an op-ed calling for the deterrence of foreign states’ cyber operations?</figcaption></figure><p>I love to repeat myself:</p><h3></h3><p>I think the idea that computer network exploitation (aka cyber espionage) can be deterred is a fantasy. It can be impeded, complicated, etc. -- but it is now a fixture of the permanent intelligence landscape, just as much as SIGINT collection and running of HUMINT assets. (1/2)</p><p>In light of the most recent “<a href="https://twitter.com/RepMikeRogers/status/1363869048728154113?s=20">op-ed by someone who ostensibly should know better</a>”, I had a few thoughts (beyond <a href="https://twitter.com/WylieNewmark/status/1363898653849583619?s=20">my op-ed specific ones</a>) on the persistent incoherence related to cyber operations that seems to pervade any discussion wherein the idea of deterrence rears it’s head these days.</p><p>While the fundamental concepts of deterrence as a psychological phenomenon and the components of proportionality, reciprocity, and (coercive) credibility remain viable outside of discussions about use of nuclear weapons, deterrence theory itself is intrinsically linked to the Cold War experience that was defined by the global sword of Damocles that was a potential US-USSR nuclear exchange. When the idea of deterrence is invoked today, those invoking it — consciously or otherwise — tend to be doing so in a context shaped by the dynamics surrounding nuclear weapons. When talking about deterring anything aside from the use of force (nuclear or otherwise), most peoples’ frame of reference is still grounded in that “use of force” experience.</p><p>It’s when you try to apply a concept purely incubated in discussions about the use of force, especially overwhelming force, to threats that don’t necessarily involve the use of force (like intelligence activities) that the concept becomes functionally incoherent but retains rhetorical value because it just <em>sounds comforting.</em></p><p>State-nexus cyber operations — including computer network exploitation (CNE; aka cyber espionage) and non-kinetic computer network attack (CNA; aka cyberattack) — do not fit the same basic characteristics of nuclear weapons usage. But because such malicious cyber activity, like terrorism or nuclear weapons exchange before it, is the “pervasive threat of the moment”, everyone seems to rush to try and apply the comforting framework of deterrence (especially deterrence by punishment) to it just because it’s there and is easily understood by most people. But in application to state-mounted cyber operations, its flawed to say the least.</p><p>Primarily, it ignores that cyber espionage is now and will remain an intrinsic part of how intelligence collection is conducted. You shouldn’t try to “deter” CNE any more than you try and deter HUMINT or SIGINT. It’s just going to happen, and everyone who is capable of it should be expected to try it. You can and should take measures to forestall, complicate, impede, degrade, and even disrupt it — running the gamut from basic security hygiene to offensive counterintelligence — but you will not be able to deter it in the total sense that it feels like we constantly hear called for in op-eds and interviews.</p><p>The obvious counterpoint to this argument is that CNE is a necessary, and sometimes sufficient, condition for CNA. That is absolutely true. But that doesn’t mean that all CNE is necessarily conducted for the purpose of CNA objectives and thus should be treated as such. That lets fear of the worst-cast scenario dictate your threat perceptions, which is not practical or realistic. If you take the time to understand how state-nexus adversaries (and the entities that task them) actually conceive, plan, and execute cyber operations then you realize that there are <a href="https://twitter.com/WylieNewmark/status/1354838946136674308?s=20">significant observables</a> in network activity that can help you to differentiate between collection- versus attack-oriented CNE activity. (As the U.S. government <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news/2021/01/05/joint-statement-federal-bureau-investigation-fbi-cybersecurity-and-infrastructure">apparently has been able to</a> with regard to recently reported activity.) And understanding how CNA is actually conducted can help you absorb the reality that generating substantive effects via CNA is <a href="https://twitter.com/ILDannyMoore/status/1358900695001403398?s=20">not necessarily as simple as it might appear</a>.</p><p>I do not believe CNE is deterrable via punishment. We must learn to treat it with nuance in regards to its potential to CNA delivery, but otherwise accept that it’s here to stay as a fixture of intelligence collection enterprises the world over. I believe CNE can only be deterred via denial insomuch as the defensive bar can be raised to impede an actor from achieving their objectives against a given target <em>or</em> actor efforts can be degraded via offensive counterintelligence to reduce either their capacity or will to engage in a particular action. This appears to be the operative logic of Defend Forward/Persistent Engagement, albeit widely misunderstood.</p><p>In the vast majority of discussions where cyber espionage (under whatever misnomer) and deterrence are referenced together, it appears to be based on the idea of deterrence via punishment to effect a substantial — if not total — reduction in such activity. In my opinion, this is a fantasy and so my casual take is and has been that “CNE cannot be deterred”.</p><p>Insomuch as CNE is necessary for CNA, and implant staging without execution is already an apparently common practice by relevant actors, I do not think that operational preparation of the environment (OPE) for CNA can be effectively deterred in any sense approaching totality. To me, CNA OPE falls into the same space with CNE: it can be impeded via denial or degradation, but we cannot prevent the phenomenon entirely. It is my opinion that there are likely mechanisms of both punishment (latent or immediate) and denial that (A) exist and (B) have been used to deter the delivery of CNA effects/action-on-objectives. I imagine these mechanisms and incidents are classified, are unlikely to be made public anytime soon, and include incidents far below the “critical infrastructure” target scope that everyone is always riled up about; think about how offensive counterintelligence or covert action could take the form of highly discrete CNA operations.</p><p>Thus, my sound-byte answer on the “is CNA deterrable?” question is that I believe that CNA delivery/actions-on-objectives can be imperfectly deterred.</p><p>Finally, I believe that the people we see making vague calls for what sounds suspiciously like deterrence via punishment are the same people who would get very upset at the U.S. government for “tipping it’s hand” if those CNA deterrence mechanisms I alluded to above were to be disclosed. And if a public act of punishment were to ever generate blowback, those people would also be the first to say “That’s not what I meant by doing something to deter threat actors!”.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c78253372eb1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Pressing Problems and Slippery Slopes: Developing an Offensive Response to Ransomware]]></title>
