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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Nisheeth Srivastava on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Nisheeth Srivastava on Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[Impact of ESG in Overall Valuation of firms]]></title>
            <link>https://insightbynish.medium.com/impact-of-esg-in-overall-valuation-of-firms-d1c310a45e7f?source=rss-c0c096f098a2------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[esg]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sustainability]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sustainable-development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[esg-investing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nisheeth Srivastava]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 10 Oct 2021 11:24:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-10-10T11:24:27.427Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1NjV2nIGuTB-3254FBceLw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Investors depend on financial statements of organizations for their valuation and investment decisions. These statements often provide insights on macro-economic overview that facilitate informed action on any specific challenges that might impact valuation. However, in the last decade we have seen a surge in a variety of challenges that are not only financial in nature but have direct or indirect impact on operations of any organization. <strong>Investors have keenly been considering these ‘additional’ set of screening criteria that provides them a good insight on the true ‘health’ of companies. </strong>These additional set of screening can be classified into environmental, social and governance related aspects that are in a way either impacting the long term sustained operations of an organization. There has been substantial academic evidence that supports the benefits derived by incorporating such information in valuation process and thereby making prudent investment decisions.</p><p>Before we move to the impact of ESG in valuation, one also needs to earnestly understand the concept of alpha and beta and the impact it has on the stocks/shares value of a company. This is an important consideration as at times, the concept of alpha and beta values create a direct correlation between impact of any externality vs valuation/share price.</p><p><strong>Exploring Alpha and Beta with ESG</strong></p><p>Alpha is the historical return of a particular stock. It measures the risk adjusted performance of a stock. Alpha enables the investor to judge whether the stock return is compensating the volatility risk associated with the stock. α = 0 means the return of the stock is just enough to compensate the risk taken, α &gt; 0 means the return of the stock more than compensates the volatility risk, and α &lt; 0 means the stock return is unable to compensate the volatility risk.</p><p>According to the modern portfolio theory if a stock’s volatility is double the benchmark volatility, then the investor should receive double the return for assuming the additional risk. On the other hand if the stock is less volatile than the benchmark, then even less return of the stock than the benchmark return can compensate the volatility risk.</p><p>Beta, on the other hand refers to the degree of volatility of a stock. Beta shows how a stock moves in relation to the movement of the benchmark. A positive beta implies that the stock moves in the same direction of the movement of the benchmark. A negative beta means the stock moves in the opposite direction of the movement of benchmark. β = 1 means the stock moves along with the benchmark in same direction with equal volatility. β = -1 means the stock moves in the opposite direction of the benchmark, but has same volatility as the benchmark.</p><p><strong>Integrating ESG factors with Alpha and Beta</strong></p><p>ESG reporting removes information asymmetry as the metrics that are used to disclose data are comparable and empowers various investors to use the information for valuing a firm. Overall, the concept of responsible investment drives investors to prefer ESG rated stock, this is primarily as the external factors which historically were complex to predict or integrate in the investment decisions are now clearly envisaged with more predictable corelation between different ESG related aspects and organizational performance. There have been numerous academic studies that show the impact of various ESG aspects on the operations of any organization. For example, in the recent events of flood in a particular region the supplies of raw material to a company were delayed by a month or so that resulted in a loss of around fifteen days output. Other aspects such as community engagement, employee relationship, and work-place diversity are capable of reducing uncertainty of information [1] and thereby facilitate informed decision making.</p><p>Three schools of thought dominate the discourse about relationship between ESG factors on one hand and alpha and beta influenced market value of a firm on the other. The first opinion is the traditional profit maximization doctrine, in which it is stated that profit maximization is the chief objective of a firm and spending shareholders’ fund in ESG activities would violate the principle of profit maximization. The subscribers to this view argue that allocation of resources in any non-profit earning activities would only reduce profitability and return to equity. This would reduce dividend paying capacity of the firm resulting in fall in market value of the stock [2].</p><p>According to the second theory, ESG investments have zero correlation with market value, that is to say they have no bearing on either alpha or beta. Propagators of this view argue that management decides on investment in ESG activities on the basis of cost-benefit analysis. The costs incurred must be in equilibrium with benefits derived as management will spend till the point where the marginal cost equals marginal benefit. Thus, cost of ESG activities would have neutral relationship with market value of the stock. It is argued that management would limit its activities within profit maximization and regulatory compliance domains [3, 4]. This neutrality of ESG activities in relation to improving alpha and beta is further reinforced by the market’s inability to price ESG activities.</p><p>The third perspective postulates a positive relationship between ESG spending and market value. Performing ESG activities would result in better utilization of resources and system or product-line development. This would result in higher profitability and greater market value [5, 6]. Environment protection management activities would give competitive advantage in the form of developed system or product, which enables the management in generating higher profit [5].