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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by INKA KOMAHI UGM on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by INKA KOMAHI UGM on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by INKA KOMAHI UGM on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@inka.komahiugm?source=rss-c7d234c42bd5------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[WAR IS PEACE: On War Profiteering and the State of Perpetual War]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@inka.komahiugm/war-is-peace-on-war-profiteering-and-the-state-of-perpetual-war-81dc2c0fcedf?source=rss-c7d234c42bd5------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[george-orwell]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[warprofiteering]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[INKA KOMAHI UGM]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 12:03:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-26T12:04:41.249Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Writer: Safira Revalina Natapermana</p><p>Editor: Keeshava Adi Widjojo</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ctlGX6ajduF1nZ74tCOevw.png" /></figure><p>“A peace that was truly permanent would be the same as a permanent war” (Orwell, 1949/2021, p. 169). In <em>1984</em>, set in a fictional totalitarian government, Orwell presents war beyond interstate conflict. Rather, its perpetuation can serve purposes within the state itself. This notion becomes particularly relevant when considering the persistence of armed conflict in contemporary international politics.</p><p>As of 2025, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) has recorded the highest number of state-based conflicts since 1946. The numbers were a staggering double from the previous year in 2024, involving at least thirteen states, such as Afghanistan-Pakistan, Cambodia-Thailand, Iran-United States, the Democratic Republic of the Congo-Rwanda, along with many others (Rustad, 2026; Davis, 2026). This research thus seeks to understand the nature and perpetuation of contemporary wars through two rationales: as a tool for economic incentive and social control.</p><p>Research on war profiteering and the war economy varies across multiple disciplines, dissecting the interdependent relationships between the defense industry, armed groups, and governmental bodies (Eaton et al. 2019; Merhl et al., 2023). Within these analyses, the U.S. Military-Industrial Complex (MIC) has been repeatedly utilized as a case study (Coyne &amp; Goodman, 2022; Duncan &amp; Coyne, 2015). Concurrently, scholarship on retention of social control through war generally focuses on internal state affairs, pointing out the correlation between the framing of war and the legitimization of expanding police states (Jentzsch &amp; Steele, 2023; Gönen &amp; Kurti, 2021). As of now, there remains a lack of studies combining both aspects.</p><p><strong>On Permanent War Economy</strong></p><p>In the face of arms races and technological warfare, private sectors have become major beneficiaries of war. Mills (1956/2000) theorized that leaders of the military, corporate, and political strata had merged into a unified ruling class with shared interests, allowing decision-making on a more centralized level. He addressed the significant positions military leaders assume within political and economic decisions despite having “many points of coinciding interests” with corporations and private actors (Mills 1956/2000, pp. 28, 199). This dynamic is rooted in the interdependent relationship between governments and arms companies: the former seeks to maintain restraint over weapons development and export, whereas the latter relies on lobbying power and resources (Merhl et al., 2024).</p><p>Coyne and Goodman (2022) dissected this element through the Military-Industrial Complex (MIC) created by the U.S. structure, in which the transactional relationship between private defense contractors and government officials largely benefits the key players at the expense of prolonged and expensive conflicts. This dynamic is further preserved by the self-reinforcing behavior of the oligarchic structure of these private arms industries. To illustrate, the Department of Defense’s top five contractors dominated 36 percent of the defense market and retained this authority for a decade (Duncan &amp; Coyne, 2015).</p><p>Taking into account these informations, the concentration of power within the Military-Industrial Complex allows economic interests to become intertwined with the perpetuation of military expenditure. While this does not necessarily imply that private actors directly instigate or prolong every conflict, their interests reinforce institutional incentives to sustain military engagement.</p><p><strong>On Social Control</strong></p><p>By another rationale, Orwell (1949/2021) argues that modern warfare serves to preserve a hierarchical society. He posits that war restricts improvements in living standards and wealth equality while distracting the masses from noticing power disparities (pp. 159–162). In the present time, states exercise this perception through various discourses such as nuclear conflicts, “war on drugs”, and “war on terror” (Gönen &amp; Kurti, 2021; Brenner, 2015). Through these narratives, governments — particularly the U.S. — gain opportunities to extend policies against perceived threats, thus preserving class structures regarding race, economic status, and gender lines. To demonstrate, the U.S. war against the global proliferation of drugs also stimulated escalating criminalization and containment of the racialized poor (Gönen &amp; Kurti, 2021).</p><p>Another example is displayed by the case of West Papua, in which the Indonesian government employed political securitization, aiming to re-establish sovereignty. Although referring to internal conflicts, the hawkish nature of the government reflects that securitization and conflict policies perpetuate racial hierarchies within the state (Christian, 2026). Together, these cases prove how the framing of threats can legitimize coercive state policies while reinforcing existing social and political hierarchies. This reflects Orwell’s argument that warfare also functions as a means through which states preserve established power structures. Therefore, the perpetuation of conflict can be understood through its application for domestic control, not simply its external objectives.</p><p>In conclusion, Orwell’s conception of perpetual war and Mill’s study of the power elite offer a valuable framework for understanding how contemporary warfare can serve purposes beyond its external, strategic objectives. As demonstrated through the U.S. Military-Industrial Complex, the concentration of power and the interdependence between political institutions and private defense contractors can create economic incentives that reinforce sustained military expenditure. Meanwhile, the cases of the U.S. war on drugs and Indonesia on West Papua illustrate how the securitization of perceived threats can legitimize coercive state policies and reproduce existing social and political hierarchies. Although the mechanisms operate differently, both demonstrate how warfare can serve the interests of powerful actors within the state.</p><p>These rationales highlight how particular interests and institutional arrangements may contribute to the persistence of warfare beyond its initial justifications. By examining such dimensions together, this research emphasizes the importance of looking beyond the immediate causes of armed conflict to consider the domestic structures and interests that sustain it. Orwell’s assertion that permanent peace and permanent war are essentially indistinguishable invites a critical examination of the political and economic systems in which warfare becomes self-reinforcing. Hence, contemporary warfare can be examined by considering whose interests are served by its continuation.</p><p><strong>References</strong></p><p>Brenner, D. (2015). The State of Peace: an exercise in doublethink. <em>Transnational Institute</em>. <a href="https://www.tni.org/files/download/the_state_of_peace_an_exercise_in_doublethink_0.pdf">https://www.tni.org/files/download/the_state_of_peace_an_exercise_in_doublethink_0.pdf</a></p><p>Christian, J. (2026). Totalizing Sovereignty: Securitization and The Paradox of Strong State Power in Papua. <em>Verity Jurnal Ilmiah Hubungan Internasional (International Relations Journal)</em>, <em>18</em>(35), 15–35. <a href="https://doi.org/10.19166/verity.v18i35.10877">https://doi.org/10.19166/verity.v18i35.10877</a></p><p>Coyne, C. J., &amp; Goodman, N. (2022). The Military-Industrial Complex. <em>SSRN Electronic Journal</em>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4135811">https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4135811</a></p><p>Davis, I. (2026). <em>2. Global trends in armed conflict</em>. SIPRI. <a href="https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2026/02">https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2026/02</a></p><p>Duncan, T. K., &amp; Coyne, C. J. (2015). The revolving door and the entrenchment of the permanent war economy. <em>Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy</em>, <em>21</em>(3), 391–413. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2015-0001">https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2015-0001</a></p><p>Eaton, T. V., Cheng, C., Mansour, R., Salisbury, P., Yazigi, J., &amp; Khatib, L. (2019). Conflict economies in the Middle East and North Africa. <em>Chatam House</em>. <a href="https://apo.org.au/node/244166">https://apo.org.au/node/244166</a></p><p>Gönen, Z., &amp; Kurti, Z. (2021). Introduction to the special issue on Capitalist World-Economy in Crisis. <em>Journal of World-Systems Research</em>, <em>27</em>(1), 4–11. <a href="https://doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2021.1054">https://doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2021.1054</a></p><p>Jentzsch, C., &amp; Steele, A. (2023). Social control in civil wars. <em>Civil Wars</em>, <em>25</em>(2–3), 452–471. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2023.2250699">https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2023.2250699</a></p><p>Mehrl, M., Seussler, D., &amp; Thurner, P. W. (2024). <em>Money First? Strategic and Economic Interests in the International Arms Trade Network, 1920–1936</em>. <em>Global Networks</em>, 24, e12482.<a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/glob.12482"> https://doi.org/10.1111/glob.12482</a></p><p>Mills, C. W. (2000). <em>The power elite.</em> Oxford University Press. <a href="https://ia600800.us.archive.org/4/items/dli.ernet.507694/507694-The%20Power%20Elite%20%281959%29.pdf">https://ia600800.us.archive.org/4/items/dli.ernet.507694/507694-The%20Power%20Elite%20%281959%29.pdf</a> (Original work published 1956)</p><p>Orwell, G. (2021). <em>1984</em>. Alma Classics. (Original work published 1898)</p><p>Rustad, S. A. (2026) Conflict trends: A global overview, 1946–2025. <em>PRIO Paper.</em> Oslo: PRIO .<a href="https://www.prio.org/publications/14802">https://www.prio.org/publications/14802</a></p><p><em>This article represents the personal views and arguments of the author, and does not represent the official position of INKA KOMAHI UGM.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=81dc2c0fcedf" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Who Gets to Shape the Future? Indonesia, the Global South & the Unequal Power Behind  AI Governance]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@inka.komahiugm/who-gets-to-shape-the-future-indonesia-the-global-south-the-unequal-power-behind-ai-governance-a262901c30ca?source=rss-c7d234c42bd5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a262901c30ca</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ai-governance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[geopolitics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[INKA KOMAHI UGM]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 11:53:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-26T11:53:43.143Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Who Gets to Shape the Future? Indonesia, the Global South, and the Soft Unequal Power Behind AI Governance</strong></h3><p>Writer: Enola Yustica <br>Editor: Kinan Adiatma Ramadhan Sulistyo</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NaGPXrJYQSgEQCndPjqydw.png" /></figure><p>Imagine being invited into a room where the rules of the future are being written. You are given a chair, a microphone, and the right to speak. Yet the room is built by people who have more computers, more data, more money, and more of the technology being discussed. You are present, but how much power do you actually have? At the 81st United Nations General Assembly in September 2026, developing countries called for a greater role in shaping the rules surrounding AI (Oladipo, 2026). For countries that will have to live with the consequences of these decisions, being allowed into the conversation is only the beginning. The harder question is whether their participation can actually change what gets decided.</p><p>The United Nations established the Global Dialogue on AI Governance precisely because AI cannot be governed by one country alone. The first dialogue, held in Geneva in July 2026, brought together representatives from 163 countries, with the UN describing the platform as a space where every country can participate in discussions on international AI governance (United Nations, 2026a). On paper, this looks like an unusually inclusive room. But the distribution of technological resources tells a different story. A September UN report found that high-income countries accounted for 77% of global co-location data-centre capacity in 2025, while low-income countries accounted for less than 0.1% (United Nations, 2026b). The same report points to shortages in computing infrastructure, energy connectivity, digital skills and institutional capacity across developing countries.