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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by The Indian Game Theory Society, NSUT on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Joker: sadist or strategist?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-stratagems/joker-sadist-or-strategist-71a84f87c1e9?source=rss-f75be31e8bca------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[game-theory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[batman]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[strategy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[the-dark-knight]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[joker]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Indian Game Theory Society, NSUT]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 18 Dec 2022 09:31:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-12-18T09:31:58.347Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Joker: Sadist or Strategist?</h3><p><em>By </em><a href="https://medium.com/@mahijee1603"><em>Manan Hingorani</em></a><em> and </em><a href="https://medium.com/@devanshisharma_84157"><em>Devanshi Sharma</em></a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*KK5_iwAZqaQ16V5L.jpeg" /><figcaption>Heath Ledger as Joker in ‘The Dark Knight’ by Cristopher Nolan</figcaption></figure><p>Director Christopher Nolan crafted one of the best superhero series of all time with <em>The Dark Knight</em> trilogy, which introduced us to one of the most complex villains yet- the Joker.</p><p>Ledger’s Joker is unlike any other version- alternately psychotic and cunning, chaotic, but mentally always in control.</p><p>He is a great mastermind, aptly described by Bruce Wayne’s loyal friend Alfred as a character who “just wants to watch the world burn”. But is the Joker actually a crazy criminal, but a great mastermind?</p><p>In this article, we will look at some scenes from ‘The Dark Knight’ and see what game theory can tell us about the villain and his motivations.</p><h3>1. The Bank Robbery</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*ibL9VaY0_wGbaTI8.jpeg" /><figcaption>The Bank Robbery</figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vetKTtM7YyU">It’s<strong><em> The Dark Knight</em></strong><em>‘</em>s opening scene</a>: five robbers in clown masks embark on an elaborate bank heist, put on the job by some weird guy in a clown mask. Something unexpected happens: one by one, they turn on each other believing that the lesser number of them left, the more money they’ll get.</p><p>Now, through this scene, we understand an important concept of game theory: <strong>Nash equilibrium</strong>. Nash equilibrium in game theory is a situation in which a player will continue with their chosen strategy, having no incentive to deviate from it, after taking into consideration the opponent’s strategy.</p><p>In this scene, the main strategy of all the robbers was to kill each other to get the maximum share. Here, all of them are assumed to be optimal robbers, that is, all of them are driven by greed and are ready to kill each other if offered more money. Hence, here a Nash equilibrium was obtained where all of them had to kill each other, thus leaving them worse off than if they had cooperated</p><p>At this point in time, we can safely design a payoff matrix:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/582/1*YgTjGCVi_9TPHaQ3jQ7Crw.png" /></figure><p>Considering a two-robber (R1, R2) situation- there are two options available to each of them- to kill the other one or to not kill. The worst case (-1,-1) is what occurred in this particular scene (both die), with (1,1) being the best-case scenario where both robbers come out alive.</p><p>Game theory works so well with Joker’s schemes because self-interest is a basic assumption of game theory, and most of his schemes are based on basic human nature- most people are self-interested, and they think about themselves before thinking of others.</p><p>This bank robbery scene is similar to a very famous game theory riddle known as <strong>The Pirate Game</strong>. Check it out in References for a better understanding of the Nash equilibrium!</p><h3>2. Joker’s Negotiation</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*TuE1nw1OGCfoZ0_X.png" /><figcaption>Joker negotiating with the mob</figcaption></figure><p>Now, this is a very interesting scene through which we will understand another important concept of game theory: <strong>negotiation</strong>.</p><p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L3oOldViIgY">The scene is as follows</a>: There is a meeting where mob leaders are deciding how to preserve their money. As the gang leaders debate their next step, the Joker sneaks in and offers his services- killing Batman in exchange for half their money. While the robbers aren’t very receptive to taking him seriously, they‘re desperate enough to agree to hear his offer.</p><p>The word <em>desperate</em> is very important and plays a crucial role in the bargaining process. The game theory concept used here is based on the fact that for a despairing person, ‘something is better than nothing’, and the negotiator urges them on saying “make this deal before it’s too late”.</p><p>The mob (and Joker) knows that if they don’t agree to his offer, then Batman would eventually find their money and they would be left with nothing, so killing him is necessary, even if they have to forgo half of their total bankroll in exchange for it.</p><p>This scene is similar to the <strong>Shrinking Pie Riddle </strong>in game theory (see references).</p><h3>INTERMISSION: On Motivation</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/474/0*ziO98QeT7hKerK_j" /><figcaption>The Joker burning the money</figcaption></figure><p>It’s always “the Joker did this, the Joker did that”, but never <em>why </em>he’s doing it- after all, for a lunatic wearing awful clown makeup, he sure loves to think.</p><p>His actions are contradictory: why would someone go to such lengths to rob a bank, work out a strategy to best negotiate for even more money, and then burn said bank? It begs the question: why exactly is he doing anything that he does? <br>the short answer is: he likes the games.</p><p>He gets off the thrill of engaging Batman in a psychological game he didn’t ask for, and thrives off making little puzzles for his own amusement that he knows are sure to bring chaos; that’s why his actions are almost impossible to guess ahead of time.</p><p>In a way, Batman was the reason Joker was born. <em>Batman created Joker.</em> Isn’t that thought scary, but incredible?</p><p>Thus, I offer an analysis: he isn’t some crazy nihilist, but crafty in a way others cannot understand. Halfway through the movie when Batman finally manages to arrest him, he never once thinks that the Joker might have let himself get arrested <em>on purpose.</em></p><p>And here lies the crux of game theory- making strategies to out best someone is great and all, but it’s equally important to think of what they might do- especially when dealing with someone as sly as the Joker, who plays games of chance and probability making sure that the odds are always rigged in his favor.</p><h3>3. The Two Boats</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*lRIzNVQKEgE8Umbh.jpg" /><figcaption>The Two Boats</figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K4GAQtGtd_0">The Joker’s final game</a> is undoubtedly one of the most memorable scenes in the movie- there are two ships, one with criminals and the other with civilians, and both are given a button that can blow up the other ship up.</p><p>From a third-person point of view, it’s easy to figure out: either side is given a chance to kill the others and save themselves before Joker kills them both. It strongly favors the Joker’s personal philosophy about how altruism doesn’t exist and that everyone acts for their own interest, he’s had his life to prove it.</p><p>The dominant strategy is to push the button and save yourselves —</p><blockquote>“Their morals, their code — it’s a bad joke. You’ll see. I’ll show you — when the chips are down, these civilized people, they’ll eat each other. See, I’m not a monster. I’m just ahead of the curve.”</blockquote><p>— HOWEVER. Joker, for all his smart strategies and games, <em>fails </em>to consider human conscience. He doesn’t count on both boats to have enough ethical strength to choose the passive strategy (doing nothing, and letting themselves be killed), and is thus caught by Batman before he can let the explosives off.</p><p>This is reminiscent of the famous <strong>Trolley Problem: </strong>there’s a runaway trolley barreling down railway tracks, onto which 5 people are tied. Their deaths can be prevented if one is to pull a lever that will deviate the course of the trolley onto another track only having one person tied to it. The question is: will you pull the lever?<br>In this case too the dominant strategy is to pull the lever and save 5 people (the human brain is receptive to numbers) and let one die, but everyone chooses the passive strategy in order to preserve themselves of guilt because of murder.</p><p>The most interesting thing to note in these instances is that the standard game theory model fails<em>. </em>Joker, for the first time since the movie (and his life), is let down by game theory. The principles he’d learned of humans being selfish- which is essentially the most basic assumption of game theory- are discredited, and credits roll.</p><p>We hope that the next time you sit down to watch <em>The Dark Knight</em>, you’ll remember Joker not just as a nihilist psychopath, but also as a stellar game theory connoisseur.</p><p>— —</p><p>References:</p><ol><li>The Pirate Game is best understood through <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mc6VA7Q1vXQ">this</a> TED-Ed video.</li><li>For The Shrinking Pie Riddle, refer <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01756293">article</a>: Livne, Z. Bargaining over the division of a shrinking pie: An axiomatic approach. <em>Int J Game Theory</em> <strong>16</strong>, 223–242 (1987).</li><li>For the Trolley Problem, refer to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yg16u_bzjPE">this video</a> by TED-Ed. For more variations of the same problem, see <a href="https://www.thoughtco.com/would-you-kill-one-person-to-save-five-4045377">this</a> article.</li><li>For a more in-depth analysis of the first scene, refer to <a href="https://mindyourdecisions.com/blog/2008/08/19/game-theory-in-the-dark-knight-a-critical-review-of-the-opening-scene-spoilers/">this article</a> by Presh Talwalkar.</li><li>For more information about Payoff Matrix, refer to <a href="http://mccollegeonline.co.in/attendence/classnotes/files/1585848452.pdf">this article</a>.</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=71a84f87c1e9" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-stratagems/joker-sadist-or-strategist-71a84f87c1e9">Joker: sadist or strategist?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-stratagems">The Stratagems</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Israel-Palestine: Pt.3 — The Norm Enforcement Model]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/israel-vs-palestine-game-theoriests-perspective/israel-palestine-pt-3-the-norm-enforcement-model-1f5dc4f42d0e?source=rss-f75be31e8bca------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1f5dc4f42d0e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[strategy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[israel-palestine-conflict]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[conflict]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[game-theory]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Indian Game Theory Society, NSUT]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 05 Sep 2021 15:24:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-09-05T15:33:32.879Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Israel-Palestine: Pt.3 — The Norm Enforcement Model</h3><blockquote><em>By Bhavya Mittal, Parikshit, Harshit Gupta</em></blockquote><p>This is the third post in the series of Israel-Palestine conflict through the eyes of Game Theory. In this post, we try to model the prevalent disagreements between Israelis and Palestinians using something called the Norm Enforcement Model and try to see how the existing norms and practices further sustain the ongoing friction between the two nations. Let’s get started then.