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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Hunchly on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Hunchly on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Hunchly on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Introducing Hunchly Cloud]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@hunchly/introducing-hunchly-cloud-25276b920ea6?source=rss-b6d7ada0a8b9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/25276b920ea6</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Hunchly]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 17 Jun 2024 20:44:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-06-17T20:44:30.446Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Introducing Hunchly Cloud!</h3><figure><img alt="The Hunchly Logo and the Kasm Logo side by side." src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*BusuoKny7gKsUzGfx5WiFQ.png" /></figure><p>Hey there! We’ve been busy working on something new and exciting with our friends at Kasm Workspaces, and we’re finally ready to tell you about it! We have teamed up to offer you a new way to use Hunchly for your investigations — Hunchly Cloud.</p><p>We’ve been big fans of Kasm for a few years now. We use their containerized workspace solution every day for our own OSINT work, we’ve helped other people get set up with the system to support investigations and training, and we’ve been telling everyone we can about how great this solution is. We’re especially excited about the attribution management this provides, right out of the box — since you’re logged into a cloud based platform, the source of your online activity will be associated with the provider instead of your local system.</p><p>Hunchly Cloud is the same great web capture tool you know and love, now running on Kasm’s secure workspace technology. This means you can run your investigations from any browser, on any device, from any place. Got internet access? You’re good to go!</p><p>What does Hunchly Cloud give you? Great security, flexibility and accessibility. Since Kasm Workspaces was designed with security in mind, sessions are secure and anonymous, your digital footprint is minimized, and you don’t need to worry about setting up and hardening your own system. Just log in via your browser and get to work! Sessions are wiped away after use, so it’s like a new system every time you launch it. Hunchly Cloud has 15 GB of storage to hold your case files and captures. If you need more control, you can run your session without storage turned on, and when you end the session, everything will be destroyed. You can import and export files on demand too, so you can set up your case file, do your work, download it to your system and close your session, erasing any trace of your activity.</p><p>You can try a quick demo of Hunchly Cloud <a href="https://cloud.hunch.ly/#/cast/hunchly-demo">here</a>. Let us know what you think!</p><h3>Pricing and Support</h3><p>We’ve got flexible pricing plans to suit your needs. Plus, our support team is always ready to help you get the most out of Hunchly Cloud. Check out <a href="https://hunch.ly/">our website</a> for more details!</p><p>Reach out to us at <a href="/service/mailto:sales@hunch.ly">sales@hunch.ly</a> or <a href="/service/mailto:support@hunch.ly">support@hunch.ly</a> any time, we love hearing from our user community!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=25276b920ea6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Finding the Most Popular Personal Email on the Planet]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@hunchly/osint-finding-the-most-popular-email-on-the-planet-51ba22166224?source=rss-b6d7ada0a8b9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/51ba22166224</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[phishing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dfir]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[osint]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investigation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Hunchly]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 31 Jan 2019 18:06:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-31T18:06:58.535Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>We spend lots of time working with our customers on support, user experience, and just general brainstorming. We often see all kinds of brilliant ideas put into action during their investigations, and we always learn a lot from our conversations. From these talks, I noticed there was one mysterious point of data that kept popping up not only in my investigations, but in every one of our customer’s investigations too. Investigations on radically different subjects were united by a single unfamiliar email address.</p><p>The solution to this mystery, as it turned out, lay in plain sight all along. A true OSINT mystery story.</p><p>Read on.…</p><h3>A Brief History of Hunchly’s Data Extractors</h3><p>While you are browsing around with Hunchly it is extracting the source code (HTML) of the site as well as any available Javascript that it can access when it captures the page.</p><p>Hunchly applies some pattern matching to all of that data, looking for things like email addresses, Google Analytics codes, social media account identifiers, and other tasty tidbits that you can pivot off of during an investigation.</p><p>This data is presented in the Hunchly Dashboard’s Data tab and page review screen. This is so you can see if there is anything that interests you or generate new investigative leads. We have a lot more in store for this data, so stay tuned for that in future blog posts.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yjwnfsb1f7SQSHXfFoApaQ.png" /><figcaption>The Hunchly Data tab showing an email address extracted from Google.com. Wait, what?</figcaption></figure><h3>Who the hell is Robert?</h3><p>As you can see in the screenshot above, there is an email address that was extracted from Google.com and that email address does not appear to be connected to Google at all.</p><p>This had me scratching my head more than a few times as I had seen this data record before. I started asking around, and sure enough, so had the customers I had asked.</p><p>Enter stage left: Phil, our intrepid Quality and Support Lead. [Ed. note: he’s also dashing. And good at editing blog posts.]</p><p>Phil had access to our development build of Hunchly with an improved page review screen that allows you to hunt through the underlying source code and Javascript. This is a sneak peek of what’s coming in our next release:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Qvad9M1_3wugtFFOXHPSDA.png" /><figcaption>Development build of Hunchly with new page review screen. Subject to change, of course.</figcaption></figure><p>Mystery solved. Robert Kieffer developed the Math.uuid.js library in 2010 which is used in <strong>every web search on Google.com</strong>. How cool must that be to have a library, with your name on it, used by millions of people every day?</p><p>Robert won the open-source lottery and now has the most popular personal email address on the planet.</p><p>Well done, Robert. Well done.</p><p>(Got another personal email you think is more famous? Let me know on Twitter at <a href="https://medium.com/u/c3735240e0fa">Justin Seitz</a>!)</p><h3>Side Story: Discovering Phishing Sites with Google Analytics</h3><p>When I was recently doing a training session for a large group of investigators who use Hunchly, something else unexpected popped out of data extracted from a popular website.</p><p>With Hunchly turned on I browsed to a LinkedIn profile and Hunchly extracted a Google Analytics code: UA-62256447–1</p><p>An investigator asked me how to demonstrate how this is useful. I showed them how you can leverage tools like <a href="https://spyonweb.com/">Spyonweb</a>, <a href="http://analyzeid.com/">AnalyzeID</a>, <a href="https://publicwww.com/">PublicWWW</a> and <a href="https://community.riskiq.com/">RiskIQ</a> to determine domain co-ownership with analytics codes. If you have multiple domains with the same Google Analytics code there is either co-ownership, or as you’ll see shortly, something else going on.</p><p>When I dropped the analytics code into Spyonweb to show the investigators a demo of how this all works, something really weird happened.