            <link>https://horkos.medium.com/pressing-problems-and-slippery-slopes-developing-an-offensive-response-to-ransomware-9606da65d409?source=rss-7510089dd2e8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9606da65d409</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ransomware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-operations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[law-enforcement]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Horkos]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 05 Feb 2021 21:45:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-02-05T22:28:42.259Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/910/1*tW_BgKBaWI1VriWasE5s3w.jpeg" /><figcaption>Rarely serious enough to warrant a Hellfire as opposed to deactivation of C2 infrastructure.</figcaption></figure><p>The other day, I saw a poll on Twitter about if it was reasonable to employ lethal force on ransomware operators. I had a number of thoughts, which I shared at length:</p><h3></h3><p>Ransomware, while disruptive and potentially having other physical effects, when employed by non-state-nexus actors for the purposes of revenue generation is criminal activity. Employing military tactics to address crime is colossally bad idea. (Militarizing the cyber police!) https://t.co/9rcOillMHE</p><p>It came to my attention today that there appear to be some misinterpretations of my remarks, specifically that they amounted a blanket rejection of offensive measures to respond to ransomware threats. To be clear, my previous comments were focused on advocating against kinetic measures, not every option under the offensive sun. But in discussing these misconceptions with colleagues, I came to a set of personal assessments that I think impact this debate.</p><p>It seems with regard to pursuit of offensive measures to respond to ransomware, the challenge is at least three-fold.</p><p>First is that there is a lack of symmetric and sufficient defenses across the potential victim landscape. This is essentially the oldest and most persistent problem in information security. As established as the problem is, it is equally obvious that it also remains one of the hardest to solve given the scale and resource gaps between individual potential victim entities. I won’t pretend to have a silver bullet idea here, but I will say that I see this problem as being a driving factor behind the desire for an offensive means to address ransomware: the defensive challenges are so great that one can’t help but look for a potential offensive alternative.</p><p>The second challenge is that while defenses are so individualistic on a victim-to-victim basis so as to lead people to scramble for offensive means to disrupt ransomware operations, law enforcement lacks such a demonstrable capacity for rapid and proactive containment of the ransomware threat generally. On the other hand, the U.S. military — specifically CYBERCOM — has demonstrated such at least elements of such a capacity. Thus Title 10 activities become attractive solutions rather quickly. And those activities are not without precedent:</p><ul><li>CYBERCOM itself <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/cyber-command-trickbot-disrupt/2020/10/09/19587aae-0a32-11eb-a166-dc429b380d10_story.html">reportedly targeted the Trickbot network</a> on the grounds of bolstering security surrounding the 2020 election, particularly in relation to ransomware threats.</li><li>That reported CYBERCOM activity very likely was conducted in concert with <a href="https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/10/12/trickbot-ransomware-cyberthreat-us-elections/">publicly acknowledged actions by Microsoft</a> that also targeted Trickbot. The targeting of Trickbot did <a href="https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/wizard-spider-adversary-update/">result in some operational degradation but these impacts were not sustained</a>. However, the apparent coordination does contribute a significant element of public-private coordination to the “offensive Title 10 solutions” precedent.</li><li>From a foreign perspective, Australia’s ASD has conducted operations to <a href="https://twitter.com/iiyonite/status/1248222849724231680">disable the infrastructure</a> of cyber criminals operating abroad.</li></ul><p>The third challenge, which relates to the second (i.e., law enforcement lacking a standing capacity to expeditiously and proactively contain the ransomware threat) is that law enforcement approaches tend to be case-centric: build cases that can secure indictments that prosecutors can take to court fairly assured of a conviction or at least a plea. In the case of ransomware, this is at loggerheads with the need to swiftly interdict ransomware operations at all phases of an intrusion so as preempt disruptive impacts of successful ransomware deployments. Meanwhile, Title 10 options — like disabling C2 infrastructure or conducting other degradation measures (such as influence operations, including hinting at a doxxing capacity) — offer that attractive quality of being able to confront ransomware’s disruptive potential directly.</p><p>The overarching problem I see moving forward is how we can pursue an offensive approach to ransomware while avoiding the slippery slope of a totally militarized response. While I don’t have a silver bullet idea here either, I think <a href="https://twitter.com/C_C_Krebs/status/1357683809479761921">Chris Krebs’s comments in the Financial Times</a> offer a good starting point for discussions on how to shape that approach.</p><p>At the end of the day, I think <a href="https://medium.com/u/183c382d4c4d">Yoshi</a> has proffered the end state I’d most like to see when it comes to having a proactive/offensive mechanism to counter ransomware operators and their activities:</p><h3></h3><p>When we talk USG efforts against ransomware, I am fully onboard with building international, public/private coalitions focused on degrading ransomware actors via law enforcement actions &amp; legal process over unilateral DoD Title 10 authorized operations.</p><p>But it’s gonna take a lot of work.</p><p><em>Acknowledgements: My gratitude to </em><a href="https://twitter.com/C_C_Krebs/"><em>Chris Krebs</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://twitter.com/chicagocyber"><em>Yoshi/ChicagoCyber</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://twitter.com/livefromtheabys"><em>不動智 — TechnoPrimitives</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://twitter.com/Viking_Sec"><em>Viking_Sec</em></a><em>, and </em><a href="https://twitter.com/colemankane"><em>Coleman Kane</em></a><em> whose perspectives and dialogue helped shape my views as expressed in this blog.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9606da65d409" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Last Clever Knot?]]></title>
