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            <title><![CDATA[Hasta siempre comandante: foquismo and the century]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@hyx6ftr/hasta-siempre-comandante-foquismo-in-the-xxi-century-de27796f6373?source=rss-3f2438854130------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[revolution]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[socialism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bolivia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[che]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[che-guevara]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[hYx6Ftr]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 10 Oct 2021 04:13:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-10-10T05:02:03.785Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On a certain day some years ago, a committed young man attempted to spark a revolution by capturing a government office. With a strength of a thousand men or so, they stormed walls and battlements, fruitlessly fighting a better armed and superior opponent to which they ultimately surrendered. Yet, their defeat was but a prelude to further insurrections, rippling and echoing through the ocean of human history. This was not in Cuba, however, and this person was not Fidel Castro: I’m describing the 1839 coup of Louis Auguste Blanqui and the “society of seasons” in Paris.</p><p>Blanqui and his appellative — “blanquist” — was to be hurled as an insult for the following decades. Luxemburg, Lenin, and Bernstein, traded blows with the brand of “blanquism” as a cudgel, for — as Engels and Marx had made clear before — a “blanquist” was little more than an “adventurist”, following Lenin, or an aspiring aristocrat divorced from the masses, as Luxemburg often stated. When the “society of seasons” took over key parisian buildings — the seats of power for the judiciary, the legislative, and the executive — they expected “the masses” to follow their lead; so to speak, that their actions would spark that “fire in the mind” that Dostoevsky feared so much and consequently, a revolution. Blanqui’s failure then, and in the subsequent insurrections — even those in which he was physically absent — cemented his reputation as something of an idealist, a “man of action” but not of thought, as Marx (I believe) once said.</p><p>But the reader, if familiar with the modern history of Cuba, would no doubt recognize certain similarities. Castro’s first attempt at revolution — the storming of the Moncada barracks — was, materially, the same as the <em>putsch</em> in Paris. His legendary speech made as part of his own defense exposed parts of that reasoning: the attack was to be the first action of a larger campaign, one that would be catapulted once the people joined his movement. Key to this was, precisely, the “conspirationist” nature of the strike force: before calling for the masses to rise, the strategic points — the Moncada barracks and the ones in Bayamo — were to be seized and secured. All this, with the purpose to reduce bloodshed.</p><p>Castro had the utmost faith in the cuban people to rise along him, as the speech evidences. Perhaps, had the attack succeeded, he would have been proved right — taking the barracks, the city might follow, and then onwards to the west. But then, one must also look at his second campaign, the one that would eventually dethrone Batista.</p><p>Having been pardoned by the dictatorship as an act of goodwill towards democracy, Castro fled Cuba in time just as another wave of detentions swept the country. Then, in his openly threatening exile in Mexico, he would meet the person after whom this text is named — argentinian Ernesto Guevara, “<em>el ché</em>” — and assembling some dozen men, he would attempt to invade Cuba once more. On one hand, bad luck followed both of his military actions, as only a small fraction of his force survived the landing and regrouped with him in their base. On the other hand, Castro seemed to have an almost supernatural good luck, as the events that followed him would seem to be tailored to the success of his particular movement.</p><p>Most western academics — from the anglosphere, at that — tend to agree that initially, Castro’s support was mostly from urban sympathizers, and the rural population had a strong mistrust of the rebels (see Coltman, 2003, and Quirk, 1993). Others don’t share that view: the rebels were unexpected hosts, certainly, but there existed <em>the inclination</em> to follow them, and it was their continued presence what eventually eroded the restraints that limited that <em>inclination</em> (see Castillo, 2000). In any case, Castro and the rebels faced a very delimited war, one which maintained a certain separation until the moment of victory.</p><p>On the eastern mountainous ranges, covered in dense tropical forests, the rebels held an unwavering presence that even bomber squadrons and thousands of men couldn’t dislodge. On the west, the M-26–7 urban cells and its sympathizers tried to steer the populace towards revolution. And, on both fronts, parallel movements — like the Revolutionary Students Directorate or the Cienfuegos mutineers — attacked Batista’s institutions. The former would face severe losses during an assassination attempt on Batista, while the latter would be suppressed, like so many before and after them, by their own comrades in arms still alienated by the regime.</p><p>This is an important first point to take notice of. The cuban revolution was explicitly fought on many fronts: on the cities, on the mountains, on the barracks, on the media and even abroad. The Directorate didn’t share much of Castro’s later marxism — then intelligently concealed — but no doubt they helped, willingly or unwillingly, draw people towards him. The support of local inhabitants in the eastern ranges helped Castro immensely, both as a source of members of the “line infantry” in his guerrilla and as “skirmishers” — “escopeteros”, or shotgunners — who constantly eroded the advancing army, as well as protected vital supply routes. The large numbers of the latter and the eventual arms of the former were, without a doubt, factors that allowed Castro to hold his own against the superior forces of Batista: disastrous battles like Las Mercedes could be softened through the supply — and escape — routes that the escopeteros helped maintain (see Ignacio Taibo II, 1989). And, as for the cities and the west, the M-26–7 created a superb job in drawing people towards the movement: both in life, with calls to action and creation of intelligence networks, and in dead, as was the case with Frank País and the repercussions his murder sparked.</p><p>However, the war started to look promising for Castro’s side as the imperialist west turned on Batista. The revolution was already on the media, as <em>The New York Times</em>’ coverage already showed. Still, the more <em>direct</em> involvement through “affirmative actions”, as the euphemism goes, was reticent at first. Szulc has famously claimed that the CIA was funding Castro’s guerrillas “as early as 1957”, but regardless of whether or not one believes that claim, it’s undoubtable american weapons and training — gunrunned by infamous CIA asset Frank Sturgis — were already strengthening the guerrilla forces. Beyond all that support, the most decisive blow to Batista’s banana republic — unsuccessfully attempted against Castro later on — was the embargo on Cuba by the US. While they had once propped the Batista army through supplies and other forms of aid, the increased use of american materiel — tanks and bombers — against the rebels was a direct breach of the “terms of service” accepted by the regime in the “Agreement of Mutual Military Assistance” between Cuba and the United States (see Vilaboy, 2021). Almost overnight, the cuban air force was landlocked — most of its maintenance tools and spare parts were imported from the US. Tanks, small arms, and even some factories were frozen in place, as Batista struggled to form deals with the european imperialists and their colonies in order to supply his forces. The embargo was dressed in the guise of a democratic protest against Batista — who still retained the love of the bourgeoisie and the mob — but indeed, there are little doubts it was an answer to his failure to swiftly contain the rebels. On one basket, the american imperialists had Castro — again, not explicitly communist then — and were betting on him winning the war; on another basket, they had Cantillo and segments of the cuban army, whom they allegedly instructed to coup Batista out of power (ibid. Coltman and Quirk).</p><p>As the M-26–7 and other rebel groups gained terrain — and as the regime’s forces disbanded or defected to the rebel’s side — Cantillo would eventually negotiate an explicit coup with Castro, which was rejected by him, yet carried out regardless. The “coup”, a rather civilized one, consisted largely of Batista’s flight to the Dominican Republic and the cession of all powers to Cantillo and his junta. Castro refused to make a compromise with the coup, and pushed onwards to the capital — La Habana, Havana as it is anglicized. Castro, who by now had the support not only of the rank-and-file but of high ranking officials such as Rego Rubido, was able to smother the junta’s opposition, eventually destroying it with Cienfuegos’ arrest of Cantillo and his later trial. As it was, the first stage of the war had already been won — yet, other rebel groups still held control over parts of the country and the infrastructure.</p><p>This is another point of interest. Castro didn’t have the <em>exclusive</em> support of the US — as imperialists love to play on all sides as to always come out victorious — but the <em>opposition</em> of the US to Batista (the shared enemy of all rebel groups) was undoubtedly beneficial for Castro. Perhaps Castro would have won regardless, in time, or perhaps other groups — or the coup — would have gained the upper hand first. However, the question is: what would have happened if the regime hadn’t been abandoned by the US? Had the american materiel continued to flow into Cuba, would Castro’s war had been successful? Possibly, likely, yes; <em>as long as</em> they had some form of support regardless. The support of the local population — replenishing and growing the numbers of guerrillas and escopeteros — <em>or </em>the support of the armed forces — perhaps allowing for the same outcome regarding Batista and the junta — <em>or</em> even foreign support, unlikely as it was that the then-tumultuous Soviet Union would directly intervene in Latin America. The more support, the better; the less support, the worse. But this tautology also applied for Batista. Had he kept the american’s favor, the army’s loyalty and — most importantly — the acceptance of the cuban people, it would have been harder for Castro to gain <em>support</em> in turn. Much like in the tactics of engagements, this aspect of war consists in “occupying” — or rather, earning — a source of support in order to deprive the enemy from it. As we’ve seen so far, their “occupation” is as important as is “holding” territory and other traditional resources.</p><p>After taking Havana, Castro faced a second “war”, that included insurrections such as Escambray (“the fight against the bandits”) and foreign attacks such as Bay of Pigs, yet they all failed — as it is well known today. It would be highly beneficial to understand how Castro masterfully maneuvered from a nonthreatening “useful idiot” for the americans who could be “steered into the right directions”, as Nixon allegedly said (see Gaddis cit. Walker, 1997), into the communist dictator who threatened the very heart of America, while building up his strength all along before his face-heel turn — just as in Las Mercedes. Perhaps it was just luck — I do believe he was an extremely, almost uncannily lucky individual — or perhaps it was intelligent statesmanship — quite likely as well. But, in any case, that is not the subject of the text. Now we must go forwards, to a different time and a different continent.</p><p>In 1965, under the humid cover of the night, Ernesto Guevara left the Congo and went east, towards Tanzania. Behind him, the Simba rebellion was in its death throes — at least, as a political challenger beyond isolated guerrillas. As he famously wrote in his Congo war diary, the story of 1965 was, for him, “<em>the story of a failure</em>”. The diary, as subjective as it could be — a chronicle through the author’s eyes — is certain evidence of an issue with the Congo adventure: almost entirely, the conditions were completely opposed to those that he had faced in Cuba. A “coup” had already happened, and the west-favored Tshombe now had the unwavering support of the imperialists in Europe and America. No embargo had been put in place, and besides soviet assistance — and limited support from China — the “international” community, or rather, the west, was forthright in its opposition to the Simbas; consequently, a stream of well-equipped mercenaries poured into the Congo and the western hegemony printed a constant flow of reports on the atrocities the Simbas carried out — with an expected uncritical silence regarding the mercenaries’ practices.