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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by The Technoskeptic on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Technology is Not the Solution (Principles of Technoskepticism — Part Two)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-technoskeptic/technology-is-not-the-solution-principles-of-technoskepticism-part-two-fbebb6ed7f18?source=rss-b07537893288------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[morality]]></category>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Technoskeptic]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 29 Nov 2017 22:04:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-11-29T22:04:46.677Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>David A.J. Reynolds</em></p><p>“If we get this right, I believe we can fix all the world’s problems.” Google executive Eric Schmidt is far from the first to predict that a universalizing technology, transcending the tangible and particular, would put the world right. It is exactly 20 years since Nicholas Negroponte, the head of the MIT Media Lab, said that in 20 years there would be world peace, since those who grow up with the Internet “are not going to know what nationalism is.” Back in 1925, General James Harbord, the chairman of RCA, confidently prognosticated that “radio will serve to make the concept of peace on earth, good will toward men a reality.” And precisely one hundred years ago, aviation pioneer Orville Wright, in an interview with <em>Harper’s Magazine</em>, extolled “the aeroplane as a real promoter of civilization.” This new invention “will help peace in more ways than one,” he insisted, “in particular I think it will have a tendency to make war impossible.”</p><p>While flight obviously failed to usher humans away from violent conflict, it does demonstrate the trajectory in which the technological mind and life propels us. All of the technologies fêted above, heralded as decisive breakthroughs in human relations, participated in what Hannah Arendt described as the “shrinkage of space and the abolition of distance.” And they have demonstrated a recurring mutuality between humankind’s increasing power over the world and our alienation from it. “Leaving the surface of the earth altogether,” Arendt posited, “is like a symbol for the general phenomenon that any decrease of terrestrial distance can be won only at the price of putting a decisive distance between man and Earth, of alienating man from his immediate earthly surroundings.”</p><p>A somewhat trivial but telling example of this is the way that many Americans tend to dismissively joke about so-called flyover states. These are thousands of square miles of the American continent, replete with unique landscapes and vibrant communities, which assume the status of nothingness to travelers for whom they merely represent what is transcended in order to journey at great speed between the nation’s coastal hubs. We may enjoy the fruits of the ability to make a trans-continental trip often and easily, but a hundred such journeys would afford less understanding and appreciation than one trip across the same territory on terra firma. The point is not that flying is intrinsically bad. But it is illustrative. Technologies that increase our command of distance also bring a different (and ultimately more crippling) distance in their wake. You are not part of what you can effortlessly span. This surviving truth found expression when a president was castigated for viewing the effects of Hurricane Katrina from the air, where the scope but not the meaning could be perceived.</p><p>The Internet, which the latest techno-utopians zealously exalt to messianic status, brings a similarly archetypal combination of connection and isolation. It is almost too obvious now to point to the phenomenon of modern men and women remotely linked with people all over the world in an instant while stubbornly oblivious to neighbors and surroundings. But the explosion of Internet availability and usage is not only exemplifying technology’s imperialism, but has also breathed new life into what should have long since been discarded — the claim that through the application and influence of technology our greatest problems can be solved. The writer Evgeny Morozov, in his penetrating 2014 critique, <em>To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism</em>, focused on a ubiquitous “Internet-centrism” as the central element of the solutionism that has reasserted an unwarranted grip on society. “‘The Internet’ has become the impetus for many of the contemporary solutionist initiatives,” he asserts, “while also being the blinkers that prevent us from seeing their shortcomings.”</p><p>While Morozov sets his sights on solutionism in general, which he describes as an “intellectual pathology that recognizes problems as problems based on just one criterion: whether they are ‘solvable’ with a nice and clean technological solution at our disposal,” the following will mainly focus more specifically on the myth of technology as a solution to <em>moral problems</em>. This is warranted because in the many places that technological solutionism can be encountered, there is almost always at least the implicit understanding of a moral imperative, motivation, or payoff. As Morozov notes, Silicon Valley’s behemoths perversely “fashion themselves as digital equivalents of Greenpeace and Human Rights Watch, not Wal-Mart or ExxonMobil.” More importantly, technology is also not only explicitly credited and touted as a solution to problems that are fundamentally moral, but is increasingly regarded as the <em>ultimate</em> solution to replace and supersede all others.</p><p><strong>What is a Moral Problem?<br></strong>A moral problem can be located in a situation in which an imbalance exists between the way persons, communities, animals, or natural life of any kind <em>should</em> be treated and are consistently <em>being</em> treated by a person or persons. The concept presupposes the involvement of a person or persons in the creation and/or perpetuation of this problem because otherwise it would not be regarded as moral in nature. If dogs were attacking humans every day in your street, it would be a problem. However, if certain powerful sections of your community were training and directing these dogs to attack others, it would be a moral problem; the involvement of humans at the causational end of the problem makes it a moral one.</p><p>Why is that? Moral agency — the ability to both make determinations about what is right and wrong and direct actions according to those determinations — is something we uniquely attribute to humans (and their superiors; God is the original moral actor, according to theists of many varieties). This assumption is made clear by our sense of moral accountability, and the exceptions of “diminished responsibility” attributed to the actions of children and to adults partially or completely incapacitated by some temporary or permanent mental problem. Generally speaking, humans have a basic understanding of right and wrong, as well as the ability to connect that understanding with specific and contextual analysis.</p><p>Moral problems, therefore, are failures to convert moral thoughts into moral action; failures to think and understand morally; or a combination of both. The problem itself is not merely the actions and their consequences, but the thoughts and attitudes that lead to the actions. If the existence or possibility of moral agency is the <em>sine qua non</em> of moral problems, then it would be misleading reductionism to imagine that the problems begin and end with mere action and inaction.</p><p>Problems which are non-moral in nature and moral problems frequently exist not only together but within each other. Furthermore, and most crucially, moral problems are often <em>systemic</em>. I use this word cautiously because it can cause people to make a system, however they define it, into the principal moral actor in a moral problem, thereby removing specific human responsibilities. However, we cannot avoid the fact that our moral problems are at least partially systemic in nature and that is partly because of the way technology is both enmeshed with these problems and their purported solutions, as well as being crucial to the very abstract forms of thinking that mitigate against authentic responses. Far from containing and being a solution to moral problems, technology blinds us to the moral source and moral essence of those problems. Even as it does this, technology exacerbates problems and inexorably creates new problems, both literally and conceptually.</p><p><strong>The Essence We Miss<br></strong>As was elucidated in <em>Principles of Technoskepticism Part I</em>, technology is not a tool but a totality which frames, orients, and grounds our way of thinking, doing, and being, alienating us from nature, ethics, and ourselves. But by no means has humankind thus entangled become disinterested in morality. Instead we now approach moral problems with a novel combination that impedes our ability to follow our consciences into actual morally-grounded action. Puffed up with the vanity and presumption of so-called technological progress, men and women assume that no problem is beyond humankind’s <em>practical</em> capabilities. But in approaching moral issues with a technological mind-set, we ensure that the root cause and heart of moral problems remain outside of our technocratic and top-down reasoning. It is an impediment that utterly hides itself from our perception.