            <link>https://horkos.medium.com/a-last-clever-knot-26fd26765e8d?source=rss-7510089dd2e8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/26fd26765e8d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[counterintelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[influence-operations]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Horkos]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2020 01:56:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-01-26T16:31:54.080Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/806/1*WZttcR-G9Nv56Fyl4zKJlA.jpeg" /><figcaption>“It’s the start, I should tell you now, of a very, very, clever knot.” (from the BBC’s Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy)</figcaption></figure><p><em>Note: This blog has been updated as of 19 November 2020 to incorporate additional material, which is preceded by an asterisk.</em></p><p>On 22 October, 2020, the U.S. government issued an <a href="https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-296a">alert</a> (AA20–296A) for a widespread campaign of malicious activity by a Russian state-sponsored cyber operations entity tracked under a variety of industry monikers. This activity took place between at least September 2020 and October 2020, with its targeting focused on a large volume of entities associated with U.S. state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) networks and aviation sector networks. The Russian entity named as responsible has been linked to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) by <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-officials-say-russian-government-hackers-have-penetrated-energy-and-nuclear-company-business-networks/2017/07/08/bbfde9a2-638b-11e7-8adc-fea80e32bf47_story.html">the Washington Post</a> in connection to past activity attributed by the <a href="https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A">U.S. government</a> to “Russian government cyber actors” and by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/22/us/politics/russia-election-interference-hacks.html">the New York Times</a> in relation to AA20–296A; for the sake of argument let’s say that attribution is plausible, if not correct. (*For additional context, Joe Slowik has also published an exceptional <a href="https://pylos.co/2020/11/04/the-enigmatic-energetic-bear/">blog</a> on the history and implications of this entity and its operations.) I’d rather not try to summarize all the activity described in the alert here, but instead to address its operational logic and how it can be taken as a likely exemplar of Russian active measures: an insidious blend of offensive counterintelligence and influence operations that, in the words of George Smiley, “would be beautiful in another context.”</p><p>The operation’s apparent targeting parameters provide our first clear clue. While the scope was clearly focused geographically on the United States and sectorally on SLTT-related entities, the described scale — in both the text of the alert (e.g., “wide variety of U.S. targets”, “targeted dozens of SLTT government and aviation networks”, a one-off reference to at least one apparent education sector target likely related to SLTT networks) and a *subsequently published <a href="https://indd.adobe.com/view/64463245-3411-49f9-b203-1c7cb8f16769">heat map</a> — is relatively large. To my eye, an operation so large against that target scope casts some doubt on as to how much actual value its operators reasonably could have expected to draw from the activity if the intention was intelligence collection in advance of the U.S. presidential election in November 2020. Regardless of if it relied on the same logic, the U.S. government seems to have arrived at a similar conclusion, not mentioning a possible collection motive but rather that “…the actor may be seeking access to obtain future disruption options, to influence U.S. policies and actions, or to delegitimize SLTT government entities.”</p><p>I would take that conclusion a bit further. I believe these targeting parameters suggest a different motive than either intelligence collection or acquiring network/system disruption options, because in either case — facing the election day time crunch — the actor would focus their targeting much more narrowly if they really needed to deliver results. I am disinclined to believe the FSB (for the sake of argument) would invest the time and effort required of such a large operation, so close to a major event of strategic significance (i.e., the U.S. presidential election), if it was really meant as a shotgun approach to acquire options or data. If those requirements existed, they would’ve certainly predated September 2020 and been the subject of more highly-targeted activity before autumn.</p><p>Our second clue is the tradecraft employed: exploit-chaining that relies on the “CVE greatest hits” of the last few years. Given the aforementioned asymmetries within the targeting parameters, the picture I see emerging is something akin to the actor artificially constructing a game reserve and then opportunistically hunting within it. The targeting parameters are the game reserve: entities in the United States, associated with SLTT government no matter how tangentially. The heavy reliance on exploit chaining — easily enough automated — is the opportunistic hunting, so opportunistic that it borders on indiscriminate. Yet it remains confined to the boundaries of the artificial reserve. With that kind of model, a viable goal emerges in my mind: the offensive counterintelligence effect known as degradation.</p><p>I have previously <a href="https://youtu.be/4XTTYr5rrrw?t=883">talked</a> about the potential degradation functions of large-scale targeted intrusion campaigns. Such campaigns require defensive efforts to be expended by a large group of particular public and private sector entities. From initial incident responders potentially all the way up to senior government officials, this effort ripples upward and outward as it gathers steam. From a counterintelligence perspective, this exertion and the anxieties that accompany it serve the function of frustrating an adversary on multiple levels. (In an academic sense, it is an interesting example of capitalizing on Clausewitzian friction.) The anxiety element of such friction also presents further exploitable possibilities.</p><p>Specifically, an actor could <a href="https://youtu.be/4XTTYr5rrrw?t=929">harness</a> the collateral psychological effects of such a degradation-oriented campaign for the purpose of active measures, including influence operations, against a wide variety of audiences. In essence, the psychological stress endured by blue team personnel and decision-makers is both the core degradation effect as well as the first-order influence impact. The second-order influence impacts would be directed at any individuals that responders et al. would tell about their trials and tribulations, including individuals who may inform the press or general public. Thus, the third-order influence impacts could affect at least a portion of the wider public. And once you are trying to get average people to wrap their heads around a campaign like that, you can count on pitfalls of the domestic information environment to help do some of the heavy lifting for the adversary when it comes to FUD (fear, uncertainty, doubt) generation. The anxiety that was primarily designed to wear down security and government communities now has actual potential to cause alarm among a susceptible percentage of the public.