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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Tasin Mahdi on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Tasin Mahdi on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@in-tasin?source=rss-c0a62de856ee------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Tasin Mahdi on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@in-tasin?source=rss-c0a62de856ee------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Can the Subaltern speak in Bangladesh’s public discourse?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@in-tasin/can-the-subaltern-speak-in-bangladeshs-public-discourse-90b15e3abd99?source=rss-c0a62de856ee------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[bangladesh]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[subaltern]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[public-discourse]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gayatri-chakravorty-spiva]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tasin Mahdi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 25 Sep 2026 16:59:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-25T16:59:21.076Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JnlHzoaRriApiwcN_mbvtw.png" /><figcaption>Image: Bangladeshi children.</figcaption></figure><p>Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s seminal essay, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (first published in 1988), argues that the voices of the most marginalised populations, the “subaltern,” are mostly silenced by the frameworks of intellectual discourse. Originally a military term used to denote lower-ranking officers, the concept of the “subaltern” was adapted into social and political theory by Antonio Gramsci to describe subordinate, marginalised classes subject to the hegemony of ruling elites. Historian Ranajit Guha later founded the Subaltern Studies collective to rewrite South Asian history from below, a project in which Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak played a central, defining role, critically expanding and reworking the concept through a deconstructive lens. Spivak concludes that the subaltern, though not literally incapable of speaking for themselves, cannot truly speak within dominant systems of knowledge and representation because their voices cannot be heard or recognised on their own terms. While she particularly uses the example of oppressed women, the concept is not exclusive to them but refers to a class of people who are unheard in colonial and postcolonial societies. Spivak contends that when scholars attempt to speak for the subaltern, they may inadvertently reinforce colonial power structures and the colonial interpretation of the situation.</p><p>In doing so, the subaltern’s lived experiences are filtered through elite epistemological frameworks, systems of knowledge shaped by those in positions of power, preventing their voices from being recognised on their own terms. This process effectively “ventriloquises” the subaltern, replacing rather than conveying their authentic voices. Ventriloquising is the act of speaking or projecting sounds in the manner of a ventriloquist, producing words without noticeably moving your lips so the sound appears to come from another source or person. A useful analogy is to imagine a person trying to describe the experience of drowning while standing safely on the shore. Even if the observer uses the most poetic and empathetic language, their description is fundamentally created or shaped by their position of safety, thereby overwriting the actual, lived sensory experience of the person underwater. Consequently, the subaltern remains unheard because the dominant systems and language of political and intellectual power, even when ostensibly progressive, are structured in such a way that they cannot fully register the consciousness of the truly dispossessed.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ByRLGkmPEq5kElxO.png" /><figcaption>Image: Bangladeshi children.</figcaption></figure><p>The relevance of subaltern theory in the socio-economic context of Bangladesh, a country born of colonial partition and postcolonial development struggles, finds clear resonance. Despite the country’s vibrant political culture, public dialogue and national discourse largely exist in two interconnected spheres: academic discourse and mainstream discourse. Academic discourse is predominantly shaped by scholars, policymakers, and intellectual elites who debate questions such as whether the Constitution should be reformed or amended. Mainstream discourse, meanwhile, is largely shaped by the urban middle and upper-middle classes, particularly journalists, political commentators, social media influencers, and online intellectuals who dominate Bangladesh’s digital public sphere. While the rural poor, workers, indigenous peoples, and others have virtually no forum in which their own voices can shape the conversation. Their voices are not necessarily absent because they have nothing to say, but because the structures through which public discourse operates rarely allow them to speak on their own terms.</p><p>For millions of people, daily life is defined not by constitutional debates or ideological disputes but by the struggle for survival. Their immediate concerns are securing the next meal, overcoming malnutrition, obtaining affordable healthcare, finding stable employment, or coping with the consequences of inflation and economic insecurity. Under such conditions, participation in intellectual or political discourse becomes a privilege rather than a practical possibility. Many poor and rural Bangladeshis have limited formal education and civic literacy, leaving them unfamiliar with the legal and political language of debates. In practice, decision-makers and journalists tend to address “the people” in generic terms, reducing actual individuals to statistics rather than hearing their stories. For example, NGO and government reports might cite poverty or demographic data for a community, but rarely include the testimonies of community members in their own words. For many subaltern Bangladeshis, immediate survival needs overshadow any luxury of participating in intellectual debate. Under such conditions, attending policy forums or writing blog posts is a distant concern.</p><p>As one study of rural women notes, although they may hear about development programs, their practical involvement is “tokenism,” invited to meetings only to satisfy formal requirements, while real decisions are made by others. In short, their engagement is often “peripheral and performative,” not substantive. This mirrors Spivak’s point that subalterns can speak, but the structures of power make it impossible for their voices to be heard or acted upon. Major institutions (political parties, universities, media outlets) remain concentrated in the hands of educated elites. Policy and media debates, from national budget discussions to university syllabi, are shaped by those with formal power and influence, almost always from urban or upper-class backgrounds. Grassroots leaders or community representatives have little access to these platforms. This reproduces a colonial-era pattern. After independence in 1971 and before as well, Bangladesh’s elite retained much of the state machinery. As a result, even “progressive” policies are often debated in elite terms, sidelining the lived experience of the poorest. Because of these factors, public discussions in Bangladesh frequently occur about marginalised people, rather than with them. Spivak’s insight is strikingly relevant that when well-meaning intellectuals or officials claim to speak for the subaltern, they often end up “ventriloquising” them, imposing elite interpretations on their lives instead of letting the subalterns speak for themselves. In the Bangladeshi context, this can be seen in instances where poor women or minority communities are represented only as case studies or footnotes.</p><p>Rather than just improving service delivery or hearing them in isolated surveys, policymakers must actively create spaces where subaltern people lead the discussion. Such measures recognise Spivak’s warning that representation must mean letting subalterns define issues in their own terms, not merely translating their problems into elite language. Subaltern theory suggests that giving marginalised Bangladeshis a real voice goes beyond formal quotas or token seats. It calls for restructuring dialogue itself. Practical steps might include strengthening labor unions, farmers’ cooperatives, slum councils, indigenous community groups, etc., so they can develop their own leaders and agendas. These bodies can articulate needs like land rights, safe housing, or local schools on their own terms. Providing civic literacy programs in rural and urban slum areas, enabling people to understand how government and law work and to exercise voice (e.g., through village councils or local elections). Creating spaces where decision-makers listen to subaltern representatives. For instance, including authentic community representatives (not just elites) in policy forums on poverty alleviation or labor laws.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*r-GNUSNcVD7zehys.png" /><figcaption>Image: Bangladeshi children.</figcaption></figure><p>If a bunch of high-profile elites or upper-class bourgeoisie living in New York were to face river erosion or sea-level rise, the entire world would be outraged. But for many decades, Bangladesh’s rural class has been constantly facing it every season. It is not that our globe lacks empathy, but it creates no outrage because our challenges and pain are unheard by others; in fact, unheard by anyone at all. Just imagine that the first incident has the potential to capture global attention, but the second one does not. Why? Who decides that? Actually, it’s us; we decide that, but we’re too busy to be bothered about ourselves. These efforts echo Spivak’s call to move “beyond speaking for” and instead facilitate conditions where subaltern groups can speak for themselves. True inclusivity means bridging the gaps that keep the dispossessed silent. Only then can a purportedly democratic society begin to hear those at its margins, as active political subjects, not just data points. While subaltern theory is well-established in South Asian academic scholarship, applying its insights to mainstream Bangladeshi media, policy frameworks, and public discourse remains a neglected imperative in a society grappling with structural inequalities and numerous political, economic, and social challenges. Yet this is precisely why the conversation must continue. A democracy cannot claim to be truly representative if those at its margins remain unheard. The challenge before us is not merely to speak about the subaltern, but to create the conditions under which they can speak, be heard, and shape the national discourse on their own terms.</p><p><em>Tasin Mahdi, a knowledge seeker based in Dhaka, Bangladesh, exhibits a profound commitment to the betterment of his home nation and a keen interest in international affairs, and quietly coaxes discussions on global and local issues.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=90b15e3abd99" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[“Victory is Certain”: Tajuddin Ahmad, the Man of Integrity]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@in-tasin/victory-is-certain-tajuddin-ahmad-the-man-of-integrity-0ac4bed79525?source=rss-c0a62de856ee------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[the-man-of-integrity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[wartime-leader]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tajuddin-ahmad]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bangladesh]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tasin Mahdi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 23 Jul 2026 07:52:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-23T07:52:24.974Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0hiUkRGFirsFysuFD1eBOQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image: Tajuddin Ahmad waving to the people.</figcaption></figure><p>This is an excerpt from the radio broadcast to the nation by Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmad on June 13, 1971, broadcast from Bangladesh Betar:</p><p>“<em>My dear countrymen, brothers, and sisters,</em></p><p><em>The eleventh week of Bangladesh’s War of Liberation has come to an end. Through this struggle, our brave men and women have very clearly expressed their indomitable resolve to achieve independence. The enemy had hoped for a swift victory by launching treacherous attacks on unarmed civilians, but our valiant freedom fighters have shattered that fantasy. The heavy casualties inflicted on enemy troops have proven the success of our defensive operations as well as the fatal miscalculation of the ruling clique in Islamabad. They had thought that Bangladesh could be subjugated through all-out terror and indiscriminate killing. All these plans to destroy the resolve of a nation determined to achieve independence have failed. The occupying enemy is in a dire situation. They have to airlift personnel and supplies from several thousand miles away. Our Mukti Bahini (Freedom Fighters) continue to launch daily attacks, causing severe disruptions to the enemy’s supply and communication systems. True, the enemy has recaptured several district towns and garrison areas through sheer military and brute force. However, this does not constitute a final settlement in such a war. Whatever gains the enemy has made are being eroded by the continuous non-cooperation of the public in administrative and economic spheres. Despite the occupiers’ threats and temptations, there is no sign of any civil administration anywhere. The wheels of factories have also not turned.