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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Hamzeh AlSughair on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Hamzeh AlSughair on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Hamzeh AlSughair on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@hs3954?source=rss-476ff03a74f------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Gaza’s Humanitarian Crisis]]></title>
            <link>https://hs3954.medium.com/gazas-humanitarian-crisis-af6b8c77b45a?source=rss-476ff03a74f------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[palestine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[middle-east]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[united-nations]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Hamzeh AlSughair]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 07 Feb 2021 22:44:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-02-07T22:44:53.639Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Gaza strip in Palestine is now on the verge of collapse. The thirteen-year long blockade imposed by Israeli forces have turned Gaza into a region suffering from overpopulation, economic collapse, and overall societal failure. Today, 38% of Gazans live in poverty, 26% of the workforce is unemployed, and 90% of the water from the Gaza aquifer is undrinkable.<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> On its current trajectory, the Gaza strip will be announced uninhabitable by the United Nations at the end of current year 2020. The severity of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza stands as roadblock towards achieving global sustainable development goals set out by the United Nations.<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a> Therefore, finding a solution to help uplift this broken society must be on the top of the international agenda.</p><p>The main challenge UN policy makers face when coming up with strategical methods to improve the standard of living in Gaza is the inability to establish common ground between the various stakeholder groups involved. It is essential to recognize that the roots of the humanitarian crisis in this region is the blockade, which comes as a byproduct of the broader political conflict between the Israeli government and the Palestinian freedom fighters of the Gazan society. When developing resolutions, the UN does not attempt to resolve the political dispute; they take the route of providing strategies that solely revolve around providing humanitarian support to Gaza.</p><p>While this type of aid is detrimental to Gazans when it comes to ensuring their short-term survival, it is by no means a long-term solution that would allow the Gazans to sustain an adequate standard of life on their own. Therefore, the correct solution that will have a better chance in turning the situation in Gaza around is a combination of both. The international community, led by the United Nations, in accordance to Goal 16 of the SGDs, must strengthen relevant institutions responsible for the humanitarian support to Gaza, and must protect the fundamental freedom of the Gazans by enforcing strategy that will allow stakeholder groups involved to reach an agreement that will lead to a gradual cessation of the Israeli blockade.</p><p>The need for strengthening the institutions responsible for the humanitarian and civic assistance of Gaza comes as a result of the shortcomings they displayed over the years. The main entity that has been designated to fulfil this purpose is the UNRWA, the UN’s Palestinian refugee agency. The UNRWA’s failure comes as a result of two reasons: Israeli occupation forces limiting the entrance of UNRWA sponsored goods into the strip, and the lack of funding from global powers. The United States, the agency’s previous biggest financer, stopped all funding in 2017, leaving a budget deficit of more than $440m. With a budget deficit that severe, the UNRWA will be forced to severely narrow down its spending, which leaves Gazans in an even more dire situation considering that their biggest humanitarian supporter is on the verge of financial collapse.</p><p>. This reemphasizes the importance of revamping the UNRWA institution into one that is financially secure and logistically prosperous. However, stakeholder interests, specifically that of the Israeli government, stands as roadblock to achieving this goal. The Israeli government accuses the UNRWA with coercing with Militant groups within the strip and believes that the UNRWA are not devoted to the fulfilment of their original goal of providing social assistance to Palestinian refugees around the Middle East. In 2017, a report came out by the Israeli media, accusing an UNRWA employee of being elected into a state position by the Hamas government in Gaza. Despite the employee refuting those claims, the Israelis continue to express their dislike of UNRWA’s methods of operation, believing that their actions entice Palestinian resistance. For those reasons, Israel leads the global campaign which calls upon other countries to stop funding the