</p><p>I personally think there’s a good chance that the reported activity was intended primarily as a degradation operation targeting the U.S. government and secondarily as an influence operation against both the U.S. government and the American public. In that sense, I’m advocating for the potential motives of “influence U.S. policies and actions” and “delegitimize SLTT government entities” as described in AA20–296A. I base this on the reported targeting parameters and tradecraft employed, as well as the effects possible from both counterintelligence- and active measures-oriented operational planning perspectives. To return to my earlier metaphor: the opportunistic hunting within the chosen game reserve in such close temporal proximity to the election would present ideal conditions for that ripple-upward-and-outward anxiety that is so ripe for exploitation. In particular, the politicization of the integrity of the election presents some extraordinary opportunities for undermining faith in democratic institutions — to include elections and their outcomes — and maybe sow a little general chaos in the process. It would be most Chekist in its logic.</p><p>There is, again to paraphrase le Carré’s Smiley, a last clever knot. I think of it as a dead man’s switch for the influence operation goals of this activity. It revolves around whether or not the activity is disclosed and ensuring some level of effects across a variety of scenarios. If the activity is discovered but not publicly disclosed, at least the first-order targets and some of the second-order targets have been impacted. If the activity is made public by entities other than the U.S. government, then first-order, second-order, and third-order target sets are impacted to at least some degree. If the U.S. government chooses to disclose the activity, all three orders of targets are impacted and the potential for general alarm among the public increases because an official government announcement almost guarantees a greater minimum level of public consumption (including via media amplification). It even may be the actor’s intent to make this latter potential evident in some way to government decision-makers as an attempt to create a disclination to disclose or attribute the activity, knowing that internal debate over what course of action to take could intensify friction within relevant government entities.</p><p>However, that third option — disclosure and attribution by the U.S. government — offers significant positive trade-offs that could counter the some of the intended effects of such activity, if done properly. Being the first to disclose, and disclosing in sufficient detail, would grant the U.S. government a strong opportunity to set the narrative and in doing so potentially engage in some meaningful inoculation of the general public against misunderstanding, manipulation, and panic. It also presents a chance to throw the adversary off their operational timelines, as a bit of retaliatory degradation. There of course remains the very real risk that the actor responsible may still leverage knowledge gained in this activity in a variety of ways both during and after election day (e.g., so-called “perception hacks”, hack-and-leak operations, website defacements, system/network disruptions, etc.); however, those possibilities would exist regardless of if the underlying activity was disclosed or not.</p><p>*There also exists the risk that domestic actors, not just the foreign ones associated with the SLTT-targeted intrusion activity, could attempt to use the existence of the aforementioned activity to bolster independent efforts (e.g., legal challenges, influence narratives, etc.) meant call into question the validity of the outcome of the election. Kudos to <a href="https://twitter.com/kyleehmke/status/1324760801803120641">Kyle Ehmke</a> for pointing out this very important point. It is likely that the actor responsible for the activity covered in AA20–296A anticipated, and even desired, that their actions could be potentially exploited in such a manner by domestic actors.</p><p>In the spirt of that third option well-executed, I believe the 22 October disclosure represents a meaningful response to Russian active measures. Some may view it as a pyrrhic victory in the absence of some kind of tangible cost imposition like indictments or disruption of adversary networks, but to take that stance ignores the more intangible, subtle dynamics likely at play. To be clear — I do not attempt to say the theory I’ve outlined definitely is what this activity represents, merely that I think there is sufficient evidence to make a good case for it. In the same vein, I must acknowledge there are details about the reported activity that I do not know and those details could weaken or outright contradict my theory. However, at the end of the day, I fundamentally remain impressed with the adversary’s apparent logic — at least from how I perceive it — and feel further secured in the belief that to not respect your adversary’s capacity for cunning is hubristic.</p><p><em>Disclaimer: As a reminder, all views expressed on this blog, including this post, solely represent my personal views and not those my employer.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=26fd26765e8d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Ya hya chouhada Muad’Dib!]]></title>
            <link>https://horkos.medium.com/ya-hya-chouhada-muaddib-7cace324cb22?source=rss-7510089dd2e8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7cace324cb22</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[frank-herbert]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[terrorism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dune]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[counterinsurgency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Horkos]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2020 17:51:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-10T23:17:36.552Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FVokp2gWrO1WJ03xZv5yGQ.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>“Long live the fighters of Muad’Dib!” (from SyFy’s “Frank Herbert’s Dune” miniseries)</em></figcaption></figure><p>In 2014, as part of my terrorism coursework for graduate school, one of my assignments was to write a manifesto of a fictional terrorist group explaining why (or why not) that group should use violence, and the accompanying implications of such a choice. The purpose of this exercise was to force us as researchers to simulate the sort of thinking required of leading figures in terrorist groups if they are to succeed in convincing compatriots and recruits that the leaders’ strategies are valid.</p><p>I chose to take my inspiration from Frank Herbert’s science fiction masterpiece <em>Dune</em>, and offered a simulated treatise on how Paul-Muad’Dib Atreides devised the Fremen insurgency on the desert planet Arrakis. I hope you enjoy it.</p><p><em>From the diary of Duke Paul-Muad’Dib Atreides, on Arrakis, approximate date 10,192.</em></p><p>It behooves me to explain the state of affairs that persists as I write. Last year, House Atreides was given the planet fiefdom of Arrakis by the Imperial Emperor of House Corrino. Arrakis, the desolate desert planet that is the sole in the producer of the spice (the necessary chemical for the long-range interstellar commerce within the Galactic Padishah Empire), was ostensibly presented to my father Duke Leto by Emperor Shaddam IV as a token of respect and confidence. However, Arrakis was in fact meant to serve as a tomb to my family and House: the Emperor, jealous of my father’s rising popularity and fearful of his small but skilled military, allied with my family’s ancient rival House Harkonnen, the previous rulers of Arrakis. Shaddam used the ongoing vendetta between my father and Baron Vladimir Harkonnen to deploy his elite Sardaukar troops — in secret and dressed in Harkonnen livery — to Arrakis in 10,191, decimate my House, and murder my father.