<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Emmanuel Ibiang on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Emmanuel Ibiang on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@ibiang.manuel?source=rss-2c3ba2246547------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 16:08:29 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@ibiang.manuel/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Free Will and Moral Agency]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ibiang.manuel/free-will-and-moral-agency-811eba789456?source=rss-2c3ba2246547------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/811eba789456</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[science]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Emmanuel Ibiang]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 17 Jan 2026 12:22:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-17T12:22:55.278Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Humans naturally perceive themselves as <strong>agents</strong> making genuine choices, not merely mechanical automata.</p><p>Every day we experience weighing options — choosing chocolate or vanilla, turning left or right — and it feels as if we could have acted otherwise.</p><p>Yet some scientific and philosophical perspectives challenge this intuition.</p><p>If the world is entirely <strong>deterministic</strong>, governed by unbreakable physical laws, are our choices truly free?</p><p>Do neuroscience experiments (like Libet’s famous brain studies) prove that our brains make decisions before we are aware of them? Or could it be that our <em>sense</em> of freedom and responsibility is fundamental to reality?</p><p>In what follows, we unpack the debates around free will, determinism, and moral responsibility.</p><p>We’ll see that <strong>scientists and philosophers</strong> wrestle with these issues, but ultimately our lived experience and moral life presuppose real agency.</p><p>Furthermore, a Christian/theistic perspective provides a coherent account: we are <strong>persons</strong> with souls, not mere particles, and our moral responsibility is grounded in the very nature God gave us.</p><p>By examining scientific claims and philosophical arguments — and hearing classical Christian voices — we will build a comprehensive picture of why we remain free moral agents, not just complex biological machines.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*oJz_GNxN2n4slGf4.png" /><figcaption><em>A lone figure with outstretched arms at sunrise, symbolizing human freedom and the intuitive feeling of agency.</em></figcaption></figure><p>Philosophers often frame the <strong>free will puzzle</strong> by contrasting three ideas:</p><p>(1) <strong><em>Freedom of Will</em></strong>: we choose our behavior</p><p>(2) <strong><em>Determinism</em></strong>: every event (including brain processes and choices) has a cause that fully explains it</p><p>(3) <strong><em>Incompatibilism</em></strong>: true freedom cannot exist if determinism is true.</p><p>At least two of these seem very plausible: we feel ourselves choosing (Freedom), and science suggests causes produce effects (Determinism).</p><p>If both hold, Incompatibilism says free will must be an illusion.</p><p>This tension — often called the <em>free will problem</em> — has occupied thinkers for millennia.</p><p>But our task is not only to describe the puzzle; it is to resolve it in a way that honors our experience and the reality of moral life.</p><h3>Determinism vs. Indeterminism</h3><p><em>Determinism</em> is the view that <strong>every event is caused</strong> by prior conditions.</p><p>As one standard account puts it, “<em>determinism is the metaphysical thesis that the facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future.</em>”</p><p>In a deterministic universe, given the exact state of the world and the laws of physics, <em>only one future is possible at any moment</em>. Applied to human decisions, this means every choice you make now was already implicit in the history of the universe — stretching back even before you were born.</p><p>If determinism is true, then in principle (though not in practice) a super-powerful intellect could predict your every action from the initial conditions of the cosmos.</p><p>Not surprisingly, many find this hard to square with our experience of choice. It <em>feels</em> as if we could have acted differently, even if only in small ways (choosing one meal over another, for example).</p><p>This intuition motivates <em>libertarian free will</em>, the idea that at least some of our choices are not fully determined by prior states and instead originate in us as genuine alternative possibilities.</p><p>Libertarianism usually implies indeterminism: our will is not entirely bound by past causes.</p><p>On the other hand, modern science (especially physics) has cast doubt on strict determinism.</p><p>Quantum physics suggests the world has <em>intrinsic randomness</em>: some events (like the decay of a radioactive atom) happen with only probabilistic predictability. However, intrinsic randomness alone doesn’t solve the problem of freedom.</p><p>Philosopher Steve Stewart-Williams notes that <strong>“unpredictability and randomness are not the same thing as free will”</strong>. If my brain fires one way or another due to random quantum noise, that doesn’t feel like <em>my</em> decision — it feels like a coin flip.