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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Imogen Lambert on Medium]]></title>
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            <title>Stories by Imogen Lambert on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[The myth of blowback: Libya intervention and the Manchester bombing]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@imogenlamb1991/the-myth-of-blowback-libya-intervention-and-the-manchester-bombing-5bc15a93186d?source=rss-c93b4b0927c0------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Imogen Lambert]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 22 Apr 2019 17:00:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-06-27T20:11:51.909Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[Unpublished article, submitted June 5, 2017]</p><p>Following the horrific attacks on Manchester carried out by British-Libyan Salman Abadi who had made visits to the country, predictably enough, much of the British Left quickly put the blame on western foreign intervention.</p><p>Jeremy Corbyn, leader of the Labour party pledged to “change what we do abroad” saying:</p><p>“Many experts, including professionals in our intelligence and security services have pointed to the connections between wars our government has supported or fought in other countries, such as Libya, and terrorism here at home.”</p><p>It was a political gamble with the comments made so soon after the disaster, and indeed the right wing pounced, accusing him of making excuses for terrorists. “Corbyn faces backlash over bid to exploit Manchester bomb”, the <em>Daily Mail</em> wrote.</p><p>But, as Labour <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/tory-labour-poll-latest-results-general-election-2017-conservative-theresa-may-jeremy-corbyn-a7763486.html">closed in </a>on the Conservative party’s massive lead, it seems clear that his comments resonate with a wider part of the UK population than purely the Stop the War Coalition brigade, and failed draw quite the backlash the right-wing had preempted. The reception to Corbyn’s comments reflect a wider trend of isolationism in a UK determined to withdraw, whatever the cost, from a globalised world.</p><p>Yet did intervention in Syria which succeeded in overthrowing Gaddafi cause the rise the IS?</p><p>Many seem to have forgotten that terrorism in Libya existed before the revolution in the form of the Gaddafi regime itself. As well as carrying out atrocities against his own people, the dictator was involved in sponsoring global terrorism, including attacks on the UK — notably the Lockerbie bombing of a plane over Scotland, killing 270 people, and the murder of policewoman Yvonne Fletcher outside the Libyan embassy in London.</p><p>Gaddafi’s infamous speeches during the revolution, pledging to crack down on protesters “home by home, alley by alley” demonstrates his brutal intentions, and after the death of around 10,000 people (by GNC estimates), the majority of Libyans backed the NATO enforced No Fly Zone which facilitated rebel advances on the ground and lead to Gaddafi’s downfall.</p><p>It would appear that the success of intervention in Libya was fairly evident; We don’t hear about thousands of Libyans making their way across Europe — despite boat loads of refugees taking the perilous journey from Libya to Italy, relatively few are Libyan.</p><p>In fact, like Salman al-Abadi’s parents, Libyans who had fled Gaddafi’s regime in Europe have been returning home. It’s distasteful to compare death tolls, but an <a href="http://www.libyabodycount.org/">estimated</a> 4,500 people killed in the post-revolution Libyan violence from 2014–2016 is few compared to the estimated half a million in Syria, with an estimated tens of thousands in regime prisons.</p><p>The vast majority of British Libyans who joined the struggle were engaging with anti-Gaddafi groups — both Islamist and secular — who, like their Syrian counterparts — would go on tackle both ISIS and the counter-revolution.</p><p>The revolutionary groups in Libya who overthrew Gaddafi with the help of NATO have been fighting IS and also under attack by the UAE-backed counter revolution complete with its own strongman, General Khalifa Haftar.</p><p>His forces have consistently undermined the new unity government and the peace process between the GNC (General National Congress, elected in 2012 in Tripoli) and the government in Tobruk in east Libya, made up of representatives elected in 2014 parliamentary elections, but is since disintegrating into military rule under Haftar.</p><p>Egypt and the UAE are currently bombing GNC-affiliated Islamist groups who were previously fighting Gaddafi in Derner this week. This is allegedly to tackle IS but Islamist groups in the area drove out IS during a <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/in-libya-a-popular-uprising-pushes-isil-out-of-derna">popular uprising</a> in 2014, replacing the black-and-white flags of IS with the flag of free Libya, and have continued fighting them ever since.