</p><p>Indonesia sits somewhere in between. At the international level it has called for stronger representation of Global South research and greater access to financing, infrastructure, skills and technology regarding AI. At home, it is pursuing what the government calls “sovereign AI”, including domestic computing infrastructure and local AI development (Kementerian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia, 2026; Kementerian Komunikasi dan Digital, 2026). Indonesia therefore finds itself asking for two things at once; a greater role in deciding the rules and greater capacity to operate under them. The first requires cooperation. The second requires building capabilities at home.</p><p>Everyone has a microphone. Everyone can speak. But one delegation may represent a country with enormous data centres, AI companies, research institutions, investment and computing power. Another may represent a country still working to secure infrastructure, and capital needed to develop those things. Both can participate in the same discussion. What happens when the discussion reaches the things that require resources to put into practice? The rules will not stay inside the room. A standard negotiated internationally can shape how AI is developed and used in countries that have far less capacity to influence it. The countries writing the rules and the countries living under them are not necessarily the same. Perhaps the future of AI will not be decided only by who gets invited into the room. It may also depend on who has the resources to do something with what is said inside it.</p><p><strong>References</strong></p><p>Kementerian Komunikasi dan Digital Republik Indonesia. (2026). <em>Bangun kemandirian teknologi dari model hingga infrastruktur, Women Nezar Patria: Indonesia siapkan sovereign AI.</em> Portal Komdigi. <a href="https://portal.komdigi.go.id/kanal-publik/berita-kini/10415">https://portal.komdigi.go.id/kanal-publik/berita-kini/10415</a></p><p>Kementerian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia. (2026)<em>. Indonesia’s intervention in the interactive dialogue of the plenary of the General Assembly with the co-chairs of the Independent International Scientific Panel on Artificial Intelligence,</em> 19 June 2026. Portal Kemlu. <a href="https://kemlu.go.id/newyork-un/pernyataan/2026/the-informal-consultations-on-the-global-dialogue-on-ai-governance?type=publication">https://kemlu.go.id/newyork-un/pernyataan/2026/the-informal-consultations-on-the-global-dialogue-on-ai-governance?type=publication</a></p><p>Oladipo, D.. (2026). <em>At UN, developing nations call for bigger say in shaping AI future. </em>Reuters. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/cop/un-developing-nations-call-bigger-say-shaping-ai-future-2026-09-29/">At U.N., developing nations call for bigger say in shaping AI future</a></p><p>United Nations. (2026). <em>Global dialogue on AI governance.</em> <a href="https://www.un.org/global-dialogue-ai-governance/en">Home | Global Dialogue on AI Governance</a></p><p>United Nations. (2026). <em>Secretary-General calls for Global Fund to address AI capacity-building gaps in developing countries. </em>United Nations Office for Digital and Emerging Technologies.<a href="https://www.un.org/digital-emerging-technologies/content/secretary-general-calls-global-fund-address-ai-capacity-building-gaps-developing-countries">Secretary-General Calls for Global Fund to Address AI Capacity-Building Gaps in Developing Countries | Office for Digital and Emerging Technologies</a></p><p><em>This article represents the personal views and arguments of the author, and does not represent the official position of INKA KOMAHI UGM.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a262901c30ca" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Melting Frontier: Scandinavian Diplomacy and the Geopolitics of a Warming Arctic]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@inka.komahiugm/the-melting-frontier-scandinavian-diplomacy-and-the-geopolitics-of-a-warming-arctic-0f7a44dbdc50?source=rss-c7d234c42bd5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/0f7a44dbdc50</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[arctic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[geopolitics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[scandinavia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[global-warming]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[INKA KOMAHI UGM]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 16:30:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-09T16:30:28.128Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Writer: Kinan Adiatma Ramadhan Sulistyo, Raakan Ats T</p><p>Editor: Albertha Cahyaning, Marcia Adeleide</p><p><em>This essay is a collaboration between the Department of INKA Komahi UGM and Forskning Scanity UGM (</em><a href="https://medium.com/u/c14213ef7a2f"><em>Scanity FISIPOL UGM</em></a><em>).</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*U6kmNUrF4X_zSF2qm4Qlqw.png" /></figure><p>Rooted in the Murmansk Initiative of 1986, in which Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev declared the Arctic a ‘zone of peace’, the Arctic is well-regarded for its ‘exceptionalism’ from global conflict (Åtland, 2008; Devyatkin et al., 2025). This idea was put into practice by the Rovaniemi Process, where the eight Arctic countries; the United States, Canada, Russia, and the Nordics were brought together for the first time concerning environmental protection, resulting in the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) and culminating with the Ottawa Declaration of 1996 and the formation of the Arctic Council (Chuffart et al., 2025; Devyatkin et al., 2025). For over two decades the Council facilitated a golden age of peace, with international collaboration on science, conservation, disaster mitigation, and indigenous representation (Devyatkin et al., 2025; Hønneland &amp; Stokke, 2007). However, this status quo would be shattered by the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, and consequently seven out of the eight (NATO) members of the Arctic Council suspended relations with Russia. The Arctic had been transformed into another front for geopolitical conflict, with Russia and NATO arming their side of the tundra whilst competing for its natural resources as sea ice continues to melt (Balona, 2025; Devyatkin et al., 2025).</p><p>Yet even as the Council’s ministerial machinery lies dormant, its Nordic members have not: Norway’s 2023 chairship reopened working-group activity through quiet backchannel diplomacy after the invasion froze cooperation, and Denmark’s succeeding chairship pushed through the first new project slate since 2022 (Balton &amp; Haig, 2026), evidence that whatever peace the Arctic retains is being sustained less by grand institutions than by improvisation at the margins. It is this tension that the present article takes up. While the retreat of sea ice has invited superpower competition and strained the diplomatic frameworks that once held the Arctic apart from great-power politics, the Nordic nations; Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland remain the primary architects of a sustainable and peaceful Arctic future through their leadership in environmental stewardship and revitalised regional cooperation.</p><p><strong>The New Geopolitical Landscape</strong></p><p><strong>Climate Change: The Threat Multiplier</strong></p><p>Long regarded as a region of no strategic importance due to its inaccessibility from harsh weather and deep layers of ice, the advent of climate change has unlocked new opportunities for shipping routes to natural resources. For one, the Northern Sea Route is now ice-free from July to October, drastically cutting East Asia to Northern Europe transit times from 35–45 days via the Suez Canal down to 18–22 days, an advantage Moscow has capitalised on through mandatory tolls and military reinforcement along its northern coast (Humpert, 2011, 2026; Shtrek, 2020). Compounding this, the U.S. Geological Survey estimates that the Arctic holds roughly 22% of the world’s undiscovered oil and natural gas, an abundance of critical minerals and rare earth elements, with Greenland holding the largest unexploited reserve of 42 million tonnes of 43 out of 50 minerals considered “critical” by western governments, as well as lithium, cobalt, graphite, copper, nickel, platinum, palladium, and large reserves of gold, zinc, diamond, uranium, tungsten, and high-grade iron ore in Baffin Island, Canada (Raspotnik, 2024; Francaviglia, 2026).</p><p><strong>The Return of Great Power Competition</strong></p><p>Since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Arctic has lost its exceptionalism, becoming yet another armed front for great power competition. Moscow has aggressively militarised its coastline by reactivating Soviet-era bases, upgrading the Northern Fleet, deploying A2/AD missile networks, and using the Northern Sea Route to bypass Western sanctions while deepening energy ties with China, a self-proclaimed “near-Arctic state” funding projects like Yamal LNG and pursuing partnerships in Greenland and the Faroe Islands, much to the chagrin of the central Danish government (Raspotnik, 2024; Humpert, 2026; Swedish National China Centre, 2026). In response, NATO has solidified its “defence and deterrence” posture by integrating new members Finland and Sweden into Joint Force Command Norfolk, establishing Forward Land Forces via the Arctic Sentry initiative, and launching a joint 2026 Nordic-Canadian strategic framework (NATO, 2026; Government Offices of Sweden, 2026; Brommesson et al., 2026). Indeed, the Nordic countries have since faced a drastic role change beginning in 2022, from historical neutrality to frontline states representing an active belligerent of geopolitical conflict.</p><p><strong>The Crisis of the Arctic Council</strong></p><p>The main casualty of 2022 was the Arctic Council. After seven Western members suspended cooperation with Moscow, the region lost its only forum for addressing issues that require collective action. The Council now faces a structural dilemma: how to govern a shared ecosystem while excluding Russia, which controls roughly half of the Arctic coastline (Balton &amp; Haig, 2026). The situation has been complicated by NATOisation. Following Finland’s and Sweden’s accession in 2023 and 2024, seven of the eight Arctic states are NATO members. Finland has also become a frontline state, hosting a Swedish-led multinational battle group under Joint Force Command Norfolk (Atlantic Council, 2026). An institution designed to separate military matters from Arctic cooperation now operates within NATO’s security architecture. Washington’s repeated interest in acquiring Greenland, rejected by Nuuk and Copenhagen, has added further tension within the alliance (NATO, 2026).</p><p>Nevertheless, the freeze was not absolute. Below the ministerial level, practical cooperation has continued. Norway and Russia have maintained their Joint Fisheries Commission, which survived the war despite sanctions and political tensions. In December 2025, the two countries agreed on a reduced 2026 cod quota of 285,000 tonnes, the lowest since 1991 (Regjeringen.no, 2025;The Barents Observer, 2026). This cooperation persisted because both sides needed it. Tensions also exist within Denmark. While Copenhagen remains firmly aligned with NATO, Nuuk and Tórshavn have sought greater freedom to engage powers such as China on resource and infrastructure development. This reflects the tension between Greenland’s dependence on Danish subsidies and its ambitions for resource sovereignty and eventual independence (Ivanova, 2025).</p><p><strong>Scandinavian Leadership in Conflict Mitigation</strong></p><p>The Nordic countries have worked quietly to preserve the Arctic Council. Norway’s 2023–2025 chairship and Denmark’s 2025–2027 chairship have focused on apolitical technical cooperation, including environmental monitoring, biodiversity protection, and search and rescue. Meetings have been done virtually, with no face-to-face ministerial sessions since the invasion. The Council has therefore continued through working groups rather than summits or political communiqués (Arctic States and Indigenous Permanent Participants Convene for the 14th Meeting of the Arctic Council and Issue Joint ROMSSA-Tromsø Statement, 2025). This reflects the Nordic model of diplomacy, based on scientific cooperation, soft power, and the inclusion of Indigenous voices through the Council’s six Permanent Participant organisations, including the Saami Council and the Inuit Circumpolar Council. Their continuity has stabilised Arctic governance despite the breakdown in state cooperation (Thorhallsson &amp; Vidal, 2025).</p><p><strong>Environmental Stewardship and Sustainable Development</strong></p><p>Environmental governance remains the area where Nordic leadership is least contested. Norway, Denmark, and Finland have promoted environmentally responsible shipping standards for the Northern Sea Route, while Arctic tourism increasingly follows Nordic environmental guidelines. However, this leadership is inconsistent. Norway remains one of Europe’s largest oil and gas exporters, while Sweden’s expanding green steel industry represents the kind of decarbonised heavy industry that Norway’s oil revenues may have delayed. The Nordic model is therefore not a unified ideology but a balance between economic interdependence and the shared need for ecological credibility.</p><p><strong>The Future of the Arctic</strong></p><p>By 2030, two broad scenarios appear plausible. First, the Arctic fragments into bilateral agreements and hardened military blocs. Russia and China deepen their Polar Silk Road partnership, the seven Arctic NATO states consolidate their defence structures, and Greenland becomes the focus of competition among Copenhagen, Washington, and Beijing. The Arctic Council survives only as a marginal institution. Second, a limited rules-based order persists through frameworks that predate and outlast the Council, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which continues to govern territorial and continental shelf disputes. Neither scenario requires a return to former Arctic exceptionalism; both may balance competition and cooperation.