UNRWA. <a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a></p><p>The first step to refurbish the UNRWA and its other subbranches is to establish common ground between them and the Israeli government. The Israeli government must recognize the key role the UNRWA plays in ensuring Gaza does not fall over the edge of complete humanitarian destruction. This will push them to consider negotiating with UNRWA officials under the UN umbrella, where negotiations would revolve around understanding how the interests both sides can be preserved. The UN must push towards a resolution where current UNRWA officials would be replaced with ones who understand that their preliminary role is to provide social and civic assistance to Gaza, and that they are not permitted to interfere in the politics of the matter. This is because having an internationally backed humanitarian institution attempt to influence the politics of Gaza will only further complicate relations and created unintended consequences as seen in the previously mentioned situation. Once UNRWA officials are replaced by a more competent set, Israel should feel more comfortable in having the UNRWA enter Gaza for humanitarian purposes, since their security interests are protected. That way, if Israel is genuinely invested in the rehabilitation of Gaza, there is no reason for it not endorse the UNRWA financially under such circumstances along with the support of other countries in the world.</p><p>While the strategy explained above is necessary in terms of easing pressure off the crippling Gazan economy for the mean time, it is by no means a long-term solution. It is essential to recognize that humanitarian aid cannot be a solution to a political problem. Humanitarian aid is necessary to ensure to survival of a society from a day to day basis. However, Gaza needs a long-term political solution that would allow the freedom of movement, the building on infrastructure needed to sustain two million people, and the creation jobs and opportunities for growth and economic development. The only way to achieve these goals is to find a way at which stakeholder groups involved would reach common ground and agree upon terms that will allow a peaceful transition that would end the Israeli siege over Gaza. <a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a></p><p>The international community, led by the United Nations, and the United States, has long attempted to rekindle peace negotiations between Gazans and Israelis. Strategies proposed are often also inclusive of the broader Palestinian-Israeli dispute over territory, which has now manifested into the crisis present in Gaza. However, these efforts have shown a continuous pattern of failure over the years, with contentious relations continuing to flare up between the two sides. The most recent strategy proposed in regards of the dispute was done on the behalf of the United States, in which they laid out the so-called “Deal of the Century”.<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a> This strategy addressed a multitude of unresolved issues that are present in the region, including the potential integration of the Gaza strip with the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. The Palestinians almost immediately rejected this deal, which begs the question, why would they refute a strategy that would reintegrate Gaza, a region that has suffered for 13 long years, back into the world?</p><p>The Palestinian Authority, rightfully so, claims that they will not accept a strategy that was designed when their officials were not present as negotiations were taking place. This highlights the mistake that is continuously being made by the United Nations and whoever is involved from the international community. How does one expect to impose a strategy that would create value for all stakeholder groups involved, without getting the perspective and opinion of a key stakeholder party? The consequences of this ill-advised approach towards the issue can be viewed when looking at the details of the United States-Israeli strategy. While the deal does suggest the reintegration of Gaza with the Palestinian West Bank, it is not sufficient considering that it also suggests Israeli’s control of the international borders of this newfound state. Israel is essentially suggesting the creation of a situation similar to Gaza, one that also includes the other Palestinian territories in the West Bank. The Palestinians condemned these efforts as attempts to force their officials to accept a deal in a take or leave it type situation.