</p><p>In other words, indeterminism (randomness) just replaces one problem with another. You haven’t gained control; you’ve introduced chance. As a classic line goes: randomness isn’t freedom — free will requires something like rational authorship over one’s actions.</p><p>Thus we see two challenges: <strong>hard determinism</strong> (if true, denies freedom) and <strong>pure indeterminism</strong> (just luck, not freedom).</p><p>Philosophers have spanned a spectrum of positions. At one extreme, <strong>hard determinists</strong> deny free will altogether. At the other extreme, <strong>libertarians</strong> deny determinism, insisting on genuine alternative possibilities. A middle view, <strong>compatibilism</strong>, accepts determinism but redefines freedom so that it’s not undermined.</p><p>Compatibilists argue that we can act “freely” even if our actions have causes, as long as those causes reflect our own desires and reasons. As the Stanford Encyclopedia explains, <em>“compatibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism”</em>.</p><p>In practice, many compatibilists say: “We are free when we act according to our motivations, without external compulsion or coercion, even if those motivations themselves have prior causes.”</p><p>Science itself hasn’t settled the matter. Classical physics seemed fully deterministic, but quantum mechanics introduced probabilistic events.</p><p>Physicist Max Planck reportedly said he regarded quantum indeterminacy as a “miracle” at the foundation of reality, but whether that rescues free will is doubtful. Modern physics indeed suggests we live in a world that is <em>not entirely deterministic</em>, but that alone isn’t helpful to freedom.</p><p>To quote Stewart-Williams again, <em>“modern physics tells us that the universe is not entirely deterministic — but it doesn’t matter, because indeterminism is at least as much a threat to free will as determinism.”</em></p><p>In short, whether the universe is fully determined or not, mere physics doesn’t automatically grant us the sort of control that moral responsibility requires.</p><p>The determinism debate raises a deeper philosophical point: <strong>randomness ≠ freedom</strong>.</p><p>If choices were simply random, they wouldn’t be meaningful or blameworthy. And if they were entirely predetermined, we might worry we’re not truly the authors of our actions.</p><p>Somewhere in between must lie real agency. Many philosophers argue that true free will requires <em>alternative possibilities plus rational self-control</em>.</p><p>In one scientific account, free will was defined by three conditions:</p><p><strong>(1)</strong> <em>the ability to do otherwise</em> (having meaningful alternatives)</p><p><strong>(2)</strong> <em>control over one’s choices</em> (being the author of one’s decisions, not overridden by forces outside oneself), and</p><p><strong>(3)</strong> <em>responsiveness to reasons</em> (acting for good reasons rather than randomly).</p><p>For example, <em>“if I roll a dice to decide whom to marry, my choice cannot be said to be free… On the contrary, if I choose to marry a specific person for their ideas and my deep love for them, then my decision will be free.”</em>.</p><p>This illustrates that random happenstance (the dice) is not freedom; true freedom connects a reasoned agent to a reasoned choice.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*GneICAus-D8gyb6o.png" /><figcaption><em>A broken chain on the ground with a ladder against a high wall, symbolizing freedom from deterministic chains.</em></figcaption></figure><h3>Neuroscience and the Libet Experiments</h3><p>In the late 20th century, neuroscientist Benjamin Libet conducted experiments that shook public confidence in free will.</p><p>Libet asked volunteers to make a simple movement (like flexing a wrist) whenever <em>they felt like it</em>, while monitoring their brain activity.</p><p>Strikingly, a measurable “readiness potential” (RP) in the brain appeared milliseconds <strong>before</strong> the subjects reported the conscious intention to move.</p><p>This seemed to suggest that the brain <em>initiates</em> the action unconsciously, and only later does our mind become aware of the decision.</p><p>Libet himself found this unsettling: he thought it showed conscious will was not the true originator of our acts — perhaps implying a hidden determinism in our neural processes.</p><p>Many took Libet’s findings as evidence that <em>our sense of freedom is an illusion</em>. Neuroscientists and popular articles often headline: “Your brain decides before you do.”</p><p>In one dramatic summary, Sam Harris writes that if he “had been in Komisarjevsky’s shoes…there is no extra part of me that could decide to see the world differently… If I had his genes and life experience and an identical brain… I would have acted exactly as he did… The role of luck, therefore, appears decisive.”</p><p>This is the Harris argument: since our genes, upbringing, and brain states fully determine us, personal responsibility seems undermined.</p><p>However, careful analysis shows Libet’s experiment is often misinterpreted. For one thing, the tasks were trivial — tapping a finger at random.</p><p>It’s debatable how well such experiments generalize to complex, deliberative choices we make in life. More crucially, newer interpretations challenge the old reading of Libet.