</p><p>And, finally, the death blow — the <em>coup de grâce</em> — was the alienation of the local population. Guevara described parts of the army — the revolutionary army — as “a parasitical army”, an armed group in the purest medieval tradition that sustained itself through pillaging and extortion (see Guevara, 1966). As he wrote in his diary, the feudal separation of the warrior and the serf deprived the former from the support of the latter. Coupled with the other malcontents of the warlords — corruption, betrayals, etc. — Guevara saw the “revolution” lost: lacking a Castro, lacking a “people’s army”, and lacking <em>support</em>, there was nothing to do but become a martyr.</p><p>In this we can see a certain flaw in the idea of “exporting revolution” as Guevara initially proposed. Most of us who admire the cuban revolution from within the Global South do not do so because our countries lack meaningful numbers of revolutions, but because such revolutions often end in stagnation, betrayals, or failures — unlike the cubans, who resisted for half a century the aggression of imperialism. Yet the “betrayed revolution” is the norm and the “successful revolution” is the exception; then, the task of the revolutionary is not only to spark a revolution but to ensure its “success” and prevent its “betrayal”. Indeed, the first step towards “success” is a military victory, but an initial victory doesn’t mean a permanent one. The different attempts to oust Castro failed, yet they existed; centuries before, the famed Toussaint L’Ouverture was ousted through betrayal just before consolidating the victory of the Haitian revolution (then Saint Domingue). Guevara arrived to the Congo just as that initial victory turned away from a permanent one — the Simbas, who had held almost half the country in 1964, were turning into the fractured and disorganized factions Guevara tried in vain to reform. Arriving without a strong grasp of the local language — languages — or the culture — the hegemony — he truly had nothing but his revolutionary spirit to face the imperialist giants and worse, the local opposition and cultural “contradictions”, to use the marxist term. If only spirit was enough to conquer injustice, this world would certainly be much better. That isn’t the case.</p><p>Someone could then attribute Guevara’s defeat to him arriving too late and underestimating the hegemony, the cultural relativism that rendered the congolese material conditions so different from the cuban ones. Indeed, to arrive so suddenly and brazenly with but a few men, shows more the intention to be last hour reinforcements than vanguards who will spearhead the revolution — a very sensible interpretation of Guevara’s intentions in that theater. However, Bolivia — his tombstone — was a very different case.</p><p>After the 1964 coup that ended the “populist” stage of Bolivia (using Dussel’s terminology) and started the Barrientos dictatorship, Guevara attempted to map a network for a potential intervention in Bolivia. His own work of political surveillance, coupled with the analysis of the failed rebellion by the “People’s Guerrilla Army” in his argentinian homeland, meant that Guevara had a strong grip on the material conditions in Bolivia and the strength of the dictatorship. Equally, the Congo had been a <em>tour de force</em> for the imperialists’ forces: at a moments notice, a number of soldiers, mercenaries, or hitmen, could swarm into most countries if that was a three-letter agency’s will. Bolivia, a CIA-backed dictatorship on the american continent, would be even more susceptible to this kind of interventionism.</p><p>Guevara’s bolivian diary shows, at times, a lack of awareness — or most likely, a severe underestimation — of these factors. In a most somber manner, one can find almost the same congolese weaknesses in the new guerrilla — the “Army of National Liberation”. As it was said, foreign support — materially, at least — unanimously backed Barrientos’ regime, with no hope of soviet or chinese aid, or cuban reinforcements. The army or the inter-government forces’ support for the revolution was out of the question, as was cooperation with the Bolivian Communist Party — Guevara narrates the differences that created a schism between his group and that of Mario Monje, the PCB’s general secretary. And, in the end, much like in the Congo, the death blow was dealt by the local population — not by rapacious behavior, however, but by the inability to form a rapport with them. With their refusal to aid the guerrilla, and their occasional role as government informants, the fate of the ELN was completely sealed (see Guevara, 1967).</p><p>Allegedly (if one believes O’Donnell) after the Congo defeat and during a temporary european exile, Guevara met the argentinian president Perón in Madrid, ostracized after the coup that deposed him. O’Donnell, quoting the testimony of Pavón Pereyra, claims that Perón bluntly told Guevara that an intervention in Bolivia would surely kill him, and begged him “<em>to not commit suicide</em>” (see O’Donnell, 2011). It could be that Guevara’s faith in <em>foquismo</em> and his doctrine of a “new man” clouded his judgment; perhaps, he didn’t understand himself the perfect symbiosis that had existed between him and Castro — and between Castro and Cuba — that allowed him to rise victorious so many years ago. Or maybe, as Perón presumably thought, this was a form of martyrdom, a continuation of his alleged planned “last stance” in the Congo. To say that the arguments around these subjects — in english and spanish — are still heated almost sixty years later, would be a gross understatement of how polarizing this topic is for certain socialists. But, in any case, the outcome was the same.</p><p>So it was that, earlier this day, Ernesto Guevara was killed in La Higuera, after being ambushed and captured by the bolivian army. As it goes, his last words towards his executioner were “<em>I know you’ve come to kill me. Shoot, coward! You are only going to kill a man!</em>” Indeed, a man was killed that day, just as many others have been killed before and after. Eventually, and almost 30 years after his death, his remains would be discovered in a hidden grave and re-entombed in Cuba.</p><p>Guevara was defeated in Congo because the war was lost when he arrived, and he was defeated in Bolivia because he couldn’t start a war. His fascination with Vietnam and the “people’s war” underestimated the importance of <em>support</em> in all its forms, and his correct appraisal of the importance of the population’s initiative to take action underestimated how feasible it was to export said initiative from one country to the other. Vietnam had Ho Chi Minh, another great revolutionary; Cuba had himself and Castro; the Congo, following his own words, had nothing but increasingly fragmented factions of warlords. Bolivia, on the other hand, had no one — just yet. Morales and his MAS party would eventually galvanize the bolivian peasants and indigenous communities towards their own form of socialism. Perhaps Guevara had simply arrived forty years too early.</p><p>Regardless of that, Guevara taught a great deal of things to socialists, in life and in death. Regarding <em>foquismo</em>, the patented doctrine of his style of guerrilla warfare, his diaries form one of the best tools for analysis and critique — coupled with the modern knowledge of certain events, that we have now but he clearly lacked. <em>Foquismo</em>, in all accounts, cannot be divorced from the idea of<em> support</em> — or, following the military terminology, one cannot think of the idea of the guerrilla as an <em>arm</em> as isolated from a regular army as an <em>arm</em>. <em>Combined arms </em>— guerrillas <em>and</em> regular armies — are considerably more effective than either acting individually. The PLA and the KMT, the VC and the VPA; or even within a “guerrilla” context, the <em>escopeteros</em> and the M-26–7 (and eventually, army defectors) — the fox and the lion, as always. It could be that a guerrilla <em>might</em> win alone, or a regular army; but in these matters, <em>might</em> is never enough. Victory should, ideally, be all but certain. Even in the face of the Goliat, of the numerically superior foe, the chances of victory should be maximized. And, sometimes, when victory is entirely unreachable — such as in Las Mercedes — the <em>combined arms</em> might help one live to fight another day. Another part of warfare is knowing when to leave and when to strike, and in that regard, a sacrifice for many revolutionaries should be to know when to refuse martyrdom and instead embrace a dishonorable retreat.</p><p>That brings me to Paris, in 1839. Blanqui, who was to be executed, was instead jailed for life. The 1848 revolution saw him freed, and he promptly went back to organizing yet more conspiratorial cells. After another failed insurrection, he was jailed once again. Freed in 1859, his unwavering activity as an agitator and conspirator saw him yet again jailed in 1861, successfully escaping, being pardoned, attempting two more failed insurrections, and eventually being captured after allegedly attempting to assassinate Adolphe Thiers. From that imprisonment was where Blanqui witnessed the rising of the communards, being completely unable to assist them in any way — save for the cells he had already created. In that cell, too, he saw the crushing of the commune, and despite his isolation was set to be deported — along with other intellectual leaders — as a punishment for the insurrection. Yet, his sentence was commuted to a single year of prison, and as soon as he was put in freedom he, once again, went back to his revolutionary labor. Riddled with diseases from spending most of his life in jail, he died soon after, at 75 years of age. During his lifetime, not a single european revolution had succeeded, and all his attempts at sparking revolutions had ended in failure. And yet, to the very end, he worked towards bringing forth the revolution, without regarding how many times they had failed.</p><p>Blanqui was justly criticized by Marx as lacking strategy, as he was effective at creating movements but not in consolidating them. That is a fatal flaw for a revolutionary, one that Marx himself couldn’t overcome — as the reader might know, such was the fate of the First Internationale. But I believe that Blanqui was possibly aware of that. It might be that, sometimes, a person recognizes themselves as incapable of being a catalyst or a spearhead — a Lenin, a Castro, a Mao — but yet is unwilling to surrender themselves to the hegemony. The only answer, then, is to either subsume the self to the leadership of such a catalyst; or, in its absence, to become that kind of martyr — to knowingly fight a losing battle over and over, until death. This is not entirely a romantic, “great man”, byronian view; it is precisely the understanding that often, a single “great man” doesn’t make history, that which makes it possible to expend revolutionary potential in such a way.</p><p>Sometimes one only needs to have patience and wait a couple of years. Other times, as was the case with Blanqui and the late Guevara, one arrives too early or too late to the revolutionary theater. But it certainly doesn’t mean, in the slightest, that said theater will not exist again — or for the first time in a country’s history.</p><p>Guevara’s death can only be understood by recognizing one of his last conversations — before his famous final words — with one of his captors. As it goes, when asked whether he was thinking of his impending death — “<em>his own mortality</em>” — he replied: “<em>No, I’m thinking about the immortality of the revolution</em>”. In Africa, as the bush wars were waning and socialist regimes were being defeated, revolutionary Thomas Sankara became president of the Upper Volta, remodeling it into Burkina Faso. A late arrival to the era of african socialism, he was murdered a few years after during a french-backed coup by his former ally Blaise Compaore (incidentally, a crime for which he is soon set to stand trial). If one follows the tragic plots that link Sankara with L’Ouverture or Guevara, it would seem almost cliché how tenuous revolutions are, and how easily they are snubbed. That is the interpretation of some people, one that I absolutely disagree with.</p><p>This is not a question of how easily the revolution is smothered, or how frail the growing revolutions are — of how powerless one is in front of the hegemony and the power of the imperialist giants. Certainly, this is not a question of accepting “the death of socialism”, as the neoliberal theorists would like one to believe (the reader might correctly assume I have an ideological grudge against some of them).</p><p>On the contrary, the “failures” of socialist revolutions and experiments strengthen the idea of socialism. First, because as it was the case with Guevara, they teach revolutionaries what is and what isn’t to be done — hence the importance of critically studying history and theory. Second, because more often than not they hold a direct genealogical link with current or future movements — e.g., the sandinistas and Sandino, despite their ideological differences.