</p><p>This occurs because of the monopolistic nature of the technological mind and all its subsidiary manners of thinking. The modern Western world preaches pluralism in matters that it finds epistemologically peripheral, such as religious doctrine, but the technological mind which rules Western priorities and systems tolerates no contradiction. Having come to the understanding that the revelation of truth is reliant on an objective, commanding, and scientific view of where we stand — the ultimate out-of-body experience — we both cut off other means of understanding and delude ourselves that ours is not a viewpoint at all. The best and brightest of our age, for example, often insist that the scientific method is the ultimate (or exclusive) means of knowing, but have rarely paused to consider that this is a conviction which the same scientific method did not (and cannot) prove to them. “The more modern technoscience asserts itself as the true relation to what-is,” Jan Patočka outlined in his 1975 essay, “Is Technological Society Decadent, and Why,” “the more it draws everything natural and then even everything human into its orbit,” while ostracizing all other ways of understanding. “We seem trapped,” reflects philosophy scholar Theresa Morris, “within the framework of a scientific-technological mind-set that keeps us from thinking differently about how we might approach our problems.”</p><p>This would be easier to deal with if the realities of the technological age were not constantly being thrust at us as a <em>fait accompli</em> which we only have time and capacity to manage, not challenge. The technological societies we live in ever-increasingly demand technological solutions while implicitly obscuring others. Our increasing addiction to electric batteries is both fueled by the delusion that it is a “green technology” solution to old technology’s problems and strengthened by our assumption that we can outrun our problems without changing priorities or principles. But a technological solution does not necessarily involve the utilization of technology, but draws upon <em>a technological way of conceiving</em> of nature, communities, others, and ourselves. “The cumulative self-propagation of the technological change of the world,” the 20th-century German-Jewish philosopher Hans Jonas explained, “constantly overtakes the conditions of its contributing acts.” But this “very same movement which put us in possession of the powers that have now to be regulated by norms” has “eroded the foundations from which norms could be derived.” In other words, the self-perpetuating way in which the technological way of living operates not only exacerbates moral problems, but simultaneously disarms us from dealing with them morally, because we are technologically conditioned to view even moral problems as technical defects. We have been ushered away from an ethically grounded way of living only to find that technology provides nothing but ethical dilemmas. These we are left to attack with means that are outside of ethics — not immoral but amoral. “Our conscience must catch up to our reason,” Václav Havel concluded with typical penetration, “otherwise we are lost.”</p><p>We try to solve moral problems technologically because we <em>view</em> these problems technologically. And it is quantification, a key element of the technological mind, which best exemplifies this dynamic. Morozov regards the “imperialistic streak of quantification — its propensity to displace other meaningful and possibly intangible ways of talking about a phenomenon” as particularly striking and concerning. Sixty years earlier, the French philosopher and theologian Jacques Ellul noted the tendency for modern men and women to restrict what is “knowable” to that “which is expressed (or, at least, can be expressed) in numbers,” with deleterious consequences since “an entire realm of effects of technique — indeed, the largest — is not reducible to numbers.”</p><p>Before we consider moral problems specifically, think of the range and amount of subjects which you primarily comprehend through quantification. It is likely that you understand your health (via weight, cholesterol level, etc.), your intelligence (via grades, IQ), your location (via miles/kilometers to or between other places), and your success or status (via salary or, again, grades), as well as many other things, entirely or largely through numbers. And this is no casual usage; many would not only be disoriented if bereft of numerical explanation, but would be indignant if denied it by others. There is nothing about health, intelligence, or location that is inherently conducive to being numerically defined, but we have conditioned ourselves to understand life through numbers to such an extent that any departure from quantification is presumed to be inaccurate and insufficient. And Morozov is right to label quantification as imperial in nature because its colonization of ever more areas of life is relentless, and, wherever it spreads, dismissiveness toward alternative means quickly follows.</p><p>But how does this particularly affect the way we deal with moral problems? Since, as Ellul noted, many important things are not in fact comprehensible through quantification, when we understand a moral problem that way, there are causational depths we will never plumb. This will frequently translate into trying to address a problem far down the causational chain, at the point where moral understandings and thoughts bear sustained fruit, not where they are formed. Teachers often bear the brunt of this misdirected zeal, as schools are charged with the correction of failures and neglect they did not create or inflict. When students with little resources and little cognitive preparation do poorly at school, it is often thought of as a failure of schooling, schools, and teachers rather than primarily a reflection of broader failings. But technological thinking always prefers the metrics of consequence, presenting them as causes.</p><p>As soon as the technological mind-set identifies a venue in which a moral failure must be corrected, it also insists on enhanced quantification. So we have seen — in the United States, the United Kingdom, and other countries — rigid, standardized testing and examination regimes brought into place to demonstrate problems and then measure the degree to which they have been resolved. Although the imposition of standardized testing as a primary means of understanding learning already betrays a prior technological way of viewing education, once installed as the primary gauge, quantification is also where the focus of attention and intention remains. The results and scores become the reality to which all resources strain to impact, at the inevitable expense of deeper and underlying problems and, indeed, benefits. “So far, anything we can quantify,” <em>What Technology Wants </em>author Kevin Kelly observes “has been getting better over the long term.” But this, of course, is the function of quantifying moral problems. We translate the issue into something that is susceptible to systemic control and then focus all our resources on moving the numbers in the direction that indicates we are succeeding.</p><p>Quantification only reinforces the conceptual mistake with which the technological mind approaches moral problems in the first place, bolstering our false sense of omnipotence. As the output of our schemes of quantification — by which we have reduced non-technological phenomena (such as ourselves) to technological formulations — inevitably trend upwards, we conclude that we have solved yet another complicated moral problem. Technology’s “cumulative creation, the expanding artificial environment, continuously reinforces the particular powers in man that created it,” explained Jonas, “by compelling their unceasing inventive employment in its management and further advance, and by rewarding them with additional success — which only adds to the relentless claim.” The technological way of doing disposes people, with progressive intensification, to reject non-technological ways of understanding moral problems.</p><p>The human as problem-solver is humanity’s self-image in the technological age. But it comes at a price, as all self-deception does. “Outshining in prestige and starving in resources whatever else belongs to the fullness of man,” Jonas continued, “the expansion of his power is accompanied by a contraction of his self-conception and being.” This is a paradox, but nevertheless a familiar one: expansion of scope as contraction of depth. If the depth is part of what makes humans distinct, as a repository and discerner of meaning, the more powerful humankind gets, the less like humankind and more like machine he becomes. Every time we “bypass the human way of dealing with human problems, short-circuiting it by an impersonal mechanism,” Jonas insisted, “we have taken something away from the dignity of personal selfhood and advanced a further step on the road from responsible subjects to programmed behavior systems.” Actual moral problems move inexorably out of our perceptive faculties, which have become tuned to a different frequency altogether.