</p><p>For example, neuroscientist Marcel Brass and colleagues reviewed decades of Libet-style research and conclude that <strong>“neuroscience does not disprove our intuition of free will.”</strong></p><p>In fact, they argue the data are <em>compatible</em> with conscious control.</p><p>One key insight is that the measured brain activity (the RP) may reflect a <em>process of preparing a decision</em> rather than an unconscious decision itself.</p><p>The RP might simply track a gradual buildup toward a threshold, influenced by many factors, which the person can still override.</p><p>In support of this, Lavazza and colleagues note that recent studies reinterpret the readiness potential as background neural noise fluctuating until some threshold triggers movement.</p><p>In other words, the RP might not be the brain <em>deciding</em> for us; it could be like the brain warming up or leaning toward acting, subject to conscious veto.</p><p>Lavazza et al. write: <em>“the discovery of the [readiness potential] has been taken as evidence that free will is an illusion… since it seems that specific brain areas activate before we are aware of the onset of the movement. However, recent studies seem to point to a different interpretation… namely that the apparent build-up of brain activity preceding voluntary movements may reflect the ebb and flow of background neuronal noise… This interpretation seems to bridge… the gap between the neuroscientific perspective on free will and the intuitive, commonsensical view of it.”</em></p><p>In plain terms, the latest neuroscience suggests Libet’s data <strong>don’t</strong> decisively refute free will; they may simply capture the brain’s preparatory role in any action.</p><p>Other neuroscientists have made similar points. Marcel Brass’ review concludes that even Libet-style experiments <em>“do not provide a serious challenge to our intuition of free will.”</em></p><p>Notably, experiments show that <em>conditional intentions</em> (commitments participants make at the start of the task) can configure the whole process.</p><p>In short, if the subject resolves “I will press if and when I want to at any time,” that intention already sets the stage.</p><p>The recorded brain signals may be tightly linked to that intention and the arbitrary timing, rather than revealing an unconscious dictator overriding our conscious will.</p><p>Importantly, neuroscience has not found a “free will center” or magic signal that generates will. Rather, brain activity correlates with will, as we’d expect if the brain implements our choices.</p><p>The crucial question — what accounts for the conscious experience and the <em>meaning</em> of choosing — remains philosophical.</p><p>Neuroscientist Alfred Mele points out that the leap from “brain fires then wrist moves” to “there is no free will” is not logically compelled; it’s one interpretation.</p><p>Many scientists caution that these experiments measure too little: everyone still voluntarily performs the finger-flips, they’re just letting someone watch their brain first.</p><p>As one commentator notes, <em>“Libet’s experiments on brain activity and free will… can be interpreted in many ways.”</em></p><p>Thus the current scientific picture is mixed.</p><p>On one hand, we are biological organisms with brains subject to physical processes.</p><p>On the other hand, scientists like Brass, Furstenberg, Mele and others stress that <em>neuroscience does not definitively disprove free will</em>.</p><p>The brain activity that precedes conscious awareness can itself reflect parts of the decision process — not necessarily the final choice.</p><p>In other words, free will could still be real at the level of conscious decisions influencing which neural fluctuations actually trigger action.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*ALQNvG17ZsCtdVo2.png" /><figcaption><em>A glowing neural network and brain, hinting at the complex neurological processes underlying decision-making.</em></figcaption></figure><h3>Philosophical Challenges: Randomness and Responsibility</h3><p>Even leaving neuroscience aside, philosophers have long noted conceptual puzzles.</p><p>One such puzzle is that neither determinism nor pure randomness seems to ground true freedom.</p><p>If my brain’s processes are fully determined by my biology, then in what sense <em>did I</em> freely choose? On the other hand, if quantum randomness affects neurons, then in what sense <em>did I</em> cause my choice, rather than chance? True freedom looks to require something beyond both.</p><p>This brings us to a key point: <strong>the mechanism of freedom matters for moral responsibility</strong>.</p><p>Randomness in decisions would make our acts capricious rather than deliberate.</p><p>Philosopher Walter (2001) summarized: <em>“A decision can’t be free if it is the effect of a random choice, but it must be rationally motivated.”</em> For example, as Lavazza et al. illustrate, if you rolled a die to choose a life partner, the outcome (your spouse) would be unfree, despite the voluntariness of saying “I do.”</p><p>Freedom of the will is commonly thought to require that our choices are <em>responsive to reasons</em>, not tossed out by chance.</p><p>This is a profound insight: free will means we act for our own reasons and values.</p><p>Random fluctuations in our brain don’t count as our reasons; they don’t make us authors of our actions.