<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Kanishk on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Kanishk on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@ironical02?source=rss-753e397ebb87------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 07:08:40 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@ironical02/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Constitutional Morality, Popular Morality, and the Structural Roots of Crime]]></title>
            <link>https://ironical02.medium.com/the-counter-majoritarian-compass-constitutional-morality-popular-morality-and-the-structural-0590a253a366?source=rss-753e397ebb87------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/0590a253a366</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[judiciary]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[india]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kanishk]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 18 Aug 2026 12:14:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-18T12:14:37.417Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There are two moralities operating in every criminal courtroom, and they rarely agree. Popular morality wants a villain. It wants the gavel to come down fast, the sentence to feel like punishment, the story to end with someone paying. Constitutional morality asks a slower, less satisfying question: what produced this act, and does the state bear any responsibility for it.</p><p>In August 2026, the Gujarat High Court forced that question into the open. Justice H.D. Suthar granted bail to Lakhiben Solanki, a woman seven months pregnant, accused of beating her two-year-old daughter to death after the child would not stop crying from hunger. Read that sentence again and notice how easily it curdles into outrage. A mother killed her starving toddler. Every instinct trained by popular morality says: lock her up, and do not overthink it.</p><p>The court refused that instinct. And in refusing it, the ruling says something larger about what constitutional courts are actually for.</p><p><strong>Constitutional Morality vs. The Popular Will</strong></p><p>Dr. B.R. Ambedkar warned the Constituent Assembly that constitutional morality is not something that comes naturally to a society. It has to be cultivated, and in a country where it has not yet taken root, courts carry the burden of defending it against the pull of majoritarian sentiment. That warning was not abstract. It described exactly the tension in this case: a public that wants punishment, and a court whose job is to ask whether punishment is even the right frame.</p><p>The frame collapses once you take free will seriously as a spectrum rather than a switch. A person choosing between two good options is exercising something close to full autonomy. A person choosing under starvation, with an abandoned family, a second child to feed, and no functioning safety net beneath her, is exercising something far thinner. The law still needs to hold her accountable. But accountability and total moral culpability are not the same thing, and constitutional morality exists precisely to keep that distinction alive when public sentiment wants to flatten it.</p><p><strong>Inside the Ruling</strong></p><p>The facts are bleak in a specific, almost unbearable way. Solanki’s husband had been away on a six-month sea voyage, and the family was left without income. She had moved out of her matrimonial home with her two daughters into a cohabitation arrangement under a Maitri Karaar, still without financial stability. On March 19, her two-year-old, hungry and crying, would not stop. Solanki struck her. When she realized the child was unconscious, she rushed her to Smimer Hospital immediately, where the girl later died.</p><p>The prosecution built its case on the postmortem injuries and argued that the severity of the assault warranted continued detention. Justice Suthar looked at the same facts and reached past them, toward what produced the moment itself. His reasoning was direct: when starvation drives a mother to an act like this, the failure is collective, not individual.</p><p>To make that point, the judgment did something unusual for a bail order. It reached for literature. It cited Pannalal Patel’s <em>Manvini Bhavai</em>, a Gujarati novel set against famine, and its central claim that hunger, not human nature, is the true evil. It invoked <em>Les Misérables</em>, where Jean Valjean steals bread to feed a starving family and spends the rest of the novel paying for a crime that was never really his alone to own. The court was not decorating its order with references. It was placing one destitute mother inside a much older literary argument: that societies which let people starve do not get to act shocked when starvation produces desperate acts.</p><p><strong>Structural Poverty and the Fallacy of Retribution</strong></p><p>Here is the uncomfortable arithmetic. A state that fails to guarantee basic food security, that offers nothing to a woman abandoned mid-pregnancy with a hungry child, has already broken its end of the constitutional bargain before she breaks the law. Retribution against her alone treats the crime as though it appeared out of nowhere, detached from the conditions that produced it.</p><p>Denying bail in a case like this does not just punish an alleged offense. It punishes poverty itself, in advance of any conviction. Pre-trial detention becomes a tool that falls almost exclusively on people who cannot buy their way out of desperate circumstances in the first place. That is not blind justice. That is justice with a very visible thumb on the scale.</p><p><strong>Addressing the Objections</strong></p><p>Two objections deserve a direct answer, because dismissing them would be dishonest.</p><p>The first: does this reasoning create a legal excuse for child abuse? No. Bail is not acquittal. Solanki still faces trial, and the chargesheet still stands. Granting bail recognizes that pre-trial imprisonment of a destitute, pregnant woman with no prior record and a completed investigation serves no purpose except punishment before proof, which the Constitution does not permit.</p><p>The second: should judges be lecturing the state on poverty at all? Yes, when Article 21 is the provision at stake. The right to life has been read by the Supreme Court itself to include the right to live with dignity, and dignity is not compatible with starvation. A court that stays silent about the conditions producing the crime in front of it is not being neutral. It is choosing not to see.</p><p><strong>Law Beyond Retribution</strong></p><p>A constitutional court’s real task is not limited to asking whether a citizen broke the law. It has to ask whether the state broke its promise to that citizen first, and whether punishing her alone lets everyone else off the hook. Justice Suthar’s order does not excuse what happened to a two-year-old girl in Surat. It refuses to let her death be filed away as one woman’s private failure, when it was also, unmistakably, a public one.</p><p>That is what constitutional morality is supposed to do.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0590a253a366" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Erosion of Fiscal Federalism in India]]></title>
            <link>https://ironical02.medium.com/the-erosion-of-fiscal-federalism-in-india-61d947a41bb3?source=rss-753e397ebb87------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/61d947a41bb3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[india]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fiscal-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gst-in-india]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kanishk]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Aug 2026 12:06:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-01T12:06:19.781Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>1. Introduction</strong></p><p>Indian fiscal federalism was constitutionally designed around divided tax sovereignty. The three lists in the Seventh Schedule distributed legislative competence to prevent fiscal subordination of one order of government to another. Article 246 made states the exclusive legislature for subjects in the State List, including, until 2017, the taxation of goods sold within their territories.</p><p>The 101st Constitutional Amendment folded state indirect tax powers into a unified structure administered by a Council in which the Union’s structural position renders state consent formally required but substantively negotiable. Simultaneously, the Union has expanded revenue mobilization through constitutional exemptions unavailable to states, while co-financing mechanisms have transformed state fiscal discretion into a de facto matching-grant system. The result is a fiscal union masquerading as a fiscal federation: states bear the political costs of public service delivery while the Union controls both the revenue envelope and the spending priorities.</p><p><strong>2. Article 279A and the Veto in the GST Council</strong></p><p>The GST Council, constituted under Article 279A of the Constitution, is formally a cooperative federal institution. Its voting structure encodes a Union veto over state tax policy.</p><p>Under Article 279A(9), Council decisions require a weighted majority of not less than three-fourths of votes cast. The Union government holds one-third of the total weighted voting power; states collectively hold two-thirds. The arithmetic consequence is absolute: every decision requires Union concurrence. The Union alone can block any resolution states unanimously favor, because preventing passage requires only that Union votes plus any dissenters exceed one-quarter of total votes, a threshold the Union can independently clear. No resolution survives Union opposition.</p><p>The Supreme Court’s decision in <em>Union of India v. Mohit Minerals Pvt. Ltd.</em> (2022) reaffirmed that GST Council recommendations are persuasive rather than legally binding, and that states retain legislative competence under Article 246A to enact divergent tax legislation through their own assemblies. Read as a doctrinal statement of constitutional law, the judgment is correct: state sovereignty within defined GST domains is not formally extinguished by Council membership. Read as a guide to the actual political economy of the Council, it is structurally misleading. A state assembly that legislates a rate deviation from the Council schedule immediately exposes its traders and consumers to cascading regulatory consequences: goods crossing state boundaries generate dual taxation disputes; input tax credit chains fracture wherever the deviating state’s rate structure diverges from the IGST framework; and the deviating state forfeits cooperative standing within an administrative machinery it continues to depend upon for day-to-day rate coordination. The result is a pooled sovereignty trap in which Article 246A autonomy is nominally preserved but economically suicidal to exercise. <em>Mohit Minerals</em> confirmed that states hold a constitutional key; the GST architecture ensures that using it locks the door from the inside.</p><p>A related structural mechanism operates at the deliberative level. Empirical observation of Council proceedings reveals that most decisions are recorded as unanimous or near-unanimous consensus rather than as formally divided votes. This unanimity is regularly cited by the Union government as evidence of cooperative federalism functioning as designed. The correct interpretation is the opposite. Consensus within the Council is manufactured under the shadow of the veto. Because state finance ministers know before any resolution is formally tabled that the Union holds an absolute blocking capability, organized state opposition is neutralized at the pre-deliberation stage. States negotiate for marginal concessions, rate exemptions for specific commodities, modifications to Compensation Cess timelines, and administrative carve-outs, all within a framework whose fundamental parameters the Union has already determined. The formal vote records agreement; the substantive negotiation reveals subordination. A body that registers near-unanimous decisions on contentious rate questions is not evidence of federal harmony. It is evidence that one party’s structural veto makes formal challenge irrational, and that rational actors do not mount opposition they know in advance cannot succeed.</p><p>The Council’s agenda further reinforces this primacy. Rate-setting, exemption schedules, the structure of the Compensation Cess, and decisions on petroleum product inclusion all pass through a body where the Finance Minister of India chairs proceedings and where the Union’s technical apparatus, the Department of Revenue and the GST Council Secretariat, produces the background documents that frame deliberation. State finance ministers arrive as regional advocates advancing their jurisdictions’ interests within parameters largely determined in New Delhi.