</p><p>The second scenario tends to be more plausible because certain issues do not follow political alignments. Search and rescue, oil-spill response, and fisheries management require cooperation regardless of diplomatic relations. A vessel in distress or an aircraft crash cannot wait for political reconciliation, and no Arctic state, including Russia, has sufficient capacity to manage all emergencies alone. Functional necessity, rather than goodwill, is therefore most likely to preserve practical cooperation. The region’s future may depend less on communiqués than on routine fishing quotas and search-and-rescue protocols.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>The Arctic can no longer maintain its former exceptionalism. Climate change, expanding economic opportunities, new maritime routes, access to oil, gas, and critical minerals, and the return of great-power competition have transformed the region. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has turned the Arctic into another arena of confrontation between Moscow and NATO, while the Arctic Council’s paralysis demonstrates the fragility of the post-Cold War cooperative order. Yet cooperation has not disappeared entirely. Fisheries management, search-and-rescue arrangements, scientific monitoring, environmental protection, and the participation of Indigenous organisations show that practical cooperation can survive even when high-level diplomacy has stalled (ÅTLAND, 2008; Geir Hønneland &amp; Schram Stokke, 2010; Devyatkin et al., 2025).</p><p>The Nordic countries cannot prevent geopolitics or remove the security dilemma created by Russia and NATO. They can, however, sustain the limited forms of dialogue necessary for regional stability. Through their Council chairships, Norway and Denmark have kept technical working groups active, encouraged environmental cooperation, and preserved space for scientific and Indigenous perspectives. In this sense, the Nordic countries provide the diplomatic “glue” that prevents strategic rivalry from eliminating all functional cooperation (“Arctic States and Indigenous Permanent Participants Convene for the 14th Meeting of the Arctic Council and Issue Joint ROMSSA-Tromsø Statement,” 2025; Brommesson et al., 2026). This practical role remains important amid rising strategic competition.</p><p>The Nordic model nevertheless contains contradictions, as the same states promoting environmental responsibility remain linked to fossil fuels, resource extraction, and the security structures contributing to Arctic militarisation. The region’s future will depend on balancing security, economic development, and environmental responsibility. A sustainable Arctic must prioritise ecological integrity, Indigenous participation, scientific cooperation, and international law over short-term economic gains. Defence may remain necessary, but it should not replace diplomacy. Ultimately, Arctic stability will depend not only on the power of competing states but also on their willingness-particularly through Nordic leadership-to recognise that peace and ecological integrity are more valuable than temporary strategic or commercial advantages.</p><p><strong>References</strong></p><p>Arctic states and Indigenous permanent participants convene for the 14th meeting of the Arctic Council and issue joint ROMSSA-Tromsø statement. (2025). <em>Arctic Council</em>. <a href="https://arctic-council.org/news/press-release-14th-meeting-arctic-council-joint-romssa-tromso-statement/">https://arctic-council.org/news/press-release-14th-meeting-arctic-council-joint-romssa-tromso-statement/</a></p><p>Åtland, K. (2008). Mikhail Gorbachev, the Murmansk Initiative, and the Desecuritization of Interstate: Relations in the Arctic. <em>Cooperation and Conflict</em>, <em>43</em>(3), 289–311. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45084526">https://www.jstor.org/stable/45084526</a></p><p>Balona, M. (2025). <em>From exceptionalism to militarisation: The changing landscape of the Arctic</em>. Atlas Institute for International Affairs.<a href="https://atlasinstitute.org/from-exceptionalism-to-militarisation-the-changing-landscape-of-the-arctic/"> https://atlasinstitute.org/from-exceptionalism-to-militarisation-the-changing-landscape-of-the-arctic/</a></p><p>Brommesson, D., Ekengren, A.-M., &amp; Michalski, A. (2026). The Nordic states and the Arctic: Contextually induced role change in a new geopolitical context. <em>European Security</em>. Advance online publication.<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2026.2669676"> https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2026.2669676</a></p><p>Devyatkin, P., Lieven, A., &amp; DerSimonian, A. (2025). <em>Restoring Arctic Exceptionalism: The Path Toward Sustainable Cooperation</em>. Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. <a href="https://quincyinst.org/research/restoring-arctic-exceptionalism-the-path-toward-sustainable-cooperation/#">https://quincyinst.org/research/restoring-arctic-exceptionalism-the-path-toward-sustainable-cooperation/#</a></p><p>Francaviglia, G. (2026). <em>How climate change is reshaping Arctic geopolitics — 360</em>. 360. <a href="https://360info.org/how-climate-change-is-reshaping-arctic-geopolitics/">https://360info.org/how-climate-change-is-reshaping-arctic-geopolitics/</a></p><p>Government Offices of Sweden. (2026). <em>Joint statement by the Prime Ministers of the Nordic countries and Canada</em>.<a href="https://www.government.se/statements/2026/03/joint-statement-by-the-prime-ministers-of-the-nordic-countries-and-canada/"> https://www.government.se/statements/2026/03/joint-statement-by-the-prime-ministers-of-the-nordic-countries-and-canada/</a></p><p>Hønneland, G., &amp; Stokke, O. S. (2010). <em>International cooperation and Arctic governance: Regime Effectiveness and Northern Region Building</em>. Taylor &amp; Francis US.</p><p>Humpert, M. (2011). The Future of the Northern Sea Route — A “Golden Waterway” or a Niche Trade Route. In <em>The Arctic Institute</em>. <a href="https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/future-northern-sea-route-golden-waterway-niche/">https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/future-northern-sea-route-golden-waterway-niche/</a></p><p>Humpert, M. (2026). China launches first scheduled weekly Arctic container service to Europe. <em>gCaptain</em>. <a href="https://gcaptain.com/china-launches-first-scheduled-weekly-arctic-container-service-to-europe/">https://gcaptain.com/china-launches-first-scheduled-weekly-arctic-container-service-to-europe/</a></p><p>Ivanova, A. (2025). After Norway, what’s next? The Kingdom of Denmark and the Arctic Council’s future. In <em>The Arctic Institute — Center for Circumpolar Security Studies</em>. <a href="https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/after-norway-whats-next-kingdom-of-denmark-arctic-councils-future/">https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/after-norway-whats-next-kingdom-of-denmark-arctic-councils-future/</a></p><p>Jcookson. (2026). <em>NATO’s new Arctic presence shows that European allies are stepping up</em>. Atlantic Council. <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/natos-new-arctic-presence-shows-that-european-allies-are-stepping-up/">https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/natos-new-arctic-presence-shows-that-european-allies-are-stepping-up/</a></p><p>Ministry of Trade, I. F. (2025). Norwegian-Russian fisheries agreement for 2026. In <em>Government.no</em>. <a href="https://www.regjeringen.no/en/whats-new/enighet-om-norsk-russisk-fiskeriavtale-for-2026/id3143864/">https://www.regjeringen.no/en/whats-new/enighet-om-norsk-russisk-fiskeriavtale-for-2026/id3143864/</a></p><p>Nordregio. (2025). <em>Resources in the Arctic 2019 — Nordregio</em>. <a href="https://nordregio.org/maps/resources-in-the-arctic-2019/">https://nordregio.org/maps/resources-in-the-arctic-2019/</a></p><p>North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2026). <em>Arctic security</em>.<a href="https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/arctic-security"> https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/arctic-security</a></p><p>Observer, A. S. B. (2026). <em>Norway, Russia reach agreement on Barents Sea fishing quotas</em>. ArcticToday. <a href="https://www.arctictoday.com/norway-russia-reach-agreement-on-barents-sea-fishing-quotas/">https://www.arctictoday.com/norway-russia-reach-agreement-on-barents-sea-fishing-quotas/</a></p><p>Raspotnik, A. (2024). The future battlefield is melting: an argument for why the u.s. must adopt a more proactive arctic strategy. In <em>The Arctic Institute — Center for Circumpolar Security Studies</em>. <a href="https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/future-battlefield-melting-argument-us-must-adopt-more-proactive-arctic-strategy/">https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/future-battlefield-melting-argument-us-must-adopt-more-proactive-arctic-strategy/</a></p><p>Romain Chuffart. (2025). Arctic exceptionalism as myth, method, and mirror. In <em>The Arctic Institute — Center for Circumpolar Security Studies</em>. <a href="https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/arctic-exceptionalism-myth-method-mirror/">https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/arctic-exceptionalism-myth-method-mirror/</a></p><p>Shtrek, A. (2020). New regime and regulations on Northern Sea Route. <em>Arctic Passion News</em>, (19), 4–7.</p><p>Swedish National China Centre. (2026). <em>China and the future of Arctic geopolitics: Four scenarios — Swedish National China Centre</em>. <a href="https://kinacentrum.se/en/publications/china-and-the-future-of-arctic-geopolitics-four-scenarios/#:~:text=Trump&#39;s%20disregard%20for%20and%20threats%20to%20US,the%20non%2DArctic%20state%2C%20China%2C%20on%20the%20other">https://kinacentrum.se/en/publications/china-and-the-future-of-arctic-geopolitics-four-scenarios/#:~:text=Trump&#39;s%20disregard%20for%20and%20threats%20to%20US,the%20non%2DArctic%20state%2C%20China%2C%20on%20the%20other</a></p><p>The Economist. (2025). The Arctic: Climate Change’s Great Economic Opportunity. In <em>The Economist</em>. <a href="https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2025/01/23/the-arctic-climate-changes-great-economic-opportunity">https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2025/01/23/the-arctic-climate-changes-great-economic-opportunity</a></p><p><em>The true costs of mining in the Canadian Arctic — WWF Arctic</em>. (2024, February 2). WWF Arctic. <a href="https://www.arcticwwf.org/the-circle/stories/the-true-costs-of-mining-in-the-canadian-arctic/">https://www.arcticwwf.org/the-circle/stories/the-true-costs-of-mining-in-the-canadian-arctic/</a></p><p>Thorhallsson, B., &amp; Vidal, T. S. (2025). The Nordic region in the Arctic. In <em>Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks</em> (pp. 334–344). <a href="https://doi.org/10.4337/9781035319725.00037">https://doi.org/10.4337/9781035319725.00037</a></p><p>U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2012). Arctic oil and natural gas resources. In <em>Eia.gov</em>. <a href="https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=4650">https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=4650</a></p><p>Zhao, P., Li, Y., Zhang, C., Kang, T., He, Z., Huang, G., Zhang, S., Zhang, X., Xu, Y., &amp; Kong, W. (2025). Arctic Sea Route access reshapes global shipping carbon emissions. <em>Nature Communications</em>, <em>16</em>(1), 8431. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-025-64437-4">https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-025-64437-4</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0f7a44dbdc50" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Bantuan Militer AS ke Ukraina: Alat Perpanjangan Hegemoni dan Kompleks Industri-Militer]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@inka.komahiugm/bantuan-militer-as-ke-ukraina-alat-perpanjangan-hegemoni-dan-kompleks-industri-militer-50ca36813b83?source=rss-c7d234c42bd5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/50ca36813b83</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[geopolitics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ukraine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[united-states]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[INKA KOMAHI UGM]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 25 Sep 2026 05:44:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-25T05:44:30.167Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>“I need ammunition, not a ride”: Memandang Bantuan Militer AS ke Ukraina sebagai Alat Perpanjangan Hegemoni dan Kompleks Industri-Militer</strong></p><p>Penulis: Getsamane Sitepu</p><p>Editor: Revanda Alfathir Setiawan</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nqln94AKCeiorBym_cjbEw.png" /></figure><p>Ketika tank dan pesawat tempur Rusia mengagresi Ukraina dalam skala besar pada 22 Februari 2022, Amerika Serikat memprediksi bahwa Negeri Lumbung Pangan Eropa itu hanya mampu bertahan dari gempuran Rusia paling lama tujuh puluh dua jam. Prediksi tersebut keliru sebab penduduk dan Angkatan Bersenjata Ukraina ternyata mampu mempertahankan diri dari gempuran, sekaligus membuka peluang keterlibatan pihak luar. Washington kemudian merespons tindakan heroik Ukraina dengan merogoh kocek sebesar $67 miliar dolar AS untuk bantuan alutsista dengan motif untuk mempertahankan diri dari agresi Rusia atas nama solidaritas demokrasi (Halu, 2022; Marsh, 2023). Akan tetapi, tindakan Washington merupakan upaya untuk melayani kepentingan kompleks militer-industri (<em>military-industrial complex</em>) dan melemahkan Rusia sebagai kekuatan rival.</p><p>Untuk menganalisis dinamika bantuan militer AS tersebut, tulisan ini memanfaatkan teori hegemoni Gramscian serta perspektif sistem dunia. Hegemoni merupakan sintesis antara koersi dan konsensus, di mana aktor dominan mendesak aktor inferior untuk menerima tatanan mereka sebagai sesuatu yang wajar dan mempertahankannya melalui institusi sosial, politik, dan ekonomi (Gramsci, 1971). Di sisi lain, kerangka analisis Wallerstein (1974) melihat kapitalisme sebagai sistem dunia yang tunggal, saling terhubung, dan menempatkan setiap negara pada tingkat perkembangan ekonomi, kemajuan teknologi, dan eksploitasi. Dalam kerangka Wallerstein terdapat negara inti (<em>core</em>) yang melakukan akumulasi kapital dan mendominasi tingkat kemajuan teknologi, ada juga negara pinggiran (<em>periphery</em>) yang dieksploitasi oleh negara inti melalui penyediaan tenaga kerja dan bahan baku. Di antara negara inti dan pinggiran, hadir negara semi-pinggiran (<em>semi-periphery</em>) dengan karakteristik dieksploitasi oleh negara inti dan mengeksploitasi negara pinggiran sebagai bentuk penyangga. Suatu negara dapat mengalami mobilitas sosial melalui industrialisasi atau siklus ekonomi global (Wallerstein, 1974).