</p><p>This positive correlation perspective is further strengthened by the argument that ESG investments entail no collateral expenses like taxation and penalty. On the other hand such activities translate into better relationship with the stakeholders, increased operational efficiency of the firm, enhanced employee relationship, employee morale and motivation, better supply chain integration, and heightened corporate reputation of the firm [6].</p><p>Yet another version that supports ESG spending infers that the perception about the positive attitude of the company towards ESG issues, rather than actual expenses incurred on them improves credibility of the company, enhances employee relationship, boosts demand and pushes up stock price [7]. This tames volatility of the stock. Empirical studies on impact of ESG on alpha and beta, and hence market value of the stock shows lack of unanimity. Overall the results of different studies are inconsistent. Some of the studies reveal positive relationship between ESG, and alpha and beta [8, 9, and 10], some studies conclude the relationship as negative [11, 12], yet some demonstrate zero correlation between ESG expenses, and alpha and beta [13, 14].</p><p>Amidst this divergence in empirical findings, one hugely agreed view emerges, which states that a positive but weak correlation exists between ESG and market value of stock. However, it is understood that different ESG factors have different connotations and they impact market value of stocks in different ways.</p><p>The above discussion based on selected literature on theoretical perspectives and empirical studies supports a positive association between ESG activities and market value of stock. While environment management activities result in enhanced operational performance of the company, policy resolution on ESG improves corporate reputation of the firm. Investors have come to recognize the importance of considering extra-financial performance of companies in valuing stocks. The weak correlation as revealed from the discussion infers that the market is yet to fully recognize the value of ESG activities. Companies giving serious consideration to ESG can expect to achieve fair value of its stocks, and the positive association between ESG factors, and alpha and beta can be expected to become long-lasting and stronger.</p><p><strong>Integration of ESG Parameters in Standard Valuation Model</strong></p><p>Capital Assets Pricing Model is a model used to determine the appropriate rate of return of an asset in order to decide about inclusion of the asset in a diversified portfolio. In this model cost of capital is ascertained by the required rate of return, which is derived by adding risk free return with company’s beta times the difference between market return and risk-free return. Thus, higher beta is associated with higher cost of capital. The ESG parameters can be integrated in the model by calculating the average beta of ESG quintiles. The average beta of ESG quintiles can be compared with the company betas to see the correlation between ESG rating and company beta. Research shows high ESG rating is associated with low company beta, <em>i. e</em>. lower cost of capital.</p><p><strong>Inclusion of ESG Parameters in Valuation Decisions</strong></p><p>A number of methods can be used to integrate ESG information in valuation of a company. The most accepted and widely used methods are discussed below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/778/1*BxdJUsHoRGS4HiuV1KXamQ.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>Figure: Methods used to integrate ESG in valuation</em></p><p>1. <strong><em>Fundamental Strategy: </em></strong>In this technique the ESG information can be incorporated into financials like revenue, operating costs, capital expenditure, and book values of assets and liabilities or into the company valuation model like capital assets pricing model, discounted future cash flow model, dividend discount model, and adjusted present value model to arrive at ESG integrated valuation of the company.</p><p>2. <strong><em>Quantitative or Systematic Strategy:</em></strong> This technique involves integration of ESG information with financial indictors like size, value, growth, momentum, and market volatility.</p><p>3. <strong><em>Smart Beta or Factor Investing: </em></strong>In this technique scores of ESG are used to develop a portfolio with the objective of creating excess-risk adjusted return, reduce downside risk, and improve ESG risk profile of the portfolio. Smart beta may be defined as an investment style where-in an index is followed to take advantage of market inefficiencies.</p><p>4. <strong><em>Passive and Enhances Passive Strategy:</em></strong><em> </em>Passive investment is a popular investment strategy these days. Investors taking this strategy are satisfied with duplicating return without being interested in beating the market. Such investors buy index tracker and derive return from upward profit trend of corporate profit. The ESG profile of such investments can be reduced by adjusting the weights.</p><p>While, with the recent push on integration of ESG in organizational performance coming strongly by investor community, it is also imperative for an organization to ace on various ESG aspects. Addressing ESG within the value chains and operations will not only make sure that companies may mitigate the various risks that arise from the impact of ESG in short, medium and long term. While, we will see more and more academic and corporate studies coming that will support the theory that ESG will impact valuations, its high time that organizations embark on a journey for integrating ESG in the way they operate and then eventually develop a robust strategy that helps them align their actions in short, medium and longer run. In my next article I hope to cover some specific ESG aspects and how they might impact an organization or I can cover the various strategies for integrating ESG in detail whatever is more useful. Till then keep sending your feedback on this article.</p><p><strong>Bibliography:</strong></p><p>[1] Trasi, G (2018). <em>The importance of intangible assets in corporate reporting,</em> available online at <a href="https://www.saa.or.jp/english/publications/pointofview_1001.pdf">https://www.saa.or.jp/english/publications/pointofview_1001.pdf</a></p><p>[2] Volkov, D. and Garanina, T. “Intangible Assets: Importance in the Knowledge-Based Economy and the Role in Value Creation of a Company.” <em>The Electronic Journal of Knowledge Management,</em> Volume 5 Issue 4, pp. 539–550, available online at <a href="http://www.ejkm.com/">www.ejkm.com</a></p><p>[3] Andriessen, D. (2004). <em>Making Sense of Intellectual Capital Designing a Method for the Valuation of Intangibles. </em>ISBN: 0–7506–7774–0. Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann 200 Wheeler Road, Burlington, MA 01803, USA Linacre House, Jordan Hill, Oxford OX2 SDP, UK, available online at <a href="http://nameofscience.org/lib/download/id=426745&amp;type=stream">http://nameofscience.org/lib/download/id=426745&amp;type=stream</a></p><p>[4] Eccles, R, G., Ioannou, L. and Serafeim, G. (2014). The Impact of Corporate Sustainability on Organizational Processes and Performance. <em>Management Science, </em>Volume 60 Issue 11, pp.2835–2857. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.1984">https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.1984</a></p><p>[5] Edmans, A. (2011). Does the stock market fully value intangibles? Employee satisfaction and equity prices. <em>Journal of Financial Economics, </em>Vol 101(2011), pp. 621–640. Available online at <a href="http://faculty.london.edu/aedmans/Rowe.pdf">http://faculty.london.edu/aedmans/Rowe.pdf</a></p><p>[6] Akerlof, G., Yellen, J., 1986. Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511559594">https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511559594</a></p><p>[7] McGregor, D. 1960. The Human Side of Enterprise. <em>Management Review. </em>Pp. 41–49. Available online at <a href="https://www.esf.edu/for/germain/McGregor%20-%20Human%20Side.pdf">https://www.esf.edu/for/germain/McGregor%20-%20Human%20Side.pdf</a></p><p>[8] Jensen, M. C. 2005. Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function. <em>Journal of Applied Corporate Finance</em>, Vol 4(3), 8–21. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.2001.tb00434.x"><strong>https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.2001.tb00434.x</strong></a></p><p>[9] Harper, P. J. 2013. Two essays on firm strategy and corporate social responsibility. PhD Dissertation. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.</p><p>[10] Zollo, M., and Singh, H. 2004. Deliberate learning in corporate acqmsttlons: postacquisition strategies and integration capability in U.S. bank mergers. <em>Strategic Management Journal</em>, 25(13): 1233–1256.</p><p>[11] Berchicci, L., Dowell, G., and King, A. A. 2012. Environmental capabilities and corporate strategy: Exploring acquisitions among US manufacturing firms. <em>Strategic Management Journal</em>. Vol. 33: 1053–1071.</p><p>[12] Mahfuja, M. (2014). <em>The impact of targets’ social performance on acquisition premiums. </em>Available online at file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/Malik_Mahfuja_2014_nosig_nocv.pdf</p><p>[13] De1oitte. 2009. How green is the deal? The growing role of sustainability in M&amp;A. https :/ /www .deloitte.com/assets/DcomUnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/US _ MA _How_ Green_ Is_ the_ Deal_J a n09.pdf</p><p>[14] Menon, S., and Kahn, B. E. 2003. Corporate sponsorships of philanthropic activities: When do they impact perception of sponsor brand? <em>Journal of Consumer Psychology</em>. Vol. 13 (3): 316–327.</p><p>[15] Bloom, P. N., Hoeffler, S., Keller, K. L., and Meza, C. E. B. 2006. How social-cause marketing affects consumer. MIT Sloan Management Review, Vol. 47: 49–55.</p><p>[16] Brown, T. J. and Dacin, P.A. 1997. The company and the product: corporate associations and consumer product responses. <em>The Journal of Marketing</em>. Vol. 61 (1): 68–84.</p><p>[17] Lev, B., Petrovits, C. and Radhakrishnan, S. 2010. Is doing good good for you? How corporate charitable contributions enhance revenue growth. <em>Strategic Management Journal</em>. Vol. 31 (2): 182–200.</p><p>[18] Deng, X., Kang, J., and Low, B.S. 2013. Corporate social responsibility and stakeholder value maximization: Evidence from merger. <em>Journal of Financial Economics</em>. Vol. 110 (1): 87–109.</p><p>[19] Waddock, S. and Graves, S. B. 2006. The impact of mergers and acquisitions on corporate stakeholder practices. <em>Journal of Corporate Citizenship</em>, 22: 91–109.</p><p>1] Cho, S., Lee, C. and Pfeiffer, R. (2012). Corporate social responsibility performance and information asymmetry, <em>Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, </em>32(13), 71–83. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2012.10.005">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2012.10.005</a></p><p>[2] Artiach, T., Lee, D., Nelson, D. and Walker, J. (2010) The determinants of corporate sustainability performance, <em>Accounting and Finance</em>, 50 (1), pp. 31–51. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-629X.2009.00315.x">https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-629X.2009.00315.x</a></p><p>[3] Statman, M. (2000) Socially responsible mutual funds, <em>Financial Analysts Journal</em>, 65 (3), pp. 30–39. DOI: 10.2469/faj.v56.n3.2358</p><p>[4] McWilliams, A. and Siegel, D. (2001) Corporate social responsibility: A theory of the firm perspective, <em>Academy of Management Review</em>, 26 (1), pp. 117−127. DOI: 10.2307/259398 <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/259398">https://www.jstor.org/stable/259398</a></p><p>[5] Porter, M. and Van der Linde, C. (1995) Toward a new conception of the environment competitiveness relationship, <em>The Journal of Economic Perspectives</em>, 9 (4), pp. 97–118. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2138392">https://www.jstor.org/stable/2138392</a></p><p>[6] Lundgren, T. and Brännlund, R (2009) Environmental policy and profitability: Evidence from Swedish industry, <em>Environmental Economics and Policy Studies</em>, 12, pp. 59–78. DOI 10.1007/s10018–010–0163–8</p><p>[7] Margolis, J., Elfenbein, H. and Walsh, J. (2007) Does it pay to be good? A meta-analysis and redirection of research on the relationship between corporate social and financial performance, Working Paper. <a href="https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/papers/seminars/margolis_november_07.pdf">https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/papers/seminars/margolis_november_07.pdf</a></p><p>[8] Waddock, S. A. and Graves, S. B. (1997) The corporate social performance-financial performance link, <em>Strategic Management Journal</em>, 18 (4), pp. 303−319. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(199704)18:4%3C303::AID-SMJ869%3E3.0.CO;2-G">https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(199704)18:4&lt;303::AID-SMJ869&gt;3.0.CO;2-G</a></p><p>[9] Russo, M. and Fouts, P. (1997) A resource-based perspective on corporate environmental performance and profitability, <em>The Academy of Management Journal</em>, 40 (3), pp. 534−559. <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/257052">http://www.jstor.org/stable/257052</a>.