</p><p><strong>The Imperative of Humility<br></strong>Humility is not the solution, but it will help us, both collectively and individually, to begin to perceive and understand that which the technological mind removes from our frame of vision. Humankind’s power does not expunge its fallibility and limitations, but rather exposes them and magnifies their consequences. We need humility more than ever before. Jonas took note of “the excess of our power to act over our power to foresee and our power to evaluate and to judge” as a decisive feature of the technological age. “In the face of the quasi-eschatological potentials of our technological processes,” he argued, “ignorance of the ultimate implications becomes itself a reason for responsible restraint — as the second best to the possession of wisdom itself.” James C. Scott has written in <em>Seeing Like a State</em> about the catastrophes that have resulted from vast utopian interventions. “How routinely planners ignore the radical contingency of the future,” he concludes. “How rare it is to encounter advice about the future which begins from a premise of incomplete knowledge.” With the manifold increase in the power, not to mention the obsessive urge, to act, the gap between our power and our wisdom ever widens. “We need wisdom most,” commented Jonas, “when we believe in it least.”</p><p>The fever of entirely centralized economic planning, which gripped governments on each side of the Iron Curtain in the post-war era, may have mostly passed. But our modern collective self-image remains enraptured by a counter-factual sense of invincibility, of which that political trend was merely one manifestation. Its sorcerers are now more likely to be CEOs and entrepreneurs than governments. Three years after the dethroning of communism in his country, Havel could tell the self-satisfied luminaries at Davos the same thing he had warned the totalitarian government he suffered under: “Man’s attitude to the world must be radically changed. We have to abandon the arrogant belief that the world is merely a puzzle to be solved.” Back in 1984 he had written, with relevance that certainly endures today, “We must honor with the humility of the wise the limits of that natural world and the mystery which lies beyond them, admitting that there is something in the order of being which evidently exceeds all our competence.”</p><p><strong>Creating Problems<br></strong>Far from being the solution to moral problems, technology disables our ability to delve into the roots and essence of moral problems, keeping us on the level of superficial phenomena that are susceptible to our machinations. But since humans and groups which think and act technologically are constantly thrusting far ahead of their knowledge and wisdom, technology is also a source of an ever-amassing array of problems, including many moral problems.</p><p>That technology is the <em>source</em> of a moral problem does not make <em>it</em> the moral actor responsible for creating and/or perpetuating the problem, otherwise, according to our own definition, the problem would not be <em>moral</em>. To diagnose technology as the (or a) source of a moral problem it is to identify a technological way of thinking and doing as, in certain situations, the functional, conceptual, and volitional impediment to responsible moral agents either thinking morally or turning their moral thoughts into moral actions or inactions. This does not mean that people are capable of perfectly moral action if relieved of a technological mind-set — any analysis of pre-modern life amply demonstrates the fallacy of such a romantic notion. However, it is the case that there are moral conclusions which come naturally to humans and moral patterns of action which develop with a similar organic frequency among humans if not impeded by something beyond our normal moral fallibility. In other words, while humanity is always susceptible to immorality in general, we can add further man-made encouragement to it, by ways we tend to think and act. Technology is such a way.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/1*6VnJgK-23x8drs1WFhLiJw.jpeg" /></figure><p>If a technological way of thinking and doing was only capable of creating <em>possibilities</em> that far exceed our knowledge and wisdom, then moral dilemmas would be the main result. But every attempt at a philosophy of technology comes to the recognition that at the heart of technology, there is a self-perpetuating dynamic. Men and women in the thrall of a technological mind-set create a strange ethic of compulsion out of the possibilities that the technological society produces, which makes the resistance of those possibilities a new kind of unethical behavior. The strength and perversity of this impulse is particularly evident in the way that an ethic of joyfully receiving the gift of new life and fighting to preserve it is so easily and self-righteously shoved aside by the destructive logic of fetus screening.</p><p>In other words, technology becomes a source of moral problems <em>because</em> people anchored to its principles not only obtain options which exceed human foresight and wisdom, but regard themselves as compelled to realizing those options. After a new possibility derived from techno-scientific activity emerges, you can be sure that someone, and more likely many people, will choose it, consequences be damned. The dilemma never stays one for long. Of course, there is an inquisitiveness in the human makeup, but technology adds a secular sense of manifest destiny to this tendency. There is an inherent restlessness and self-perpetuation in technology that does not render men and women free of moral responsibility, but creates a cognitive and experiential momentum that they find themselves invariably unwilling to resist.</p><p>In this way, we make our problems progressively worse, because the advances we make seem to render us ever-less able to resist further technological possibilities, while making the consequences ever more unpredictable. Technology “has become autonomous; it has fashioned an omnivorous world which obeys its own laws and which has renounced all tradition,” claimed Ellul in <em>The Technological Society</em>. The user cannot remain “for very long in possession of a technique the results of which he can predict; constant invention ceaselessly upsets his habits.” As Jonas noted, “to a considerable extent technology itself begets the problems which it is then called upon to overcome.” This is another element of self-perpetuation, distinct from the inherent dynamics of technology: its very destructiveness constantly creates imbalances and emergencies in which we appear to have no recourse other than technology. Not only does technology project us into new crises because, in Heidegger’s formulation, “the revealing never simply comes to an end,” but, as Jonas noted, “in providing solutions for the problems it has created,” technology “must create new ones and thus becomes its own compulsion.”</p><p>Humans thinking and living technologically not only ever add to the problems, moral and otherwise, but have proven prone to extend and deepen existing problems, despite all the egalitarian mythology that has accompanied technological breakthroughs down to the present day. This has been persuasively explained by Kentaro Toyama, a computer scientist who was the founding executive of Microsoft Research India and is now a professor of Community Information at the University of Michigan, in his book, <em>Greek Heresy: Rescuing Social Change from the Cult of Technology</em> (see also the excellent interview with Toyama on <em>The Technoskeptic</em> podcast). Toyama went to India with his age’s presumptive faith in the ability of technology to be a third-world savior. “Technology has the power to make such a positive difference in people’s lives,” Microsoft founder Bill Gates pontificated, “we have a simple obligation: spread it.” In reality, Toyama discovered “In project after project, the lesson was the same: information technology amplified the intent and capacity of human and institutional stakeholders, but it didn’t substitute for their deficiencies.” This not only means that technology was not the solution, but that, by serving as an amplification of existing phenomenon, it increased the power of the powerful and the disadvantage of the poor. “Technology — even when it’s equally distributed,” he makes clear, “isn’t a bridge, but a jack. It widens existing disparities.” The idea that technology can alleviate, for example, extreme poverty, relies on the fallacy that technology “cause(s) a fixed benefit wherever it’s used.” No such fixed benefit ensues, however, and while “good schools incorporate technology to augment learning…underperforming schools are made worse by the distraction.”</p><p>Perhaps most absurdly of all, realities which are not morally problematic become increasingly and artificially regarded as problems in the context of the technological mind-set. We are, under the influence of technology, continuously inclined to not only create but <em>invent</em> problems. This is a dynamic we are used to recognizing in the theory and practice of modern commercial advertising. “With the tools of the new applied psychology, the advertisers of the early 20th century quickly mastered the idea of the technological fix,” historian Merritt Roe Smith explains in his essay, “Technological Determinism in American Culture.” “Their aim was to excite consumers’ needs by associating them with intangible desires.” But it was not just through advertising that incessant demand was being systematically created rather than just formulaically met — this has been a feature of the technological life as a whole. In this age, “the relation of means to ends is not unilinear but circular,” Jonas asserted. “Once incorporated into [the] socioeconomic demand diet, ends first gratuitously (perhaps accidentally) generated by technological invention become necessities of life and set technology the task of further perfecting the means of realizing them.” This has persistently but mistakenly been postulated as a distinctive feature of “capitalism,” but this very same dynamic unfolded meticulously in European communist societies — if anything, even more deeply. As the “standing reserve” of nature constantly stands ready, in Heidegger’s understanding, to be used and re-used for our evolving benefit, the “revealing” power of technology can continually unmask new avenues for material tinkering.