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*VYa0F1rcSAliawIM.jpeg" /></figure><p>Cartoon depicting the Israel-Palestine conflict</p><h3>Introduction</h3><p>Norms are unwritten rules and practices in society. As such, norms are also a potent force governing individual and societal behaviors. For example, in India, most people consider eating beef as a sin. This is so as a cow is considered ‘’holy’’ in Hinduism, which also explains the ban of beef by the government in some states.</p><p>Now suppose if there are many norms related to a nation in another. These norms may be in favor of the other state or against it. What if each and every one of them is against the opposite state? This instills an ill-disposed attitude towards them and thus <em>breeds</em> <em>conflict. </em>Let us take an example to clear this out. In Israel, it is forbidden to talk to someone from the Palestinian military. Since this norm is <em>negatively </em>related to Palestine, it causes further unrest between the two nations.</p><p>These negative norms are a major factor in <em>giving rise to</em> and<em> sustaining </em>the current unrest between the nations. The enforcement of these norms by the respective governments and people of the two nations can, thus, help us ‘<strong>model</strong>’ the conflict between them. Let us see how we can do that.</p><h3>Basics of Norm Enforcement Model</h3><ol><li><strong>Prisoner’s Dilemma</strong></li></ol><p>The Norm Enforcement Model has its roots in the classic model of Prisoner’s Dilemma. Whenever a norm is broken by a person, the person of that nation can be considered analogous to a prisoner. There will obviously be many prisoners but, like the classic ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’, if we consider two prisoners at a time, they both have two choices: whether to <em>co-operate </em>or to <em>defect.</em></p><p>1)By co-operation, that prisoner can stay silent and not say anything to the authorities.</p><p>2)In defection, that prisoner can snitch on the other prisoner and betray him.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/526/0*eWCV6E90S6bwriGa" /></figure><p>Payoff Table for the players in Prisoner’s Dilemma</p><p>If we compare the payoffs for each strategy from the pay-off table to actual prison sentences, we can see that mutual defection is the ideal strategy for <em>an individual.</em></p><p>When both the prisoners(players) chose to defect they get a sentence of P. When a prisoner remains silent and is ratted out by the other, the one who defects walks free while the accused gets the highest payoff as T. (Eg. T = 3, R = 1, S = 0, P = 2) T &gt; P &gt; R &gt; S The sum of payoffs is least when both prisoners remain silent (co-operate) 2R &lt; S + T. This results in mutual co-operation being the <em>best collective strategy.</em></p><p><strong>2. Iterative Prisoner’s Dilemma</strong></p><p>In the Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma(IPD), prisoners interact across multiple periods, reacting to one another’s actions. In the case of IPD, we are considering the prisoner’s dilemma applicable for <strong>2 </strong>agents over and over in <strong>n</strong> iterations. In such a setting, a prisoner’s decision to<em> cooperate or defect</em> today not only determines payoffs for the first iteration but also influences the outcome of future iterations.</p><p>A sanctioning stage in the game can lead us towards the strategy of mutual cooperation in which players may punish one another, iteratively. How?</p><p>If a player chooses to punish, the punisher incurs a cost, cp, where cp &gt; 0, while the punished player is harmed h, where h &gt; cp &gt; 0. Such sanctioning is referred to as costly punishment and combining both the IPD model and a sanctioning stage, we arrive at the Norm Enforcement Model.</p><p><strong>3. Norm Enforcement Model</strong></p><p>The Norm Enforcement Model(NEM) can be considered as an extension of the Iterative Prisoner’s Dilemma model containing sanctioning or punishing stages — when we consider a long frame of time, where norms are broken repeatedly then and again.</p><p>The model assumes perfect information, that is: if a player defects, all other players observe the defection, and if a player punishes, all other players observe the punishment. The punishment involved is of 2 types :</p><p>1)<strong>Third-party punishment</strong> — direct punishment of defectors.</p><p>2)<strong>Higher-order punishment</strong> — indirect punishment of individuals who fail to punish defectors.</p><p>The strategy of a given player thus has two parameters. First, players must select whether to<em> cooperate or defect</em>. Second, players must decide whether to <em>punish one other. </em>Since prisoners have a fear of retaliation for today’s defection, they can be heavily punished by the sanctioning stage from the other prisoner and so as a result, they count on the other prisoner to co-operate as well. Both prisoners stay silent in the hope that the other person doesn’t punish them in the sanctioning stage. This way, mutual cooperation is induced.</p><p>Some underlying assumptions in the Norm Enforcement model are —</p><ul><li>The model assumes a sufficiently long “shadow of the future” or time frame, ensuring that agents sufficiently value future payoffs.</li><li>All players observe the actions of their peers. This assumption merely serves to simplify the model.</li><li>The cost of exacting punishment is relatively less than the damage induced (h &gt; cp &gt; 0). Costly punishment is a realistic behavior, observed across a variety of cultures and societies.</li></ul><p>With the model in place, let us explore the different norms that influence the Israel-Palestine conflict.</p><h3>Norms in Israel and Palestine</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*idlj78lzZ7FBtIUp.jpg" /></figure><p>A man protesting in the Israel state</p><p>Social, bilateral, and international norms all influence the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The following sections elaborate upon each of the mentioned norms — explaining what they are, how they multiply and support the existing conflict, and employ the NEM to see how <em>well</em> they do so.</p><blockquote><em>Social and Political Norms</em></blockquote><p>Social norms define the acceptable conduct of people, enforced and sustained by the mechanisms of punishment identified in the Norm Enforcement model.</p><p>As societies embroiled in intractable, interethnic conflict, Israeli and Palestinian national narratives and societal beliefs are saturated with notions of ethnocentric superiority, enemy criticism, and the veneration of national unity. Consequently, Israeli and Palestinian social norms solidify such beliefs and ideals. Let us see how these ideas are ingrained in society through something called <em>Internalization.</em></p><blockquote><strong><em>Internalization</em></strong></blockquote><p>Internalization is an individual’s acceptance of a set of norms and values through socialization. The internalization of social norms in Israeli and Palestinian society is widespread, as citizens strongly identify with their respective identities and national narratives. Strong internalization ensures that violating an established social norm becomes psychologically painful, even when material payoffs for defection are positive.</p><p>Why is internalization relevant?</p><p>In the structure of the Norm Enforcement model, internalization <strong><em>reduces the temptation to defect.</em></strong> If that is the case, then the norm goes on and thus conflict expands. Internalization ensures that violating an established social norm becomes psychologically painful, even when material payoffs for defection are positive. As such, widespread internalization eliminates the incentive to defect and further stabilizes existing social norms.</p><blockquote><em>Israeli Norms</em></blockquote><p>Discriminatory social norms in Israeli society include boycotts of Palestinian goods and services, as well as prohibitions against selling property to or hiring Palestinians. Such social norms have remained in existence for such a long time, given the severe punishments and social sanctions that await the Israelis who dare violate them. Businesses that hire Palestinian workers may be subject to boycott. Families that sell their property to Palestinians may be condemned and socially ousted. Furthermore, citizens who fail to punish defectors who get involved with the Palestinian community may be subjected to similar punishment, even being treated as defectors themselves.</p><p>Israeli political norms further worsen cooperation and compromise with the Palestinians.</p><p>Employing social media attacks and vigilante justice, Israelis punish politicians perceived as compromising with the Palestinians. Meaning that <em>cooperation with Palestinians is termed punishable. </em>Thus, such political attacks and violent reprisals inhibit political compromise and negotiations in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.</p><p>Both Israeli social and political norms are sustained by mechanisms of <em>costly punishment</em>, as well as widespread<em> internalization</em>. The primary mechanisms which sustain Israeli norms remain<strong> third party</strong> and <strong>higher-order</strong> punishment.</p><p>Overall, the robustness and authority of Israeli social and political norms indicate that the mechanisms sustaining such norms are strong, effectively preventing defections of cooperation and compromise with the Palestinians.</p><blockquote><em>Palestinian Norms</em></blockquote><p>The dominant Palestinian narrative of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict characterizes Palestinians as innocent, moral people maliciously and violently uprooted from their homeland. As such, cooperating or even sympathizing with Israelis is equally worse as national betrayal, formalized in the Norm Enforcement model as <em>defection.</em></p><p>Social norms in Palestinian society that inhibit defections of cooperation or collaboration primarily intend to hamper Israeli economic growth and territorial expansion.</p><p>Such social norms in Palestinian society include the boycott of Israeli products, the ban on land sales to Israelis, and the prohibition against cooperating with the Israeli military. Defectors face ridicule and social exclusion, stamped as Israeli collaborators. Furthermore, Palestinians are prohibited from selling land to Jewish or Israeli individuals, a social norm recently added into law by the Palestinian Authority. Defectors convicted of violating the prohibition face the<em> death penalty.</em></p><p>Thus, both the boycott of Israeli products and the prohibition on land sales to Jews are maintained through <em>higher-order punishment</em> (punishing those who fail to punish defaulters), manifested as social exclusion, vigilante justice to name a few. Also, the norms prohibiting Palestinians from collaborating or cooperating with Israel are maintained through the most violent means of <em>third-party punishment</em>.</p><p>Furthermore, bystanders that fail to condemn and punish defectors are frequently denounced as defectors themselves, subject to the same severe mechanisms of punishment.</p><p>From the above discussion, it is evident how the prevalent social norms in the Israeli and Palestinian society sustain and encourage the ongoing conflict between the two nations. Changing our perspective a bit and coming onto bilateral and international norms, we will see how these norms act as major catalysts to further deepen the ongoing problems between Israel and Palestine.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*NYZmSBWH46b8Xnp0.jpg" /></figure><p>Protesters from both nations going head-to-head</p><blockquote><em>Bilateral Norms</em></blockquote><p>Bilateral means something which affects both parties involved in a conflict. Bilateral norms are shaped by repeated interactions between Israelis and Palestinians, defining guidelines of acceptable conduct for interracial interactions happening amongst the two nations.