</p><p>The only logical solution that would create value to all stakeholder groups is one that considers all perspectives when designing the strategy. All key influences, including the Israeli government, the Palestinian Authority, the Gazans and neighboring Arab countries, should collaborate under the UN’s flag should agree on a joint framework that would endorse economic stabilization initiatives in Gaza and political arrangements that would reintegrate Gaza and the West Bank. However, unlike the strategy proposed by the United States, this strategy would grant the Palestinian Authority sovereignty over its international borders, namely borderlines that connect them with neighboring Jordan and Egypt. That way, Palestinian can finally have a sovereign state of their own which would allow manage their internal and external affairs, including the rebuilding of Gaza. While Israel can protect its security interests and perhaps even establish diplomatic relations with neighboring Palestine in the future. <a href="#_ftn6">[6]</a></p><p>Gaza will remain a region suffering from turmoil if peace treaties being suggested are not as inclusive as they should be in terms of considering different stakeholder values. Strategies proposed above will be very effective in solving many of the UN’s sustainable development goals, most importantly goal 16, which calls upon peace, justice and strong institutions.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Humanitarian Situation in the Gaza Strip Fast Facts — OCHA Factsheet — Question of Palestine.” <em>United Nations</em>, United Nations, <a href="http://www.un.org/unispal/humanitarian-situation-in-the-gaza-strip-fast-facts-ocha-factsheet/">www.un.org/unispal/humanitarian-situation-in-the-gaza-strip-fast-facts-ocha-factsheet/.</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Macintyre, Donald. “By 2020, the UN Said Gaza Would Be Unliveable. Did It Turn out That Way?” <em>The Guardian</em>, Guardian News and Media, 28 Dec. 2019, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/28/gaza-strip-202-unliveable-un-report-did-it-turn-out-that-way.">www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/28/gaza-strip-202-unliveable-un-report-did-it-turn-out-that-way.</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> “Israel Accuses UNRWA Employee of Being Elected to Hamas Government in Gaza.” <em>Al Bawaba</em>, <a href="http://www.albawaba.com/news/israel-accuses-unrwa-employee-being-elected-hamas-government-gaza-947382.">www.albawaba.com/news/israel-accuses-unrwa-employee-being-elected-hamas-government-gaza-947382.</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> Gringauz, Lev, et al. “Why Israel-Hamas Negotiations Remain Stuck.” <em>Jewish Week</em>, 10 Apr. 2019, jewishweek.timesofisrael.com/why-israel-hamas-negotiations-remain-stuck/.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> “The ‘Deal of the Century’: Revealed and Reviled.” <em>Jordan Times</em>, 4 Feb. 2020, <a href="http://www.jordantimes.com/opinion/hasan-abu-nimah/%E2%80%98deal-century%E2%80%99-revealed-and-reviled.">www.jordantimes.com/opinion/hasan-abu-nimah/%E2%80%98deal-century%E2%80%99-revealed-and-reviled.</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> Amr, Hady, et al. “How to Fix Gaza.” <em>Brookings</em>, Brookings, 6 Dec. 2018, <a href="http://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/12/03/how-to-fix-gaza/">www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/12/03/how-to-fix-gaza/.</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=af6b8c77b45a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict is not “sui generis”?]]></title>
            <link>https://hs3954.medium.com/why-the-palestinian-israeli-conflict-is-not-sui-generis-db529dee4745?source=rss-476ff03a74f------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Hamzeh AlSughair]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 20 Dec 2020 06:04:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-12-20T06:04:57.742Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/275/1*Hg9GdI_X8J9s8leq9FHhAg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Israel’s declaration of independence in 1948 marks the beginning of a series of violent clashes and full-scale wars between the Israelis and the Palestinians. These events have shaped the current political dynamics of what we now know as the “Palestinian-Israeli” conflict. The “Palestinians-Israeli” conflict can be simply explained as a dispute over territory, with the territory being the piece of land located West to the Jordan river and east to the Mediterranean Sea. Considering Israel has won all major military confrontations, most prominently the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and the 1967 six-day war, the current distribution of the disputed territory is highly in their favor. Today, the state of Israel sits at 77% of the land of what was once historic Palestine, and it militarily occupies the remaining 23% which are the West Bank and Gaza.</p><p>However, when analyzing the status quo, it is evident that the conflict is far more complex than a dispute over territory. The roots of the conflict can be traced to fundamental differences in culture, religion and ideologies. The Israelis believe that it is their god given right to exist and govern over the disputed territory, whereas the Palestinians argue that their presence on the land for centuries is enough justification for their right to have a state of their own. Fragmentation in political parties and the presence of extremist views on both sides of the equation has made it even more difficult to find a comprehensive solution. This heightened level of complication associated with the issue has led many political thinkers to view it as “sui generis” or distinct that it no longer fits into the framework of Middle East Politics. However, empirical evidence has shown otherwise. This type of complexity is in fact present in many other issues related to Middle East politics, which can be proven by dissecting the dynamics of the “Palestinian-Israeli” conflict and building analogies that connects it with other issues in the Middle East.