</p><p>As a conceptual creator of new demands to be met and newly-imagined problems to be solved, the technological mind and life is unceasing. “Every new step in whatever direction of whatever technological field tends not to approach an equilibrium or saturation point in the process of fitting means to ends (nor is it meant to),” Jonas explained, “but, on the contrary, to give rise, if successful, to further steps in all kinds of direction and with a fluidity of the ends themselves.” There is no end to it, short of the implosion of the technological <em>modus vivendi</em>. The consequence of technology’s “innovations is disequilibrating rather than equilibrating with respect to the balance of wants and supply, always breeding its own new wants.” Consider the things that people where you live demand as a moral imperative which their equivalents fifty or even twenty years before could either not have imagined or would never have demanded. Even in 2010, nearly 80 percent of BBC survey respondents, spanning 26 countries, concluded that access to the internet was a <em>fundamental right</em>. Why are you entitled to have it just because it can be had? And do claims based on that logic really deserve the lofty terminology and urgency of morality?</p><p>Last year, a UN Human Rights Council report insisted that the Internet “contributes to the progress of humankind as a whole” and is an “<em>indispensabl</em>e tool for realizing a range of human rights” (italics added). Once you have come to this spurious position, then the next step is to conclude, as the report does, that every state must “make the Internet widely available, accessible and affordable to all segments of population.” And once this is also accepted and demanded — as, for example, the 1996 Telecommunications Act in the United States does — then this must be measured. But, as technology develops, the statistical level at which a technological goal is deemed to be met likewise increases, hoving ever out of sight. The FCC announced last year that “advanced telecommunications capability is not being deployed to all Americans in a reasonable and timely fashion,” but this conclusion is based on its finding that ten percent of Americans do not have access to a benchmark that the FCC itself recently made six times higher than it was. The FCC now does not consider an American to have access to broadband unless the service he or she is connected to runs at 25 megabits per second. This is <em>five times</em> higher than is necessary to watch Netflix in HD quality. The creation of rights, the alchemy of statistics, and the invention of problems go hand in hand.</p><p>It is, therefore, partly the technological phenomenon of quantification which ensures that manufactured desires develop into newly perceived problems, because as soon as a new want has been conceived, then there is an urge to quantify the degree to which the material manifestation of it is being distributed. With our urge to invent new abstract categories as statistical vehicles which — even though we treat them as real phenomena akin to groups and communities — exist only in our arbitrary ordering of reality into percentages, we amass survey data and adjudicate. “Given Silicon Valley’s digital hammers,” Morozov observes, “all problems start looking like nails, and all solutions like apps. Such predisposition makes it harder to notice that not all problems are problems.”</p><p><strong>The Imperative of Responsibility<br></strong>Technology masks the moral essence of problems, produces fresh problems, exacerbates existing problems, and distracts us from real problems. The various ways it does so tend to mask or distort the essential foundation of moral understanding and action — authentic and organic moral responsibility. Without it, there is no situation in which a gap between the way people, animals, or natural life should and are being treated becomes a <em>moral</em> problem. If there is no moral responsibility, then moral agency is just another kind of mental capability, like deduction, that can be used or not according to the will. Why does the technological mind, life, and self tend to cloud our sense of moral responsibility or even separate us from it entirely?</p><p>First, this technological mind, life, and self encourages people to distance themselves — with a deceptive objectivism and a mechanized sense of transcendence — from the particular, the local, and experiential. The organic human groundedness in a personally known local environment, community, and place is a fundamental basis of the moral responsibility that we find imperiled by technology. This is, as Havel put it, “the world of our lived experience, a world not yet indifferent since we are personally bound to it.” This is “a world in which, through which, and for which we are somehow answerable, a world of personal responsibility.” Genuine personal responsibility is built on neither monastic separation nor casual universalism. Within the world of lived experience, Havel continued, “categories like justice, honor, treason, friendship, infidelity, courage, or empathy have a wholly tangible content, relating to actual persons and important for actual life.”</p><p>Our age offers us two simultaneous and strangely co-existent alternatives to this organically rooted personal responsibility, both of which mitigate against the actual exercise and maintenance of moral responsibility. The first is to turn the seat of moral agency, the individual self, into the <em>purpose</em> of moral agency. Individual autonomy, self-promotion, and self-expression become the highest goal to which the possession of moral agency is aimed at achieving. We seem to be so locked within this radical individualism that we can pontificate endlessly about “meritocracy” without ever pausing to consider that our conception is entirely based on the novel and unspoken assumption that only an individual human is capable of bearing and possessing merit.</p><p>Despite this deeply engrained worship of the individual, we have also not shaken ourselves free of the idea that a broader obligation remains. A correct sense that our responsibility does not conclude with our own noses lingers. But, within a view of the world that both persistently individualizes value and abstracts us into an aloofly objective sense of reality, how will this lingering sense of duty express itself? It does so by making large artificial abstractions — the economy, the nation, the world, etc. — into the objects of our responsibility and the supposed recipients of our morally responsible actions. Our actual personal responsibility for what we experience and know is too often substituted for a lofty-sounding but ultimately meaningless commitment to what we will not actually encounter. This results in a politics that retains the tone of moral urgency, but presents its field of action as a series of inhuman and amoral abstractions, while its goals never exceed material growth. The “professional ruler” who governs in the technological age and in the service of what Havel calls “impersonal power” is “legitimized by science, cybernetics, ideology, law, abstraction, and objectivity, that is, by everything except personal responsibility to human beings as persons and neighbors.”</p><p>Why should an imagined responsibility to “the world” not be an addition, rather than an alternative, to specific and organic moral responsibility? While it conceivably could be, it very often functions as a replacement both because we need a replacement for the avenue of morality from which we have been alienated and because, once embraced, the abstract crowds out the real. We can cognitively and psychologically satiate our need for community with a sham, while also ignoring the finite nature of our ability to meaningfully care for others. Consider that, without being instructed to do so, traditional human societies tended to gather in group sizes with a limit of around 150. This has come to be known as Dunbar’s Number because the Oxford scholar Robin Dunbar postulated that a “limit imposed by neocortical processing capacity” creates “a cognitive limit to the number of individuals with whom any one person can maintain stable relationships” which parallels the observed village and settlement size in traditional societies. We assume that humans can be as big as our abstractions, but as we discussed at the beginning, we cannot be part of what we span, and when we leave the Earth in our abstract flights of fancy, we often leave behind the particular in the pursuit of the universal.</p><p>It is ironic that <em>the economy</em> has become perhaps the most insistent and pervasive abstraction in modern discourse since it is rooted in the Greek word <em>oikos</em>, home. In our technologically shaped moral discourse, the specifically tangible (the “focal” in philosopher Albert Borgmann’s conception) has become thoroughly confused with the vague. “Human beings in their settled condition,” maintains English philosopher Roger Scruton, “are animated by <em>oikophilia</em>: the love of the <em>oikos</em>, which means not only the home but the people contained in it, and the surrounding settlements that endow that home with lasting contours.” This relationship to home, resonant of what the Italians call <em>campanilismo</em>, is an antidote to radical individualism and morally vague universalism alike because it restores real persons and things really encountered in real places to the center. “The <em>oikos</em> is the place that is not just mine and yours but <em>ours</em>,” in an actual, not merely imagined, sense. Within this context, people can genuinely, rather than superficially, be “oriented towards one another in a posture of responsibility.” Instead of imagining that choosing between “capitalism” and socialism is the incumbent question of technoskepticism, we should ask, in Havel’s words, “whether we shall, by whatever means, succeed in reconstituting the natural world as the true terrain of politics, rehabilitating the personal experience of human beings as the initial measure of things, placing morality above politics and responsibility above our desires.”