</p><p>And third, because of their historical presence. Something which I might write about in the future is precisely this: the existence of socialism all throughout human history, in the east and west, in the north and south. The flame is snubbed and drowned — once, twice, thrice, a hundred times, or a thousand. Yet there’s always a flame to smother. No matter how many times the reactionaries and imperialists do it, how many times the feudal lord murders the peasants or the monarch sends soldiers to fire on the protesters — or how many drone strikes one orders against a country — the flame cannot be permanently extinguished. As long as inequality and injustice remains spread, at it is, through the world, the flame will keep on burning. That reality which Castro described in his famous speech, while he faced the judiciary of Batista, is perhaps absent in Cuba today, but remains present and visible all over — in many countries and continents, in Latin America, and evidently, in my own city. That is the appeal of the flame for those that have nothing, and that is what renders it so hideous to those that have everything. The light it sheds illuminates what is wrong with the world.</p><p>Returning to Sankara, he too — like the Che — had a number of phrases that have become almost ubiquitous among certain socialists. The most relevant one, however, is this one, which he said in public a few days before his assassination: “<em>while revolutionaries as individuals can be murdered, you cannot kill ideas</em>”. To that I would add that, while revolutions can be defeated, one cannot defeat <em>the</em> <em>revolution</em>.</p><p>(The reader would do well to check out the song that gives this text its name, “<em>Hasta siempre comandante</em>”. Originally composed by Carlos Puebla, today it has a number of different covers in different styles, ubiquitous as it has become. Its english translation is available in Wikipedia, see: <a href="https://bit.ly/3v1aVOe">https://bit.ly/3v1aVOe</a>)</p><p>Sources:</p><blockquote>Quirk, R. E. (1993). <em>Fidel Castro</em>. WW Norton &amp; Company. <a href="https://bit.ly/3oO1z7a">https://bit.ly/3oO1z7a</a></blockquote><blockquote>Coltman, L. (2003). <em>The real Fidel Castro</em>. Yale University Press. <a href="https://bit.ly/3oNHDRZ">https://bit.ly/3oNHDRZ</a></blockquote><blockquote>Castillo Bernal, T. A. (2000). <em>Cuando esta guerra se acabe</em>. Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.</blockquote><blockquote>Taibo III, P. I. (1989). Escambray, la misión. In <em>La batalla del Che: Santa Clara</em>. Planeta. <a href="https://bit.ly/3Dt7XEW">https://bit.ly/3Dt7XEW</a></blockquote><blockquote>Guerra Vilaboy, S. (2021). <em>La revolución cubana</em>. Navegando Publicações. <a href="https://bit.ly/3DvGPp5">https://bit.ly/3DvGPp5</a></blockquote><blockquote>Gaddis, J. L. (1997). <em>We now know</em>. Oxford University Press. <a href="https://bit.ly/3lpoN1t">https://bit.ly/3lpoN1t</a></blockquote><blockquote>Guevara, E. (2005). <em>Diario del Congo</em>. Mondadori. <a href="https://bit.ly/3mG5L6d">https://bit.ly/3mG5L6d</a></blockquote><blockquote>O’Donnell, P. (2011, 8 octubre). Opiniones de Perón sobre el Che. <em>El País</em>. <a href="https://bit.ly/3oK3WrK">https://bit.ly/3oK3WrK</a></blockquote><blockquote>Guevara, E. (1967). <em>Diario en Bolivia</em>. Literatura Argentina Contemporánea. <a href="https://bit.ly/3FzIoEj">https://bit.ly/3FzIoEj</a></blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=de27796f6373" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Ski masks in the jungle: the civil war of the zapatistas]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@hyx6ftr/ski-masks-in-the-jungle-the-civil-war-of-the-zapatistas-8dde1fcf8dfb?source=rss-3f2438854130------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8dde1fcf8dfb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[civil-war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mexico]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[capitalism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ezln]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[hYx6Ftr]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 22 Sep 2021 19:29:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-09-22T19:29:22.447Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Introductory note: When I first started writing this, I used a personal translation of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation’s press release of September 19, 2021 as an epigraph. Since then, they have released an english translation (see here <a href="https://bit.ly/3lT73ux">https://bit.ly/3lT73ux</a>). In any case, I now include their version with some clarifying notes for the reader.</p><blockquote>Communique from the Indigenous Revolutionary Clandestine Committee-General Command of the Zapatista Army for National Liberation</blockquote><blockquote>September 19, 2021</blockquote><blockquote>To the people of Mexico:</blockquote><blockquote>To the peoples of the world:</blockquote><blockquote>To the Sixth in Mexico and abroad:</blockquote><blockquote>To the Networks of Resistance and Rebellion: [<em>In the original, “to the Europe that is down and to the left”</em>]</blockquote><blockquote>First: On September 11, 2021, in the early morning, while the Zapatista air delegation was in Mexico City, members of ORCAO [<em>Organización Regional de Cafeticultores de Ocosingo, lit. Regional Organization of Coffee-farmers of Ocosingo</em>] — a paramilitary organization serving the Chiapas state government — kidnapped the compañeros Sebastián Nuñez Pérez and José Antonio Sánchez Juárez, autonomous authorities from the Good Government Council of Patria Nueva [New Homeland], Chiapas.</blockquote><blockquote>The ORCAO is a political-military organization with paramilitary characteristics: they have uniforms, equipment, weapons, and ammunition purchased with money they receive from [government-sponsored] “social programs”. They keep part of the money for themselves and use part of it to pay off government officials for reporting that they [the ORCAO] are complying with the terms of the social programs. They fire on the Zapatista community of Moisés y Gandhi every night with these weapons.</blockquote><blockquote>The EZLN [<em>The spanish acronym for the Zapatistas</em>] has waited patiently as all avenues toward a solution were attempted and exhausted. While the Chiapas state government tried to sabotage and impede freedom for our compañeros, it was human rights organizations and the progressive Catholic church who made an objective assessment of what might happen.</blockquote><blockquote>Second: The compañeros were deprived of their liberty for eight days and then freed today, September 19, 2021, thanks to the parish priests of San Cristóbal de las Casas and Oxchuc, of the San Cristóbal diocese. The compañeros were robbed of a walkie-talkie and six thousand pesos in cash belonging to the Good Government Council.</blockquote><blockquote>Third: Kidnapping is a crime under both the bad government’s laws and Zapatista law. While the Chiapas state government has supported and covered up these crimes, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation took the necessary steps to free those who were kidnapped and to detain and sanction those who committed the crime.</blockquote><blockquote>Fourth: The only reason the conflict did not escalate into a tragedy was due to the intervention of the parishes mentioned above, human rights organizations, and the mobilizations and denunciations carried out in Mexico and, above all, Europe.</blockquote><blockquote>Fifth: The misgovernment of Rutilio Escandón is doing everything possible to destabilize the southeastern Mexican state of Chiapas:</blockquote><blockquote>It violently represses the normalistas [1].</blockquote><blockquote>It sabotages the agreements made between the organized teachers and the federal government, forcing the teachers to take more radical action to demand the agreements be complied with.</blockquote><blockquote>Its alliance with narcotraffickers forces indigenous communities to create their own self-defense groups, as the government does nothing to protect the life, liberty, and property of the population. It not only protects the narcotrafficking gangs, but also encourages, promotes, and finances paramilitary groups like those that are constantly attacking communities in Aldama and Santa Martha.</blockquote><blockquote>Its vaccination campaign is purposefully slow and disorganized, creating unrest in rural communities that it will no doubt exploit. Meanwhile, the rising covid deaths in these communities are ignored.</blockquote><blockquote>Its officials are stealing everything they can from the state treasury, perhaps preparing for a federal government collapse or betting on a new party coming into power.</blockquote><blockquote>And now they want to sabotage the departure of the Zapatista delegation participating in the European chapter of the Journey for Life. They ordered their ORCAO paramilitaries to kidnap our compañeros, leaving the crime unpunished, and trying to provoke a reaction from the EZLN, all in a state where governability hangs by a thread.</blockquote><blockquote>Sixth: If what the Ecologist Green Party of Mexico (PVEM) [<em>a satellite party that forms alliances of convenience with the PAN, PRI, or MORENA</em>]wants is to provoke a crisis with international repercussions so that it can destabilize the regime currently in power, they should call a referendum to revoke the presidential mandate.</blockquote><blockquote>The PVEM is one of the names used around here by the same old PRI [<em>Partido Revolucionario Institucional, Revolutionary Institutional Party, who ruled Mexico during the party-dictatorship era</em>]. Sometimes they say it’s the PAN [<em>Partido Acción Nacional, National Action Party, “right wing conservatives”</em>], sometimes the PRD [<em>Partido de la Revolución Democrática, Party of the Democratic Revolution, “center-left” moderates</em>], and now it’s the PVEM badly disguised as the Movement for National Regeneration [MORENA] [<em>The governing center-left party]</em>. But it’s the same criminals as ever, and now they’re part of the misnamed “opposition” movement [<em>Lobby that allegedly seeks to limit the power of MORENA</em>], a “fifth column” within the 4T [2].</blockquote><blockquote>Those responsible are: Rutilio Escandón and Victoria Cecilia Flores Pérez.</blockquote><blockquote>If what they want is to topple the federal government, or to cause problems in retaliation for the current federal criminal investigations against them, or to support one of the factions competing for power in 2024 [<em>Year when the next presidential elections are to be held</em>], then they should use the available legal channels and stop playing with the life, liberty, and property of the people of Chiapas. They should call for a vote to revoke the presidential mandate and stop playing with fire because they’re going to get burned. [<em>An electoral poll to decide whether or not the mexican president will remain in power until the end of his term</em>]</blockquote><blockquote>Seventh: We call on Europe below and to the left and on the Sixth in Mexico and abroad to protest in front of Mexican embassies and consulates and at the government offices of the state of Chiapas, demanding an end their provocations and renunciation of their death cult. The date is Friday, September 24, 2021.</blockquote><blockquote>Given the actions and omissions of the state and federal governments regarding these crimes and previous ones, we will take the necessary measures to bring justice to the criminals in the ORCAO and the government officials who sponsor them.</blockquote><blockquote>That is all. Next time there won’t be a communique. That is, there won’t be words, only actions.</blockquote><blockquote>From the mountains of southeastern Mexico,</blockquote><blockquote>In the name of the Indigenous Revolutionary Clandestine Committee-General Command of the EZLN</blockquote><blockquote>Subcomandante Insurgente Galeano. [<em>The former Subcomandante Marcos</em>]</blockquote><blockquote>Mexico, September 19, 2021.</blockquote><blockquote>[1] Students at the Escuelas Normales, or rural teachers’ colleges.</blockquote><blockquote>[2] The López Obrador campaign deemed its governing project the “Fourth Transformation” (4T), supposedly on par with historic events such as Mexican Independence (1810), a period of reform in the mid-19th century, and the Mexican Revolution (1910).</blockquote><p>. . .</p><p>The famed <em>Romance of the Three Kingdoms</em> opens its first chapter with this adage: “<em>As the saying goes, the world’s major trend is to be united for a long time and to be divided for a long time”</em>. Or, in Robert’s translation: “<em>The empire, long divided, must unite; long united, must divide. Thus it has ever been</em>”. Through the millennia during which China has existed in its different iterations, this aphorism seems to be true: conflicts, big and small, are always a constant.