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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Paul Lee on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Paul Lee on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@ipaullee?source=rss-ce3102b78640------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Paul Lee on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ipaullee?source=rss-ce3102b78640------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Rocketfuel for Motorcycles]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ipaullee/rocketfuel-for-motorcycles-4367ab30b85e?source=rss-ce3102b78640------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4367ab30b85e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rocket-fuel]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bootstrap]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Paul Lee]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 15 Jan 2019 18:39:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-15T18:39:49.199Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Rocketfuel for Motorcycles</p><p>TL:DR — It’s not binary a binary choice to raise venture capital or not. At some juncture of a company’s life it may make sense to, at other junctures, not so much. There is no magic formula. You can bootstrap all the way; you can bootstrap then raise, you can raise then “bootstrap”, you can raise, bootstrap, then raise again. It’s ok if it’s hard to raise capital, the financing isn’t an end goal, it’s a means to an end.</p><p>I’m sure you read the NY Times article:</p><h3>Josh Kopelman on Twitter</h3><p>Motorcycles are common (2018: Honda sold 18M motorcycles) Jet planes are rare (2018: 806 Boeing planes) VCs sell jet fuel, which doesn&#39;t work in motorcycles Bad stuff happens if VCs push jet fuel on a bike owner. Or if a bike owner thinks they can fly. https://t.co/cubYfKksGP</p><p>I’ve been reading the feedback through multiple tweets and blog posts justifying when Venture Capital is or isn’t appropriate.</p><p>What I think is left out in this analysis is that there are a number of founders that don’t necessarily see a $1B outcome for their company at inception.</p><p>I’ll borrow a familiar drawing to make my point:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/609/1*cpD75_2-XWyn22MeL4RsCw.png" /></figure><p>I think that most astute founders are thinking about the skateboard at stage 1. If that’s working, they’re leveraging what’s working and seeing adjacent opportunities for growth, but I don’t believe the vast majority of founders I meet are thinking about the car in stage 5. They’re figuring out how to get to stage 2 (the skateboard with the handle — not to be confused with Bird or Lime ;p). Even at the seed (or Series A) stage of funding, I’m not convinced the majority of founders are thinking about the car. If they are stating it, I think it’s really more for the investors’ benefit.</p><p>They are however, building potentially great businesses. As the business progresses, they are seeing the variety of opportunities and I truly believe most exceptional startups get the authentic idea of a very large business at the Series B and beyond.</p><p>I was having lunch with the founder of a startup* I’ve invested in. This is actually the second startup I’ve invested where he was the CEO and we were talking about how his new company was going. He was remarking how different this raise was from his first startup from a fundraise perspective. He’s getting tons of interest in his Series B (we led the A) and he was saying relative to his last company, it’s just much easier overall.</p><p>I think it’s easier today for him because:</p><ol><li>The later stage market is more flush with capital,</li><li>He’s a more experienced founder having done this before, and probably most importantly,</li><li>His last startup is currently worth $1B+</li></ol><p>Now of course if your last startup is worth $1B, maybe this post isn’t very relevant. However, if you’re running your first or second startup, you should know that it didn’t start that way for this founder.</p><p>In his first startup, he recently moved from a foreign country, he wasn’t super confident in his pitching skills, and his business was still nascent. He told me over lunch he wondered if he had made a mistake moving from his home country. He went on to say that I was literally one of the last conversations he had (every other firm he met in SV had turned him down over a 6 month period) and I was the only person to offer him a term sheet. I didn’t know this at the time, but in thinking about it, it doesn’t bother me in the least.</p><p>This is all well and good but raising is a small part of building. We’re in a market where cash is easy but the work thereafter is incredibly difficult. It’s hard to process that, at some point, the merry go round stops and I do believe we’re at or near peak.</p><p>So whether or not you’re able to raise your early round of venture, if you believe in your business, keep going. Cut burn, focus on sales, stay alive. It may or may not make sense to raise venture capital, but that doesn’t mean your company won’t be incredibly valuable. Money won’t always be available but it doesn’t mean the end of your company.</p><p>Several years ago, I was fortunate to be an investor in a company* in Chicago that subsequently raised an $8MM Series A. The company was performing but it was definitely not a rocket ship. As their money was running out, they got an acquisition offer from a strategic. It would have been a “nice” return for the investors but certainly was not a unicorn. The exit would also have meant life changing money for the founders. Crushingly, the acquirer pulled their term sheet at the 11th hour and left the company with little cash and very few options.</p><p>The founders took a few days to process what had just happened, but then came into work with an ambitious plan to pivot from b2c to b2b while laying off 90% of their team. It sounded crazy at the time and I actually had a discussion with the founders about calling it a day. But they persisted.</p><p>The company, over the next 4 years, bootstrapped and grinded their way to 8 figures in revenue, added back all the employees (and then some), and just recently announced a large raise (with a valuation well north of their last post-money). Do I think they will be a $1B company? I don’t know (and not sure they do either) but I do know they’re getting inundated with offers for “rocketfuel”.