</em></p><p><em>Rescue from the extreme economic crisis into which the invaders have been plunged by the total non-cooperation of people at all levels is impossible for them without foreign aid. Yet, their appeals for assistance have found no resonance in any country. They are now forcing the public to deposit 100-taka and 500-taka notes without receiving any exchange value, under the guise of withdrawing them from circulation. This not only acknowledges their economic bankruptcy but also exposes their heinous conspiracy to loot ordinary people to fill Islamabad’s empty coffers. Compared to their physical and moral strength, the enemy has overextended itself. This will undoubtedly cause their downfall. These foreign troops, who came from the west to the east, will not be able to hold onto what they have seized. By adopting policies of well-planned murder, looting, and rape, they have branded themselves as enemies of humanity and enemies of civilization. A sea of hatred separates them from the general public. This is why our guerrilla tactics are inflicting such heavy losses on the enemy. Wherever the enemy goes, they display brutal cruelty. One reason for this is that fear has entered the enemy’s heart. They are afraid because they know they are losing.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/0*M2BoHi83-i52PArG.jpg" /><figcaption>Image: A portrait of the man of integrity, Tajuddin Ahmad.</figcaption></figure><p><em>I congratulate the people of Bangladesh for heroically resisting the colonial military forces of Islamabad. Their courage and sacrifice have touched the hearts of freedom-loving people all over the world and earned their respect. Despite the enemy forces being vast in number and fully equipped with advanced weaponry, the Mukti Bahini has been able to punish them. In this new phase of the struggle, the freedom fighters have become more organized, and their numbers have grown. Every single day, numerous young people are coming forward to receive military training. They are fighting for an ideal. They are fighting for the undeniable right to govern their own country and to live with dignity in their own homeland; they are fighting for the soil of their land, for avenging the murder of innocent civilians, and for avenging the dishonor of mothers and sisters.</em></p><p><em>The events of the past few weeks have exposed Pakistan’s sinister conspiracy against the people of Bangladesh to the grieving people of the entire world. The core of this conspiracy is the destruction of a nation through mass genocide. It involves systematically creating famine, reigning with terror, adopting a scorched-earth policy, driving a massive number of Bengalis into India, and labeling them as infiltrators before the world; wiping out intellectuals and political figures; destroying the current economic foundation; and obstructing the path of future development. The sole purpose of all this is to turn Bengalis into complete political and economic slaves of the military lords and capitalists of West Pakistan. To call the methods they have adopted to achieve this goal barbarous is an understatement. To call them bestial is an injustice to beasts. Yet, these goals and methods make the nature of our enemy crystal clear. Let the people of the world understand that we are struggling for democracy against a barbaric dictatorship, and for no other reason. A vast segment of the human race has freely expressed its support for a just political and economic system in this country. We are struggling to establish that very right.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/0*OOJDmFUJX7kiW_y-.jpg" /><figcaption>Image: An image of the man of integrity, Tajuddin Ahmad, managing the administration of the liberated <em>mukta anchals</em> under the Mujibnagar government.</figcaption></figure><p><em>What used to be called Pakistan was ruled for so long by a small clique of the military, bureaucracy, and big businessmen, all of whom are West Pakistani, over the majority eastern region of the country. Through a historic election, the seventy-five million people of Bangladesh unanimously rendered a verdict deciding to put an end to these twenty-three years of colonial slavery through their elected representatives. Last December, Yahya and Bhutto, representatives of the minority ruling clique, practically refused to accept this electoral verdict. Following weeks of deceptive talks in response to our constitutional demands, and even before formally concluding or declaring the failure of those talks, they launched a tank attack on the sleeping people of Bangladesh on the night of March 25. The subsequent events are a matter of history. Now we know that the talks were dragged on only as long as it took to import shipfuls of troops to the port of Chittagong. Long after the slaughter of completely unarmed Bangladeshi civilians, the fabrication of non-Bengalis being killed by Bengalis was invented as an excuse for these atrocities.</em></p><p><em>One of Yahya’s continuous incoherent and contradictory falsehoods is that Sheikh Mujib wanted to arrest him in Dhaka. Yet, all along in Dhaka, he was living within the safe cocoon of his generals. On the night of March 25, students, teachers, slum dwellers, laborers, rickshaw-pullers, and Bengali soldiers, police, and border guards were massacred in a cowardly military assault. Now it is claimed that Sheikh Mujib’s men had planned to seize Dhaka and Chittagong on the morning of March 26, and that this action had to be taken to thwart that plan. However, the military operations Yahya has unleashed against the entire population of the country cannot be considered a preemptive measure. These lies are so clumsy that they have failed to hide the true truth from the world, which is that the unprovoked military aggression by West Pakistani soldiers is driven by the denial of the self-governance rights of the country’s majority population.</em></p><p><em>The undeniable responsibility of the major powers in the reign of terror currently running rampant in Bangladesh cannot be ignored. By providing Pakistan with military and economic aid and turning a blind eye to its usage, they have aided the establishment of Pakistan’s dictatorial rule and the rise of the capitalist, aggressive military clique. By undermining the rights of democratic Bangladesh, they have paved the way for this faction and fostered the growth of fascist military power. They must first realize that the blood staining Yahya Khan’s hands also touches their own. The American people now understand that it is precisely because of the economic and military aid provided by their country that this massive carnage in Bangladesh could take place.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/447/1*sNxEGF6SnP4iGllTemPFEQ.png" /><figcaption>Image: A portrait of the man of integrity, Tajuddin Ahmad.</figcaption></figure><p><em>My appeal to the major powers, in the name of the oppressed people of Bangladesh, is that they must no longer strengthen bloodthirsty military authoritarianism against democratic forces. My appeal to them is that until the occupying military forces are withdrawn from Bangladesh, they must not attempt to repair the shattered economic structure of the Islamabad government, either directly or through the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund. Let no one be in doubt that giving any form of aid to Islamabad means boosting Pakistan’s military might, which will only be used to suppress the people of Bangladesh. The conspiracy hatched by Pakistan to depopulate Bangladesh through systematic massacres and a scorched-earth policy has several facets. Initially, they wanted to achieve this objective by creating friction between Bengalis and non-Bengalis; now they are trying to accomplish it by deliberately destroying communal harmony. But my countrymen know that our struggle is the struggle of all people of Bangladesh, regardless of race or religion. Those who are currently trying to pollute the environment of the country by spreading the venom of communalism are nothing more than enemy agents. We will not forgive these agents of the enemy. Anti-social elements who are looting, torturing, and oppressing under the shadow of the military will be given fitting punishment.</em></p><p><em>Pakistan has succeeded in placing a burden on India’s economy by driving millions of refugees onto its shoulders. We are grateful to India for everything it is doing to sustain the massive number of war-stricken, uprooted men and women who have been forced to seek shelter there. The statement by the United Nations Secretary-General calling for international aid contains a strong indirect recognition of the genocide and bestiality in Bangladesh. Regrettably, despite this belated appeal, the volume of international aid remains inadequate, and the monsoon season is approaching. People are suffering indescribably amidst epidemics. India is shouldering this problem entirely on its own. Of course, evidence that the global conscience has been stirred has recently emerged. We appeal to people of all countries to provide all kinds of assistance for those who have fled Bangladesh to India out of persecution and those suffering from famine inside the country. However, arrangements must be made to ensure that these relief supplies do not fall into the hands of the occupation government; otherwise, this aid will be used to kill innocent people. I want to let everyone know that the refugees of Bangladesh are eager to return home. To accelerate the time of their return, the youth of Bangladesh are joining the Mukti Bahini in huge numbers. They know that this is the only way to bring their loved ones back home, not by depending on the whim of barbaric forces who drove them out of the country through sheer violence. The Government of Bangladesh has decided that all citizens of Bangladesh who have been illegally uprooted from their homes, lands, and property since March 25 will have everything restored to them in a liberated homeland.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/0*TItqkGZKvIGi6ttg.jpg" /><figcaption>Image: An image of the man of integrity, Tajuddin Ahmad, leading a procession.</figcaption></figure><p><em>We appeal to all nations of the world to recognize the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. Formed on the basis of the free will of the people, this government is the sole representative of the country. Rejecting the colonial rule of West Pakistan completely, our people are fighting for independence. The persecution suffered by our people has very few parallels in world history. But we claim recognition not just for that reason, but because of our representative character. To all governments that have yet to take a firm stance regarding our struggle, those who have merely offered verbal support, and those who oppose it, I wish to state that the People’s Republic of Bangladesh has carved out a place on the map of the world and will remain permanently rooted there through the willpower of its seventy-five million people. Is it logical not to recognize this vast segment of humanity? Or is it favorable to the interests of these states?</em></p><p><em>I appeal once again to all countries of the world for arms assistance for the liberation struggle of Bangladesh. I have a special plea for our Muslim and Arab brothers who have not yet been able to condemn the genocide in Bangladesh. The notion that Yahya’s soldiers are fighting for Islamic principles and justice in Bangladesh is a tragic illusion on their part. He is invoking Islam while barbarously suppressing the will of the people and human rights. Having shattered Muslim solidarity himself by feeding Muslim corpses to vultures, he is now trying to maintain that solidarity in the name of Islam. For Muslim states to remain silent regarding our struggle means refraining from condemning colonialism and barbarism. Let the Arabs remember how they waged their own liberation struggles against the colonial rule of the Muslim Turks. Our fight against West Pakistani colonialism is no different. The people of Bangladesh are firmly resolved to continue the struggle until the enemy is finished or driven off our soil. Just as we have supported the struggles of the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America against colonialism and imperialism, we appeal to them to support our struggle in the exact same way. Our appeal to the major powers is to cast aside short-sighted calculations and stand on the side of justice and democracy. The slaughter of one million people and the displacement of five million cannot be considered the domestic affair of any government. May the aid you provide no longer add to the injustices committed against the peace-loving, freedom-loving, and democratic people of Bangladesh. Instead, exert your influence in an attempt to awaken the sound judgment of the insane ruling clique in Islamabad. Take steps to ensure the security and release of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the undisputed leader of the people of Bangladesh.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*xXkkG8mOhpS4ykXGHUlTkA.png" /><figcaption>Image: An image of the man of integrity, Tajuddin Ahmad, cordially shaking hands with armed forces personnel of the Mukti Bahini.