</p><p>My mother and I fled into the desert, where we were taken in by the indigenous people known as the Fremen (who had previously allied with my father shortly before his death). Now, House Harkonnen rules Arrakis again and brutally oppresses the Fremen in pursuit of stability and profit. They are unaware of the survival of my mother and myself, a fact that has allowed us integrate ourselves deeply into Fremen tribal communities of the deep desert where the Harkonnen dare not go. In that greater community, I have achieved a position of leadership and respect through my fighting ability, strategic thinking, and subtle manipulation of the Fremen’s messianic belief in a <em>Lisan al-Gaib</em> (an offworlder who will come and lead them to paradise) — all of which comprise my hybrid Atreides-Fremen identity as Paul-Muad’Dib. Meanwhile, the Harkonnen only venture out of their few cities and garrisons either in pursuit of spice production or in futile, yet wantonly vicious, attempts to instill control over the desert Fremen.</p><p>The Fremen, meanwhile, have nothing in the way of what could be considered traditional means of redress against the Harkonnen. Known for their brutality and cruelty, House Harkonnen does not care for the well-being of Dune’s inhabitants but instead only for steady spice production. And the rest of the Imperium, cripplingly dependent on spice for all interplanetary commerce, cares only for the same. Excepting my family’s brief rule of Arrakis, the Fremen have continually suffered slaughter at the hands of offworlders: during the Sardaukar-Harkonnen invasion approximately twenty thousand were killed, and around nine thousand more by Harkonnen forces since then.¹ The great majority of these are not combat deaths — they are mass killings bordering on pogroms aimed at pacifying a restless indigenous population. And while nigh on thirty thousand does not near endangering the total Fremen population of close to ten million — most secreted throughout around five hundred cave communities (“sietches”) in the deep desert — it is still a meaningful toll nonetheless.²</p><p>There is no voice in Imperium advocating for the human or political rights of the Fremen. The Imperium is a feudal system, and within a feudal system subjects of one ruler are that ruler’s business and no one else’s. Especially given the galactic demand for spice, the Imperium is even more apt to turn a blind eye to the viciousness of the Harkonnen so as long as the spice flows. In fact, my father was the first governor of Arrakis who ever attempted to legitimately win the support and loyalty of the Fremen — a fact I have not let go to waste as I have built my influence among them.</p><p>I am in a similar position. My family was conspired against by the most powerful leaders in the Imperium, and I am believed dead. Should I announce my survival to the galaxy, I would either be called a charlatan or assassinated — most likely both. By circumstance and geography, the only allies available to the Fremen and I are each other, which builds on my House’s earlier sincere attempt to align with them. So while the Fremen and I have mutually accepted one another, we individually and collectively lack peaceful domestic or interplanetary mechanisms with which to attempt to change our overlapping conditions. I believe that this leaves only one viable avenue for us both in light of their goal of ending their subjugation and my goal of restoring my family to its rightful place: violence.</p><p>Without any method of nonviolent redress or recourse, in the face of butchery and subjugation, it is only natural for a group to turn its thoughts to violence. In the case of the Fremen, it is not something unfamiliar to them. Aside from the brief period of Atreides rule, Fremen insurgents operated at varying levels of magnitude against all previous governors of Arrakis. They are skilled fighters, naturally toughened by growing up on the harshest planet in the Imperium and seasoned by surviving years of oppression. However, their previous campaigns have been incoherent at best. Those who do attack Harkonnen military or spice-harvesting facilities are typically small groups which, while often successful, do little to inflict meaningful damage on the larger Harkonnen apparatus. The attacks amount to harassments that only incite greater Harkonnen fury and bring the Fremen no closer to self-rule. While no Fremen harbor pro-Harkonnen sympathies, many of the deep desert tribes prefer isolation to confronting as technologically superior a foe such as the Harkonnen.</p><p>The concern driving Fremen restraint when it comes to wider employ of violence is essentially two-fold: of the Harkonnen using their established capabilities to attempt larger scale counterinsurgency operations that could endanger Fremen safe havens in the deep desert; and of an intervention by other offworlders should the Fremen succeed in uniting and expelling the Harkonnen given the intergalactic demand for spice. I believe that now that I am present to lead them, both of these concerns can be mitigated, thus paving the way for more concentrated, offensive violent action. The first Fremen concern — regarding Harkonnen capabilities — is now an eminently rectifiable asymmetry. The Fremen outnumber the Harkonnen on-planet by whole orders of magnitude, and are better fighters as well. The Harkonnen advantage lies in technology and external support: but a cohesive, all-Fremen effort would be able to effectively dislodge them. So then the problem becomes an internal Fremen one: they are not wholly united in their determination to the meet the Harkonnen threat with force. I am the solution to this dilemma.</p><p>Though the construction of my hybrid Paul-Muad’Dib identity, especially through manipulation of the Fremen belief of <em>Lisan al-Gaib</em> and my ducal right to the governorship of Arrakis, I can fashion myself as the figurehead and voice of a critical mobilizing ideology that can unite the Fremen tribes.³ A whole-Fremen front makes up in capacity what it lacks in technological capability, and a united Fremen would be open to widespread instruction in the weirding way — a deadly martial art known to my mother and I. The result would be an unmatched fighting force with superior knowledge of the battlespace, fulfilling my father’s farsighted belief that “desert power” is essential for combat supremacy on Arrakis.⁴ For example, the Harkonnen may control the air with their fleet of ornithopters, but masses of trained Fremen riding gigantic sandworms would unquestionably control the desert.</p><p>And not only will that ideology galvanize the Fremen to united action, it will provide an avenue out of their second restraining concern: destruction by offworlders in the event of Harkonnen defeat. Once the planet has been secured under the banner of my rightful ducal claim to governorship, my unique knowledge of the planet’s ecology coupled with my physical control over it will grant me the ability to halt all spice production — permanently. “The power to destroy a thing is the absolute control over it.”⁵ That threat will allow me to leverage anything from the Emperor and the rest of the Imperium, not least of all preserving the Fremen’s freedom from renewed subjugation.</p><p>Clearly, I am a personified force multiplier for the Fremen, representing a critical acquisition in resources.