</p><p>The flip side is that a purely mechanistic cause-and-effect chain seems to undermine the <em>agency</em> we cherish. If everything I do was predetermined by prior states, one might conclude I am ultimately not the <em>source</em> of my actions, but an effect.</p><p>Some thinkers even describe such a view as making people “nothing more than poorly calibrated clockwork”. Morally, this is hard to swallow: our legal systems, ethical intuitions, and personal sense of guilt or pride all assume that people are truly responsible for what they do.</p><p>We hold criminals accountable, we praise heroes, and we punish unjust acts — all on the belief that <strong>agents choose their actions</strong>.</p><p>Thomas Aquinas expressed this clearly centuries ago. He wrote: <em>“I answer that, man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain.”</em></p><p>In other words, society’s entire framework of moral guidance presupposes that people have the freedom to heed counsel or rebel against it.</p><p>If free will were utterly absent, motivation and morality would be meaningless — no exhortation could change anyone.</p><p>Modern ethics and law operate similarly. As Lavazza and Inglese (2015) observe, <em>“Ethics and law have incorporated [the notion of free will], adopting the belief that usually people are free to act or not to act… and that, as a result, they are responsible for what they do.”</em></p><p>This is the default assumption: we treat sober, sane adults as free agents who can choose, and we make them “worthy targets of blame or praise” accordingly. (Of course, there are exceptions: we excuse actions by children or mentally ill persons on the grounds that full freedom was lacking.) But even these caveats assume <em>some</em> capacity for choice exists.</p><p>Stepping back, the philosophical challenge is to find a notion of freedom robust enough to support moral responsibility yet compatible with what science tells us about nature.</p><p><em>Compatibilists</em> say that determinism can coexist with meaningful choice — for example, one may think that what matters is whether you acted according to your character and reasons.</p><p><em>Libertarians</em> insist that free will requires indeterminism so that alternatives are genuinely open at decision points. Yet as we noted, indeterminism isn’t a panacea. Stephen Hawking once quipped that <em>“It would be very singular that all of nature … should obey eternal laws, and that there should be a little animal … who, in contempt of these laws, could act as he pleased.”</em></p><p>This skepticism about our special exemption from physical laws captures the determinist sentiment. But singular as we are, our minds operate within nature too.</p><p>The conceptual upshot is that the problem is deep, but not insoluble. As Stewart-Williams summarizes the big picture, we have to give up at least one of the three plausible propositions (Freedom of Will, Determinism, Incompatibilism).</p><p>That yields three classic positions (deny free will, deny determinism, or deny the incompatibility). However, the debate doesn’t just end there.</p><p>New perspectives enrich it: some modern thinkers talk about “<em>free will without freedom of the will</em>” (no matter the physics, no freedom); or “higher-level descriptions” (we might accept deterministic neurons but still describe humans as free agents in another vocabulary).</p><p>Importantly, we must recall that freedom is a <strong>personal</strong> or <strong>agent-centered</strong> notion.</p><p>The Stanford entry on compatibilism notes that free will is thought of as “a special feature of persons as agents”.</p><p>Persons — not particles — are what need explaining.</p><p>If human beings are ultimately <em>just</em> bundles of physical processes, then the concept of responsibility looks shaky. But if persons are more than material processes — if we have minds or souls — then free agency regains a foundation.</p><p>Christian theism will argue precisely that: we are created persons, not cosmic machines.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/0*bdaURecv8qx0kOM2.png" /><figcaption><em>The word “LIBERTY” carved into a sidewalk. Society literally lays claim to the concept of freedom.</em></figcaption></figure><h3>Moral Reality: We Experience Ourselves as Free</h3><p>In ordinary life, <strong>we act as if we have free will</strong>, and everything about our moral universe assumes it.</p><p>We deliberate, set goals, struggle with temptations, and feel pride when we succeed or remorse when we fail.</p><p>From the perspective of our inner experience, decision-making simply <em>is</em> free.</p><p>As one writer put it: choosing between vanilla or chocolate “seems obvious” that you “could pick either”.</p><p>We wouldn’t think twice about punishing someone who willfully steals, or thanking someone for a kind deed.</p><p>Our legal institutions — courts, laws, prisons — are built on the assumption that people make choices.</p><p>Imagine if all actions were random or fated: then holding anyone accountable would seem unjust.</p><p>Interestingly, studies suggest people’s belief in free will also has real social effects.</p><p>Research reviewed by Brass et al. notes that when individuals are exposed to strong messages that <em>free will is an illusion</em>, it can lead to more cheating, aggression, and less helpful behavior.</p><p>In other words, abandoning the idea of free agency seems to undermine moral motivation.