</p><p>Although some groups in the area are allegedly affiliated to al-Qaeda, like Russia’s campaign to quash revolutionary groups in Syria, they are not discriminating between mainstream Islamists and militants, with the Egyptian military spokesperson <a href="http://publish.alaraby.co.uk/home/%5Bhttps:/www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-idUSKBN18P0GP%5D%20">telling</a> Reuters this week that the military was not targeting a specific group because it did “not differentiate between various factions.”</p><p>Rather than an inevitable consequence of NATO intervention, the fighting between the two rival governments was probably a major factor for ISIS to emerge in Libya. Despite the strife, the country is in better shape than Syria which, contrary to leftist claims, never experienced a meaningful intervention on the side of the rebels. If there was, its unlikely the space would have emerged for IS to establish itself in the country, allowing them a strong territorial foothold in the region, invaluable for their propaganda.</p><p>The streak of Western-inspired ideology in ISIS arises not because they were cultivated by western foreign interventions but because, in their core, they are fascists; their leader Abu Baker Al-Baghdadi has been <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/events/the-islamic-states-ideology-propaganda/">described</a> as an “Islamist Stalin”, attempting to enforce jihadism in one literal State, as <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/IS-Propaganda_Web_English.pdf">oppose to the “global” jihadism practiced by al-Qaed</a>a, or the Islamist reform through democratic process, as advocated by much of the Muslim Brotherhood.</p><p>Pro-revolution conspiracy theories that IS are working with regimes should be rejected, but there is some convergence of interests between the dictatorships and IS, in that they are both working to destroy what is left of revolutions. Accordingly, in startling parallels with regime propaganda, ISIS itself criticizes foreign intervention, not only when directed against them, but when its against the regimes they claim to oppose — regimes which activists claim need to be deposed in order to get rid of IS entirely.</p><p>IS propaganda derides other Sunni Islamic groups as being stooges for the West — dubbing them “<a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/IS-Propaganda_Web_English.pdf"><em>sa hawat</em></a><em>”</em> in their media, in reference to Sunni Iraqis who accepted US backing to tackle al-Qaeda. Their <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/IS-Propaganda_Web_English.pdf">early propaganda</a>, aimed at Arabs rather than the Muslims in the west, especially focused on this issue, insulting Syrian rebel group <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/IS-Propaganda_Web_English.pdf">Ahrar-al Sham </a>as “Jews” and publishing interviews from fighters in “<em>sahawat”</em> groups, who relay taking money from gulf states to fight militants.</p><p>It is this muscular “anti-imperial” edge and claim to independence, coupled by the promise of an immediate and material Islamic State — treated by other jihadist groups as a utopia — that attracts local support to IS. Thus, their fascistic ideology<a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/IS-Propaganda_Web_English.pdf"> is far from “nihilistic”,</a> as pundits repeat, further mystifying the group. And to an Arabic-speaking Brit who has some awareness of inter-jihadist differences, its likely it was partly these aspects that attracted al-Abadi to IS rather than mainstream Libyan groups.</p><p>The former head of MI5, Baroness Manningham-Buller, was probably right at the time when she said that the Iraq war had led to greater radicalization in the UK in 2010. However, Iraq has also been subject to its own internal struggles, involving the backing of authoritarian <a href="https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/of-levant-and-leviathan-cautionary-tales-from-a-turbulent-world/">Nour al-Malaki</a> against a secular-orientated opposition lead by Iyad Allawi in 2010 elections. Maliki’s oppression and — possibly deliberate inaction — lead to the initial rise of IS in Mosul.</p><p>The Iraq war was awful and unjustifiable, but it should not rule out future interventions — as the husband of murdered MP Jo Cox said, there are good interventions, and bad ones. It really is that simple.</p><p>Like the Stalinist aspects of the anti-imperialist Left who lend support to Arab regimes, IS rejects the internal dynamics of various states, and cares nothing about the oppression of their peoples. They did not rise from the Arab Spring, but emerged to crush it. And they attempt to enforce a unified vision by terror — whether by murdering children at a Manchester concert, or occupying and terrorising local populations in the Arab world.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5bc15a93186d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Sheikh Nimr: the anti-sectarian cleric who’s death stoked sectarianism]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@imogenlamb1991/sheikh-nimr-the-anti-sectarian-cleric-whos-death-stoked-sectarianism-cd311872b46f?source=rss-c93b4b0927c0------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[sectarian-violence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sectarianism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sheikh-nimr]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Imogen Lambert]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 22 Apr 2019 16:53:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-04-22T16:53:06.909Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[Unpublished article, written January 3, 2016]</p><p>Following the execution of Sheikh Nimr along with other clerics, including Sunnis, the crisis between Saudi Arabia and Iran continues to escalate, leading to rampant speculation of a heightened proxy war between the two countries and tensions between Sunni and Shia sects of Islam.