⁶ But none of that means anything unless I can demonstrate to them that my ideology is worth adopting and that uniting is a feasible option. I must demonstrate the validity and effectiveness of it, and the surest way to that with a Fremen audience is propaganda of the deed. A systematic terrorist campaign against the Harkonnen presents the perfect opportunity to demonstrate the credibility of my ideology and strategy, hopefully creating revolutionary conditions and gathering enough support to surge the campaign into full blown insurgency and insurrection.⁷ Within the campaign there would three strategic logics at work: outbidding isolationist tribes for intra-Fremen credibility, attrit the Harkonnen presence on Arrakis, and provoke the Harkonnen into a response which would galvanize more Fremen to action.⁸</p><p>These logics are reflected in something the late Duncan Idaho, my father’s Ginaz-trained swordmaster and ambassador to the Fremen, once told me:</p><blockquote>When your opponent fears you, then’s the moment when you give the fear its own reign, give it the time to work on him. Let it become terror. The terrified man fights himself. Eventually, he attacks in desperation. That is the most dangerous moment, but the terrified man can be trusted usually to make a fatal mistake. You are being trained here to detect these mistakes and use them.⁹</blockquote><p>Faced with a relentless tempo of Fremen attacks conducted by Fedaykin death commandos, the Harkonnen will likely do two things. First they will panic on a rising scale in proportion to their decreasing loss of a sense of control over Arrakis. And second, in their panic, they will respond the most familiar way they know how: violent oppression, which will spur more Fremen to action in my cause. While some Fremen may still remain on the sidelines, none would take up arms against those of us fighting the Harkonnen; it would be considered among the entire Fremen community anathema to all of their deepest tribal norms relating to duty and honor.¹⁰ It is because of those same norms that I dare not direct any attacks on recalcitrant Fremen tribes aimed at intimidating them into action.¹¹</p><p>The campaign of violence will be dual-pronged. First is an escalation of already ongoing attacks conducted against Harkonnen ruling infrastructure, both physical and human. Harkonnen garrisons and smaller outposts are ideal installation targets, while Harkonnen military personnel and political personnel provide abundant human targets. Fremen collaborators (strictly defined as informers, mercenaries and those benefiting from Harkonnen largesse — so as to avoid inadvertently violating Fremen tribal norms mentioned above) are also viable targets. These attacks will be carried out by Fedaykin in groups ranging in numbers from a fireteam to a platoon, depending on the type and size of target.</p><p>The second and more critical prong will be an unyielding tempo of high-impact attacks on spice-harvesting infrastructure. Target sets will include active harvesting operations, spice storage warehouses, and non-Fremen-aligned smuggling operations. These attacks would utilize forces ranging in number from a single platoon up to a battalion, depending on the size of the target. A combined goal of these two prongs will be to strangle spice production. Lacking spice revenues would weaken the Harkonnen — demonstrating to reluctant Fremen our ability to inflict pain on their oppressors — and force offworld intervention to address the damage we have caused, thus bringing the Emperor and his allies within striking distance. In both cases, Fedaykin losses will be expected. However, I do not foresee losses as deterring Fremen from participating, as death in battle is glorified by their religion. To a lesser extent, Fremen may be convinced to participate in 21st century “fedayeen-style” attacks in which none of the participants are expected to survive if they can be convinced the mission is of sufficient importance to the overall success of the campaign. Regardless, due to religious beliefs, outright suicide attacks will be unfeasible.</p><p>While the circumstances of this campaign echo those of an insurgency, it would be incorrect to characterize my proposed campaign as such — yet. The initial operations would in reality more closely resemble terrorist operations mounted from safe havens (i.e., sietches the deep desert) in hopes of rousing the wider support necessary to propel the campaign into an insurgency capable of effectively seizing and holding enemy territory. While we now have the operational strength equal to several brigades, hopefully as our effectiveness is demonstrated by our deeds we will amass entire divisions of fighters to overcome those of the Harkonnen. Not only will these fighters already naturally be accustomed to operating in Arrakis’ harsh climate, they will be dispersed and concealed within the unforgiving desert and thus not present a clear geographic center of gravity for the Harkonnen to target. Operationally, they will generally plan and execute attacks from the sietch level (each participating sietch will likely have several companies of fighters at its disposal), but all large-scale operations will be coordinated at some level with a high command led by myself and key tribal leaders.</p><p><em>Endnotes:</em></p><p>[1] Frank Herbert, <em>Dune</em>. (New York: Ace Books, 1990), p. 375.</p><p>[2] Herbert, pp. 375–376.</p><p>[3] Herbert, pp. 426–429.</p><p>[4] Herbert, pp. 89–90.</p><p>[5] Herbert, p. 476.</p><p>[6] Martha Crenshaw, “The logic of terrorism: Terrorist behavior as a product of strategic choice.” In <em>Origins of Terrorism</em>. Walter Reich ed. (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1990), p. 58.</p><p>[7] Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” <em>International Security</em>, Volume 31, Number 1, Summer 2006, p.58; Crenshaw, p. 60.</p><p>[8] Kydd and Walter, pp. 59–60, 69–70, 76.</p><p>[9] Herbert, p. 304.</p><p>[10] Herbert, p. 426.</p><p>[11] Kydd and Walter, pp. 66–67.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7cace324cb22" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[CYBERCOM Apparently Got Half-Baked Ideas for Christmas]]></title>
            <link>https://horkos.medium.com/cybercom-apparently-got-half-baked-ideas-for-christmas-93e25e1bc91c?source=rss-7510089dd2e8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/93e25e1bc91c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Horkos]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 26 Dec 2019 08:18:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-02-25T17:05:45.823Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Note: This blog has been updated since I wrote it at approximately 3:00 AM.</em></p><p>I am increasingly loathe to write blogs, mostly due to the combination of time required and a lack of stories that generate sufficient interest on my part to get me to overcome the time commitment hurdle — I usually just do an obnoxiously long Twitter thread. But then, I read <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/us-cybercom-contemplates-information-warfare-to-counter-russian-interference-in-the-2020-election/2019/12/25/21bb246e-20e8-11ea-bed5-880264cc91a9_story.html">the <em>Washington Post</em>’s latest</a> on what CYBERCOM is apparently considering as deterrent measures against Russian interference in the 2020 U.S. elections. After going through three attempts to write appropriately substantive, albeit admittedly snarky, Twtter threads, I decided this justified a quick (if not still loosely structured) blow-by-blow of my feelings on this.