</p><p>Conversely, belief in freedom tends to make people more conscientious. This doesn’t <em>prove</em> free will exists, but it highlights that our conviction in it is woven into our moral fabric.</p><p>Recognizing that we typically view ourselves as free, philosophers have scrutinized whether this intuition can survive scientific scrutiny.</p><p>Some argue it can, by reframing free will at the level of agent descriptions.</p><p>Even physicist and geneticist Francis Collins (an outspoken Christian) remarks that while DNA explains biological function, it does <em>not</em> explain all that makes us human.</p><p>“DNA sequence alone… will never explain certain special human attributes, such as the knowledge of the Moral Law and the universal search for God. Freeing God from the burden of special acts of creation does not remove Him as the source of the things that make humanity special,” Collins writes.</p><p>In context, Collins is pointing out that there is something qualitative — a moral and spiritual dimension — to humans that goes beyond pure physical determinants. One such dimension is free will.</p><p>Even if we subjectively feel free, we must still justify that feeling to skeptics.</p><p>Here theistic thought provides a reassuring perspective.</p><p>The <strong>Christian tradition</strong> has long affirmed human freedom. For instance, St. Augustine (5th century) insisted that Scripture presupposes free choice.</p><p>He argued that God’s commands and rewards would be pointless if we could not freely obey them.</p><p>As Augustine says: <em>“Now He [God] has revealed to us, through His Holy Scriptures, that there is in a man a free choice of will. … God’s precepts themselves would be of no use to a man unless he had free choice of will, so that by performing them he might obtain the promised rewards.”</em></p><p>In other words, when the Bible says “choose life” or warns of punishment, it’s implicitly teaching that humans can indeed choose to obey or disobey.</p><p>God treats us as free moral agents even if our ultimate nature is a mystery to us.</p><p>Likewise, Thomas Aquinas (13th century) argued on rational grounds that <em>“Man has free-will: otherwise… rewards and punishments would be in vain.”</em></p><p>Aquinas pointed out that if we weren’t truly free, giving moral advice, laying down laws, or offering rewards would make no sense.</p><p>In his <em>Summa Theologiae</em>, Aquinas reasons that our very rationality implies freedom: human reasoning can follow opposite courses in contingent matters, and so <em>“it is necessary that man have a free-will.”</em></p><p>Thus classical theism claims not only do we feel free, but God <em>designed</em> us to be free.</p><p>One of the most eloquent defenders of free will was C. S. Lewis, a 20th-century Christian author.</p><p>He vividly described why God must have given creatures genuine choice. <em>“God created things which had free will… If a thing is free to be good it’s also free to be bad… free will is what has made evil possible,”</em> Lewis notes — acknowledging the problem of evil.</p><p>But he immediately adds the <strong>teleological point</strong>: <em>“free will, though it makes evil possible, is also the only thing that makes possible any love or goodness or joy worth having. A world of automata — of creatures that worked like machines — would hardly be worth creating.”</em></p><p>In Lewis’s words, the <em>Happiness</em> God intends for us is the “happiness of being freely, voluntarily united to Him and to each other in an ecstasy of love and delight… and for that they’ve got to be free.”</p><p>This beautifully captures the Christian hope: true love and virtue demand freedom. God, according to Lewis, knew the risks — “if God thinks this state of war in the universe a price worth paying for free will… we may take it as worth paying.”</p><p>In short, classical theism asserts that free will is a gift from the Creator, making us more than mere biological mechanisms.</p><p>Christian thinkers also emphasize the <strong>soul</strong> dimension.</p><p>In theism, humans are more than matter: each person bears God’s image and has an immortal soul.</p><p>The soul is conceived as the seat of rationality and choice, not reducible to atoms.</p><p>We won’t dive into the complex theology of the soul here, but suffice it to say that many Christians believe our choices originate in our soul’s free disposition, even while our bodies act.</p><p>This underscores “Persons, not particles”: the ultimate source of our actions is our <strong>self</strong>, endowed by God, not just blind physical forces.</p><p>Francis Collins, reflecting this mindset, notes that humans have attributes “that make humanity special” — moral insight, spiritual longing, conscious freedom — which go beyond any purely genetic explanation.</p><p>In his view, knowing God as Creator provides the best foundation for why we have such traits at all.</p><p>For the Christian, free will is not a cosmic fluke, but part of God’s intentional design for personal beings.</p><h3>Counterarguments from Science and Philosophy</h3><p>To present a balanced view, we must engage seriously with the toughest criticisms. Let’s consider some common counterarguments and how we might respond:</p><ul><li><strong>“Neuroscience proves free will is an illusion.”