</p><p>The contrast with comparable federal institutions is analytically instructive. Canada’s Council of the Federation and Germany’s Bundesrat both give subnational governments structural blocking power on federal fiscal legislation. In those systems, concurrent jurisdiction over major tax bases comes with genuine co-determination. Article 279A offers states the formal appearance of co-determination while engineering Union primacy into the voting weights. The reduction of state finance ministers to regional lobbyists is not a failure of the institution’s operation but a direct consequence of its design.</p><p><strong>3. Cess, Surcharges, and the Shrinking Divisible Pool (Article 270)</strong></p><p>The constitutional division of tax revenues between the Union and states rests on the concept of the divisible pool: taxes listed under Article 270(1) flow into a shared pool distributed according to Finance Commission formulas. Article 270(1) explicitly excludes surcharges and cesses. This exception, intended as a narrow instrument for hypothecated emergency financing, has become the primary mechanism through which the Union expands its revenue base without sharing the proceeds with states.</p><p>The Road and Infrastructure Cess on petroleum products, the Health and Education Cess levied atop personal income tax, and multiple product-specific cesses generate revenues that remain entirely within the Union Consolidated Fund. States have no constitutional claim to these flows regardless of their scale. A government that maximizes cess and surcharge revenues relative to divisible pool revenues retains a structurally larger share of aggregate public revenue without technically violating Finance Commission recommendations, because those recommendations apply to the divisible pool and the divisible pool alone.</p><p>The fiscal consequence is a growing divergence between statutory and effective devolution. The Fifteenth Finance Commission recommended a vertical devolution share of 41 percent of central taxes to states. The Sixteenth Finance Commission, constituted to recommend devolution from 2026–27, operates against a baseline in which effective devolution, measured against total central gross tax revenue rather than the divisible pool alone, has consistently fallen in the range of approximately 30 to 32 percent. The gap represents cess and surcharge collections that have expanded substantially as a share of Union revenue over the past decade, yet which legally cannot be devolved. States receive their statutory share of a progressively shrinking fraction of total central revenue. The recommendations are technically honored; effective devolution is quietly compressed.</p><p><strong>4. The Surrender of State Tax Instruments and the Residual Levy Problem</strong></p><p>GST adoption required states to surrender substantial indirect tax authority. Value Added Tax, the Central Sales Tax on interstate trade, Entry Tax, Octroi, and state-level Sales Tax on most goods were subsumed into the unified GST framework. States cannot independently set rate bands, define exemptions for categories they previously controlled, or deviate from Council-approved schedules. In exchange, they were promised revenue neutrality through a compensation mechanism guaranteeing 14 percent annual revenue growth over a 2015–16 base, a commitment that the Union allowed to expire in 2022 without renewal.</p><p>The tax levers remaining outside GST are constitutionally retained but structurally constrained by political economy. Alcohol and tobacco remain outside GST and represent states’ most productive autonomous revenue source, though their inelasticity as a base imposes a ceiling on productive expansion. Petroleum products, technically excluded from GST, are subject to informal coordination pressure because their pricing carries national macroeconomic implications. Stamp duties on property transactions remain with states but are vulnerable to competitive base erosion as jurisdictions compete for real-estate investment.</p><p>The practical consequence, most visible during the fiscal shocks of 2020–21, is that states facing sudden revenue shortfalls cannot respond by expanding the primary indirect tax base. That base is now federally administered. Increasing alcohol excise is administratively straightforward but politically costly and economically regressive; it converts state budgets into regressive taxation instruments precisely when progressive fiscal options would be most appropriate. During the COVID-19 period, when GST revenues contracted sharply, states faced simultaneously falling transfers, an expiring compensation guarantee, and no independent lever for formal economy revenue expansion. The architecture that was supposed to produce revenue buoyancy produced fiscal immobility during the most severe economic contraction in decades.</p><p><strong>5. The Destination-Based Tax Shift and Its Industrial Revenue Penalty</strong></p><p>The transition from origin-based to destination-based GST fundamentally restructured the geographic distribution of indirect tax revenues. Under the prior framework, manufacturing states collected Central Sales Tax on interstate goods at the point of production. Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Gujarat, and Karnataka, as the primary hubs of industrial manufacturing and organized services export, captured CST revenue reflecting their economic output. Destination-based GST reverses this: IGST on interstate trade is credited at the consuming state, meaning revenue accrues where final consumption occurs regardless of where production took place.</p><p>The structural redistributive consequence is significant. High-production, lower-consumption states like Tamil Nadu and Gujarat effectively transfer GST revenue flows to large-population, high-consumption states like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The industrial investment, labor productivity, and export capacity that generated pre-GST CST revenue now generate IGST that flows elsewhere. Manufacturing states are not compensated within the GST framework for this structural transfer; they depend on Finance Commission horizontal devolution to recover some proportion of their fiscal contribution to national output, but the devolution parameters, as examined in the following section, do not fully restore this.</p><p>The destination-based structure was internationally standard practice, drawn from VAT systems in the European Union and the Canadian provinces. The Indian implementation occurred without the compensatory intergovernmental transfer mechanisms that both the EU and Canada deploy to manage regional industrial disparities. The EU’s regional development funds and Canada’s Equalization Payment system both acknowledge explicitly that destination-based consumption taxation requires deliberate fiscal equalization instruments designed to account for production-consumption asymmetries. India’s Finance Commission mechanism performs equalization but was not structurally redesigned after 2017 to account for the additional regional redistributive effect of the GST destination shift, leaving the industrial penalty unaddressed within the tax architecture itself.</p><p><strong>6. The Sixteenth Finance Commission and the North-South Fiscal Asymmetry</strong></p><p>Finance Commission horizontal devolution determines how the states’ aggregate share of divisible pool taxes is distributed among them. The Sixteenth Finance Commission’s deliberations take place against sustained objection from southern state governments, which have consistently argued that the devolution formula systematically penalizes economic performance and fiscal discipline.</p><p>The formula under consideration assigns Income Distance a weight of 42.5 percent, measuring the gap between a state’s per-capita income and the highest state per-capita income and thereby rewarding fiscal need while penalizing prosperity. Population based on 2011 Census data carries a weight of 17.5 percent, a choice that rewards higher historic fertility rates. GDP Contribution receives a weight of 10 percent. Demographic Performance, rewarding states that achieved fertility transition earlier, carries a weight of 10 percent. The Income Distance criterion at nearly half of total devolution weight structurally disfavors economically advanced states: a state that generates higher per-capita income receives a smaller horizontal share precisely because it is productive.</p><p>The cumulative distributional consequence is striking. Southern states including Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Telangana collectively contribute substantially more to central tax revenues than they receive in devolution transfers. Analysis of Fifteenth Finance Commission outcomes indicates that southern states receive approximately 30 to 40 paise per rupee contributed to the divisible pool, while large northern states receive between Rs. 2.00 and Rs. 3.00 or more per rupee contributed. The formula’s internal logic is defensible as poverty alleviation: redistributing from high-income to low-income states mirrors the domestic transfer principles of every major federal system.</p><p>The political contestation arises because the same states that receive less devolution also bear the costs of demographic transition: lower dependency ratios, aging workforces, and declining population growth reduce both their representational weight in Parliament and their leverage within the GST Council. The forthcoming delimitation exercise, constitutionally required to realign Lok Sabha constituencies based on updated population data, will likely reinforce this compounding disadvantage. States that implemented family planning most effectively stand to lose parliamentary seats relative to states with higher population growth, adding political underrepresentation to fiscal underrepresentation. Advanced southern states find themselves penalized simultaneously by the tax architecture for being economically productive, by the devolution formula for being fiscally successful, and by democratic arithmetic for having controlled their populations.</p><p><strong>7. Centrally Sponsored Schemes and the Co-financing Trap</strong></p><p>Centrally Sponsored Schemes constitute a third channel through which Union fiscal preferences override state fiscal autonomy. Unlike Finance Commission devolution or statutory tax sharing, CSS represent tied grants: states receive funds only for programs whose design, targeting criteria, and administrative framework are determined in New Delhi and branded with the Prime Minister’s name on completion.</p><p>Major CSS including Jal Jeevan Mission and PM Awas Yojana require states to contribute matching funds in the range of 40 to 50 percent of total program expenditure as a condition of receiving central releases. The consequence is that state budgets are partially pre-committed to financing centrally designed programs before states determine their own expenditure priorities. SGST revenues, which represent the state’s primary GST proceeds and the most significant untied revenue stream remaining after tax surrender, are partially diverted to match central contributions for schemes that reflect New Delhi’s political priorities rather than state-assessed developmental needs.</p><p>A state that declines to participate in a CSS loses central funding without recovering fiscal space, because the matching contributions were already budgeted in anticipation of central releases. Non-participation is technically possible under the Constitution but fiscally punitive in practice. The aggregate scale of CSS has expanded substantially over the past decade, proceeding without constitutional amendment or statutory framework, relying instead on cabinet approval and annual budget allocations. States have no formal mechanism to challenge scheme design and no constitutional entitlement to untied grants as a proportion of central transfers. When CSS matching contributions are netted against devolved revenues, the effective untied fiscal resources available to states are considerably lower than gross devolution figures suggest. The gap between statutory devolution percentages and actual state fiscal discretion is therefore wider than the cess-surcharge analysis alone establishes.</p><p><strong>8. Article 293(3) and the Asymmetric Borrowing Regime</strong></p><p>Article 293(3) requires states to obtain Union consent before raising loans if any outstanding loan from the Union remains unpaid. Since virtually all states carry legacy Union loans, the provision gives the Union standing authority to condition state borrowing. Net Borrowing Ceilings, administratively set by the Ministry of Finance, restrict state governments to borrowing within 3 percent of Gross State Domestic Product, inclusive of off-budget borrowings by state entities including electricity distribution companies (DISCOMs), state road corporations, and state infrastructure financing boards.