</p><p>I will make a banner statement up top: (1) I do see the value in the <em>tactics</em> described in the article (primarily for offensive counterintelligence as opposed to changing the behavior of an entire government), but not as an election inference deterrent given the reported targeting scope and (2) my thoughts here are going to be incomplete. What follows are chronological block quotes from the article and my immediate reactions to each.</p><blockquote>One option<strong> </strong>being explored by U.S. Cyber Command would target senior leadership and Russian elites, though probably not President Vladimir Putin, which would be considered too provocative, said the current and former officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the issue’s sensitivity. The idea would be to show that the target’s sensitive personal data could be hit if the interference did not stop, though officials declined to be more specific.</blockquote><p>Rather than call these “influence operations” or “information operations”, which they are at a very granular level, I am going to just calling this “doxxing” — because at the end of the day it’s designed to employ the same fundamental dynamics against targets. Doxxing any of these targets below Putin in an effort to stop an election interference campaign is, put briefly, a waste of time in 2019–2020. We can be almost certain that Putin himself demanded the current election interference campaign and any underlings (official or unofficial) who hesitate in execution of their respective tasks in this effort will simply be replaced, one way or another. The key decision-maker is Putin and he, along with his national security apparatus, has already seen that if they power through that they can reap major effects from this kind of activity against an American audience.</p><blockquote>“When the Russians put implants into an electric grid, it means they’re making a credible showing that they have the ability to hurt you if things escalate,” said Bobby Chesney, a law professor at the University of Texas at Austin. “What may be contemplated here is an individualized version of that, not unlike individually targeted economic sanctions. It’s sending credible signals to key decision-makers that they are vulnerable if they take certain adversarial actions.”</blockquote><p>I agree with Bobby Chesney’s view here on what the Russians are doing when they place implants in U.S. critical infrastructure — I’ve even given a <a href="https://youtu.be/4XTTYr5rrrw?t=883">talk</a> on it! However, I think drawing similarities between that activity, which is deeply multifaceted in its drivers, and this is not necessarily the best parallel. I like the “targeted economic sanctions” analogy a little bit better, but again only on a functional level. The “sending credible signals to key decision-makers” element I think breaks down because again, Putin and his service chiefs are the key decision-makers. These ops won’t target Putin and any ops that target service chiefs (e.g., Alexander Bortnikov at FSB, Sergey Naryshkin at SVR, Igor Kostyukov at GRU) will be ones they will be expected to ride out if they want to keep their positions. Ops targeting mid-level officials or the heads of specific capacities might create mild operational drag if it leads to personnel replacement because Ivan Ivanovich is spooked by text messages referencing his embezzlement of service funds, but he will be replaced by the next guy on the rung below rather quickly.</p><p>Again, the idea of “credible signals” breaks down because it demonstrates on the part of CYBERCOM a lack of understanding of contemporary Russian intelligence strategic culture — another topic I’ve <a href="https://medium.com/@horkos/its-a-feature-not-a-bug-discord-observed-in-russian-intelligence-operations-2e2e79c4c8cc">addressed before</a>. Mark Galeotti summed it best in his <a href="http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR_169_-_INSIDE_RUSSIAS_INTELLIGENCE_SERVICES_(WEB_AND_PRINT)_2.pdf">“wartime mindset” analysis</a>, which he has since expanded on <a href="https://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/en/nav-fix-sec-insights/2681-the-intelligence-and-security-services-and-strategic-decision-making.html">multiple</a> <a href="https://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/en/nav-fix-sec-insights/2741-active-measures-russias-covert-geopolitical-operations.html">times</a> to include an increasing centrality of active measures, in that operational risk-taking is increasingly the norm for Russian intelligence services. It is a complex calculus to think that this doxxing might deter individual officials when the operational and organizational culture around them demands they accept substantive personal risk in the conduct of their duties. Hang-on-tight thinking is alive and well in the Russian intelligence community.</p><blockquote>The intelligence community last month issued a classified update — a “national intelligence estimate” — asserting that Russia’s main goal in the 2020 campaign continues to be to sow discord. “It’s always been about exacerbating fault lines in our society,” one senior U.S. official said.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*iBcYI_6s7lkXlGLx05cIqA.gif" /><figcaption>We go live to my reaction.</figcaption></figure><blockquote>In the past year, Congress and the Trump administration have eased restraints on the military’s use of cyber-operations to thwart foreign adversaries…“[CYBERCOM]’s foray into influence operations reflects an evolution in thinking. “It’s a really big deal because we have not done a good job in the past of integrating traditional information warfare with cyber-operations,” Chesney said.</blockquote><h3>Horkos on Twitter</h3><p>Translation: The fact that &quot;clandestine military cyber operations&quot; now include deniable activities that otherwise would trigger the statutory covert action framework but now don&#39;t is probably going to be bad and Congress should feel bad. This does not bring joy. https://t.co/HKkos4Z18A</p><p>In the olden times, this would’ve been a Title 50 covert action, meaning it would be run by CIA and subject to an exceptionally rigorous legal and coordination framework by statute. But since we live in the “YOLO CYBER” time of NSC45, these operations would likely be Title 10 clandestine military operations. I am concerned by that shift for the reasons in the above tweets from myself and Jason Kichen, as well as the fact that I think trying to coerce foreign officials outside of wartime by doxxing them should be the responsibility of an intelligence agency rather than a military combatant command. But that’s just me.</p><blockquote>Beginning in October 2018, CYBERCOM used emails, pop-ups and texts to target Russian Internet “trolls” who were seeding disinformation on U.S. social media platforms. The trolls worked for the Internet Research Agency, a private entity controlled by a Russian oligarch close to Putin. CYBERCOM also messaged hackers working for Russian military intelligence, indicating that their identities were known and could be publicized. Although the command did not sign its messages, the Americans knew there would be no mistaking who had sent them, officials said at the time.