</p><p>At the same time and with same means that the technological mind, life, and self draws us away from the ground of moral responsibility that can be found in <em>oikophilia</em>, it also disables our moral responsibility by conceptually placing humans at the assumed pinnacle of reality, able to manipulate and tinker with all we see. If humankind is the master of the universe, then the contents of moral responsibility are entirely in humankind’s hands to alter or ignore according to its own context and whim. The idea of human groundedness explored above does not mean that we reject the existence of objectivity, it means that we look up to the objective from where we actually are; we do not pretend and presume to peer down on it imperiously from above. If we remain aware of where we are as human beings, we can observe that there is, as Havel called it, an “absolute horizon” which we do not master or control. “The natural world, in virtue of its very being, bears within it the presupposition of the absolute which grounds, delimits, animates, and directs it,” asserted Havel. “Any attempt to spurn it, master it, or replace it with something else…[is] an expression of hubris for which humans must pay a heavy price, as did Don Juan and Faust.”</p><p>We live to such a degree within a cocoon of artificial, man-made reality that we can easily delude ourselves into forgetting that we are, even at the height of our technological powers, reliant on what we neither created nor invented. To put it another way, we never transcend or exceed our dependence on what is given to us, not manufactured by us, as the numerous natural sources of even the most advanced space-age inventions should remind us. Humans are never prouder of their achievements than when we manage to <em>replicate</em> or repurpose what we find pre-existing in nature, such as in the successive landmarks of genetic manipulation. But even if we replicate life a billion times over, we never transcend the stature of a recipient, not having authored the original.</p><p>With the acknowledgement that there are material limits and dependencies beyond our devising and control can come the acknowledgement that there are, necessarily, also moral limits and dependencies beyond our devising and control. Our moral responsibility is not, therefore, ours to revoke or amend. It has been humankind’s insistence on our moral responsibility as recipients and stewards that has, in the past, encouraged the exercise of self-restraint. “One almost never sees voluntary self-restraint,” observed Alexander Solzhenitsyn, as he critiqued modern western civilization at Harvard in 1978. To reverse the impulse to do what can be done before considering whether it should be done is antithetical to the technological way of thinking, which is always adept at framing ethical restraint itself as unethical. “It is time, in the West,” Solzhenitsyn continued, “to defend not so much human rights as human obligations.” Human societies as enthralled by their own entitlements as they are entranced by their own performance and expansion are unlikely to do what must be done to arrest the destructive and alienating course of the technological age: step back in contemplation and step down in humility.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fbebb6ed7f18" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-technoskeptic/technology-is-not-the-solution-principles-of-technoskepticism-part-two-fbebb6ed7f18">Technology is Not the Solution (Principles of Technoskepticism — Part Two)</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-technoskeptic">The Technoskeptic</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Technology is Not a Tool (Principles of Technoskepticism — Part One)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-technoskeptic/technology-is-not-a-tool-principles-of-technoskepticism-part-one-99e9f9d48ee4?source=rss-b07537893288------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/99e9f9d48ee4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[culture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[heidegger]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[skepticism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Technoskeptic]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 20 Sep 2017 20:16:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-09-20T20:20:34.562Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>By David A.J. Reynolds</em></p><p>“A life can be said to be decadent when it loses its grasp on the innermost nerve of its functioning,” wrote the great Czech philosopher, Jan Patočka, “when it is disrupted at its inmost core so that while thinking itself full it is actually draining and laming itself with every step and act.” Therefore, he continued, “a society can be said to be decadent if it so functions as to encourage a decadent life, a life addicted to what is inhuman by its very nature.”</p><p>Like many of his fellow dissident philosophers in Prague, Patočka understood that the Czechoslovak communist regime — which he would die defying in March of 1977 — was not an outlier in the Western world, but an extreme symptom of a broad civilizational malady. He wrote the above in an essay entitled, “Is Technological Society Decadent, and Why?” and Patočka was concerned about technology precisely because of his commitment to understanding and preserving what was vital and precious in humankind. Discussing the intellectual engagement of philosophers Edmund Husserl and Heidegger — both of whom he had studied under — with the same intersection, Patočka commented that they “focus on a central point in which the essential core of technology touches upon the essential core of man, and for both this point is the relation of the human being to truth.”</p><p>There is, in other words, something at the very core of technology and the technological world we inhabit which presses hard against the moral, epistemological, and ontological heart of humanity, constricting and endangering our ability to love, know, and be what is real and true. But this danger, central to technoskepticism’s sense of urgency, is easy to ignore because the way technology is perceived persistently misses the forest for the trees. As the contemporary philosopher Albert Borgmann points out, “the peril of technology lies not in this or that of its manifestations but in the pervasiveness and consistency of its pattern.” Certainly there are particular points at which the leading edge of our technological age draws us to specific exposés and rebuttals, but as long as such statements of resistance are isolated from each other with no defining horizontal coherence, they will be easier to dismiss as the mere raging of the discontented.</p><p>We must, in Borgmann’s words, “take the measure of technological life in its normal totality” because it is the only accurate way of confronting it. Since technology is “a radically fundamental and comprehensive phenomenon,” it must be addressed in a way commensurate to its nature, breadth, and impact. Instead, we are wont to treat technology as a tool-box presenting us with a range of solutions. Even much putative skepticism repeats this mistake, assuming that only the careful selectiveness and judicious wielding of technological innovation is required. But as the American philosopher Don Ihde explains, one of Heidegger’s insights was that technology “is not just the collection of things and activities, but also a mode of truth or a field within which things and activities may appear as they do.”</p><p>Heidegger’s own words, at least in English translation, can be hard to explicate, but on this central point, he resounds with the clarity of a church bell. “The essence of technology is by no means anything technological. Thus we shall never experience our relationship to the essence of technology so long as we merely conceive and push forward the technological, put up with it, or evade it. Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny it. But we are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we regard it as something neutral; for this conception of it, to which today we particularly like to do homage, make us utterly blind to the essence of technology.”</p><p>Living in a technological age, we see the world through a technological lens to which we are often oblivious. We navigate according to the tips of technology’s icebergs while, fathoms below, its core escapes our attention. Drawing on the observations of Heidegger and others, what follows will suggest three fundamental ways in which the essence of technology is pushing hard against the essence of humankind. In each way, the power of technology is defined by the totality with which its ethos grounds the assumptions and orients the instincts within modern Western civilization, while the alienations in its wake define the cost.