</p><p>Amerika Serikat merupakan negara dengan pengaruh signifikan dalam bidang militer, ekonomi, dan budaya di tatanan dunia multipolar (Parveen, 2026). Kekuatan hegemoni Negeri Paman Sam terdiri dari enam ratus instalasi militer di seluruh dunia, mata uang dolar sebagai mata uang dominan dalam sistem finansial global, dan budaya populer yang memengaruhi arus globalisasi (Crothers, 2018; Elson, 2021; Vine, 2017). Dalam kacamata hegemoni Gramscian, Amerika Serikat mengolah tiga bidang tersebut sebagai metode untuk mempertahankan tatanan internasional liberal dan melemahkan kekuatan aktor hegemoni lain. Realitas tersebut, ketika dikaitkan dengan agresi militer Rusia ke Ukraina, adalah ancaman bagi keberlangsungan hegemoni Amerika Serikat karena posisi Rusia sebagai pesaing hegemoni di Benua Biru (Karlsson, 2016; Tsygankov, 2019).</p><p>Upaya Washington untuk mempertahankan hegemoni dan melemahkan pesaingnya dilakukan melalui pemanfaatan sektor militer dan ekonomi. The White House &amp; Timofeev (2022) memaparkan pengiriman bantuan alutsista sebagai jaminan bahwa Ukraina memiliki kekuatan yang cukup dalam melawan agresi Rusia. Tidak hanya itu, Washington juga menerapkan sanksi terhadap sektor industri pertahanan dan kedirgantaraan Rusia, larangan bagi perusahaan multinasional asal Amerika Serikat untuk menanam modal, dan pembatasan transaksi keuangan dengan tujuan melemahkan ekonomi dan memotong akses Kremlin terhadap sistem perbankan dunia. Langkah bantuan alutsista dinilai oleh Senator Lindsey Graham sebagai “uang terbaik yang pernah kami keluarkan” karena tidak perlu mengerahkan Angkatan Bersenjata Amerika Serikat (Dickinson, 2023).</p><p>Baik Amerika Serikat maupun Rusia adalah rival sekaligus aktor hegemonik dalam geopolitik dunia (Tsygankov, 2019). Agresi militer Rusia ke Ukraina adalah babak terbaru dalam ajang kontestasi hegemoni, di mana Kremlin ingin memastikan Kyiv berada dalam kontrol ekonomi, militer, dan politiknya. Akan tetapi, Kyiv menolak hegemoni Kremlin sejak peristiwa Revolusi Maidan pada tahun 2014. Dinamika setelah Revolusi Maidan dimanfaatkan Washington untuk memperluas hegemoninya ke wilayah bekas Blok Timur. Agresi militer adalah kesempatan bagi Washington, dan mereka memanfaatkannya dengan baik melalui bantuan alutsista serta sanksi ekonomi.</p><p>Washington tidak mampu mengimbangi kemajuan teknologi persenjataan militer, sehingga mereka beralih ke sektor swasta untuk membantu mengembangkan dan memberikan akses terhadap teknologi alutsista (Bray, 2020). Lebih lanjut, Bray (2020) menjelaskan sebuah hubungan simbiosis mutualisme, di mana perusahaan alutsista mendapatkan pengaruh atas Kongres AS guna memastikan ketersediaan akses ke pasar global yang siap untuk barang dan jasa mereka, dan Washington meraup keuntungan dari pengeluaran kontrak pertahanan hingga penjualan senjata internasional. Hubungan yang disebut sebagai kompleks militer-industri (<em>military-industrial complex</em>) ini telah berlangsung sejak Perang Vietnam.</p><p>Kompleks militer-industri Washington juga mengambil andil di Ukraina dalam bentuk skema Program Pembiayaan Militer Asing (FMF). Skema FMF mewajibkan negara sekutu seperti Ukraina membeli alutsista serta menerima pelatihan dari Amerika Serikat dalam rangka memastikan interoperabilitas alutsista di antara sekutu dan mitra (Lapatina, 2024; Lawson &amp; Morgenstern, 2020). Dengan skema ini, Ukraina tidak hanya diwajibkan untuk membeli alutsista AS, tetapi juga berfungsi sebagai lahan uji coba.</p><p>Peran Ukraina sebagai lahan uji coba alutsista telah dibuktikan melalui penggunaan salah satu sistem alutsista buatan Amerika Serikat yang dioperasikan di medan laga, yaitu HIMARS. Peluncur roket ini terbukti mampu melawan balik agresi Rusia dan berpotensi memperluas permintaan global alutsista AS karena statusnya telah mencapai “teruji dalam pertempuran.” Apabila dikaitkan dengan teori Wallerstein (1974), upaya Ukraina melawan agresi Rusia dimanfaatkan oleh perusahaan alutsista untuk mengakumulasi kapital melalui pembelian alutsista, sebuah fenomena yang dilegitimasi oleh Washington melalui kebijakan bantuan militer.</p><p>Ketika Washington terus mengirimkan alutsista ke Ukraina sebagai salah satu bentuk praktik kompleks militer-industri, hegemoni, khususnya blok historis, ikut menjustifikasi bantuan tersebut sebagai bentuk kewajiban moral sekaligus melindungi tatanan liberal internasional. Institusi sosial dan politik yang menopang hegemoni AS memang berperan di sini. Dalam pandangan Gramscian, industri alutsista terhubung dengan institusi yang lebih luas, tak hanya soal ekonomi, tapi juga sosial dan politik. Atlantic Council misalnya, sebagai lembaga pemikir ternyata bergantung pada dukungan industri militer, sementara Senat AS sebagai pemangku kebijakan juga menjadi penerima donasi dari perusahaan alutsista.</p><p>Sebagai salah satu kekuatan hegemon, Washington memanfaatkan agresi militer Rusia ke Ukraina sebagai agenda untuk memperlemah kekuatan rival mereka di Eropa. Hal ini dilakukan dengan sanksi ekonomi, larangan Rusia mengakses perbankan global melalui SWIFT, dan pengiriman alutsista ke Ukraina yang dibungkus dengan narasi “solidaritas mempertahankan demokrasi”. Kenyataannya, pengiriman alutsista menjadi “uang terbaik yang pernah kami keluarkan” karena AS tidak perlu mengirimkan pasukannya ke medan laga, cukup dengan berbagi beban dengan negara yang sedang diserang oleh kekuatan yang lebih besar.</p><p>Bantuan alutsista yang diberikan Washington penuh dengan kepentingan kompleks militer-industri dan dibungkus atas nama “solidaritas demokratis”. Alih-alih sekadar memberikan secara cuma-cuma atas nama solidaritas, Ukraina diwajibkan untuk membeli alutsista dari AS melalui skema Program Pembiayaan Militer Asing (FMF) guna membantu melestarikan simbiosis mutualisme Kongres dengan perusahaan alutsista. AS mengeksploitasi negara semi-pinggiran untuk mengakumulasi kapital sebanyak mungkin.</p><p><strong>Daftar Pustaka</strong></p><p>Crothers, L. (2018). <em>Globalization and American popular culture</em>. Lanham Rowman Et Littlefield.</p><p>Dickinson, P. (2023, October 26). <em>Arming Ukraine is cheap compared to the far higher price of Russian victory</em>. Atlantic Council. <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/arming-ukraine-is-cheap-compared-to-the-far-higher-price-of-russian-victory/">https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/arming-ukraine-is-cheap-compared-to-the-far-higher-price-of-russian-victory/</a></p><p>Elson, A. (2021). <em>The Global Currency Power of the US Dollar</em>. Springer Nature.</p><p>Francesca Lucia Bray. (2020). Neoliberalism and Empire: The American Military-Industrial Complex. <em>Glendon Journal of International Studies</em>, <em>11</em>. <a href="https://gjis.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/gjis/article/view/40265">https://gjis.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/gjis/article/view/40265</a></p><p>Gramsci, A. (1971). <em>Prison Notebooks</em>. Columbia University Press. (Original work published 1929)</p><p>Halu, A. (2022). US Military Assistance to Ukraine. <em>THIRD CONCEPT</em>, <em>36</em>(428), 7–9. <a href="https://khagarijancollege.co.in/upload/publication_scopus/1687758391.pdf#page=7">https://khagarijancollege.co.in/upload/publication_scopus/1687758391.pdf#page=7</a></p><p>Karlsson, H. (2016). <em>Competing Powers: U.S.-Russian Relations, 2006–2016</em>. (Original work published 2016)</p><p>Lapatina, A. (2024). <em>How America’s Aid to Ukraine Actually Works</em>. <a href="http://www.lawfaremedia.org./">Www.lawfaremedia.org.</a> <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/how-america-s-aid-to-ukraine-actually-works">https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/how-america-s-aid-to-ukraine-actually-works</a></p><p>Lawson, M. L., &amp; Morgenstern, E. M. (2020, April 30). <em>Foreign Assistance: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy</em>. Dtic.mil. <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/html/trecms/AD1171950/">https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/html/trecms/AD1171950/</a></p><p>Marsh, N. (2023). Responding to needs: military aid to Ukraine during the first year after the 2022 invasion. <em>Defense &amp; Security Analysis</em>, <em>39</em>(3), 329–352. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2023.2235121">https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2023.2235121</a></p><p>Parveen, W. (2026). “The Decline of U.S Hegemony and Emergence of Multipolar World.” <em>International Journal for Research Trends and Innovation </em>, <em>11</em>(1), 354–360. <a href="https://www.ijrti.org/papers/IJRTI2601046.pdf">https://www.ijrti.org/papers/IJRTI2601046.pdf</a></p><p>The White House. (2022). <em>National Security Strategy</em>. <a href="https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf">https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf</a></p><p>Timofeev, I. N. (2022). Sanctions on Russia: A New Chapter. <em>Russia in Global Affairs</em>, <em>20</em>(4). <a href="https://doi.org/10.31278/1810-6374-2022-20-4-103-119">https://doi.org/10.31278/1810-6374-2022-20-4-103-119</a></p><p>Tsygankov, A. P. (2019). <em>Russia and America</em>. John Wiley &amp; Sons.</p><p>Vine, D. (2017). <em>Base Nation: How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the World</em>. Skyhorse Publishing.</p><p><em>Artikel ini mewakili pandangan dan argumen pribadi penulis, dan tidak mewakili pandangan dari INKA KOMAHI UGM.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=50ca36813b83" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Beyond Victimhood: Iranian Women and Their Resistance]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@inka.komahiugm/beyond-victimhood-iranian-women-and-their-resistance-bffdd3119590?source=rss-c7d234c42bd5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bffdd3119590</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[iranian-women]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[feminism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[arghavan-fallahi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gender-apartheid]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[INKA KOMAHI UGM]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 25 Sep 2026 05:29:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-25T05:29:09.854Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Writer: Albertha Cahyaning Setyandini</p><p>Editor: Kinan Adiatma Ramadhan Sulistyo</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mn6VSKfG67duGuYJaTNrQQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>When we talk about Iranian women, we often hear stories about oppression, violence, and restriction. This is understandable, for women in Iran face many laws that limit their freedom, ranging from what they can wear, marriage and divorce to employment and participation in public life (CHRI, 2025b). However, seeing Iranian women only as passive victims can also become a problem. It makes us forget that they are also people who can make decisions, resist, and fight for their rights. Instead of focusing only on their oppression, we should also pay attention to how Iranian women understand their own experiences and how they respond to the conditions they face. At the same time, Iranian women are not a single, homogeneous group, and their experiences can differ depending on their social and political circumstances. Their different forms of resistance show that they are active actors in challenging patriarchal power.</p><p>One problem with focusing too much on suffering is that it can make women’s resistance less visible. The suffering of Iranian women is real, especially because the government uses laws and policies to control many parts of their lives (CHRI, 2025a). Yet, women do not simply accept these restrictions. In September 2022, the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Jina Amini in custody, three days after she was arrested over an alleged hijab violation, sparked the Woman, Life, Freedom movement across Iran. The protests challenged compulsory hijab, discrimination against women, and broader restrictions on people’s rights, but were met with violent state repression that killed more than 500 protesters and led to tens of thousands of arrests (CHRI, 2025a). Despite this repression, many women have continued to challenge compulsory hijab rules in their everyday lives, even while facing punishment (CHRI, 2025a). For some Iranian women, refusing to wear the hijab can be a way to express their autonomy. However, this does not mean that wearing the hijab is always a sign of oppression or that all Iranian women want to remove it. What matters is the ability of women to make their own choices with their bodies and clothing.</p><p>Iranian women do not experience oppression in the same way. The term “Iranian women” includes people of different ages, social backgrounds, occupations, ethnicities, and political positions. These differences shape how they experience restrictions, opportunities, and forms of resistance. Therefore, their experiences cannot be understood under a single narrative. Some may resist through public protest, while others may express their resistance through everyday choices, work, education, or other forms of action. For example, a woman who refuses to wear the hijab may face social or legal pressure, while an activist involved in political movements may face much more serious repercussions. The case of Arghavan Fallahi shows this situation. According to the Iran Human Rights Monitor (2026), Fallahi, a 25-year-old political prisoner, was sentenced to death on charges of <em>baghi</em>, meaning armed rebellion, based on allegations of involvement with anti-government groups and armed activities. However, according to her lawyer, no weapons were found in her possession and there was no evidence establishing her involvement in armed activities. This case highlights how different social positions can shape the risks Iranian women face and the ways they resist oppression. More broadly, Iran Human Rights reports that at least 241 women were executed between 2010 and 2024, yet only 26% of these executions were officially announced by Iranian state media, reflecting the limited transparency surrounding executions of women (CHRI, 2025b). The report also highlights systemic gender discrimination in Iran’s legal system, including the unequal value given to women’s testimony in court, where it may be considered half the value of a man’s testimony (CHRI 2025b). These conditions show that Iranian women can face not only restrictions in their everyday lives but also serious and unequal consequences within the legal system.