</p><p>Certainly this isn’t limited to the chinese. Even with their almost uninterrupted history, from the Three Kingdoms to the Warlord Era ambitions, invasions, or inefficiency, have caused the “Middle Kingdom” to split. The japanese, egyptians and romans all faced the same issues. In fact, they still face them. If one believed the neoliberal theorists such as Fukuyama, history has ended and we will usher in an era of global capitalist prosperity (following his later addenda, even if wars continue and capitalism falls, this era will still exist somehow). If we believe the capitalist ideologues, today we live in an era of historical peace. Liberal democracy has pacified humankind, conflict is tamed at last.</p><p>It could be that this illusion of stability is the First World’s largest show of hubris so far. Or perhaps, just another structural mirage inside the western hegemony. For many in the global south, conflict never subsumed — something that perhaps is evident to the reader. Yet, for those in the First World, conflict wasn’t eradicated or controlled either, just disguised. Swept under the rug of state-controlled media and armed repression.</p><p>I’ve discussed Fukuyama’s notions more deeply on texts in other languages, which perhaps I will translate someday if my laziness doesn’t overtake me and if I can afford the time to do so. But something relevant to this idea of capitalist peace and the end of history is one of his many addenda, published in <em>The New York Times </em>after 9/11. Besides the respectable ability of Fukuyama to bear the white man’s burden despite not being white, his central thesis gives a certain <em>schadenfreude</em> to the modern non-capitalist reader: the north-west (the free capitalist countries) will banish the south-east (the envious saracens) in the battle of wits and justice, <em>a la </em>Tolkien. I’m sure his newest books or essays will touch upon the financial crises, the COVID pandemic, and the retreat from Afghanistan, no doubt arguing the validity of his thesis despite these events. Maybe I will read them. Certainly I won’t buy them.</p><p>Maybe the reader is wondering why I opened this text with a zapatista press release, and whether or not I will continue to beef against Fukuyama for the remainder of this work. The answer to the latter question is no, and regarding the former, because among the many countries that adopted neoliberalism in the 90’s, Mexico strongly desired and aspired to be the poster child of capitalist globalization — to resurrect the mexican miracle through the power of privatization and the free-market.</p><p>The history of Mexico is not too different from many other global south post-colonial countries. Torn between nationalism and interventionism, between the XIX century liberals and the reactionary conservatives — all the time leaving the proletariat and its many ethnicities on the sidelines — Mexico strove for a modernization that never arrived, or to retain an idealized past that never existed. But among the many <em>caudillos</em>, dictators, demagogues and strongmen that populate the pages of mexican history textbooks, there are three rough “periods” of time that are of interest for this topic.</p><p>Let’s start with the late XIX — early XX century dictator, Porfirio Diaz. The image of the mexican revolution that followed his fall or abdication is comparatively well known in the west: <em>bandidos</em> and watering holes, Pancho Villa and his gang, as well as the cinematic John Wayne cowboy that must free a town from the criminal mexicans. However, the period <em>before</em> the revolution — the Diaz dictatorship commonly known as the “Porfiriato” — is somewhat ignored by most non-mexicans; perhaps, with the exception of socialists familiar with Turner’s work or the mexican leftist movements.</p><p>The Porfiriato can arguably be classified as a late arrival — as all cultural imports are — of Mexico to the politics of “enlightened despotism”, more despotic than enlightened in this case. Diaz’s famous state motto, “Order and progress”, was shared by many “enlightened” regimes throughout Latin America, all of them taking said phrase — directly or indirectly — from european positivism and its emphasis on technological and social progress. As it went with most european schools of thought, the latter and the former were invariably tied to the european standards for industrialization and its incipient capitalism. Consequently, progress and modernization meant importing anglo-european policies and personnel.</p><p>Diaz’s economy is a rather fascinating subject that can’t be completely summarized in such a short work and equally, isn’t its main subject. But, roughly, one could describe it as a creative mixture of feudalism and capitalism: “capitalist feudalism”, as it is so imaginatively called by some. Great expanses of land — both for farming and husbandry — were monopolized by a few, select dynasties: a social class known as “latifundistas”, literally translated as “landowners”. Their massive states, or haciendas, often served as a local hub within regions: jobs, supplies, and communications, were all tied spatially and figuratively to them, forcing most if not all of the population to fall under their grip. Most often, immigration and emigration were heavily controlled and restricted, effectively tying people to a single hacienda for their entire life; and sometimes, the infamous price gouging that bonded workers into debt tied them after their deaths too, as their debt was transferred to their family. In the rural landscape of a then-heavily agrarian country, these policies resulted in the re-creation of veritable serfs and feudal lords; or rather, in the optimization of them.</p><p>The capitalism of this system enters on the developmental aspect. The country was industrialized through privatization and encouragement of foreign investment: an impressive number of railroad lines were built, connecting the formerly disjointed country — the majority of them, property of the foreign companies who had funded them. The state immigration policies that aimed to “whiten” the country — as in Argentina or Brazil — failed to effectively integrate foreigners into the population, creating instead circles of fleeting investors that went back to their homeland after retiring, or created dynasties by refusing to “mix” with the local masses. The presidential cabinet, following Comte, consisted of a “technocracy”, or at least what aspired to be one: foreign and foreign-educated ministers tasked with applying the superiority of european thought to the difficulties of the “backwards” country. Hand in hand, foreign capital and latifundistas created a superficially strong economy that seemed to signal the definitive transition of Mexico into the civilized states of the west; and, under that gilding — as Twain said once — serfdom, slavery, and genocides, threatened to collapse the socioeconomic foundations of the state. After some failed essays at rebellions and revolts, they eventually did — the mexican revolution forced Diaz into exile and inaugurated another era of the “empire divided”, that would last for roughly two decades. That brings us to the next epoch: the state dictatorship of the PRI.</p><p>The Institutional Revolutiony Party — a literal translation of its spanish name — is a regional synonym with the XX century Mexico: the <em>de facto</em> government that rose victorious in many fraudulent elections, at the head of a system that liberal-turned-reactionary Vargas Llosa once famously called “<em>the perfect dictatorship</em>”. An electoral gilding of stability and safety hid repression and dictatorship, but as it was the case with most US-aligned regimes, there existed a certain invisibility over the worst aspects of this state: Mexico was a newer, better country, where perhaps the drunken westerner would have a holiday every now and then, but that didn’t protrude meaningfully in the more unpleasant aspects. <em>Luchadores</em> and film directors would fill the media landscape with entertainment or art, painters would draw in american buildings, and for the rest, it would be “business as usual”; as Mexico, once again, had entered the civilized and developed countries of the western hegemony.</p><p>Still, there was a fundamental difference between the PRI and Diaz. Whereas Diaz had a massive amount of inequality and a meaningful quantity of outright slavery, the PRI undeniable had a certain “assistentialist” focus on his public policies. If the reader is familiar with my previous article about Shining Path, he might be acquainted with the importance of assistentialism in defeating insurgencies: a person that is sufficiently fed and has a minimum amount of social security will be harder to radicalize that someone who is a “wretched of the earth”, following Fanon and Pottier. Before the PRI, Mexico alternated between the more-than-moderate socialism of Cárdenas and the less-than-fascist nationalism of Calles, until the <em>volkgeist</em> finally settled for the “sensibly moderate” kleptocrats such as Ávila Camacho and Miguel Alemán. It was during the latter’s period when the “mexican miracle” started to materialize: World War 2 and its economic demands suddenly placed the unassuming country as a desirable ally, and besides its token contribution to the military efforts with the 201 fighting squadron, Mexico’s industry supplied the american war machinery as mexican wealth increased exponentially. The early PRI thus found itself at the head of a prosperous state that still retained important levels of inequality and social unrest, which eventually crystallized into a number of movements — most famously, the 1968 strikes that loosely grouped students, workers and farmers nationwide. The suppression of the strikers during the late 60’s — early 70’s massacres meant the eradication of the left wing — moderate and radical — as a political actor in the cities, but a number of socialist movements still remained: the Party of the Poor in the wilds of Guerrero, and the September 23 Communist League (the LC23S, per its spanish initials) as an urban guerrilla. Again, it is important to compare this climate with the peruvian one I touched upon in my previous work: even if the mexican state also participated in the “dirty war”, with all the practices that term implies, it is beyond doubt that there was never an equivalent to Shining Path in Mexico: neither the Party of the Poor nor the LC23S had the widespread<em> gravitas</em> nor achieved the power that SP, at its height, displayed. Why was that?</p><p>While I must repeat that I won’t carry out an extensive analysis of the PRI’s economic policies — despite how appealing that might sound (to me, at least) — it’s sensible to claim that like many of its counterparts in the west, the first half of the PRI regime was marked by the bastardized keynesianism so common back then. Public works, booming state companies, and the apparently ever-growing industries — oil refineries, mining companies, etc. — conspired with a <em>de facto </em>“captive market” to catapult the formerly quasi-feudal country into a westernized, urban-centered society. Inequality remained, and poverty fermented in certain states as it had done for centuries. But <em>just enough</em> people were fed and employed to prevent any subversive group from gaining too much popularity. Coupled with the anti-socialist hegemony and the generous support and funding of american agencies to the repressive organizations of the state, it appeared as if the empire, once more, had been united.</p><p>From the late 70’s to the 80’s, and 90’s, worldwide, there were a number of crises that can only be described as “catastrophic” for the global south — and for the Soviet bloc, eventually. Unsurprisingly, I will again omit an in-depth analysis of them, of assessing why the mexican economy tanked and what could have been a better alternative. But to understand this and the previous XX century economic crises and policies I mentioned, I highly recommend as introductory works Carlos Marichal’s bibliography, especially his book “<em>Nueva historia de las grandes crisis financieras: Una perspectiva global, 1873–2008</em>” (which sadly remains untranslated, that I am aware of). Having said that, it’s time to go on towards the next period, which arose as an answer to face these crises: the neoliberalism of Salinas de Gortari.</p><p>Perhaps someone familiar with contemporary mexican politics will recognize these two words — “neoliberalism” and “Salinas” — as a staple of current president Obrador’s daily speeches. Along with many other actors, such as the “conservatives” or the “fifís” (a neologism for certain segments of the bourgeoisie), it would seem that the neoliberals are to his government what the communists were to the PRI: a boogeyman and a “public enemy” to usefully blame for everything, at least according to certain detractors of his “populist” government.