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pu0WB_DZQS3bSnPj_7Nb4g.png" /></figure><p>Well that’s a bit weird. None of those sites are LinkedIn.</p><p>So being naturally curious I started poking around at the domains above, and I discovered that on March 21, 2018 the Wayback Machine had a record of billogy.com that was a copy of…</p><p>You guessed it, the LinkedIn login page.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fSfPGYC0ViwO90smYuD85g.png" /></figure><p>If you use RiskIQ or PublicWWW you can actually find a long list of phishing sites that have just simply copied the LinkedIn login page, including their Google Analytics code with it. This explains why we saw the strange results on Spyweb.</p><p>This is actually quite an effective way to determine if a lazy hacker has setup a phishing site for your own domain. Just go search for your own analytics codes and see what results pops up. A little digging on this topic also led me to a <a href="https://www.securitee.org/files/malanalytics_www2018.pdf">research paper</a> that covers some of this as well.</p><p>With a little help from Hunchly, we solved some mysteries and found some phishing sites all from a few tidbits of information automatically extracted from two very popular websites.</p><p>I’d be really interested to hear of any mysteries you solve using this feature. Drop me a line at: <a href="/service/mailto:justin@hunch.ly">justin@hunch.ly</a>. All war stories welcome.</p><p>Justin</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=51ba22166224" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Vetting & Court Disclosure in Online Investigations]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@hunchly/vetting-court-disclosure-in-online-investigations-9be7c1be51a3?source=rss-b6d7ada0a8b9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9be7c1be51a3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[osint]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investigation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[legaltech]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Hunchly]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Jan 2019 19:06:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-18T19:06:40.528Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Vetting &amp; Court Disclosure for Online Investigations</h3><p>I couldn’t help but notice<a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/4816822/exclusive-epirate-crown-exposing-police-informant-killed-b-c-money-laundering-probe/"> this monstrous money laundering case</a> in Canada that was tossed out because the Crown (Canadian prosecutors) accidentally disclosed a confidential human source.</p><p>This hurts for sure.</p><p>At the heart of many Hunchly investigations (both from defence investigators and law enforcement) is the fact that you are collecting a massive trove of information, and this information will need to be disclosed to a third party (prosecution, defence, experts, etc.).</p><p>What information do you keep? What has to be filtered out?</p><p>This can be a very labour intensive process as you need to be able to clearly present your case without disclosing irrelevant information or creating unnecessary doubt.</p><h3>Hunchly’s Automatic Capture: Hero or Villain?</h3><p>Hunchly’s primary purpose is to free the investigator from having to remember to take screenshots, maintain a list of URLs, hash content, or track things like target email addresses.</p><p>With Hunchly active, investigators can just do their thing, their way, and not sweat the small stuff.</p><p>However, when we think of Hunchly’s evidence capture from the perspective of vetting we definitely see that there is a potential problem: When they collect more data, doesn’t the investigator have to do more work vetting?</p><p>Short answer? Yup, it sure does.</p><p>The long answer is more complicated. I will <strong>always </strong>opt for having more data to sift through at the end of an investigation than having an incomplete case or having some Facebook account get deactivated and now I can’t retrieve valuable intel.</p><p>Worse is having evidence tossed out because it is incomplete. <a href="https://www.hunch.ly/osint-articles/osint-article-screenshots-terrorism-case">R vs. Hamdan taught us this well.</a></p><p>This really comes down to investigator organization.</p><p>What we’ve learned from experience and from our power users is that If you setup your case using selectors, tags, and you star pages as you browse (mark them Important), then you save countless hours in vetting time down the road. Need help with this? <a href="/service/mailto:justin@hunch.ly">Just ask for a demo</a> and I’ll show you.</p><p>We also track deletions from your case, so if you need to do some cleanup you are still maintaining an audit trail of what you deleted and when.</p><p>In short, our recommendations are:</p><ol><li>Use the automatic capture.</li><li>Organize your case before you collect your first page.</li><li>Reap the rewards, save the headache.</li></ol><h3>An Expert Opinion</h3><p>I reached out to Nick Ibbott, former police officer and founder of<a href="https://www.leadsolutions.ca/"> L.E.A.D. Solutions Inc.</a> to get some perspective on vetting. Nick has years of experience in law enforcement, and has dealt with his fair share of disclosure before.</p><p>Here is a summary of our Q&amp;A session, edited for length and clarity:</p><p><strong>Justin: What are some strategies you recommend people employ before they start their investigations?</strong></p><p>Nick: First of all Justin, I would like to thank you for allowing me to be a part of your blog. You and your team at Hunchly have done an excellent job in providing a world-class application for practitioners involved in digital investigations. It is the “must have” tool, so much that it is one of building blocks in the digital investigations training program I have developed and delivered to investigators.</p><p>The strategies that I recommend comes from the 30 years of policing, most of which were from units that dealt with medium to large scale operations. My viewing lens is from a Canadian perspective, but I would think the same challenges I faced were similar to most of the law enforcement professionals in other democratic countries.</p><p>I like to use two analogies in my training modules to explain some critical components in investigating events. Both of them are simple and drive home the point in multiple ways.</p><p>The first analogy is a rock thrown into a still pond. The rock is the information you have gathered from your investigation. When you throw that rock into a quiet pond, it creates ripples in the water that expand outward. The more rocks you throw into the pond, more ripples are made, and they will undoubtedly intersect with each other. That intersection of information may turn out to be the evidence that you were looking for to corroborate your investigative theory.</p><p>An example of this would be if a tip came into the police that Person A was a drug dealer, and he lived at Location B. You as the investigator conducted police computer database checks and confirmed that Person A lived at Location B. Your next logical step would be to conduct physical surveillance at Location B, and observed Person A dealing drugs. The two rocks in this story were the information about Person A and Location B. The intersection of confirming that Person A lived at Location B corroborated the tip information. This observations of Person A dealing drugs provided you the grounds for an arrest.</p><p>The other analogy is a common one in courthouses all over Canada, and the U.S. That analogy is “fruits of the poisonous tree.” This doctrine is used in the criminal courts to identify evidence (the “fruits” of your investigation), that was obtained and has been determined to be tainted. If the evidence was tainted, it might be excluded. The goal of a defence attorney is to have evidence excluded, as evidence is what convicts people.</p><p>So what do these analogies have to do with a strategy of disclosure?</p><p>Everything!</p><p>My policing career mantra and now my training mantra is “it’s not the day you found the evidence, it’s the day you testify on how you found the evidence that matters.”