</p><p>Finally, Iranian women’s struggles should not be understood only through outsiders’ perspectives. A feminist post-structuralist perspective challenges the idea that “women” are a single group with the same experiences, needs, or understanding of freedom. Therefore, there is no single model of liberation that can represent all Iranian women. While opposing compulsory hijab and demanding greater rights may be important forms of resistance, they do not necessarily represent all Iranian women’s priorities or aspirations. Iranian women should have space to define what freedom means to them and what changes they want to see. This is especially important when external actors have their own political goals. For example, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has described toppling the Iranian regime as Israel’s “central mission,” showing that Iran’s political future can also become part of the strategic agendas of external actors (Levaton &amp; Magid, 2026). Therefore, international actors can support Iranian women, including advocating for women such as Arghavan Fallahi, whose death sentence has raised international concern alongside the danger faced by other political prisoners and activists (Verein Welle, 2026). Such support should help make their voices heard while allowing Iranian women to define their own struggles and future.</p><p><strong>References</strong></p><p>Center for Human Rights in Iran. (2025a). <em>Gender apartheid in Iran is crushing women’s lives and futures</em>. Center for Human Rights in Iran. <a href="https://iranhumanrights.org/2025/03/gender-apartheid-in-iran-is-crushing-womens-lives-and-futures/">https://iranhumanrights.org/2025/03/gender-apartheid-in-iran-is-crushing-womens-lives-and-futures/</a></p><p>Center for Human Rights in Iran. (2025b). <em>Women and the death penalty in Iran: A gendered perspective</em>. Center for Human Rights in Iran. <a href="https://iranhr.net/en/reports/41/">https://iranhr.net/en/reports/41/</a></p><p>Iran HRM. (2026). <em>Iran: Arghavan Fallahi, 25-Year-Old political prisoner, at risk of execution</em>. Iran Human Rights Monitor. Iran HRM. <a href="https://iran-hrm.com/2026/08/21/iran-arghavan-fallahi-25-year-old-political-prisoner-at-risk-of-execution/">https://iran-hrm.com/2026/08/21/iran-arghavan-fallahi-25-year-old-political-prisoner-at-risk-of-execution/</a></p><p>Levaton, S., &amp; Magid, J. (2026). <em>Netanyahu: Toppling Iranian regime is Israel’s ‘central mission,’ goal ‘within reach’</em>. Timesofisrael. <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-toppling-iranian-regime-is-israels-central-mission-goal-within-reach/">https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-toppling-iranian-regime-is-israels-central-mission-goal-within-reach/</a></p><p>Verein Welle. (2026). <em>Urgent appeal: Don’t let Arghavan Fallahi alone in deathrow</em>.<a href="https://vereinwelle.ch/projects/arghavan-fallahi-in-danger/?utm_source=chatgpt.com"> </a><a href="https://vereinwelle.ch/projects/arghavan-fallahi-in-danger/">https://vereinwelle.ch/projects/arghavan-fallahi-in-danger/</a></p><p><em>This article represents the personal views and arguments of the author, and does not represent the official position of INKA KOMAHI UGM.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bffdd3119590" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Africa Space Economy dan Politik Pembangunan: Perspektif Negara Pascakolonial dalam Kerangka…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@inka.komahiugm/africa-space-economy-dan-politik-pembangunan-perspektif-negara-pascakolonial-dalam-kerangka-1aa080161573?source=rss-c7d234c42bd5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1aa080161573</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[africa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decolonization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[space]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[INKA KOMAHI UGM]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 26 Aug 2026 22:34:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-26T22:34:19.817Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Africa Space Economy dan Politik Pembangunan: Perspektif Negara Pascakolonial dalam Kerangka Kerjasama Antariksa dengan Amerika Serikat</h3><p>Penulis: Salma Arsya Putri Hartoto</p><p>Editor: Keeshava Adi Widjojo</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*S8cfg3ntwUHh7NoOocOW1w.png" /></figure><p>Pada Juni 2025,<em> Africa Space Economy Conference </em>diadakan di Nigeria guna meninjau agenda berkelanjutan dalam pengembangan <em>space economy</em> di Afrika (International Astronautical Federation, 2025). Hal ini menunjukkan upaya kuat dari negara-negara di Afrika untuk bergabung dalam<em> global space governance.</em> Tendensi ini terlihat sejak Januari 2016, saat <em>African Union </em>mengadopsi <em>African Space Policy and Strategy</em> untuk membangun program antariksa Afrika dengan tujuan merespons kebutuhan sosial, ekonomi, politik, dan lingkungan (African Union, 2024). Kebijakan ini menjadi strategi pembangunan teknologi tinggi yang memperkuat posisi Afrika dalam tata kelola global luar angkasa. Namun, agenda kerjasama eksternal dalam pengembangan teknologi tinggi ini justru membuat orientasinya dipertanyakan, sejauh mana proyek besar ini justru berupaya mendesentralisasi perhatian politik terhadap isu-isu domestik seperti krisis kemanusiaan dan menggambarkan kondisi pascakolonial Afrika.</p><p>Beberapa negara Afrika mulai melibatkan dirinya secara langsung dalam rezim <em>global space governance</em>, ditandai dengan penandatanganan NASA<em> Artemis Accords </em>oleh Nigeria dan Rwanda pada Desember 2022, diikuti Angola dan Senegal di tahun 2023 dan 2025. <em>Artemis Accords</em> merupakan sebuah perjanjian internasional yang dipromosikan oleh NASA dan Departemen Luar Negeri Amerika Serikat yang mendukung eksplorasi serta pembangunan luar angkasa dengan tujuan utama mengembalikan manusia ke Bulan dan Mars sebagai agenda nasional AS (Office of Space Commerce, 2020).</p><p>Kerjasama Afrika dan AS menjadi semakin signifikan, salah satunya melalui inisiatif SERVIR (Regional Visualization and Monitoring System) yang dijalankan oleh NASA dan USAID (US Agency for International Development) sejak 2016. Program ini memanfaatkan teknologi geospasial dan observasi bumi untuk membantu negara-negara di Afrika meningkatkan pengelolaan lingkungan dan ekosistem (NASA, 2016). Inisiatif yang dikelola oleh NASA dan USAID ini juga mengikutsertakan NASA Harvest Africa serta SERVIR West Africa untuk mengoptimalkan pemanfaatan data satelit yang tersedia (SERVIR West Africa, 2024). Selain itu, terdapat juga forum-forum lain seperti<em> US-Africa Space Forum </em>(2022) dan<em> US-Africa Commercial Space Stakeholders Meeting </em>(2023) mencerminkan perluasan kerjasama ekonomi kedua negara.</p><p>Akan tetapi, dibalik agenda besar tersebut kawasan Afrika yang sedang menghadapi tantangan struktural yang signifikan, khususnya dalam prioritas sumber daya nasional. Secara keseluruhan kawasan, terdapat tantangan keterbatasan dana, sumber daya, dan kurangnya infrastruktur teknis yang memadai, serta diperlukannya investasi masif untuk memaksimalkan fasilitas ruang angkasa sendiri (Africa Space, 2024). Selain itu, kebutuhan mendesak seperti pangan, kesehatan, pendidikan, dan keamanan acapkali menyerap sebagian besar anggaran negara (Africa Space, 2024). Meskipun kebijakan antariksa yang dikembangkan difokuskan pada pembangunan sosial, ekonomi, dan politik negara kawasan, intervensi AS dan mitra potensial <em>Global North</em> lainnya menjadikan kerjasama tersebut kerap diperlakukan sebagai proyek elitis yang justru jauh dari kebutuhan masyarakat.</p><p>Terlebih lagi, sebagian kawasan Afrika masih memiliki isu mendesak yang berada dalam kondisi stagnan, bahkan cenderung terpinggirkan dari agenda politik kawasan. Ketika membicarakan Afrika sebagai sebuah kawasan, Dalam menelaah diskursus mengenai Afrika, keberagaman kondisi sosio-ekonomi merupakan dimensi yang tidak terelakkan. Hal tersebut dikarenakan variabel-variabel ini secara fundamental melatarbelakangi sekaligus memosisikan dinamika kehidupan masyarakat dalam keseharian mereka Perbandingan antara negara-negara Afrika yang bergabung dalam <em>Artemis Accords</em> dan konflik di kawasan Afrika seperti Sudan Selatan, menunjukkan adanya kontras prioritas dalam kebijakan kawasan. Di tengah meluasnya kerjasama luar angkasa Afrika dengan AS, di sisi lain, Sudan Selatan mengalami kondisi yang stagnan dengan konflik bersenjata, krisis kemanusiaan dan ketidakstabilan. Terlebih lagi, peristiwa<em> Nasir Clashes</em> yang terjadi pada 2025 bentrok antara anggota South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) dan Nuer White Army juga menambah kerentanan di sub kawasan Afrika Timur (Amani Africa, 2025).</p><p><strong><em>Space Economy</em> sebagai keberlanjutan <em>Postcolonial Statehood</em></strong></p><p>Herbst (2000) berargumen bahwa selama Perang Dingin, negara-negara Afrika dapat bertahan karena patronase eksternal dan norma internasional yang melindungi perbatasan kolonial di Afrika, alih-alih karena kapasitas domestik yang kuat. Karenanya, pembentukan negara di Afrika menjadi terputus dari masyarakat dan wilayahnya sendiri (Herbst, 2000). Kondisi ini menyebabkan kedaulatan dijamin secara eksternal, bukan dibangun dari dalam sehingga konflik internal tidak mengancam status internasional negara. Hal ini berimplikasi kepada kinerja para elit politik yang memiliki insentif relatif rendah untuk memprioritaskan penyelesaian permasalahan internal, sedangkan pencarian legitimasi eksternal tetap dilakukan salah satunya melalui partisipasi dalam pengembangan ekonomi luar angkasa.<em> </em>Selain itu, proyek ini justru mencerminkan upaya AS untuk memperluas pengaruhnya di Afrika melalui teknologi tinggi dan norma internasional luar angkasa serta sebagai strategi kepemimpinan globalnya di domain antariksa.</p><p>Pengesampingan isu kemanusiaan dalam agenda ini memperkuat kritik bahwa agenda besar pengembangan ekonomi luar angkasa<em> </em>dapat mendesentralisasi fokus isu domestik yang genting, serta menunjukkan pola keberlanjutan negara pascakolonial. Pengesampingan isu ini dapat dilihat dari bagaimana isu humaniter tidak dimasukkan kedalam agenda besar pengembangan ekonomi luar angkasa<em> </em>Afrika. Dalam pertemuan-pertemuannya, pengembangan ekonomi luar angkasa hanya difokuskan pada tema masa depan teknologi dan ekonomi, tanpa secara spesifik mengambil posisi tentang isu kemanusiaan terlebih apa yang terjadi di Sudan Selatan, Afrika Timur, atau di bagian sub kawasan lainnya. Secara umum, krisis di Sudan Selatan bahkan disebut sebagai krisis yang terlalu banyak diabaikan, secara umum kepentingannya (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2025). Dalam kerangka <em>African Public Financ</em>e, Herbst (2000) menunjukkan bahwa negara-negara di Afrika umumnya mempertahankan legitimasi negaranya bukan melalui penyelesaian atas konflik internal, melainkan melalui akses pendanaan dari eksternal yang tidak menuntut kapabilitas domestik atau penguasaan teritorial tertentu (Herbst, 2000). Maka dari itu, ekonomi luar angkasa<em> </em>dapat dilihat sebagai sesuatu yang mereproduksi logika serupa, di mana kawasan tampil sebagai aktor modern, tetapi kondisi krisis domestik masih stagnan akibat agenda eksternal yang mengesampingkannya.</p><p>Berdasarkan hal tersebut, dapat disimpulkan bahwa negara-negara kawasan Afrika memiliki kelemahan fiskal, bukan karena gagal, melainkan karena tidak pernah ‘dipaksa’ untuk membangun sistem keuangan yang mengakar, hal ini disebabkan negara tidak memiliki prioritas untuk memperluas kontrol dalam administratif, serta legitimasi internasional yang tidak memberi syarat tertentu dalam pengembangan kapasitas domestiknya (Herbst, 2000). Selain itu, keterlibatan aktor <em>Global North</em> seperti AS dalam ekonomi luar angkasa Afrika mereproduksi pola kolonial lama alih-alih semata-mata memperluas peluang teknologi, di mana agenda pembangunan kawasan mengesampingkan persoalan internal yang dibingkai melalui kepentingan eksternal. Hal ini dapat mengesampingkan diskursus Afrika tentang fokus penyelesaian masalah internalnya ke penguatan teknologi yang memperkuat legitimasi kepemimpinan AS, serta menunjukkan kehadiran AS di Afrika tanpa tujuan untuk mendorong pembangunan struktural kawasan Afrika, salah satunya penyelesaian konflik internal. Maka dari itu, partisipasinya dalam pengembangan ekonomi luar angkasa<em> </em>khususnya dalam kerjasamanya dengan AS melalui <em>Artemis Accords</em> dan bagaimana agenda tersebut justru mendesentralisasi isu kemanusiaan kawasan, memperlihatkan pola negara pascakolonial.</p><p><strong>Referensi</strong></p><p>Africa Space. (2024). <em>Space in Africa</em>. Space News Africa. <a href="http://africa-space.com/">http://africa-space.com</a>/</p><p>African Union. (2024). <em>African Union Heads of State and Government Adopts the African Space Policy and Strategy | African Union</em>. Au.int. <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20160131-3">https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20160131-3</a>?</p><p>Amani Africa. (2025). <em>Timeline of Escalating Tensions in South Sudan — Amani Africa</em>. Amaniafrica-Et.org. <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/timeline-of-escalating-tensions-in-south-sudan/">https://amaniafrica-et.org/timeline-of-escalating-tensions-in-south-sudan/</a></p><p>Herbst, J. (2000). <em>States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control</em>. Princeton, Nj Princeton University Press.