</figcaption></figure><p><em>Under the leadership of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, this struggle of Bangladesh has sprung from the soil of the country like fresh blossoms. It originated from the desire of the people to put an end to the unbearable political relationship that was disrupting Bangladesh’s economic development and cultural identity. The propaganda spread by Pakistan claiming this to be instigated by India is its well-known tactic. Similar propaganda has been spread regarding all of Bangladesh’s demands, and no one is paying attention to it anymore. It must be stated that our movement was not built on the basis of ethnic necessity, nor is it directed against any cultural or linguistic group. To those citizens of Bangladesh whose native language is not Bengali, I hope they will not side with the enemy or consider themselves of the same stock as the occupying ruling clique. We know that many West Pakistani soldiers, especially Sindhi, Baluch, and Pathan soldiers, are being forced against their will to perform many shameful and cruel acts. I appeal to them to refuse to commit such inhumane deeds, uphold the dignity of soldiers, and stand by our side in the struggle against the oppressors. Our Mukti Bahini is now preparing the killing fields for the enemy in the swamps, jungles, rivers, and pathways of Bangladesh. With their blood, they have marked the symbols of our national identity. They are fighting for the new state in which our future lies. Their courage, self-sacrifice, and capacity to endure hardship will remain an ideal for all freedom fighters. Their success is truly the victory of their spiritual strength. There has never been another struggle fought with so few resources against such a brutally powerful enemy. I want to let them know that they reside in the hearts of the entire nation, and every single person is praying for their success.</em></p><p><em>Brave countrymen, you have endured suffering in this struggle, and you have also felt a sense of glory. Through this dual current, your strength has grown while the enemy’s strength has diminished. The enemy’s moral and financial strength is destroyed. Their presence is distorted. To shorten our period of suffering, we must attack the enemy simultaneously on all fronts. You must ensure that export goods and commodities do not fall into the enemy’s hands. Those traitors who have sided with the enemy must be punished. Maintain solidarity with the Mukti Bahini, who are purging the air of the country from pollution. Help your fellow freedom-fighting comrades in this struggle of yours. Be vigilant against the activities of enemy agents aimed at destroying communal and party harmony, and keep faith in your just goals and inevitable victory. Victory is certain. Joy Bangla.”</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/721/1*N0peQd6GLEKMjKUBvVIM4w.png" /><figcaption>Image: Handwriting of Tajuddin Ahmad.</figcaption></figure><p>Translated and formatted by me, Tasin Mahdi.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0ac4bed79525" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Prayer in Mogadishu: The Somali experience and the possible rise of so-called Islamists in…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@in-tasin/prayer-in-mogadishu-the-somali-experience-and-the-possible-rise-of-so-called-islamists-in-4c26f3465285?source=rss-c0a62de856ee------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4c26f3465285</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[mogadishu]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bangladesh]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[somalia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[radicalisation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[islamist-extremism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tasin Mahdi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 30 May 2026 12:19:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-30T12:19:42.643Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Prayer in Mogadishu: The Somali experience and the possible rise of so-called Islamists in Bangladesh</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SEsavB7oi-tmd7MoD6CRIA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image: Ali Jimale Mosque, a major landmark located in Mogadishu, Somalia. Women come here to pray as well. This is something Al-Shabaab objects to! (Hassan Ali via AFP)</figcaption></figure><p>This <a href="https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1CnLngAATc/">post</a> is collected from the author Raju Norul’s post and only translated by me.</p><p>I went to pray Eid prayers at the Al-Jamali Mosque in Mogadishu, wearing a panjabi that was close to red in color. It is the largest mosque in Mogadishu and can hold 5,000 people at once. It is an excellent mosque made of white stone. But I felt a little weird seeing people looking at me with great interest. Looking around, I saw that I was the only foreigner who had gone there to pray. Even though my skin color was greyish, I was certainly different from the Somalis. I thought, this must be the reason they are staring.</p><p>After asking the two gunmen with me, they told me that people were looking because of my panjabi. I felt a bit embarrassed. I said that I only have this one panjabi with me, and it is my favorite one, which I have been wearing for 10 years.</p><p>After hearing what I learned next, I was stunned, and my body turned cold with fear. The problem is that the panjabi I am wearing has cuts on both sides; ordinary Somalis hate this type of clothing intensely.</p><p>When the extreme corruption, dictatorship, and the oppression of his forces crossed the limits of human endurance in 1991, riots began between clans across the country, which is known as civil war. Millions of people have killed each other. Somalia collapsed as a state. The walls riddled with bullets in various places of the city still stand as witnesses.</p><p>Taking advantage of that instability, some foreigners began to be seen moving around here. A large part of them came from Afghanistan. They go from mosque to mosque, inviting people to Islam. They wear loose-fitting panjabis, pleated salwar, and turbans on their heads. People thought these pious people were here to save them.</p><p>They started preaching from the mosque. Then slowly it spread into the community. Small children and teenagers started joining their group. With extreme unemployment and an education rate of only 20 or 25 percent, people were desperate at that time. Famine was everywhere, hunger in the stomach, no hospitals, no schools, colleges, or universities. People jump at the chance to do something if they get it.</p><p>It was seen that teenagers would suddenly disappear from home, and after returning a few months later, mothers would see that their son had changed. He would not talk to his mother without a veil, behaved badly, and would hand over his sister to those mollas wearing cut-sleeve panjabis to satisfy his religious brother. That sister would be raped day after day. The brother did not care, he was told that his sister had been sacrificed in the path of Allah.</p><p>Days pass. Their support increases. Weapons are seen in their hands. It became forbidden for women to go outside. Someone received a command at home that tonight someone’s wife must come. Leaving her husband and children behind, that wife would secretly go to the mollas’ camp and return after three days, in secret. So that no one would know. That camp would be in some mosque again.</p><p>From ancient times, women here would make a sound with their mouths during any festival, much like the uludhvani in our country. There is a reason for this. Because of the connection with the sea, Somalia had a deep connection with the Indian subcontinent. The mollas would find those women and cut their tongues so that they could never make that sound again. As a result, half the tongues of countless women in Somalia are still missing.</p><p>In this way, over the last two and a half decades, this country on the shores of the Horn of Africa, India, and the Red Sea has become the breeding ground for one of the most dangerous militant groups in the world, Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab is mainly a branch of Al-Qaeda, and a large part of its members came with training from the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Slowly, the country, which was deeply connected with trade, Islamic culture, and sea routes with Persia and the Indian subcontinent, became increasingly unstable.</p><p>This continued until 2024. The country sank to the brink of an abyss. The Somali police force, with the help of America and Turkey, launched an operation against Al-Shabaab. Especially in the capital, Mogadishu, and the surrounding villages. Thousands of people from both sides lost their lives in intense fighting.</p><p>After the operation, it was seen that millions of condom packets were being recovered from the mosques, and CDs of pornography and books on militancy were being found. There were countless mosques where not a single Quran Sharif was found. Such news started appearing widely in the media.</p><p>The hatred in the minds of ordinary people was already there, and it increased several times over. The Somali community runs on a clan basis. For the good or bad of one member of the clan, another member of the clan can gladly give his life. They were furious. They also joined that battle. They killed thousands of Al-Shabaab members. They drove them away. Now, Somalis hate it when they see Kabuli-style clothing. In this country of 99.5 percent Muslims, people wear white Saudi-style robes on Eid.</p><p>Peace has not come yet. If a militant mentality once enters the depths of society, is it so easy to drive it away?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/0*vmyh074mV3aXLnu0" /><figcaption>Image: The interior view of the Al-Jimale Mosque in Mogadishu, Somalia. (Feisal Omar via REUTERS)</figcaption></figure><p>The whole of Mogadishu is covered in a blanket of security. Thousands of UN peacekeeping forces have set up security checkpoints every hundred or two hundred meters. Passing those security checkpoints wearing the cut-sleeve panjabi, I was thinking, is this then religion?</p><p>The transformation of Somalia is a chilling mirror for the current landscape in Bangladesh. As the nation navigates its own post-2024 transition, the visible increase in extremist rhetoric and the resurgence of radical groups, often exploiting socio-economic fragility and political vacuums, echo the early stages of the Somali descent.</p><p>Just as in Mogadishu, where the promise of a “pious” path masked a darker agenda of control and fragmentation, the growing visibility of hardline ideologies in our community demands vigilance. If the history of the Horn of Africa teaches us anything, it is that once a militant mentality takes root in the social fabric, it does not easily retreat. We are at a crossroads; either we foster genuine social resilience and institutional integrity, or we risk letting the shadows of the past define our future.</p><p><em>Raju Norul, an activist and writer.</em></p><p><em>Tasin Mahdi, a devoted knowledge seeker based in Dhaka, Bangladesh.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4c26f3465285" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Documentation: Sheikh Jamal: A Courageous Guerilla Fighter]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@in-tasin/documentation-sheikh-jamal-a-courageous-guerilla-fighter-0b4ab82f500c?source=rss-c0a62de856ee------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/0b4ab82f500c</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tasin Mahdi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 28 Apr 2026 11:22:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-04-28T15:52:34.388Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2>Documentation: Sheikh Jamal: A Courageous Guerrilla Fighter</h2><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*Szb1RFbfypxazss5vRCelg@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>Sheikh Jamal was a daring and heroic guerrilla fighter. He participated in the Liberation War of Bangladesh at the age of only seventeen. He was the second son of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, a valiant freedom fighter and a commissioned officer of the Bangladesh Army.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/499/1*o4nq6DIgoc6r8jgOGDeFrw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image: Sheikh Jamal loading ammunition into a heavy machine gun on December 1, 1971, in Kaliganj, East Pakistan, where he had joined the Bangladeshi guerrilla forces. His unit was fighting about 10 miles inside the East Pakistan border. (AP, Horst Faas)</figcaption></figure><p>Following the arrest of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman by the Pakistani army in the early hours of March 26, 1971, his family members (excluding Sheikh Kamal) were held captive in house number 26 on Road number 18 (now 9A) in Dhanmondi.</p><p>On August 5, 1971, the teenage Sheikh Jamal escaped from that barbed-wire-fenced confinement and fled to India. His journey from the Dhanmondi house to Agartala was extremely perilous. From Agartala, he traveled through Kolkata to Kalshi in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. There, he joined the Bangladesh Liberation Forces (BLF), which later became known as the “Mujib Bahini.”</p><p>He underwent 21 days of specialized training alongside about 80 other selected youths. After completing the training, he returned to the country and joined Sector 9, led by Major Jalil. Later, he fought under the command of the daredevil guerrilla commander Mahfuz Alam Beg. Upon the country’s independence, he returned home on December 19, 1971, still wearing his battlefield attire.</p><p>Sheikh Jamal was born on this very day, April 28, 1954, in Tungipara, Gopalganj district. He completed his secondary education at Dhaka Residential Model College and his higher secondary education at Dhaka College. He had a keen interest in learning the guitar and was also known as a talented cricketer.