</p><p>The inclusion of state off-budget borrowings in the ceiling while the Union maintains off-budget fiscal flexibility constitutes an asymmetric constraint of structural consequence. Union off-budget financing through capital expenditure by public sector undertakings not fully consolidated in the Union budget, or National Small Savings Fund lending to state-adjacent entities, does not face equivalent ceiling treatment. States’ fiscal space is measured comprehensively and enforced constitutionally; the Union’s fiscal space is measured selectively and regulated by legislative self-amendment of FRBM targets.</p><p>The treatment of DISCOM liabilities under this framework requires analytic precision. A significant portion of accumulated DISCOM losses reflects subnational political economy choices that cannot be attributed to national policy mandates: unmetered agricultural power connections that prevent volumetric billing, politically enforced tariff structures that have not been revised to reflect supply costs, distribution losses driven by chronic infrastructure underinvestment, and endemic bill non-collection in electorally sensitive constituencies. These dynamics constitute a genuine moral hazard. When state governments shield loss-making utilities from commercial discipline because agricultural and household power subsidies carry direct electoral value, the resulting liabilities are not primarily a product of central direction but of subnational fiscal choices that generate sovereign financial risk. Any structurally honest account of DISCOM debt must acknowledge this dimension.</p><p>That acknowledgment, however, does not dissolve the constitutional asymmetry in enforcement. The Centre’s application of Net Borrowing Ceilings under Article 293(3) includes state utility off-budget borrowings without applying equivalent consolidation discipline to Central Public Sector Undertaking liabilities, many of which serve comparable sectoral functions and are similarly excluded from full FRBM accounting. A state DISCOM borrowing to finance rural electrification or irrigation pump connections faces mandatory inclusion in the state’s 3 percent GSDP ceiling; a CPSU borrowing to finance comparable national energy or infrastructure programs does not. The asymmetry is not that DISCOM liabilities are included in state ceilings, which is defensible on fiscal risk and transparency grounds, but that Union-controlled off-budget entities face no symmetrical consolidation requirement. Fiscal discipline is structurally imposed downward through constitutional borrowing authority while remaining a matter of legislative discretion at the centre.</p><p>The Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management framework embeds this asymmetry further. The FRBM Act applies formally to both Union and state governments, but enforcement mechanisms differ categorically. State fiscal deficits trigger borrowing ceiling adjustments through the constitutional authority of Article 293(3). The Union’s fiscal deficit path has been revised repeatedly through parliamentary amendment of FRBM targets, with no external enforcement mechanism capable of imposing discipline against the government that controls the legislative agenda. The same fiscal prudence that is structurally imposed on states through constitutional authority is, for the Union, a matter of legislative self-regulation subject to sovereign discretion.</p><p><strong>Systemic Implications: The Future of the Union</strong></p><p>The seven structural mechanisms analyzed above converge on a single systemic outcome: the progressive displacement of state fiscal autonomy by Union fiscal direction. This displacement does not require constitutional amendment at each stage. It proceeds through deliberative institutions with asymmetric voting weights, through the exploitation of constitutional exceptions to revenue sharing, through the administrative expansion of tied grant programs, and through the selective application of fiscal discipline frameworks.</p><p>The constitutional theory of Indian federalism has always accommodated substantial Union dominance. The Emergency provisions of Articles 352 to 356, the assignment of residuary legislative power to the Union under Article 248, and the overriding effect of Union legislation on Concurrent List subjects all reflect a framers’ deliberate choice for a strong center. The Constituent Assembly understood Union political dominance as compatible with state fiscal independence within defined tax domains. What the present structure produces is qualitatively different: states bearing constitutional responsibility for public health, education, agriculture, and public order without the fiscal instruments required to discharge those responsibilities independently.</p><p>The democratic accountability consequences are direct and underexamined. When a state’s public hospital system underperforms, voters hold the state government responsible. When primary schools fail, the chief minister faces electoral consequences. If the state government’s capacity to fund those systems is structurally constrained by Union decisions over which it has no unilateral authority, the accountability relationship between voters and elected officials is distorted in ways that cannot be corrected through electoral competition alone. Responsibility without fiscal autonomy is not federalism. It is administrative decentralization operating behind a federal constitution’s formal vocabulary.</p><p>Structural correction requires constitutionally grounded institutional reform rather than administrative adjustment or politically untenable reconfigurations of federal voting power. Three reforms address the mechanisms identified above with legal precision and constitutional anchorage.</p><p>The cess and surcharge circumvention of Article 270 requires a formal constitutional amendment rather than a statutory ceiling. Any legislative cap on cess revenue sharing is vulnerable to reversal by simple parliamentary majority from the same government that benefits structurally from the exemption; a statutory fix reproduces the very problem it addresses. A constitutional amendment to Article 270 capping cess and surcharge collections at a defined proportion of Gross Tax Revenue, beyond which all proceeds automatically and unconditionally flow into the divisible pool, would foreclose the administrative maneuver through which effective devolution has been compressed below statutory rates. The 101st Amendment created a constitutional institution for tax coordination; a corrective amendment to Article 270 would reimpose constitutional discipline over the revenue-sharing consequences of that coordination.</p><p>The CSS co-financing trap requires not a new statutory framework but the substantive operationalization of the Inter-State Council under Article 263 of the Constitution. The Inter-State Council has existed since 1990 and has been convened irregularly without binding decision-making authority. A constitutional mandate under Article 263, conferring co-determination rights over CSS design parameters, matching ratios, and expenditure targeting on the Inter-State Council as a deliberative body, would convert states from passive co-financiers into constitutional co-authors of the programs they are required to fund. Unlike the GST Council, the Inter-State Council’s constitutional structure does not encode a Union veto. Reconstituting it as the apex deliberative body for centrally sponsored transfers would introduce genuine federal co-governance into an expenditure domain currently governed by cabinet discretion and political branding.</p><p>The pooled sovereignty trap confirmed in <em>Mohit Minerals</em> (2022) requires not judicial reversal but operational implementation. The Court established that states hold Article 246A legislative competence to deviate from Council decisions; what renders that right functionally unusable is the absence of formal harmonization and dispute-resolution protocols governing the consequences of deviation. Establishing binding adjudication mechanisms, administered through a body with independent representation from both Union and state governments and with defined timelines for resolving input tax credit disputes and rate-mismatch claims, would allow states to exercise their constitutional autonomy without triggering commercial chaos or administrative retaliation. Deviation with due process is a genuine federal option; deviation without institutional infrastructure is constitutionally protected and practically impossible. The <em>Mohit Minerals</em> holding means nothing for state autonomy until the procedural architecture makes exercising it viable.</p><p>Each of these reforms faces the political obstacle that the Union government controls the constitutional amendment calendar and the parliamentary legislative agenda, and benefits structurally from the present arrangement. The institutional incentive structure produces compounding inertia, sustained across Finance Commission cycles, GST Council deliberations, and annual budget exercises. That inertia produces the fiscal subordination that the Constitution’s framers believed they had precluded. Understanding how that gap between constitutional design and fiscal reality has been engineered, and through which specific mechanisms it is maintained across every tier of the intergovernmental transfer architecture, is the prerequisite for any reform agenda capable of moving beyond the Law Commission report shelf.</p><p><strong>SOURCES:</strong></p><p><a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=https://legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/COI-updated.pdf">Constitution of India (Full Text PDF) – Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice</a></p><p><a href="https://www.indiacode.nic.in/">The Constitution (101st Amendment) Act, 2016 – India Code Repository</a></p><p><a href="https://www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?abv=CEN&amp;statehandle=123456789/1362&amp;actid=AC_CEN_2_2_00039_201715_1517807326965&amp;sectionId=25096&amp;sectionno=12&amp;orderno=13&amp;orgactid=AC_CEN_2_2_00039_201715_1517807326965">The Goods and Services Tax (Compensation to States) Act, 2017 – India Code</a></p><p><a href="https://www.indiacode.nic.in/">The Integrated Goods and Services Tax (IGST) Act, 2017 – India Code</a></p><p><a href="https://www.bdo.global/en-gb/microsites/tax-newsletters/indirect-tax-news/issue-3-2022/india-supreme-court-strikes-down-gst-reverse-charge-on-ocean-freight-in-cif-imports">Supreme Court Ruling: <em>Union of India v. Mohit Minerals Pvt. Ltd.</em> (2022) — Analysis &amp; Summary</a></p><p><a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=https://main.sci.gov.in/">Supreme Court of India Official Judgments Portal</a></p><p><a href="https://prsindia.org/policy/report-summaries/report-15th-finance-commission-2021-26">Report of the 15th Finance Commission (2021–26) Summary — PRS Legislative Research</a></p><p><a href="https://cdnbbsr.s3waas.gov.in/s316026d60ff9b54410b3435b403afd226/uploads/2023/02/2023020674.pdf">15th Finance Commission Expenditure Directives — Ministry of Finance, Department of Expenditure (PDF)</a></p><p><a href="https://interstatecouncil.gov.in/">Inter-State Council Secretariat — Sarkaria and Punchhi Commission Reports</a></p><p><a href="https://niti.gov.in/">NITI Aayog Documents &amp; Policy Archives</a></p><p><a href="https://rbi.org.in/commonman/English/scripts/commpol.aspx">State Finances: A Study of Budgets (Annual Publication Portal) — Reserve Bank of India</a></p><p><a href="https://cag.gov.in/">Union Government Financial &amp; Compliance Audit Reports — Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG)</a></p><p><a href="https://www.irejournals.com/formatedpaper/1713324.pdf">Beyond One Nation, One Tax: Constitutional Limits in Mohit Minerals — IRE Journals (PDF)</a></p><p><a href="https://www.nipfp.org.in/">Working Papers &amp; Fiscal Research — National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP)</a></p><p><a href="https://accountabilityindia.in/">Budget Briefs &amp; Scheme Allocation Tracking — Accountability Initiative, CPR</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=61d947a41bb3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Vattenfall vs The State of Germany]]></title>
