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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Second Sight on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Assault on Coexistence]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/second-sight-icm/assault-on-coexistence-5001a6d8a1fa?source=rss-98e95f907fdc------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Second Sight]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 14:33:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-27T14:33:24.633Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On October 23, 2026, unidentified gunmen opened fire on mourners attending a funeral at the St. George’s Greek Orthodox Church in Hamoud village in Jordan’s southern Karak Governorate, killing at least eight people and injuring dozens. The death toll rose to nine on October 24, as one of the injured died. Jordanian authorities described the shooting as a terrorist attack carried out by extremists, although the perpetrators’ identities, motives and possible links to militant organisations remained unconfirmed. King Abdullah II condemned the attack and vowed the harshest response against those responsible. “Those who delude themselves into thinking that they can divide Jordanians with their bullets have no chance in the face of our unity,” he declared, adding that “every Jordanian life is precious” and that the state would respond with an “iron fist.” The King’s emphasis on national unity highlights the wider stakes of the attack: beyond the loss of life, the violence raises the question of whether an assault on a religious community can be used to generate fear and weaken Jordan’s social cohesion.</p><p>The choice of target is significant. The gunmen struck mourners gathered at a place of worship, turning an occasion of grief into an episode of indiscriminate violence. Christians constitute a minority in Jordan but have long been part of the country’s social fabric. An attack on a Christian congregation carries implications beyond the immediate community. Violence against a religious minority can generate fear, weaken public confidence in the state’s ability to provide equal protection, and encourage the perception that religious identity determines who can safely participate in public life. The attack’s broader significance lies in this potential to damage coexistence, irrespective of whether that was the perpetrators’ intended objective.</p><p>The circumstances of the assault warrant close scrutiny. Footage broadcast by Jordanian state television reportedly showed three armed men approaching the church and opening fire. Witness accounts described gunfire and panic among mourners. As of October 24, no organisation had claimed responsibility, and authorities had not established whether the assailants were connected to a known militant group. Interior Minister Mazen al-Faraya reportedly described the perpetrators as extremists, while the investigation remained <a href="https://www.investing.com/news/world-news/seven-killed-as-gunmen-open-fire-at-church-in-jordan-authorities-say-4970162"><strong>ongoing</strong></a>. The ideological and organisational origins of the attack thus remain open questions rather than the basis for premature attribution.</p><p>The absence of an immediate claim of responsibility does not diminish the need to investigate possible organised extremist activity. Jordan has previously confronted Islamist militant networks and plots. Karak itself witnessed a major attack in December 2016, when an Islamic State-linked assault killed 10 people, including seven security personnel and a Canadian tourist. That precedent provides relevant context, but does not establish a connection between the two incidents. Investigators must also determine whether the latest attackers acted independently or received assistance, identify the sources of their weapons, and establish whether local networks or external contacts facilitated the operation. The challenge now is to translate the King’s declaration into an effective security response.</p><p>The political challenge is equally important. If the perpetrators sought to provoke sectarian confrontation, any resulting mistrust or retaliation would extend the consequences of the attack far beyond the victims and their families. An investigation that establishes responsibility without casting suspicion on entire communities would help deny the perpetrators any wider social impact.</p><p>The international response underscored the significance of the attack. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney condemned the shooting as a “<a href="https://m.rediff.com/news/report/seven-killed-after-gunmen-open-fire-at-jordan-church-during-funeral/20261024.htm"><strong>despicable act of terror</strong></a>,” emphasising its violation of the sanctity of a place of worship and the suffering inflicted on families attending a funeral. United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres stressed that places of worship must remain safe and that attacks against civilians were unacceptable. The UN published a statement on the attack on <a href="https://www.un.org/sg/fr/node/401528"><strong>October 23, 2026</strong></a>. These reactions underline the wider concern over civilian protection and freedom of worship. For Jordan, however, the immediate challenge remains to translate expressions of solidarity into effective prevention, accountability and reassurance for vulnerable communities.</p><p>Jordan’s stability cannot be taken for granted, but neither can one brutal assault be treated as proof that coexistence has failed. The decisive question is whether the state can deliver justice while preserving the social cohesion that extremist violence may threaten. The response to Karak will be measured not only by arrests or security measures, but also by whether Jordan emerges from the tragedy more secure and no less united.</p><p>Deepak Kumar Nayak<br>Research Associate, <em>Institute for Conflict Management</em></p><p>Publisher &amp; Editor: Ajai Sahni</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5001a6d8a1fa" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/second-sight-icm/assault-on-coexistence-5001a6d8a1fa">Assault on Coexistence</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/second-sight-icm">Second Sight</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: Political Hijack]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/second-sight-icm/khyber-pakhtunkhwa-political-hijack-063d3bdc3cea?source=rss-98e95f907fdc------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Second Sight]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2026 13:27:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-15T13:27:28.193Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On October 13, 2026, at least 12 persons were injured and more than 50 were arrested, as violent clashes were reported across many places in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) after the Federal Government suspended the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI)-led Provincial Government and imposed governor’s rule. Supporters of jailed former Prime Minister (PM) Imran Khan took to the streets across multiple districts, leading to a severe Police crackdown and widespread rioting.</p><p>The worst violences was in the Bara area of Khyber District, where protestors manhandled Security Force (SF) personnel, briefly detaining 15 inside a municipal office and taking their weapons. Protestors set fire to a National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) centre and portions of a Rescue 1122 building, and destroyed traffic signals and local infrastructure. At least 12 persons were injured as local Police and paramilitary forces deployed tear gas, baton charges, and live ammunition to disperse crowds.</p><p>In Tirah (Khyber District), Hayatabad (Peshawar District), Swat and Swabi Districts, the protesters blockaded roads and clashed with SFs. Law enforcement agencies detained over 50 persons in these worst-hit areas and formally charged them with terrorism, sabotage, and destroying state property.</p><p>Following the approval of President Asif Ali Zardari, Governor’s rule and emergency were enforced in KP on October 11 on the grounds that they were necessary to maintain law and order. The President approved the imposition of an emergency and Governor’s Rule in KP under Articles 232 and 234 of the Constitution, on the advice of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. The Federal Government justified the decision by pointing to a sharp surge in terrorist attacks across KP, alleging that the provincial administration was obstructing counterterrorism efforts.</p><p>KP Governor Faisal Karim Kundi has assumed executive authority, supported by an 11-member Advisory Council. The Federal Government has issued a notification for the deployment of the Army in KP to assist the civil administration.</p><p>Following the imposition of the emergency and governor’s rule, the Federal Government launched a sweeping security crackdown, arresting several top PTI leaders and hundreds of party workers. The incumbent KP Chief Minister Muhammad Sohail Khan Afridi, PTI provincial KP president Junaid Akbar and speaker of the KP Assembly Babar Saleem Swati, were arrested. Former KP CM Ali Amin Gandapur stated that he was placed under house arrest in Dera Ismail Khan. Senior PTI leader Asad Qaiser claimed that up to 2,000 party workers and supporters had been detained during the multi-day crackdown across the province.