</p><p>[10] Guenster, N., Derwall, J., Bauer, R. and Koedijk, K. (2011) The economic value of corporate eco-efficiency, <em>European Financial Management</em>, 17 (4), pp. 679–704. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-036X.2009.00532.">https://doi.org/10.1111/<strong><em>j</em></strong>.1468-036X.2009.00532.</a></p><p>[11] Brammer, S. J., Brooks, C. and Pavelin, S. (2006) Corporate social performance and stock returns: UK evidence from disaggregate measures, <em>Financial Management</em>, Autumn, pp. 97−116. ISSN 1755­053X doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755%20053X.2006.tb00149">https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755­ 053X.2006.tb00149</a></p><p>[12] Scholtens, B. and Zhou, Y. (2008) Stakeholder relations and financial performance, <em>Sustainable Development</em>, 16, pp. 213−232. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/sd.364">https://doi.org/10.1002/sd.364</a></p><p>[13] Lee, D. (2006) An analysis of the Sustainability Investment Strategy Employing the Dow Jones World Sustainability Index, PhD Monash University, Clayton.</p><p>[14] McWilliams, A. and Siegel, D. (2001) Corporate social responsibility: A theory of the firm perspective, Academy of Management Review, 26 (1), pp. 117−127.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d1c310a45e7f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Impact of ESG on Intangible Assets in Merger & Acquisition]]></title>
            <link>https://insightbynish.medium.com/impact-of-esg-on-intangible-assets-in-merger-acquisition-7f9970408400?source=rss-c0c096f098a2------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[esg-investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[esg]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sustainability]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nisheeth Srivastava]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 02 Oct 2021 18:01:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-10-02T18:01:17.273Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KXyziDvtfe8-joPl5fBh8Q.png" /></figure><p>Companies now acknowledge that maximizing stakeholders’ value is more important than maximizing shareholders’ value. This realization has given rise to widespread and interesting debate among academicians, analysts, and investors about how important the ESG factors are in long term investment decisions. Literature on the subject is abounding with well researched and eye-opening texts. Companies have increased their ESG investments, and disclosure of ESG investments and activities now get greater space in the annual report of the companies than before. Interestingly there is also a great push by regulators to make companies accountable for their ESG performance and disclosure and also to avoid any greenwashing efforts. Eventually, with investors demanding transparent ESG disclosures, more and more companies now realize and recognize that intangible assets are more powerful than tangible assets especially in the long-term context. The objective of this article is to assess succinctly how the impact of ESG investments and disclosure on the intangible assets are related to merger and acquisition (M&amp;A) and how the valuations of intangible assets influence the M&amp;A premium.</p><p><strong>ESG and Intangible assets</strong></p><p>More and more corporate investors and fund managers are emphasizing on the potential of ESG integration and are adopting responsible investment (RI) policy. This widespread recognition of ESG has led to accessibility and use of ESG information. Regulation w.r.t ESG disclosure and service of reputed funded information providers have worked as the wind tail of surge in ESG information database. Financial report shows the decision of the management and results of such decisions in the bottom line of the report. But ESG disclosure information enables one to visualize the future balance sheet of the company as those would provide the competitive advantage to the company and ensure positive stream of future cash flows [1].</p><p>Study by Eccles, Loannou, and Serafeim [4] has shown that high sustainability firms perform better than the low sustainability firms, and in the context of constrains placed by the ESG integration high sustainability firms show greater ability and willingness in engaging in product and process innovation. For example, better HR practices provide long-term strategic benefits to the company. Companies with high level of employee satisfaction are seen to command higher long-term equity returns. Edmans [5] in his study on employee satisfaction and equity return declares that employee satisfaction resulting from stronger recruitment, retention, compensation, and career policies results in better corporate performance and higher intrinsic value of intangible assets. According to the Efficiency Wage Theory [6], excess satisfaction increases motivation and effort of the employees as they don’t want to be fired from a satisfying job. McGregor [7] opines that highly satisfied employees identify themselves with the company and internalize the objectives of the company.</p><p><strong>Impact of ESG Performance on M&amp;A</strong></p><p>Companies adopt different strategies to maximize firm value. In today’s fiercely competitive global market scenario, merger and acquisition (M&amp;A) is considered an important tool for value maximization [8]. Harper [9] has shown in his study that positive ESG factors and attractiveness as an M&amp;A target are positively correlated. Acquirer prefers high ESG companies as target due to the ESG related value enhancing capabilities of such firms. Acquirer derives the synergic benefits from the competitive capabilities of the target firm, which enables the acquirer to increase firm value. Due to this the post-acquisition combined value increases [10, 11]. This is the reason high ESG companies receive higher acquisition premium than low ESG companies.</p><p>Synergy may be of different types, namely financial synergy, managerial synergy, product market synergy, and operational synergy. Financial synergy enables the firm to acquire capital at lower cost, to get easy access to creditors, and to reduce systematic risk by diversification. Managerial synergy results in availability of managerial expertise. With product market synergy the firm is able to sell unique products and services, which would in turn increase value of the firm. Thus, it is clear that acquirer’s motive behind M&amp;A is to maximize value of the combined firm. Since high ESG targets give higher synergy post M&amp;A period, the acquirer pays higher premium to the target firm with better ESG performance during M&amp;A.