</p><p>International Astronautical Federation. (2025). <em>IAF : AFRICA SPACE ECONOMY CONFERENCE 2025</em>. Iafastro.org. <a href="https://www.iafastro.org/activities/iaf-logbook/africa-space-economy-conference-2025.html">https://www.iafastro.org/activities/iaf-logbook/africa-space-economy-conference-2025.html</a></p><p>NASA. (2016). <em>NASA, USAID Open Environmental Monitoring Hub in West Africa — NASA</em>. NASA. <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/news-release/nasa-usaid-open-environmental-monitoring-hub-in-west-africa/">https://www.nasa.gov/news-release/nasa-usaid-open-environmental-monitoring-hub-in-west-africa/</a></p><p>NASA. (2022). <em>NASA Welcomes Nigeria, Rwanda as Newest Artemis Accords Signatories — NASA</em>. NASA. <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/missions/artemis/nasa-welcomes-nigeria-rwanda-as-newest-artemis-accords-signatories/">https://www.nasa.gov/missions/artemis/nasa-welcomes-nigeria-rwanda-as-newest-artemis-accords-signatories/</a></p><p>NASA. (2023). <em>NASA Welcomes Angola as Newest Artemis Accords Signatory — NASA</em>. NASA. <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/general/nasa-welcomes-angola-as-newest-artemis-accords-signatory/">https://www.nasa.gov/general/nasa-welcomes-angola-as-newest-artemis-accords-signatory/</a></p><p>Norwegian Refugee Council. (2025). <em>The world’s most neglected displacement crises in 2024</em>. NRC. <a href="https://www.nrc.no/feature/2025/the-worlds-most-neglected-displacement-crises-in-2024">https://www.nrc.no/feature/2025/the-worlds-most-neglected-displacement-crises-in-2024</a></p><p>Office of Space Commerce. (2020). <em>National Space Policy — Office of Space Commerce</em>. Commerce.gov. <a href="https://space.commerce.gov/policy/national-space-policy/">https://space.commerce.gov/policy/national-space-policy/</a></p><p>SERVIR West Africa. (2024). <em>About | SERVIR</em>. Icrisat.org. <a href="https://servir.icrisat.org/about/">https://servir.icrisat.org/about/</a></p><p>Space Forum Africa. (2025). <em>Home — Space Forum Africa</em>. Space Forum Africa — Home. <a href="https://www.spaceforumafrica.org/">https://www.spaceforumafrica.org/</a></p><p><em>Artikel ini mewakili pandangan dan argumen pribadi penulis, dan tidak mewakili pandangan dari INKA KOMAHI UGM.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1aa080161573" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Whistle Blows, Terror Grows: Spain’s Victory and England’s Defeat Reveal About Football Politics]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@inka.komahiugm/whistle-blows-terror-grows-spains-victory-and-england-s-defeat-reveal-about-football-politics-f4171f3dd046?source=rss-c7d234c42bd5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f4171f3dd046</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[fifa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[feminism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football-politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[INKA KOMAHI UGM]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 26 Aug 2026 22:27:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-26T22:27:03.517Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Writer: Tiara Dwi Kinanti</p><p>Editor: Kinan Hayuwimala</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*p-Xvy56c5NYzADN0Jbefiw.png" /></figure><p><em>“Vamos España!”</em> That excitement has become a familiar reflex among football fans, the glorious feeling of watching a national side arrive at football’s biggest stage. Spain’s triumph at the 2026 FIFA World Cup closed a quadrennial euphoria. The finals between Spain and Argentina were more than a contest of tactics and squad depth; it was, in a sense, a meeting of two footballing cultures shaped by a shared colonial history but expressed through very different national temperaments. This is often what scholars describe as football diplomacy, where global sporting events double as arenas of soft power, national branding, and cultural exchange. In International Relations, the state is usually treated as the actor best positioned to convert these moments into strategic advantage. Yet beneath the celebratory coverage of national triumph sits a less visible reality.</p><p>For a significant share of the global population, particularly women, the final whistle of an international match does not mark the end of the contest. It can mark the start of an immediate threat closer to home. This pattern is most thoroughly documented in the United Kingdom. Quantitative research from Lancaster University, examining patterns across three prior World Cups, found a 38% rise of domestic violence when the England national team loses and remains elevated by 26 percent even when the team wins or draws (Kirby et al., 2014). Through a Feminist IR lens, this is not simply a British anomaly; it is the localized manifestation of a transnational, gendered power structure, and as football culture has globalized, so has its capacity to catalyze this kind of domestic harm.</p><p>Mapping this pattern across borders requires looking at how hegemonic masculinity is locally expressed. In the United Kingdom and parts of Northern Europe, this plays out through what is often called ‘lad culture’, characterized by collective male bonding, heavy drinking in pub settings, sports betting, and a normalized undercurrent of casual misogyny (Phipps &amp; Young, 2013). This combination creates conditions where aggression is more socially tolerated. When the national team loses, collective disappointment is amplified by intoxication, which lowers inhibition and heightens emotional volatility. As observed through a Critical Feminist lens, the state and its cultural industries have a hand in reinforcing hegemonic masculinity, a social construction of manhood built around dominance, aggression, and discomfort with vulnerability. When the team loses, some supporters experience this as a personal loss of standing. Because prevailing norms of masculinity offer few accepted outlets for processing that vulnerability, the frustration is sometimes carried home. The domestic space then becomes a secondary site where a supporter attempts to reassert control, at the expense of those closest to him. It tends to treat the household as a sealed, apolitical space, separate from the anarchic dynamics of the international system. Cynthia Enloe’s framework suggests that the state’s pursuit of soft power through sport carries a cost that is rarely counted: the physical safety of women. It tends to treat the household as a sealed, apolitical space, separate from the anarchic dynamics of the international system, by arguing that the personal is international and the international is personal (Enloe, 2014/1990).</p><p>This is not only a matter of individual anger. This also demonstrates how both the state and private companies profit from football, alcohol, and sports betting while externalizing their social costs onto public health systems and domestic violence services. The 38 percent spike documented by Lancaster University can be read as the direct byproduct of an economic and cultural system turning into private homes, where the burden falls disproportionately on women. When a bet on a World Cup match is lost, the emotional weight of a sporting defeat is compounded almost instantly by financial desperation, increasing vulnerability in the household (The Lancet Regional Health-Americas 2025). A partner facing both a bruised sense of national pride and a depleted household budget presents a heightened, more acute risk profile at home.</p><p>In each context, the macro-politics of national prestige and the commercial interests tied to global sport are prioritized well above the everyday safety of women in private homes. The emotional weight of national defeat, and sometimes even victory, continues to be absorbed disproportionately by women, long after the stadium empties and the broadcast ends. If institutions such as FIFA and national governments want to take the social consequences of football seriously, they will need to build a more deliberate framework connecting sport, gender, and human security. Until that connection is made explicit, the relationship between a nation’s result on the pitch, and the safety of its citizens at home will remain an uncomfortable and largely unaddressed feature of the modern game.</p><p><strong>References</strong></p><p>Enloe, C. (2014). <em>Bananas, beaches and bases: Making feminist sense of international politics</em> (2nd ed.). University of California Press. (Original work published 1990)</p><p>Kirby, S., Francis, B., &amp; O’Flaherty, R. (2014). Can the FIFA World Cup football (soccer) tournament be associated with an increase in domestic abuse<em>? Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency,</em> 51(3), 259–276. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0022427813494843">https://doi.org/10.1177/0022427813494843</a></p><p>Phipps, A., &amp; Young, I. (2013). <em>That’s what she said: Women students’ experiences of ‘lad culture’ in higher education.</em> National Union of Students.</p><p>The Lancet Regional Health–Americas. (2025). Sports gambling in the Americas: The rise of invisible risks. <em>The Lancet Regional Health–Americas,</em> 48, Article 101211. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lana.2025.101211">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lana.2025.101211</a></p><p><em>This article represents the personal views and arguments of the author, and does not represent the official position of INKA KOMAHI UGM.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f4171f3dd046" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM): Arena Relasi Kuasa antara Uni Eropa dan Tiongkok]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@inka.komahiugm/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism-cbam-arena-relasi-kuasa-antara-uni-eropa-dan-tiongkok-f61aaae187af?source=rss-c7d234c42bd5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f61aaae187af</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[uni-eropa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cbam]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[geopolitics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tiongkok]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[INKA KOMAHI UGM]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 25 May 2026 11:23:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-25T11:23:57.768Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Penulis: Zahra Mawadda</p><p>Editor: Keeshava Adi Widjojo</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Y_cgHVFtTN7G5aiA8BTnnQ.png" /></figure><p>Dalam menghadapi isu karbon dan iklim, Uni Eropa dan Tiongkok menempati posisi yang berbeda (Averchenkova dkk., 2016). Sebagai salah satu negara dengan sektor industri terbesar dan berkembang pesat, Tiongkok belum sepenuhnya diiringi oleh penguatan dan penyesuaian kebijakan lingkungan. Kondisi ini menyebabkan Tiongkok masih berada dalam proses adaptasi terhadap tuntutan perlindungan lingkungan. Di sisi lain, Uni Eropa memposisikan dirinya sebagai entitas global yang memimpin kebijakan lingkungan, termasuk pengendalian karbon dan emisi. Perbedaan posisi tersebut memengaruhi cara kedua aktor ini membentuk pandangan serta sikap dalam menjalankan hubungan luar negeri mereka, terutama ketika isu lingkungan menjadi faktor utama dalam interaksi internasional. Perbedaan ini juga penting untuk memahami sejauh mana kedua entitas berkomitmen dalam menghadapi dan menjawab isu tersebut di era ini.</p><p>Berdasarkan laman European Commission, CBAM didefinisikan sebagai salah satu instrumen kebijakan untuk menetapkan harga yang adil pada barang-barang dengan intensitas karbon tinggi dalam rangka mendorong produksi yang lebih ramah lingkungan di negara-negara non-Uni Eropa. Meskipun implementasinya masih akan dilakukan per tahun 2026, muncul potensi tantangan berupa peningkatan biaya ekspor produk-produk yang memiliki jejak karbon tinggi sehingga memaksa Tiongkok untuk melakukan penyesuaian dalam mengelola sistem produksinya (Seneca ESG, 2022).</p><p>Penelitian ini menggunakan konsep Normative Power Europe (NPE) dan International Political Economy (IPE) untuk menjawab dan memahami dinamika politik antara Uni Eropa dan Tiongkok dalam konteks kebijakan dalam kebijakan Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). Normative Power Europe (NPE) dipahami sebagai suatu konsep yang menjelaskan bagaimana Uni Eropa menanamkan nilai-nilai yang dianggapnya ‘wajar’ dalam bentuk norma-norma, seperti demokrasi, HAM, <em>rule of law,</em> dan multilateralisme (Manners, 2002). Dengan menggunakan konsep ini, pemeliharaan lingkungan dan standar karbon berfungsi sebagai titik normatif yang akan bertransformasi menjadi praktik hegemoni. Di sisi lain, IPE sebagai bidang kajian yang menganalisis bagaimana dinamika politik membentuk aturan dalam proses ekonomi berfungsi sebagai kacamata untuk memahami CBAM yang dibingkai atas nama perlindungan lingkungan sebagai mekanisme pembentukan relasi kuasa dalam perdagangan internasional. Kedua konsep ini digunakan dengan saling melengkapi satu sama lain untuk mengangkat isu lingkungan dan berdampak pada aspek politik, ekonomi, serta sebagai instrumen yang membawa dan mencerminkan kepentingan strategis antara Uni Eropa dan Tiongkok.</p><p>Ketegangan politik yang terjadi antara Tiongkok dan Uni Eropa dalam menyikapi CBAM, memiliki dampak langsungnya terhadap struktur perdagangan Tiongkok. Sejumlah sektor, seperti semen, baja, aluminium, pupuk, listrik, dan hidrogen diproyeksikan akan terdampak oleh penerapannya. Menurut Wang dkk., kebijakan ini tidak hanya dapat menurunkan intensitas emisi karbon di Tiongkok, tetapi juga menimbulkan penurunan yang signifikan pada volume ekspor ke Uni Eropa. Dampak ini muncul karena meningkatnya harga produk beremisi tinggi ketika memasuki pasar Uni Eropa sehingga daya saing produk Tiongkok menurun di kawasan tersebut.