</p><p>PTI strongly rejected the imposition of governor’s rule and emergency measures in KP, labelling the move an “unconstitutional assault on the public mandate”. On October 14, 2026, PTI chairman Barrister Gohar Ali Khan moved the Peshawar High Court to challenge the emergency and governor’s rule. Barrister Khan asserted that the measures effectively stripped KP of its democratically elected Government.</p><p>After the Federal meeting on KP’s emergency and Governor’s rule on October 11, while addressing the media in Islamabad, Federal Information Minister Attaullah Tarar alleged that the PTI-led Government in KP had a “nexus” with terrorist groups. Tarar added that all cabinet members were of the view that the “PTI government in KP is hand in glove with terrorists and has an unholy alliance with terrorists”. “Terrorists have a clear say in how each district will be run,” he alleged, citing reports from the Intelligence Bureau and law enforcement agencies (LEAs).</p><p>On October 13, defending the imposition of the emergency and governor’s rule on the floor of National Assembly, Federal Minister for Law and Justice Azam Nazeer Tarar disclosed that 2,911 terrorist incidents were recorded in KP between 2021 and 2024, while the number rose to 3,787 incidents between October 15, 2025 and October 9, 2026.</p><p>According to a new policy review based on annual data from the Islamabad based think tank Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) released on October 2, 2026, terrorist attacks in KP nearly quadrupled between 2021 and 2025. Terrorist attacks recorded in the province increased from 111 in 2021 to 413 in 2025, a rise of 272.1 percent. There were 169 attacks in 2022, 174 in 2023, and 295 in 2024.</p><p>According to partial data compiled by the <em>South Asia Terrorism Portal</em> (SATP), KP has recorded a total of 1,853 terrorism-related fatalities, including 1,264 terrorists, 329 SF personnel and 260 civilians in the current year, so far (data till October 13, 2026). During the corresponding period of 2025, the province recorded 1,704 such fatalities, including 1,139 terrorists, 365 SF personnel and 200 civilians.</p><p>While terrorism in KP has been growing, the political rift between the Pakistan Muslim League — Nawaz (PML-N)-led Federal Government and the PTI-led Provincial Government has complicated the fight against terrorism as each holds the other responsible for the deteriorating security situation. On September 28, 2026, Federal Information Minister Tarar alleged that the PTI leadership in KP was the ‘B team’ of TTP, and that the provincial government facilitated the terrorists for its political and financial interests. The PTI leadership has rejected these assertions, contending that security concerns are being exploited as a pretext for political manoeuvres aimed at eroding the party’s influence in the province.</p><p>Tushar Ranjan Mohanty<br>Research Associate, <em>Institute for Conflict Management</em></p><p>Publisher &amp; Editor: Ajai Sahni</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=063d3bdc3cea" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/second-sight-icm/khyber-pakhtunkhwa-political-hijack-063d3bdc3cea">Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: Political Hijack</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/second-sight-icm">Second Sight</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[J&K: Hashim Musa: From SSG commando to terrorist]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/second-sight-icm/j-k-hashim-musa-from-ssg-commando-to-terrorist-d46b0dbdd3b4?source=rss-98e95f907fdc------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Second Sight]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 14:40:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-02T14:40:29.948Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On September 29, 2026, a Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) commander and former Pakistan Army Special Services Group (SSG) commando, Mohammad Asif <em>aka</em> Hashim Musa / Hashim Moosa / Fauji, was killed in an encounter in the Korag area of Yusmarg in the Budgam District of Jammu and Kashmir (J&amp;K). His body, along with war-like stores, was recovered during a search operation in the Palmaidan area near Yousmarg early on September 30. Hashim Musa operated across the Pir Panjal range in the Poonch-Rajouri belt and into the Kashmir Valley. He had escaped an earlier encounter in the Yousmarg hills during which his associate Yasir, a LeT terrorist, was killed around September 5, 2026, in <em>Operation Ashdar</em> in the Ashdar Gali area of Budgam.</p><p>“The killing of Moosa is a serious blow to the LeT ecosystem in the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir,” a Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) statement on September 30, 2026, noted. According to the official Press Information Bureau (PIB) release, with Moosa’s killing, the entire group of four senior LeT commanders operating in J&amp;K since 2022 had been neutralised. The MHA identified the other three commanders as Junaid Bhat, killed in Dachigam, Srinagar District, on December 3, 2024; Suleman, killed during <em>Operation Mahadev</em> in Pahalgam, Anantnag District, on July 28, 2025; and Yasir, killed during <em>Operation Asdhar</em> on September 4, 2026. The group was linked to attacks at Halan in Kulgam District, Kandi in Rajouri District, Dera Ki Gali in Poonch District, Shahsitar in Poonch, Shiv Khori in Reasi District, Gagangir in Ganderbal District, Bootapathri in Baramulla District, and Baisaran in Pahalgam.</p><p>The killing of Hashim Musa is not an isolated incident; it is a microcosm of Pakistan’s institutional strategy. At least five terrorists have been killed in encounters between September 1 and 30, 2026, including Musa. On September 5, a terrorist identified as Yasir was killed in Budgam. On September 17, two Pakistani terrorists, Saddam and Mustafa, were killed in Udhampur District. The decomposed body of a suspected Pakistani Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) terrorist, along with an M4 assault rifle, was recovered from Seojdhar Forest in Doda District.</p><p>Hashim Musa was a resident of Mohalla Kohisar Colony in the New Chakra area of Rawalpindi, Pakistan. His family originally hailed from Dhok Maliyar village in the Nasirabad area in Attock District of Punjab province; he relocated to Rawalpindi in 2015 with his wife Abida Parveen and their three daughters. He served for 23 years in the Pakistan Army’s SSG as a <em>Havildar</em> in the 4th Commando Yalghar Battalion (Pakistan Army Service Number PA-3106947). He was part of former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf’s personal security detail from 2006 to 2008. His operational history included counter-insurgency operations against the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) in Balochistan (2006), operations in Kurram Agency (2011–12), North and South Waziristan (2014–15), and against the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan <a href="https://satp.org/terrorist-profile/pakistan/tehreek-e-taliban-pakistan-ttp"><strong>(TTP)</strong></a> in Khyber Agency (2015–16). He was also deployed with a Pakistan Army contingent for a United Nations peacekeeping mission in Sudan in 2009. He received military awards including the Tamgha-e-Istiqlal and Tamgha-e-Azm. Pakistan’s National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) reissued him a Computerised National Identity Card (CNIC 37105–9228244–5) on September 12, 2020, valid until 2030. He retired from the Pakistan Army on March 31, 2023, at the age of 42. After retirement, he joined LeT, illegally crossed into India in September 2023, and was appointed as the chief commander of LeT in J&amp;K. His military background and appearance earned him the sobriquet <em>Fauji</em>.</p><p>The April 22, 2025, attack at Baisaran meadow in Pahalgam of Anantnag District killed 26 people (25 tourists and one local pony operator). Early police investigations named Hashim Musa among the key suspects, alongside Adil Hussain Thoker and Ali Bhai <em>aka</em> Talha, and announced an INR 2 million reward for his arrest. However, the National Investigation Agency’s (NIA’s) 1,597-page chargesheet filed on December 15, 2025 did not name Hashim Musa among the seven accused or the three direct attackers. It charged LeT and TRF as organisations and named Pakistani handler Sajid Jatt (who remains at large), the three Pakistani terrorists killed in <em>Operation Mahadev</em>, including Faisal Jatt <em>aka</em> Suleman Shah, Habeeb Tahir <em>aka</em> Jibran, and Hamza Afghani, and two local harbourers — Parvaiz Ahmad and Bashir Ahmad Jothat. A later supplementary chargesheet also named LeT chief Hafiz Saeed. Musa remained at large for more than 17 months after the April 2025 Baisaran massacre, until he was finally killed.