</p><p>Firstly and most critically, we live within and according to technology as <em>a way of thinking</em>, which alienates us from nature. Secondly and consequently, technology <em>is a way of doing</em>, which alienates us from ethics. And thirdly and most fatally, technology is <em>a way of being</em> that alienates us from ourselves. In sum, technology functions like a totalitarian ideology. But, unlike an ideology, it mostly operates unperceived and unarticulated.</p><p><strong>The Technological Mind (Technology as a Way of Thinking)<br></strong>In his 1984 essay, “Politics and Conscience,” Václav Havel recalled his childhood reaction to coming across a factory in the countryside which “spewed dense brown smoke and scattered it across the sky.” There are a number of possible reactions to this incongruous sight, even among those who would find it distasteful. A man might object “to the smoke from the smokestack only if the stench penetrates his apartment,” while not taking “offense at it metaphysically since he knows that the factory to which the smokestack belongs manufactures things that he needs.” Furthermore, people “of the technological era…conceive of a remedy only within the limits of technology.” In this spirit, many would find the situation “a regrettable lapse of a technology that failed to include ‘the ecological factor’ in its calculation, one which can be easily corrected with the appropriate filter.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/1*RB_emt66Nz9LA7iFqcAeZA.jpeg" /></figure><p>These responses assume, in keeping with the popular “tool” analogy applied to modern technology, that there is nothing <em>fundamentally</em> wrong — despoliation is merely a kink to be straightened out. For Havel, however, the rural smokestack illustrated a central fault in the way our civilization relates to the natural world. There is a problem in the “spiritual framework of modern civilization” which is at the root of its “present crisis.” That smokestack is “the symbol of an age which seeks to transcend the boundaries of the natural world and its norms,” rejecting a stewardship of that world which accepts it on its own basis.</p><p>“Modern rationalism and modern science, though the work of people that, as all human works, developed within our natural world,” Havel continued, “now systematically leave [the natural world] behind, deny it, degrade and defame it — and, of course, at the same time colonize it.” Reflecting on the ruination of Czech agriculture under the guidance of supposed rationalization, Havel concluded, with broad applicability, that “people in the age of science and technology live in the conviction that they can improve their lives because they are able to grasp and exploit the complexity of nature and the general laws of its functioning. Yet it is precisely these laws which, in the end, tragically catch up with them and get the better of them.” Forsaking a view of nature grounded in the way we experience it, we have learned to regard it with an inhuman objectivity, isolating it from its context and reducing it to a functional existence.</p><p>This conviction that modern technology’s essence lies in a technological mind-set, which cognitively precedes and frames our modern ways of acting technologically, is key to Heidegger’s claims about the danger that technology poses to man. This technological way of thinking is a re-conceptualization of the natural world and its constituent parts. “When man, investigating [and] observing, ensnares nature as an area of his own conceiving,” Heidegger posited in “The Question Concerning Technology” (1954), “he has already been claimed by a way of revealing that challenges him to approach nature as an object of research, until even the object disappears into the objectlessness of standing-reserve.” There are two words key to Heidegger’s thinking here: 1) technology at its essence is a way of <em>revealing</em><strong> </strong>things and, in this sense, is a new type of attempt to disclose and use the truth about something material; 2) <em>standing-reserve</em> (<em>gestell</em> in German) is how Heidegger classifies what this technological way of thinking re-conceptualizes the natural world as: “Everywhere everything is <em>ordered</em> to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering.” As political philosophy professor Mark Blitz explains, “technological conscriptions of things occur in a sense prior to our actual technical use of them, because things must be (and be seen as) already available resources in order for them to be used in this fashion.”</p><p>Such thinking emerges with clarity in modern science. “Man’s ordering attitude and behavior display themselves first in the rise of modern physics as an exact science. Modern science’s way of representing pursues and entraps nature as a calculable coherence of forces.” The image of a conceptual trap is helpful, giving us the idea of a process in which what exists is isolated from its organic connections before being moved and repurposed. Nature is perceived as a <em>calculable coherence of forces</em> through the imposition of abstract forms of calculation — understanding nature in way that separates it from itself — while seeing its use in a way that is similarly unrelated to its pre-existing state and context.</p><p>In Patočka’s assessment, this is an inheritance of the Enlightenment, whose intellectual products were “animated by a spirit and a mode of knowing wholly different from its predecessors.” Above all in modern science and mathematics, the Enlightenment marks “a spirit of technological dominance emerging,” which, as a broadly applicable way of perceiving the world, replaced its predecessors: “a formalizing universality imperceptibly shifting to an emphasis on product over content, on mastery rather than understanding.” Max Weber called this “disenchantment” (<em>entzauberung</em>), an insistence that “there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by calculation.”</p><p>Therefore, Blitz summarizes, “it was technological thinking that first understood nature in such a way that nature could be challenged to unlock its forces and energy. The challenge preceded the unlocking.” It is hard to define or convey why this is problematic because our responses tend to be dependent on the way of thinking that is being criticized, acknowledging content only in objectively observable product and interpreting a dearth of distributive functionality as a lack of meaning. In his book, <em>Landmarks</em>, Robert MacFarlane describes outsiders’ perception of the great moorland of the Isle of Lewis (off the northwest coast of Scotland) as emptiness — a great stretch of <em>nothing</em>. “We’re flying over nothing,” exclaims a downward-looking passenger, as his plane wings its way over the moors to Stornoway.</p><p>It was precisely this manner of thinking about the moorland that encouraged a 2004 proposal to cover it with 234 towering wind-turbines serviced by 210 pylons and 104 miles of road. “The crux of the [ensuing] debate,” MacFarlane relates, “concerned the perceived nature and worth of the moor itself, and the language that was used — and available — to describe it.” As this implies, one of the ways that a relationship between man and land independent of a technological way of thinking could be restored was by protecting and revivifying the words that had been used to describe the moor since time out of mind. The naming of things is a role in tune with the ethic of stewardship that long precedes modern conceptions. The biblical account of creation declares that God himself named the heavens, the Earth, and the oceans, but then delegated to his steward, Adam — placed “in the garden of Eden to work it and keep it” (<em>Genesis</em> 2:15) as a priest would a temple — to name the animals. “What is required,” in the words of Lewis native Finlay Macleod, “is a new [old] nomenclature of landscape and how we relate to it, so that conservation becomes a natural form of human awareness, and so that it ceases to be…under-appreciated and thus readily vulnerable to desecration.” There is a mutual relationship between conservation and conversation, and part of the liberating of nature from the conceptual status of standing-reserve, which orders it to await repurposing, is rediscovering the language that conveys a more defiantly subjective, phenomenological view of the world. “What is needed,” Macleod concludes, “is a counter-desecration phrasebook.”</p><p>The distinction between, on the one hand, a sky-high and abstracted view of the land that aids its repurposing and re-ordering, and, on the other, an accrued, lived, local, and grounded perspective is informative to understanding the technological way of thinking that the former represents. The technological mind places itself artificially above and beyond man’s lived experience, radically changing the way he relates to his surroundings, as Hannah Arendt also noted in her concepts of Earth alienation and world alienation. “The increase in the power of man over the things of this world,” she argued, “spring…from the distance which man puts between himself and the world.” For example, whatever humans do within modern physics, “we always handle nature from a point of view in the universe outside the Earth.” Though “still bound to the Earth through the human condition, we have found a way to act on the Earth and within terrestrial nature as though we dispose of it from outside, from the Archimedean point.” We have been conditioned to understand “subjective” as a synonym for unreliable, but it is the so-called objective view that is the illusory one because it is a method of alienation from our own surroundings that has “left us a universe of whose qualities we know no more than the way they affect our measuring instruments.” We have placed an elaborate series of techniques, quantifications, and systems of thought and representation between us and reality and have regarded those intermediaries as reality.