</p><p>CBAM sebagai sumber ketegangan politik tidak hanya berdampak pada isu perdagangan, tetapi juga memengaruhi cara Tiongkok memandang isu lingkungan dalam menjalankan dan menyesuaikan kebijakannya. Tiongkok sendiri telah melakukan berbagai upaya untuk menangani permasalahan cara produksi yang dinilai akan lebih ramah lingkungan yang sebagian besar didorong oleh tekanan internasional. Emisi karbon yang dihasilkan menimbulkan dilema bagi Tiongkok, yakni apakah harus segera bertransisi menuju kebijakan yang lebih ramah lingkungan atau menerima konsekuensi berupa penurunan aktivitas ekspor-impor.</p><p>Standar karbon yang dianggap dipromosikan UE sebagai mekanisme akan menentukan siapa yang dapat mengakses pasar dan dengan syarat apa sehingga memperlihatkan dimensi relasi kuasa yang melekat di dalamnya. Situasi ini menunjukkan bahwa penyebaran norma lingkungan UE mampu diperdebatkan oleh aktor lain yang memiliki kepentingan dan lintasan pembangunan berbeda. Pada titik inilah, CBAM menjadi arena di mana klaim normatif dan kepentingan politik-ekonomi saling berhadapan, bukan sekadar kebijakan teknis pengendalian emisi.</p><p>Lebih spesifik lagi, kebijakan ini memicu potensi Uni Eropa dan Tiongkok untuk bergesekan pada isu proteksionisme yang dapat menimbulkan persepsi bahwa standar lingkungan dijadikan alat untuk melindungi produsen lokal (Cornago &amp; Berg, 2024). Uni Eropa berupaya mengurangi ketergantungan pada impor beremisi tinggi yang sebagian besar berasal dari Tiongkok sehingga kebijakan iklim berubah menjadi sumber sensitivitas ekonomi di antara keduanya. Tekanan inilah yang membuat CBAM dipandang sebagai persoalan ekonomi yang berpotensi mengancam posisi Tiongkok sebagai salah satu kekuatan ekonomi terbesar di dunia.</p><p>CBAM membentuk pola interaksi yang baru antara Uni Eropa dan Tiongkok karena langkah ini memposisikan isu iklim dan lingkungan yang menjadi fokus langsung ke dalam hubungan bilateral kedua negara tersebut (Otto, 2025). Dalam konteks ini, CBAM berubah menjadi arena politik yang mempertemukan ambisi yang berkebalikan, yakni antara Uni Eropa yang normatif dan Tiongkok yang defensif dalam mempertahankan struktur industrinya. Akibatnya, muncul <em>norm diffusion</em> dengan tidak berbentuk adopsi sukarela, yakni tekanan Eropa bekerja lewat posisi pasarnya yang dominan sehingga standar karbonnya tampak seperti norma global yang harus diikuti (Pradipta, Muhammad Zulfikar dkk., 2023).</p><p>Secara nilai dan identitas, negara-negara Uni Eropa memiliki kesepahaman mengenai CBAM sebagai sebuah misi kolektif. Namun demikian, terdapat kewaspadaan di antara beberapa negara anggota yang khawatir kebijakan ini dapat mengguncang perekonomian domestik mereka yang terlihat pada Jerman yang masih sangat bergantung pada ekspor dan rantai pasok global, termasuk hubungan dagangnya dengan Tiongkok. Struktur industri Jerman, seperti sektor otomotif, baja, dan mesin sangat bergantung pada bahan baku serta komponen dari Tiongkok sehingga membuat Jerman relatif sensitif terhadap potensi balasan dagang yang dapat mengancam aktivitas perdagangannya.</p><p>Pada satu sisi, terdapat temuan dari Wirdiyansyah (2025) yang mengatakan bahwa kebijakan CBAM dinilai akan membahayakan ekonomi Tiongkok. Maka dari itu, Tiongkok merancang strategi tandingan dengan membawa isu CBAM ke dalam WTO, tepatnya ke dalam Committee on Trade and Environment. Hal ini menjadi momen dan langkah strategi yang tepat bagi Tiongkok untuk mengalihkan fokus perdebatan dari aspek lingkungan ke aspek keadilan perdagangan. Pada titik ini juga muncul kesinambungan dengan kekhawatiran awal Tiongkok mengenai potensi proteksionisme. Dengan membawa isu ini ke WTO, memungkinkan Tiongkok untuk sedikit ‘menjegal’ kepentingan Uni Eropa yang dinilai bukan sebagai pembawa norma lingkungan, tetapi sebagai aktor yang memanfaatkan standar ekologis untuk memperketat akses pasar.</p><p>Pada akhirnya, CBAM dapat dipahami sebagai cerminan dari cara Uni Eropa mengelola perannya dalam tatanan global yang semakin kompetitif yang memicu perundingan ulang mengenai keadilan, tanggung jawab, dan distribusi beban dalam sistem perdagangan global yang memengaruhi keseimbangan kepentingan antara negara maju dan negara berkembang. Kebijakan ini menunjukkan bagaimana Uni Eropa mempertahankan relevansinya di tengah perubahan struktur kekuasaan dunia sekaligus menjadikan isu lingkungan sebagai bagian yang tidak terpisahkan dari kepentingan ekonomi dan strategi politik. Hubungan kedua negara ini menegaskan bahwa tata kelola iklim global kini bergerak ke arah yang lebih politis yang mana sebuah standar, regulasi, dan akses pasar menjadi sarana utama negosiasi.</p><p><strong>Referensi</strong></p><p>Averchenkova, A., Bassi, S., Benes, K., Green, F., Lagarde, A., Neuweg, I., &amp; Zachmann, G. (2016). <em>Climate policy in China, the European Union and the United States: Main drivers and prospects for the future </em>. <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Averchenkova-et-al_2106-in-depth-country-analysis-v2.pdf">https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Averchenkova-et-al_2106-in-depth-country-analysis-v2.pdf</a></p><p>Cornago, E., &amp; Berg, A. (2024). <em>Learning from CBAM’s transitional phase: Early impacts on trade and climate efforts</em>. Centre for European Reform. <a href="https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/policy-brief/2024/learning-cbams-transitional-impacts-trade">https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/policy-brief/2024/learning-cbams-transitional-impacts-trade</a></p><p>European Commission. (2025). <em>Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism</em>. European Commission. <a href="https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism_en">https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism_en</a></p><p>Manners, I. (2002). Normative Power Europe: a Contradiction in Terms? <em>JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies</em>, <em>40</em>(2), 235–258. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5965.00353">https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5965.00353</a></p><p>Otto, S. (2025). The external impact of EU climate policy: political responses to the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. International Environmental Agreements Politics Law and Economics, 25. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-025-09667-z">https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-025-09667-z</a></p><p>Pradipta, M. Z., Putranti, I. R., &amp; Hanura, M. (2023). Peran regulasi Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) dalam upaya penerapan ambisi net zero carbon di negara Jerman [Undergraduate thesis, Diponegoro University]. UNDIP Repository. <a href="https://eprints2.undip.ac.id/id/eprint/19720/1/COVER.pdf">https://eprints2.undip.ac.id/id/eprint/19720/1/COVER.pdf</a></p><p>Seneca ESG. (2022). <em>INSIGHTS | Europe’s CBAM and its impact on China </em>. Seneca ESG. <a href="https://senecaesg.com/id/insights/insight-europes-cbam-and-its-impact-on-china/">https://senecaesg.com/id/insights/insight-europes-cbam-and-its-impact-on-china/</a></p><p>Wang, X.-C., Dong, X., Zhang, Y., Xiao, R., Varbanov, P. S., &amp; Fan, Y. V. (2023). The Potential Impacts of Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism on Carbon Neutrality of China. <em>Chemical Engineering Transactions</em>, <em>103</em>, 511–516. <a href="https://doi.org/10.3303/CET23103086">https://doi.org/10.3303/CET23103086</a></p><p>Wirdyansyah, D. M. (2025). Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and its implications for developing economies: A systematic literature review. Indonesian Journal of Energy, 8(2), 162–176. <a href="https://doi.org/10.33116/ije.v8i2.292">https://doi.org/10.33116/ije.v8i2.292</a></p><p>Worldometer. (2022). <em>Emisi CO2 Tiongkok — Worldometer</em>. Worldometer. <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/id/emisi-co2/emisi-co2-cina/">https://www.worldometers.info/id/emisi-co2/emisi-co2-cina/</a></p><p><em>Artikel ini mewakili pandangan dan argumen pribadi penulis, dan tidak mewakili pandangan dari INKA KOMAHI UGM.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f61aaae187af" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Penutupan Selat Hormuz: Ancaman Nyata bagi Ketahanan Energi Global]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@inka.komahiugm/penutupan-selat-hormuz-ancaman-nyata-bagi-ketahanan-energi-global-423101944af6?source=rss-c7d234c42bd5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/423101944af6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ketahanan-energi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[geopolitics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[middle-east]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[selat-hormuz]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[INKA KOMAHI UGM]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 25 May 2026 11:16:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-25T11:16:03.132Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Penulis: Salvia Patricia Nibenia Gulo</p><p>Editor: Kinan Adiatma Ramadhan Sulistyo</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vP9n72zFjkGTbdxy5jXIcw.png" /></figure><p>Pada 4 Maret 2026, <em>Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps</em> (IRGC) secara resmi menutup Selat Hormuz–sebuah langkah yang selama puluhan tahun hanya menjadi ancaman di atas kertas. Dalam hitungan hari, harga minyak mentah melonjak lebih dari 10%, disertai premi asuransi kapal tanker naik empat hingga enam kali lipat, dan ratusan kapal lebih memilih putar balik dibandingkan harus menanggung risiko (Congressional Research Service, 2026). Dunia kemudian tiba-tiba tersadar bahwa selat selebar 33 kilometer itu bukanlah sekadar jalur laut biasa, ia adalah urat nadi energi global yang mampu menyandera ekonomi global dalam sekejap.</p><p>Guncangan instan pada pasar global saat penutupan terjadi bukanlah tanpa alasan. Hingga tahun 2025, Selat Hormuz menjadi jalur krusial bagi sekitar 25% perdagangan minyak mentah dan 20% ekspor gas alam cair dunia setiap harinya (International Energy Agency, 2026a). Ketiadaan jalur alternatif yang sebanding memperburuk situasi ini. Pipa darat milik Arab Saudi dan Uni Emirat Arab hanya mampu menampung 3,5 hingga 5,5 juta barel per hari–jauh di bawah volume normal yang mencapai lebih dari 20 juta barel per hari sebelum krisis (International Energy Agency, 2026a). Maka ketika selat ditutup, tidak ada rencana cadangan yang cukup memadai untuk menanggung konsekuensi dari penutupan tersebut. Akibatnya, pasar energi global mencatat sejarah disrupsi terparah pada Maret 2026, ditandai dengan merosotnya pasokan minyak dunia hingga 10,1 juta barel per hari.</p><p>Di Asia, kawasan yang menyerap sekitar 84% ekspor minyak dari Selat Hormuz–termasuk kekuatan ekonomi seperti China, India, Jepang, dan Korea Selatan–menghadapi lonjakan harga sekaligus ancaman kelangkaan fisik (Congressional Research Service, 2026). Sementara itu di Eropa, harga gas TTF melonjak hampir dua kali lipat dalam hitungan hari, membangkitkan kembali momok krisis energi 2021–2022 pasca-perang Ukraina (Loft, 2026). <em>International Monetary Fund</em> (IMF) memperingatkan bahwa krisis ini menciptakan efek pajak mendadak bagi seluruh perekonomian dunia, di mana negara-negara berkembang yang menanggung beban terberat akibat inflasi logistik dan tekanan pada subsidi domestik (Adrian dkk., 2026).</p><p>Uniknya, pemblokiran ini tidak melibatkan alutsista konvensional seperti ranjau laut ataupun kapal perang besar. Sebaliknya, Iran memanfaatkan armada drone berbiaya rendah yang terbukti sangat efektif–hanya dengan beberapa serangan saja sudah cukup membuat perusahaan asuransi dan operator pelayaran besar seperti Maersk, CMA CGM, dan Hapag-Lloyd menarik diri dari kawasan tersebut (Domonoske, 2026). Menurut firma analitik komoditas media Kpler (2026), fenomena ini merupakan penutupan de facto melalui penarikan asuransi–meskipun secara teknis selat tersebut masih dapat dilalui, mayoritas operator kini menganggapnya tidak lagi layak secara ekonomi. Kasus ini menjadi bukti nyata bahwa kerentanan sistemik energi global dapat dieksploitasi hanya dengan biaya yang sangat minimal.</p><p>Krisis ini sebenarnya telah diprediksi oleh para analis yang secara konsisten telah memberikan peringatan bahwa Selat Hormuz merupakan <em>choke point</em> yang paling krusial sekaligus berbahaya bagi stabilitas sistem energi global. Atlantic Council (2025) merinci secara teknis bagaimana Iran dengan sekitar 5.000 hingga 6.000 ranjau laut, armada drone, dan rudal anti-kapal mampu melumpuhkan jalur tersebut. <em>International Energy Agency</em> (2026a) sendiri juga telah menegaskan jauh sebelum terjadinya krisis bahwa gangguan berkepanjangan di selat ini akan berdampak langsung pada harga global dan memicu kelangkaan fisik yang cepat. Ketergantungan akut pada satu jalur tunggal ini menyingkap kegagalan struktural yang mendalam dalam tata kelola ketahanan energi global. Masalah utamanya sendiri bukanlah ketiadaan peringatan, melainkan minimnya langkah nyata global dalam mengantisipasinya.</p><p>Namun, respons dunia terhadap krisis ini justru memperlihatkan betapa sulitnya koordinasi global ketika kepentingan negara-negara besar saling bertabrakan. Upaya Amerika Serikat melancarkan <em>Project Freedom</em> untuk mengawal kapal tanker sekaligus memblokade pelabuhan-pelabuhan Iran, justru menciptakan situasi blokade ganda yang menghambat proses negosiasi. Kemudian diperparah dengan Rusia dan China yang menggunakan hak veto mereka di Dewan Keamanan PBB untuk menggagalkan resolusi perlindungan pelayaran komersial (Loft, 2026). Di sisi lain, meskipun negara anggota IEA merespons dengan pelepasan cadangan darurat terbesar dalam sejarah lembaga tersebut–400 juta barel–tetap saja tidak cukup untuk menahan lonjakan harga minyak (International Energy Agency, 2026b). Data dari Bloomberg (2026) melaporkan bahwa kalangan industri menilai dunia belum sepenuhnya memahami skala krisis ini–dengan proyeksi harga minyak yang berpotensi menyentuh $200 per barel jika penutupan jalur terus berlanjut.</p><p>Sistem internasional kini dihadapkan pada kenyataan pahit melalui kasus krisis Selat Hormuz pada tahun 2026 ini. Kasus ini menyingkap kerapuhan fondasi ketahanan energi global yang selama ini dibangun di atas asumsi bahwa jalur-jalur kritis tidak akan pernah terganggu. Kini, setelah asumsi tersebut runtuh dan kemampuan penutupan Selat Hormuz terbukti secara nyata, muncul sebuah urgensi baru–akankah komunitas global bertransformasi untuk membangun arsitektur energi yang tidak lagi bergantung pada satu titik, atau justru terjebak dalam kelalaian lama sembari menanti datangnya krisis serupa di masa mendatang?