</p><p>Hashim involvement was, however, confirmed in multiple terrorist attacks across J&amp;K. On December 21, 2023, terrorists ambushed two Army vehicles (a Gypsy and a mini-truck) near Dera Ki Gali in the Rajouri-Poonch sector of J&amp;K, while troops were moving to reinforce an ongoing operation; the attack killed four Indian Army soldiers (the final toll after one more soldier succumbed to injuries) and injured another three. He was linked to the Gulmarg attack in October 2024, when terrorists ambushed a vehicle of the 18 Rashtriya Rifles near the Nagin Post in the Bota Pathri area, about 6–7 kilometres from Gulmarg in Baramulla District, close to the Line of Control (LoC), resulting in five fatalities, including three soldiers and two civilian Army porters. In addition, he led the ambush on an Indian Air Force (IAF) convoy in Poonch District on May 4, 2024, near Shahsitar/Sanai Top in the Surankote area, in which Corporal Vikky Pahade of the IAF was killed, and another five personnel were injured.</p><p>The elimination of Hashim Musa marks a significant operational success against a high-value foreign terrorist cadre. His specialised military training, experience in counter-insurgency and VVIP security roles, and subsequent leadership within LeT illustrate how skilled terrorists are infiltrated into J&amp;K. His killing marks a notable success for Indian counter-terrorism agencies.</p><p>Ruchika Kakkar<br>Research Assistant, <em>Institute for Conflict Management</em></p><p>Publisher &amp; Editor: Ajai Sahni</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d46b0dbdd3b4" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/second-sight-icm/j-k-hashim-musa-from-ssg-commando-to-terrorist-d46b0dbdd3b4">J&amp;K: Hashim Musa: From SSG commando to terrorist</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/second-sight-icm">Second Sight</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Yemen: Houthis threaten Bab el-Mandeb]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/second-sight-icm/yemen-houthis-threaten-bab-el-mandeb-ccfcc0c5ce8a?source=rss-98e95f907fdc------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Second Sight]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 12 Sep 2026 13:57:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-12T13:57:02.102Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Houthi seizure of Yemen’s strategic Red Sea port city of Mokha on September 10, followed by their reported advance towards the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Hanish Islands, marks a significant escalation in the Yemen conflict. The development has raised concerns over freedom of navigation through one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints and could further aggravate disruptions to global energy supplies already caused by the conflict involving Iran and the United States.</p><p>Mokha, located about 75 kilometres north of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, gives the Houthis a direct presence on the approaches to the waterway. The group’s reported advance southwards towards Dhubab and the strategic islands in the Red Sea could provide it with greater capacity to threaten shipping using the strait. Control of Dhubab and the nearby Perim Island would be particularly significant because of their position at the southern entrance of the Red Sea. The Houthi advance therefore represents more than a territorial gain: it could provide the group with an opportunity to convert its existing attacks on maritime traffic into sustained pressure on an international shipping corridor.</p><p>The strategic importance of Bab el-Mandeb has increased following the disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil exporter, has increasingly relied on Red Sea routes after the effective closure of Hormuz, through which a significant share of global oil previously passed. Any serious disruption at Bab el-Mandeb would consequently constrain one of the remaining major maritime routes available for moving Gulf energy supplies towards international markets. The simultaneous vulnerability of the two chokepoints could create a particularly serious risk for global energy security.</p><p>The potential consequences extend beyond oil. Bab el-Mandeb connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and provides the maritime link between the Indian Ocean and the Suez Canal. A prolonged threat to navigation could force commercial vessels to avoid the Red Sea and undertake longer journeys around the Cape of Good Hope, increasing transportation costs, insurance premiums and delivery times. Such disruption would add pressure to global supply chains already affected by instability in the Middle East.</p><p>For Iran, the Houthi advance could provide an additional source of strategic leverage against the United States and its regional partners. Yemeni, Iranian and regional sources cited have attributed the latest Houthi advance to direct guidance from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, although Tehran has denied controlling the group. The Houthis themselves have described their operations as defensive and said they would stop once attacks on Yemen cease. Regardless of the extent of Iranian operational involvement, the geographical convergence of pressure around Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb has created a wider strategic concern for international shipping.</p><p>The development also represents a major setback for Saudi Arabia and the internationally recognised Yemeni government. Saudi-backed forces are reportedly relocating southwards towards Dhubab, suggesting that the fighting could intensify around the approaches to Bab el-Mandeb. The Houthi campaign has already included attacks on Saudi cities and infrastructure, including energy facilities. A stronger Houthi position along the Red Sea coast could expose Saudi energy infrastructure and Red Sea export routes to additional threats.</p><p>The reaction of the international community will be critical. United Nations Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg has warned of a “new and more dangerous phase” in the conflict, while the United States has accused the Houthis of acting as Iranian proxies. Pakistan has also reportedly warned Iran to restrain Houthi actions, reflecting growing concern that the escalation could broaden into a wider regional confrontation.</p><p>The immediate question is whether the Houthis seek to consolidate Mokha or continue southwards towards Dhubab and Perim Island. Capturing Perim would be especially consequential because of its location at the narrowest point of the strait and its potential value for monitoring maritime traffic. Such a development could transform the current threat to shipping into a more sustained strategic challenge.</p><p>The seizure of Mokha therefore marks a potentially important turning point. While Houthi control of the Bab el-Mandeb has not yet been established, their advance has brought them considerably closer to the chokepoint. If the conflict produces simultaneous and prolonged restrictions around Bab el-Mandeb and Hormuz, the consequences could extend from Yemen and the Gulf to global energy markets and international trade. Preventing such an outcome will require renewed diplomatic efforts alongside measures to preserve freedom of navigation and prevent the Yemen conflict from becoming another front in the wider regional confrontation.</p><p>Afsara Shaheen<br>Research Associate, <em>Institute for Conflict Management</em></p><p>Publisher &amp; Editor: Ajai Sahni</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ccfcc0c5ce8a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/second-sight-icm/yemen-houthis-threaten-bab-el-mandeb-ccfcc0c5ce8a">Yemen: Houthis threaten Bab el-Mandeb</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/second-sight-icm">Second Sight</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Chhattisgarh: Jhiram Ghati — The Wages of Self-deception]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/second-sight-icm/chhattisgarh-jhiram-ghati-the-wages-of-self-deception-67273d59ef89?source=rss-98e95f907fdc------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Second Sight]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 09 Sep 2026 14:35:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-09T14:35:13.680Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On September 5, 2026, a Special National Investigation Agency (NIA) Court in Jagdalpur, Bastar District, Chhattisgarh, convicted 10 surviving cadres of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (<a href="https://www.satp.org/terrorist-profile/india/communist-party-of-india-maoist-cpi-maoist-all-its-formations-and-front-organizations"><strong>CPI-Maoist</strong></a>), including three women, for their roles in the Jhiram Ghati massacre in the Darbha region of Sukma District on May 25, 2013.</p><p>The conviction of the 10 Maoists by a Special NIA Court in Jagdalpur, 13 years after the Jhiram Ghati attack, brings a measure of judicial accountability for one of the most consequential operations of the Maoist insurgency in Chhattisgarh. The court is scheduled to pronounce the quantum of punishment on September 16, 2026. Yet the significance of the verdict extends well beyond the 10 Maoists convicted. Jhiram Ghati remains important because the attack demonstrated, with devastating clarity, the consequences of mistaking a decline in the intensity of violence for a destruction of insurgent capability. That warning had been articulated before the attack.