</p><p>Nimr was arrested in 2012 for “instigating sedition” in the Shia-dominated Eastern provinces of Qatif and al-Ihsaa where he lead protests against the Saudi government.</p><p>Following Nimr’s execution, Iranian supporters of the Sheikh attacked the Saudi embassy in Tehran, and the Sheikh’s detractors have reitterated the accusation that he was pawn for Iran — considering Iran’s furious reaction to the Sheikh’s death, one may conclude that was indeed the case.</p><p>Yet, as the sectarianism escalates, following his death many pointed out that the Sheikh — despite his position as a Shia cleric in Saudi Arabia — was in fact against basing politics purely on sect, and some of his discourse and speeches urged his followers to think beyond proxy wars between Iran and Saudi.</p><p>During the speech that lead to his arrest and eventual execution Sheikh Nimr mocked Saudi Arabia’s posturing towards Iran, and denied he had any strong connections to the country.</p><p>“The Saudi regime says we are acting on the pretext of a foreign country…they usually mean Iran but they do not dare say it,” Nimr said.</p><p>“In December 1978 there were riots to defend the honor of Awwamiya and this was four months before the fall of the Shah…they attacked us anyway,” he said.</p><p>“Instead of talking about a ‘foreign country’ go ahead and attack that country, instead of attacking fifty people here. We have no ties to Iran or any other foreign country. We have our own values and we defend them. Not by violence but by steadfastness will your power be defeated.”</p><p>Although the Sheikh may well have had connections to Tehran, a wikileaks cable suggested that he sought to distance himself from the government. His calling for the downfall of Assad at 2011 protest in Saudi demonstrates that even if he was a supporter, he did not blindly support all of the country’s policies.</p><p>As the diplomatic crisis between Iran and Saudi continues on Tuesday, the aggression remains largely rhetorical — the two countries have never engaged in direct military conflict with each other.</p><p>Iran and Saudi are on opposing sides in the Syria war, however many — especially in Syria — continually urge that the struggle is viewed beyond the lenses of proxies and sectarianism.</p><p>Some pointed out that although Saudi Arabia had funded Jaysh al-Islam, an important militant opposition group in Syria, most of those fighting in the group were Syrian and had their own autonomy.</p><p>Many of those in Syria mourning the recent assassination of the group’s military leader, Zahran Alloush, at the hands of Russia, were no supporters of Saudi Arabia, viewing the country’s support with suspicion.</p><p>Similarly, some analysts have said that Iran has not supported the opposition in Bahrain to the extent they are commonly perceived to do, and there is a segment of the opposition in the country — that also includes Sunnis — who are also against Iranian interference in the country’s affairs.</p><p>Nimr understood the limitations of “picking a proxy”, or trusting powers to meaningfully support any oppressed populations; as many defenders of Bashar al-Assad used the opportunity of Sheikh Nimr’s execution to attack Saudi Arabia, many forgot the Nimr’s solidarity was extended through lines of oppression, not sect, or proxies.</p><p>Accordingly, Nimr spoke out against the abuses of the Assad regime.</p><p>“The oppressed should unite together against the oppressors, instead of becoming tools in the hands of the oppressors,” he said.</p><p>“The Khalifa family [in Bahrain] are oppressors, and Sunnis are not responsible for their actions. These are not Sunnis, they are tyrants. The Assad family in Syria are oppressors, and Shiism is not responsible for their actions. Never defend an oppressor. It is never justified for someone who is oppressed to defend [another’s] oppressor.”</p><p>While the media emphasized the sectarian nature of the reaction to Nimr’s death, many others remembered his comments, and what he actually purpoerted to stand for.</p><p>Writer and academic Robin Yassin-Kassab wrote that although he didn’t agree with Nimr’s politics — Nimr wanted a clerical system — or Zahran Alloush, who made rampant sectarian comments against Alawis and Shia, he mourned them both.</p><p>“Both were fighting (defensively) for self-determination and (their idea of) freedom, both against tyrannical states,” he said.</p><p>“So long as we allow our compassion and principles to be determined by sect, so we continue to fall into the divide-and-rule trap set by the authoritarian states in our region and globally.”</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cd311872b46f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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