</p><p>He had a strong passion for joining the army. When Yugoslav President Marshal Tito visited Bangladesh in 1974, he observed Sheikh Jamal’s interest and offered him the opportunity to train at the Yugoslav Military Academy. He later joined there as a cadet. However, due to differences in environment, language, and climate, he found it difficult to adapt. Subsequently, he received the opportunity to train at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in Britain.</p><p>The passing-out parade at Sandhurst was held on June 27, 1975. Among the foreign cadets, three young officers from Bangladesh, including Sheikh Jamal, received their commissions. This achievement was even reported in international media.</p><p>After returning to the country, he joined the Bangladesh Army as a Second Lieutenant and was posted to the Second East Bengal Regiment at Dhaka Cantonment. There, he quickly gained respect among his fellow officers and soldiers for his professionalism and sincerity.</p><p>Sheikh Jamal was married on July 17, 1975. While balancing his family life and military duties, he was tragically killed in a brutal massacre just a month and a half later, on August 15, 1975, while staying at the Dhanmondi 32 residence.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0b4ab82f500c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The political context of 1971: Countering the depoliticisation narrative]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@in-tasin/the-political-context-of-1971-countering-the-depoliticisation-narrative-a65ebd60c278?source=rss-c0a62de856ee------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a65ebd60c278</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[1971]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[liberation-war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bangladesh]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tasin Mahdi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 10 Apr 2026 18:15:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-04-10T18:15:36.253Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*oacJ8KMka9O47Pr_Ol3sgg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image: 1971.</figcaption></figure><p>The effort to remove the Bangladesh Liberation War from its political context is old, but it rests on weak logic. It tries to turn a long constitutional struggle into a sudden emotional reaction to the night of 25 March, as if the war began only because the occupation forces attacked in darkness and as if the Bengali people had no prior political consciousness. That is a false reduction of history. It ignores the fact that the war emerged from a long movement for autonomy, from the democratic verdict of the 1970 elections, and from the breakdown of the constitutional transfer of power. The war was not the absence of politics. It was politics reaching its decisive and violent conclusion.</p><p>The deeper foundation of that struggle was already visible in the Six-Point Programme of 1966. It was not merely a list of regional grievances. It was a constitutional argument for restructuring the then state of Pakistan so that Bengal would no longer be treated as a subordinate economic colony. The Six points demanded parliamentary supremacy, a federal arrangement in which the centre would retain only defence and foreign affairs, separate fiscal and monetary policy, control of taxation and revenue by the federating units, separate foreign exchange accounts, and even a separate militia or paramilitary force for East Pakistan. This matters because it shows that the demand for autonomy was already pointing toward political self-rule and administrative separation. (Banglapedia, n.d.). (<a href="https://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Six-point_Programme">Banglapedia</a>) However, the argument for long-term regional autonomy was structurally fragile in the conditions that existed in Pakistan at the time. East and West Pakistan were separated by thousands of kilometres of hostile geography and had no meaningful organic administrative continuity between them. More importantly, the relationship between the two wings was not one of equal federation but of deep political and economic asymmetry, where East Pakistan was widely perceived and experienced as being treated as a subordinate region in a quasi-colonial structure. In such a context, autonomy within a single state framework depended entirely on goodwill and constitutional restraint from the central authority. That condition collapsed completely when the central state itself abandoned its constitutional norms and resorted to coercive domination. A state structure has meaning only when it can protect political rights. When that structure is used to suppress one region, deny representation, and ultimately enable mass violence, it ceases to function as a legitimate framework. State structures are meant to serve the people; when they fail to do so, their authority is morally and politically void. This is why the autonomy framework, while historically important as a political stage, could not survive as a final solution.</p><p>The election of 1970 then converted that political logic into an explicit democratic mandate. The Proclamation of Independence itself records that free elections were held to elect representatives for the purpose of framing a constitution, and that the Awami League won 167 out of 169 representatives. That meant the Bengali leadership was not simply a street movement or a military faction. It had a constitutional mandate from the people to form a government and draft a constitution. When the National Assembly was postponed, and the military regime refused to transfer power, the constitutional process was broken from above. The war was therefore not a rebellion against the democratic order. It was the defence of a democratic verdict that had been denied.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uTVV2km4H70RCXFBSqLT6A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image: 1970 election result board.</figcaption></figure><p>The armed phase also had political direction from the start. In the Chattogram account preserved in later recollections, Captain Rafiqul Islam moved at around 8:45 PM on 25 March after several days of secret meetings with Major Ziaur Rahman, Lt Col M. R. Chowdhury, and Chattogram Awami League leaders. The same account says that after 7:00 PM, Dhaka informed Chattogram that the talks had failed and that Bengali soldiers should not surrender their arms. Whether one stresses the exact minute or the wider sequence, the point is the same. The first continuous armed response in Chattogram was not a random outburst by an individual officer. It was a decision shaped by political consultation, military preparation, and the collapse of negotiations. That is a far stronger historical reading than the myth of spontaneous rebellion. (bdnews24.com, 2023). (<a href="https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/b9mzkznhzd">bdnews24.com</a>) The same structure appeared across the country. After 7 March, Sangram Parishads formed in many places, and local resistance training began. This was not an undirected social explosion. It was organised through elected MPAs (Member of the Provincial Assembly), who acted as representatives of the people and coordinated with Bengali officers wherever possible. In Habiganj, civil leadership entrusted Major C. R. Dutta with the liberation operation in Sylhet. In Barisal, civil leadership appointed Major Jalil as commander. In Kushtia-Chuadanga, Major Abu Osman Chowdhury formed a joint command with elected figures such as Dr Ashab-ul-Haq and Advocate Yunus Ali. In areas such as Sunamganj, where there were no Bengali officers at hand, civil leadership itself carried the resistance. This is important because it shows that the war had both a military arm and a civil-political arm, and neither can be understood properly without the other.</p><p>The regional autonomy argument strengthens this point rather than weakening it. The Six-point Programme already anticipated a political order in which the centre would be stripped of most powers and East Pakistan would control the key instruments of administration, finance, and even militia. In other words, by 1966, the demand had already gone beyond protest. It had become a constitutional challenge to the unitary logic of Pakistani rule. When a movement begins by demanding fiscal autonomy, control over revenue, separate currency arrangements, and a separate militia, it is not strange that the same movement later insists on sovereign authority when those demands are rejected and answered with force. Independence was therefore not a leap away from politics. It was the final answer to the failure of autonomy within Pakistan. The election of 1970 then transformed this already fragile constitutional arrangement into a direct legal crisis. The Awami League’s overwhelming victory gave it the uncontested right to form a government and frame a constitution. Yet the refusal to transfer power after December 1970 exposed a deeper structural truth: Pakistan’s constitutional order was not being interpreted differently; it was being selectively suspended. The delay from December to March was not procedural uncertainty but a political decision that effectively nullified electoral sovereignty. When an elected majority is prevented from assuming power despite constitutional mandate, the constitutional order ceases to be binding in any meaningful democratic sense.</p><p>The Teliapara meeting of 4 April is another example of why the war cannot be reduced to military improvisation. The officers there understood that a resistance movement without a government would be treated as mere insurgency. That is why they repeatedly urged the rapid formation of a government. The meeting also helped set out the command structure of the war. This proves a critical point. Military courage alone does not create national legitimacy. For that, there must be an elected authority, political command, and a constitutional basis. The officers were not trying to replace politics. They were trying to anchor the war inside politics so that the struggle would be recognised as the resistance of a people, not the mutiny of a few officers. (The Daily Star, 2014; Daily Sun, 2025). (<a href="https://www.thedailystar.net/commemorating-teliapara-with-a-muktijuddha-smriti-complex-53549">The Daily Star</a>)</p><p>The question of Bangabandhu’s declaration of independence is often misunderstood by those who want to detach the war from legality. He had the right to make that declaration because he possessed the popular mandate. The Proclamation of Independence later confirmed that right explicitly. It states that he was the undisputed leader of the 75 million people of Bangladesh and that, in fulfilment of the legitimate right of self-determination, he duly made the declaration of independence on 26 March. It further says that the elected representatives constituted themselves into a constituent assembly, confirmed the declaration, and declared Bangladesh a sovereign people’s republic. That is not rhetoric. It is a legal claim grounded in election results, constitutional authority, and the principle that a people attacked and denied representation may assert sovereignty through their elected leaders. His arrest did not cancel that authority. It intensified the political effect of his declaration because it exposed the regime’s violence to the world. A leader who has already secured a democratic majority does not need to disappear in order to be effective. In fact, his detention can heighten the crisis of legitimacy for the ruling power. That is exactly what happened. The Pakistani authorities were left looking undemocratic, arbitrary, and tyrannical, while the Bengali leadership could present itself as the victim of repression and as the rightful representative of the people. That is why the argument that an arrest somehow makes the declaration less valid is logically weak. Arrest can silence a person, but it does not erase a mandate. The creation of the Mujibnagar Government on 10 April completed the legal architecture of the struggle. The Banglapedia account explains that the government was formed by the top Awami League leaders, that the oath was taken on 17 April at Baidyanathtala, and that the government functioned as the government in exile. It also shows that the Ministry of Defence divided the war zone into sectors and appointed sector commanders, that the foreign affairs ministry built diplomatic missions abroad, and that other ministries handled finance, administration, health, information, and civil governance. This was not a symbolic cabinet. It was a functioning wartime state. Every freedom fighter, sector commander, and administrator operated within that sovereign framework.</p><p>That is why the de-politicisation narrative fails on both historical and logical grounds. It commits a chronology error by treating the night of 25 March as the beginning of everything. It commits a false dichotomy by pretending that armed resistance and political leadership are opposites. It commits a category mistake by treating military command as if it can replace democratic legitimacy. It commits a straw man by depicting the Bengali people as a crowd without consciousness or organisation. The actual record shows the opposite. The Six points created the autonomy framework, the 1970 elections created the mandate, the March crackdown created the armed emergency, the Chattogram revolt showed political and military coordination, the Teliapara meeting established command logic, and the Proclamation and Mujibnagar Government gave the war legal sovereignty. That is the continuity of history. That is the continuity of legitimacy.</p><p>The decision to swallow garbage is personal, but it does not change the truth of history.