</p><p>In March 2013, <a href="https://satp.org/south-asia-intelligence-review-Volume-11-No-36"><strong><em>SAIR</em></strong></a> had assessed that the Maoists were in a phase of “tactical retreat”, concentrating on reconsolidating their strengths, enhancing recruitment to the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA), developing alternative communication channels to prevent information leakage, intensifying propaganda and expanding overground mobilisation. The assessment cautioned that the State must not mistake a decline in violence for the destruction of Maoist capacity.</p><p>Barely two months later, the Jhiram Ghati attack provided a brutal demonstration of that distinction. On <a href="https://satp.org/south-asia-intelligence-review-Volume-11-No-47"><strong>May 25, 2013</strong></a>, CPI-Maoist cadres ambushed the Congress Party’s <em>Parivartan Yatra</em> (Trek for Change) convoy in the Darbha Valley of Bastar. Among those killed were Chhattisgarh Congress chief Nand Kumar Patel, his son Dinesh Patel, former Leader of Opposition Mahendra Karma and former Union Minister Vidya Charan Shukla (who later died of his injuries in hospital). Security personnel and Congress workers were also killed. While contemporary accounts initially reported 28 fatalities, the <a href="https://nia.gov.in/rc-062013niadli"><strong>NIA case</strong></a> records 27 persons killed, including 10 Police personnel, and 38 injured.</p><p>The attack was not simply another entry in the chronology of Maoist violence. It was a demonstration of operational capacity. The Maoists selected difficult terrain, ambushed a sizeable political convoy, used an improvised explosive device and sustained an attack against an armed security contingent. Reports that several political leaders were subsequently targeted after their protective personnel had exhausted their ammunition underscored both the determination of the attackers and the inadequacy of the security arrangements.</p><p>This is where the Jhiram episode intersects directly with the present conviction. The NIA court has now convicted the 10 accused. The prosecution examined 101 witnesses and relied on forensic and documentary evidence. Eleven persons had originally faced trial, but one died during the proceedings. Several other accused named during the investigation remain absconding. The defence has indicated that the verdict will be challenged in a higher court.</p><p>The conviction is significant, but it should not be confused with a complete historical or operational accounting of the attack. The political controversy surrounding Jhiram has persisted precisely because questions have remained about the extent to which the investigation established the larger planning and command structure behind an operation of such scale. Congress leaders have repeatedly alleged that the investigation did not adequately examine a wider conspiracy. Such allegations remain political claims and cannot be treated as established fact merely because they have been repeatedly made. Nonetheless, they point to an important distinction: convicting participants is not necessarily the same as reconstructing the entire architecture of an insurgent operation. This distinction matters particularly in the context of the Maoist movement’s subsequent trajectory.</p><p>In 2013, the insurgency still possessed the territorial depth, organisational networks, local intelligence and armed formations necessary to conduct major operations in Bastar. Today, that environment has changed substantially. Sustained security operations, the expansion of security infrastructure, leadership losses and large-scale surrenders have substantially reduced the Maoists’ operational footprint in Chhattisgarh and elsewhere across the country.</p><p>Counter-insurgency is particularly vulnerable to what may be called the comfort of declining statistics. Once fatalities fall and large attacks become less frequent, political and administrative establishments begin to interpret improving indicators as evidence of irreversible success. Jhiram was a warning against precisely such self-deception.</p><p>There was another failure: the protection of political activity in a high-risk insurgency theatre. Whatever the subsequent political recriminations over responsibility for the security arrangements, the basic lesson is uncomplicated. Political mobilisation in an insurgency-affected area cannot be treated as ordinary political campaigning. Intelligence, route sanitisation, convoy discipline, communications, contingency planning and adequate protective cover are integral to the conduct of such activity.</p><p>The passage of 13 years has changed the Maoist threat substantially, but it has not diminished the importance of these lessons. The Maoist insurgency’s current weakened state is reflected not only in the decline of its operational footprint but also in the fate of some of the prominent Maoists originally named in the Jhiram investigation. Thippiri Tirupathi <em>alias</em> Devuji, a CPI-Maoist Politburo member and believed to have become the Maoist ‘general secretary’ after the death of Nambala Keshava Rao <em>alias</em> Basavaraju, the former CPI-Maoist ‘general secretary’, surrendered in Telangana on February 22, 2026. Barse Deva <em>alias</em> Barsa Sukka, who succeeded Madvi Hidma as ‘commander’ of PLGA Battalion 1, surrendered on January 2, 2026, while CPI-Maoist ‘Central Committee Member (CCM)’ Ganesh Uike <em>alias</em> Pakka Hanumantu was killed in an encounter in Odisha on December 25, 2025. A generation of security personnel and administrators now operating in Bastar encounter a far weaker Maoist movement than the one that executed Jhiram. They must, nevertheless, understand what that organisation was once capable of achieving.</p><p>The verdict is to be welcomed as an important step towards accountability. But Jhiram Ghati cannot be reduced to the conviction of 10 accused or to a historical footnote. Its deeper significance lies in the warning that preceded the attack, and the failure to adequately heed it. Thirteen years on, the central lesson of Jhiram remains unchanged: the absence of frequent violence does not, by itself, establish the absence of insurgent capability.</p><p>Deepak Kumar Nayak<br>Research Associate, <em>Institute for Conflict Management</em></p><p>Publisher &amp; Editor: Ajai Sahni</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=67273d59ef89" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/second-sight-icm/chhattisgarh-jhiram-ghati-the-wages-of-self-deception-67273d59ef89">Chhattisgarh: Jhiram Ghati — The Wages of Self-deception</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/second-sight-icm">Second Sight</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Tripura: Surrendered Cadres’ Agitation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/second-sight-icm/tripura-surrendered-cadres-agitation-21c508aa4da5?source=rss-98e95f907fdc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/21c508aa4da5</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Second Sight]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 06 Sep 2026 02:21:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-06T02:21:24.554Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Tripura’s latest road and rail blockade by surrendered insurgent groups highlights persistent gaps in the implementation of the September 4, 2024, tripartite peace accord and raises questions over the sustainability of the State’s post-insurgency rehabilitation process. On September 4, 2026, seven organisations representing surrendered cadres launched a 72-hour blockade at multiple locations, demanding implementation of the accord and fulfilment of an 11-point charter. The organisations include the National Liberation Front of Tripura (<a href="https://satp.org/terrorist-profile/india/national-liberation-front-of-tripura-nlft"><strong>NLFT</strong></a>), NLFT-Parimal Debbarma (NLFT-PD), NLFT-Nayan Bashi (NLFT-NB), All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF), ATTF-Old, Joint Action Rehabilitation Committee (JARC) and the Joint Action Committee (JAC).</p><p>The protesters blocked the Assam-Agartala National Highway at Chandra Sadhu Para near Hathai Kotor Bridge and other locations, while railway movement was disrupted near Brigudas Bari. Tyres were reportedly set ablaze and vehicles stranded, prompting deployment of Police and paramilitary forces. The immediate demands include rehabilitation of surrendered cadres, withdrawal of pending cases, security for former cadres and leaders, and greater powers for the Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council (TTAADC) over land-related matters.