</p><p>An investigator has to be aware of how they obtained the information, and how the disclosure of that information two years from now will impact the overall investigation. That vision of how the disclosure of your evidence will play out in the future will help you prepare for today. A well-formulated strategy will assist investigators in the long run.</p><p>Like most law enforcement members, past and present, I lived my career using acronyms. For disclosure strategies, I came up with the acronym U.I.O.D.</p><p>· <strong>Understand</strong> — what information is considered to be confidential/privileged/protected.</p><p>Knowing the case law and speaking with your crown/district attorney about what information falls into the above categories.</p><p>· <strong>Identify</strong> — create and put in place a process to identify information to be vetted.</p><p>I would mark up my notebook with annotations marking things to be vetted for disclosure and why it was being marked (such as confidential/privileged).</p><p>· <strong>Organize</strong> — a consistent system to organize all information for disclosure</p><p>A naming convention for all information to be saved as, digital vetting tool applications.</p><p>· <strong>Disclose</strong> — track the evidence that has been disclosed, review.</p><p>Consistent and trackable disclosure practices to the crown/district attorney</p><p>The justice system is based on fairness to all, not tipped over in the favour for the police only. Fairness comes with the fact that ALL of the information that the police have about that particular investigation, is up for disclosure to the accused person.</p><p>The most important part of a disclosure strategy is understanding what categories of information need to be vetted. A case could fall apart if the investigator were not aware that particular pieces of evidence should have been protected and it was missed by the reviewing eyes of the crown/district attorney.</p><p>Some of the most sensitive information that comes into the possession of law enforcement is from confidential human sources (CHS) and anonymous tips. A CHS and tipsters can provide information that point the police toward a particular person or a crime. That information can be very detailed and, in some circumstances, only known to that source.</p><p>Those rocks of information need a certain approach at the beginning to ensure it remains protected. The mere act of setting up surveillance at Location B, could in the end identify the CHS if that source was the only one to know about it. Every step taken after learning of information from sources needs to be flushed out to identify the risk to the source if a particular action is taken. Sometimes, the risk to the source overrides the action you want to take.</p><p>I could go on into great detail about what are some common categories of information that should be vetted on first blush, but I will leave that for another time.</p><p><strong>Justin: How do you approach vetting online evidence before submitting to the court?</strong></p><p>Nick: My approach to online evidence is not much different than any other evidence. I follow the U.I.O.D. strategy I mentioned above, with some variations.</p><p>I categorize online evidence into two streams. One stream deals with publicly available online information and online information that I gathered from engaging with the subject.</p><p>If the request for an online investigation came from another investigator, I would seek to UNDERSTAND what information they gave me was meant to be protected if they had not already IDENTIFIED it. The information is the rock I would throw into the pond.</p><p>My online investigation evidence would be ORGANIZED in categories of information types. The categories would help me in the vetting process as I would know what information would need to be vetted out for DISCLOSURE.</p><p>Search engine queries would not typically need be vetted unless the search query information was protected (the rock I threw in the pond).</p><p>If I was logging into a social media network using an investigative account, and my sole purpose was to review publicly available information on the subject, I would vet the investigative account information. The vetting was to protect the use of this account in ongoing and future investigations.</p><p>The other stream I had mentioned, when the investigator engaged with the subject either by friending/following or communicating with the subject by messaging them, is a different subject entirely in my opinion and experience.</p><p>That engagement could and would under most circumstances be considered an undercover operation and with that flows disclosure protocols no different than real-world undercover ops. Everything would be potentially up for disclosure including the devices used by the investigator and a forensic extraction of those devices to capture all interactions with the subject.</p><p><strong>Justin: Do you have any war stories of how an online investigation was blown because of improper vetting/disclosure practices?</strong></p><p>Unfortunately, I can’t speak to any online investigation that was blown from the practice, but I have a few that were in jeopardy of falling off the rails because of vetting/disclosure. In those instances, we were able to identify a category of information that would have identified yet to be charged people and closed the loop quickly without the fairness of the accused being affected.</p><p>With the vast amount of information that is now compiled in investigations, the fruits of that, the evidence, is being scrutinized with the intention of having it excluded. Following a strategy that helps you keep that evidence from falling off the tree is what you should be thinking about in the beginning.</p><p>Some excellent insights here from Nick for sure.</p><p>If you have some thoughts on vetting and court disclosure hit me with it here: <a href="/service/mailto:justin@hunch.ly">justin@hunch.ly</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9be7c1be51a3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How To Blow Your Online Cover With URL Previews]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@hunchly/how-to-blow-your-online-cover-with-url-previews-c5e8a60f1a5c?source=rss-b6d7ada0a8b9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c5e8a60f1a5c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[osint]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investigation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[opsec]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Hunchly]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 03 Jan 2019 18:40:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-05T14:29:05.786Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Updated: January 5, 2019 — Additional testing was performed against Skype that revealed that URL previews were still working. My initial testing methodology just didn’t determine the right circumstances under which it generated previews. Please see the Skype section below. Updates to the Slack section to include a mitigation has been added as well.</em></p><p>URL previews are a nice feature found in most messaging applications. They allow you to paste a URL to a friend or colleague, and have a handy miniature view of the website you are about to view.</p><p>The downside is that a lot of applications generate these previews without you knowing what is happening behind the scenes. In some cases this can equate to you disclosing your public IP address in a manner that you likely wouldn’t want.</p><p>Don’t forget: when you browse to a website your public IP address is exposed. This is just how the Internet works unless you’re using Tor or a VPN to hide it.</p><p>The difference with URL previews in messaging applications is that you are broadcasting to the website owner that you are <strong><em>discussing </em></strong>the website, as opposed to just browsing to it.</p><p>This small and subtle change in context is actually quite an important distinction. You’ll see why very shortly…</p><h3>A Little History</h3><p>A few years ago I was on a penetration test where I was attempting to spearphish executives at a well known corporation in Europe. They had one of the most brilliant CISOs I had ever met and an absolutely amazing incident response team on staff.