</p><p>Acquirer firm conducts an ESG due diligence before taking any M&amp;A decision. Professional experts hired for this purpose prepare valuation report of the target incorporating quantified assessment of social and environmental reputation and risks [12]. Thus, it is natural that as compared to shareholders, acquirer places greater importance on the ESG performance of the target firm. If the market price of target firm’s share correctly reflects the ESG performance, the acquirer may not be willing to pay high premium. But it is quite possible that due to the non-financial an intangible nature of ESG performance, market more often than not would devalue them. Even if the market price of shares of the target firm correctly reflects the ESG performance, acquirer company may give premium if it has risk diversification options. Shareholders can liquidate high risk stocks and construct risk-diversified portfolio quite easily, but once a target is acquired, it becomes difficult for the acquirer to divest any part of it. Due to this acquirer is more conscious than the shareholders about the potential risks of the target firm.</p><p>Acquirer firm is always concerned about the environmental, social, legal, and other risks of the target firm as those can prove to be financial and reputational liabilities in the post M&amp;A period. Due to this acquirer agree to pay higher than the market price to the target and higher ESG targets deserve higher premium than the low ESG targets. It is also true that acquirer firm agrees to pay higher than market price to targets with high ESG performance as this would reduce its own negative value [12]. It is seen that the high ESG of the target firm can be a value creation resource for low ESG acquirer company. If the acquirer has inferior ESG performance then the benefit of superior ESG performance of the target would flow to the acquirer firm.</p><p>The benefits of high ESG performance can be of various forms; for example, high labour productivity, better operational efficiency, corporate branding, constructive relation with suppliers, regulatory authority, and the community. High ESG performance increases the intrinsic values of all of these intangible assets. Researches show that ensuring positive social value enables a firm to expand the market, make product differentiation, and create brand value. Increased brand equity and improved customer satisfaction bestow competitive advantage to the firm which firm uses in increasing sales and profitability [14, 15, 16, and 17].</p><p>Deng et al [18] has shown in their research that acquisition of high ESG target results in high announcement return and high stock return in the post-acquisition period. Aktas et al [19] in their study using intangible value assessment (IVA) score have shown that ESG performance of the target firm and the acquirer’s gain potential are positively correlated. They observe in their study that the acquirer firm is rewarded by the stock market for acquiring a socially responsible firm, and the net social value of the acquirer firm improves as a result of acquisition of high ESG performing target firm.</p><p>Well, planned and executed ESG activities will definitely enhance the value of the intangible assets of a company, and intangible assets will become more productive than the tangible assets as the various components of market (as discussed above) show positive value. Acquirer will get a range of benefits by acquiring high ESG performing target firm. Further, at multiple instances, the intangible assets of a firm are not properly valued and therefore, high performing ESG firms will entail lower intangible liability and risks in post M&amp;A period, and this will lead to better risk mitigation options. Overall, embedding ESG in the discussions of M&amp;A will maximize returns for both acquirer and the target firm and bring value to both. In the next article I will try to explore how organisations can strengthen their ESG performance by embedding various ESG parameters in different aspects of their operations.</p><p>Bibliography:</p><p>[1] Trasi, G (2018). <em>The importance of intangible assets in corporate reporting,</em> available online at <a href="https://www.saa.or.jp/english/publications/pointofview_1001.pdf">https://www.saa.or.jp/english/publications/pointofview_1001.pdf</a></p><p>[2] Volkov, D. and Garanina, T. “Intangible Assets: Importance in the Knowledge-Based Economy and the Role in Value Creation of a Company.” <em>The Electronic Journal of Knowledge Management,</em> Volume 5 Issue 4, pp. 539–550, available online at <a href="http://www.ejkm.com/">www.ejkm.com</a></p><p>[3] Andriessen, D. (2004). <em>Making Sense of Intellectual Capital Designing a Method for the Valuation of Intangibles. </em>ISBN: 0–7506–7774–0. Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann 200 Wheeler Road, Burlington, MA 01803, USA Linacre House, Jordan Hill, Oxford OX2 SDP, UK, available online at <a href="http://nameofscience.org/lib/download/id=426745&amp;type=stream">http://nameofscience.org/lib/download/id=426745&amp;type=stream</a></p><p>[4] Eccles, R, G., Ioannou, L. and Serafeim, G. (2014). The Impact of Corporate Sustainability on Organizational Processes and Performance. <em>Management Science, </em>Volume 60 Issue 11, pp.2835–2857. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.1984">https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.1984</a></p><p>[5] Edmans, A. (2011). Does the stock market fully value intangibles? Employee satisfaction and equity prices. <em>Journal of Financial Economics, </em>Vol 101(2011), pp. 621–640. Available online at <a href="http://faculty.london.edu/aedmans/Rowe.pdf">http://faculty.london.edu/aedmans/Rowe.pdf</a></p><p>[6] Akerlof, G., Yellen, J., 1986. Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511559594">https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511559594</a></p><p>[7] McGregor, D. 1960. The Human Side of Enterprise. <em>Management Review. </em>Pp. 41–49. Available online at <a href="https://www.esf.edu/for/germain/McGregor%20-%20Human%20Side.pdf">https://www.esf.edu/for/germain/McGregor%20-%20Human%20Side.pdf</a></p><p>[8] Jensen, M. C. 2005. Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function. <em>Journal of Applied Corporate Finance</em>, Vol 4(3), 8–21. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.2001.tb00434.x"><strong>https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.2001.tb00434.x</strong></a></p><p>[9] Harper, P. J. 2013. Two essays on firm strategy and corporate social responsibility. PhD Dissertation. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.