</p><p>The agitation follows months of repeated protests over what surrendered cadres describe as delays in implementing rehabilitation commitments. In June, NLFT and ATTF representatives had announced a similar 72-hour road and rail blockade, alleging that the proposed INR 2.5 billion rehabilitation and development package remained largely unimplemented. The agitation was subsequently withdrawn following government assurances. JARC and JAC also withdrew an indefinite blockade call on June 24, 2026, after receiving assurances that their demands would be examined. Another proposed blockade scheduled for August 13, 2026, was deferred following government intervention.</p><p>The recurrence of such protests indicates that assurances have not translated into sufficient implementation on the ground. The issue is particularly significant given the scale of the surrenders. According to data presented in the Tripura Assembly on March 17, 2026, 1,245 militants belonging to various outfits surrendered between April 2023 and March 2026, including cadres of different NLFT factions and ATTF. A total of 147 weapons were surrendered. Under the rehabilitation policy, eligible former cadres are entitled to a fixed deposit of INR 400,000 and a monthly stipend of INR 6,000 for three years. Protest leaders, however, have claimed that only a small proportion of surrendered cadres have received rehabilitation packages.</p><p>The credibility of the peace process increasingly depends on the Government’s ability to establish transparent and time-bound mechanisms for verifying beneficiaries and delivering promised assistance. Delays in rehabilitation can leave former insurgents economically vulnerable and politically dissatisfied, potentially creating conditions for renewed mobilisation, even if they do not translate into a return to armed insurgency.</p><p>The demands also extend beyond individual rehabilitation. Former insurgents have raised issues concerning pending criminal cases, security arrangements, livelihood opportunities and the powers of the TTAADC over tribal land. These demands reflect the broader socio-political grievances surrounding Tripura’s tribal population. Consequently, the present agitation cannot be addressed solely through financial packages; questions concerning land, customary rights and institutional powers require sustained political engagement.</p><p>The repeated resort to blockades is itself a concern. Tripura depends heavily on the Assam-Agartala Highway and railway network for the movement of people, commodities and essential supplies. Disruption of these routes imposes costs on the wider population and provides protesting groups with considerable leverage over the State Government. Repeated disruptions also affect the State’s economic activity and connectivity.</p><p>For the Government, the immediate challenge is to prevent the present agitation from escalating, while restoring confidence in the peace agreement. A publicly monitored rehabilitation framework, clear beneficiary criteria, time-bound disbursement of assistance and regular consultations with surrendered cadres could help reduce the trust deficit. Pending legal cases should also be reviewed through an established mechanism, while political demands concerning tribal land and TTAADC powers require separate dialogue.</p><p>The present crisis does not indicate a return of insurgency in Tripura. Rather, it demonstrates that ending armed conflict is only one stage of a peace process. Unless surrenders are followed by credible rehabilitation, livelihood support and implementation of political commitments, unresolved grievances can continue to generate instability through protests and disruptions. The durability of Tripura’s peace will ultimately depend on converting the 2024 accord from an agreement of surrender into a functioning framework for long-term reintegration.</p><p>Afsara Shaheen<br>Research Associate, <em>Institute for Conflict Management</em></p><p>Publisher &amp; Editor: Ajai Sahni</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=21c508aa4da5" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/second-sight-icm/tripura-surrendered-cadres-agitation-21c508aa4da5">Tripura: Surrendered Cadres’ Agitation</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/second-sight-icm">Second Sight</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[AUF: Targeting the Taliban]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/second-sight-icm/auf-targeting-the-taliban-738654194fda?source=rss-98e95f907fdc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/738654194fda</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Second Sight]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 03 Sep 2026 12:43:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-03T12:43:08.961Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As reported on September 2, 2026, the Afghanistan United Front (AUF) killed a Taliban official, Qari Aghagol, from the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, in the 18th Security District of Kabul.</p><p>As reported on August 31, 2026, AUF killed a Taliban intelligence operative in the Minar Chowk area of the Spin Boldak District of Kandahar Province.</p><p>On August 31, 2026, AUF forces attacked a Taliban security command center in Ghor Province, in which five Taliban fighters were injured. AUF cadres hit the entrance of the command center with a grenade during the attack.</p><p>On August 30, 2026, AUF targeted a Taliban outpost in the Gereshk District of Helmand Province, killing three Taliban fighters and seizing their weapons and ammunition.</p><p>In the night of August 29, 2026, AUF forces attacked the Taliban’s First Police District in Asadabad, the capital of Kunar Province, killing two Taliban Police personnel.</p><p>As reported on August 29, 2026, AUF forces launched an offensive operation against a Taliban checkpoint in the Nawzad area of Nawzad District in Helmand Province, killing six Taliban fighters.</p><p>AUF was publicly launched on October 19, 2023. However, the group’s website confirms that Lt. Gen. Sayad Sami Sadat was voted leader on May 12, 2023, indicating that the organisation’s formation process predates its public launch in October that year. General Sadat, a Pashtun, was serving as the Deputy Chief of the Afghan Army in 2021, before the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. He earlier commanded the Afghan National Army’s 215th Corps in Helmand Province and served in the National Directorate of Security (NDS), the former Afghan government’s intelligence and security service. He is reportedly a graduate of the Joint Services Command and Staff College at the United Kingdom’s Defence Academy, Class of 2011; and at the Polish National Defence University, he completed the Battalion Command Course. He also holds an MA in Strategic Management and Leadership from the UK Charter Management Institute. As reported on August 6, 2026, Sadat has appeared frequently in US media since the Taliban’s takeover in 2021, and he maintains relationships with Capitol Hill. AUF subsequently developed a military wing, claimed its first military operation on July 30, 2026, and announced a broader armed campaign on August 1, 2026.</p><p>According to partial data collated by<em> Institute for Conflict Management</em>, AUF has killed 28 Taliban fighters and injured 11, in 14 incidents, since its formation (data till September 2, 2026). Most of these attacks have been concentrated particularly in two districts — Kabul and Kandahar, the former being the capital of Afghanistan, and the latter the nerve centre of the Taliban, the location of its Amir, Hibatullah Akhundzada. A few attacks have also taken place in the Helmand, Kunar, and Ghor provinces.</p><p>However, on September 1, 2026, AUF Spokesperson Hilal Kakar claimed that the group had carried out at least 43 operations against the Taliban in 14 provinces over the preceding month, claiming 74 Taliban members were killed and 35 were wounded. “We will save Afghans from the Taliban and seek a prosperous and free Afghanistan,” Kakar declared.</p><p>As posted on its verified X handle on October 19, 2023, AUF declared that its office had been established in Washington DC a day earlier, on October 18, 2023. This office is headed by ‘Governor’ Masood Bakhtawar. He was the former Deputy Governor of Helmand Province.</p><p>AUF’s leadership council consists mainly of former Afghan Army and intelligence general officers, governors, committed, combative, and capable Afghans, as well as young politicians and human rights activists. The council members come from diverse ethnicities, including Hazaras, Pashtuns, Tajiks, and Uzbeks. AUF declares, “Our mission is to unite Afghans and return Afghanistan to the constitutional order, ensuring that Afghans can enjoy freedom, peace, and prosperity,” adding that its campaign has three major pillars — civil, political, and military fronts:</p><p>We will deliver a comprehensive national strategy to stabilize Afghanistan by political and military means, to establish a just, democratic system of government, with equality for women and minorities. We will be one people formed of many, united under the flag, and governed under an agreed constitution with the consent of the people.</p><p>AUF’s principal concerns since the Taliban’s takeover include:</p><ul><li>The re-emergence of terrorism in Afghanistan, owing to the presence of large number of terrorists affiliated with Al Qaeda, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and other such groupings;</li><li>Chinese exploitation of Afghanistan’s minerals; and</li><li>The humanitarian catastrophe experienced by Afghan people.