</p><p>Keep going, don’t get distracted by how you get there.</p><p><em>*Names of startups have been intentionally held so as not to reveal specific info. If you’d like to know who the companies are, feel free to reach out and we can talk about it.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4367ab30b85e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Liquidation Preference and Participation Caps for Unicorns]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/buildersvc/liquidation-preference-and-participation-caps-for-unicorns-4b5617ee3a03?source=rss-ce3102b78640------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4b5617ee3a03</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Paul Lee]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 11 May 2015 13:19:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-04-28T13:23:59.052Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I read an article over the weekend talking about Unicorns and their respective valuations: <a href="http://recode.net/2015/05/10/heres-one-thing-all-the-billion-dollar-unicorns-have-in-common/">http://recode.net/2015/05/10/heres-one-thing-all-the-billion-dollar-unicorns-have-in-common/</a> — The author stated that the thing ALL Unicorns have in common is that they have Liquidation Preferences (ie, the investors have the ability to take out their full investment BEFORE any of the common shareholders including founders and management).</p><p>It’s probably worth noting but not exactly earth shattering — here’s an insight about venture backed deals — they ALL have liquidation preferences. Here’s Fred Wilson’s blog post explaining why: <a href="http://avc.com/2010/08/heres-why-you-need-a-liquidation-preference/">http://avc.com/2010/08/heres-why-you-need-a-liquidation-preference/</a></p><p>The more interesting discussion would have been around whether or not the late stage investors had multiple liquidation preferences or participating preferences. What are liquidation preferences and/or participating preferences?</p><p><strong>Quick primer</strong>:</p><p><em>LIQUIDATION PREFERENCE — </em>typically 1x (particularly for early stage investors because they don’t want to set a precedent for any other liquidation preferences — more on that in a future post). However, in weird times, they can vary, from 2x to as high as 10x (in the late 90&#39;s and early 2000&#39;s). What does that exactly mean? Let’s say a late stage hedge fund invests $50MM in Unicorn.io at a $950MM pre-money valuation. Let’s assume there are two scenarios —</p><ul><li>In Scenario A, Late Stage fund invests at 1x liquidation preference and the Unicorn.io sells for $2B. The fund can then convert to common (assuming no additional financings and no further dilution) and get gross proceeds of $100MM OR they can stay as the 1x preferred and get back $50MM. They would convert to common and get back the $100MM.</li><li>In Scenario B, Late Stage fund invests at 3x liquidation preference and Unicorn.io sells for $2B. The fund can convert to common and get gross proceeds of $100MM or they can stay as the 3x preferred and get back $150MM. In this instance, they would NOT convert to common and instead get back $150MM.</li></ul><p><em>PARTICIPATING PREFERENCE</em> — typically non-participating. However, participating preferred terms can arise when there is a valuation gap between investor and management. Let’s again bring up Unicorn.io. Let’s assume late stage fund invests $50MM at a $950MM pre-money valuation.</p><ul><li>In Scenario A, Late Stage fund invests with a 1x liquidation preference non-participating and Unicorn.io sells for a $2B. The fund can convert to common and get gross proceeds of $100MM or they can stay as the 1x preferred and get back $50MM. They would convert to common and get back the $100MM</li><li>In Scenario B, Late Stage fund invests at a 1x liquidation preference with participation <strong>up to 3x</strong> and Unicorn.io sells for $2B. The fund can convert to common and get gross proceeds of $100MM or they can exercise their participating preference up to 3x which means: fund first takes their $50MM back (leaving proceeds of $1,950,000,000). Then takes 5% of the remaining proceeds ($97,500,000) which yields total gross proceeds of $147,500,000. Any exit greater than $3B yields an outcome where the hedge fund would convert to common (because of the 3x cap). If Unicorn.io sold for $3B then Late Stage fund would convert and receive $150MM in proceeds, which is the same as them NOT converting (as their return would be capped at 3x).</li></ul><p>If the article pointed out that the late stage guys had terms like this on Unicorns— 2x liquidation preference with a 4x cap (ie the late stage guys pull out double their money and then participate in the remaining proceeds until they achieve a 4x return), THAT would have been interesting (and maybe not surprising).</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4b5617ee3a03" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/buildersvc/liquidation-preference-and-participation-caps-for-unicorns-4b5617ee3a03">Liquidation Preference and Participation Caps for Unicorns</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/buildersvc">Builders VC</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Con’s of Venture Debt]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ipaullee/the-con-s-of-venture-debt-d6a638188cf3?source=rss-ce3102b78640------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d6a638188cf3</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Paul Lee]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 04 May 2015 22:19:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-05-04T22:19:38.986Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Venture Debt?</h3><p>I was just reading an interesting article from NextView Ventures — <a href="http://nextviewventures.com/blog/what-is-venture-debt/">What is venture debt and how should startups use it</a>?</p><p>Really good overview and gives a solid basis for a cursory understanding. I won’t rehash the article (you should read it) but there are some key insights that the article doesn’t mention.</p><p>For quick background, while I was at GE Capital, I actually did a rotation in the GE’s venture debt shop and learned quite a bit about the business….