</strong> It’s true some neuroscientists, like Sam Harris, interpret brain experiments to mean our sense of freedom is misleading. Harris argues that if we could swap places with a criminal (possessing identical brain and history), <em>“I would have acted exactly as he did… There is simply no intellectually respectable position from which to deny this”</em>. In other words, everything about us is determined (by biology and environment), so “luck appears decisive.” This deterministic outlook naturally casts doubt on moral responsibility.</li><li><strong>Response:</strong> First, as we discussed, the best neuroscience doesn’t straightforwardly eliminate free will. Many careful reviews conclude that <em>“Libet-style tasks do not provide a serious challenge to our intuition of free will.”</em> Neuroscience may explain <em>how</em> decisions correlate with brain activity, but it does not explain <em>why</em> the experience of agency should vanish. Brain processes and conscious intentions are likely two descriptions of the same event. Moreover, even if our genes and brains heavily influence us, this doesn’t <em>logically</em> force us into resignation. We still navigate life as persons making choices. Harris’s “luck” argument is powerful but arguably overlooks that <em>we always act according to our character, values, and reasons</em>. Punishing someone who committed a crime because they were “just determined by factors beyond their control” would then lead to absurdity: we’d excuse criminals on the grounds that <em>we</em> would do the same under identical conditions. But such a stance undermines justice and is counterintuitive. Besides, none of us actually possesses an infallible “mirror” of someone else’s brain, so the scenario is purely hypothetical. In reality, we have to make moral decisions under uncertainty and none of us can literally become another person, so we hold people accountable in practice.</li><li><strong>“Even if the brain leaves gaps, randomness isn’t freedom.”</strong> Some try to salvage free will by invoking quantum indeterminacy: maybe if brain events have a random component, our will can slip in between. But as noted, chance doesn’t give <em>control</em>. If a quantum jump decides whether you act, then your action wasn’t <em>you</em> deciding, it was random. Philosopher Daniel Dennett quipped, “A puppet is free as long as he loves his strings,” emphasizing that real freedom has to do with motivation and rational endorsement, not the absence of cause.</li><li><strong>Response:</strong> This is why freedom is more plausibly understood in <strong>compatibilist terms</strong> by many thinkers: free will is not about metaphysical uncausedness, but about being the source of our actions in a meaningful way. As Lewis pointed out, what matters is not escaping cause-effect law (which seems impossible anyway), but the <em>kind</em> of laws we are subject to. If the laws allow for conscious deliberation and voluntary action (as ours apparently do), then our decisions can be both determined and free (in the sense of reflecting our character). Indeed, the Stanford SEP reminds us that even a “deterministic” act can be free if caused in the right way: incompatibilism only claims free will <em>requires</em> breaking determinism, whereas compatibilism says it only requires that the agent’s own motivations cause the act. Critics might say that’s just redefining free will, but note that it often suffices for moral responsibility: if an action flows from a person’s beliefs and desires, we justly praise or blame them for it. This satisfies the “responsiveness to reasons” criterion.</li><li><strong>“But where is the wiggle room? Can you really do otherwise?”</strong> A common retort is that even compatibilism sounds like pretending, since if determinism is true you <em>couldn’t</em> choose otherwise in an absolute sense. However, most compatibilists clarify that “could have done otherwise” means that had you chosen differently (say, if you’d willed it differently), you would have acted differently — not that the same history could lead to two different outcomes. In practice, we humans never experience having the <em>same exact past</em> and yet choosing differently; we always face new choices based on new decisions. The important thing is that when deciding we genuinely deliberate. If nothing else, our deliberation and self-control distinguish us from robots (even “smart” robots) that cannot reflect on their motives.</li><li><strong>“Science suggests we are completely reducible to matter.”</strong> Materialists argue that the brain <em>is</em> the mind, so no mind exists independently. If true, then the source of behavior is just biochemistry.</li><li><strong>Response:</strong> Here one can appeal to the limitations of scientific explanation. Science describes <em>how</em> things happen (neurons fire, hormones release), but it doesn’t automatically tell us <em>why</em> or whether experiences like consciousness and will emerge. As Collins points out, there are aspects of humanity (moral insight, the search for meaning) that we currently understand only as matters of personhood, not physics. The Christian (and some secular) reply is that a fully materialist picture leaves no room for the fundamental notion of <em>agency</em>. If you reduce everything to physics, it becomes unclear what the statements “Alice chose to give charity” or “Bob is evil” really mean. They become shorthand for neural states, losing the personal “Alice” and “Bob” who are moral agents. In practice, humans speak and behave as if we are <em>someone</em> making decisions; discarding that seems practically absurd.