</p><p>The Israeli state when dealing with terrorism claims to take a strict stand against it. However, while Israeli terrorists are typically tried for murder in Israeli courts and, if convicted, sentenced to life in prison. On the other hand, Palestinian terrorists are either slain in self-defense or tried for murder in Israeli courts, facing life in prison if convicted.</p><p>Also when dealing Palestinian defectors, they are punished by the Israeli government with the use of a collective form of punishments, which typically includes:-</p><ol><li>Demolishing the defector’s family’s home, and forcibly removing its inhabitants.</li><li>Revoking social security and healthcare benefits from the defector’s next of kin.</li></ol><p>Such powerful mechanisms of third-party punishment administered by the Israeli state sustain the bilateral norm and dissuade would-be perpetrators of terrorism.</p><p>Despite such severe penalties put upon terrorists by the Israeli state, acts of atrocious violence still occur with some frequency in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, predominantly perpetrated by Palestinians. Notably, robust <em>third party and higher-order punishment </em>of terrorists remains absent in Palestinian society. In fact, terrorism is regularly celebrated by citizens and political leaders in the Palestinian community. Without robust enforcement of the norm prohibiting terrorism, heinous acts of extreme violence and terrorism will continue to haunt both communities and thus reinforcing interethnic hatred.</p><blockquote><em>International Norms</em></blockquote><p>International norms are the informal rules and regulations determined by the international community that constrains sovereign domestic and foreign policy.</p><p>The purpose of organizations such as the UN is to codify and enforce such international norms, looking over the domestic and foreign policy of sovereign states. However, the UN realizes little success in constraining the domestic and foreign policy of nations due to the organization’s inability to reliably produce <em>consensus</em> and its lack of <em>effective mechanisms for punishment</em>, if any nation commits a violation. Thus, the failure of the UN to enforce international norms is well explained by the missing effective mechanisms for punishments that are critical to the Norm Enforcement model.</p><p>Today, the UN regularly addresses the conflict by condemning Israel’s domestic policy and security strategy. Yet, despite many resolutions and denunciations, the UN has had little to no impact on Israeli policy. UN resolutions censuring Israel and demanding adherence to international norms typically fail to attain a complete agreement for punishing the Israeli state. Even when the UN is able to reach a conclusion against the state, it lacks effective mechanisms to materially punish Israeli violations of the international norm <em>prescribing settlement expansion.</em></p><p>Thus, few viable mechanisms of third-party punishment exist for stemming the construction and expansion of Israeli settlements. Consequently, the Israeli government has no external incentive to enforce any such norm internally.</p><p>All the above norms and their enforcements act as a major catalyst to the ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine. How? Since these norms are followed by extreme punishments amongst the Israeli and the Palestinian society, they are continued across generations further deepening the already present divide between the two nations. The Norm Enforcement model just tries to give a brief logical explanation as to why this is the case.</p><p>Through this article, we hope you now have a new <em>view </em>to look at the Israel-Palestine conflict with the eyes of game theory. We touched upon the Norm Enforcement model and saw that how this model can correctly describe the conflict which has been sustained through the norms prevalent in both societies. Will the conflict reach a solution is a question which the future can answer better. Till then, stay tuned for more by IGTS, NSUT!</p><blockquote><strong><em>Bibliography</em></strong></blockquote><p>Dobrushkin, Eryk. 2019. A Game Theoretic Approach to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Bachelor’s thesis, Harvard College</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1f5dc4f42d0e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/israel-vs-palestine-game-theoriests-perspective/israel-palestine-pt-3-the-norm-enforcement-model-1f5dc4f42d0e">Israel-Palestine: Pt.3 — The Norm Enforcement Model</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/israel-vs-palestine-game-theoriests-perspective">Israel Vs. Palestine — Age-Old Conflict Explained Through Game Theory</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Real Reason Leading to Delayed Drug Launch in India]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@igts.nsit/the-real-reason-leading-to-delayed-drug-launch-in-india-7cacb0d3aa1e?source=rss-f75be31e8bca------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7cacb0d3aa1e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[rationality]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[game-theory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[strategy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business-strategy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[drug-launch]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Indian Game Theory Society, NSUT]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 25 Jul 2021 07:42:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-07-25T07:42:16.556Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote>By Vertika Sah, K Abhishek, Manav Grover, Shrey Shukla</blockquote><p>There is a Popular notion that drug launch is delayed in developing countries like India because of delayed transfer of technology due to a ‘post launch’ imitation threat which is due to weak intellectual property rights (IPR). The delay in drug launching in developing countries like India is a primary concern because it leads to delay in access to better treatment and healthcare. For a long time it has been argued that threat of post launch imitation is responsible for this delay. This argument has been used to justify the Imposition of a strong IPR regime across the board. This view, however, is naive and shallow. lt does not consider the fact that with adequate reverse engineering capabilities the new drug can be imitated even if it is not launched locally due to the modern age of information and communication technology.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/567/1*Na-B5ZFnAfEvrbRxZUEbqA.png" /><figcaption>Image from Shutterstock</figcaption></figure><p>India is a country known for its immense reverse engineering capabilities because of its advanced infrastructure. There are numerous instances where Indian firms developed non-infringing versions of drugs before they were locally launched by the foreign innovator. In some cases Indian firms were immediate followers after a drug was locally launched by the foreign innovator. Omeprazole, Celecoxib, Refecoxib are some drugs for systemic diseases that were launched in India by local firms before their foreign innovators entered the markets. Ranitidine, Ciprofloxacin, Cetirizine are some drugs for infectious diseases, in these cases the drug was launched by innovating firms and the local firms followed. We will later discuss in detail the strategy which is employed by local firms in deciding whether to launch the imitated drug before or after the entry of the foreign innovator in the market .</p><p>The lag in the launch of a drug in India may be caused by demand lag or imitation lag. Demand lag is the length of time between innovation of a drug in a country A and the demand for this product in some country B. Demand lag may occur due to the “pen habit” of the physicians of country B, that is physicians are habitual and prefer prescribing the existing drug and may take time to switch over to newly invented drugs. Demand lag can also occur due to socio-economic taboos regarding treatment of a health problem or regarding the new drug. Demand lag plays a role in the delay of drug launch but it is not the only factor and also not the most important one.</p><h3><strong>Cost Analysis</strong></h3><p>The First launch of a drug in a developing nation like India, demands clinical trials among its native citizens. The requirement of clinical trials imposes a cost to the first mover. The second mover (the follower), on the other hand, is just required to undertake only a simple bio-equivalence study to prove the similarity of its product to the first. That comes handy in terms of cost for the follower. There are, however, clear advantages of the first move as well. The first mover is successful in attaining the brand loyalty and goodwill among the consumers, which ensures limiting competition due to a larger market share and acting as an entry deterrent.</p><p>Therapeutic areas can be classified into two broad categories: Infectious diseases and Non-Communicable diseases. Infectious diseases are caused by foreign bodies (pathogens), as a result of contaminated food, drinks, or bad sanitation, commonly observed in tropical countries like India (Eg, Dengue, Food poisoning). Non-Communicable diseases, on the other hand, are caused not by any foreign body, but by malfunctioning of the internal human system.</p><p>Non-communicable diseases, at times, are not fully curable, just controllable partially. They demand for a continuous long lasting, sometimes lifelong consumption of a drug as in the case of Diabetes. Hence, what happens is that the physicians are generally reluctant to switch over their patient’s usual drug, as by that time, the patient reaches a comfort zone with that drug. Therefore, the “psychological cost” of the switch over ascends. Hence, their physicians are mostly reluctant to switch overs. This clearly augments the first mover advantage in terms of assured brand loyalty and market share. So in order to instill public (primarily doctors) goodwill, though not statutory, even the firm moving second choses to go for clinical trials.</p><p>Infectious diseases, on the contrary, are generally, temporary in nature, plus they are not too complex to get cured off. Hence, the psychological cost of convincing to switch over reduces. The follower, in this case, doesn’t need to incur the convincing costs for the reasons highlighted. Thus, the second mover’s necessity to go for clinical trials naturally dies down.</p><p>The first mover advantage is also determined by an important aspect of firm characteristic, that is the marketing strength of the two players. This will act as an important parameter of the extent to which first movers can capture/retain their market share.</p><h3>The Model</h3><p>We model this strategic interaction in terms of a two-player–two-period game of incomplete information. The players are (1) a domestic Pharma (DP), and (2) a Multinational Pharma; (MP)</p><p>DP is an established domestic firm that can imitate the globally introduced new drug and is capable in technological aspects to reverse engineer the drug for the Indian market. But this doesn’t mean that DP will necessarily imitate a new drug. They may or may not decide to copy that. Imitation takes time and it is perhaps the lag in demand that gives the domestic firm the necessary time to copy the product. MP on the other hand is a multinational innovator of the drug and DP has an informational edge over MP as the latter has no advance knowledge of whether the former has imitated the new drug till MP actually decides to enter the market.</p><p>DP can either imitate the drug or leave it. If the firm chooses to do so, then it will further have two choices, to move into the market or to wait for the MP to move first. If DP chooses to move first, it will have to bear the cost of R&amp;D but the second mover (MP here) won’t. Although we take the marketing caliber of both the companies to be the same, first-mover will have the advantage of higher market share than in case of them moving second. If DP chooses to wait and lets MP make the first move, it won’t have to bear the cost of R&amp;D but will have less market share than what it potentially could have.