            <link>https://ironical02.medium.com/vattenfall-vs-the-state-of-germany-453bd35b05a0?source=rss-753e397ebb87------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/453bd35b05a0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[corporate-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[case-study]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kanishk]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 06:29:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-20T06:29:11.642Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Section 1: The Moorburg Precedent (Vattenfall I)</strong></p><p>The dispute that was commenced at ICSID in 2009 as Vattenfall I started not with a sudden shift in policy, but with a permit. The Swedish state-owned energy conglomerate, Vattenfall AB, had successfully obtained a permit from the City of Hamburg for the construction of a 1,640-megawatt coal-fired power plant at Moorburg on the River Elbe. The project was of commercial importance for Vattenfall. It promised to be an anchor of Vattenfall’s generating capacity in the North of Germany and to rationalize its position on the regional grid. The construction permits had been issued by Hamburg city authorities, and Vattenfall had already begun investing. Then the political configuration of the Hamburg Senate changed, with the Green Party joining the coalition. The environmental conditions for the permit on Moorburg suddenly became significantly stricter. Hamburg imposed water quality conditions on the uptake of cooling water from the Elbe for the plant. Vattenfall would have to implement cooling tower systems which were significantly more expensive to construct and reduce the plant’s efficiency. Vattenfall deemed these conditions technically unworkable and economically devastating. Negotiations with Hamburg stalled. Vattenfall’s legal counsel invoked Part III of the Energy Charter Treaty, a multilateral treaty aimed at establishing the protection of investment within the energy sector, signed by more than fifty states. It would permit Vattenfall to take its case before an ICSID tribunal, rather than domestic German courts. In particular, Vattenfall sought to avail itself of the Treaty’s Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) standard, enshrined in Article 10, and its prohibition on unlawful expropriation, contained in Article 13. The 2009 claim at ICSID sought around 1.4 billion Euros in damages. The FET claim turned on the notion of “legitimate expectations.” Vattenfall argued that it had invested at Moorburg based upon permit conditions which Hamburg had the authority to issue, and which a reasonable investor would be legally entitled to expect. The subsequent increase in environmental standards had occurred at the time when the Greens had joined the coalition. This had resulted in the arbitrary altering of regulatory standards, against which the FET standard offers protection. The illegal expropriation claim operated similarly: although not direct expropriation, it argued that, by fundamentally altering the plant’s business model, the permit conditions rendered the investment worthless, effectively a taking. The tension at the heart of this framing of the claim was succinctly captured in the 2012 commentary on legitimate expectations in the context of the Vattenfall proceedings from Kluwer Arbitration, “The tribunal has the delicate task of navigating between excessive regulation by states and politically motivated changes to the investment climate”. The matter settled in 2011, before the tribunal reached a merits decision. The Hamburg authorities eased the conditions relating to the plant’s water use, and Vattenfall dropped its claims. The plant was constructed. The conventional telling of this settlement is a classic case of the regulatory chill effect. This analysis, while not entirely inaccurate, tells only half the story. A strong argument can be made that the Hamburg authorities had no legal basis for introducing the harsher conditions for Moorburg, which it and the state governments had introduced under the Federal Water Resources Act (Wasserhaushaltsgesetz) and which were outside the scope of municipal authority in Hamburg. The original permit conditions had been properly imposed by Hamburg’s own administrative agencies, pursuant to regular administrative procedures, and were not themselves particularly demanding. The revised permit conditions came about as a consequence of the Greens joining the Hamburg coalition government and had not formed part of the underlying assumption on which Vattenfall had invested. Under German administrative law, permitting conditions need to comply with principles of proportionality, and cannot be applied arbitrarily or inconsistent with the terms upon which an authorization was originally issued. These stricter conditions arguably went far beyond that, and could, to some extent at least, have been challenged in German domestic proceedings. This does not negate the regulatory chill effect. Whatever its legal merits in German domestic law, the fact that Vattenfall was able to mount a €1.4 billion ICSID case under the ECT has no doubt created uncertainty for regulators across Europe who contemplate regulating energy infrastructure in future. However, the Hamburg settlement arguably also involves an overreach by municipal government and was corrected by the use of a tool that was available to a foreign investor and to a domestic one with a well-advised and well-resourced legal team, with a result which leaves the general principles of public law and environmental protection in some doubt.</p><p><strong>Section 2: The Nuclear Phase-Out (Vattenfall II)</strong></p><p>The 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster was followed by a shift in German energy policy unmatched in its postwar history. Within weeks of the event, the administration of Chancellor Angela Merkel, which had authorized in late 2010 an extension of nuclear plant operating lifetimes in an amendment to the German Atomic Energy Act, had changed course. Germany’s Thirteenth Amendment to the Atomic Energy Act, enacted in June 2011, mandated the immediate shutdown of eight nuclear reactors and set hard deadlines for the retirement of Germany’s remaining nuclear facilities by 2022.</p><p>For Vattenfall, the Thirteenth Amendment was not an academic matter. The company owned one-third of the Brunsbuttel nuclear plant in Schleswig-Holstein and one-half of the Krummel plant in the same German state. The plants themselves had already been out of operation for years prior to the earthquake and tsunami, Brunsbttel was closed in 2007 after a transformer fire, while Krummel shut down in 2009 amid repeated technical failures, but Vattenfall possessed more than physical operating assets: it had what were called electricity generation residuals. As permitted under the 2010 life extension legislation, Germany’s nuclear facilities had been allocated certain additional terawatt-hours of potential electricity generation, the use of which could be consumed at any of the group’s operating facilities or transferred among them. The Thirteenth Amendment stripped these residuals away without compensation. Since both Brunsbuttel and Krummel fell within the category of plants required to shut down immediately, and given their recent operating histories were unable to take up their allocated residuals, the Thirteenth Amendment eliminated any future entitlement on Vattenfall’s part to those residuals. The Thirteenth Amendment had extinguished a valuable source of potential future revenue streams held by Vattenfall under German law less than twelve months prior to the law’s enactment. As captured by a UNCTAD case profile on the Vattenfall II arbitration, Vattenfall subsequently initiated in 2012 under Case No. ARB/12/12 ICSID proceedings and one of the largest investment arbitration cases filed against an EU Member State to date. The claims sought a total of €4.7 billion in damages. Although like the Moorburg case it was brought under the same ECT legal framework, it was based on a more expansive factual record and alleged expropriation under Article 13, arguing Germany had taken a protected investment without adequate compensation. It also asserted that the abrupt repudiation of a statutorily based life extension policy had frustrated Vattenfall’s legitimate expectations in its energy investments (Article 10 FET). A comprehensive analysis of the nuclear phase-out arbitration by the Transnational Institute highlighted how the German position generated a fundamental problem for investment law. While the nuclear phase-out was Germany’s response to a perceived public safety crisis and enjoyed broad popular and parliamentary support, and in the view of most legal scholars and a vast majority of international jurisprudence was perfectly valid and non-compensable exercise of Germany’s sovereign police powers under customary international law, Vattenfall contended that the police powers exception was inapplicable here. Germany had not adopted the Thirteenth Amendment out of any safety concern whatsoever because, given the current shutdown status of both Brunsbttel and Krmmel, those facilities represented no active safety risk. Instead, they were essentially eliminating residual generation rights to which they had little appetite due to the associated costs.</p><p><strong>Section 3: Dual-Track Litigation and Forum Shopping</strong></p><p>Vattenfall’s litigation strategy in the context of the nuclear phase-out thus ran along two parallel legal tracks. Domestically, Vattenfall’s German nuclear industry co-shareholders E.ON and RWE launched constitutional complaints against the 13th Amendment before the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfG) challenging the 13th Amendment under the Basic Law. Foreign state-owned Vattenfall was likewise involved in parallel domestic proceedings, while also keeping its ICSID track open. In December 2016 the BVerfG handed down its decision, a decision far more damaging to the German government’s position than often reported. It did not simply confirm the nuclear phase-out and an albeit limited compensation requirement. Instead, it held that the 13th Amendment was, in part, unconstitutional. The unconstitutionality lay not in the decision to phase out nuclear energy per se but in the failure of Parliament to create any kind of transitional arrangement for investments which had, between the time of the life extension legislation in 2010 and the reversal in 2011, been made, legalised or planned by investors on the basis of the property rights allocated to them in that window by the Eleventh Amendment, inter alia to operate them. Such operators had vested property interests, protected under Article 14(1) of the Grundgesetz, to run their nuclear power plants and sell electricity. These were summarily wiped out by the 13th Amendment, with no transitional provisions and no compensatory mechanisms for already incurred reliance costs, leading to what the BVerfG called “frustrated investments”. This unconstitutionality required corrective action from the legislature, which it set a deadline for. This turned the entire domestic debate about the phase-out on its head. The German nuclear companies were no longer making what appeared to the German authorities as more or less speculative claims in the political sphere or the abstract legal domain. They were constitutional creditors whose legally protected property rights had been directly, explicitly violated by the legislature’s own statute. Germany could thus no longer treat the phase-out as a fait accompli in domestic law. Since it now, via the BVerfG, acknowledged the obligation to compensate precisely those ‘frustrated investments’ for which Vattenfall was claiming substantial damages from Germany in the parallel ICSID arbitration, its negotiating position in the international arbitration was fundamentally weakened. This is the essence of the dual-track strategy in its most important manifestation. The BVerfG analysed the phase-out under German fundamental rights law using the proportionality test and assessed it against the property rights guarantees of Article 14 of the Grundgesetz, concluding that transitional provisions were constitutionally mandated. The ICSID tribunal analyzed the case under the ECT standards for fair and equitable treatment and for expropriation, based on the reasonable expectations of an international investor at the time of investment, not under German constitutional standards. Yet both tests came to the same conclusion: the 13th Amendment as passed went too far in ways recognised by both German constitutional law and international investment law. Forum shopping exists in the space between such distinct legal systems. It was here that Vattenfall was able to exploit its strategic advantage. It sought compensation for its constitutional property rights under the Grundgesetz, and it simultaneously initiated an international arbitration to claim a much higher sum of money, under an international treaty and the legal logic that governs international investment arbitration, regardless of what any German court would rule. German negotiators trying to settle the nuclear case with the domestic players E.ON and RWE knew throughout the process that there was an open international arbitration, pending, with a multi-billion euro damage claim brought by Vattenfall, that the German players were unable to bring. The shadow of the pending ICSID proceedings hung over these settlement negotiations as a structurally superior negotiation lever that E.ON and RWE could not access.