</li><li><strong>“Determinism means no change through persuasion.”</strong> Some worry that if determinism is true, then talking to people (education, moral arguments) is futile: “If your brain would have done X regardless, why even debate it?” Compatibilists counter that determinism doesn’t imply that cause-effect chains can’t have complex inputs. Deliberating and persuading are themselves part of the causal chain. If you read a persuasive argument, it changes your brain states, which in turn affects your decisions. So <em>even in a determined world</em>, talking matters. Indeed, Aquinas noted that if we lack freedom, we could never reason from premises to conclusions: in formal logic, premises <em>determine</em> conclusions, yet this process is intelligible and purposeful. By analogy, compatibilists say the fact that reasons and motivations cause actions does not negate our reasoning power; rather, it is the very mechanism by which we exercise it.</li></ul><p>In light of these debates, one might fairly say: <strong>Even the smartest critics don’t have a knock-down argument that we <em>must</em> be automatons.</strong></p><p>The evidence for us being mere robots is mostly that our brains obey physical laws (as far as we know) and that introspection can be misleading.</p><p>But neither fact proves that free will is <em>impossible</em> or illusory.</p><p>Many philosophers and scientists today (even those who are non-religious) adopt some form of compatibilism or nuance that acknowledges our complexity.</p><p>As the Neuroscience &amp; Biobehavioral Reviews article concludes, <em>“Libet’s experiment has been viewed as a challenge to a strong intuition about free will… We believe that the contribution of neuroscience to the free will debate can best be evaluated by a joint effort from philosophy and neuroscience.”</em></p><p>In practice, this joint effort yields the conclusion: neuroscience <strong>questions, but does not disprove</strong> human agency.</p><h3>Theistic Coherence: Persons, Soul, and Responsibility</h3><p>All these considerations naturally lead to a theistic interpretation.</p><p><strong>Christian theology</strong> sees humans as created in God’s image (Genesis 1:27), meaning we share qualities like rationality, morality, and freedom.</p><p>From this viewpoint, it makes perfect sense that we experience real choice: God made us for relationship and love, which inherently require freedom.</p><p>Love, genuine love, cannot be coerced or pre-programmed; it must be given freely.</p><p>We have already heard C. S. Lewis on why free will is worth the risk.</p><p>Let us also recall the words of Jesus (in the New Testament): <em>“So if the Son sets you free, you will be free indeed”</em> (John 8:36, NIV). This suggests that freedom is a fundamental condition of the redeemed human soul.</p><p>Moreover, the Apostle Paul implies free agency in moral accountability when he says, <em>“Let no one say when he is tempted, ‘I am tempted by God’… let each person be quick to hear, slow to speak, slow to anger”</em> (James 1:13–19) — all assuming we can respond to temptations.</p><p>In short, Scripture consistently treats humans as capable of choosing good or evil, being praised or blamed for it.</p><p>Classical Christian philosophers like Augustine and Aquinas built on these intuitions.</p><p>Augustine’s debates with the Pelagians revolved around grace and will, but even when affirming God’s grace, he never denied that we have a free will.</p><p>In his <em>On Grace and Free Will</em>, Augustine writes that our freedom is evident in the Bible, since God’s commands and rewards assume we can obey.</p><p>Thomas Aquinas saw even more plainly that free will is logically necessary: <em>“the sensitive appetite [the instincts of animals] acts without judgment. But man acts from judgment… [so] man is rational and therefore must have free will.”</em></p><p>Theologians conclude that free will is not an accident or flaw in God’s design; rather, it’s a defining feature of what it means to be an <em>image-bearer</em> of God.</p><p>What about determinism versus divine foreknowledge?</p><p>Some worry that if God is omniscient and knows the future, our freedom is compromised.</p><p>Many Christian thinkers respond that God’s knowledge does not <em>cause</em> our actions; instead, God timelessly knows the choices we will freely make.</p><p>We won’t tackle this complex issue in detail here, but it’s part of the classical framework: <strong>human beings</strong> can have <strong>libertarian freedom</strong> even under <strong>divine sovereignty</strong>.</p><p>Crucially, theistic belief provides a <strong>basis for moral reality</strong>.</p><p>If we are truly created by a personal God, then the moral truths we intuit (like “justice is real”, “murder is wrong”) have an objective grounding.</p><p>Free will makes sense if we are intended to be moral creatures.</p><p>As Francis Collins noted, science explains <em>how</em> biology works, but <em>why</em> human beings are moral agents is not answered by genome sequences.</p><p>A theistic worldview elegantly explains free will by positing a Creator who made personal creatures for love and relationship.</p><p>The risk of evil was taken in order to allow genuine good — a point Augustine and Lewis both emphasized in their writings on the Fall and redemption.</p><p>On a practical level, many Christians live as though free will were real, and find solace in God’s justice.