</p><p>After I sent the initial round of phishing emails I was monitoring my command and control server to look for connections from users, anti-virus, or anything else that might indicate that I was either having some success or was about to be caught.</p><p>After a few hours there was not a lot of activity until my web server received a connection from an IP address that resolved back to Skype. This was a WTF moment for me since my phishing server was brand new and there didn’t seem to be a good reason why a Skype server would be touching it.</p><p>A few minutes later another hit from a different Skype server. Now I was really pondering what was going on.</p><p>Then it dawned on me: someone was discussing my command and control system during a Skype chat, and Skype was generating previews of the phishing site I had setup.</p><p>I performed a couple of quick tests using my own Skype account, and sure enough, I could reproduce the issue easily. I now knew that the incident response team was on to me, and it was time to switch tactics.</p><p>But this also raised a much larger issue in my mind when it came to online investigations, incident response and running covert online operations.</p><h3>How Does This Apply to Online Investigations?</h3><p>There are two viewpoints here: one is from an investigative standpoint and the second is from the standpoint of you running a covert operation through a website.</p><p>From the investigative standpoint, if you are passing URLs back and forth with a fellow investigator you may end up notifying your target that you are talking about them. This is exactly how I figured out that the incident response team was on to me during my penetration test. You likely don’t want this to happen.</p><p>The second standpoint is where you are running a website for a covert online operation. You can monitor for these URL previews and determine that someone is discussing your site, potentially letting you know that your ruse is working or that you might be caught out (again, context is important and mission-dependent here).</p><p>Either way, it is a unique set of behaviours that can be observed that is not general browsing activity.</p><h3>Test Results from Various Platforms</h3><p>I did some quick testing of various messaging clients and services. The test was to simply setup a <a href="https://gist.github.com/phrawzty/62540f146ee5e74ea1ab">Python web server</a> on a Digital Ocean droplet ($5/month plan is sufficient). The Python web server just printed out the IP address and headers of the connecting client.</p><p>I also setup a DNS record specific for this testing so that I could try using IP addresses vs. domain names. WhatsApp was the only service tested that responded differently for IP addresses vs. domain names. Every other service was happy to generate previews for an IP address. There was also no difference between using an HTTP vs. HTTPS URL.</p><p>Here is a summary of findings:</p><h4>Slack</h4><p>We, like many other companies, live on Slack so this was the first test I performed. Slack was happy to generate URL previews and identified itself with the following User-Agent:</p><blockquote>User-Agent: Slackbot-LinkExpanding 1.0 (+https://api.slack.com/robots)</blockquote><p>The IP address of the request was from my publicly facing IP address through my office connection in both mobile and desktop versions of Slack.</p><p><strong><em>Update</em></strong>: You can disable previews in Slack by going to Preferences -&gt; Messages &amp; Media -&gt; Inline Media and Links. Uncheck the “Show text previews of linked websites.”</p><p>Thanks to <a href="https://twitter.com/Ahmed_A_Eissa">Ahmed Eissa</a> for pointing this out.</p><h4>Apple Messages</h4><p>So Messages was an interesting test that had some pretty unique behaviours. If you post a link from Messages on your desktop/laptop it will generate the preview directly from your public IP address as can be expected.</p><p>The user agent shows:</p><blockquote>User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_11_1) AppleWebKit/601.2.4 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/9.0.1 Safari/601.2.4 facebookexternalhit/1.1 Facebot Twitterbot/1.0</blockquote><p>Pretty interesting that you see the Facebot and Twitterbot pieces in there! This was actually picked up by a <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/iOSProgramming/comments/4wcake/ios_10_imessage_user_agent_impersonates_facebook/">Reddit user</a> as well.</p><p>Here is where things can be a bit more interesting: if you are sending an SMS phish to a target you can enhance the URL preview experience a little by ensuring you have a file named:</p><blockquote>apple-touch-icon-precomposed.png</blockquote><p>The Messages app will attempt to retrieve this file once it determines that it can successfully reach the target web page. This file will be used in the preview that is generated and could help to entice your target to click the link. It can also be a way of acknowledging the fact that Messages was the application doing the URL preview in the first place.</p><h4>Wire</h4><p>Wire is pretty interesting. When you post a URL from the app both on desktop and on your mobile phone your public IP address will show up in the logs. However, there are no User-Agent headers that show up. In fact the only header that Wire sends is:</p><blockquote>Connection: close</blockquote><p>So this in itself is interesting because many of your HTTP clients (browsers, crawlers, bots, etc.) will send additional headers. By Wire stomping out all information this does become a “tell” that perhaps someone is discussing a target site in the Wire application. Further tracking of how often you see this limited set of client headers would have to be done in order to come up with something more statistically relevant than my single observation.</p><p>Note that in Wire there is a setting in Preferences -&gt; Options called “Create previews for links you send.” If you disable this it will prevent Wire from doing these URL previews. I recommend you do this. Thanks to <a href="https://inteltechniques.com/">Michael Bazzell</a> for assistance with this one.</p><h4>Facebook</h4><p>Facebook also announces itself, but it uses Facebook-owned infrastructure to hit the site for a preview. You will see a User-Agent header of:</p><blockquote>User-Agent: facebookexternalhit/1.1 (+http://www.facebook.com/externalhit_uatext.php)</blockquote><p>It doesn’t use your public IP address but does indicate that someone has posted a link to the target site on their Facebook profile or have sent it via Facebook Messenger. The IP address you see show up will be registered to Facebook so you can use a site like <a href="https://ipintel.io/">ipintel.io</a> to look it up.</p><h4>WhatsApp</h4><p>WhatsApp behaves somewhat differently than the other services. It will not honor IP addresses directly but if you type in a domain (and any port) it will attempt to do URL previews. Additionally, it will do continuous requests as you type the URI of the target page as well which generates a lot of traffic.</p><p>The User-Agent looks like this:</p><blockquote>User-Agent: WhatsApp/0.3.1649 N</blockquote><p>The request comes from your public IP address.</p><h4>Skype (Added January 5, 2019)</h4><p>During original testing Skype was not producing URL previews. Subsequent testing revealed this was due to a non-standard webserver port being used in the testing. Further testing of Skype revealed that by default it still does produce URL previews providing the website has a proper domain name and is listening on the standard ports of 80/443.</p><p>The User-Agent looks like this:</p><blockquote>User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) SkypeUriPreview Preview/0.5</blockquote><p>The request comes from an IP address owned by Microsoft.</p><p>You can disable this by going into Preferences -&gt; Messages and disabling the “Web link previews” option.</p><h4>Services That Didn’t Generate Previews</h4><p>There were some services that didn’t generate any previews or traffic when pasting links, or typing URLs. Of course you should test this yourself to verify.</p><p>Signal (Desktop/Mobile)<br>Sudo (Mobile)<br>Threema (Mobile)<br>Twitter DM (Mobile/Web)<br>Wickr (Desktop)</p><p>All of the mobile testing was done on an iPhone X so there may be differences with Android that aren’t covered here.