</p><p>[10] Zollo, M., and Singh, H. 2004. Deliberate learning in corporate acqmsttlons: postacquisition strategies and integration capability in U.S. bank mergers. <em>Strategic Management Journal</em>, 25(13): 1233–1256.</p><p>[11] Berchicci, L., Dowell, G., and King, A. A. 2012. Environmental capabilities and corporate strategy: Exploring acquisitions among US manufacturing firms. <em>Strategic Management Journal</em>. Vol. 33: 1053–1071.</p><p>[12] Mahfuja, M. (2014). <em>The impact of targets’ social performance on acquisition premiums. </em>Available online at file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/Malik_Mahfuja_2014_nosig_nocv.pdf</p><p>[13] De1oitte. 2009. How green is the deal? The growing role of sustainability in M&amp;A. https :/ /www .deloitte.com/assets/DcomUnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/US _ MA _How_ Green_ Is_ the_ Deal_J a n09.pdf</p><p>[14] Menon, S., and Kahn, B. E. 2003. Corporate sponsorships of philanthropic activities: When do they impact perception of sponsor brand? <em>Journal of Consumer Psychology</em>. Vol. 13 (3): 316–327.</p><p>[15] Bloom, P. N., Hoeffler, S., Keller, K. L., and Meza, C. E. B. 2006. How social-cause marketing affects consumer. MIT Sloan Management Review, Vol. 47: 49–55.</p><p>[16] Brown, T. J. and Dacin, P.A. 1997. The company and the product: corporate associations and consumer product responses. <em>The Journal of Marketing</em>. Vol. 61 (1): 68–84.</p><p>[17] Lev, B., Petrovits, C. and Radhakrishnan, S. 2010. Is doing good good for you? How corporate charitable contributions enhance revenue growth. <em>Strategic Management Journal</em>. Vol. 31 (2): 182–200.</p><p>[18] Deng, X., Kang, J., and Low, B.S. 2013. Corporate social responsibility and stakeholder value maximization: Evidence from merger. <em>Journal of Financial Economics</em>. Vol. 110 (1): 87–109.</p><p>[19] Waddock, S. and Graves, S. B. 2006. The impact of mergers and acquisitions on corporate stakeholder practices. <em>Journal of Corporate Citizenship</em>, 22: 91–109.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7f9970408400" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The spiritual man and the religious man]]></title>
            <link>https://insightbynish.medium.com/the-spiritual-man-and-the-religious-man-c616f9f4f635?source=rss-c0c096f098a2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c616f9f4f635</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[humor]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sarcasm]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nisheeth Srivastava]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 13 Jun 2021 13:32:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-06-13T13:32:19.032Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><em>In evening,</em> </strong>when the day went dark and the bells in that institution halted. The religious man hurried to his humble abode. He already walked miles and still were to walk miles before he reached destination. He lived a fully dedicated religious life, following the pious path as mentioned in the great holy book, indulged in sin (on two occasions), repented his sins and thus filled gold chest for afterlife. He hurried towards south on a narrow road that was broken and to avoid punishment for a wrong offering in that institution he galloped like a doe being chased by a wolf.</p><p>On the crossroad, he met the spiritual man, walking in bliss, driven by humanity and human emotions. He walked the whole day and was now very tired. The spiritual man, discarded all holy books, asked questions, became a seeker and was driven by the inner self. He lived a bohemian life, was called a vagabond and mated like a primate. He lived in present, driven by practicality fed on trust and faith (of whom we don’t know). He lived a life beyond human rules and transcended towards oblivion (on three and half occasions under ganja and once under some unknown phenomenon). He came out on a casual stroll and was heading north, by keeping his head high, and smiling, he walked with confidence.</p><p>Both the religious man and the spiritual man met at the crossroad. They detested each other and frowned with great despair. However, as a matter of social courtesy decided to great each other.</p><blockquote>‘Salutations, O Spiritual man, where do you saunter today?’, asked the religious man.</blockquote><blockquote>‘Nowhere, this earth is my paradise, I maunder to enjoy its beauty’, said the spiritual man (with his head held high). He further said, ‘where does this evening take you O! holy religious man?’.</blockquote><blockquote>‘Nowhere, I quelled my mind with prayers at the institution and now enjoy the scenic vista’, said the religious man.</blockquote><p>While there was hate, it was mutually decided that they both will go near the old banyan tree and rest. Both trudged and reached the old banyan tree and retired. In the meanwhile, the tree was hit by a cannon ball that was fired aimlessly by a new recruit on the long-hauled frigate waiting for an apparent inevitable war (as the president of X did not offer a classic English tea to the president of Y). The tree was split in half, obviously burnt and the religious and the spiritual man lay there, charred, with their fate. The two ravens who lived in the neighborhood and were famished, tactfully assessed this gourmet dining opportunity.</p><p>The first raven said, ‘Had God not been kind, we would have been obliterated’. The second raven couldn’t agree more and nodded in approval. Ravens, thanked God and driven by their inner self (of the non-conventional human rules) went to feast.</p><p>While our main protagonists lay charred being dined by our friendly ravens, far off, the new recruit was being chastised for misfire. The frigate captain compelled him to lie to admiral, who was apparently omniscient of all navy matters and pledged ubiquitously to sabotage career of his lesser colleagues on any transgressions.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c616f9f4f635" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Demystifying the EU Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR)]]></title>