</p><h4>References:</h4><p>Arefin, A. S. M. Shamsul. (2012). মুক্তিযুদ্ধের প্রেক্ষাপটে ব্যক্তির অবস্থান [Muktiyuddher prekkhapote bektir obosthan]. Somoy Prakashan. (<a href="https://opac.iub.edu.bd/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=13723&amp;utm_source=chatgpt.com">IUB Library</a>)</p><p>Banglapedia. (n.d.). Mujibnagar Government. Asiatic Society of Bangladesh. Retrieved April 10, 2026. (<a href="https://en.banglapedia.org/index.php/Mujibnagar_Government">Banglapedia</a>)</p><p>Banglapedia. (n.d.). Proclamation of Independence. Asiatic Society of Bangladesh. Retrieved April 10, 2026. (<a href="https://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Proclamation_of_Independence">Banglapedia</a>)</p><p>Banglapedia. (n.d.). Six-point Programme. Asiatic Society of Bangladesh. Retrieved April 10, 2026. (<a href="https://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Six-point_Programme">Banglapedia</a>)</p><p>bdnews24.com. (2023, March 26). Early military action in Chattogram preempted a worse genocide in 1971: Rafiqul Islam. (<a href="https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/b9mzkznhzd">bdnews24.com</a>)</p><p>The Daily Star. (2014, December 5). Commemorating Teliapara with a Muktijuddha Smriti Complex. (<a href="https://www.thedailystar.net/commemorating-teliapara-with-a-muktijuddha-smriti-complex-53549">The Daily Star</a>)</p><p>Daily Sun. (2025, April 3). Historic Teliapara Day today. (<a href="https://www.daily-sun.com/printversion/details/798809">Daily Sun</a>)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a65ebd60c278" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The “Big Bird” in the cage: Why Bangabandhu chose to be arrested in 1971]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@in-tasin/the-big-bird-in-the-cage-why-bangabandhu-chose-to-be-arrested-in-1971-381ddcaab75c?source=rss-c0a62de856ee------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/381ddcaab75c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[26th-march]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bangabandhu]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[1971]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[liberation-war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bangladesh]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tasin Mahdi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 17 Mar 2026 16:30:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-03-17T17:13:29.271Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7o3-WBDh2NemEOVStydjvA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image: Sheikh Mujib speaks at a press conference at London’s Claridge’s hotel on 8 January 1972 following his release from Pakistani prison.</figcaption></figure><p>This <a href="https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1FLUgkQp61/">post </a>is collected from the author Akhtaruzzaman Azad’s post and only translated by me.</p><p>A debate often arises regarding the founding President of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. It centers on whether he was arrested or surrendered on the night of March 25, 1971; whether he should have courted arrest that night or followed other Awami League leaders to India to lead the government-in-exile; and whether he should have led that government or returned home to engage in frontal guerrilla warfare. The latter debate carries little weight today, as a head of state or government cannot typically engage in frontline combat; they must remain in a leadership position, bearing responsibility for the entire nation. Regarding March 25, the biggest question concerning Sheikh Mujibur Rahman is whether he should have crossed over to India. The identity of those who raise this question is clear: those who opposed Bangladesh’s independence, armed the Pakistan Army during the Liberation War, and formed paramilitary forces to kill freedom-loving people. However, simply stating that “the questioners are anti-independence” does not fully answer the query; rather, the question will continue to circulate for generations.</p><p>Sheikh Mujibur Rahman is the central figure of Bangladesh’s independence. Having been elected the Prime Minister of undivided Pakistan, he became the most significant figure in both wings. Consequently, it is natural that every minute of his life will be tested against a touchstone, scrutinized under a magnifying glass, and subjected to rigorous dissection. Although he is a settled figure of history and the Liberation War itself is a settled matter, old questions resurface with political shifts, making answers inevitable.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/0*610Pd03f_GIDPpZ4.jpg" /><figcaption>Image: The Pakistan army launched Operation Searchlight between 11.30 pm and midnight on 25 March. Armoured vehicles, tanks and trucks carrying soldiers rolled out of the cantonment and made their way to targets designated earlier.</figcaption></figure><p>When we imagine Sheikh Mujibur Rahman being arrested on the night of March 25, a single image comes to mind: Mujib wearing a white Panjabi and black coat, sitting on a sofa with his head bowed, while two armed Pakistani soldiers stand behind him. This one photograph of his arrest is etched in history. Looking at it, one might think the Pakistan Army gently took Mujib from Dhanmondi 32 to West Pakistan that night and that nothing else happened. But the reality was different. Much occurred that night. Admittedly, on March 25, most Awami League leaders and activists assumed Mujib would go into hiding instead of courting arrest and would lead the resistance himself. But Mujib’s thinking was different. What a leader will do on the eve of war is not a decision that can be made through a referendum; the leader must decide instantly. Mujib had his own rationale, and according to that plan, he stayed at his Dhanmondi 32 residence. The reasoning behind this decision, scattered accounts of the arrest, and historical evaluations are included in this narrative. Notably, on the night of August 15, 1975, when Mujib called the then Army Chief Shafiullah to report that his house was under attack, Shafiullah also told him to move. But Mujib did not move, neither on August 15 nor on March 25. Mujib was the President of Bangladesh in ’75 and the elected Prime Minister of undivided Pakistan in ’71. A President or Prime Minister does not flee; Mujib did not flee; he either courted arrest or faced death.</p><p>Before describing the arrest on the night of March 25, it is necessary to mention that at 10:30 PM that night, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman sent a secret message to Chittagong for broadcast. In that message, he urged the people to resist the army’s attack at any cost, regardless of his fate. In that message, he also declared the independence of Bangladesh. After sending the message, he asked most of the Awami League activists and BDR members responsible for his security to leave his house. The army began its attack in Dhaka around 11:00 PM, and Mujib sent the declaration of independence half an hour before or just as the attack started. Thus, it is not the case that Mujib went to West Pakistan for a “picnic” with the soldiers without providing any direction regarding independence. Those who read the declaration of independence from Chittagong Radio Station on March 26 and 27 did so on behalf of Mujib. As the elected Prime Minister of undivided Pakistan, no one but Mujib had the authority to declare independence at that time, and he did not court arrest without making that declaration. The source for the transmission of the message to Chittagong is the <em>New York Times</em>, January 18, 1972. Mujib told these facts himself to journalist Sydney Schanberg on January 16. Searching “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1972/01/18/archives/he-tells-full-story-of-arrest-and-detention-sheik-mujib-describes.html"><em>He tells full story of arrest detention</em></a>” on Google brings up Schanberg’s full report.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/360/0*q3oph3Xh7UVuHJWX" /><figcaption>Image: This is an article excerpt from The Times’s January 16, 1972 edition.</figcaption></figure><p>As mentioned, we see only one photo of the arrest, where he sits gloomily in a Panjabi and a coat. This might make us think he was just sitting on the sofa. In reality, the army attacked Dhaka at 11:00 PM and his house at 1:00 AM. They did not enter his house in a pleasant mood or escort him respectfully to a car. They entered while firing from all sides. About seventy soldiers were sent to arrest him, led by Brigadier Zahir Alam Khan. The mission was named “Operation Big Bird.” After the arrest, Zahir Alam sent a coded radio message to General Tikka Khan at Dhaka Cantonment: “Big bird in cage, little birds have flown.” Needless to say, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was the most important figure to the Pakistani rulers and military.</p><p>On March 26, 1972, <em>Dainik Bangla</em> published Begum Fazilatunnesa Mujib’s account of the night of March 25, 1971. An excerpt read:</p><blockquote>“Around ten o’clock, a gentleman from Kalabagan came and collapsed in front of Sheikh Saheb. He had only one thing to say, flee, Bangabandhu, flee. Hearing him, my heart grew fearful. I sent my eldest daughter and her younger sister to her husband’s house. At the moment of leaving, the younger daughter hugged me and her father and cried. Sheikh Saheb stroked her head and said, one must not cry in times of danger, mother. By then, soldiers were everywhere. Tanks were on the streets. Many people rushed to this house at Road 32. They said, Bangabandhu, please move away. He shook his head firmly, no, I will not go anywhere. Gunfire started from ten o’clock. The sound of shots drifted from afar. I saw Sheikh Saheb pacing the room with every soundwave. He muttered, the Bengalis cannot be killed this way, Bengal will not die. After midnight, the sound of gunfire drew closer. While closing the windows for the children, I saw soldiers entering the neighbor’s house. I clearly remember hearing a thunderous, angry roar, Go on, charge!</blockquote><blockquote>Immediately, a barrage of shelling began. Even amidst this intense gunfire, I felt the soldiers entering my house. I sat helplessly in my bedroom. Heavy shelling continued toward the house. They perhaps wanted to kill us by firing into this room. The shelling was so intense it felt like the whole house would collapse. My eyes and face burned from the smell of gunpowder. At that fierce moment, I saw Sheikh Saheb pacing the room incessantly like an angry lion. I had never seen him that angry. Around 12:30 AM, they came upstairs while firing. Sheikh Saheb hadn’t said anything to them until then. But now he walked out restlessly in front of them. I later heard the soldiers would have killed him then had the Colonel not shielded him with both hands. In a steady voice, Sheikh Saheb ordered them to stop firing. Then, keeping his head high, he went downstairs. A few moments later, he came back up. My second son, Jamal, handed him his wristwatch and wallet. A few clothes were packed. The soldiers took the suitcase and bedding. Before leaving, he looked at us once. He left with them, holding his pipe and tobacco.”</blockquote><p>As mentioned, the arrest process was not peaceful. One account notes that a local policeman on duty at Mujib’s house was killed by army fire (though Zahir Alam Khan claimed in his book that the policeman was only wounded). Soldiers also physically assaulted Mujib. Havildar Major Khan Wazir slapped Mujib loudly that night. This detail is found in Zahir Alam Khan’s autobiography, <em>The Way It Was: Inside the Pakistan Army</em>. Soldiers also struck Mujib on the back and legs with rifle butts (source: the “Arrest” chapter of Mohiuddin Ahmad’s book <em>Mujib of ‘71</em>). The raiding party used submachine guns and even grenades. Every male present at the house was arrested and taken to Adamjee Cantonment; others were released except Mujib. The source for the arrest of all males is Pakistani Brigadier General Siddiq Salik. Detailed descriptions of who ordered the arrest, how the house was surveyed, and what happened around Dhanmondi 32 are found in Zahir Alam Khan’s book. If one lacks the time to read the book, searching “The night Mujib was captured” will yield significant portions published in <em>Prothom Alo</em> on December 17, 2023. Reading that alone reveals the arrest was a terrifying experience, not a “bed of roses.” No one guaranteed he wouldn’t be killed during or after the arrest. Interested readers may also refer to the chapter “Dhanmondi 32 on March 25, ‘71” in Lt. Col. Muhammad Lutful Haque’s book <em>From Larkana Conspiracy to Independent Bangladesh</em>.</p><p>Sheikh Mujibur Rahman himself expressed the fear that he could have been killed on the night of March 25. In a January 1972 interview with British journalist David Frost (1939–2013), Mujib said, “That night, a commando unit of the Pakistan military surrounded my house. They wanted to kill me. Initially, they thought that if I came out, they would kill me and propagate that Bengali extremists had killed me. That is how they would carry out the massacre.” Furthermore, courting arrest did not guarantee Mujib’s safety. Staying alive would have been more certain had he fled to India. Even after being arrested, he faced death. A military court was set up in Pakistan with eleven or twelve charges against him, at least six of which carried the death penalty. “Declaring war against the government and army” and “treason” were among them. On December 4, just days before Bangladesh was liberated, the military court sentenced Mujib to death. A grave was even dug next to his cell. When legal execution failed, they tried other ways to kill him. Mujib was kept in Mianwali Jail, which was General Niazi’s district. On December 15, the day before the surrender, rumors were spread in the jail that Niazi had been killed in the East and that Mujib, the reason for Niazi’s death, was in that very prison. A conspiracy was hatched to open the cell doors so that angry inmates would kill Mujib. However, the plot was leaked, and Mujib survived. Mujib described this incident to Sydney Schanberg.