</p><p>There are probably a ton of other messaging apps out there that you could test, and you absolutely should. Feel free to let me know and I can update this post with your results.</p><h3>Mitigations</h3><p>There are a few things you can do to help mitigate the risk:</p><p><strong>Defang your URLs — </strong>This is simply the method where you replace the dots and colons with other characters, or use brackets. An example could be:</p><p>Regular: <a href="https://www.hunch.ly/">https://www.hunch.ly</a></p><p>Defanged: hxxps://www[.]hunch[.]ly</p><p><strong>Use a VPN</strong> — this is a secondary suggestion really as it is isn’t mitigating the original problem but for the services that are spitting out your public IP address this will at least obscure it.</p><p>Next time you are doing an online investigation, don’t lose valuable intelligence while you’re doing it. Take <a href="https://hunch.ly/">Hunchly</a> with you.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c5e8a60f1a5c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Tenacity]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@hunchly/osint-tenacity-hunchly-89727adc471a?source=rss-b6d7ada0a8b9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/89727adc471a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[journalism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[osint]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Hunchly]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 05 Sep 2018 16:39:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-09-05T16:39:13.612Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I get asked this question a lot: what is the biggest thing you look for in a good investigator?</p><p>Hands down my answer is always this: tenacity.</p><p>Report writing, technical aptitude, web browser wizardry, these are all things that can be trained into a (willing) investigator. Tenacity on the other hand is something that is incredibly difficult to drill into someone’s brain.</p><p>Explaining to someone that sometimes you DO have to read thousands of Tweets to find your answer. Or that yes, examining all 500 Instagram posts could actually give you clues you may not otherwise have found. Another incredibly enlightening statement to make is that Google results beyond the first 3 pages may actually have something useful in them.</p><p>Mind blown, right?</p><p>Some people look at the task with glee (hire these people) others may completely disregard or shrink away from such a challenge.</p><p>There have been many times where I have fielded emails or phone calls from investigators that go something like this:</p><p><strong>Investigator: </strong>Justin, I am stuck on investigation X, do you possess any secret sauce you can share?</p><p><strong>Me:</strong> No secret sauce but how long have you been at it?</p><p><strong>Investigator:</strong> Well I spent two hours looking at their Twitter timeline and I just can’t seem to find anything.</p><p><strong>Me:</strong> You’re not stuck. You can barely watch a good movie in two hours, that’s not enough time to get stuck in an investigation.</p><p><strong>Investigator: </strong>*pout*</p><p>I totally understand that sometimes (particularly in private practice) you may be limited by your client in terms of how many hours you can spend. This is no different in law enforcement either, you do not have unlimited time and resources (contrary to popular belief) to perform an investigation.</p><p>I get it, I really do.</p><p>However, there are many examples of tenacity being the only thing that breaks a case. Not fancy tech. Not some secret search method on Facebook. Just sheer tenacity.</p><p>Here are a couple of war stories to illustrate:</p><h3>The Overwhelming Twitter Feed</h3><p>I was involved in an investigation where an anonymous Twitter user was levelling threats against a set of individuals that belonged to a particular organization.</p><p>No other social media accounts, no email addresses, no name. Nothing.</p><p>So I head to the target profile and…..36,000+ Tweets.</p><p>My initial reaction was: F&amp;@*! No one wants to go through that many Tweets trying to find clues.</p><p>However, you have to remember, you should be <em>excited</em> to see that much data. An account with 3 Tweets means that unless they have made some significant OPSEC failures, it’s going to be tough to find any useful nuggets. Thousands of Tweets vastly increases your chances of finding something useful. In security terms we would call this the attack surface.</p><p>So I did what anyone <em>should</em> do. I started reading, and scrolling and reading and scrolling. For hours. With only a few hours remaining in the investigation I found a single Tweet where the user referenced a Facebook group.</p><p>You can guess what happened next. I jumped to the group, hunted through all 500+ members until I found a user that had the same profile picture as the target Twitter account. Found a single photograph they had taken from their apartment balcony, geolocated that photo to pinpoint where they lived and eventually pinned down their name too. Case closed. Report written.</p><p>Tenacity pays off.</p><h3>Unmasking Thomas Paine</h3><p><a href="https://twitter.com/CraigSilverman">Craig Silverman</a> from Buzzfeed is one of the best investigative journalists out there. He routinely employs a dizzying array of OSINT tricks and takes tenacity to a whole new level.</p><p>Recently he ran the story linked below, where he was able to cooperate with a handful of other researchers to eventually uncover the person behind a pro-Trump propaganda website.</p><p><a href="https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/revealed-notorious-pro-trump-misinformation-site-true">https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/revealed-notorious-pro-trump-misinformation-site-true</a></p><p>At the bottom of the article Craig actually speaks to how the real life person was discovered in the end. It involved identifying a handful of Twitter accounts that were used currently or historically, and examining those Tweets for clues. One such clue was a YouTube video of a young hockey player, at which point they identified that the parent of this hockey player was in fact the same person who ran the propaganda Twitter account and website.</p><p>Tenacity pays off!</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>I may have mentioned this before: tenacity pays off.</p><p>That’s it. Next time you are stuck on an investigation, or overwhelmed by data, just remember to keep your head down and keep digging.</p><p>Happy hunting!</p><p>-Justin</p><h4>A Note From Craig on Hunchly</h4><p>Craig is a Hunchly user, so naturally I asked him how he used Hunchly for this particular story. Here is what he said:</p><blockquote>For this investigation I created two different Hunchly cases. I started with a general True Pundit case, where I did my initial information gathering and searches, and that grew to be 844 pages with 72 notes and 134 searches. Once I zeroed in on Michael Moore as my target, I created a new case just for him and ended up with 447 pages with 46 notes and 88 searches. One key thing in Hunchly 2 is being able to enter a keyword to filter the case pages without having to create a new selector. This enabled me to quickly bring up the relevant information while I was writing and fact checking the story.</blockquote><p>Very cool use of the filtering in the History table! You can also tell that Craig is heavily leveraging the note taking system in Hunchly which is incredibly useful for documenting important posts or setting down investigative milestones for when you are preparing your final report or story.