</p><p>Unlike the communists, the neoliberals were both present and a major political actor during the last decades of the XX century. And again, unlike the looming KGB agents so feared by the press in those days, the neoliberals had an actual impact in the mexican <em>statu quo</em>: in an echo of Diaz’s order and progress, the Salinas administration gambled on both the creation of a technocracy and on economic growth via private investments. Following the global trend of privatization, state companies were dismembered and put on sale, free trade agreements were signed, and the technocrats waited for yet another entrance of Mexico into the civilized world of the developed west. For some of them, it was a shocking surprise to see that, in the first day of 1994, a group that called themselves a “Liberation Army” had just announced something like a declaration of war on the government.</p><p>Why did the zapatistas rebel? That’s a question that would be better answered by them. One can find their first declaration in the previously cited website (<a href="https://bit.ly/3u1ryIM">https://bit.ly/3u1ryIM</a>). But if someone asked me “why <em>do I think</em> the zapatistas rebelled?” I would answer in a slightly different way.</p><p>The situation in Mexico was a parallel of what happened in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev’s promises fell flat, and just some months before the zapatista rising, Yeltsin’s tanks were shelling the russian white house during the constitutional crisis. Months after the zapatista declaration, PRI reformist candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio would be publicly assassinated — allegedly, at the behest of Salinas. Neoliberalism, essentially, relies on dividing the empire. One privatizes industries and agrees on certain treaties believing that, magically, the invisible hand of the market will guide the productive forces long suppressed by the state to prosperity. In the face of the growing oligarchy, of undernourishment and food scarcity, of unemployment and unrest, neoliberalism demands one refrains from veering away and continues to push deeper into that brand of capitalism. People like Gorby or Yeltsin, like Salinas or Zedillo, often follow that advice. When one removes the most minimal safety nets from chronically impoverished states such as Chiapas — where the aforementioned dregs of poverty and exploitation continued to fester for centuries, unnoticed — the single possible consequence is rebellion: a <em>jacquerie</em>, perhaps, or a civil war.</p><p>Which brings me to the opening question. Will the zapatistas start a civil war? The answer requires acknowledging another question: “What happened to the zapatista uprising?” The zapatistas themselves, again, have a great deal of media relating to that; and, equally, there are a number of other resources — some more ideologically slanted than others — available online. But the conclusion is identical, even if the interpretation isn’t: conflict mostly ceased with the signing of the San Andrés Accords, and the government consecrated promises into laws while the zapatistas laid down their weapons. Some communities retained autonomy. The rest of the indigenous communities — not only mayan, but all those in the mexican territory — were to benefit from these reforms and laws. Another farewell to arms, all the more likely due to the democratic election of PAN candidate Vicente Fox for the presidency. The PRI, and its discontents, were finally over. The end of history, perhaps.</p><p>If the reader is acquainted with contemporary mexican politics, they will no doubt know how that turned out. If they aren’t, it’s sufficient to say not much has changed. Mexican laws are often like those “scraps of paper” that Lassalle talked about: platitudes and promises, good intentions that lack a method — or the inclination — to be materialized. The crises that birth the zapatistas also strengthened a different kind of group, one that had been present since the days when they trained nicaraguan <em>contras</em> at the behest of american intelligence agencies. They are, of course, the cartels.</p><p>After the infamous “war on drugs” during Calderón’s presidency, and its partial continuation during the term of PRI-resurrectee Peña Nieto, many powerful cartels were fragmented. Then, the Chapo Guzman was extradited, and the current president took office with the promise to end the “war on drugs” policy: “hugs, not gunshots”, as he famously said. The “innovative” use of the armed forces as a police force was Calderón’s trump card against the rising power of the cartels; for Peña Nieto, it was a new string of privatizations that were to resurrect the economy — as well as the cited use of the armed forces; and, for López Obrador, it’s his “assistentialism” and militarized police force — and the continued use of the armed forces — that which is to give him the triumph against the now traditional cartels. The technocrats of the previous administration were perhaps surprised — certainly not bothered — when their strategies didn’t accomplish much and the cartels kept on multiplying. It may be that the current technocrats — the hordes of turncoat career politicians and well-meaning idealists — will be equally shocked some day. Obrador’s administration is not over, which makes it impossible to say for sure just yet.</p><p>Let’s go back to the question. Will the zapatistas start a civil war? Dear reader, if I could say without a midge of doubt what will happen in the future, I wouldn’t be writing here — perhaps I would be a religious prophet, or locked away in the basement of a CIA black prison. But, my opinion — fallible and imperfect — is that no, the zapatistas won’t start a civil war, as they are not able to. The truth, as disappointing as it may be, is that the country of Mexico lacks — again, in my limited opinion — the potential for <em>foquismo</em>, and another zapatista armed insurrection would most likely remained confined to their current territories. Perhaps the presidency of Obrador would be unwilling to send the army to crush them, as the government once did. Yet, as the transcribed zapatista communique mentions, it’s evident the state government lacks such moral restrictions. Any potential conflict now has another actor: the massive and comparatively well-armed cartels, who often serve as mercenaries or paramilitary forces for the municipal and state governors — themselves, often related to the cartel leadership through blood or otherwise. The lack of a big-name state agency doesn’t mean the absence of repression. It’s a show of cosmic black humor that the suddenly unemployed government spooks went on to start their cartels. Nevertheless, they continue to be a major cause of mortality for dissidents and whistleblowers: “the more things change, the more they stay the same”, as the saying goes.</p><p>I truly can only wish for a peaceful resolution of this crisis. However, above this event — the immediate problem the zapatistas discuss — there rises yet another question. A spicy question, that the reader might be thinking about — consciously or unconsciously. “Will there be a civil war in Mexico?” Even with my limited and flawed vision, I strongly believe that the answer is “yes”. Maybe not today, or tomorrow. But perhaps in some decades. Maybe in some years.</p><p>Not because of the zapatistas, certainly, and not because of the actions of a <em>foquista </em>guerrilla. But overall, because the empire is divided once more. Or, at least, it seems like it’s in the closing stages of realizing that division.</p><p>Last year, a group of governors from the north-western states famously declared their intentions to separate themselves from the federation, to “secede” in other words. Then, the clarifications arrived: they hadn’t meant a literal secession, but a figurative one; they wanted to separate themselves from the “<em>federation’s fiscal control</em>”, not from their <em>imperium</em> and authority. Laugh and mockery ensued. Perhaps, it was an ill-fated attempt at importing Brexit and MAGA rhetoric into the mexican territory.</p><p>This year, a group of PAN senators — the “right-wing catholic and conservative” party, one must remember — met with the neo-francoist spanish party VOX, ostensibly to form an “anti-communist alliance” with Latin America. Widely ridiculed and mocked, this rhetoric was quickly silenced, and the architect of said media stunt — “media consultant” Christian Camacho — was fired. Then, president Obrador invited cuban president Díaz-Canel to the independence day military parade, afterwards hosting the CELAC meeting with peruvian president Pedro Castillo and venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro. The “red scare” now was revived, and Obrador’s remarks against the cuban embargo perhaps raised some eyebrows in Langley and Washington — after his private meeting with Harris and Cohen, it could be that the american government expected a different attitude.</p><p>Is Obrador an echo of Echeverría, an international socialist and a national capitalist? No doubt plenty of people will defend and attack him, from the left and from the right. Still, the lesson is somewhat deeper than that. It’s not a question, but a truth — the acceptance of a very hidden and gilded fact. Under the checks and balances, the good intentions of activists and idealists; under the promises of demagogues and the vain fear-mongering of media, there lies something that is said but not believed, or known but not recognized. That is, that the state — the democratic, liberal, westernized state — is tenuously fragile. In the case of Mexico, it might not be fragile, but breaking.</p><p>The american liberals and democrats — and the “respectable conservatives”, which basically overlap with them — were astonished at the January Insurrection in the Capitol: without diplomacy, without formality, without respect for the solemnities and mannerisms through which political violence is regulated in the US, there was a crowd — nay, a horde — roving the halls of the sacrosanct building. Strong condemnations followed, condescending lectures on the values of liberal democracy under siege by “<em>Y’all Qaeda</em>”. This was not China or Afghanistan, after all; this was the USA, and people’s lives mattered — allegedly — and democracy was to prevail. Trump couldn’t possibly get away with this. He didn’t, as he received the strongest sentence known to liberals and democrats: a ban from Twitter. Besides that, the <em>putsch</em> so far remains unpunished.</p><p>It’s a mistake to believe there was something substantially unprecedented in the “riots”. Perhaps one can speak of “uniqueness” in geographical or political terms, as the capitol carries a special cultural and historical significance — an attack on it is an affront on its symbolic status, according to some americans. But the <em>violence</em> itself, the political “riots”, is certainly not new in american history. The reader might know of the “race riots”, or more fittingly, the “race massacres”: from Chicago to Tulsa and Orangeburg, from the KKK to the sporadic mobs of civilians and cops. But beyond that, one has Haymarket and Blair Mountain, the mutinous troops in Vietnam and the murder of inconvenient activists and revolutionaries — Fred Hampton, Luther King, Malcolm X, etc. Despite the gilding of the checks and balances, or the well polished and generously funded hegemony, the “liberal democracy” facade is tenuous at best or crumbling at worst. In its most structurally weak spots, they shoot anyone who tries to touch it.</p><p>Mexico, for all its ambitions of order and progress, of attaining a free market and emulating its northern neighbor, faces even worse problems than the US. The uncritical consumption of gourmet american-imported discourse no doubt has led some people to believe in the stability of the liberal hegemony — mostly the <em>intelligentsia </em>and the petite bourgeoisie, two overlapping demographics. And yet, there exists a <em>zeitgeist</em> of collapse: from the reactionary right wing who panics over the center-left “communism” of MORENA, to the different self-defense movements that have arisen throughout the many state-neglected areas; and, between all that, the zapatistas and other autonomous communities, such as Cherán. In one state, the youth has a kind of aspiration — in the purest exemplification of Freire’s theories — to attain a specially insidious occupation: a job in the cartel, whether as a hitman, mule, “halcón” (watchman), or otherwise. The cartel pays more than they could ever hope to earn in most jobs, and it’s a vehicle of climbing the local social pyramid. On another state, the same kind of person finds their community under the heel of the same cartel, the one so beloved by the community that sheltered it and that receives its boons. As it takes but not gives, and under the passive gaze of the government, the crushed community takes up arms. Perhaps they’ll succeed in driving away the cartel, or perhaps the army — often at the behest of cartel sponsors — will disarm them, leaving them defenseless. Maybe, eventually, these groups will become cartels themselves. “<em>Without political education, a soldier is a potential criminal</em>” — Sankara famously said; but equally, without political guidance, any movement is a potential danger — or failure.