</p><p>As aforementioned, the simple explanation of the Israeli-Palestinian issue is that it is a dispute over land, a question of which group should govern which territory. As of right now, the West Bank is divided into three distinct parts, Area A, Area B, and Area C. Area A consists of Palestinian cities that are domestically run by the Palestinian Authority, Area B consists of cities that are run by a joint effort of the PA and the government of Israel, and Area C consists of Israel’s illegal settlements. The increasing number of Israeli settlements built in Area C of the West Bank presents another unique challenge to the conflict, as it makes the possibility of a two-state solution even less plausible.</p><p>This type of clash over territory between two distinct ethnic groups is not a phenomenon that is unheard of in Middle East politics. In fact, the Kurds, just like the Palestinians, face the exact same dilemma. Amid the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the ethnic group that identifies as Kurdish, believed in its right for statehood. With the establishment and rise of the three states of Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, the Kurdish national movement was unable to achieve its goal. Like the Palestinians, the Kurds became an ethnic minority in each of the respective three states mentioned before. The group fought for greater autonomy and even outright independence against Turkish nationalism and Iraq’s Ba’athist government, but were suppressed by brutal force and violent crackdowns. This battle against disenfranchisement and repression is something that resonates with many Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza.</p><p>Furthermore, an essential factor that further complicates the “Palestinian-Israeli” conflict is religion. Political groups on both sides have used religious rhetoric to justify their supremacy over the land, specifically over the city of Jerusalem. Jerusalem is sacred to both the Jews and the Muslims, and both the Israelis and the Palestinians have claimed it as their undisputed capital. The word Zionist is derived from the word Zion, which refers to a biblical mount located in ancient Jerusalem. The Zionist movement believed in the ancient attachment of the Jewish people to the Palestinian land. Palestinian Muslims glorify the city of Jerusalem as the place of the Aqsa-mosque, and the location of Prophet Muhammad’s ascension to heaven. These religious ties to the city have been used as a political weapon by both sides. For example, The Jewish national party in the Israeli Knesset justifies its opposition to the creation of a Palestinian state through the use of such religious rhetoric. The rise of these movements in the Israeli government makes it more difficult to move towards an end to the conflict; it only serves to further polarize it.</p><p>Once again, the use of religion as a political tool is not something that is unfamiliar to the politics of the Middle East. The sectarian war in both Iraq and Syria is a preliminary example of that. The struggle between the Sunnis and Shias, and their use of religious concepts to justify their advocacy for “holy war” can be directly compared to the struggle taking place between certain political factions in both the Israeli and Palestinian governments. The type of rhetoric used by terrorist group ISIS, which stipulates that holy war must be waged to reestablish an Islamic caliphate in the Levant, is no different than the rhetoric that was used by Radical Zionist groups such as the Haganah and the Irdun. These groups committed atrocious acts of terror against the Palestinian people to bring upon their “God-given right” to reestablish the ancient state of Israel in Arab Palestinian land.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=db529dee4745" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Political Islam.]]></title>
            <link>https://hs3954.medium.com/political-islam-4f5ddc3ef1b5?source=rss-476ff03a74f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4f5ddc3ef1b5</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Hamzeh AlSughair]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 26 Nov 2020 06:47:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-11-26T06:47:19.630Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Political Islam</h3><p>The term “Political Islam” refers to an ideology and social movement that gained increasing political relevance since the late 1960’s. Advocators of political Islam seek to reshape society and the nature of the state in ways that are more in line with interpretations of Islamic principles. Islamists believe that Islam and government should be wedded together. Reform for political Islamists is one that is based on their own interpretations of Islamic theology. This has created a certain level of confusion among political scholars, as they faced difficulty differentiating between the ideologies of a Political Islamist and the beliefs of an average devout Muslim, which is resultant of the varying interpretations of Islamic scripture. Realizing this prompts the need to pose the question of whether or not the single concept “Political Islam” is sufficient to decipher origins, strategies, and objectives of organizations that gained immense popularity in the post-colonial era. Are their politics inherently derived from Islamic law as the term “Political Islam” insinuates? Or are there any outside factors influencing their governing ideologies?