</p><p><strong>Section 4: State-Owned Enterprises and the ISDS Paradox</strong></p><p>Vattenfall AB is fully owned by the Swedish government. It is a portfolio of shares owned by the government, its board is answerable to the governmental owners, its profits redound to the benefit of the public coffers in Sweden. But when it decided to sue Germany under the investment chapter of the ECT via that investment regime, it was essentially the Swedish state taking on Germany through a dispute resolution system intended to protect the capital of private individuals from an abuse of state power. The ECT’s investor-state provisions do not distinguish between SOEs and privately owned investors. “Investor” means any legal person constituted under the law of a contracting party. Sweden law constitutes Vattenfall AB. That’s enough to make Vattenfall an ECT investor with all ECT protections, including recourse to ICSID arbitration. There’s no ambiguity on formal legal grounds. The trouble lies with the institutional logic. However, formal legality depends on a particular legal threshold established through an early application of ICSID jurisprudence. In the authoritative commentary that accompanied the ICSID Convention’s drafting, Aron Broches, ICSID’s principal architect, specifically addressed the SOE standing issue and established the criterion still widely used today: a state-owned company qualifies as an ICSID investor and may bring an ISDS claim so long as it wasn’t acting as a state’s agent and discharging sovereign or governmental functions. If it meets that test, its state ownership becomes legally irrelevant to standing. It captures the classical public international law divide between acts of sovereignty (acta jure imperii) that only a state can perform and commercial or private acts (acta jure gestionis) that anyone may engage in, whether states, SOEs or private citizens. In its activities in Germany, Vattenfall easily met the second test, the commercial one. Its equity stakes were taken through normal market transactions; it operated within the open, liberalized German energy market subject to the same regulations as other players; it sought planning permits and made investment decisions based on its commercial strategy. None of its activities were performed pursuant to Swedish governmental authority, as they all took place on commercial terms and market rules within Germany. The fact that it was ultimately owned by the Swedish government did not alter that fact of how it acted. That fact clarifies the legal technical question but not the institutional or geopolitical one. The core institutional idea behind ISDS is to fill a systemic gap, addressing the fact that, for purposes of international adjudication and diplomatic negotiation, individual investors lack recourse against hostile or irresponsible host governments for breach of the investment protections of treaties. To a significant extent, the ISDS system aims to make foreign investors the equals of the host government. However, that premise is undermined when the investor itself is an entirely owned entity of a sovereign with ample diplomatic and legal recourse options. Both Sweden and Germany are members of the ECT and the EU. The natural means of addressing this dispute was for them to engage in diplomatic negotiations, seek assistance of the European Commission, or in the very worst case pursue inter-state arbitration or a dispute under EU law. While Sweden had the legal option of espousing Vattenfall’s claim under diplomatic protection mechanisms, the chosen route was to go through the mechanism designed to protect private investors’ interests, and thereby obtain a sovereign claim against another government under private-protection rules. This is the geopolitical joke: a state utilized a mechanism designed to curb state abuse of sovereign power in order to achieve an advantage against another state. The ECT’s collision with EU law, identified by European Papers as part of a cluster of challenges to its application within the EU, illustrates precisely this kind of paradox: where the strict application of each element in the standard doctrinal test of standing (like the Broches test) may appear to justify jurisdiction over a particular case (an SOE), the underlying rationale of the dispute resolution mechanism itself would, if systematically followed, suggest a very different outcome.</p><p><strong>Section 5: The Quantum War, or the Value of Stranded Assets</strong></p><p>The Damages Hearing. The tribunal on Vattenfall II was asked in the damages hearing to tackle a question which lies at the nexus of investment law and energy economics: how do you measure the damages sustained by a nuclear power plant that has not generated a Watt of electricity in years, the operation of which has been prohibited by statute, and the owners of which say they are entitled to the revenues which would have been earned from this power plant for the next decade and a half? Vattenfall, obviously, wanted the answer to be DCF. The methodology of DCF calculates a damages amount by projecting future cash flows from an investment over its useful life, discounted at an appropriate discount rate back to present value. Vattenfall therefore modeled the future production of electricity from Brunsbuttel and Krummel during the lifetime under which it would have been allowed to operate, if the 2010 life extension had remained and if the Thirteenth Amendment had never been passed. The present value, or at least a valuation which is notionally such, led to the main damages figure claimed, close to €4.7 billion. Germany replied by, primarily, pointing out two factors, one empirical and one legal. Its claim to limit compensation to sunk costs rather than speculative, would-be revenues of plants that had not been operated for years, both prior to the impugned legislation, seems to me perfectly coherent. Why should a party be entitled to compensation in respect of would-be profits of decades into the future which could be affected by any of many eventualities from market developments through to technical issues, all the while having, for all the relevant time, left its plant sitting idle? Second, and the more important points in my view, the tribunal created a procedural benchmark of importance to both parties as, a read of the tribunal’s press releases shows. As ICSID documents note the tribunal asked both parties to prepare submissions based on, inter alia, eight separate questions. One was question number 8 and asks to what value, at the time on or before June 29, 2011, the affected investments were worth on the basis that they remained as operating power plants under the applicable German legal framework on or before June 29, 2011. I think this was important as it fixes a moment in time and this can only be of importance, of analysis and relevance, to ensure that what we are measuring as loss. I.e. The decline in value of an investment, the measurement of that loss must be compared to some baseline, an estimate of the value of the investment in the counterfactual in which the 13th Amendment did not occur. What that would mean for the plant would be that anything which happens before June 29, 2011 and affects the value of the plant does not impact upon its loss whereas after that point something that affects the value of the plant in the actual timeline has to be measured against that baseline. This question about what actually had happened versus what would have happened, and the impact of those divergences on value on both sides of that baseline became a central element in settlement discussions.</p><p><strong>Section 6: The Jurisdictional Dispute and the Achmea Objection</strong></p><p>On March 6, 2018, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled in Slovak Republic v. Achmea BV that the investor-state arbitration clause contained within the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT was incompatible with EU law. According to the CJEU, arbitral tribunals seated pursuant to such intra-EU BIT clauses interpreted and applied EU law without review by the CJEU and thus threatened the supremacy and uniform application of EU law required by the EU legal order. Therefore, according to the CJEU, intra-EU BIT arbitration was structurally incompatible with the EU legal order. The German Government immediately sought to elevate the jurisdictional ruling in Achmea to the level of a jurisdictional objection in the Vattenfall II case. Germany’s argument was straightforward: the dispute in Vattenfall II involved two EU member states and was therefore intra-EU in nature; the logic in Achmea therefore applied; the tribunal therefore had no jurisdiction. The tribunal denied this argument in its Decision on the Achmea Issue, handed down in 2018. The Oxford Law Blog provides a helpful summary of the tribunal’s logic, and the key elements of its reasoning included: (i) the ECT is a multilateral treaty with members outside the EU and was not designed as an intra-EU arbitration mechanism, unlike the intra-EU BIT at issue in Achmea; (ii) the ECT contains no “disconnection clause,” i.e., no provision stating that member states’ obligations under the ECT were to be trumped or superseded by their obligations under EU law. In the absence of such a clause, the tribunal reasoned that the rule of pacta sunt servanda, codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, dictated that member states were bound by their commitments, including the submission to ICSID jurisdiction under Article 26 of the ECT. Germany could not unilaterally resile from those commitments in light of a later CJEU judgment involving a different legal instrument; and (iii) the ECT did not have self-contained intra-EU scope capable of supplanting ECT jurisdiction over a dispute with an external dimension: even though the investor Vattenfall AB is Swedish, it is a separate legal entity, and its investment falls within the scope of the ECT. The tribunal preserved its jurisdiction, but the European Union’s institutional response to Achmea was not finished. On January 15, 2019, the EU member states adopted a formal Joint declaration on the consequences of Achmea for investment protection agreements concluded between them. In that Declaration, they unambiguously agreed that intra-EU BIT investment arbitration provisions are incompatible with EU law and will not be applied. Member states also agreed, with some reservations, to apply the reasoning in Achmea to investor-state arbitration under the ECT when the investor and the host state are both member states of the EU. However, many member states including Germany took the view that the Declaration applies to ECT arbitrations; other states took a more cautious view, precisely because the Vattenfall II tribunal had rejected the argument that Achmea applied to the ECT. The CJEU then addressed that ambiguity in September 2021 with its ruling in Republic of Moldova v. Komstroy LLC. The CJEU concluded that Article 26 ECT does not apply to disputes between an EU investor and an EU member state on the reasoning that, as with intra-EU BIT arbitration, it would lead to tribunals interpreting and applying EU law without supervision from the CJEU, thus posing a threat to the EU’s autonomy and the uniform application of its law. The ECT’s multilateral character, which formed a key part of the Vattenfall II tribunal’s reasoning, does not override the essentially intra-EU character of a dispute between two member states, in the CJEU’s view. The outcome of Komstroy is a fundamental disruption that the Vattenfall II settlement could not contain. The ICSID Convention, which provides the legal framework for the present arbitration, provides a self-contained arbitral mechanism: awards under the ICSID Convention are not subject to an enforcement process as such and are enforceable against state assets in any contracting state as if they were a final judgment of that state’s municipal courts, pursuant to Article 54 of the Convention. Germany is a contracting state and was therefore (and remains) obligated to enforce an award under Article 54 of the Convention. This places German courts and the German Government in an irreconcilable position, bound by their own treaty obligations to enforce an ICSID award but also prohibited by a ruling of the CJEU from taking steps to enforce such an award on the ground that it was made pursuant to an arbitral process contrary to EU law. There is no possible solution that satisfies both instruments, other than the denial of jurisdiction, or at the very least denial of enforcement. That issue, the jurisdictional stalemate that Komstroy has produced between the ICSID regime and the EU legal order, does not arise in this specific case thanks to the settlement in 2021, but for all future intra-EU ECT arbitrations, the issue remains unsettled.