</p><p>Once the natural world has been conceptually transformed into a mere object which we observe from a scientific distance, the way is opened, before anything has actually been done, for the material revolutions of the technological age. The natural world has been exposed to a demanding urge in which all is quantified, calculable, exposed, available, changeable, movable, and replaceable. All of nature is open to requisitioning and enlistment, like the conditions of a state undergoing total mobilization and total war. Just as total mobilization turns a citizen into a soldier, whether the citizen wishes to be or not, the technological way of thinking turns the elements of nature into pieces and units. “One piece of standing reserve is replaceable by another,” according to Heidegger. “The piece as piece is already imposed upon for replaceability.” In a technological world, according to philosopher Andrew Mitchell, “there is no end to replacement…only this unending slippage and dispersal.” This ethos of availability, transformation, and replaceability, he continues, “cracks the very discreteness of the [natural] object,” alienating us from the natural world, hiding its varied existence from our conceptions behind a wall of abstraction.</p><p><strong>The Technological Life (Technology as a Way of Doing)<br></strong>Based on this pervasive technological way of thinking, a technological way of doing has naturally become the norm wherever the technological mind rules. Since it is based on a way of perceiving reality, the technological life escapes our attention in its totality, with skeptics focusing their criticism on dependent ideas and ideologies — such as Marxism or the bundle of contemporary practices we call capitalism — that are merely offshoots of the wider technological and materialist perspective. As a way of doing, the technological life is also an imperial force that does not require any conscious promotion (even besides the fact that major political philosophies on each side of the spectrum operate according to its assumptions) because it is both an endless process and self-perpetuating.</p><p>Since the technological mind-set does not allow what it beholds to remain what it is, but structures a conceptual and then actual repurposing, cycles of perpetual action are set in motion. Firstly, as in one of Heidegger’s examples, “a tract of land is challenged into the putting out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit.” The coal is then mined not merely that it may be somewhere else. Instead, “it is stockpiled; that is, it is on call, ready to deliver the sun’s warmth that is stored in it. The sun’s warmth is challenged forth for heat, which in turn is ordered to deliver steam whose pressure turns the wheels that keep a factory running.” Therefore, “what is unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is stored up, what is stored up is, in turn, distributed, and what is distributed is switched about ever anew.” This is the momentum of the technological life: “unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and switching about are ways of revealing,” which “never simply comes to an end. Neither does it run off into the indeterminate.” In Mitchell’s paraphrase, “the standing reserve is not simply put to use or applied toward a particular end, but instead is surrendered to endless repurposing.”</p><p>Since it is in the nature of technology <em>as a way of doing</em> to repurpose, it has no logical conclusion. But once its logic has been accepted and then unleashed, the technological life is, furthermore, self-perpetuating. As Mitchell also cautions, it would be a mistake to imagine that nature is turned into a standing-reserve ready for repurposing <em>in response to</em> specific demand. Instead, “the imposed demand actually constitutes the standing reserve.” Technical functionality is a frame which has to be seen through before functionality is what is required. In other words, the artificially objective, detached view of the world determines its natural objects to be <em>resources</em> and, therefore, imposes an ‘on demand’ or ‘on call’ status on all of it. That status logically precedes the time when anything is literally demanded to be repurposed. In Mitchell’s explanation, “one thing enlists another into the standing-reserve.” Each enlistment into actual standing-reserve, leads to a further requisitioning, whether it is a new substance being produced for a similar purpose or a new stage of repurposing of a substance already in use.</p><p>Energy, as Heidegger understood, is the archetypal example, with “the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium…[and] uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy.” Each step is pregnant with the next. Each use, within the logic of the technological mind and life, opens up a new challenge on the natural world. <em>If that can and should be done, then why not this?</em> The damming of the great river Rhine to produce energy means that “the Rhine itself appears as something at our command” and “what the river is now, namely a water power supplier, derives from out of the essence of the power station.” Of course there have been water mills churning by rivers since long before the modern age, but, by contrast, they took the river as it was, conforming the human process to the nature of the experienced river. The power station that feeds off the dammed river does the opposite. And without it ever needing to be said, the pursuit of energy and its extraction becomes a matter of <em>how</em> not <em>if</em>, extending into new methods and locations.</p><p>In this way, the technological life produces a counter-ethics in which human ethics, developed within a sense of stewardship and responsibility, can be dismissed while preserving the appearance of moral reasoning. Examine for yourself how often arguments are now given and received as ethical without ever moving beyond the production and relative distribution of commodities, relegating human ethics to being just another subservient branch of scientific materialism. The same familiar, religious sense of urgency accrues to our supposedly ethical demands, even as we alienate ourselves from actual ethics or even the possibility of ethical judgements. It is the consequence of first theoretically and then actually replacing, in Patočka’s formulation, the “care of the <em>soul</em>, the care to <em>be</em>” with “the care to <em>have</em>.”</p><p>Therefore, despite the increasing dominance of the technological life based on the technological mind, its essence and its nature (and therefore its existence as a phenomenon) recedes further from view. The technological life, Patočka further observed, “closes itself up against all that claims to transcend its sphere. For nothing but just the calculable resources that are ‘on order’ can penetrate the unitary network of technically uncovered reality.” It becomes impossible for technological minds acting within a technological life to perceive that which approaches from outside of its assumptions as anything other than an irrelevance, a distraction, or, indeed, immorality. Technological life, in this context, appears to us as nothing more than logically applied reason and morality. “The standing reserve is the mode of presence for all that exists under the dominance of contemporary technology,” Mitchell argues, “and it is the only permissible mode.” Any ethically-derived constraints and alternative conceptions appear as the attempt to rob people of the material resources which they are entitled to have.</p><p>Even the shape of resistance often conforms to the dominant logic, as all dependent exceptions do. For example, with tracks of territory repurposed as <em>national parks</em>, the act of preservation requires the natural world to become a ward of state, as if it were an abandoned orphan, and a destination for the tourism industry.</p><p>The technological life is also obscured from conscious understanding because, just as the technological mind distances man from nature, the increasing complexity of the technological life further distances most people from the technological processes of unlocking, transforming, storing, and distributing on which it depends. There even seems to be an inverse relationship between our decreasing awareness of what we depend on and our increasing dependence on it, since it is only our dependent demand, rather than our understanding of the causes, that conditions our approval.</p><p>Until relatively recently, most of the processes by which “natural resources” were technologically repurposed into what people used were readily observable and easily understood. For example, until the 1980s, coal not only fueled the power stations which enabled Britain’s work and entertainment, it was also the source of energy that heated its homes. And the journey from mine to commodity was no mystery, with large sections of the country given over to the coal industry. But how many of today’s two billion smartphone users — including 80% of Britain’s adult population — have any idea about either the way in which that ubiquitous product rests upon a complex and varied use of “natural resources” or the way in which these resources are obtained and repurposed? Our world relies no less on the ceaseless intrusive destructiveness of the technological life than its modern predecessors, but most of us are far less conscious of it.