</li></ul><p>On June 5, 2024, the Front claimed that the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP) had 9,000 fighters in Afghanistan and could conduct attacks “throughout the region”, and further, that “the IS-KP group has the ideological, human resources, and recruitment capacity to carry out attacks in Europe and the United States, and they have demonstrated this capability in Afghanistan and Iran as well.”</p><p>AUF has accused the Taliban of beating, torturing and humiliating young people; detaining, torturing, and murdering security and defence personnel of Afghanistan’s former government; and harassing and extorting local residents.</p><p>Interestingly, on August 27, 2026, AUF asserted that at least 180 religious scholars from across Afghanistan had issued a fatwa calling on the group (AUF) to carry out military operations against the Taliban. The <em>fatwa</em> had been issued by religious scholars, Islamic academics and researchers specialising in Quranic interpretation, theology, <em>hadith</em>, jurisprudence, the Prophet’s biography, creed and other fields of Islamic studies. These scholars also called on the opposition to “take up the sword” and free citizens from what they described as this “tyranny”.</p><p>The emergence of AUF introduces new security challenges for the Taliban, compounding existing pressures from other opposing groups such as the National Resistance Front (NRF), Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) and National Mobilization Front (NMF), among others; recurrent hostility and internal fractures in Badakhshan province; and regional tensions with Pakistan. Under the circumstances, the Taliban needs a multi-pronged defensive approach to maintain its dominance, both administratively and militarily, in Afghanistan.</p><p>Sanchita Bhattacharya<br>Research Fellow, <em>Institute for Conflict Management</em></p><p>Publisher &amp; Editor: Ajai Sahni</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=738654194fda" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/second-sight-icm/auf-targeting-the-taliban-738654194fda">AUF: Targeting the Taliban</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/second-sight-icm">Second Sight</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[TELANGANA: From Maoists to Mafias — New Security Challenge]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/second-sight-icm/telangana-from-maoists-to-mafias-new-security-challenge-e28c3fd9f60b?source=rss-98e95f907fdc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e28c3fd9f60b</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Second Sight]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 27 Aug 2026 10:54:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-27T10:54:40.604Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The dramatic decline of Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) in Telangana represents a significant security achievement, but the transition from an insurgency-affected environment to a relatively peaceful one is unlikely to be without complications. In particular, the erstwhile Communist Party of India-Maoist (<a href="https://satp.org/terrorist-profile/india/communist-party-of-india-maoist-cpi-maoist-all-its-formations-and-front-organizations"><strong>CPI-Maoist</strong></a>)-affected districts of Bhadradri Kothagudem and Mulugu, as well as adjoining border areas, require sustained attention to organised crime, narcotics trafficking and other forms of illicit commerce. The issue is not that Maoist structures are simply being replaced by criminal syndicates, but rather that the networks, terrain, routes and local vulnerabilities that developed during decades of insurgency could potentially be exploited by criminal actors.</p><p>The scale of the Maoist decline in Telangana has been substantial. On April 10, 2026, the State Police declared Telangana free of Maoist armed formations following the surrender of 42 cadres, including People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) Battalion ‘chief’ Sodi Keshalu <em>alias</em> Sodi Kesha <em>alias</em> Malla <em>alias</em> Nikhil, and members of the Maoist State Committee, before then Telangana Director General of Police (DGP) B. Shivadhar Reddy in Hyderabad. The surrender followed 761 Maoist cadres giving up arms since 2024 and marked a decisive weakening of the organisation’s armed infrastructure in the State. Yet, the geographical areas that once sustained the insurgency remain strategically significant. Bhadradri Kothagudem and Mulugu have been the principal Maoist-affected districts, with the former accounting for the highest number of LWE-linked fatalities in Telangana since the formation of the State. The DGP also noted that recent leadership changes within the PLGA, including the surrender of former Battalion Chief Badse Deva, had further weakened the outfit, and claimed that the latest surrenders had effectively neutralised the CPI-Maoist’s organisational presence in Telangana.</p><p>These districts also occupy an important position in the inter-State trafficking geography. The forested and relatively difficult-to-monitor terrain adjoining Chhattisgarh, Odisha and Andhra Pradesh, provides routes through which narcotics, particularly <em>ganja</em>, can enter Telangana and subsequently move towards major urban and consumer markets. The problem is already visible in enforcement operations. In July 2026, Bhadradri Kothagudem Police and the Telangana Elite Action Group for Drug Law Enforcement (EAGLE) Force seized 525 kilograms of <em>ganja</em> worth approximately INR 26.2 million near Bhadrachalam. Police alleged that the consignment originated in Odisha and was being transported through Bhadrachalam, Khammam, Warangal and Adilabad, towards Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh.</p><p>Significantly, on July 7, 2026, current Telangana DGP C.V. Anand stated that, although CPI-Maoist activity had declined significantly, it had not been completely eliminated. Addressing a review meeting with senior Police officials in Khammam, Anand directed the Police to maintain surveillance on surrendered Maoists for another one to two years. More importantly, he observed that drug peddlers had emerged as a greater threat than Maoists, linking the decline in Maoist activity with an increase in cannabis cultivation and trafficking. He directed EAGLE and the District Police to intensify operations against <em>ganja</em> cultivators and traffickers, including seizure of their assets and invocation of the Preventive Detention Act.</p><p>At the same time, Anand disclosed that the Greyhounds Force had not been disbanded, with 600 of its 1,100 personnel continuing to monitor the rehabilitation and activities of surrendered Maoists. The continued deployment of such specialised counter-insurgency personnel indicates that, despite the substantial decline of the insurgency, the State remains cautious about the possibility of residual Maoist activity and the emergence of new security challenges.</p><p>Anand also noted that Maoists had historically opposed cannabis cultivation in forest areas and punished those involved in the trade. This observation is significant because it suggests that the decline of Maoist influence may have altered the security and social environment in areas where the insurgents had previously exercised considerable control over local economic activity.</p><p>The significance of the latest seizure of <em>ganja</em> lies not merely in the quantity seized but in the sophistication of the network involved. The traffickers allegedly used a specially fabricated concealed chamber inside a container truck, along with an escort motorcycle, to evade detection. The use of concealed compartments and escort vehicles suggests that trafficking networks are adopting methods characteristic of organised criminal operations rather than relying solely on small-scale, locally based peddling. The pattern is not restricted to a single route. Intelligence and enforcement agencies have observed traffickers modifying established corridors in response to intensified policing. Recent reporting indicates that ganja suppliers operating from the Andhra-Odisha Border (AOB) have begun using alternative routes into Telangana following increased surveillance by EAGLE, the Hyderabad Narcotics Enforcement Wing and the Police in border districts. A July 14, 2026, <a href="https://telanganatoday.com/khammam-police-seize-450-kg-ganja-in-six-months"><strong>report</strong></a>, for instance, noted that the Khammam Police seized approximately 450 kilograms of <em>ganja</em> in 55 cases during the first six months of 2026, with 123 suspects arrested.</p><p>This evolving trafficking environment raises a larger security question. During the Maoist insurgency, forests and borderlands were used for movement, concealment, logistics and communication. Following the further decline of the insurgency in 2026, the same physical geography can potentially acquire a different criminal utility. Routes once used for the movement of cadres, arms and supplies could become attractive to narcotics traffickers, arms smugglers, illegal miners, timber traffickers and other organised criminal networks.