</p><p><strong>Section 7: Settlement and the Global Policy Backlash</strong></p><p>On the 9th of September 2021 Germany and Vattenfall reached a settlement. Germany’s general settlement with nuclear plant operators, that include E.ON, RWE and EnBW in addition to Vattenfall, saw Germany compensate plant operators a total of approximately 2.4 billion Euros for its nuclear phase-out and Vattenfall receiving approximately 1.425 billion Euros in a settlement with Germany, an amount significantly less than the 4.7 billion that they had asked for, but one of the biggest ever paid as a result of an ISDS-adjacent process in European history. The settlement finally ended the ICSID proceedings, but not the public and policy debate to which they had given rise. The second case of Vattenfall became the poster child for the European objection to the ISDS model, a central point of discussion during the EU Commission and US talks to conclude an agreement to free up transatlantic trade, the TTIP talks, where investor protection, including ISDS mechanisms, was a part of the discussion, with, of course, Europe’s own governments, civil society organizations and unions, highlighting Vattenfall as a stark illustration of what ISDS represented in reality; a state-owned Swedish company leveraging a contract intended to protect private investors to extract compensation from the democratic decision of the German people over their own energy strategy. This European political backlash ultimately led to the stalling of the talks of the TTIP, with its proposed investment protection regime never coming close to its final stages. A more structural solution was the result of three institutional steps:</p><ol><li>The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, which entered into force in 2014 and to which an add-on was given in the 2017 Mauritius Convention provided for open access to all documents of investment arbitration. In the case of Vattenfall II, it wasn’t clear whether it was in keeping with these transparency standards.</li><li>The European Commission put forward the idea of an MIC in partnership with various countries, through UNCITRAL Working Group III. The MIC is designed to act as a permanent judicial body of investment arbitrators rather than an ad hoc committee formed by an investor’s request, thereby addressing both the problem of frequent, interlocking investor and arbitrators’ interests and providing consistency and precedential value.</li><li>This latest response came from within the treaty itself: after years of dispute, in 2023, France, becoming the first EU member state to do so, withdrew from the treaty on the grounds of the incompatibility with the Paris Agreement and the problematic issues illustrated in such cases as Vattenfall. A series of EU states, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, and several others have subsequently notified withdrawal under the relevant clauses of the treaty, although their investor protection rights are protected by a sunset clause for a further twenty years.</li></ol><p>The coordinated European withdrawals from the ECT are a far more radical reimagining of investment treaty architecture by developed economies than has occurred since the model began being standard in the 1990s. What the Vattenfall cases taken as a whole show is not that investment treaties have no role. Indeed, the original intent of the ECT was to protect cross-border energy investments in liberalizing markets from expropriation. What they do show is how an instrument designed to fulfill that particular purpose can, without constraints of scope and with no institutional checks, create outcomes incompatible with democratic accountability. A state-owned company, deemed capable of bringing an investment arbitration claim, then seeking compensation in the billions for what appears to be a purely political decision of a democratic parliament in response to a disaster of its own making, using a regime meant to safeguard foreign investors in illiberal markets, does not show how the system has achieved its intended logic; instead, it shows how far it has diverged from it. That this difference, for the first time, has been deemed legally unbridgeable by both the ICSID Convention and the EU’s Court of Justice.</p><p><strong>SOURCES:<br></strong> <a href="https://icsid.worldbank.org/cases/case-database/case-detail?CaseNo=ARB/09/6">ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6 Case Details</a><br> <a href="https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement/cases/329/vattenfall-v-germany-i-">UNCTAD Investment Dispute Navigator — Vattenfall I</a><br> <a href="https://icsid.worldbank.org/cases/case-database/case-detail?CaseNo=ARB/12/12">ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12 Case Details</a><br><a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement/cases/483/vattenfall-v-germany-ii-">UNCTAD Investment Dispute Navigator — Vattenfall II</a><br><a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf%3Fnum%3DC-142/16">CJEU Case C-142/16 (Commission v. Germany)</a><br><a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-284/16">CJEU Case C-284/16 (Slovak Republic v. Achmea BV)</a><br><a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf%3Fnum%3DC-741/19">CJEU Case C-741/19 (Republic of Moldova v. Komstroy LLC)</a><br><a href="https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2016/12/rs20161206_1bvr282111en.html">German Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of 6 December 2016 (1 BvR 2821/11)</a><br><a href="https://icsid.worldbank.org/rules-regulations/convention">ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules</a><br><a href="https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/conventions/transparency">Mauritius Convention on Transparency</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=453bd35b05a0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Why Great Statesmen Are Never Good People]]></title>
            <link>https://ironical02.medium.com/why-great-statesmen-are-never-good-people-86c8126d293f?source=rss-753e397ebb87------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/86c8126d293f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kanishk]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 10 Jul 2026 02:37:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-12T14:55:03.745Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>1. The Divergence of Private Morality and Raison d’État</strong></p><p>Private morality, as experienced in the lives of individual humans, relies on a shared set of moral commitments, transcending philosophical differences: honesty, compassion, the inviolability of the individual human dignity irrespective of consequence. This isn’t simply an issue of personal preference. It is the fundamental structure underlying Kantian universality, Rawlsian fairness, and Aristotelian virtue. The good human, under any of these theories, is not a liar to preserve institutions, a torturer of dissidents, a sacrifice of innocents for stability. Such a person does not exploit fellow beings as means, but treats them, in front of them, as ends. But the state operates according to an altogether different grammar. The concept of “raison d’état,” a term coined formally by Giovanni Botero in 1589 in Della ragion di stato, but understood by political actors centuries before, designates a system of rule where the preservation, unity, and power of the state form the paramount consideration. Here, morality is the subordinate of the state and not vice versa, serving the state only when convenient and abandoned without fuss when inconvenient. Here the standard for action is singular and simple: will this help the sovereign power persist and flourish? The interaction of these two logics of action, this two-part system, is structural not coincidental. Any political operative internalizing privately sourced morality will inevitably arrive at a crossroads wherein adherence to private ethical guidelines (honesty, mercy, fidelity to individual dignities) will directly contradict the basic necessities of political power to endure, remain coherent, or enhance its capacity for dominion. An operative who selects private morality at that point is not a better human who happens to hold power, but a political imbecile whom the system will expel, making way for one who adheres strictly to the state’s survival imperative. This is not an obscure, academic observation. It is the stark, unavoidable truth that haunts political thought, from Thucydides to Carl Schmitt, the implicit assumption in nearly all serious analysis of power, that great political practitioners are not good people who managed to acquire power, but are instead the products of a system that systematically filters out those bound by private ethical concerns. The inherent logic of the modern nation-state is incompatible with the ordinary ethical commitments of a decent person. This argument is supported by three core propositions. First, that power acts not as a source of corruption, but as a filter to remove empathy and personal ethics from the operator’s repertoire. Second, that Western philosophical thought can, through Max Weber’s ‘ethics of responsibility’, provide a rationale for this elimination. And third, that the currently-dominant, “new politics” style of the ethical executive (the ‘ethical actor’ operating behind a shield of algorithmic public relations) represents not a deviation from this historical logic, but a refinement of it.</p><p><strong>2.The Machiavellian Selection Filter and the Calculus of Violence</strong></p><p>When Niccolò Machiavelli is brought up, it is almost always as a theorist of cynicism, and in so doing he is completely misread. His 1513 text The Prince does not celebrate the use of cruelty. In reality, the book functions as an empirical study on what it actually takes to survive in politics, presented with the clinical precision a physician might use in describing a disease. It is not about being cruel for the sake of it; Machiavelli’s central thesis is that any ruler who is not willing to act cruelly when circumstances demand it will be destroyed by others who are. In his thinking, goodness in a prince is less a virtue and more of a structural vulnerability. This argument about selection filter logic adds yet another layer to the matter. Power is not merely about its corrupting effect on decent people. The effect political environments have, over time, is to select for those able to commit the required corruption. It is an environment that is ruthless and competitive. A politician, for example, who objects to surveillance, imprisonment without trial, detention, or sacrificing a segment of society for the sake of preserving the entire system, is easily superseded by those who will not. Such political spaces select for those who have a complete lack of morality, not because it is admirable, but because it enables them to adapt and survive. Those who balk at crossing certain boundaries inevitably acquire such boundaries as liabilities that others may exploit. Take the case of Abraham Lincoln for example. He is particularly noteworthy here because the extent of Lincoln’s private decency is generally considered unquestionable by historians. Lincoln himself was by no means cynical. In his private correspondence, he expressed sincere suffering regarding the Civil War and those who knew him on a personal level described a person with a profound sense of empathy and an often self-deprecating sense of humor. There is virtually no evidence of a historical Abraham Lincoln who was unconcerned with the suffering of his fellow man. And yet: in April 1861, Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus in the corridor stretching between Washington and Philadelphia without obtaining the consent of Congress. In his decision in Ex parte Merryman (1861), the chief justice Roger Taney, acting as a circuit judge, ruled that suspension required a congressional act and was unconstitutional. Lincoln rejected this reasoning; by claiming that the Executive branch itself had the authority to interpret the Constitution during times of crisis, Lincoln treated the Chief Justice’s ruling as if it were an unbinding opinion. He was claiming that in an era of war in which the Union itself was under attack and the Congress was in recess, the constitutional provision about suspending the writ must be interpreted through the lens of the Executive’s duty to protect the country, not the lens of normal separation of powers. By declaring that the Executive had concurrent interpretive powers in an existential crisis, Lincoln essentially told Taney that he regarded the decision as unenforceable; yet, his move wasn’t an outright act of defiance of judicial authority; it was a careful assertion that in a period of existential threat the constitution allows for concurrent interpretive power. Lincoln’s administration then continued to jail dissidents, publishers, and Confederate sympathizers without trial, expanding suspension across the entire Union territory by September 1862; while the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act of 1863 granted Congressional approval, the die was already cast, as Lincoln had made it clear he would proceed outside the normal bounds of the Constitution when it felt necessary to preserve the state. It is necessary to explain in explicit terms the utilitarian calculus Lincoln performed. For Lincoln, maintaining the Union meant that suspending due process for indeterminate civilians in order to ensure that the Constitution (and therefore the rights it is designed to protect) could endure was a necessary act. Individual