</p><p>Thus, every moment of the nine and a half months Mujib spent in a Pakistani prison was a countdown to death. The Pakistan government did not provide him with luxury or comfort. Therefore, the theory that Mujib “<em>surrendered</em>” or “<em>fled</em>” to Pakistan for comfort on the night of March 25 holds no ground today. Similarly, the theory that “Mujib did not want independence” is baseless. Had he not wanted independence, he wouldn’t have been sentenced to death, a grave wouldn’t have been dug for him, and plots to have him killed by inmates wouldn’t have been made. After his arrest, the army burnt down his house in front of his ninety-year-old father and eighty-year-old mother. If he hadn’t wanted independence, the Pakistan Army wouldn’t have committed such heinous acts. Jamaat-e-Islami did not want independence. If Mujib hadn’t wanted it either, he would have been an angel in their eyes. Yet, Jamaat labels him as not wanting independence on one hand, while trying to paint him as a monster on the other. Their logic doesn’t hold up. Even half a century after his death, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman remains a terrifying nightmare for the Pakistan Army and Jamaat-e-Islami.</p><p>Now, as to why Mujib courted arrest on March 25, he answered this himself to David Frost. In the interview broadcast on January 18, 1972, Frost asked, “Why did you stay at your house instead of going elsewhere?” Mujib replied, “I knew the Pakistani forces were barbaric. I knew that if I went into hiding, they would kill all the people of the country. So I decided, better I die, but let my dear countrymen be saved.” Frost said, “You could have gone to Kolkata.” Mujib replied, “I could have gone anywhere. But how could I leave my countrymen! I am their leader. I will struggle, I will die. Why should I flee? My call to the people was to build resistance.” In his January 10, 1972, speech at the Racecourse Ground, he said, “My brothers, when they took me away, Tajuddin and Nazrul left me; I told them, do not ask me to die with seven crore Bengalis. I am blessing you. Tajuddin was crying. You go and struggle. I have faith. I want to die in this house. This will be the place of Bengal, and I want to die right here. I cannot bow my head to them.” As noted, Mujib did not flee on March 25 or August 15. A head of state or government does not flee. The January 10 speech is no less important than the March 7 speech.</p><p>A sensational point is the interview given by Tikka Khan, the commander of the Eastern Command, to Musa Sadik, a war correspondent for Shadhin Bangla Betar Kendro. Tikka Khan said, “I knew very well that a leader of his [Mujib’s] stature would never flee, leaving his people. To catch Mujib, I would have searched every house and street in Dhaka. I had no desire to arrest Tajuddin or any other leader. That is why they could flee so easily. If I hadn’t been able to arrest Sheikh Mujib that night, my forces would have blown up every house in Dhaka and Bangladesh with mortar shells. In retaliation, we might have killed a crore of Bengalis that night.” Musa Sadik took this interview on December 31, 1988, at the Governor’s House in Lahore. It can be found in his book <em>Muktiyuddha Hridoye Momo</em> or by searching “Return of the Patriarch from the jaws of death.” The fact that the massacre would have been worse had Mujib not courted arrest is verified by Tikka Khan himself. “Big Bird” Mujib had sensed this and told his leaders to go into hiding.</p><p>The debate over Mujib’s arrest or surrender is endless. Some call him a traitor, others say he stayed because he didn’t want independence, and some call it a mystery. Many claim the death toll would have been lower had he led from the field or abroad. However, iconoclastic writer Humayun Azad wrote in his 2003 book <em>Amra Ki Ei Bangladesh Cheyechilam</em>:</p><blockquote>“Pakistan captured Mujib, and could have killed him; that was natural for them. But even those brainless people perhaps understood that a dead or martyred Mujib would be far more alive and powerful than a captive one. They understood they could suppress or deceive a captive Mujib, but not a martyred one; then he would become undefeated, invincible, and unstoppable. I never saw Mujib up close, nor did I desire to. I am not a hero-worshipper. I saw him from a distance a few times but never praised him; I don’t feel a special attraction or respect for political ‘great men.’ That Mujib was captured and imprisoned in Pakistan during the war is something his enemies have condemned for a long time… mice condemning a lion.</blockquote><blockquote>In our pathetic country, all kinds of explanations are possible. Lies are very powerful here. If Mujib hadn’t let himself be caught and had fought as a fugitive, declaring independence from some broken radio station, would our war have been more intense or successful? Would he then be the Mujib? He would then have been a Major Zia. If Mujib had fled and declared war, it wouldn’t have been the Liberation War, he wouldn’t be Mujib, he would be a mere separatist, and we would have lost a massive political icon; we wouldn’t have felt such inspiration. A captive Mujib was much more powerful and inspiring than a fighting Mujib; he became a Great Hero, placed far above a mere ‘declarer.’ Throughout the war, he was the controller and the inspiration. He was, in a sense, the Liberation War. In a Pakistani jail, he might not even have known about the war… but as the embodiment of all Bengalis, he was the one fighting it. Every Bengali and freedom fighter was Mujib’s second self. Mujib’s captivity was a bigger event than the declaration of independence. One can become a declarer by declaring, but one cannot become Mujib.”</blockquote><p>Nure Alam Siddique, the president of Chhatra League from 1970-72, said in a late-life interview: “I was probably the last person to leave Road 32 [on March 25]. I requested a lot from him. The leader didn’t want to come with us. I was very sad then. Now I think he made the right decision. Had he gone, the people’s morale would have broken… people would think he had a prior deal with India to break Pakistan. That firm step toward embracing death accelerated and strengthened the independence movement.”</p><p>Syed Abul Maksud, one of Bangladesh’s most objective political analysts, wrote in 2020: “History shows that considering the overall situation, every decision Bangabandhu took from March 1, 1971, to January 10, 1972, was correct. Bangabandhu believed in systematic politics from the start and disliked hiding like communists. He did politics with the people.” Mujib himself wrote in <em>The Unfinished Memoirs</em>: “I do not believe in the politics of hiding. Because I do not like secret politics, nor do I believe in it.”</p><p>In the same column, Abul Maksud wrote: “Bangabandhu was the leader of the majority party. He was not a revolutionary or a guerrilla leader. He could not flee out of fear. Some colleagues advised him to declare independence and go into hiding on the evening of March 25. Bangabandhu did not agree. He did not want to leave the people in front of cannon muzzles. He stayed at his residence as a leader of a parliamentary democracy. His colleagues left him and went into hiding. The decision to stay was one of the most correct decisions of his life. Because he was on the path of constitutional and systematic politics, he gained international support… It was not a separatist movement like Biafra.” Biafra was a partially recognized country in West Africa (1967-70) that declared independence from Nigeria but was crushed by military action. Had Mujib gone to India on March 25, Bangladesh’s fate might have been like Biafra’s, either never independent or reabsorbed into Pakistan after a few years.</p><p>Farhad Mazhar, currently favored by pro-Pakistan factions, wrote on July 4, 1995, in <em>Bhorer Kagoj</em>: “Sheikh Mujib was extraordinarily far-sighted, and at least in this decision to get caught, he showed great wisdom. This was the ultimate expression of his leadership. Letting himself be caught was his core performance… When I look back at history today, it seems that by being caught by the occupying Pakistani soldiers, he showed unparalleled wisdom. Had he not done this, I doubt whether Bangladesh would have become independent.”</p><p>Essayist Abdul Halim (1939–2010) wrote in <em>Dainik Sangbad</em> on May 10, 1995: “The statement that Bangabandhu let himself be caught, i.e., surrendered, is incorrect. Bangabandhu was at his home, which was also his office. At that time, Bangabandhu was running a parallel government through the non-cooperation movement. The Pakistani soldiers went there and arrested or detained him. This is not called ‘surrendering.’ In fact, the Pakistanis detained him as the President of independent Bangladesh. Partial recognition of this is that he was taken to West Pakistan. If it were a simple arrest, Dhaka Central Jail would have sufficed.”</p><p>Columnist Khandakar Mazharul Karim wrote in <em>Dainik Ittefaq</em> on September 28, 2000: “By courting arrest, the Father of the Nation showed foresight. Had he been caught while a fugitive, he would have been deprived of diplomatic status, respect, and facilities. Even if he led from abroad as a fugitive, he couldn’t have secured the rights under international human rights charters. Thus, taking the risk of a violent death, he courted arrest.” Professor Ahmad Nurul Islam wrote in <em>Dainik Nayadiganta</em> on October 30, 2007: “I believe that Mujib probably knew that with international help, he could return to the soil of Bengal from the hands of the Pakistanis. But had he gone to India, he might not have been able to return.”</p><p>Journalist ABM Musa (1931-2014) wrote in his 2012 book <em>Mujib Bhai</em>: “If Sheikh Mujib hadn’t returned to independent Bengal, what would have happened to the country? Because he returned on January 10, 1972, many things became possible, and many tragedies were averted. Many believe that had he not returned, the Indian Army would not have left so soon. Some say a civil war would have broken out between the Mujib Bahini and the government-in-exile… Bangladesh could have become another Congo, Somalia, or Afghanistan… Simply put, had Bangabandhu not returned, many accidents would have happened which no one else could have stopped… New Bangladesh could have been Iraq or Afghanistan.” It goes without saying that returning from India would not have given Mujib the same confidence or acceptance to control a war-torn country as returning from a Pakistani prison did.</p><p>To summarize the information and theories presented: history does not follow the rules of arithmetic. In arithmetic, two plus two is four; in history, it can be four or twenty-two. According to the 1970 election results, Mujib was the Prime Minister of undivided Pakistan. He was the president of the majority party. After the election, East Pakistan effectively ran on his orders. He was the sovereign authority. Thus, the decision on what to do on March 25 was his alone to make, and he alone had the wisdom for it. He made his decision, and Bangladesh ultimately became independent. Had he gone to India that night, the history of the subcontinent would have been different. Bangladesh might have become independent sooner, or not at all, or might have been reabsorbed like Biafra. Historical equations suggest that had he gone to India, the consequence for Bangladesh would have been grim.</p><p>On his way back from Pakistan, Mujib stopped in India and told Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to withdraw the Indian Army from Bangladesh. Indira Gandhi complied, choosing March 17 (Mujib’s birthday) as the date for total withdrawal because she respected him so much. No other leader would have had the courage to tell the Indian Prime Minister to withdraw their army. Mujib had that courage. However, he wouldn’t have felt that level of confidence had he fled to India on March 25. To stay in a country as a refugee and then return from there to ask that country to withdraw its army is unthinkable. Furthermore, because he returned from “Pakistan,” local war criminals received a general amnesty and survived; had he returned from “India,” they might not have.</p><p>Analyzing these statements, it appears that the image of a captive Mujib in a Pakistani jail was far more powerful than a Mujib hiding in India would have been. Almost all leaders were in India, including Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, but their roles were not as significant. Had Mujib gone to India, he might have remained eclipsed, a footnote in history. The people of East Pakistan had already revolted once to free him from the Agartala Conspiracy Case. To free him again, they liberated the entire country. If he were hiding in India, that ironclad resolve might not have existed. A captive Mujib gained international importance that a fugitive Mujib would not have.</p><p>A captive Mujib became the most important political character in the subcontinent in 1971, a synonym for the country. Some Awami League members in India even said they wanted a living Mujib back, even at the cost of independence. Mujib meant independence, and independence meant Mujib. Finally, Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi wrote in <em>The Betrayal of East Pakistan</em> that Bhutto had four “trump cards” to bring back prisoners of war, one of which was Mujib. Mujib could have been traded for prisoners, but he was released unconditionally. After December 16, around 93,000 Pakistani prisoners were in various camps in India.