</p><p>One doesn’t need to be a prophet to predict the difficulties of the future. Climate change might bring back the famines of colonial Mexico, and in turn, these might just be the final push for the existing fractures to collapse into a civil war. An economic crisis spiraling into a secession. Obrador becoming just a bit too left-leaning and being couped out of power. Or simply, the return of the political pendulum: the ascent of a Bolsonaro-like cryptofascist in the next elections, a <em>putsch</em>, and in time, the return of an american-backed dictatorship. Hopefully not, but possibly — probably — yes. And then, the story begins anew: <em>caudillos</em>, idealists, class parasites and revolutionaries. Always the same, but different. Mexico is not Peru and its armed groups are not Shining Path, but Latin America in general imitates itself often.</p><p>“<em>Thus it has ever been</em>”.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8dde1fcf8dfb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Gonzalo on horseback: Shining Path and the politics of violence]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@hyx6ftr/gonzalo-on-horseback-shining-path-and-the-politics-of-violence-5c8cc5b861c?source=rss-3f2438854130------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5c8cc5b861c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[gonzalo]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[political-theory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[socialism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[shining-path]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[hYx6Ftr]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 19 Sep 2021 05:04:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-09-19T05:04:16.965Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Abimael Guzmán, better known as “Comrade Gonzalo”, recently died in a peruvian navy hospital. For some people, this was a cause for celebration — the leader of the hated “Shining Path” was finally dead. Those who supported SP certainly didn’t share that view: for them, Guzmán — Gonzalo — was yet another martyr in the struggle for socialism. Within the “far left”, or the revolutionary socialists, his death remarked the ideological split between “maoist” hardliners — many of whom supported SP — and the rest of these leftists, who saw SP as little more than terrorists.</p><p>I need to start this text by saying I fully condemn all instances of violence, that I do not glorify any of the factions or persons hereby described, and that I do not support nor excuse any group that is considered a terrorist by the free and democratic west — by the US and NATO countries, more specifically. This is because Medium’s terms of service and rules are very specific regarding these themes, and internet-famous Rainer Shea recently got his own account banned because of that.</p><p>Having said that, it’s necessary to touch on many of said themes from a political theory perspective, from a hypothetical revolutionary view. This text serves both as a summary in english of SP and its characteristics, and as an introductory rant on the ramifications and use of violence and power. Why is it that, apparently, the violent SP failed to gain the mass support that the “violent” bolsheviks or chinese communists had? And, historically, how can one explain the success of violent leaders and the failures of others? If violence is a tool, why does it work so unreliable?</p><p>An easy answer, and a somewhat propagandistic one, could be that this violence is propaganda itself: that X was a violent thug but Y wasn’t, that Y’s violence was defensive while X’s violence was offensive, etc. That would be both a truth and a lie; or rather, while it’s undoubtable that a number of factions have been rather violent and others have been comparatively peaceful, it’s beyond all doubt that wrestling power through a revolution requires violence (again, something me and Medium strongly condemn, but that I analyze nonetheless). The righteousness of said actions are a useful tool for propaganda and lionizing revolutionaries, but it has no place in a serious analysis of tactics and strategies. To understand the use of violence, one must leave behind this idealization and adopt a realistic — but never cynical — view of what violence implies.</p><p>However, perhaps a certainly slanted understanding of violence is what could be behind this unwise imbalance. Take, for example, the Tambov rebellion — one of the major <em>jacqueries</em> against the bolsheviks. What would a person scouring Wikipedia find about it? The <em>Black Book of Communism</em>’s account of destruction and genocide, Pipes’ testimony of brutal communist infighting — chemical warfare and torture included — or Sennikov’s heroic discovery of secret documents, and his alleged later persecution at the hands of the KGB due to that (according to Gagkuev, at least). In between, part of Zhukov’s memories lie framed, serving as a confirmation of this brutality rather than as an alternative point of view.</p><p>As of today, more people believe this than doubt it — Wikipedia is either a direct source or a citations repository for both internet users and burgeoning academics. In the XX century, this type of particularly charged writing was even more common, as most sources were rather divided: on one side, the opposition, with better or worse attempts at disguising their biases; on the other side, the defendants, explicit or disguised in their apologia. Perhaps that is a present practice in academia, but it matters little for this topic. What needs to be understood is the existence of the rather common practice — and the fatal flaw — of disguising ideology as<em> realpolitik</em>.</p><p>Gonzalo, or Guzmán, was very influenced by Morote Best’s thought; and Morote Best was himself very influenced by — if not a zealot of — maoism in its 1970’s conception. If one follows Nicholas Shakespeare’s words regarding Best (as per the interview of the more respectable Uki Goñi) Morote was a fanatic of Hoxhaism and Maoism, of the heroic resistance of China and Albania against the “social imperialism” of the Soviet Union. Perhaps, a manichaean who believed in manichaeist relations of fundamental opposition. Black and white, but never gray.</p><p>Shakespeare certainly becomes more opinionated in his assessment of the “terrible conditions” of socialist Albania (“<em>unthinkable for an european country</em>”, as europeans are too civilized for that) but there is little reason to doubt his testimony regarding Morote Best. His influence on Guzmán is evident, even more when taking into account the incorporation of pioneering socialist Mariátegui in SP ideology. Humberto Flores, in the eponymous paper “<em>El pensamiento de José Carlos Mariátegui</em>”, gives a concise resume of said author’s thought: equal parts gramscist and intersectionalist, Mariátegui recognized the need of indigenous inclusion without falling into the mistake of becoming a “re-reactionary” — an “indigenous supremacist” rather than an emancipator. Knowing that Mariátegui was a proponent of a balanced and marxist strategy that compatibilized indigenous issues with the demands of the non-indigenous proletariat, how could it be that SP, who claimed to follow the “shining path of Mariátegui [thought]” (el luminoso sendero de Mariátegui) faced such a strong indigenous opposition?</p><p>Allegedly, Guzmán visited China in the first years of the Cultural Revolution, before the full scope of its consequences was felt. The revolution itself is a phenomenon to study alone — which evidently is not the purpose of this text — but, in any case, there are some things to take notice of. First and foremost, the most evident one: Mao Zedong was in a political position of power inside an existing socialist state, with the loyalty of the people and the army all but ensured — indeed, western scholars often mention the so-called “five man group” and its favorable assessment of the political situation as factors behind the decision to start the revolution. Second, the “red guards” — the actors behind most actions — were predominantly civilians — students, peasants, etc. — with the PLA taking a passive or repressive role most of the time. And third, that as it was said before, the consequences of the Cultural Revolution hardly benefited the chinese state: something that the “revisionist” or “state capitalist” — according to its maoist detractors — CPC has acknowledged since 1981.</p><p>But, how does that correlate to Guzmán, and to his later persona of Gonzalo? Let’s follow the same scenario regarding Wikipedia. Imagine the hypothetical situation of a newborn communist scouring its articles for things like the Tambov rebellion or the own Cultural Revolution. Imagine, then, that this person reads all the litany of things people like Kristof or organizations like Radio Free Asia claim and that Wikipedia editors uncritically accept (following Medium’s terms of service, these are all true and the Cultural Revolution was everything they say it was). Then, this person would read about how people were cannibals all of a sudden, or how they strapped dynamite to random civilians, or whatever other atrocity western-funded ideologues bravely and truthfully document. What would this person possibly think?</p><p>In my view, there are three simple paths. The first, and the most uncommon, would be to do exhaustive research of their own: to follow the materialist study every marxist allegedly upholds but rarely practices. The second, and perhaps more common, would be to flatly deny it: to assert, as some do, that the Cultural Revolution was a peaceful and organized effort that didn’t have any negative consequences, and anything contrary to this view is revisionism or CIA propaganda. The third one, and possibly more dangerous than the former, is to accept it — to embrace the violence and brutality that existed — and justify it.</p><p>Now, let’s imagine that this person is not an internet surfer — like perhaps the reader is — and is instead a freshly graduated student in the middle of the XX century. Someone who has heard praises about the chinese from his ideological mentor, and who lacks the ubiquitous information that today exists. Well read, perhaps, but fundamentally an idealist — a manichaean — and not a pragmatist nor a realist. Let’s imagine this person visits China, and confirms his ideas: a revolution is starting, and the red guards will cleanse the country from the evil revisionists and capitalist apologists. “Unlike the “social imperialist” USSR, the chinese are taking action! The revolution isn’t betrayed, but lives on!”</p><p>It must be said that under no circumstances should it be interpreted that I paint Guzmán as a tragic byronian character. But the fundamental flaw of the SP’s policies was, first and foremost, thinking they could imitate the Cultural Revolution while carving out a piece of Peru for their state — with the opposition of the peruvian army, the MRTA, and the ronderos, increasing and growing stronger each day. Then, another mistake was believing a Cultural Revolution <em>could be imposed</em> instead of harnessed organically — that you could turn anyone into red guards from one day to the other. And last but not least, that this “cultural revolution” would ever be beneficial for the popularity of SP or the well-being of the peruvian people.</p><p>There was a fundamental difference in this implementation of “cultural cleansing” between SP and the CPC. Critics of the Cultural Revolution and some of its apologists both admit it had a “linear” character, in terms of cause and effect. That is, that one could basically follow this simplified timeline:</p><blockquote>Victory of the CPC &gt; leads to &gt; Great Leap Forward &gt; leads to &gt; Cultural Revolution</blockquote><p>For some anti-communists and anti-maoists, this shows that perhaps, the CR was a desperate attempt at regaining power following the crises during the GLF. Mao, in this characterization, was something of a demagogue that stirred a micro-civil war for no reason other than to create conflict — and to profit from said conflict, somehow. Again, a cause and consequence relation: the CR existed because the GLF did. The CR was a necessity for the demagogue, but not something born out of whim.</p><p>For some maoists and people who reject this reductive interpretation, the CR was an attempt at “purging” the non-maoist elements in the party — an echo of Stalin’s purges, of the Jacobins, or whatever other counter-reactionary movement has existed historically. Indeed, the 1966 “Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” mentions the following (in a rather rough translation):</p><blockquote>“Although the bourgeoisie has been overthrown, they are trying to use the old ideas, culture, customs and habits of the exploiting class to corrupt the masses and conquer the hearts and minds of the people in order to achieve their goal of restoration. The proletariat, on the contrary, must meet all the challenges of the bourgeoisie in the ideological field and change the spiritual outlook of the whole society with new ideas, new culture, new customs and new habits of the proletariat itself. At present, our aim is to defeat those in power who follow the capitalist road, criticize the reactionary academic “authorities” of the bourgeoisie, criticize the consciousness formation of the bourgeoisie and all exploiting classes, reform education, reform literature and art, and reform all superstructures that do not adapt to the socialist economic base, so as to facilitate the consolidation and development of the socialist system.”