</p><p>There is also evidence that the narcotics economy itself is becoming increasingly sophisticated. In a March 20, 2026, <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/hyderabad/drugs-hidden-in-dictionaries-jackfruit-loads-eagle-exposes-covert-trafficking-tricks/amp_articleshow/129686252.cms"><strong>report</strong></a>, EAGLE was cited as having flagged a widespread trafficking network characterised by concealment, mobility and digital anonymity, with traffickers using everyday objects and legitimate transportation and communication systems to move narcotics into and across Telangana. Investigations have also pointed to the movement of ganja, hash oil, synthetic drugs and cocaine through inter-State and international networks. In another case, Hyderabad Police uncovered a <em>ganja</em> distribution network allegedly using <a href="https://www.newindianexpress.com/amp/story/states/telangana/2026/Jul/03/hyderabad-cops-bust-pan-india-ganja-racket-using-speed-post-3"><strong>Speed Post</strong></a> and courier services to supply customers across 21 States, demonstrating how a local drug-distribution network can become connected to a much wider criminal ecosystem.</p><p>For Telangana, the post-Maoist security transition cannot be measured exclusively through the absence of encounters or insurgent incidents. The nature of the security challenge is changing. The immediate threat from a territorial Maoist insurgency may have receded, but governance gaps, difficult terrain, porous inter-State boundaries and established clandestine routes require continued surveillance.</p><p>The State’s strategy should consequently move beyond conventional counter-insurgency. Strengthening intelligence-sharing between Telangana, Chhattisgarh, Odisha and Andhra Pradesh; mapping trafficking corridors; monitoring former Maoist logistical routes; expanding financial investigations into trafficking proceeds; and integrating local policing with specialised narcotics agencies will be important. Equally important will be sustained development and State presence in remote former Maoist strongholds.</p><p>The larger lesson is that the end of insurgency does not automatically mean the end of insecurity. As Telangana closes one chapter of its Maoist conflict, it will need to ensure that the physical, logistical and social spaces once exploited by insurgents do not become operating environments for organised criminal networks. The transition from counter-insurgency to comprehensive internal-security management will be critical to consolidating the gains made against LWE.</p><p>Deepak Kumar Nayak<br>Research Associate , <em>Institute for Conflict Management</em></p><p>Publisher &amp; Editor: Ajai Sahni</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e28c3fd9f60b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/second-sight-icm/telangana-from-maoists-to-mafias-new-security-challenge-e28c3fd9f60b">TELANGANA: From Maoists to Mafias — New Security Challenge</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/second-sight-icm">Second Sight</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Somalia: The Pirates are Back]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/second-sight-icm/somalia-the-pirates-are-back-3316995e7087?source=rss-98e95f907fdc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3316995e7087</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Second Sight]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 22 Aug 2026 13:22:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-22T13:22:24.056Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On August 20, 2026, officials disclosed that two commercial vessels carrying a total of 22 Indian nationals (as well as one Syrian, one Sudanese and one Iraqi national, while the nationality of one seafarer has yet to be confirmed) were hijacked in separate incidents off Yemen and Somalia, highlighting a renewed piracy threat in waters around the Horn of Africa. The Eritrea-flagged oil products tanker <em>M.T. Sibu 1</em>, carrying 16 Indians among its 20-member crew, was hijacked by six-armed pirates in the Gulf of Aden, about 30 nautical miles off the Yemeni coast. According to a report prepared by the Directorate of Maritime Administration, all 20 crew members were safe, although the latest status of the vessel and crew was still awaited.</p><p>On 17 August 2026, pirates seized the Cameroon-flagged cargo ship <em>M/V LUTUF</em>, owned by Polar Movement Shipping. The vessel was taken about 3.5 nautical miles off Marraya in Puntland’s Eyl District, Somalia, and subsequently steered toward the Nugaal coast near Garmaal in Dangoroyo district. Its 10-member crew included six Indians, one Turkish national, one Georgian, and two Serbian security guards. The ship was reportedly carrying weapons destined for a Turkish military training facility in Mogadishu, along with communications and satellite equipment. Eight pirates, believed to belong to the same group involved in the earlier hijacking of the <em>M/V Sward</em>, carried out the attack. Turkish forces later monitored the area with helicopters and drones.</p><p>These two incidents form part of a wider pattern of attacks recorded in 2026. On July 1, the Indian Navy’s <em>INS Trikand</em> foiled an attempted pirate attack on the bulk carrier <em>MV Golden Arsenal</em>, which was carrying 21 crew members including one Indian national, about 300 nautical miles east-northeast of Djibouti. The vessel reported damage to its bridge superstructure, but the crew took shelter in the citadel and remained safe. On July 17, the Tanzanian-flagged fuel and chemical tanker <em>MT Asana</em> was hijacked off the Yemeni coast in the Gulf of Aden; its crew of at least 19 included 11 Indian nationals alongside Syrian, Yemeni, and Egyptian personnel. On May 2, the Togo-flagged product tanker <em>M/T Eureka</em> was boarded by armed men near Qana in Yemen’s Shabwa Governorate and diverted toward Somali territorial waters in Puntland; its mixed crew included multiple Indian and Egyptian nationals. On April 26, the Saint Kitts and Nevis-flagged general cargo vessel <em>M/V</em> <em>Sward </em>was hijacked approximately six nautical miles northeast of Garacad, Somalia. On April 21, a tanker carrying about 18,000 barrels of oil was also seized near the Somali coast.</p><p>These incidents mark a clear resurgence of Somali piracy after more than a decade of relative inactivity. Between 2005 and 2012, Somali pirates were responsible for more than 1,000 attacks and extracted approximately $400 million in ransom payments. At its peak, the World Bank estimated that piracy cost the global economy as much as $18 billion a year, with more than 200 attacks recorded in 2011 alone. International naval patrols — including the European Union’s Operation Atalanta, Combined Task Force 151, and deployments by the Indian Navy and others — together with Best Management Practices for shipping and the widespread use of private armed security teams, drastically reduced successful hijackings. Between 2013 and 2017, commercial hijackings had virtually stopped, and the shipping industry formally lifted its “high-risk” designation for the Indian Ocean in 2023.</p><p>That calm has now ended. Since April 2026, the French Navy’s Mica Centre has recorded 18 piracy incidents and hijackings, with at least three vessels still held for ransom at the time of writing. The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) has raised the piracy threat level along the Somali coast to “substantial” and advised vessels to transit with caution. European Union naval forces patrolling the region have described the ongoing war involving Iran as having given pirate groups a clear “window of opportunity.”</p><p>Modern Somali piracy remains a product of state collapse combined with the destruction of traditional livelihoods, after the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, as Somalia lost any functioning central government, coast guard, or fisheries regulation. The current resurgence has been enabled by several converging factors: naval forces once focused on anti-piracy patrols have been stretched thin by conflicts in the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz; shipping traffic has been pushed closer to Somali waters as vessels seek alternative routes; and persistent instability along the Puntland coastline — particularly in traditional strongholds such as Garacad in the Mudug region — has allowed coastal networks to reactivate.</p><p>The pirates themselves are primarily young men aged 20 to 35 from coastal communities in northern and northeastern Somalia, especially the autonomous region of Puntland (areas around Eyl, Garacad, Hobyo, and Banderbeyla). They do not form a single hierarchical organisation or terrorist group. Instead, they operate in fluid Pirate Action Groups — small, clan-based teams of five to twenty men. These groups typically include former or current fishermen who supply seafaring skills, ex-militiamen or former soldiers who handle weapons and boarding tactics, local organisers and financiers who arrange skiffs, fuel, ladders, and ransom negotiations, and occasional support from urban or diaspora networks. In the 2026 wave, at least two or three active groups have been identified. They are armed mainly with <em>AK</em>-type assault rifles and occasionally rocket-propelled grenades. Their motivation is primarily financial — ransom payments that can reach several million dollars — rather than ideological, although economic desperation and weak governance provide the enabling conditions. Speculated links to al-Shabaab or the Houthis remain unconfirmed.