</p><p>The three choices for DP can be shown as</p><p>1. Copy and move (C&amp;M)</p><p>2. Copy and wait for the MP to move first (C&amp;W)</p><p>3. Do not copy (DNC)</p><p>If the imitator plays C&amp;M, the game becomes one of perfect recall. Otherwise, the innovator has no knowledge of whether the imitator has played C&amp;W or DNC. In that case, the MP, while playing in the second period, can only speculate the imitator’s action. The strategy for MP here comprises of two possible choices</p><p>1. Go and market(g&amp;m)</p><p>2. Do not go (d&amp;g)</p><p>Now if DP decides to C&amp;W then it will wait for the first period and will definitely move in the second period irrespective of MP’s decision DP will move after MP or will eventually be the first in the market in case MP chooses d&amp;g.</p><h3>Results</h3><p><strong>Case I: Drug launch in case of non-communicable diseases (ND)</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/601/0*mbF4SgejEDJBx3Z6" /></figure><p>If Domestic Pharma (DP) chooses C&amp;M strategy then Multinational Pharma (MP) will either choose to move or not to move. MP will prefer to move only if the benefits from his share of the market exceeds the cost of clinical trials. In the case of Non-Communicable diseases, switching to new medicine is less likely. Hence, it is more likely that the MP will suffer loss due to less sales. So, it is advisable for the MP to not move in this situation. So for DP the dominating strategy would be C&amp;M and for MP it would be d&amp;g. And this is where theoretical equilibrium will occur.</p><p><strong>Case II: Drug launch in case of infectious disease (ID)</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/571/0*XsW00XAm1jvPajDd" /></figure><p>In case of Infectious diseases, if a company prefers to move first then they need to undergo clinical trials. Companies coming later don’t need to waste their resources on this. However, unlike Non-Communicable diseases, in Infectious diseases the absence of psychological cost of switchover makes it a more lucrative deal for second mover.</p><p>So, if DP decides to do C&amp;M then the MP should choose to move as fast as possible. But analysing the model it is clear as day that C&amp;W would be the dominating strategy for DP and for MP it would be g&amp;m. As MP is an international company thus it is not wrong to assume that they have impeccable marketing calibre which would help them to recover the cost incurred in clinical trials or in other words they would definitely not suffer a loss.</p><h3><strong>Conclusion</strong></h3><p>The findings in this model were consistent with the data. In the Non-Communicable disease segment, such as cardiology, diabetes, and pain management, drugs were launched by domestic firms with very short delay (less than three years). The delay is considerably longer for the launch of drugs in Infectious disease segment, like anti-infectives, anti-inflammatories, and anti-histamines, where the domestic firms are observed to adopt a C&amp;W (copy and wait) strategy, followed either by simultaneous launch, where domestic firms move along with the multinational firm (delay of two to six years), or the multinational firm does not move and domestic firms move after a considerable delay (seven to nine years).</p><blockquote><strong>Bibliography</strong></blockquote><p>SARADINDU BHADURI and AMIT SHOVON RAY. A game theoretic model of drug launch in India.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7cacb0d3aa1e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Israel & Palestine: Pt.2— The Evidence Games Model]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/israel-vs-palestine-game-theoriests-perspective/israel-palestine-pt-2-the-evidence-game-model-76abd704f9d2?source=rss-f75be31e8bca------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/76abd704f9d2</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Indian Game Theory Society, NSUT]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 20 Jun 2021 12:13:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-06-20T15:17:46.618Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote>By Ujjwal Bansal, Daksh Dhangar, Harshit Batra, Hardik Chhabra</blockquote><p>The evidence games model was Developed by Yoeli, Hilbe, and Hoffman (2019), as a way to understand the content of propaganda and polarisation through the lens of psychological game theory. This setup is very useful in understanding the perspective of an individual who wishes to persuade another. This individual is hence expected to share supportive facts exclusively and conceal contradictory data as a part of his game plan to be compelling. The evidence games model will be used to explain how even if the source is suspicious, we can still gauge how effective the information was due to confirmation bias: when people are given information which supports their bias they will tend to remember it more often than when people are given information which challenges their bias. The theory also sheds light on the strategies used by media outlets in order to maximise their engagement with the audience. A simplistic form of the model, derived from its rather complex mathematical model is illustrated as:</p><p>An evidence game is a strategic disclosure and persuasion game in which an informed agent (referred to as the sender), having personal gains in a certain scenario, determines what piece of information is disclosed and reaches the receiver’s end. The phenomenon of biased revelation of evidence/information comes into the picture in this scenario as the sender, regardless of the nature of information, prefers maximum gains. Hence the sender is expected to selectively share supportive evidence and conceal contradictory data. In a perfect world, the receiver anticipates such behaviour from the sender and accordingly adjusts their interpretation of the obtained information. In this setup, the sender cannot benefit from deviating from such expectations. If the sender were to deviate by concealing supportive evidence or revealing damaging data, the receiver would possess an even lower belief in the desired state, harming the sender’s payoff. Thus, the Nash equilibrium conditions motivate the sender’s persuasive spin and biased revelation. In an extension to this setup, if the sender has access to the process of search of evidence, the phenomenon of selective search also makes its presence. The receiver is now supposed to expect a thorough search for favourable evidence and a minimal search for contradictory data. This persuasive and deceptive behaviour of the sender is, apparently, the best strategy they can adopt, and any deviation from this potentially reduces their payoff.</p><p>Consider the following example. There are 2 events A and B with evidence a and b respectively. Event A is the preferable event for the sender while event B is the complement of event A. ϕ denotes the piece of evidence that supports neither A nor B. All beliefs are formed regarding the occurrence of A.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/866/1*2jzf9wzTzXMzZKb94Nz2sQ.png" /></figure><p>The sender obtains a combination of 2 evidence that foster accurate beliefs about the event. The sender consequently reveals selective evidence to the receiver, offering purported beliefs about the same event. Consequently, the receiver generates posterior beliefs about the state of the world, given their assumptions of the sender’s persuasion motive.</p><p>Overall, the assumptions and behaviours in this model are both measured and reasonable and are capable of being leveraged to illustrate the societal polarisation and the Israel-Palestine conflict in this regard.</p><p><strong>Societal Polarisation and the act of self-deception</strong></p><p>Polarisation is endemic both within and between Israeli and Palestinian communities. Such polarisation exacerbates and perpetuates the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, deepening the divide between the two peoples and decimating any probability of mutual understanding. The Palestinian political system has been undergoing an intense crisis of clashing objectives, contrasting methods, and distinct ideologies. Mimicking the colossal polarisation existent within the political landscape of Israel, the profound split between the two leading Palestinian political movements, Fateh and Hamas (and increasingly within the former), has seriously exacerbated this crisis. Fateh rebuts political violence and chooses diplomatic negotiation as its way out of this gargantuan nationwide clash while Hamas, a predominantly Islamic faction deems mass violence as the only path to Palestinian independence. Political fission to this degree amongst the people of the two nations has further cranked up the tension over the years. A multitude of features from the Israel-Palestine conflict associated with the Evidence games model illuminate individuals’ persuasive intents and the involvement of practices like biased revelation, selective search, and internalisation of spin fostering polarisation on a scale as that of Israel-Palestine. From the stance of party officials, the “senders” aim to prove their authenticity and captivate communal reputation which triggers dissipation of purported beliefs to the “receivers”. Owing to the inability of the masses to reach a consensus on what is the neutral ground, posterior beliefs of the “receivers” are predominantly coherent with the purported beliefs of the “senders” provoking polarisation and divide. To master the act of deception, man needs to deceive himself first in order to avoid the disclosure of deceptive intent. Exclusively consuming politically biased news sources and not being open to contrasting viewpoints further catalyses the domino effect of polarisation and deception. For instance, a Likudnik may exclusively read Yisrael Hayom (pro-Netanyahu daily newspaper) and watch Likud TV, while rebutting all other sources. Reframing the roles of sender and receiver, persuasion motives of news sources, eyeing to consummate maximum viewership, provoke behaviours of biased revelation and selective search. For instance, Yisrael Hayom is known to publish pro-Netanyahu content and disregarding unsupportive data. In the wake of this selective search and confirmation bias, individuals amass an arsenal of confirmatory evidence while renouncing contradictory data. The media serves as an echo chamber, exacerbating societal polarisation. A biased belief about the true state of society is adopted. With the presence of such methodologies on both ends of the political spectrum, the result is divisive political polarisation. The polarising dynamics of Palestinian politics and that of Israeli society mirror each other largely both internally and mutually, well captured by the Evidence Games model.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pT-kEcUU5QOzCfZT_aHmFg.jpeg" /><figcaption>First published in The Economist, U.K., May 14, 2021 | By Kal</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Bilateral Polarisation</strong></p><p>The defining feature of relation between Israeli and Palestinian society is deep driven polarisation which is the product of individuals struggling to prove national fealty to their peers and the product of individuals struggling to prove national fealty to their peers. The driving motive behind this is societal pressure to demonstrate their solidarity towards the nation. to strengthen their existing belief the citizens of both countries diligently search for biased sources. They prefer watching national news aligned to their believes, talk to individuals of similar mindset. Through this process of selective search, individuals amass an arsenal of confirmatory evidence while bypassing contradictory data. Ultimately, citizen of both countries will internalize their purported beliefs and adopt a biased belief about the true state of the world this further deep the divide.</p><p><strong>Policy Implications</strong></p><p>As we have seen, the Evidence Games model provides us an effective way for analysing the causes of societal and bilateral polarisation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.</p><p>A proposal of a program of third-party media regulation may help reduce societal and bilateral polarisation in the conflict.