liberty was sacrificed in favor of system survival. Roughly 620,000–750,000 soldiers lost their lives in the course of the war Lincoln fought to preserve the Union — a proportion of the population of America equivalent to roughly 2 percent of its total population. From the standpoint of personal morality, a man who imprisons people without trial, claims executive constitutional prerogative over a sitting chief justice, and allows tens of thousands of people to perish for a larger goal would be considered a tyrant. But judged from the perspective of statesmanship, Abraham Lincoln is a standardbearer for saving his country. This is not an inherent contradiction. The filter is simply doing its work. The great political leaders operate on a level of pragmatic calculation which is, and has to be, inherently incompatible with the moral logic of private life because private conscience cannot possibly scale human utility across time and geography. When an individual considers lying to save a friend from mild embarrassment, they operate on a register in which individual dignity is sacrosanct. When a leader considers sacrificing a province, or even a generation, in order to save a constitutional order from collapsing, they operate on a register in which the value of individual dignity is a factor in a calculation that scales lives against consequences. It is only on that latter scale that the logic required to perform the calculation can operate, and men and women who lack the capacity for moral abstraction needed to switch scales simply don’t survive in top-level politics long enough to make history; those who do (those, and those alone) make it. The costliest political calculations, not always with the direct and tangible aim of maximizing some outcome but in the interest of perpetuating the system which enables such calculations to exist, are, in effect, the price of morality. You can’t have meaningful personal ethics without a functioning system of state, and you can’t have a functioning state without a political calculus that is immune from the demands of personal conscience. A politician who sacrifices individual freedom for state security is therefore not hypocritical; they are merely playing by the rules of the game, the brutal internal logic of which is only too obvious.</p><p><strong>3.The Weberian Imperative: The Ethics of Responsibility</strong></p><p>The most theoretically potent defence of political amorality came from the sociologist, not the politician. Max Weber’s lecture ‘Politik als Beruf’ (“Politics as Vocation”), delivered at Munich University in January 1919, in a Germany lying in the rubble of its World War One defeat, is still perhaps the sharpest explanation of why the structure of political activity demands an ethical posture that would seem monstrous in private life. At the heart of Weber’s argument is a fundamental distinction between two ethical systems that cannot be reconciled. The first is Gesinnungsethik, or the ‘ethic of conviction’. Here the morality of an action depends solely on whether it adheres to a pure principle, irrespective of its consequences. A Christian pacifist who, in Weber’s example, refused to defend himself against murder because to do so would compromise the absolute moral imperative of refusing violence — this man is acting on an ethic of conviction. For this ethic, what follows from an action, whether a good deed leads to a disaster, or an evil deed achieves a happy result, is no more the concern of the actor than the sins of his neighbours are to God. Weber does not entirely disparage this ethic. It is “magnificent,” he says, “in private life”, perhaps even, “within certain limits”, political life as well. The other ethic, responsibility, or Verantwortungsethik, operates with entirely different assumptions. It requires the actor to assume responsibility not only for the good intentions of their actions, but also for their foreseeable consequences. It is the individual operating under the responsibility ethic that the statesman truly is, who, to cite Weber, “makes his contract with the diabolical powers”. It is here that politics demands compromise of private ethics: no genuine statesman can exempt himself from this by appealing to “the cleanliness of his motives”. The individual acting on conviction states, according to Weber: ‘The Christian acts rightly and leaves the result to God.’ Responsibility is a more exacting creed: the man of responsibility “cannot afford to do this,” he “must consider the foreseeable consequences of his action and he will be held responsible for them.” Good results must be pursued, even at the cost of doing things that would make one an altogether morally wicked person in private life. This distinction, however, is emphatically not a licence to expediency or to wanton brutality. A politician under the responsibility ethic is not merely doing whatever is most expedient; they are making a deliberate, painful, conscious sacrifice of personal morality on behalf of systemic goods and for which they have a specific duty. They do not evade this sacrifice. They do not try to cover it over. The politician of conviction sleeps soundly: he knows his action was right. The politician of responsibility lives, or fails to live, with the consequences of his actions; he pays the price for his profession but does not pretend that what he did was anything else but what he did. The quintessential man of the responsibility ethic in historical practice, however, remains Otto von Bismarck, a man whose actions make the mechanism of his statecraft clear and whose career warrants close analysis in this respect. When the King invited Bismarck to take over as Minister-President of Prussia in September 1862, it was specifically because the parliamentary deputies would not approve the increased military budget needed for military reforms and the King wanted someone willing to act without parliamentary authorization. Bismarck, for his part, did so for the next four years, collecting taxes and funding military modernization directly contrary to the Prussian constitution. Bismarck did not blush; he explicitly articulated this position to the Budget Committee in September 1862, in his famed ‘blood and iron’ speech.</p><p><strong>4. The Modern Paradox: Simulated Goodness and Algorithmic Statecraft</strong></p><p>So far this discussion could seem to reflect merely historical conditions that the modern democratic state has overcome. Mass-media scrutiny of the state; accountability to the constitution and to international human rights law; the constant visibility engendered by digital communication: have all these factors fundamentally reconfigured the relationship between political power and personal ethics? According to this line of argument, the historical epoch in which Lincoln defied a sitting Chief Justice on a point of constitutional authority or Bismarck manipulated telegrams to provoke wars is a pre-democratic form of statecraft superseded by today’s institutions which offer far greater real accountability. This perspective is mistaken. The true change effected by modernity has not been the democratisation of statecraft, but the democratisation of surveillance. The operator who would today succeed must operate under conditions of total exposure. Whether to meet a group of conspirators in a secluded office, deliver an ill-advised comment at a reception, or fabricate a lie at a press conference: all activities now run the risk of immediately going public through the media channels operating in tandem. The rational response to such conditions and the one that all successful political operators have employed: have not been to abandon the ruthless ethics of statecraft, but to cultivate a second, public life that protects the state from the fallout from political amorality. To be a great political leader is to be a performer whose skill lies in convincing people that you are good. The insight described here is not one that comes from cynical despair, but from structural observation. Barack Obama authorised a significantly larger number of drone strikes than his predecessor George W Bush in a counterterrorism policy which involved targeted assassinations resulting in hundreds of civilian deaths in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, while simultaneously projecting an image of progressive empathy and international concern that saw him receive the Nobel Peace prize in 2009 before most of his presidency had actually occurred. Tony Blair’s very considerable talents as a communicator and person who radiated warmth, were deployed to launch an invasion of Iraq based on intelligence that his own advisers had questioned on the grounds of unreliability, leading to a war which has to date resulted in more than 150,000 civilian deaths. In these cases the effective performers of decent politics and empathetic human behaviour committed acts that no individual operating according to their private ethical standards would deem morally acceptable. The argument requires a serious philosophical correction here because what the modern operator does differs fundamentally from the Weberian political operative: When Weber’s operator invokes the ethics of responsibility, they take their own decisions and moral costs of doing so into account. The whole principle of the Verantwortungsethik is that they own their decision and the ethical cost of their action. This is the line between acting amoral but responsibly, and acting simply amoral or opportunistic. The Bismarck who withheld troops from taking Vienna was doing the math, but was willing to accept the political consequences in so far as that was the best that could be managed within the confines of the political circumstances and of taking responsibility for the consequences of that act. Likewise when Lincoln took constitutional executive power against Taney he justified it on grounds which he took to be sufficient for that action and was taking the consequences that flow from that action. A modern leader using algorithmic media management to hide the realities of their operations is doing neither of these things. It is not acknowledging the amoral aspects of what it means to operate in power and taking ethical responsibility for it. Instead it is trying to engineer the impression that no such decision was taken and in so far as it seeks to engineer the impression of some ethically unassailable act then its strategy is one that aims to hide the reality of the act. This is not responsibility ethics; it is evasion ethics, in which the machinery of the modern state apparatus is concerned not with bearing responsibility for the morality or otherwise of its decisions but with covering over them, with protecting its operators from bearing the burden of any such debt. If the Weberian responsible politician racks up a series of debts in order to be able to perform effective state craft, the modern, algorithmic manager outsources that process of accumulating debt to a professional team, the purpose of which is to ensure that it never actually adds up to anything. In its underlying methodology statecraft may be identical but its commitment to accountability has been transformed into its careful and painstaking evasion. The significance of this distinction lies in the fact that it implies two failures of political ethics. In Bismarck’s case the ethical failure, on purely private moral standards, lies in its deliberately starting wars. The ethical failing of a modern politician using algorithms and media manipulation is not simply the underlying decision to initiate warfare (although in so far as this may or may not be defensible), it lies additionally in the concerted effort to ensure that the private ethicising decision is hidden and becomes inaccessible to the wider public. If one sees the state machine and its ethical dimension as a structure of necessity then one must accept that there are many actions which it requires. That algorithmic layer of degeneration has now been made explicit. The practice in political communication operations now is to hire data scientists, psychologists, and behavioral economists to determine how to push buttons that maximum the approval response in the public; what narratives suppress certain concerns; and what sequence of “bad news” items will cause the least political pain. The Cambridge Analytical scandal broke in 2018 revealing a years-long practice: precisely targeting emotional appeals to the smallest possible demographic segments for maximum political impact. This is not persuasion as private moral reasoning would understand it; it is the industrial production of simulated relatability for the prevention of a fully lucid apprehension of what decision is being made. In a similar way, at the international system level, the institutional infrastructure of international law performs a complementary role. The post–World War II international legal order (based on the UN Charter, the Geneva Conventions, and the nascent body of international human rights law) is often described as being a constraint upon state conduct. It