</p><p>The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has repeatedly described the situation of the dozens of seafarers still held in captivity in 2026 as a humanitarian crisis. The Gulf of Aden, which feeds into the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, remains one of the world’s most critical maritime corridors, carrying roughly 12 to 15 per cent of global trade by value and about 30 per cent of the world’s container traffic each year.</p><p>Until both the maritime security gap and the underlying coastal economic drivers are addressed, the risk to seafarers, energy supplies, and global trade through this vital corridor will persist.</p><p>Ruchika Kakkar<br>Research Assistant, <em>Institute for Conflict Management</em></p><p>Publisher &amp; Editor: Ajai Sahni</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3316995e7087" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/second-sight-icm/somalia-the-pirates-are-back-3316995e7087">Somalia: The Pirates are Back</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/second-sight-icm">Second Sight</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Pakistan — Saudi Arabiai: Passport Scandal]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/second-sight-icm/pakistan-saudi-arabiai-passport-scandal-ac402a7beed3?source=rss-98e95f907fdc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ac402a7beed3</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Second Sight]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 20 Aug 2026 09:13:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-20T09:13:59.929Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On August 18, 2026, Pakistan’s Minister of State for Interior Talal Chaudhry told the National Assembly that Afghan nationals had surrendered around 5,000 Pakistani passports in Saudi Arabia alone. He added that the disclosure was part of a broader nationwide campaign to identify and remove fraudulent national identity records obtained by foreign nationals. According to Chaudhry, some Afghan nationals had obtained Pakistani Computerised National Identity Cards (CNICs) and were even added to the official family trees of Pakistani citizens, allegedly through collusion with citizens or the involvement of National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) officials. Criminal cases have been registered against officials accused of facilitating the issue of fraudulent documents, while some have also been dismissed from service.</p><p>These developments come amid Pakistan’s intensified scrutiny of foreign nationals and a continuing repatriation drive that has returned nearly 2.7 million Afghans to Afghanistan since late 2023. In July, the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) arrested NADRA officials accused of facilitating fraudulent identity documents for Afghan nationals and began examining possible links between the network and militant elements. Chaudhry noted that the issue extended beyond CNICs to Pakistani passports obtained through fraudulent means and used by Afghan nationals abroad. He warned that when individuals holding such documents become involved in fraud, terrorism or other criminal activities overseas, they may be treated as Pakistani citizens, potentially resulting in visa restrictions and reputational damage to Pakistan. FIA has arrested more than 100 agents in related operations over the preceding month. Opposition lawmakers, including Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) Member of the National Assembly (MNA) Sharmila Faruqui, called for a detailed investigation and demanded that the Director General of Passports appear before the National Assembly to explain how many additional fraudulent Pakistani passports may be circulating worldwide.</p><p>This was not an isolated incident. Earlier reports from 2023–2025 pointed to a larger and more systematic misuse of Pakistani identity documents by Afghan nationals in Saudi Arabia. Parliamentary briefings cited approximately 12,000 Pakistani passports recovered from or linked to Afghan nationals over five years. Of these, around 3,000 reportedly involved photo-swapping, while another 6,000 were allegedly obtained by manipulating data held by the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA). Some passports were also reportedly issued using forged identity documents. Many of the Afghan nationals found in possession of such passports were subsequently deported to Afghanistan.</p><p>Pakistan has hosted millions of Afghan refugees for decades, but since late 2023, Islamabad has implemented a large-scale Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan. The policy was introduced amid a rise in militant violence in Pakistan, particularly attacks attributed to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (<a href="https://satp.org/terrorist-profile/pakistan/tehreek-e-taliban-pakistan-ttp"><strong>TTP</strong></a>). Islamabad has repeatedly accused Afghan Taliban authorities of providing safe haven, support, and facilitation to the TTP and other terrorist groups involved in cross-border attacks. UN monitoring reports have also documented continued Taliban support for TTP. Islamabad has linked its increasingly restrictive policies toward Afghan nationals to broader security concerns and the alleged presence of militant networks in Afghanistan. Kabul has taken some limited measures, including relocating some TTP fighters, and Afghan authorities deny allowing their territory to be used to conduct attacks against Pakistan or other countries. Relations have deteriorated sharply. Cross-border clashes, Pakistani airstrikes into Afghanistan (including around Kabul and border provinces), and reciprocal retaliatory actions have occurred, with periods described by Pakistani officials as “open war.”</p><p>Pakistan links identity fraud and illegal migration to broader security risks, including possible militant infiltration or networks that exploit porous documentation systems. The identity-document scandals exacerbate distrust: Pakistan sees systemic fraud, enabled in part by internal corruption and cross-border networks; the Afghan side views mass returns and documentation crackdowns as punitive.</p><p>Saudi Arabia hosts large numbers of Pakistani and Afghan workers, as well as pilgrims, making the integrity of identity and travel documents an important concern for Riyadh. Document fraud can undermine Saudi immigration controls, labour-market regulation, and public-order measures. Saudi authorities have also repeatedly raised concerns about illegal residency and begging networks involving foreign nationals, including some Pakistanis.</p><p>For Saudi Arabia, the recovery or surrender of fraudulent Pakistani documents is consistent with its strict enforcement of residency and identity regulations. Large-scale document fraud involving a close strategic partner creates both practical enforcement challenges and diplomatic sensitivities. The issue becomes particularly significant as Pakistan’s role in Saudi security cooperation expands, including through the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement and the newer trilateral arrangement involving Türkiye.</p><p>For Pakistan, the exposure of fraudulent Pakistani documents carries significant reputational risks. If Saudi authorities perceive systemic weaknesses in Pakistan’s passport and identity-document systems, scrutiny of genuine Pakistani workers, pilgrims, and travellers could increase, potentially leading to tighter visa and immigration procedures. While Saudi Arabia can seize fraudulent documents and deport individuals involved, persistent cases could eventually prompt Riyadh to impose broader scrutiny on Pakistani nationals. Repeated misuse of Pakistani passports also risks undermining the image of Pakistan as a reliable security partner.</p><p>Strategically, the episode sharpens the security dilemma with Afghanistan, and a larger failure of state capacity and border integrity. This episode is less a standalone scandal than a symptom of deeper rot: porous Pakistani identity systems, entrenched corruption, unresolved TTP sanctuaries across the border, and the practical friction that even a deepening Saudi-Pakistan defence partnership cannot fully insulate against.</p><p>Ruchika Kakkar<br>Research Assistant, <em>Institute for Conflict Management</em></p><p>Publisher &amp; Editor: Ajai Sahni</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ac402a7beed3" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/second-sight-icm/pakistan-saudi-arabiai-passport-scandal-ac402a7beed3">Pakistan — Saudi Arabiai: Passport Scandal</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/second-sight-icm">Second Sight</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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