</p><p>The Israeli and Palestinian governments may form strategies and methods to reveal underlying persuasion motives and restrict the coverage of highly biased media sources. The Israeli and Palestinian governments can empower an unbiased third-party regulator to find out the most biased media sources and then publicly penalise them. This regulatory body will be given control of regulating the broadcasting of information.</p><p>By revealing the underlying persuasion motive and the biased content the consumers will be informed on the nature of their media consumption, hopefully leading to a positive shift in their beliefs. An interesting and a powerful regulatory measure may be to revoke a source’s right to the radio and television coverage for those sources that do not meet minimum requirements of objectivity. Another intervention can be to decrease the priority of the most biased sources, allocating them higher channel numbers less used by casual consumers. Though it seems impossible to entirely decrease the polarisation helped by the internalisation of evidence games, hopefully such policy measures implemented by an impartial third party may help to moderate divisive political polarisation.</p><blockquote><strong>Bibliography</strong></blockquote><p>Dobrushkin, Eryk. 2019. A Game Theoretic Approach to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Bachelor’s thesis, Harvard College</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=76abd704f9d2" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/israel-vs-palestine-game-theoriests-perspective/israel-palestine-pt-2-the-evidence-game-model-76abd704f9d2">Israel &amp; Palestine: Pt.2— The Evidence Games Model</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/israel-vs-palestine-game-theoriests-perspective">Israel Vs. Palestine — Age-Old Conflict Explained Through Game Theory</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Israel & Palestine: Pt.1 — The Hawk-Dove Model]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/israel-vs-palestine-game-theoriests-perspective/israel-palestine-pt-1-the-hawk-dove-model-b01fefe4f9bf?source=rss-f75be31e8bca------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b01fefe4f9bf</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[game-theory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[strategy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[palestine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[isreal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[conflict]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Indian Game Theory Society, NSUT]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 31 May 2021 15:36:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-05-31T19:02:53.893Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Israel &amp; Palestine: Pt.1 — The Hawk-Dove Model</strong></h3><blockquote>By Satya Pratik, Sneha Tiwari, Paarth Chhabra, Daksh Goyal</blockquote><p>As the tension between Israel and Palestine is rising people around the world are learning more about this issue which is widely considered as the biggest dispute post World War II and still enduring. The dispute has resulted in many casualties over years resulting in strong political movements and debates among people. Since most people are reading history of the issue, understanding the issue with game theory will make their hold on it even more comprehensive.</p><p><strong>Hawk-Dove model</strong></p><p>The Hawk dove model is used to analyse disputes over resources between parties. Each party chooses whether to fight for some resource or concede, which is equivalent to choosing whether to play Hawk or Dove. If one agent fights and the other concedes, the fighter claims the full resource, worth v. If both fight, each has equal probability ½ of victory, while both pay a cost of fighting, c. Thus, in expectation, each will earn v/2 — c. If neither fight, the pair splits the resource and each claim v/2.</p><p>When v/2 &lt; c, the only Nash equilibria are those in which one player fights and the other concedes (the assumption made here is from observing natural phenomena that in order to attain a resource a party is likely to lose more than gain through aggression).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/489/0*XjNH_QhNp7vuTot2" /><figcaption>Fig. Payoff Matrix for Hawk-Dove Model</figcaption></figure><p>We can deduce that an individual’s optimal strategy is to assume the opposite role as their opponent. Thus, so long as fighting is relatively costly (v/2 &lt; c), an individual can never benefit by deviating from this equilibrium strategy, constituting a Nash equilibrium.</p><p>The conclusion we can draw from this model keeping the assumption in mind is that for optimal results a party should try to anticipate the opposition’s move and accordingly try to establish Nash equilibrium.</p><p>Till now the theoretical aspect of the Hawk-Dove model has been discussed. Now moving onto its applicability on the actual issue.</p><p><strong>Analysis of Israel-Palestine conflict history</strong></p><p>By the theory of the model that for a conflict to stop there must be a mutual agreement and one must relatively act like dove and other as hawk. So it is clear that both the parties have been acting like Hawk in most of the issues becoming the hurdle between them and peaceful agreement. Now through following historical instances one can establish the relation.</p><p><strong>National Narratives of Incumbency</strong></p><p>The Israelites, predecessor to the Jews, were among the ancient inhabitants in the land of Palestine. However, through military conquest, religious conversion, and mass migration, the Jews became the minority in the land. Subsequently, the land attained a Muslim Arab majority by the middle of the 9th century CE. Given the intuition of the Hawk-Dove model, one would expect the Palestinian community, having lived as the clear majority in the region to assume the role of Hawk. Conversely, one would expect the flood of new Israeli immigrants to assume the role of Dove. However, history tells a different story. In reality, both factions asserted a national narrative of incumbency, and the seeds of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were sown.</p><p><strong>Land Deeds v. Squatters Rights</strong></p><p>In the late 19th and early 20th century, Zionist organisations purchased large tracts of Palestinian land from absentee landowners to support Jewish migration to Palestine.</p><p>On the other hand, Arab tenant farmers subscribed to a Middle Eastern conception of ownership, which was constituted by living, working, and investing in one’s land. Thus, each faction touted what they believed to be verifiable justification for rightful ownership while rejecting the claims of their opponent resulting in both parties pursuing the role of hawk, and thus as predicted by the hawk dove model violent clashes ensued.</p><p><strong>British Promises</strong></p><p>Throughout the course of WWI, Britain solicited political and military support from colonised peoples across the globe. For instance, in exchange for support in the war effort against the Ottoman Empire, Britain promised both Arabs and Zionist Jews political independence in the land of Palestine.</p><p>The crumbling Ottoman Empire ceded control of Palestine and thus resulting in the revelation of contradictory promises to Palestinian Arabs and Zionist Jews.</p><p>The British instituted strict colonial rule after WW1, precluding either nationality from asserting autonomy as promised. Thus, conditioning on the contradicting promises of independence made during the war, both factions began to incite violence against one another and their British colonial rulers. The failure of the British government sowed the seeds of the emerging Israeli-Palestinian conflict.</p><p><strong>Authority of the UN</strong></p><p>Israel, citing the legality of a vote by the international community, declared itself an independent state. Meanwhile, Israel’s Arab neighbours rejected the notion that an international body might determine sovereignty in the region.</p><p>The Arab nations moved to quash a state they believed had no legitimate right to exist. Disagreeing over the validity of the uncorrelated asymmetry of Resolution 181( passed by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in 1947 that called for the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states), both sides mobilised to defend their perceived legitimate claim, consistent with the Hawk-Dove model.</p><p><strong>Contemporary Study</strong></p><p>The Hawk-Dove model is really crucial for awareness on Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this model also provides perspective for contemporary study. Following are some case studies analysed using the Hawk-Dove model.</p><p><strong>Land Swaps and Loss Aversion</strong></p><p>Precise Land swaps are one of the key moves toward peace agreement but certain circumstances have posed difficulty.</p><p>This can be explained by two psychological effects used in economics,</p><p>⦁ <strong>Endowment effect:</strong> It is the finding that people are more likely to retain an object they own than acquire that same object when they do not own it.</p><p>After the state of Israel was finally established, by acquiring land in the peninsula, it was their instinct that influenced them to protect and defend their territory which they possess. This human instinct can be explained by the Endowment effect, which further prevented them from renouncing the land or conducting land swaps for peace.</p><p>⦁ <strong>Loss Aversion</strong>: It is the tendency to prefer avoiding losses to acquiring equivalent gains.</p><p>In the case of Palestine, after the announcement of the state of Israel and the Nakba war of 1948, quite a number of Palestinians were displaced. They demand their right to return to the land. Consciously they feel that their land was stolen and they lost the land in hands of the colonisers. This conscious feeling can be associated with the loss aversion effect for which they feel it is justifiable to seek the land by any means possible which yet again prevents them from conducting a peaceful agreement.</p><p><strong>International Borders and the Green Line</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/843/0*ISfdMBRxkvhvOXIr" /></figure><p>A well defined border allows both the parties involved to find an optimal outcome and thus establish a peaceful relation since it helps in defining the role in Hawk-Dove model and therefore subsequent actions can be taken in mutual interest.</p><p>Currently, The Israeli and Palestinian communities have no such well-defined border. So far the green line which was drawn for the sake of making one after the 1948 war appears to be the least disputable international border in the future on a peaceful agreement.</p><p>To be consistent with the model the border should not be flexible and ambiguous which again doesn’t seem to be the case with Green Line specially after the actions of both sides post The Oslo Peace Accords. Currently the green line seems like a deception for equilibrium dynamics and unhelpful in defining the rules.</p><p><strong>Policy Implications</strong></p><ul><li>Removal of illegal Israeli settlements.</li><li>Removal of Israeli Forces from West bank</li><li>Setting out a detailed border</li></ul><p>Israeli<strong> </strong>settlements in the West Bank problem is increasing day by day. The official figures estimate ( due to security barrier controversial for its exact positioning between Israeli and Palestinian territory) about 15% of the security barrier runs along the Green Line, while 85% cuts into West Bank Palestinian territory, encircling major Israeli settlements. The UN estimates that a projected 191,000 acres are enclosed between the security barrier and Green Line, comprising roughly 14% of the West Bank.</p><p>This only increases the ambiguity further making the job of finding an optimal solution out of question. Also unwanted militarisation further makes the job tougher.