</p><p>So here’s the quick need to knows:</p><p>Venture debt can be broken down mostly into two separate camps: debt funds and finance co’s (WTI, Horizon Technology Finance, TriplePoint) and banks (SVB, Square 1, Comerica). The debt funds and finance co’s typically take more risk — ie, lend greater amounts (25%+ of equity raise), charger higher rates (typically 8–15% in today’s market), ask for higher warrant coverage (8–20% of the loan amount in warrants priced at the last priced round) while the banks typically lend smaller amounts (15–25% of the equity raise), charge a lower rate (5–10%), and require your deposits business (more on this later).</p><p>The pro’s of raising venture debt is largely that it’s cheaper than equity. You take significantly less dilution. Instead of raising $10MM of equity, you can raise $8MM of equity and $2MM of debt.</p><p>The con’s, and here’s where most people don’t really talk publicly, are numerous:</p><ol><li>You have to pay it back — $2MM of debt isn’t $2MM of burn. You have to pay it back on a monthly basis (typically in a 36–48 month period). So while founder thinks he has $10MM of proceeds in the above example, he really has less than that.</li><li>It’s senior to the equity — well of course it is, it’s debt — what’s the big deal? The big deal is when you need to go to your existing investors to ask for a bridge because things aren’t going exactly as planned, they will be injecting money that sits behind the debt facility (or whatever you owe on it). That introduces another variable into the equation precisely when you don’t want another variable. I’ve seen equity investors pass up on a bridge loan because it was sitting beneath the debt.</li><li>MAC clause — look carefully in your term sheet — is there a MAC (Material Adverse Change) clause? This clause basically means the term is subjective — ie, your company didn’t hit the projections, there’s a material adverse change in the business. Your competitor got funded $40MM, there’s a material adverse change in the business. The market has gone south, there’s a material adverse change in the business.</li><li>They own the deposits — do you bank with them? If you do, see if they have a clause where they can sweep the cash (ie take over your bank account and ACH the money out). It may or may not be justified, but if the cash is swept, you don’t have the money to sue the bank and you’re done.</li></ol><p>There are definitely instances where venture debt may make sense: the startup is performing well, you’ve figured out your growth formula, and you’re using the debt to push your metrics to get a healthier valuation. However, there is DEFINITELY a downside to the debt, particularly when things aren’t going as planned (and that never happens in venture backed startups, right?).</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d6a638188cf3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Let’s revise the vesting schedule for startup founders and employees]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ipaullee/let-s-revise-the-vesting-schedule-for-startup-founders-and-employees-7817fcb301ea?source=rss-ce3102b78640------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7817fcb301ea</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Paul Lee]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 15 Apr 2015 22:39:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-04-17T15:54:48.630Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If you ask attorneys, mentors, venture investors, etc the appropriate vesting schedule for startup founders and employees, the generally accepted response will be the standard 48 month, 12 month cliff vesting schedule. Brad Feld, whom I’ve greatly admired from afar, utilizes these numbers in his Term Sheet Series — <a href="http://www.feld.com/archives/2005/05/term-sheet-vesting.html">http://www.feld.com/archives/2005/05/term-sheet-vesting.html</a> (that said, I have no idea if he still believes in those numbers or if he’s changed his mind as this was written in 2005 I believe).</p><p>It occurred to me as I was starting my own startup that the landscape for value creation in startups has drastically changed. Whereas back in the 90&#39;s and 00&#39;s (when these schedules were devised), there was a lot of capital required in in terms of developing code and building products (as it was literally the first time anyone had done it) early on, the costs of startups have come down dramatically due to API’s, frameworks, advanced languages, etc.</p><p>Historically, the value creation was much more <strong>linear</strong> — you might have created a ton of value in the first two years because so much had to be done for the first time. The typical rounds of financing might have been $2MM seed at $3MM pre (year 1), $5MM Series Aon $10MM pre (year 2), $10MM Series B on $30MM pre (year 3), and then a growth round (year 4 and on).</p><p>Today, you’re seeing a pre-seed round of $400K on $4MM pre (3–6 months), a $2MM seed round at $8–10MM pre (year 1), a $10MM Series A round at $40MM pre (year 2), and then a $40MM Series B round at $200–400MM pre (year 3). This value creation is <strong>exponential</strong>.</p><p>The natural conclusion is that the bulk of the value creation is happening in years 3 and 4. So how to align incentives?</p><p>Here’s what I think makes sense: instead of the 25% cliff, then 75% vesting over 3 years, why not vest:</p><ul><li>10% in Year 1,</li><li>20% in Year 2,</li><li>30% in Year 3,</li><li>40% in year 4.</li><li>In addition, the cliff should be dropped (as a quid pro quo).</li></ul><p>In this way, both founders and employees have incentive to stick around for the long(er) haul (where the bulk of the equity value is created). As for the cliff, you can argue it’s ok if the employee leaves after 6 months because they’re walking away with a much smaller portion of their vested equity.</p><p>Investors and founders always say, “It’s never about the idea, it’s about the execution” — why not structure equity compensation to reflect that?</p><p>This is the way I’m structuring the vesting for what I’m working on. Thoughts?</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7817fcb301ea" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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