</p><p>For example, Christian ethicists argue that even if someone’s actions are sinful or “predetermined” in a sense, God <em>still holds them responsible</em> when they choose against Him — just as God commands repentance and faith as if the human will is operative.</p><p>This apparent paradox is resolved by saying that ultimately, our wills are <strong>gifted by God</strong>; refusing to use that gift rightly is what makes us blameworthy.</p><p>We are not robots; we are moral subjects.</p><h3>Synthesis and Conclusion</h3><p>Are we truly <strong>agents</strong>, or <strong>biological automatons</strong>?</p><p>The answer that emerges from science, philosophy, and theology is a confident <strong>yes</strong>: we are agents.</p><p>Deterministic physics does not logically obliterate free will, and indeterministic randomness does not produce it either.</p><p>Rather, our freedom is found in the way we respond to reasons and make choices that we can take <em>credit</em> or <em>blame</em> for.</p><p>Experiments like Libet’s show that the brain precedes awareness, but not that awareness is meaningless — current science suggests our conscious intentions have a role, even if the details are murky.</p><p>Our very experience and the structure of morality <strong>assume</strong> that we can choose, deliberate, and change our minds.</p><p>As Lavazza et al. note, <em>“we often act on impulse… but this does not imply that we are not potentially able to act freely.”</em> We assume people are “potentially free” and thus hold them accountable.</p><p>From a Christian viewpoint, this is exactly what one would expect if we are persons made in God’s image.</p><p>God created humans with wills, not as puppets.</p><p>Throughout Christian history, theologians have affirmed that freedom is an essential part of our humanity.</p><p>Thinkers like Augustine, Aquinas, and Lewis emphasize that without freedom, morality, love, and progress would be impossible.</p><p>The Creator’s design appears to be that we freely cooperate with His grace or freely reject it.</p><p>This squarely puts moral agency at the center of human life.</p><p>In the broader series on science and faith, free will is yet another place where “everything eventually points to the Creator.”</p><p>Science alone might incline toward viewing humans as complex biochemical machines, but such a view is incomplete. It cannot capture the reality of our moral experience.</p><p>Only by acknowledging the soul and purpose given by God do we have a satisfying account of agency.</p><p>As Collins remarks, science reveals the “how” of the genome, but <em>“It will never explain certain special human attributes, such as the knowledge of the Moral Law”</em>.</p><p>The existence of moral knowledge and free will is arguably evidence of a personal source — a Creator who made morality as fundamental as physics.</p><p><strong>Counterarguments from neuroscience and philosophy have not disproven the freedom we know in ourselves.</strong></p><p>Instead, they have deepened our understanding: yes, our brains obey laws, and yes, some processes precede our awareness, but these facts do not negate the possibility that <em>we</em> are those who ultimately make decisions.</p><p>Those decisions are made in the framework of reasons, values, and character that define us.</p><p>If we had no say in them, we would be trapped in inhuman fatalism — a stance both philosophically unappealing and contrary to our <strong>felt reality</strong>.</p><p>On the contrary, because we experience ourselves as free and because our moral lives only make sense on that basis, it is far more coherent to affirm agency.</p><p>Finally, consider society and future consequences. We build laws, schools, and systems on the assumption that people can change and improve.</p><p>We rehabilitate criminals, educate children, and pray for conversion — all assuming that hearts and minds can truly turn.</p><p>This social reality <strong>presumes free will</strong>. If we ever acted as if humans were automatons, society would crumble.</p><p>In summary, every line of evidence — experiential, moral, philosophical, and theological — converges to the conclusion that <strong>we are indeed agents, not mere biological robots</strong>.</p><p>Our choices matter.</p><p>We do influence the world with our wills, and we can hold ourselves and others responsible.</p><p>This picture fits gracefully with a theistic worldview: humans are purposefully created with freedom.</p><p>Recognizing this freedom enriches our understanding of humanity and aligns with the belief that our lives have meaning beyond the reach of physics alone.</p><p>Thus, when we weigh all perspectives, the agent-hood of human beings stands firm.</p><p>Each decision we make, from the trivial to the profound, is an affirmation that we are more than molecules in motion — we are moral beings endowed with will.</p><p>And in that light, even the tension between freedom and determinism can be seen as part of a glorious reality: that we participate, however mysteriously, in the unfolding of creation, accountable to ourselves and to a higher source.</p><p><strong>Free will</strong>, then, is not only <strong>real</strong>; it is the very <strong>ground</strong> on which responsibility, love, and even faith rest.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=811eba789456" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>