</blockquote><blockquote>When the trolls persisted, CYBERCOM, beginning on Election Day and for at least two days afterward, knocked their servers offline, The Washington Post previously reported. The Americans also sent messages aimed at spreading confusion and discord among research agency operatives, including computer system administrators. Some workers were so perturbed that they launched an internal investigation to root out what they thought were insiders leaking personnel information, according to U.S. officials.</blockquote><p>I stand by my take from when the 2018 activity story originally broke:</p><h3>Horkos on Twitter</h3><p>Also, the idea that this op meaningfully &quot;temporarily [removed] an arrow from the Russian&#39;s quiver&quot; doesn&#39;t compute to me. Taking IRA&#39;s LAN down during that particular timeframe wouldn&#39;t do much since IRA ops&#39; real impacts are accomplished &quot;left of [election] boom&quot;. (2/2)</p><p>My further thoughts can be found in that thread and its replies, but a targeted campaign of aggressive texting and LAN shutdowns doesn’t equate to disrupting key assets the roles of which would have essentially been completed by the operational dates described in reporting. Also, mean-texting a GRU officer isn’t going get them to stop operating; being exposed is literally a core element of the risk model they accept when they become intelligence officers. I have yet to see any evidence to suggest the 2018 activity by CYBERCOM did anything meaningful besides generate political dividends for the administration and CYBERCOM itself.</p><blockquote>The new options contemplate targeting key leaders in the security services and the military and potentially some oligarchs. The messaging would be accompanied by a limited cyber-operation that demonstrates the Americans’ access to a particular system or account and the capability to inflict a cost, said individuals familiar with the matter. The message would implicitly warn the target that if the election interference did not cease, there would be consequences.</blockquote><p>Like I’ve repeated above, doxxing people below Putin here is not likely to generate any effects besides maybe some personnel shuffles and accompanying low-grade operational degradation. As long as Putin wants 2020 election interference to happen, he will find people who will make it happen regardless of personal risk. As to the “limited cyber-operation” described, that is the only measure I saw in the whole article that seemed to might have the desired impact, but it would depend on the target and nature of the intrusion.</p><blockquote>The options do not envision any attempt to influence Russian society at large, which officials saw as having limited success given Putin’s control of the country, including much of the media.</blockquote><blockquote>Some see the new options as potentially effective at altering a key official’s decision-making calculus without being hugely escalatory because they do not seek to foment a popular uprising, which is Putin’s big fear, analysts note.</blockquote><p>This is ceding ground to Putin on his biggest fears. He fears nothing more than loss of control and desires nothing more than preservation of his regime. While it is true that state control/influence over the Russian public’s information is substantial, it is not complete. Do you really want to deter Putin’s desire to meddle in 2020? Figure out a way to let him know that the size of his private wealth and how he acquired it can be made common knowledge to the average Muscovite. That is a cost he will actually have to consider before deciding to incur.</p><p>[<em>Addendum:</em> Since I first published this blog, I was offered some <a href="https://twitter.com/lincolnpigman/status/1210170618026614791">thoughtful</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/lukOlejnik/status/1210210418230255617">critiques</a> about the tone and language I used in this section in particular. I did not mean to imply that the “wealth option” of operations would shake the foundations of Putin’s rule. Rather, that it — despite being a weak option — is more likely to be meaningful as a potential deterrent since it would impact Putin directly and create concerns about what other information had been acquired on him that could be potentially released. Still, I don’t think targeting Putin would necessarily work in this context either, because the key logic there is sending a message suggesting the ability to degrade his praetorian interests but a lack of desire to truly follow through unless he does something particularly egregious. Not only is figuring out how to convey that a messaging and planning nightmare, but the definition of “something particularly egregious” remains an unformed U.S. red line the crossing of which would lead to concentrated effects-based operations against a foreign head of state.]</p><blockquote>Another possibility involves disinformation aimed at exploiting rivalries within the Russian government and power elites.</blockquote><p>It appears that Fiona Hill left the NSC and everyone forgot about the truth of the “mutually assured incrimination” dynamic she <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/book-party/wp/2017/03/31/trumps-new-russia-expert-wrote-a-psychological-profile-of-vladimir-putin-and-it-should-scare-trump/">described</a> as Putin deploying to control power elites. The resultant control model is enforced by the entire praetorian power structure of the Putin government, particularly the FSO and the FSB’s Economic Security Service. Good luck with accomplishing that kind of rivalry exploitation on such a scale that it can meaningfully degrade Russia’s ability to capitalize on oligarch resources to engage in election interference.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/1*Lgm8HwmepPrbG2sSizI2Nw.gif" /><figcaption>Circumstances wherein I’d believe this is meaningfully feasible.</figcaption></figure><blockquote>Any operation would be reviewed by other agencies, including the State Department and CIA, and require the defense secretary’s approval. It would be aligned with other potential U.S. efforts, such as sanctions or indictments, officials said.</blockquote><p>So…is this supposed to describe a covert action coordination framework just ending up at the Pentagon rather than the White House-by-way-of-Langley? Why not just do it via the existing covert action statutory framework and let this be an opportunity for CYBERCOM to slipstream effectively with CIA’s Center for Cyber Intelligence?</p><blockquote>Cyber-operations alone are usually not sufficient to transform an adversary’s behavior.</blockquote><p>Can we swap “usually not” for “essentially never”?</p><blockquote>No single office within the Defense Department oversees cyber, electronic warfare and psychological operations. So this month, Congress created a Senate-confirmed position of principal information operations adviser to coordinate strategy and policy in this area across the Pentagon and with other agencies.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/1*4Aik6P_1xnTZVxQ8A33JNA.gif" /><figcaption>Fitting image to end on.</figcaption></figure><p>Happy holidays.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=93e25e1bc91c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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