</p><p>Former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon tried to form policy which are suggested above (observing the situation through Hawk-Dove Model) but on both sides it gets tougher to implement these strategies with extreme opposition from both Israeli and Palestinian public as well as international bodies whenever a policy requires some sacrifice like discussed in Land swaps and Loss aversion. Also with illegal Israeli settlements the hope for green line to act as proper border is only blurring day by day. But the whole analysis suggests that a detailed national border and properly assigning role according to the Hawk-Dove model will only help in establishing a Nash equilibrium or say peace.</p><blockquote><strong>Bibliography</strong></blockquote><p>Dobrushkin, Eryk. 2019. A Game Theoretic Approach to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Bachelor’s thesis, Harvard College</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b01fefe4f9bf" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/israel-vs-palestine-game-theoriests-perspective/israel-palestine-pt-1-the-hawk-dove-model-b01fefe4f9bf">Israel &amp; Palestine: Pt.1 — The Hawk-Dove Model</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/israel-vs-palestine-game-theoriests-perspective">Israel Vs. Palestine — Age-Old Conflict Explained Through Game Theory</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Chapter 3 : Mixed Strategies]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/game-theory-101/chapter-3-mixed-strategies-a1c717e40d1d?source=rss-f75be31e8bca------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a1c717e40d1d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[strategy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[game-theory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[planning]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mixed-strategies]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Indian Game Theory Society, NSUT]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 10 Feb 2020 16:59:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-02-10T16:59:56.381Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Chapter 3 : Mixed Strategies</h3><p>By Tarush Bajaj</p><p><strong>Pure vs Mixed strategies:</strong></p><p>Pure strategies define the course of gameplay. In particular, it determines the move a player will make for any situation they could face. A player’s strategy set is the set of pure strategies available to that player.</p><p>A mixed strategy is an assignment of a probability to each pure strategy. This allows for a player to randomly select a pure strategy in any order. Since probabilities are continuous, there are infinitely many mixed strategies available to a player. This allows a player to execute randomisations.</p><p><strong>Why mixed strategies over IDSDS(refer chapter 2)?</strong></p><p>There are various instances where no dominant strategies remain for a player to execute.A number of possible strategy pairs can be ultimately played.</p><p>In such cases one cannot make precise predictions. This can be illustrated by the game “The Battle of the Sexes”.</p><p><strong>Example:Based on “Battle of the Sexes”</strong></p><p>Two friends have to decide whether to see a movie or go to the opera. Unfortunately, they work in different parts of the city and, owing to a massive outage of the telephone system, find themselves incommunicado. They must simultaneously and independently select an event to attend. There is only one movie theater and only one opera venue, so the friends will meet each other if they manage to coordinate their decisions. Both prefer to be together, regardless of which event they attend. However, friend 1 prefers the opera and friend 2 prefers the movie.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/745/0*eGBKyBWwZnXm6cq_" /><figcaption>Figure 1</figcaption></figure><p>We observe here that there is no dominant strategy for either of the friends. Hence all four strategies are the most precise equilibrium predictions we can make after applying IDSDS.</p><p><strong>Best responses-</strong></p><p>It seems reasonable that rational people refrain from using dominated strategies. Dominance is a good descriptive and prescriptive concept.</p><p>Matching pennies, the battle of the sexes, and the coordination games have no dominated strategies, so one cannot predict how people should or will play these games on the basis of the dominance criterion.</p><p>Rational folks think about the actions that the other players might take; that is, people form beliefs about one another’s behavior. In games, it is wise to form an opinion about the other players’ behavior before deciding your own strategy.</p><p><strong>Mixed Strategies(Maths)-</strong></p><p>“Consider a Strategy profile σ=(σ<em>₁</em>,σ<em>₂</em>,…,σ<em>ₙ</em>),where σ<em>ᵢ</em> ∈ ΔS<em>ᵢ</em> for each player <em>i</em>. Profile σ is a <strong>mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium </strong>if and only if u<em>ᵢ</em>(σ<em>ᵢ</em>,σ₋ٰ<em>ᵢ</em>)≥u<em>ᵢ</em>(s<em>ᵢ</em>,σ₋ٰ<em>ᵢ</em>) for each s<em>ᵢ</em> ∈ S<em>ᵢ</em> and each player <em>i</em>. That is, σ<em>ᵢ</em>, is a Best Response to σ₋ٰ<em>ᵢ</em> for each player i.”</p><p>For a mixed strategy to be the Best Response, it must put positive probability only on pure strategies that are Best Responses.</p><p><strong>Example:</strong></p><p>Based on Randomisation in sports.</p><p>A situation in tennis, whereby the server (player 1) decides whether to serve to the opponent’s forehand (F), center ©, or backhand (B) side. Simultaneously, the receiver (player 2) decides whether to favor the forehand, center, or backhand side.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*2ALGYB6rqZ-tcLIW" /><figcaption>Figure 2</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Mixing strategies:</strong></p><p>If player 1 mixes between B (with probability q) and C (with probability 1 — q) he obtains an expected utility that exceeds the utility from selecting F, regardless of what strategy player 2 chooses.</p><p>=&gt;In order to show this results, we must separately consider the case in which player 2 chooses F (left column), C (middle column), and B (right column).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/968/0*GBJw0-mPEVI3bYra" /><figcaption>Figure 3</figcaption></figure><p>If player 2 chooses F (in the left column), then player 1s EU from mixing is 5q +2(1 — q), which exceeds his utility from F (zero), if</p><p>5q +2(1 — q) &gt; 0 =&gt; 5–2q +2 &gt; 0 =&gt; q &gt; -⅔</p><p>Assuming q ranges from 0 to 1.</p><p>If player 2 chooses C (in the middle column), then player 1s EU from mixing is 3q +0(1q), which exceeds his utility from F (2), if</p><p>3q +0(1 — q) &gt; 2 =&gt; 3q &gt; 2 =&gt; q &gt; ⅔</p><p>This is a necessary condition for the mixing to yield a larger EU than F. (We will keep it in mind.)</p><p>If player 2 chooses B (in the right column), then player 1s EU from mixing is 2q +3(1-q), which exceeds his utility from F (2), if</p><p>2q +3(1 — q) &gt; 2 =&gt; 2q +3–3q &gt; 2 =&gt; 1 &gt; q</p><p>which holds by assumption given that q belongs to [0,1].</p><p>Hence, as long as player 1 mixes between B and C and assigns to B a probability q &gt; 2/3, he obtains an expected utility that exceeds the payo⁄ he obtains from selecting F, regardless of the strategy player 2 selects. We can therefore delete strategy F from the matrix, since it is strictly dominated by a randomization between B and C, and thus player 1 would never use it. Deleting F (upper row), we obtain the following reduced matrix:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/684/0*SOOlKmWRbCsXz-WD" /><figcaption>Figure 4</figcaption></figure><p>Given the above reduced matrix, we can now move to player 2. Can we identify a strictly dominated strategy for player 2?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/796/0*LUlo09d3mnG40nT6" /><figcaption>Figure 5</figcaption></figure><p>Yes, F is strictly dominated by C for player 2.</p><p>We can hence delete the column corresponding to strategy F for player 2 (since it is strictly dominated), yielding the following reduced 2*2 matrix:[figure 6]</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/685/0*Kqrng_xD5_Jo8INd" /><figcaption>Figure 6</figcaption></figure><p>However, for the remaining matrix does not have any further strictly dominated strategies that we can delete for player 1:</p><p>Hence neither B is strictly dominated by C nor C is dominated by B.</p><p>Hence, we cannot further eliminate strictly dominated strategies, and our (very imprecise) equilibrium prediction is f(C,C),(C,B),(B,C),(B,B)[refer figure 6].</p><p><strong>Final order:</strong></p><p>Firstly we apply IDSDS until no strictly dominating strategy is left.</p><p>Then we attach probabilities with best reponses. Strategies are mixed and matched to obtain the most optimum strategy.</p><p>When no further steps can be taken we attain the most precise equilibrium.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a1c717e40d1d" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/game-theory-101/chapter-3-mixed-strategies-a1c717e40d1d">Chapter 3 : Mixed Strategies</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/game-theory-101">Game Theory 101</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Chapter 2 : Dominance Solvable Games]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/game-theory-101/chapter-2-dominance-solvable-games-83990f998a08?source=rss-f75be31e8bca------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/83990f998a08</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[prisoners-dilemma]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[game-theory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dominace-solvable-games]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Indian Game Theory Society, NSUT]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 28 Jan 2020 16:04:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-02-10T16:47:05.644Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Chapter 2 : Dominance Solvable Games</h3><p>By Shameek Pathak</p><p><strong>Dominated Strategy</strong></p><p>A strategy is said to be strictly dominated if the payoff received is always lower compared to any other strategy(s) irrespective of the strategy preferred by his opponent. And <strong><em>rationality</em></strong> strictly condemns the selection of a strategy that can never be beneficial regardless the moves of other players. Now this compels us to define rationality in the domain of game theory to clear the air.</p><p><strong>Common Knowledge of Rationality</strong></p><p>When two or more players interact with an intention to maximise their gains with an understanding that outcome depends not only on their own chosen actions but also on selection of actions of others.</p><p>This simply conveys the idea that a player would never follow the strategy that would result in lower payoffs than other available strategies in the set. A rational player would never choose a strategy that is dominated.</p><p><strong>Every player is assumed to be rational.</strong></p><ul><li>Every player knows that every player is rational:</li></ul><p>For example, player A can anticipate that player B would never be using strictly dominated strategies. In other words, when player A considers which strategy to select, he does so by deleting all strictly dominated strategies of player B from the matrix, since player B would never use them. Hence player A will only have to consider a reduced matrix with fewer cells to examine.</p><ul><li>Every player knows that every player knows that every player is rational:</li></ul><p>By a similar argument, player A knows that player B has already deleted the strategies that are strictly dominated for player A, and that player B considers the reduced matrix once these strictly dominated strategies have been deleted.</p><ul><li>Every player knows that every player knows . . . . . <strong>∞</strong></li></ul><p>After several deletion rounds we reach to a reduced matrix where there are no strictly dominated strategies that can be deleted then the remaining cells are our equilibrium predictions. The procedure we follow is known as “Iterative Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies (IDSDS)”.</p><p><em>Same technique was implemented in earlier explained game of </em><strong><em>Prisoners’ Dilemma</em></strong><em>.