</blockquote><p>Remarkably, one should take notice of the first word: “<em>Although the bourgeoisie has been overthrown</em>”. Again, cause and consequence, a linearity of events.</p><blockquote>Armed struggle &gt; leads to &gt; overthrowing the bourgeois &gt; leads to &gt; the Cultural Revolution.</blockquote><p>Perhaps the reader has noticed already what I’m trying to say. Gonzalo — not anymore Guzmán — had a flawed understanding of strategy, to say the least. If one is to look at the other important “kindred” regime of the era — Democratic Kampuchea — one can easily see the same linearity I mention: the KR had <em>de facto</em> control over the country at the time their most well-known policies were implemented. At their greatest power, SP held significant power over the forests of central Peru — the modern San Matías San Carlos reserve — and its influence or areas of operation extended from Lima to the Brazilian border, and from San Martín to Puno. Yet, it had no absolute or significant control over these territories — no “forward bases”, as the guerrilla term goes, not even the support of the majority of the population. Which brings me to another point.</p><p>SP had an infamously strong perception of indigenous and rural communities. Their ideas somewhat mirrored those of the Democratic Kampuchea regime: “everyone must embrace our ideology, and if they don’t, they are our enemy”. One of the best known cases of indigenous-SP enmity was the asháninka, who live in the central forests that SP controlled. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission has estimated around 6,000 asháninka deaths and 10,000 displaced from their land (See 2.8. Los Pueblos Indígenas y el Caso de los Asháninkas, in Book V, Chapter 2, of the Commission’s Final Report). And, following some of the testimonies in the previous report, one can see the widespread use of cartel-style intimidation tactics: mutilations, public executions, and overall displays of power intended to intimidate the population.</p><p>Again, cartels are famous for their brutality, but also because of their “generosity” in bribing towns and villages with public works and gifts. That is the essence of the “carrot and stick” school of thought, or its equivalent in spanish, the “plata o plomo” [silver or lead] tactic. On the other hand, wholly abusive and exploitative regimes, such as Leopold II’s Congo, have given nothing to the population but relied entirely on military might: no carrot but a large stick, figuratively speaking. An attempt at rebellion under such an administration can seldom lead to victory, and it’s not in the lack of rebellions but in the easiness of suppression where the regimen’s “stability” lies. SP clearly lacked either the ability to bribe their way to acceptation — to earn the “hearts and minds” — or the strength to chronically subjugate the communities they alienated. Precisely because of this was how its arguably biggest enemy was created: the ronderos.</p><p>The ronderos (better translated as “militias”) are an umbrella group that includes both the “organic”, grassroots “rondas” and the government-created Self-Defense Committees. In any case, they were at its core the manifestation of an esteemed and treasured historical tradition of Latin American rural communities: that of forming mobs to lynch and fight against various enemies for various reasons. The policies of replacing indigenous traditions and religions with gonzaloism, and having the same posture for the rabidly christian peasants, was an idea that was bound to create a massive rejection of SP and its ideology within these more traditional demographics.</p><p>Undoubtedly, a number of people supported SP in the beginning. Degregori (in Chapter 4 of “<em>Shining and other paths</em>”) exposes a very intuitive cause of this support: SP, cartel-style, had arrived to a capitalist-desolated region and brought order and a better administration with them. Driving away the corrupt government officials, they now represented an unknown alternative — perhaps, a better one. For the youths, they were the modern <em>caudillos</em>, and their tickets to wealthiness or renown. For the intellectuals — most of their membership at the beginning — they were the single “real” revolutionary movement. For the comparatively apolitical masses, they were more overseers: not good, not bad, just new — just there. Their influence on the youths often meant their incorporation into what they thought was a “local vanguard”, a cadre group to supervise, maoist-style, the administration of the region.</p><p>In that point is where one finds the split between Mariátegui and Gonzalo, the weakest link — in a chain of many weak links — that was the downfall of SP. In the gonzaloist view, maoism is more of a map than a guide; that is, rather than use its methods or adapt them to a specific end, one must follow the “road” without many diversions in order to arrive to the destination one seeks. Otherwise, to reject or excessively alter this map means revisionism — as Deng later did — and that is the <em>summa blasphemia</em>, the utmost sacrilege for the maoist fundamentalist. Degregori then showcases how this translated to the context of the meritocratic, community-based indigenous villages: elders were replaced with the young cadres, peasants were grouped into wealth strata, and their customs and religion was to be replaced by gonzaloism — as said before. There is a certain hubris in replacing a centennial system that has worked so efficiently — a trait fitting of bourgeois intellectuals, ironically — and that replacement, as well as its consequences, was perhaps the catalyst for the creation of some ronderos.</p><p>Degregori indicates three major issues that the reader perhaps has already imagined. First and foremost, the aforementioned problem regarding the <em>creation</em>, and not the <em>discovery</em>, of vanguards and revolutionaries. A person that was entrusted by SP with the leadership of a village could be anyone: a committed gonzaloist, someone closer to indigenous traditions than to maoism, or perhaps even a power-hungry opportunist. More often than not, the latter scenario was quite frequent: as it had happened in so many other latin american countries, the <em>caudillo</em> was nothing but a rustler that progressively got drunker and drunker on its newfound power, institutionalizing nepotism and tyranny until they met an atypical and soon death. Then the village, still blood-soaked, decided to treat the new overseers as they had treated the previous ones: as nothing but predatory parasites from whom one must defend the town from.</p><p>Many indigenous communities — certainly not all of them — have a form of social organization from which the westerners, both the geographical and intellectual ones, can learn a great deal from. Criminal justice, in particular, is quite versatile: it includes corporal or monetary punishment, but it’s usually centered on restitution. Degregori certainly makes a somewhat more nuanced analysis about this relation (itself, something better studied by Erdal and Whiten) but the insinuation of conflict is rather obvious: a Cultural Revolution — or at least, the gonzaloist interpretation of it — was fundamentally opposed to the conservation of this lifestyle, of this hegemony, of “archaic ideas” in the words of Degregori. And further, the own inability or unwillingness of SP to hold and defend territory — to abandon a purely guerrilla-style of warfare — meant that, in the face of the retreating SP forces, these communities were often left defenseless and ripe for many more abuses at the hands of the peruvian army. Then, it’s not a carrot and a stick, nor a big stick and nowhere to hide: it’s two sticks, and when one goes the other arrives.</p><p>Mao Zedong owed the success of the guerrilla war to three things, <em>grosso modo</em>, something beyond discussion and which is only questioned by maoists or anti-maoists regarding <em>the proportion</em> in which these things helped achieve victoy. First and foremost, the victory against the japanese: the cooperation between the regular army of the KMT and the guerrilla forces of the CPC meant, in the maoists’ view, a hammer and scalpel strategy, while the anti-maoists often claim that the KMT’s “traditional forces” did the most of the fighting. Second, the fact that at the end of the war, the CPC now had a very different kind of army: a number of guerrilla irregulars, for sure, but also professional soldiers and combined arms divisions, salvaged from the japanese or supplied by the soviets — which only increased as the War of Liberation raged on. And third, the ideological aspects: against Chiang Kai-Shek’s traditionalism and conservatism, Mao promised the emancipation of the peasants and the pursuit of socialist policies.</p><p>That is not to ignore the tactical aspect of the war, which was as important as these factors if not more, but without these elements — without the threat of the japanese eliminated, a versatile army, or the support of the population — there was simply no hope to win the war. And, while SP certainly didn’t hold the same position, it also didn’t have any of its equivalents: it hadn’t defeated the peruvian state or any of its opponents, it didn’t have a professional or well-equipped army, and more importantly, it steadily lost the support of the population. The frankly astonishing tactic of gaining support — or respect and fear — through sporadic acts of brutality, like the infamous case of the reprisal massacre in Lucanamarca, meant that the enmity of the peasants and of some indigenous communities was all but entirely secured. The mistake of Gonzalo, again, was being entirely blind to the conditions of the peruvian society: this was not the unified China of the middle XX century, but perhaps an echo of the Warlord era — or rather, a parallel of the Afghanistan war. But SP was not the DRA-soviet army, nor the invading american forces; SP was yet another irregular faction, now fighting on all fronts against forces united only by their campaign against a common enemy. This was a <em>Vendée</em> campaign for the ambitions of SP, one that they were fighting without an efficient army, an efficient general, or indeed, an efficient plan. Which brings me to the final point: the <em>coup de grâce</em>, or “tiro de gracia”, for the SP movement.</p><p>When the Democratic Kampuchea government started attacking villages on the vietnamese border, there were a number of skirmishes that imitated the future Sino-Vietnamese war. But in true zealot fashion, the inexplicable order to continue the attacks in vietnamese territory — with the infamous “Eastern Zone massacres” — cemented the fate of the DK. After the fighting escalated to an actual invasion, the DK army — even with chinese support — was practically shattered by the PAVN, who took over the country in a year. The entire regime was destroyed by what was, at best, a whimsical show of hostility, and at worst a bout of idiocy.</p><p>SP survived many of such bouts, as it was said above, but eventually those decisions caught up to them. There was a tacit compatibility between the ronderos and the peruvian state that was often overlooked by both parties; that is, when the peruvian forces weren’t busy doing their own crimes against humanity, the ronderos managed to stabilize their territories rather effectively. And on the other side, after the peruvian army had routed the SP forces, the ronderos could move in permanently. This tenuous symbiosis was noticed by Fujimori and in 1992, he took policies to take advantage of this relationship: the famous Decreto Legislativo 741 legalized the “Self-Defense Committees”, and eventually the government itself started arming and training some ronderos. SP now faced better armed and better trained opponents, who knew the territory as well or better than them. More importantly, these were forces from the local populations, who could now rely on government support and toleration.</p><p>Then, there was a carrot in addition to the stick — sticks, more accurately. The Programa Nacional de Asistencia Alimentaria — “National Program for Alimentary Assistance” — was started by the Fujimori administration around the same time. While heavily criticized for its corruption scandals and considerable inefficiency, this program was a show of “assistentialism” — a figurative bribe, following the previous metaphors — of the government towards its rural population. Funded by the rabid capitalist policies of the Fujimori regime, the increased acceptance of the state by the peasants took away more support for SP. Indeed, this was a carrot and a stick, and SP didn’t have — and couldn’t afford — a carrot.