</p><p>Grab a free trial from here: <a href="https://www.hunch.ly/">https://www.hunch.ly</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=89727adc471a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Unfriendly Friend Request]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@hunchly/osint-undercover-facebook-hunchly-7ea55c564bb5?source=rss-b6d7ada0a8b9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7ea55c564bb5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[osint]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hunchly]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investigation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Hunchly]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 26 Jun 2018 10:31:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-06-26T10:31:01.018Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1-cmwRylT_N6womco6blug.jpeg" /></figure><p>There was a great article on <a href="https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/06/08/busted-by-a-facebook-friend-whos-an-undercover-cop-its-legal/">Naked Security</a> that described how a man was charged with possessing a firearm and ammunition after an undercover police officer befriended him on Facebook and discovered photographs of a handgun, a large amount of cash and keys to a Mercedes.</p><p>The officer was then able to obtain a search warrant, and sure enough they found all of the incriminating physical evidence that was shown in the photograph on Facebook.</p><p>I found this case fascinating as there were a lot of moving pieces that involved both an undercover operation, online monitoring and some evidence capture issues that I found warranted a deeper look.</p><p>The court’s analysis on whether the Facebook evidence should be allowed or not can be read <a href="https://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=273550">here</a>.</p><p><strong><em>Disclaimer:</em></strong> I have said it before and I’ll say it again, I am not a lawyer, nor a member of law enforcement and this is not a critique of either the defense or the prosecution. Or really anyone else.</p><p>Now let’s dig into some of the particulars that are available in the decision.</p><h3>Archiving All Activity is Essential</h3><p>The first thing that caught my eye was this sentence:</p><blockquote>Based on the record before us, it is unclear what information from Everett’s Facebook page was available to Detective Landis before “friending” Everett and what information was available only after the two became “friends.”</blockquote><p>Yep. There is a perfect use case for <a href="https://www.hunch.ly/">Hunchly</a> and describes one of the biggest issues I see with online investigations. We don’t possess a crystal ball, so what we see while investigating <em>today </em>may not be what we see <em>tomorrow.</em> Additionally, sometimes we see materials today that only become relevant much later in the future.</p><p>You are observing an account of interest today, and they may be posting mundane items or nothing of particular interest. You then send a friend request which potentially can change the content that you are able to see. You now may have to speak to the facts regarding what you saw in the past, and how it changed <em>after </em>the friend request. Tough to do if you haven’t captured all of the content.</p><p>We have no idea what part of our investigations can end up in disclosure to the court or could end up being cross-examined. Always best to be prepared to show your work.</p><p>There was also an interesting footnote to that paragraph:</p><blockquote>When considering Everett’s motion, the trial judge questioned both parties about Everett’s Facebook privacy settings. Everett’s counsel stated that he did not know whether the photos in evidence were “Friend-only protected” or whether they were viewable on Everett’s public profile. Trial Transcript (Feb. 15, 2017), at A095. The State noted that it appeared that, “at some point, maybe in 2016,” Everett changed his Facebook profile to a “private page, which does restrict some access.” Id. But, the State also argued that, “at some point, there is evidence to suggest that it was, in fact, a public page that anyone could go on and look at.” Id.</blockquote><p>Pretty interesting that the judge is asking about privacy settings. I think we are going to see more and more of this when the courts are contemplating online evidence submissions. Again, with some archiving they could have easily explained what they saw from a third-party perspective but only the account holder (or production from Facebook) could give you a fully accurate picture of what the privacy settings were.</p><h3>Physical Evidence Corroborating Online Evidence</h3><p>I always find it humorous when people say that they can “solve entire cases with OSINT alone”. I think a more accurate way that cases play out is shown below:</p><blockquote>The search warrant, which was both authorized and executed on November 5, 2015, allowed police to conduct a daytime search of Everett’s residence to collect DNA samples and/or a deadly weapon. During the search of Everett’s home, police recovered a loaded nine-millimeter Smith &amp; Wesson handgun; the handgun’s original box with a serial number matching the Smith &amp; Wesson handgun; clothing, including the black T-shirt and the red necklace that Everett was wearing in the Photo and other Facebook photos; and Everett’s pay stubs.</blockquote><p>Yep! The photos gave them grounds to get the search warrant, they seize the physical evidence and compare it to the online evidence. The two compliment each other, which is how things tend to go more often than not.</p><h3>Fruit of the Poisonous Tree</h3><p>This is a common saying when talking about evidence that has been potentially collected illegally. The saying is indicating that if the source of the evidence is contaminated, then anything stemming from that evidence is also contaminated and may not be included as evidence. In this case the defendant is arguing that the Facebook monitoring was a “warrantless search” and as such would then negate the search warrant and anything seized because of it:</p><blockquote>Everett’s claim is somewhat convoluted, but his central argument is that Detective Landis’s monitoring of his Facebook page constituted an unlawful, warrantless “search” and, thus, any information seized pursuant to it must be suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 6 of the Delaware Constitution.</blockquote><p>This is a really interesting argument and something I believe we are going to see more of in case law.</p><p>Now there is a bit more verbiage below this statement that is interesting:</p><blockquote>Everett also argues that Detective Landis presented no evidence that the privacy settings of his Facebook page were “set to anything other than ‘private.’” And, given that Detective Landis had “friended” Everett, Everett argues that it is reasonable to assume that his settings were “private” and, as such, the Photo itself was only viewable to his friends and, thus, he had a “legitimate expectation of privacy.” Finally, he asserts that, even assuming arguendo that his acceptance of Detective Landis’s “friend” request amounted to consent, Detective Landis’s use of deception rendered that consent involuntary because the detective lacked the reasonable suspicion to monitor him.</blockquote><p>Again the issue of privacy settings is raised.</p><p>There is a takeaway here: if you are monitoring or investigating a Facebook account it is worth doing some archival and analysis of the account to determine (as best you can) the privacy settings for that account. Lawyers, judges and others may start to question this more and more frequently.</p><p>The rest of the court document discusses a number of other cases that contemplate similar themes, friend requests, among other things that are really interesting to review. I encourage you to review the document in its entirety.</p><h3>Key Takeaways</h3><p>There are a number of things that looked really interesting to me:</p><ol><li>Be prepared to discuss your monitoring activities going back to the first day you ever landed on a target’s account. This goes for criminal, and civil cases.</li><li>Take note of any observable privacy settings for your target. This can be tricky sometimes but certainly if you befriend your target, note any changes in their Facebook/Instagram/Twitter timelines after you have befriended them.</li></ol><p>As always, if you have any questions or comments shoot me an email at <a href="/service/mailto:justin@hunch.ly">justin@hunch.ly</a>. I am always on the prowl for interesting court cases so please send them my way if you are aware of any!</p><p>Happy hunting!