            <link>https://insightbynish.medium.com/demystifying-the-eu-sustainable-finance-disclosure-regulation-sfdr-577669b41b7b?source=rss-c0c096f098a2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/577669b41b7b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sustainable-finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[esg]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sustainability]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[esg-investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sfdr]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nisheeth Srivastava]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 27 May 2021 12:29:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-05-27T12:29:17.538Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The last few years have plagued sustainability as many leading organizations started finding loopholes in transparent ESG disclosures and attributed this to the array of ambiguous ESG standards. With the sudden rise in sustainable finance and ESG centric financing becoming a lucrative business, ESG standards flooded the market. Everyone wanted to take a bite of the ESG pie and came up with new and new non harmonized standards about almost everything. Organizations choose what suited them, giving many organizations an obvious way of bypassing genuine “ethical” behavior and painting a “rosy” business picture as usual. Traditionally, with the business, as usual, C suite felt nothing wrong with it, and eventually, organizations started getting more credit than what they deserved.</p><p>Nothing in the business world works in isolation, and this is where the problem started, leading to incorrect positioning of stocks, incorrect investor expectation, and so on. Organizations wholeheartedly embraced ‘greenwashing’ and rather than identifying mitigative actions and acting on them in the short, medium and long term, they just started manipulating the actions by varied baselines and creating ESG castles in thin air.</p><p>Thankfully, soon the European markets realized that something should be done to end this menace. Thus, we saw the development of the Sustainability Financing Disclosure Regulation (SFDR, which at least promises to improve the overall transparency and standardization of financial market participants). European Supervisory Authorities (three agencies, i.e., EBA, EIOPA, and the ESMA) developed the technical standards draft for SFDR, which focuses broadly on:</p><p><strong>· Sustainability risks that lead to loss of asset value due to environmental and social events</strong></p><p><strong>· Sustainable investments in economic activities that contribute to the environmental or social objectives (including the investment in EU taxonomy eligible economic activities)</strong></p><p><strong>· Principle Adverse Impacts (PAI) on sustainability factors which result in having negative effects on environment, social and governance aspects (such as human rights, labor, anti-corruption etc.)</strong></p><p>In this write up I aim to explore the impact SFDR might have on both EU and Non-EU entities and what course of action may be taken to be ready for SFDR. This write up has four sections, i.e. Applicability of SFDR (for different firms), overall obligation (for readers that have an interest in the legal side of the regulation), inferences (what firms may do and my take on this), and lastly the important dates (when what will happen and when firms need to gear up).</p><ol><li><strong>Applicability:</strong></li></ol><p>The SFDR will impact both EU and Non-EU entities.</p><p><strong>EU Firms: </strong>EU Financial firms including banks, investment firms providing single managed account servers, asset managers (i.e. AIFM or UCITS), pension providers or insurance undertakings that provide insurance-based investment products (IBIPs) and Investment Advisory firms that provide investment advice or provide advice on IBIPs shall be impacted directly by the SFDR</p><p><strong>Non EU Firms: </strong>Non-EU Firms may be impacted directly through the national private placement regimes (NPPR*) where pre-contractual disclosure requirements on sustainability will be integrated into the disclosures required with NPPR, however if this will be limited to pre contractual/product level disclosures or will be extended to entity level disclosures it is not clear.</p><p>Non-EU firms will be indirectly impacted through their relationship with EU firms where there might be a push from the EU firms to meet the SFDR compliance and they might extend their requirements to the Non-EU partnering firms as well. Any Non-EU firms that sub manage EU AIFM or UCITS will also need to be compliant to the requirement of SFDR</p><p>Once the SFDR is in force these firms will be required to make pre contractual disclosures on ESG (‘Product Level Disclosures’) along with relatively detailed public disclosures (‘Entity Level Disclosures’)</p><p><strong>2. Obligation:</strong></p><p>a) <strong>Sustainability Risk Disclosure: </strong>Under the SFDR, firms will need to make certain public disclosures on their approach to sustainability risk. The EC notes on this point that,</p><blockquote>“With regard to the integration of sustainability risks in the investment decision making process, financial market participants must, in accordance with the applicable sectoral legislation, already consider sustainability risks in their internal processes. The regulation requires transparency in their respect, with no further details necessary in the regulatory technical standards.</blockquote><p><strong>b)</strong> <strong>Article 8 and 9 products Article 8 products: </strong>Article 8 products are described in the SFDR as products which actively promote environmental or social characteristics, while article 9 products are products which have sustainable investment as their objective. Both categories are subject to higher standards of disclosure under the SFDR. The EC makes the following statement in relation to these products:</p><blockquote>“As regards financial products that qualify under Articles 8 and 9 of the Regulation, in accordance with applicable sectoral legislation, product manufacturers must already describe in the product documentation how the levels of sustainability are achieved. This means that the manufacturers must comply with the disclosure principles set out in articles 8 and 9 of the regulation”</blockquote><p>c) Adverse sustainability impacts: Firms within the scope of SFDR will be required to publish “entity level data on whether and if so how, they have regard to the principle adverse impacts on sustainability of investment decisions or investment advice. The EC notes on this point as follows:</p><blockquote>“In relation to the transparency of adverse sustainability impacts, numerous financial market participants currently comply with the non-financial reporting requirements under Directive 2013/34/EU<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> or adhere to international standards and might consider using that information. Even without full regulatory technical standards, there are no impediments to financial market participants and financial advisors complying with the Level 1 requirements laid down in the regulation”</blockquote><p><strong>3) Inferences</strong></p><p>Based on the requirements highlighted in the obligations section, broadly, the disclosures by financial institutions can be classified in three categories i.e., a) Entity level disclosures b) Product level disclosures.