</p><p>Like many other political movements, the rise of Political Islam is attributed to the establishment of organizations that succeeded in influencing groups of people to join their movement. Therefore, political Islam is not representative of the Muslim Majority, its rise is only an indication of the success of its network. Understanding the difference between Islamists and the Muslim majority is key to determining whether or not the term “Political Islam” is adequate to describe the ideologies of so called “Islamic” movements.</p><p>The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is a concrete example of an organization that is subsumed under the label “political Islam”. ISIS had the goal of eliminating the frontiers of Sykes-Picot through the use of terror. The organization rigorously advocated the use of horrid violence against each and every individual that oppose their extremist ideologies, even if that person was a Muslim himself. ISIS was also able to build a global network, recruiting fighters from all over the world, and specifically from Western countries. From the standpoint of ideology, ISIS believed that the current global modern state system has encouraged a disobedience to god’s commandants. Therefore, anyone who confirms to the current system must be considered an apostate. ISIS justifies their primitive views by referring to certain Quranic verses that are, in most situations, taken out of context. Knowing that, we can argue that labeling ISIS, alongside other Islamic terror organizations such as Al-Qaeda, under the banner of “Political Islam” is not a fair nor adequate assessment of the true nature of their beliefs.</p><p>Political thinkers often support the aforementioned argument by explaining that terror movements such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda are not so much the radicalization of Islam as it is the “Islamicisation” of radicalism. Daesh’s apocalyptic agenda is one that is inherently radical, as oppose to being inherently Islamic. A study has shown that most of the Jihadis who choose to join radical terrorist groups such as ISIS lack any serious religious training. It is paramount to realize the distinction between Islam and terrorism, as one does not facilitate nor promote the other. ISIS’s distorted ideology is also influenced by certain Medieval concepts. For example, ISIS views Paris as a symbol of the apostate civilization, the capital of prostitution and vice. Therefore, Paris must be destroyed to achieve their final goal of a worldwide Islamic Caliphate. Paris is also viewed as part of the so-called “Crusader campaign” launched by Western countries, a view that was held by the Islamic community in 1095 when Crusades where actually taking place. ISIS’s view of Islamic revivalism is not inspired by Islam itself, but from the belief that Islam can only be revived if the current modern state-system is destroyed.</p><p>Conclusively, labeling radical organizations such as ISIS and its numerous contemporaries under the banner of “Political Islam”, is not only inaccurate, but it is also inconclusive to the many other patterns of thought that influences the organization’s ideals. The distinction between the atrocious acts of terror committed by ISIS and Islam as a religion is an enough reason to conclude that “Political Islam” as a term is not sufficient in justify the ideologies of these terror groups. However, other groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Islamic revolution of Iran, who also are subsumed under the banner of “Political Islam”, are a better example of what the term truly means and exemplifies. Such groups might be viewed as being highly conservative, however, when analyzing their ideologies, it is evident that their core beliefs are inherently Islamic.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4f5ddc3ef1b5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Concept of Rentier States in The Middle East.]]></title>