</p><p>Justin</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7ea55c564bb5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Emojis in the Courtroom ☠️  ]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@hunchly/osint-emojis-in-the-courtroom-22a846e6e151?source=rss-b6d7ada0a8b9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/22a846e6e151</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[osint]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[emoji]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investigation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Hunchly]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 19 Jun 2018 12:16:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-06-19T12:16:01.041Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hW9UrJ6hmcp-HZsea0xu1Q.jpeg" /></figure><p>A Hunchly customer had sent me this interesting interview where a professor, and a defense lawyer discuss the use of emojis in the courtroom.</p><p>Much like my post on <a href="https://medium.com/@hunchly/jumping-to-osint-conclusions-a97fc5e623f4">jumping to conclusions</a>, where emojis were used, I found it interesting to hear some opinions on how emojis are showing up in court and what it means for OSINT investigations.</p><p>Emojis have been used in investigations as means to determine the tone of Tweets, Facebook posts and pretty much anywhere else that emojis are supported (which is nearly everywhere now). Most social media monitoring platforms also support queries and monitoring based solely on a particular emoji.</p><p>Even Facebook has a guide on how to determine when an emoji is to be deemed <a href="https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/kzkpea/facebook-poop-emoji-hatespeech-documents">hate speech</a>.</p><p>Like any other source of information we analyze during an investigation, it is important to remember that it is incredibly difficult to determine the real <em>meaning </em>behind them without having some additional context in which to frame them.</p><p>There are <a href="https://www.google.ca/search?q=the+meaning+of+emojis&amp;oq=the+meaning+of+emojis">many websites</a> dedicated to cataloguing and explaining the meaning behind emojis but of course the meanings can be very ambiguous, and ambiguity is the enemy of any good OSINT report.</p><p>The interview can be found below, and it is definitely worth a listen:</p><p><a href="http://www.cbc.ca/listen/shows/the-current/segment/15530359">The Current | Emoji evidence is causing confused faces in courtrooms</a></p><p>If you find any interesting court cases or you have any topic you would like to see appear on this blog just shoot me an email: <a href="/service/mailto:justin@hunch.ly">justin@hunch.ly</a></p><p>Grab a free 15-day trial of Hunchly <a href="https://www.hunch.ly/">here</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=22a846e6e151" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Advanced Website Analysis for OSINT]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@hunchly/advanced-website-analysis-for-osint-ff35373d918f?source=rss-b6d7ada0a8b9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ff35373d918f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[chrome]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[python]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hunchly]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[osint]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Hunchly]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 05 Jun 2018 14:12:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-06-05T14:32:39.103Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Many OSINT investigations are tied to using our bread and butter sites like Twitter, Facebook, Google, etc. I like to think that overall we are pretty good at extracting data from those platforms and leveraging the information found there.</p><p>Occasionally I get requests from Hunchly customers where they are looking to dive deeper into a target website to see how data is being displayed or they are looking for opportunities to automate data collection from a site that is not just static HTML.</p><p>I preach it often, but your most powerful tool is your web browser and in particular, it is no surprise that we are big fans of Google Chrome at Hunchly HQ.</p><p>Google Chrome comes loaded with tools that can assist you in digging into non-standard data sources that a website may offer.</p><p>In this video I will demonstrate how to use Google Chrome tools to dig into a target website that is streaming data about ships and aircraft around the world and displaying it on a map. For extra fun the data that is being passed around is in a custom format that we need to figure out in order to extract the information we are after.</p><p>You will learn how I approach analyzing a site like this, and along the way understand some of the tools available to you within Google Chrome.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DIE65eym9zfw&amp;src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FIE65eym9zfw&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/0b19e80afa155f54337405dc841ee2e2/href">https://medium.com/media/0b19e80afa155f54337405dc841ee2e2/href</a></iframe><p>As a bonus, I also walk through how to write a Python script to automate the process of grabbing and decoding the data that the site provides. You can check this video out below:</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D3k49QqF9BFY&amp;src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2F3k49QqF9BFY&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/b7e9bc082e86186a1cce165d94b8ab5e/href">https://medium.com/media/b7e9bc082e86186a1cce165d94b8ab5e/href</a></iframe><p>If you have any questions or have another site that you would like me to analyze on-screen just shoot me an email: <a href="/service/mailto:justin@hunch.ly">justin@hunch.ly</a></p><p>Justin</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ff35373d918f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Using Ghiro Image Forensics with Hunchly]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@hunchly/osint-using-ghiro-image-forensics-with-hunchly-acfde68c5bf9?source=rss-b6d7ada0a8b9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/acfde68c5bf9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ghiro]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hunchly]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[osint]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Hunchly]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 29 May 2018 12:08:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-05-29T12:08:14.143Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Ghiro is an incredibly cool image forensics platform that allows multiple users to store and analyze thousands of images. Ghiro automatically extracts EXIF metadata, builds maps, performs error level analysis and much more.</p><p>While Hunchly does automatically extract EXIF metadata from photographs, where Ghiro really shines is its ability to allow thousands of images from multiple users to be uploaded and analyzed.</p><p>This can be incredibly useful for those of you working in child exploitation or human trafficking cases when you are collecting thousands of images at a time and your team wants to be able to collaborate on their analysis.</p><p>In this video I demonstrate how to fire up the Ghiro virtual machine appliance, get logged in and how to both manually and automatically push images from Hunchly directly into Ghiro.</p><p>You’ll also get your first taste of the Hunchly API as we run a Python script to automatically pull data from Hunchly, create cases in Ghiro that match Hunchly, and then upload images automatically to those cases.