</em></p><p><strong>Illustration: Based on Puccini’s Opera</strong></p><p>Tosca, the female protagonist experiences her lover, Cavaradossi being captured and condemned to death, but the Roman Chief of Police, Scarpia offers to spare his life by instructing the firing squad to use blank bullets and fake the execution <strong>but </strong>only<strong> </strong>in return for Tosca’s sexual favours. Scarpia has an option to act cunning and order a killing execution. And Tosca also has an alternative of stabbing him with the knife while apparent favours are being exchanged . So both can keep their side of the bargain or double-cross.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/430/0*2G7t9-sk1SZnawY1" /></figure><p>Scarpia’s two choices:</p><ol><li>Double-cross : Ordering real bullets to be used.</li><li>Respect the Bargain : Ordering blank bullets to be used.</li></ol><p>Tosca’s two choices:</p><ol><li>Double-cross : Stab Scarpia with the knife.</li><li>Respect the Bargain : Consent to his demand of sexual favours.</li></ol><p>The Payoff Matrix can tentatively be framed in the following manner.</p><p>For Tosca:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/432/0*ollyhlcFX6WUpdah" /></figure><p>Payoff = 1; implies she gives her consent and her lover is shot dead. A lose-lose situation.</p><p>Payoff = 2; implies she stabs Scarpia but finds her lover shot dead. A small win but a heartbreaking loss.</p><p>Payoff = 3; implies she loses her consent but her lover is alive. A small sacrifice but big win.</p><p>Payoff = 4; implies she stabs Scarpia and her lover is spared. A win-win scenario.</p><p>For Scarpia:</p><p>Payoff = 1; implies he is stabbed and his prisoner is alive. A lose-lose situation.</p><p>Payoff = 2; implies he is stabbed but his prisoner shot. A partially satisfying death.</p><p>Payoff = 3; implies he gets the favours but his prisoner is alive. A comforting dissatisfaction.</p><p>Payoff = 4; implies he gets the favors and his prisoner is shot. An all win situation.</p><p><em>Now let’s observe where rationality and IDSDS takes us :</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/662/0*sI9MuTEs7XNbnCfA" /></figure><ol><li>Tosca finds that “Consent” is strictly dominated. Thus rationality considers it out of consideration.</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/512/0*Og3YVrd4gSfBqS8o" /></figure><p>2. Scarpia too ponders and concludes that “Blanks” is strictly dominated and hence striked out.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/843/0*YCiiTBys2GLmDh1H" /></figure><p><strong>IDSDS leads us to a bloody outcome with both Scarpia and Tosca’s lover dead and Tosca alive with guilt and grieving.</strong></p><p>But this all might have been avoided. If they would have had better payoffs if they had played (Consent, Blanks). No double crossing and double-double crossing; (Stab, Real).</p><p>This conflict between individual and group incentives is similar to that arising in the prisoner’s dilemma game, and many other games in economics and social sciences.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/883/0*hzppKD4PamhBq9Cm" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/857/0*BAcMQZvex6gX5vQJ" /></figure><p><strong>Illustration: Banning of Cigarette Advertising on TV and Radio</strong></p><p>In America, President Richard Nixon signed the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, which banned cigarette ads from airing on television and radio. Before 1971, you could find a cigarette advertising such as these:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*H2Tf2S9NKZ3s9NK6" /></figure><p>So let’s push ourselves a little back in time when these ads were a thing and try to analyse the advertisement war. We now consider two major key players who dominated the field in the 1970’s; Philip Morris (PM) and RJ.Reynolds (RJR). And assuming the annual demand of 1,000,000,000 units and a profit of $ 0.1 per unit. For simplicity each of these firms can choose to spend $ 5, $ 10 or $ 15 million on their product advertisement. (The annual demand is considered independent of money poured in advertisement.)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/845/0*7IuyHYL6o1V7gVh9" /></figure><p>π here represents the profit.</p><p>Similar formulation will work for both PM and RJR. <em>And we assume a relation of direct proportionality between ‘market share’ and ‘cost on advertisement’.</em> And after some calculations we can construct the payoff matrix.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/905/0*4TEYenTLdP88oUfL" /></figure><p>Now we shall avoid falling foul and let IDSDS run its course.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/895/0*4BfuAX2Qil4FC-JK" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/794/0*hnGaFiyxVtX8Z2D1" /></figure><p>Spending 5 million would be a strictly dominated step for both RJR and PM thus put out of question.</p><p>The option of 10 million is going to go down the same spiral.</p><p>The strategy profile of spending 15 million stands the test of IDSDS resulting in payoff (35 million, 35 million). And just here we let “Nixon” happen eventually leading to Radio and TV advertising hence making it impractical to spend 15 million formulating a reduced payoff matrix. Which would be devised as shown;</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/653/0*GLN4ObGiklHFqW8z" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/857/0*uSHPsgJJLdUKbers" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/722/0*5I5amzW8uVlTYDkS" /></figure><p>Now this 2x2 matrix is about to face a similar fate!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/669/0*qsSjSnFPuqvq574r" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/976/0*1nnTkXEwZ0ldfS-9" /></figure><p>IDSDS waved its wand and…..</p><p>The only strategy bound to work is to spend 10 million resulting in an annual money inflow of $ 40 million for each one of them. <strong>Surprised, well you should be the ban actually helped the firms gather 40 million instead of 35!!</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=83990f998a08" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/game-theory-101/chapter-2-dominance-solvable-games-83990f998a08">Chapter 2 : Dominance Solvable Games</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/game-theory-101">Game Theory 101</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Chapter 1 : Games and Representation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/game-theory-101/chapter-1-games-and-representation-b8fb82f65a89?source=rss-f75be31e8bca------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b8fb82f65a89</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[game-theory]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Indian Game Theory Society, NSUT]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 11 Jan 2020 19:24:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-01-12T04:02:00.700Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Chapter 1 : Games and Representation</h3><p>By : Ayushi Arya</p><p>Game theory is the study of mathematical models of strategic interaction among rational decision-makers and human behaviour in strategic settings.</p><p>Any set of circumstances that has a result dependent on the actions of two of more decision-makers (players) is called a game.</p><h3>What makes a game?</h3><ul><li>At least 2 players or agents who behave rationally</li><li>Set of available actions</li><li>Order, or time structure of a game</li><li>Payoffs i.e the outcomes they can potentially get as the game unfolds</li><li>Rules for the game</li></ul><h3>Representation of game theory:</h3><ul><li>Extensive: Trees</li><li>Normal: Payoff Matrix</li></ul><h3>A distinction between ways of representing games that is based on order of play.</h3><ul><li>Simultaneous</li><li>Sequential</li></ul><p><strong>Games of perfect information:</strong> Cases where no moves are simultaneous, and where no player ever forgets what has gone before.</p><p><strong>Games of imperfect information:</strong> Cases which involve mixed stages of moves, however temporally staged they might be.</p><p>Games of perfect information are the (logically) simplest sorts of games. This is so because in such games (as long as the games are finite, that is, terminate after a known number of actions) players and analysts can use a straightforward procedure for predicting outcomes.</p><h3>Extensive (Game tree):</h3><p>A game tree is an example of what mathematicians call a <em>directed graph</em>. That is, it is a set of connected nodes in which the overall graph has a direction. We can draw trees from the top of the page to the bottom, or from left to right.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/432/1*qpf5TvtPjYkLCC2cAdmdSA.png" /></figure><p>The point of representing games using trees can best be grasped by visualising the use of them in supporting backward-induction reasoning.</p><p>The extensive form can be used to formalise games with a time sequencing of moves. Games here are played on trees (as pictured here). Here each vertex (or node) represents a point of choice for a player. The player is specified by a number listed by the vertex. The lines out of the vertex represent a possible action for that player. The payoffs are specified at the bottom of the tree. The extensive form can be viewed as a multi-player generalization of a decision tree. To solve any extensive form game, backward induction must be used. It involves working backward up the game tree to determine what a rational player would do at the last vertex of the tree, what the player with the previous move would do given that the player with the last move is rational, and so on until the first vertex of the tree is reached.</p><p><strong>Trees are used to represent <em>sequential</em> games, because they show the order in which actions are taken by the players.</strong></p><h3>Matrices (normal):</h3><p>This is the second type of mathematical object used to represent games. Matrices, unlike trees, simply show the outcomes, represented in terms of the players’ utility functions, for every possible combination of strategies the players might use.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/407/1*t-EaUUl-1H_xuNYfTehvjQ.png" /></figure><p>shows the players, strategies, and payoffs. More generally it can be represented by any function that associates a payoff for each player with every possible combination of actions. Each player has two strategies, which are specified by the number of rows and the number of columns. The payoffs are provided in the interior. The first number is the payoff received by the row player (the second is the payoff for the column player.</p><p>Matrix games are referred to as ‘normal-form’ or ‘strategic-form’ games, and games as trees are referred to as ‘extensive-form’ games.</p><p>The two sorts of games are not equivalent, because extensive-form games contain information — about sequences of play and players’ levels of information about the game structure — that strategic-form games do not.</p><h3>Strategy of a game:</h3><p>In game theory, a player’s strategy is any of the options which he or she chooses in a setting where the outcome depends not only on their own actions but on the actions of others. A player’s strategy will determine the action which the player will take at any stage of the game.</p><h3>Pure and mixed strategy:</h3><p>A pure strategy provides a complete definition of how a player will play a game. In particular, it determines the move a player will make for any situation they could face. A player’s strategy set is the set of pure strategies available to that player.</p><p>A mixed strategy is an assignment of a probability to each pure strategy. This allows for a player to randomly select a pure strategy. Since probabilities are continuous, there are infinitely many mixed strategies available to a player</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b8fb82f65a89" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/game-theory-101/chapter-1-games-and-representation-b8fb82f65a89">Chapter 1 : Games and Representation</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/game-theory-101">Game Theory 101</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Keynesian Beauty Contest]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@igts.nsit/keynesian-beauty-contest-4805b792a220?source=rss-f75be31e8bca------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4805b792a220</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[game-theory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[strategy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Indian Game Theory Society, NSUT]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 28 Mar 2019 10:21:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-03-28T10:21:17.720Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By Akshay Gandhi</p><p>A group of people are asked to select a number each between zero and hundred. The one whose number is nearest to the 2/3rd of the average of the numbers submitted wins the game. What number do you choose?