</p><p>Third, and perhaps more controversially, the final fracture in SP was Gonzalo himself. Much has been said about the existence or nonexistence of the “Gonzalo cult of personality”, of whether or not Gonzalo had created a political cult instead of a movement. But this is inconsequential for the present text. Undoubtedly, Gonzalo has concentrated a massive amount of power in few people, including himself. Whereas the CPC had a hundred leaders — from Zhou Enlai to the infamous Lin Biao — SP had but a few “replacements” distinct from the municipal SP <em>caudillos</em>: Gonzalo, Morote (son of Morote Best) and Ramírez, <em>nom de guerre </em>“Comrade Feliciano”. Perhaps this was a strategy that could have echoed Pol Pot’s: to retreat into the jungle and continue waging “the people’s war”, under the concentrated leadership of Gonzalo and a few cadres. But inexplicably — or rather, incongruously — the people’s war was not being raged from the central peruvian forests, but from the capital of Lima.</p><p>The Operación Victoria (Operation Victory) was an action that truly legitimized Fujimori’s <em>eighteenth brumaire</em> — or April 5th, rather — against the shambled and humiliated peruvian “democracy”. In a single sweep, the peruvian police captured Gonzalo, his wife, and other three SP cadres, all living in a middle-class neighborhood of Lima. Allegedly, the operation was the product of a six month-long intelligence campaign. A year later, Gonzalo — now Guzmán — publicly declared the end of the “people’s war” and the capitulation of SP. Some followed his orders, others abjured said command as illegitimate. A few years later, Feliciano was also captured in the suburbs of Huancayo, another peruvian city. With the ronderos controlling most of the former “theater of operations” and the peasants placated by humanitarian aid, most guerrillas had been disbanded or destroyed — the MRTA, SP’s famous enemy, had just been annihilated by Fujimori’s commandos after the Chavín de Huántar crisis. Without a meaningful leader, without an ideological successor, and without a base of support, SP — the original, gonzaloist incarnation — had been effectively killed.</p><p>Now Perú has a former rondero president: Pedro Castillo, candidate of marxist-leninist party Perú Libre. SP, much like other of its contemporaries, has degenerated into “drug-terrorism”, a term coined by anti-socialist reactionaries. At best — for gonzalo hardliners — the group is splintered, with people like Palomino, “Comrade José”, forming their own factions ideologically and explicitly separate from SP. At worst, SP is no more, and the regional offshoots or José’s Militarizado Partido Comunista del Perú (Militarized Communist Party of Peru) are all that remains of the once powerful movement. Needless to say, it seems like they might be relegated to the footnotes of history, as one of the many guerrillas that existed and disappeared during the XX century. Yet, for many peruvians — indigenous and “mestizo” — they certainly weren’t a footnote in <em>their</em> history.</p><p>I read somewhere a quote from a western journalist — an american or anglosaxon, I believe — that called Shining Path a “potential Khmer Rouge” had they achieved power. However ominous or inflammatory that sounds, that’s a big supposition: “<em>had they achieved power</em>”. Physically, materially, there was much potential for SP to “win” the “people’s war”. Had they established a better rapport with the rural population, for example, they would have become a true menace for the peruvian state: no ronderos, but the people’s rondas, so to speak. Had they followed the MRTA’s focus on urban campaigns, perhaps they too would have failed; or perhaps, they would have successfully created a “united front”, and the <em>Fujimorazo</em> would have been a <em>Gonzalazo</em> instead. And still, should they have instituted better tactics and operations, it could be that SP would have truly followed the late Pol Pot, in its jungle exile and mysterious death. None of it happened, and it’s nothing but fiction to speculate about it. I do write fiction, but not here.</p><p>What can a leftist or socialist learn from Gonzalo’s adventurist experiment? First and foremost, that violence is inexcusable, every violent faction in the peruvian conflict was wrong, and in no way should they ever be imitated nor guerrilla groups should be formed anymore. Please vote reactionaries and imperialists out of power, or debate them when possible. No terrorist is to be idolized, and every violent group is a terrorist.</p><p>Now that my Medium permanence has been secured — hopefully — the question can be answered. Dogmatism, in many cases, is a mistake. Many marxists probably know this — or claim to know it — but dogmatism is almost antithetical to the materialist method: in as much as the economy conditions the superstructure, one must study the economy and its superstructure in order to understand a society. Marxism itself is not excepted from that affirmation, and the different ideological conflicts — between the orthodox marxists and leninists, between trotskyists and stalinists, between maoists and dengists — are the ever-present proof of that. But even if many of these conflicts are aspects of politics, of <em>realpolitik</em> masquerading as ideology — “<em>academy is the continuation of politics by other means</em>”, paraphrasing Clausewitz — one must take account of its significance in policy-making. The DRA brought compulsory education to the most isolated areas of Afghanistan, and the local tribesmen killed their teachers for daring to teach women (Anand Gopal’s article in <em>The New Yorker</em> is unusually sobering for an imperialist newspaper). The Calles’ administration attempts to strong-arm secularism into Mexico was answered with a veritable crusade, with the catholic clergy barking for the masses to take up arms against the blasphemous state — a call that was answered. The Shining Path’s demands for practically all elements in peruvian society — indigenous communities, catholic peasants, and urban dwellers — to subsume to Gonzaloism led to the conflict that has been exposed already.</p><p>Sometimes, what works somewhere might not work somewhere else. Equally, sometimes it’s better to leave some people alone. Certain historical figures have emulated the <em>weltgeist</em>, roving through the world and crushing anything that they feel like crushing. The great conquerors of old: Temujin, Timur, Bonaparte. These empire-makers met mixed successes, with some regimes dissolving after their deaths and others lasting centuries. But all of them have something in common: their will was imposed through might, cunning, and bloodshed. For all the character assassination of socialism and communism as a bloodthirsty vampiric ideologies, the socialist and communist must not forget that the purpose of their ideology is to emancipate, first and foremost. Someone (not me, as I reject violence in all its forms and Medium does too) might say that violence and war is often a tool for emancipation; perhaps, the single tool for emancipation under certain conditions. And yet, that person could also say that violence can and should never be an end: that, in reality, one must choose what battles to fight, and within the war of emancipation bloodshed indispensably must be minimized. Many people often clamor for extermination wars: left and right, they think of conflict as an aestheticized, desirable ideal. In reality, it is no such thing. A child or a man-child might think of war that way: a socialist mustn’t. That hypothetical person would say that there lies the necessity of leading: one who demands others die must be there leading them to death. Indeed, a necessary evil can never be consecrated as a social tenet.</p><p>Then, another lesson, tied with the previous one. The sunk cost of warfare. If one reads the anti-socialist mainstream literature (which is real and completely accurate, as I am not denying whatever the western academics claim happened) one would see a ridiculously large but very real and very accurate death toll for socialist-related conflicts. Take the french <em>Black Book of Communism</em>, a work rather favored by anti-socialists and incidentally, by many a Wikipedia editor. It claims the real and accurate number of 94 million people killed directly or indirectly by communists. The picture it paints alone of the “<em>Red Terror</em>” is basically equal to the nazi genocides, if not worse — certainly worse, by the authors’ own words. Then, of course, are the other truthful testimonies of the true and accurate brutality of certain regimes: from Solzhenitsyn’s account of the gulags, to modern day Yeonmi Park and her veridical experiences. For a socialist that accepts these testimonies — real and true as they are — the options circle back to the initial question. Either one rejects these actions, or one justifies them as necessary.</p><p>Certainly they are not necessary. Take Solzhenitsyn: Stalin’s whims led to the more than half a million deaths during the purges — as truthfully documented by the <em>Black Book</em> — which no doubt was one of the most important genocides in the XX century, along with every other socialist and communist one. What would happen in a country if the “state was against its citizens”, as the <em>Black Book </em>says? One must remember that this was not the extermination of minorities, as happened in the Reich, nor the brutalization of faraway people of color, as the colonial powers did: this was the soviets murdering and killing the majority of its citizens just because they suspected them of being un-soviet, or alternatively, simply because they felt like it. Depopulation campaign, gulag imprisonments, outright extermination camps: 20 million deaths due to various communist-related causes, to sum it up. A terrorist state like that, immersed as it was in various wars — against the whites, the poles, the entente, the japanese, and the <em>jacqueries</em> — was simply destined to fail. Why didn’t it collapse then? A question I can’t answer.</p><p>Yet, “<em>how would one avoid the collapse of such a state?</em>” is the real question. Simply put, by not doing any of those things. The question of power is the dilemma of the carrot and the stick: if one doesn’t have a carrot, perhaps a big stick will do; however, if one doesn’t have a big stick — and others have sticks as well — things seem rather complicated. Imagine that the bolsheviks, instead of being a genocidal regime of bloodthirsty ghouls, achieved power through the widespread support of the population. Imagine that, faced with the post-war crises (another reminder of the undesirability of conflict) they faced starvation and rebellions. Imagine that instead of simply genociding and gulag-ing their way out of that situation, they decided to apply the carrot and the stick. That way, they would have been able to overcome these challenges.</p><p>Thus, the second lesson is that the sunk cost can never be a negative balance. If an action damages more than it benefits, it must be discarded. Perhaps war is such an action, but no doubt it does benefit the winners more than it damages them at times — evidenced by many wars waged by the cited colonial powers. Yet, the socialist war is seldom a war of invasion: its either a civil war or a war of defense, fought in the own territory. One can’t burn a house just to kill a cockroach. And, in that regard, the strategy should be rational and logic: based on needs and pragmatism, not on dogma or ideology, and certainly not on the particular examples that many western scholars have very truthfully documented.</p><p>Maybe that’s a final lesson to conclude with. Ideally and hypothetically (because me and Medium’s rules condemn violent revolutions and revolutions in general) the revolutionary should be almost platonic: a philosopher-king, or rather, a philosopher-warrior-king. But realistically, there are some more achievable things to study, which are basically everything Gonzalo ignored. One such hypothetical revolutionary needs to know the society they fight for: to know what they speak, eat, know and believe, to understand them as much as possible. Specially in inter-ethnic relations, one should be willing to talk: not to remain silent and not to scream, but to respectfully teach and be taught. To establish dialogue.</p><p>Then, they should also understand the military life: tactics, organization, administration; everything that a conflict requires. A tautology — an obvious truth — but an ignored one. Beyond reading, one should learn them. Warfare, like all social phenomena, is never definite, and certainly the technology today has changed it even further. But to talk about that is the matter of a separate text.</p><p>They too should accept their limits, and supple them with the right personnel. To leave certain affairs to those who are better equipped or trained, to be humble enough to recognize their own shortcomings. To listen. All that, antithetical with the literal, non-propagandistic aspects of a personality cult.</p><p>What is this revolutionary? The same thing that Machiavelli described: the fox <em>and</em> the lion, a modern day prince. Perhaps that is why foxes <em>or</em> lions — academics <em>or</em> warlords — often make poor revolutionaries.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5c8cc5b861c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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