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2F6DgCqMJvlvw%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D6DgCqMJvlvw&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2F6DgCqMJvlvw%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/47ceb85a306112253a6d6a5b7770ae45/href">https://medium.com/media/47ceb85a306112253a6d6a5b7770ae45/href</a></iframe><h3>Resources</h3><p><a href="https://github.com/hunchly/hunchly-oss">Hunchly Open Source Software Repo</a></p><p><a href="https://www.getghiro.org/">Ghiro</a></p><p><a href="https://www.virtualbox.org/wiki/Downloads">Virtualbox Download</a></p><p><a href="https://eforensicsmag.com/ela-photo-forensics/">ELA Photo Forensics</a> (E-ForensicsMag.com)</p><p>Grab a free 15-day trial of Hunchly from here: <br><a href="https://www.hunch.ly/try-it-now">https://www.hunch.ly/try-it-now</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=acfde68c5bf9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Jumping to OSINT Conclusions]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@hunchly/jumping-to-osint-conclusions-a97fc5e623f4?source=rss-b6d7ada0a8b9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a97fc5e623f4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[osint]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investigation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[journalism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Hunchly]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 23 May 2018 21:00:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-05-24T12:02:35.754Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>We all have done it. We find a Tweet, an IP address, or some other piece of information during an investigation, and we gleefully toss it into our report thinking we have the smoking gun or some killer argument that will win the day. Or, we use definitive language like we know for certain what a single piece of information means.</p><p>I have had a more senior investigator shred my own reports for using definitive language in a pure OSINT investigation.</p><p>Rightfully so.</p><p>I spend a lot of time combing through news articles and court cases looking at how social media or other forms of OSINT are turning up in cases and I spotted one the other day that I thought was interesting.</p><p><strong>WARNING:</strong> This is a sexual interference case, and contains information that might be upsetting or offensive. Don’t read the entirety of the case if it bothers you; I’ll snip out the relevant pieces. As with other legal case pieces I write about, this is not a criticism of the defense, prosecution or law enforcement. I’m not a lawyer. You’ve been warned.</p><p>The case is R. vs. Angel and can be found here: <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2018/2018bcsc794/2018bcsc794.html?searchUrlHash=AAAAAQALImluc3RhZ3JhbSIAAAAAAQ%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank">https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2018/2018bcsc794/2018bcsc794.html?searchUrlHash=AAAAAQALImluc3RhZ3JhbSIAAAAAAQ</a></p><h3><strong>The Background</strong></h3><p>In this particular case, it is a 53-year old accused with a 14-year old complainant. There are a lot of interesting tidbits on apps used, such as Grindr, which might be worth reading about.</p><p>What caught my eye was the defense counsel raising the fact that the complainant had Tweeted four days after the alleged incident took place:</p><blockquote>[27] At various times, the complainant described the alleged events with Mr. Angel as being highly traumatic. On July 10, 2016, four days after the alleged events, however, the complainant acknowledged having tweeted, “I am so happy right now”, followed by four smiley faces.</blockquote><p>This was interesting to me right away, as I could see how an eager private investigator or someone working on behalf of the defense counsel would use this as an opportunity to say that it couldn’t have been very traumatic if they were Tweeting this statement four days after the alleged offense.</p><p>They try to hammer this point home again later on (Angel is the accused):</p><blockquote>[61] Mr. Angel submits that the complainant was not a reliable witness. Mr. Angel notes that the complainant often answered that he did not recall or did not know, including at very important junctures such as when he was asked about the disabling of his Grindr account, and whether or not Mr. Angel was circumcised. Mr. Angel submits that it is hard to reconcile the complainant’s description of the events at issue with his July 10, 2016 tweet that “I am so happy right now” followed by four smiley faces.</blockquote><p>Now, where the cautionary tale for OSINT folks comes into play is where the judge says the following:</p><blockquote>[87] Regarding the complainant’s July 10, 2016 tweet about being “so happy”, I am not prepared to engage in stereotypical thinking that this tweet cannot be reconciled with the complainant’s description of a highly traumatic event. It often takes time for young victims of sexual exploitation to fully process their feelings, particularly when they may perceive themselves to have been willing participants. It is also not uncommon for victims of sexual abuse to put on a happy face to mask their true inner feelings. In this case, I lack sufficient context to draw any adverse conclusion from the complainant’s tweet.</blockquote><p>Right. This really drove a point home for me when I read this. Just because we (the investigators) feel that something is important, does not mean our intended <em>audience </em>will feel the same way. Clearly the judge did not agree with the assertion put forward regarding the Tweet in question.</p><h3><strong>Some Thoughts</strong></h3><p>Too often we are taking data, drawing inferences from it, reporting on it and then not corroborating or even testing the validity of the information. This is covered by Micah Hoffman as well, in his excellent post on <a href="https://cyber-defense.sans.org/blog/2018/05/09/the-5-biggest-mistakes-made-during-an-osint-investigation">The 5 Biggest Mistakes During an OSINT Investigation</a>.</p><p>I absolutely think that the defense should have been doing social media research, and I wouldn’t even argue that the Tweet should be not have been raised. I am not a legal strategist. Most lawyers are going to first weigh the pros and cons of every statement or piece of evidence before submitting it before the court.</p><p>They’ll make a risk calculation carefully before using or discarding that information.</p><p>But are we doing this in our investigations?</p><p>We really should be, especially before putting pen to paper.</p><h3><strong>Some Tips</strong></h3><p>It is always tough to determine what information to include in a deliverable before it is sent out. You don’t want to overload the client with information but we don’t want to leave out potentially relevant information either.</p><p>Here are some tips in general that I have found useful before, during and after an investigation:</p><ol><li>Before you start, make sure you fully understand what your client (internal/external/the public) is using your report for, what their objectives are, and fully understand the scope of the materials they expect to receive (as much data as possible vs. only data that fits certain criteria).</li><li>Document everything you do. Use <a href="https://www.hunch.ly%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank">Hunchly</a>. If you miss something in your report, you can always go back through your case, review the data you captured and amend the report if required.</li><li>Get a third party investigative review of your report. A fellow OSINT-slinger is ideal; they can spot gaps in analysis, areas where you could have fleshed out additional context or they can point out additional techniques that could assist in your case.</li><li>Get a third party non-investigative review of your report. These eyeballs will be more in line with your audience,<em> the consumer of your report</em>. It will identify language issues, question any statements you make, or raise issues where you are using technical language that is difficult to understand. Fix it, send it back. Rinse, wash, repeat.</li><li>Before you ship: question everything. Even if you feel a Tweet is relevant, it is a good idea to think about arguments and counter-arguments. You are likely not a doctor, lawyer, or psychologist so don’t pretend to be one. Instead, give your audience viewpoints on the data that can help better inform them and try to think of how any of your findings could be challenged.</li></ol><p>Stay tuned for any other additional cases that we find interesting. If you know of a case in your country that you found interesting, please send it to us: <a href="/service/mailto:justin@hunch.ly">justin@hunch.ly</a></p><p>If you haven’t taken Hunchly for a spin yet, grab a free 15-day trial <a href="https://www.hunch.ly/try-it-now">here</a>.</p><p>Justin</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a97fc5e623f4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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