</p><p><strong>a.</strong> <strong>Entity level disclosures</strong></p><p>The SFDR obligates financial institutions to disclose information around Integration of sustainability risks, Principal Adverse Impacts and Policy &amp; Procedures around disclosures. SFDR will expect disclosures to be made on policy/procedures on integrating sustainability risks in the investment decision-making process. Further, PAI of investment decisions on various sustainability aspects must be disclosed along with a statement on due diligence policies. Lastly, SFDR will also obligate disclosure of sustainability risk integration on various policies.</p><p>b. <strong>Product level disclosures:</strong> For meeting the obligations of SFDR the financial institutions will have to classify products into <strong><em>three categories 1) Mainstreaming products 2) Products promoting environmental and social aspects 3) Products with sustainable investment objective</em></strong> (the last two are specifically where the maximum greenwashing was happening). Product level disclosures can be clubbed in three different ways to make it easy for SFDR compliance i.e <strong><em>a) Pre contracting disclosures (transparency standpoint),b) Periodic Reporting (basically the M&amp;E progress) and c) Website disclosure (transparency standpoint).</em></strong></p><p>For the pre contracting phase disclosures, any financial market participants (FMP’s) should provide details policy/procedures <strong><em>for integrating sustainability risks in the investment decision</em></strong> making process. Further, the assessment of the likely impact of sustainability risks on the financial return should also be provided, along with a clear justification for skipping any such detail. In terms of the <strong><em>product principal adverse impacts (PAI) a statement indicting product level PAI on sustainability factors</em></strong> (mandatory and voluntary indicators as highlighted in the regulation) should be provided.</p><p><strong><em>For periodic reporting, PAI on sustainability factors statement should be provided at set frequency.</em></strong> Further, statement on the performance of environmental and social indicators over a period of time should be provided.</p><p>As a matter of <strong><em>good practice, some aspects such as comparison between the product impact and impact of any specific index and market index should also be provided</em></strong>. Further, the statement on the product w.r.t how it addresses EU taxonomy (in percentage terms of total product portfolio) should also ideally be disclosed.</p><p>On product level website, the information related to the various methodologies used for assessing, measuring and monitoring various characteristics, performance in terms of due diligence process for underlying assets, several sources of data, screening criteria for the underlying assets and relevant sustainability indicators should be also be provided.</p><p><strong>My Take:</strong></p><p>While it might be early to adopt the level II requirements of the SFDR, but it gives a good idea of what the mandatory and voluntary adverse sustainability factors might be.<strong><em> Level II requirements define 32 mandatory and 18 voluntary indicators that ideally should be adopted by financial institutions at this stage and it might be better to have an annual plan for action to be developed</em></strong>. Further, some of the Non-EU entities getting restless may consider conducting a scoping exercise and should try to understand how the Level II requirements may impact them, what is the current gap at policy and procedure level. Overall, it might also be a good idea to understand what their European footprint is (for example, whether in terms of EU regulated entities and activities or in terms of EU investors and clients). <strong><em>For Non-EU financial institutions, it might also be a good idea to assess if their products are likely to fall under Article 8 of the SFDR.</em></strong></p><p>Non-EU entities should also consider their disclosures on the website and other marketing collaterals (prospectus etc.), better to already get it aligned with SFDR. Also, it might be a good time to sit back and prepare a view point on the PAIs w.r.t the organization size and long-term strategy.</p><p>I reviewed the Level II requirements of the SFDR and it seems promising if effectively been implemented. With the recent strong action on many organizations by many EU regulators give a high-level confidence that SFDR will come as no joke. Organizations may want to realign their strategies w.r.t SFDR and be true and transparent about their actions.</p><p><strong>4). Important Dates</strong></p><p>29th December 2019: Entry into force</p><p>31st January 2021: — Finalization of ESAs RTS on PAI indicators to be disclosed by product manufacturers with +500 employees and pre contractual and periodic information to be disclosure by financial products promoting ESG factors or investing in sustainable investments.</p><blockquote><em>10th March 2021: First application date pre-contractual disclosures on the degree of sustainability of financial products</em></blockquote><blockquote><strong>30th June 2021: Disclosure by product manufacturers (500+ employees) of their policies on consideration of PAI on sustainability factors</strong></blockquote><blockquote><strong>1st January 2022: Disclosure in periodic documents by financial products on the attainment of their ESG characteristics or objectives in sustainable investments</strong></blockquote><blockquote><strong>1st January 2023: Disclosure of consideration of adverse sustainability impacts financial products.</strong></blockquote><p><strong>In the next post I hope to decode the various indicators (mandatory and voluntary) from the Level II of SFDR. </strong>Till then hope you enjoyed reading the post. I will as always make time for a good virtual coffee discussion.</p><p>Please note these views are personal.</p><p>* The NPPR is a <strong>regime</strong> agreed between Member States which allows for AIFMs to market AIFs that are not allowed to be marketed under the AIFMD passporting <strong>regime</strong>. This mainly relates to the marketing of Small AIFMs, non-EU AIFs and AIFs managed by non-EU AIFMs</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC Text with EEA relevance: Access at: <a href="http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/34/oj">http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/34/oj</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=577669b41b7b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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