</p><p>“Lithium-ion batteries were supposed to be different from the dirty, toxic technologies of the past,” the <em>Washington Post</em> reflected in a September 2016 piece. In reality, the cost of this particular technological sleight of hand — and there is always a cost — has merely been moved further away from most users. “Smartphones would not fit in pockets without” these batteries. “Laptops would not fit on laps. Electric vehicles would be impractical.” But they rely, among many other things, on cobalt, which must be mined from the earth. Sixty percent of the world’s current cobalt supply comes from Congo, where an estimated 100,000 people “use hand tools to dig hundreds of feet underground.” The demand for cobalt has tripled over the last five years along with soaring smartphone sales, but demand is expected to double again before 2020 partly due to electric cars, each one of which requires up to 33 pounds of cobalt. Meanwhile, two-thirds of the graphite, which must also be mined and then refined for use in lithium-ion batteries, comes from China, where the process causes a predictable trail of pollution and despoliation. In the Atacama region of Chile and Argentina, companies are clamoring for its lithium, a further key component, which can be extracted there with the use of large quantities of water. There is one ounce of lithium in a laptop, but the battery powering a normal electric car contains 44 pounds of the substance.</p><p>“Green technology” is a useful myth for those who believe that the essence of technology can be turned in on itself. Yet the sequence of exploitation and pollution that the <em>Washington Post</em> uncovered amid the extraction of these three substances has been an ever-present, centuries-long companion to the realization of the technological mind through the technological life. The three places of extraction boast widely varied political and governmental contexts, but what binds them together is that the damage caused to land and people has had no effect on the inexorable continuation of the process. Technology as a way of doing things has alienated us from human ethics because it has pushed its concerns to the periphery. Whatever regulations are passed in a particular location or time, the technological life never ceases to press into the place where man understands his responsibility, perverting and restricting it.</p><p><strong>The Technological Self (Technology as a Way of Being)<br></strong>When reflecting on his early encounter with the smokestacks and their noxious output, Havel imagined the similarly horrified reaction of a medieval peasant to the same intrusion. Like a medieval person, he mused, children “are far more intensely rooted in what some philosophers call ‘the natural world,’ or <em>Lebenswelt</em>, than most modern adults. They have not yet grown alienated from the world of their actual personal experience.” For those in this frame of mind, he continued, “Our ‘I’ primordially attests to that world and personally certifies it…a world not yet indifferent since we are personally bound to it.” This is “a world in which, through which, and for which we are somehow answerable, a world of personal responsibility.” It is this sensibility — along with “the absolute horizon of [man’s] relations” in which we rightly recognize what is beyond our moral purview and capability — that has been destroyed, in Havel’s view, by the impersonal, supra-human, objective, and distant view of reality in the technological age. The most fundamental resulting casualty of man’s alienation from both nature and ethics, in his “attempt to abolish God and to play at being God,” is humankind itself. “Man rejected his responsibility as a ‘subjective illusion’” — something that only sentimentality and superstition placed in his consciousness — “and in place of it installed what is now proving to be the most dangerous illusion of all: the fiction of objectivity stripped of all that is concretely human.” Technology is a way of being and it is ourselves that we ultimately alienate in the technological age.</p><p>If technology is a way of thinking about reality, then our understanding and perception of our own humanity could not escape unscathed. Since the elements of the natural world primarily interest the modern homo sapien not as self-defining objects, but as standing-reserve, as resources for repurposing, then “man…is nothing but the orderer of the standing-reserve,” Heidegger maintained. Once this is so, “he comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve.” People, in other words, become in their own eyes exactly what they have turned the rest of the world into, pieces and units to be repurposed. And it is hard to delve into either recent history or current affairs and fail to conclude that this is exactly the scenario in which we find ourselves.</p><p>The totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century are useful to consider not as flippant analogies to the present, but, as Havel understood, having lived under one, as “a grotesquely magnified image of,” modern civilization’s “own deep tendencies.” For example, one of the things that made the Holocaust such an extraordinarily <em>modern</em> example of genocide was that the Nazi regime established and rationalized the Final Solution by dehumanizing the Jewish people of Europe not only through rhetorical and legal methods familiar for centuries, but also by relentlessly and methodically commodifying them. The processes and procedures that operated within the Final Solution were predicated upon, and carried out according to, the idea that the people within its grip were units and pieces — isolated and ripped out of their human contexts of meaning — that needed to be processed according to certain supposedly objective criteria. This way of thinking about humans as units to be isolated and transported and used — congruent with a technological way of thinking and doing — aided perpetrators, in parallel with anti-Semitic ideology, in repeatedly transcending instinctive human repugnance at extreme cruelty. The Marxist states of the twentieth century were likewise adept at the commodification of their people, both smoothing the path to and justifying a systemic and murderous disregard for human lives. If you and I can think of numerous more benign ways in which people today are defined and treated as “human resources” to be quantified, calculated, exposed, available, changeable, movable, and replaceable, it is not because these ways are synonymous with Nazism or Communism but because, whether we like it or not, our societies belong to the same modern technological civilization as those systems did. The same urge to look upon human affairs from a false objectivity and the same tendency to methodically separate the way we live from the imperatives of the care of the soul, condition our rhythms and patterns of life.</p><p>But if we only think about humankind’s alienation from itself in terms of the way we view <em>others</em>, then we have missed the heart of it. Technology as a way of being means that the technological self is alienated from his and her own fundamental humanity: as a technological human, I become alienated from myself. Remember that it was Patočka’s contention, derived from Heidegger and Husserl, that it was “not technology as such” which posed the danger, “but technology in its relation to that <em>in man</em> which is <em>capable of truth</em>” (italics added). He was not saying that a man or woman is some independent source of truth, but that there is something within our species that is uniquely equipped, as well as eager, to <em>know</em> the truth. That is, after all, what the technological life, in Heidegger’s framework, is a tragic attempt to do — reveal. But since the technological, abstracted perception of reality brooks no contradiction from the subjective self, all other forms of revelation are shut off from the mind and the heart. “The uncovering that prevails at the essential core of technology necessarily loses sight of uncovering itself,” Patočka explained, “concealing the essential core of truth in an unfamiliar way and so closing man’s access to what he himself is — a being capable of standing in an original relation to the truth.” Amidst all his restless productivity and inventiveness, “man henceforth knows only individual, practical truths, not the truth.”</p><p>This is why Heidegger himself focused all his energy on the essence of technology, rather than specific technological examples — at the level of assumption, perception, and priority, “the actual threat has already affected man in his essence.” The technological way of perceiving, uncovering, and using reality in which our age and society is encapsulated and enmeshed, “threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.” What shall it profit a man if he should gather all the information and lose the truth? Once I have declared the world to be at my feet, in, to use Patočka’s phrase, “its quantifiable meaninglessness,” then I have left behind the role of a man and all its potential for authentic perception and adopted a new identity of my own invention, capable of ruling the world but not of being at home and happy in it.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=99e9f9d48ee4" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-technoskeptic/technology-is-not-a-tool-principles-of-technoskepticism-part-one-99e9f9d48ee4">Technology is Not a Tool (Principles of Technoskepticism — Part One)</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-technoskeptic">The Technoskeptic</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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