</p><p>Does this game sound like a game of fortune to you, if not, do you know what numbers would be the most probable winners. In this article we will discuss the strategy to all such games through a concept called Keynes’ Beauty Contest. Moreover, this concept is a very useful one in our financial markets.</p><p>Keynes was a British economist and is also known today as the father of Macro Economics. He believed that, in a market, people price their shares not based on what they think their fundamental value is, but rather on what they think everyone else thinks their value is. To describe this, he used a newspaper game as an analogy. In this game, entrants were asked to choose the six most attractive faces from a hundred photographs. Those who picked the most popular faces were then eligible for the prize. Someone who doesn’t like to think much would choose those six faces he thinks are attractive but a more smart player will choose what he believes others would choose as attractive.</p><p>“It is not a case of choosing those [faces] that, to the best of one’s judgment, are really the prettiest, nor even those that average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. We have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligence to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who practice the fourth, fifth and higher degrees.” (Keynes, General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, 1936)</p><p>So let’s get back to our game, how do we know what number to choose? The strategy is to know your competitors. Your number should depend upon what others are choosing. You definitely can not know what others are choosing but you sure can have an idea about it. In fact the few times this game has been published, the results have been quite consistent. So, let’s see how to choose the number. To explain the concept better we have divided the participants into orders — zero, one, two and so on. A zeroth order player will think that the average might be around 50, so he will choose something around 50. A first order thinker will know by one upping the zeroth order player that the 2/3rd of the average(50) will be around 33, so he will choose something near 33. Similarly a second order player by one upping the first order player will know that the average will be around 33. This is because he believes that most other participants would be first order players and hence he would find the 2/3rd to be around 22.</p><p>This can go on to reach its Nash equilibrium. In simple words a Nash equilibrium is that point where no one has a better chance at winning after changing his decision if no one else changes his. The Nash equilibrium of this game will be 0 because if every one chooses 0, the 2/3rd of the average will be 0 and everyone will be a winner. But in a practical game, would 0 be the answer? Most probably not. That depends on what kind of participants are in the game, are they second order players or third order. There will be entrants who will pick their numbers without giving it much thought and then there will be saboteurs but if there are enough participants, the results will be much based on the above tactic.</p><p>It is also noteworthy that how much effort people will be put into the game and the number of participants of the game is proportional to the winning prize. In 1997,</p><p>when this game was published with a prize of two business class tickets to North America, the number of entrants were 1,382. Several years later, when the winning prize was just a traveling bag the number of entrants dropped to 583. Although the winning guesses were quite close both the times, 13 in 1997 and 12 the second time.</p><p>Keynes was referring to the investors of 1900s but this idea has again come into fashion after the 2008 economical crisis. The financial crisis of 2008 had two main problems; unemployment and deflation. Keynes provided the answer to combat the two dilemmas simultaneously by stimulating the global demand. For such a purpose, the recipe of what should be done is simple: lower taxes, lower interest rates, raise public spending and reduce the exchange rate to make export selling more competitive.</p><p>In speculative markets, Keynes said, you win not by picking the soundest investment, but by picking the investment that others, who are playing the same game, will soon bid up higher. This may sound like a crazy game, but if others are playing it, we must, too. The outlook for the economy depends on how this convoluted beauty contest plays out.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4805b792a220" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[POSSIBILITY OF NUCLEAR WARS? — A GAME THEORY PERSPECTIVE]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@igts.nsit/possibility-of-nuclear-wars-a-game-theory-perspective-d28f0c196fe1?source=rss-f75be31e8bca------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d28f0c196fe1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[nuclear-weapons]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[strategic-thinking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[game-theory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[strategy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Indian Game Theory Society, NSUT]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 20 Mar 2019 14:10:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-03-20T14:10:00.365Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>POSSIBILITY OF NUCLEAR WARS? — A GAME THEORY PERSPECTIVE</h3><p>By Ishikaa Agarwal</p><p>“Are we headed towards a nuclear war?”</p><p>This is the question that gives us chills down our spines whenever a nuclear state be it the Russian or the North Korean regimes makes vile threats of nuclear warfare. This constant irresponsible threat of a possible nuclear war looms much closer to home as well, in the Indian Subcontinent, due to the constant tensions between India and Pakistan. The threat again came into the forefront with the recent occurrence of a terrorist attack in Kashmir.</p><p>The US bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are the lone example of a nuclear attack and to think of the damage that they caused is deeply regretful to say the least, and that was with weapons that were less advanced and of lower orders of magnitude than the current nuclear arsenal. The number of weapons in existence today are enough to destroy the planet dozens of times over, though experts say that if just five nuclear weapons were detonated, the world could be plunged into a nuclear autumn.</p><p>At present, nine countries possess nuclear weapons and five other countries can deploy and store nuclear arsenals under NATO nuclear weapons sharing. A nuclear war today will bring the world to an end but the fact that it still hasn’t is surprising! Well, maybe it is not that surprising after all. It can be well argued that Game Theory has played quite a role in averting such a crisis and keeping the possibility of world getting into a nuclear war far from reality.</p><p>But how?</p><p>It can be traced back to the end of world war 2 after which started the Cold War. The dissolution of wartime alliance against Nazi Germany, left the United States and the Soviet Union as the sole two political and economic behemoths with wholly disparate ideologies (capitalism and communism respectively) which brought the advent of nuclear weapons. Both began to focus on military strategies around their nuclear arsenal and were heavily armed in preparation of a possible all-out nuclear war. To understand why the world wasn’t blown to pieces before we were born, let’s model this into a game!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/602/1*THSBcC_2zI4Y3aH_sYe-yQ.png" /></figure><p>In the game above, the Soviet Union makes the first move (we can also analyse by choosing the USA to make the first move). The Soviet Union must decide whether to use their nuclear weapons and <em>attack</em>, or not i.e. <em>don’t attack. </em>If the Soviet Union chooses <em>don’t attack</em>, the game ends, a stalemate where no nuclear weapons are used.</p><p>If the Soviet Union chooses to <em>attack</em>, the USA must decide whether to <em>retaliate</em> or not i.e. <em>don’t retaliate. </em>In this game the payoffs are measured in “utility” to the player. The numbers are fairly arbitrary, and only matter in their relation to each other.</p><p>If our game ends in a stalemate, both players receive a payoff of “zero”, no better or worse off than before.</p><p>If the Soviet Union <em>attacks</em>, and the US r<em>etaliates</em>, both players receive a payoff of “negative infinity”, meaning — the game ends in mutual destruction of both the players (not a good situation for humanity!).</p><p>If the Soviet Union chooses to <em>attack, </em>and the USA chooses <em>don’t retaliate</em>, the Soviet Union receives a payoff of “200” and the USA receives “-200”.</p><p>Analyzing the possibility of a nuclear war or analyzing whether a nuclear attack is a viable option i.e. to attack or to not attack — has the concept of “prisoner’s dilemma” involved in it. Each player has the incentive to screw over the other. But there is an important caveat: The prisoner’s dilemma assumes there is no future. If you’re just playing once, your dominant strategy would be to betray — or attack. But in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma, where players are in long-term interactions, they’re reasoning not just about today but about the chances of retaliation tomorrow. In the presence of a credible threat of retaliation, now each country has an incentive to cooperate — to not attack.</p><p>They act against their own interest in the short-term because it assures them no retaliation. This is what game theorists call a “doomsday device”, a device in the game that triggers retaliation if the first player attacks. Both sides employed a few strategies equivalent to the doomsday device. Both sides established nuclear submarines all over the world, ready to strike back if their main bases were hit, the US kept nuclear armed planes in the air for 3 decades ready to respond. This thinking was used as a way to reason the stockpiling of nuclear arsenals. Each side had a nuclear strategy that discouraged an attack by the other side, on the basis that such an attack would lead to total destruction of the attacker — the doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD). Moreover, both sides adopted what is known as the “madman strategy”, convincing the other player that they are not rational thinkers and they will respond with retaliation even if it is not in their best interests. This is exactly what Kim Jong-Un did, he portrayed himself as naive and impulsive and created terror in the minds of rival countries. The same is the case with India and Pakistan where both the countries are convinced to not unleash a nuclear attack on the other, but here, their geographical proximity also plays an important role considering the wide scale damage a nuclear weapon would cause.</p><p>But one can never know as even though Game theory advice “strategic restraint” to be the best option it can’t tell the decision makers what they should do. Though, it surely can give them the possible outcomes to each move they make, but human emotions and irrationality can take-over any time, leading to certainly destructive and irreversibly decisions to be made!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d28f0c196fe1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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