</p><p>Akhtaruzzaman Azad, a Dhaka University alumnus and author of many books.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=381ddcaab75c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why I Will Not Vote in This Election]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@in-tasin/why-i-will-not-vote-in-this-election-d6fc98dae418?source=rss-c0a62de856ee------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d6fc98dae418</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[narrative]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[novote]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[elections]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[liberation-spirit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bangladesh]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tasin Mahdi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 09 Feb 2026 18:26:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-09T18:26:28.969Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SitFb0lEOBg2WCEQGu3Z1A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image: Children are holding their national flags in the mustard field.</figcaption></figure><p>The upcoming 13th National Parliamentary Election, scheduled for February 12, 2026, is a one-sided and therefore illegitimate election. In colloquial terms, it can be described as an all-in-the-family election. In Bangladeshi political history, elections have lost public acceptability and legitimacy when a party representing a substantial portion of the population has been absent. This has been a consistent standard of political judgment, not an arbitrary one. In the present case, a major political force that represents a large segment of the Bangladeshi people is again absent from the electoral process. Under such conditions, the upcoming election has already failed, and will continue to fail, to meet not only the standard of being free and fair, but the more fundamental standard of being inclusive. For this reason alone, the election is structurally one-sided.</p><p>At its core, an election is not a single-day event but a continuous political process through which a public mandate is formed regarding the ideological direction, policy framework, and governing philosophy of the state. When significant political options that large portions of the population wish to choose from are excluded or rendered ineffective, the constitutional purpose of holding an election is not fulfilled. Elections derive legitimacy not merely from procedural regularity but from meaningful choice. Without that choice, the process becomes a formal exercise rather than a democratic one.</p><p>Most of the political parties that have pledged to participate in the upcoming election are broadly homogenous in outlook. They largely share the same political vision, ideological assumptions, and policy orientation. To state this plainly and with due respect, that shared orientation can be described as an anti-hegemonic Bangladeshi Muslim nationalist ideal that has long existed in this subcontinent. While there may be differences in degree or rhetorical emphasis, these variations do not amount to genuine ideological alternatives. In contrast, the political spectrum rooted in Bengali nationalism, secularism, and socialist ideals is absent from this election altogether.</p><p>Historically, Bangladeshi politics has been shaped primarily by the tension and interaction between these two ideological currents. Public discourse, state policy debates, and even everyday political consciousness in Bangladesh have been framed within this duality since independence. When one of these foundational currents is missing from an election, the resulting political process cannot claim to reflect the collective will of the people. In that context, it logically follows that this election is one-sided, and that its constitutional purpose of representing popular sovereignty cannot be fulfilled.</p><p>However, the decision not to vote in this election is not based solely on its lack of inclusivity or its failure to meet constitutional standards. The more pressing reason is the need to register a clear and principled rejection of a specific narrative that this election seeks to legitimize. Before addressing that narrative directly, I want to clarify my own position. I am unequivocally pro-change. Bangladesh is a young state. We are only in the 54th year of our independence. From the perspective of political science, this is a relatively short period in the life of a nation. Yet it is also long enough to have built strong, accountable, and effective institutions. That we have failed to do so is a collective failure, not the responsibility of any single individual or group alone. This failure must be critically examined. Structural reforms are necessary. We must rethink how state accountability is ensured, how public interest is translated into governance, and how the constitutional vision articulated by the framers of our state can be meaningfully implemented. I have supported such change in the past, I support it now, and I will continue to do so.</p><p>The critical question, however, is whether the current election and the accompanying referendum can genuinely serve as instruments of such reform. A large segment of the Bangladeshi population is already asking whether this process reflects their aspirations or merely imposes conclusions upon them. This skepticism is not accidental. It emerges from the broader political context in which the election is taking place.</p><p>This brings me to the central issue. A deliberate counter-narrative is being advanced through the upcoming election. This narrative directly challenges the historical and ideological foundations of Bangladesh’s independence. It seeks to undermine the Liberation War narrative that led to the creation of the state and the Constitution of 1972. There is a visible effort to declare that Mujibism must be buried, that the Constitution of 1972 is no longer relevant, and that the moral and historical legitimacy of 1971 itself is open to revision. The implicit message is that the people of Bangladesh were mistaken in 1971 and that the country must return to an older ideological framework.</p><p>To some, this may sound exaggerated. However, recent events make this context unmistakably clear. Two years ago, it was argued that a particular political party had ruled by instrumentalizing the Liberation War narrative. Many of us acknowledged that this claim contained partial truth. What followed after August 5th removed any remaining ambiguity. The destruction of the house from which Bangladesh’s declaration of independence was announced, the demolition of portraits of the seven Bir Sreshthos, the erasure of official records of thousands of freedom fighters, and the open calls to bury Mujibism revealed that the target was not merely a fifteen-year period of governance. The target was the Liberation War narrative itself. This becomes even more evident when one considers that the term Mujibism was not prominently used or emphasized during that party’s fifteen years in power, yet it has been repeatedly invoked in the last two years. This is not coincidental. Mujibism is being attacked now precisely because it represents the ideological foundation of the Liberation War. The hostility is directed not at governance failures of that party’s fifteen year rule but at the historical legitimacy of the state itself.</p><p>Seen in this light, the upcoming election and the proposed referendum function as instruments to formalize this counter-narrative. Just as the 1970 election and the subsequent psychological and political consent of the people provided the mandate for the Liberation War and the birth of Bangladesh, the current election is being positioned as a mandate to delegitimize that very historical foundation. Participation under these conditions would not merely endorse a flawed electoral process. It would contribute to the normalization of a narrative that negates the core ideals upon which the state was founded. For all these reasons, as someone who believes in the fundamental ideals of the Liberation War and is simultaneously committed to necessary structural change, I choose to protest this election by refusing to participate in it. Not voting, in this context, is not political apathy. It is a deliberate act of resistance against a process that seeks to convert exclusion into consent and revisionism into mandate.</p><p><em>Tasin Mahdi, a knowledge seeker based in Dhaka, Bangladesh, exhibits a profound commitment to the betterment of his home nation and a keen interest in international affairs and quietly coaxes discussions on global and local issues.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d6fc98dae418" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The rise and rupture of political coexistence in Bangladesh: A few words on building the future…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@in-tasin/the-rise-and-rupture-of-political-coexistence-in-bangladesh-a-few-words-on-building-the-future-d84890a27c6a?source=rss-c0a62de856ee------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d84890a27c6a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sheikh-hasina]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[political-coexistence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[khaleda-zia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bangladesh]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tasin Mahdi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 30 Dec 2025 14:48:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-12-30T14:48:11.952Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>The rise and rupture of political coexistence in Bangladesh: A few words on building the future after the “Battle of the Begums.”</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5TDYAWu0u680AKrvtfgZBg.jpeg" /></figure><p>In the 1990s, the anti-autocracy movement led jointly by Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia took the form of the “<em>Battle of the Begums</em>,” marking a pivotal phase in Bangladesh’s political history. Though often remembered for their intense rivalry, this period initiated a limited but significant political coexistence between the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). For the first time since independence, these forces worked within a joint political framework, acknowledging each other’s presence in national politics despite big ideological differences.</p><p>During Ershad’s autocratic rule, on January 24, 1988, police opened fire on Sheikh Hasina’s motorcade as she was heading to a public meeting at Laldighi Maidan in Chittagong. According to official records, 9 people were killed; however, unofficial sources put the death toll at 24, while the Awami League’s webpage cites 80 fatalities. The Awami League described this attack as a deliberate attempt to assassinate Sheikh Hasina. In protest of this attack, the Awami League and the then 8-party alliance called for a demonstration at the Shaheed Minar in Dhaka on January 26. For various reasons, Sheikh Hasina did not attend that rally, but to everyone’s surprise, BNP leader Begum Khaleda Zia did. She even led a protest march following the rally to condemn the police firing on Sheikh Hasina’s convoy, and the massacre carried out by Ershad’s autocratic regime. The image shows many current ruling party leaders, including Inu, Menon, Shahjahan Khan, Shirin Sultana, and Sheikh Selim, participating in the march led by Khaleda Zia.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*4v0OUV6UasPsWL5I.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image: Shaheed Minar, 1988.</figcaption></figure><p>This coexistence was reflected in several symbolic and practical interactions between the leadership of the two parties. Senior figures from both sides occasionally met in formal and informal settings, proving that political competition had not yet turned into ultimate enmity. Sheikh Hasina’s presence as an invited guest at the wedding of Khaleda Zia’s eldest son, Tarique Rahman, remains one of the most striking examples of this political courtesy. Similarly, both leaders were often seen together at military-hosted events, reinforcing the idea that despite the rivalry, the political system still allowed room for mutual recognition and restraint.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/549/0*c_660vXm9eBRAli4.JPG" /><figcaption>Image: The then Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and opposition leader Begum Khaleda Zia sit at a wedding reception for Khaleda’s second son, Arafat Rahman, March 28, 1997. (Reuters)</figcaption></figure><p>However, this balance was fragile. The country continued to experience political unrest, street confrontations, and institutional weakness. Over time, mistrust between the Awami League and the BNP deepened. The August 21, 2004, grenade attack marked the most decisive rupture in this relationship. During an Awami League rally in Dhaka, military-grade grenades were hurled at the stage where Sheikh Hasina and senior party leaders were present. The attack killed and injured many and sent shockwaves through the nation. Beyond its immediate human cost, the incident fundamentally altered political relations in Bangladesh. It destroyed whatever remained of mutual trust and effectively ended the coexistence that had developed during the 1990s. From that point onward, politics increasingly became defined by fear, suspicion, and permanent confrontation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*6QohbmgNXOQDo30f.