            <link>https://hs3954.medium.com/the-concept-of-rentier-states-in-the-middle-east-25ab7515ff96?source=rss-476ff03a74f------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Hamzeh AlSughair]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2020 01:31:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-11-03T01:31:15.997Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Rentier states are those whose economies are heavily reliant on substantial external forms of money supply (rent) for state revenues. Under the assumptions of the rentier state theory, the government acts as the principal recipient of the wealth, while the populace manages distribution and utilization. Politically speaking, a rentier state is more likely to be autocratic than democratic as a result of the state’s decision, or indecision, to levy taxes on productive economic sector. The lack of taxation is viewed as a tool used by autocratic regimes to undermine their accountability to society. Rentier states assume their citizens oblige to a theoretical social contract, which mandates the excessive provision of goods, services and other perks to society by the state in exchange for absolute autonomy in decision-making. [1]</p><p>The rise of “renterism” in the 20th century Middle East is a byproduct of both the discovery of massive oil reserves and the establishment of authoritarian regimes. States amass the majority of oil wealth and sustain single party control of governmental decision making and in exchange citizens receive massive cuts on taxation and exclusive economic benefits. However, this framing of oil-exporting countries under the umbrella of a rentier state have resulted in over-generalized accounts that ignore the need for scrupulous analysis of the complex internal and transnational geopolitical dynamics of the oil industry. Studies on the ‘oil complex’ and the histories of oil cities highlight the presence of different perspective and relations that challenge some key assumptions of the “rentier state”.</p><p>Analyzing the relationship between the state and the working class is key in understanding if said state qualifies or disqualifies as a rentier state. An essential characteristic of being rentier stipulates that claims against the state must always be based on noneconomic grounds. Iran, a major oil player in the region, and a member of OPEC, is generally regarded as being “rentier” by definition, specifically before the 1979 Iranian revolution, when Iran was a major oil exporter to Western countries. However, a misconception that pushed the narrative of Iran being rentier is the supposed irrelevance of labor and class relations in the oil industry. This conventional argument is neither convincing, nor historically accurate when looking at the two oil cities of Abadan and Masjed Suleiman. [2]</p><p>The oil workers of Abadan and Masjed Suleiman suffered from dire working conditions and low wages during the monopolistic control of The Anglo Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) over Iranian oil. Despite being recognized as frontier at the time, the Iranian government failed to suffice the workers with enough economic perks which will keep them from holding the government accountable. Oil workers were clearly dissatisfied, and they continuously pursued the prospect of establishing autonomous self-representation in the form of trade unions and pressure groups. Oil workers’ political involvement was consequential to both the 1946 oil nationalization movement and the 1979 toppling of the Shah. “The labor struggles over work conditions often mingled and overlapped with urban protests over living conditions.”[3] This changes the general understanding of what we assumed a rentier state should exemplify in terms of its domestic affairs. Unlike the aforementioned proclamation, in both 1946 and 1979, the demands of the oil workers of Abadan and Majsed and their objection against the state was inherently based on economic ground.</p><p>This pushes the need to delve deeper into the true traits of a frontier state such as Iran. It is clear that oil workers in Iran were not satisfied with the economic perks provided by the state, pushing them to protest the status quo. If the labor force is not satisfied, how can a frontier state sustain their monopoly control over natural resources and their autonomy in decision-making? Iran have continuously resorted to the suppression and oppression of the demands of oil-workers, whether it was during the era of the international oil companies or under the current militant Islamic regime, labeling them “as a political threat to national security and the commercial profitability of the oil sector”[4]. This method of oppression is largely followed by many oil-rich frontiers states in the region, namely Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain. Therefore, perhaps a more realistic definition of a frontier state in the Middle East region today would be one that describes the authoritarian and oppressive nature of the state towards workers who challenge their absolute dictatorial control over the country’s natural resources. It can also be concluded that the “rentier social control”, which the rentier state describes a mutual beneficial relationship between the ruling party and the working class, is in fact repressive by nature, and in many situations, tends to greatly favor the state.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=25ab7515ff96" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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