</p><p><strong>Referensi</strong></p><p>Adrian. T., Azour. J., Chalk. N., Gourinchas. P., Kammer. A., Selassie. A. A., Srinivasan. K., &amp; Valdes. R. (2026). <em>How the war in the Middle East is affecting </em>energy<em>, trade, and finance.</em> International Monetary Fund. <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/blogs/articles/2026/03/30/how-the-war-in-the-middle-east-is-affecting-energy-trade-and-finance">https://www.imf.org/en/blogs/articles/2026/03/30/how-the-war-in-the-middle-east-is-affecting-energy-trade-and-finance</a></p><p>Bakr, A.(2026). <em>US-Iran conflict: Strait of Hormuz crisis reshapes global oil markets.</em> Kpler. <a href="https://www.kpler.com/blog/us-iran-conflict-strait-of-hormuz-crisis-reshapes-global-oil-markets">https://www.kpler.com/blog/us-iran-conflict-strait-of-hormuz-crisis-reshapes-global-oil-markets</a></p><p>Congressional Research Service. (2026). <em>Iran conflict and the Strait of Hormuz: Impacts on oil, gas, and other commodities</em> (Report No. R45281). Congress.gov. <a href="https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R45281">https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R45281</a></p><p>Domonoske, C. (2026). <em>The Iran war has effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz.</em> NPR. <a href="https://www.npr.org/2026/03/04/nx-s1-5736104/iran-war-oil-trump-israel-strait-hormuz-closed-energy-crisis">https://www.npr.org/2026/03/04/nx-s1-5736104/iran-war-oil-trump-israel-strait-hormuz-closed-energy-crisis</a></p><p>International Energy Agency. (2026a). <em>Strait of Hormuz: Factsheet.</em> IEA. <a href="https://www.iea.org/about/oil-security-and-emergency-response/strait-of-hormuz">https://www.iea.org/about/oil-security-and-emergency-response/strait-of-hormuz</a></p><p>International Energy Agency. (2026b). <em>Oil market report — April 2026.</em> IEA. <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-april-2026">https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-april-2026</a></p><p>Loft, P. (2026). <em>Israel/US-Iran conflict 2026: Reopening the Strait of Hormuz</em>. House of Commons Library. <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10636/">https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10636/</a></p><p>Longley, A., Lee, J., Nightingale, A., Wittels, J., Fevrier, T., Lu, D., Patino, M., Pogkas, D., &amp; Warren, H. (2026). <em>Iran War: How High Could Oil Prices Get with Strait of Hormuz Closure?</em> Bloomberg. <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2026-iran-war-hormuz-closure-oil-shock/">https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2026-iran-war-hormuz-closure-oil-shock/</a></p><p>Mouton. D. E., Wald. E., Derentz. L., &amp; Gavito. J. (2025). <em>Four questions (and expert answers) about Iran’s threats to close the Strait of Hormuz. </em>Atlantic Council. <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/four-questions-and-expert-answers-about-irans-threats-to-close-the-strait-of-hormuz/">https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/four-questions-and-expert-answers-about-irans-threats-to-close-the-strait-of-hormuz/</a></p><p><em>Artikel ini mewakili pandangan dan argumen pribadi penulis, dan tidak mewakili pandangan dari INKA KOMAHI UGM.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=423101944af6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Ethiopia dan Kegagalan Imajinasi Global Atas Afrika Pascakolonial]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@inka.komahiugm/ethiopia-dan-kegagalan-imajinasi-global-atas-afrika-pascakolonial-a7993a237267?source=rss-c7d234c42bd5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a7993a237267</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ethiopia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[afrika]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pascakolonial]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[INKA KOMAHI UGM]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 25 Apr 2026 15:41:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-04-25T15:41:45.221Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Penulis: Vanessa Kezia Tessalonika Sinaga</p><p>Editor: Revanda Alfathir Setiawan</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NxjuR05dluUxXBduvTNKfQ.png" /></figure><p>Ketika berbicara mengenai kolonialisme di Benua Afrika, Ethiopia kerap dijadikan pengecualian. Secara historis, Ethiopia tidak pernah mengalami kolonialisme formal sebagaimana dialami mayoritas negara Afrika lainnya, pendudukan Italia pun berlangsung relatif singkat. Ethiopia bahkan telah menjalankan pemerintahannya jauh sebelum negara-negara pascakolonial lain di benua tersebut terbentuk, sehingga kerap ditempatkan sebagai simbol kedaulatan Afrika (Rifda, 2022). Namun, <em>kekuatan </em>tersebut ternyata tidak serta-merta menjadikan Ethiopia lebih mapan daripada negara-negara Afrika lainnya. Di era kontemporer ini, kemiskinan dan bencana kelaparan justru menjadi potret dari Ethiopia. Padahal, saat kita membicarakan tentang keterbelakangan Afrika, kolonialisme umumnya menjadi jawaban. Fenomena ini memperlihatkan sebuah paradoks; jika kolonialisme sering dijadikan penjelasan tunggal atas kemiskinan Afrika, mengapa negara yang relatif bebas dari kolonialisme formal justru menjadi salah satu negara miskin di benua Afrika? Untuk menjawab pertanyaan tersebut, esai ini berargumen bahwa kemiskinan di Ethiopia tidak dapat dipahami sebagai warisan kolonial semata, tetapi sebagai hasil dari cara dunia menyederhanakan Afrika sekaligus mengabaikan dinamika politik internal pascakolonial.</p><p>Keterbelakangan di Benua Afrika umumnya hampir selalu dijelaskan melalui kritik terhadap kolonialisme. Cara pandang ini tidak sepenuhnya keliru, mengingat signifikansi dari dampak kolonialisme itu sendiri terhadap berbagai lapisan struktur di Afrika. Akan tetapi,cara pikir ini dapat menjadi masalah ketika kolonialisme direduksi menjadi penjelasan tunggal yang seolah mampu menjelaskan seluruh pengalaman Afrika. Narasi tunggal tersebut pada akhirnya mengaburkan keragaman politik, sosial, dan sejarah yang sesungguhnya ada di antara negara-negara Afrika. Dalam hal ini, Afrika direduksi dalam satu entitas homogen, seolah seluruh negara di benua tersebut mengalami pengalaman sejarah yang serupa. Akibatnya, isu penting seperti kemiskinan Afrika tidak dipandang sebagai isu politik yang kompleks, tetapi sebagai kondisi yang hampir alamiah.</p><p>Dalam lapisan yang lebih dalam, homogenisasi tersebut bekerja bersama dengan asumsi yang lebih problematis, yakni anggapan bahwa kegagalan ini merupakan karakter inheren dari Afrika itu sendiri. Sebagaimana dijelaskan oleh Danso and Aning (2022), negara-negara Barat mengonstruksikan Afrika sebagai arena tidak rasional dan <em>tidak beradab, </em>sehingga dipersepsikan sebagai ancaman terhadap Eropa yang lebih damai dan beradab. Sekali lagi, cara pandang ini tidak hanya rasis, tetapi memposisikan Afrika sebagai kawasan yang secara alamiah tidak dapat mengatur dirinya sendiri sehingga menjustifikasi upaya sekuritisasi benua tersebut — kolonialisasi — sebagai bagian dari misi peningkatan peradaban (Danso &amp; Aning, 2022).</p><p>Oleh karena itu, dapat dipahami pula bahwa cara pandang tersebut bukan merupakan produk dari kolonial, tetapi telah berakar dalam imajinasi Barat atas Afrika. Dalam konteks inilah, keterbelakangan Afrika tidak hanya disederhanakan, tetapi juga dihilangkan unsur-unsur politis dan masyarakatnya. Afrika tidak dilihat sebagai kawasan yang kompleks dan mampu melaksanakan kehidupan bermasyarakat, tetapi sebagai negara yang butuh intervensi dan butuh dibelaskasihani.</p><p>Dalam konteks ini, Ethiopia menjadi <em>anomali </em>bagi narasi dominan yang menjadikan kolonialisme sebagai penjelasan tunggal. Ethiopia merupakan negara yang diakui sebagai simbol melawan imperialisme Barat sekaligus menjadi negara yang secara rutin mengalami krisis kelaparan dan dikategorikan sebagai salah satu negara termiskin di dunia. Bahkan, menurut <em>CNBC Research (2025)</em>, Ethiopia berada di urutan ke-21 negara termiskin di dunia berdasarkan PDB per kapita tahun 2025. Namun, fakta tersebut tidak mengubah cara dunia melihat Ethiopia dan kemiskinan di Afrika. Hal ini mengindikasikan pengabaian terhadap keberadaan dan kompleksitas faktor-faktor internal pascakolonial dalam diskursus.</p><p>Pada dasarnya, untuk dapat lebih memahami kemiskinan Ethiopia, perlu pendekatan yang mampu melihat bagaimana dinamika politik internal beroperasi. Memahami kemiskinan Ethiopia secara lebih mendalam menuntut perhatian pada dinamika politik internalnya. Dalam konteks ini, teori <em>Two Publics</em> Peter Ekeh menawarkan kerangka yang relevan. Ekeh membedakan dua ruang publik: <em>civil public </em>sebagai ranah negara, dan<em> primordial public </em>sebagai ranah solidaritas komunal (Ekeh, 1975). Di banyak negara Afrika pascakolonial, <em>civil public</em> kerap dijadikan alat akumulasi kekuasaan oleh elit politik, sementara kesetiaan dan keuntungan yang mereka raup justru dialirkan kembali ke kelompok primordial mereka (Ekeh, 1975).</p><p>Dalam konteks Ethiopia, dinamika ini tercermin dalam kontestasi kekuasaan yang berujung pada konflik Tigray. Kebijakan dari Perdana Menteri Abiy Ahmed yang meminggirkan elit politik Tigray — kelompok etnis yang telah berkuasa di Ethiopia selama hampir tiga dekade — karena dugaan korupsi dan penindasan, memicu insekuritas politik dari kalangan masyarakat Tigray (BBC, 2020). Bahkan, orang-orang Tigray sampai mengadakan pemilihan umum regionalnya sendiri sebagai bentuk perlawanan mereka terhadap kebijakan pemerintah pusat. Analisis Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa (PBB) mengenai konflik di Tigray menunjukkan tingkat krisis pangan yang ekstrem, dengan sedikitnya 20 persen keluarga di wilayah tersebut menghadapi kekurangan pangan parah. Tingkat kematian pun dilaporkan melebihi dua orang per 10.000 penduduk per hari (BBC News, 2021).</p><p>Dinamika sosial-politik di Ethiopia tersebut menunjukkan keterbatasan cara pandang yang menjadikan kolonialisme sebagai penjelasan tunggal atas keterbelakangan Afrika. Dalam hal ini, permasalahan sosial seperti kemiskinan tidak disebabkan oleh kolonialisme semata, tetapi memuat gejolak politik domestik yang lebih kompleks. Dalam kasus Ethiopia, salah satu lapisan permasalahannya adalah dimensi kesukuan, di mana beberapa kelompok masyarakat Ethiopia tidak melihat kebijakan penindakan kriminalitas sebagai upaya penegakkan hukum, tetapi serangan terhadap etnis-etnis tertentu.</p><p>Dengan demikian, dapat dikatakan bahwa meskipun kolonialisme tetap memberikan pengaruh yang signifikan pada catatan sejarah dan struktur kehidupan di Afrika, menjadikannya satu-satunya faktor yang membangun kehidupan sosial dan politik Afrika justru berisiko mereduksi kehidupan masyarakat di Afrika dan memberikan identitas kepada mereka sebagai entitas homogen yang secara inheren gagal. Dalam konteks Ethiopia sebagai negara yang <em>dikatakan </em>tidak pernah dijajah, kemiskinan dan krisis pangan tidak dapat dilepaskan dari dinamika politik internal pascakolonial, khususnya praktik kekuasaan negara yang memisahkan antara <em>civil public</em> dan<em> primordial public</em> sebagaimana dijelaskan oleh Peter Ekeh.</p><p>Lebih jauh, kecenderungan dunia internasional untuk tidak beranjak dari persepsi bahwa kemiskinan Afrika adalah karena mereka pernah dijajah mencerminkan pengabaian kita pada Afrika secara keseluruhan. Alih-alih mendorong pembacaan yang lebih kritis dan kontekstual, narasi tersebut justru mempertahankan Afrika sebagai objek belas kasihan dan intervensi. Oleh karena itu, kehidupan Afrika pascakolonial menuntut pergeseran kerangka analisis, dari sekadar warisan kolonial menuju perhatian yang lebih serius pada kehidupan masyarakat, serta sebagai bentuk rekonsiliasi sejarah yang berbasis pada pemberdayaan.</p><p><strong>Referensi</strong></p><p>BBC. (2020). <em>Krisis Tigray di Ethiopia, apa yang terjadi?</em> BBC News Indonesia. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/dunia-54996885">https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/dunia-54996885</a></p><p>BBC News. (2021). <em>The marks of the conflict can easily be seen.</em> BBC News Indonesia. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/dunia-57439319">https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/dunia-57439319</a></p><p>Danso, K., &amp; Aning, K. (2022). African experiences and alternativity in International Relations theorizing about security. <em>International Affairs, 98</em>(1), 67–83. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab204">https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab204</a></p><p>Ekeh, P. P. (1975). Colonialism and the two publics in Africa: A theoretical statement. <em>Comparative Studies in Society and History, 17</em>(1), 91–112. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/178372">https://www.jstor.org/stable/178372</a></p><p>Rifda, A. (2022).<em> Negara tertua di dunia: Mengintip peradaban dunia.</em> gramedia.com. Best Seller Gramedia. <a href="https://www.gramedia.com/best-seller/negara-tertua-di-dunia/">https://www.gramedia.com/best-seller/negara-tertua-di-dunia/</a></p><p>Wade, M. (2023). <em>Why is Africa poor? </em>Substack.com; Africa’s Bright Future. <a href="https://magatte.substack.com/p/why-is-africa-poor">https://magatte.substack.com/p/why-is-africa-poor</a></p><p>Widyatama, E. (2025). <em>Daftar 50 negara termiskin di dunia, ada Indonesia?</em> CNBC Indonesia; cnbcindonesia.com. <a href="https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/research/20250625125649-128-643821/daftar-50-negara-termiskin-di-dunia-ada-indonesia">https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/research/20250625125649-128-643821/daftar-50-negara-termiskin-di-dunia-ada-indonesia</a></p><p><em>Artikel ini mewakili pandangan dan argumen pribadi penulis, dan tidak mewakili pandangan dari INKA KOMAHI UGM.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a7993a237267" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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