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image: Sheikh Hasina addressing her supporters shortly before the August 21, 2004, blast.</figcaption></figure><p>In any democratic system, ideological disagreement is natural. What undermines democracy is the transformation of disagreement into enduring political toxicity and violence. Coexistence does not require ideological compromise, but it does require restraint and recognition of political legitimacy. When these elements disappear, democratic competition collapses into exclusion and retaliation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*-jnDYgmcc5e18G87.jpg" /><figcaption>Image: Sheikh Hasina Wajed, left, and Khaleda Zia, right, speak as they attend a function in Dhaka on November 21, 2008. (AFP)</figcaption></figure><p>Despite the deep rupture created by August 21, the political relationship between the two leaders remained complex and contradictory. During Sheikh Hasina’s tenure as Prime Minister, Khaleda Zia faced political isolation. The collapse of coexistence became even more visible during Sheikh Hasina’s later terms as Prime Minister. Following the BNP’s boycott of the January 5, 2014, national election, the country entered a period of intense political violence. In the lead-up to and aftermath of the election, BNP led agitation involved widespread arson attacks, the torching of polling centers, attacks on public transport, and incidents that resulted in the deaths of numerous civilians and security personnel. The political environment deteriorated rapidly, creating a serious law and order crisis.</p><p>Within this context, Khaleda Zia was effectively confined to her Gulshan residence from January 3 to mid January 2015, a period widely described by the media as a form of virtual or de facto house arrest. While the government denied issuing a formal house arrest order, the restriction was imposed amid fears of further violence and instability following the election boycott and continuing street agitation. This 17-day confinement symbolized how far political confrontation had replaced coexistence in Bangladesh’s political culture.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*cq4mElPBb8pFPX7BaFXE5Q.png" /><figcaption>Image: The sand truck was left lying on the road after it was removed. The road was closed to traffic on January 19, 2015.</figcaption></figure><p>Shortly after this period, on January 24, 2015, Khaleda Zia’s younger son, Arafat Rahman, died in Malaysia. On January 24, 2015, Sheikh Hasina, while serving as Prime Minister, went to Khaleda Zia’s residence to offer condolences. However, the gates were not opened, and the meeting did not take place. This moment became a powerful symbol of the complete breakdown of political and human engagement between the two leaders, even in the face of personal tragedy.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*WjCopjF5eX99U3icVOkOaQ.png" /><figcaption>Image: Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina at the gate of Khaleda Zia’s Gulshan office on January 24, 2015.</figcaption></figure><p>Such moments illustrate that political coexistence in Bangladesh was not destroyed overnight, but gradually eroded by accumulated trauma, mistrust, and unresolved grievances. It is natural for political parties in any country to hold sharp ideological differences. Disagreement, debate, and competition are essential elements of a democratic system. However, when these differences evolve into permanent political toxicity and normalized violence, democracy itself begins to erode. A violent and hostile political environment benefits no one except those who thrive on chaos. By contrast, coexistence between rival political forces, even in the presence of deep disagreement, creates the minimum conditions necessary for a healthy and functioning democracy.</p><p>Symbolic gestures carry weight far beyond their immediate meaning. A statement of condolence from Sheikh Hasina following Khaleda Zia’s passing, or expressions of grief and restraint from Awami League leaders, could serve as an important step toward rebuilding a form of coexistence that has long disappeared from Bangladesh’s political culture. Such gestures would simply reaffirm that political rivalry does not have to permanently extinguish humanity. It is precisely because coexistence weakens extremism that the defeated forces of 1971 continue to work relentlessly to ensure it never takes shape. Their political survival depends on the sustained distance and hostility between the Awami League and the BNP. Without this division, they lose relevance, narrative, and space in national politics. Therefore, for a democratic transition and a beautiful future for Bangladesh, the nation must set aside entrenched political hostilities, without denying its gravity. Unity against neo-Razakars and the defeated forces of 1971 is not a matter of preference but necessity. There is no alternative. If this division persists, those forces will inevitably rise again. In the current post, on August 5, a war-like political situation, emotional restraint is crucial. There will be time to address grievances and confront painful histories once stability returns. For now, creating a form of coexistence based on strategic considerations is not a weakness. It is the need of the hour.</p><p><em>Tasin Mahdi, a knowledge seeker based in Dhaka, Bangladesh, exhibits a profound commitment to the betterment of his home nation and a keen interest in international affairs and quietly coaxes discussions on global and local issues.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d84890a27c6a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Documentation: The 1988 Laldighi Massacre to Kill Hasina: A Moment of Rare Political Unity]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@in-tasin/archive-the-1988-laldighi-massacre-to-kill-hasina-a-moment-of-rare-political-unity-bc997d2cbcae?source=rss-c0a62de856ee------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bc997d2cbcae</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[laldighi-massacre]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sheikh-hasina]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bangladesh]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[khaleda-zia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hasina-assassination]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tasin Mahdi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 30 Dec 2025 13:38:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-19T17:54:29.120Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*oQxYMGF0w2meTYEzwMVMlQ@2x.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image: Shaheed Minar, 1988.</figcaption></figure><p>During Ershad’s autocratic rule, on January 24, 1988, police opened fire on Sheikh Hasina’s motorcade as she was heading to a public meeting at Laldighi Maidan in Chittagong. According to official records, 9 people were killed; however, unofficial sources put the death toll at 24, while the Awami League’s webpage cites 80 fatalities. The Awami League described this attack as a deliberate attempt to assassinate Sheikh Hasina.</p><p>In protest of this attack, the Awami League and the then 8-party alliance called for a demonstration at the Shaheed Minar in Dhaka on January 26. For various reasons, Sheikh Hasina did not attend that rally, but to everyone’s surprise, BNP leader Begum Khaleda Zia did. She even led a protest march following the rally to condemn the police firing on Sheikh Hasina’s convoy and the massacre carried out by Ershad’s autocratic regime. This is a photo of that procession. The image shows many current ruling party leaders, including Inu, Menon, Shahjahan Khan, Shirin Sultana, and Sheikh Selim, participating in the march led by Khaleda Zia.</p><p>After the incident, Hasina stated, “The autocrat Ershad wanted to kill me, but my party workers protected me with their lives.”</p><p><em>Tasin Mahdi, a knowledge seeker based in Dhaka, Bangladesh, exhibits a profound commitment to the betterment of his home nation and a keen interest in international affairs and quietly coaxes discussions on global and local issues.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bc997d2cbcae" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[An Unwarranted Controversy over Bangabandhu’s Title]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@in-tasin/an-unwarranted-controversy-over-bangabandhus-title-dfd53db28d90?source=rss-c0a62de856ee------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dfd53db28d90</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tasin Mahdi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 21 Dec 2025 13:09:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-12-21T13:09:57.589Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>An Unwarranted Controversy over Bangabandhu’s Title Arising from the 1973 “Vietnam Day” Programme of Bangladesh Chhatra Union</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/225/1*9ZjqbqrYef4PPlu93-dBFQ@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>On 1 January 1973, as part of the observance of “Vietnam Day,” the Bangladesh Chhatra Union, along with DUCSU and other student organisations, organised a protest march against the brutal bombing of Vietnam by the United States. In the context of a newly independent Bangladesh, this demonstration reflected the strong international anti-imperialist sentiment prevailing among students and progressive political forces at the time. (The Daily Star)</p><p>At around 11:45 a.m., when the procession reached the American Information Center in Dhaka, the situation became tense. As the demonstrators turned aggressive while protesting in front of the center, the police attempted to restrain them. This was not an exceptional action; it is standard practice for any host country to deploy police to ensure the security of foreign diplomatic and information establishments. During the confrontation, police opened fire, killing two students: Motiul Islam, a 21-year-old student of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Dhaka, and Mirza Kudirul Islam, an HSC second-year student of Dhaka College. Seven others were injured in the incident.</p><p>The killings triggered widespread public outrage across the country, leading to the announcement of a hartal on 2 January from 5:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. (The Daily Star)</p><h4>Bangabandhu’s Response:</h4><p>Following the incident, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman expressed profound grief in an official statement. He said, “I am deeply grieved by the unfortunate incident today which resulted in the loss of our two boys and caused injury to some. My heartfelt sympathies go out to the bereaved families and to the injured persons. A judicial inquiry has already been ordered to ascertain the causes which resulted in this tragedy. The government and the people, and all political and other organisations, have a common interest to ensure that such an incident does not recur so that everyone can enjoy the fruits of a peaceful democratic society in Bangladesh.” (The Daily Star)</p><p>This statement clearly demonstrates that Bangabandhu viewed the incident with serious humanitarian and political concern. He acknowledged the loss of young lives, expressed solidarity with the affected families, and immediately ordered a judicial inquiry to ensure accountability and prevent the recurrence of such tragedies.</p><p>However, in the heat of the moment, a DUCSU leader made an emotionally charged remark that appeared to question Bangabandhu’s title as the Father of the Nation. In reality, DUCSU or any other institutional body never revoked or rejected Bangabandhu’s title. That remark was an impulsive outburst driven by anger and grief, not a considered or lasting political position. Today, fragments of that momentary reaction are being selectively used by certain quarters to run propaganda against Bangabandhu, detached from their historical context.</p><p>It must also be stated unequivocally that Bangabandhu never took a position against Vietnam. On the contrary, he stood firmly against American aggression, a stance that subjected him to significant international pressure. Bringing Bangabandhu into the controversy surrounding the Vietnam protest is therefore entirely irrelevant. His immediate expression of sorrow for the slain students and his order for a judicial inquiry demonstrate that he valued students’ lives and upheld the principle of justice.</p><p>Blaming Bangabandhu for this incident, or using it to distort history, is an act of intellectual dishonesty. Ultimately, one truth remains unshaken: Bangabandhu is Bangabandhu. He earned this name through his leadership in the struggle for the emancipation of the Bengali people, and millions of people called him “Bangabandhu” out of love, trust, and historical experience. This name is not a formal prefix or a temporary political label. It is the recognition of a nation’s collective struggle and aspiration. It cannot be erased, diluted, or undermined by words spoken in moments of anger.</p><h4>References:</h4><p>“Judicial inquiry ordered over police firing on students,” The Daily Star. Link: https://www.thedailystar.net/backpage/news/judicial-inquiry-ordered-over-police-firing-students-2020529</p><h4>Additional Reference:</h4><p>“1st January: The Anti-Imperialism Solidarity Day in Bangladesh,” Marxist Review Asia. Link: https://www.marxistreview.asia/1st-january-the-anti-imperialism-solidarity-day-in-bangladesh</p><p>Tasin Mahdi.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dfd53db28d90" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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