is more precisely understood as a legitimating technology. For example, the permanent five members of the UN Security Council, which enjoy the right of veto over resolutions of the Council, have uniformly employed their veto powers to protect their own military operations or those of their allies from accountability. For example, the United States has vetoed dozens of UN Security Council resolutions criticizing the Israeli military operation; Russia has vetoed resolutions concerning the Syrian civil war; and China has repeatedly exercised its veto power over resolutions on Myanmar. Rather than blocking state actors from exercising power in cold calculations of strategic interests, the legal architecture of international law provides the procedural discourse with which to make those calculations appear congruent with international norms. The targeted killing program conducted under the Obama administration was itself administered pursuant to a legal architecture of executive Office of Legal Counsel memoranda asserting that the targeted strikes were consistent with the law of armed conflict, the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) approved by Congress in September 2001, and the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Whether these arguments were valid in terms of intellectual rigor or not is a separate question from the functions they performed: the administration of this targeted killing operation provided legal rationalization to the decision to kill specific human beings with remote-controlled aircraft, rendering it a function of rule rather than sovereign violence. This is not law imposing restraint on power; it is law providing power with a rhetoric of justification. This shadow jurisprudence of modern statecraft, a body of executive doctrines, legal opinions, and institutional mechanisms that operates below the threshold of public intelligibility, is not merely the reincarnation of Bismarck’s Realpolitik or Lincoln’s wartime constitutional pragmatism; it is those approaches, newly clothed in the language of multilateral institutions, rights, and due process. The basic calculus remains the same: state security, broadened as necessary to mean the security of the political regime, or the maintenance of the power of dominant states, trumps any moral claims an individual may possess whenever a conflict arises. The legal apparatus exists to legitimize this priority, to dress a power that coerces, not as law, but in the raiment of principle. And the communications apparatus exists to assure the public that there is nothing to see anyway, not even the appearance of principled action. From Botero in 1589 to our twenty-first-century algorithmic political communications operations, the state has never had any other measure of success besides its own survival and the propagation of its power. Private morality, founded in the inherent worth of individual beings and the duties and responsibilities derived from that worth, cannot be deployed by a state toward the internal ends of policy without compromising its own essential functionality. The accomplishment of modernity is not the domestication of that tension but the professionalization of masking it. The moral man and the effective operator continue to be structurally distinct. The degeneration of Weber’s ethics of responsibility into the ethics of avoidance has simply, as intended, obscured that incompatibility.</p><p><strong>SOURCES:<br></strong><a href="https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Della_Ragion_di_Stato">Wikipedia Entry for Della Ragion di Stato</a>.<br><a href="https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/ex-parte-merryman/">Teaching American History Ex Parte Merryman Document Record</a>.<br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ex_parte_Merryman">Wikipedia Analysis of Ex Parte Merryman</a>.<br><a href="https://constitutingamerica.org/ex-parte-merryman-1861-guest-essayist-allen-guelzo/">Constituting America’s Civil War Records</a>.<br><a href="https://germanhistorydocs.org/en/from-vormaerz-to-prussian-dominance-1815-1866/excerpt-from-bismarcks-blood-and-iron-speech-1862">German History in Documents and Images Archive</a>.<br><a href="https://www.cfr.org/articles/obamas-final-drone-strike-data">Council on Foreign Relations Drone Strike Data Report</a>.<br><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/23/us-justification-drone-killing-american-citizen-awlaki">The Guardian’s Report on Drone Law Disclosures</a><br><a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Cambridge-Analytica">Encyclopædia Britannica Entry on Cambridge Analytica</a>.<br> <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/07/the-great-hack-facebook-cambridge-analytica/">Amnesty International Briefing on The Great Hack</a>.<br><a href="https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/vetoes-since-1946">United Nations Security Council Veto Dashboard</a>.<br><a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.un.org%2Fdepts%2Fdhl%2Fresguide%2Fscact_veto_table_en.htm">UN Dag Hammarskjöld Library Veto List</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=86c8126d293f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Digital Sovereignty and the Tech Embassy Crisis]]></title>
            <link>https://ironical02.medium.com/digital-sovereignty-and-the-tech-embassy-crisis-b8c64dbcdeb0?source=rss-753e397ebb87------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b8c64dbcdeb0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[corporate-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-law]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kanishk]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 25 Jun 2026 21:01:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-25T21:01:37.910Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When the ink was dry on the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, an organizing premise was established for global politics that would hold for almost 400 years: territory, and the degree of authority it gives the state over that territory, underwrote international law and power politics. And then, that principle fractured. It is not the fracturing primarily of rival states competing for territory, although that, too, goes on. It is of a new category of actor which the Westphalian system never foresaw: a dozen or so multinational technology firms who now, in effect, control the digital equivalents of all critical governmental resources. They control satellite networks used for military command, cloud infrastructure underpinning state administration, the social platforms by which public opinion is formed, and the digital architectures that underpin virtually all economic activity. When an administrative system relies for its functioning on the continuing contractual good will of a privately incorporated entity whose operations span borders not within state control, then, rather than merely weakening, the Westphalian sovereign is effectively displaced by a form of de facto transnational jurisdiction for which existing international law has no settled name or remedy. The argument is as follows: the existing sovereignty paradigm is no longer applicable in the age of digitalization; tech firms are now first-tier geopolitical agents, whose power the state can no longer command but must attempt to mediate; and while governments have tried to devise new legal tools with which to cope, they are woefully unprepared for the structural transformation they face.</p><p><strong>1. THE DEATH OF THE WESTPHALIAN MAP: DIGITAL TERRITORY HAS NO BORDERS</strong></p><p>Our legal system rests on a geography it can physically verify. State courts’ jurisdiction extends only to the borders of their territory. Police officers work locally. Border guards check each good coming in; their jobs are physical activities associated with a physical boundary. This understanding of jurisdictional power is based on the assumption that every object of governance and the activities of the governor all occur in space; that activity is always traceable to a location to which any state’s enforcement tools can apply. All those preconditions of our legal system have systematically failed in the digital realm. Consider how the process of communication now occurs. For the German citizen communicating in a message, the content is encrypted using protocol technology from California, the messages are transmitted through infrastructure and routing managed by the cloud, potentially stored and transmitted via European-based data centers in Ireland or the Netherlands or Singapore (as a network administrator optimises traffic flows), and decrypted onto a device which is then, in the EU, to be operated by a device with an operating system that the U.S. company continually maintains from headquarters operations centered in Cupertino, Calif. How can a German court have jurisdiction over this? Ireland can also claim a share of the rights given its government’s ownership of some of the servers the data travels across under the EU’s GDPR, just as U.S. investigators can claim control over the company’s records. Singapore may assert jurisdiction over the network hubs where data is routed. None of these states have a complete chain of legal or factual control. Only the tech firm controlling the transmission, the data storing servers, and the decoding device has control over the whole transaction, with only one legal rubric, namely the terms of service it publishes to customers, governing the enterprise.</p><p>In 2018, the U.S. Congress enacted the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act, which authorized extraterritorial warrants compelling technology providers to produce evidence stored outside U.S. territory for the purposes of criminal investigations conducted under federal law. European regulators, however, armed with the GDPR’s own extraterritorial reach and the threat of penalties reaching four percent of global annual turnover, could simultaneously compel the same firm to refuse precisely that disclosure: Article 48 of the GDPR prohibits the transfer of personal data to foreign authorities absent an EU-recognized legal basis, such as a mutual legal assistance treaty, placing any company subject to both regimes in an unresolvable conflict of obligations. The result is not merely a legal collision but a regulatory vice. Transnational corporations are forced to operate as reluctant proxies for competing sovereign regimes, calculating which jurisdiction’s penalties they can least afford to absorb and which sovereign’s demands they are structurally positioned to satisfy. What transpires is an ongoing negotiation between competing legal orders that determines where power actually resides, a negotiation conducted not in legislative chambers or treaty halls but in the compliance departments of private firms.</p><p>In 2017, for example, Denmark was the first to open a branch government Office of Ambassador in Silicon Valley to liaison with the technology companies, recognizing that they influence policy in their country to a degree not entirely dissimilar to what Berlin or Washington could do: decisions in Mountain View or Redwood City impact Danes as severely as decisions from neighboring foreign ministries, but these are made within private companies with their own internal processes for doing business that cannot be addressed in any traditional way via an embassy located in some distant capital. Other states and the E.U. are following Denmark’s example and are opening similar governmental entities. A brief digression: the cloud refers to networks of distributed hardware and Software as a Service that store information remotely. These companies manage their infrastructure and operations as integrated, cross-border enterprises. The “exclusivity or quasi exclusivity of control held by private companies” of cloud architecture over digital services means that tech firms “act as ‘surrogate states’” with regard to infrastructure as much as with regard to content policy. In 2018 Denmark followed by establishing their Ministry of Digitalization to work with tech giants headquartered there. Such an attempt will naturally be fraught with a variety of challenges, none least of which is navigating existing frameworks, a challenge underscored by an increasing reliance of countries on cloud services, a sector the UN said would “grow sixfold over 10 years, from some $69bn in 2015 to $400bn a decade later.” Cloud technology can save businesses trillions and government millions. Governments across the world use these technologies extensively for critical functions such as information archiving, tax collections, research and development, data centers for government ministries and operations and disaster management. A 2016 study estimated that the global public cloud market would expand to 500 billion dollars by 2020 from around 75 million dollars a year previous. And global market expansion has outpaced estimations. Data migration into cloud is the one option left to many of these countries for ensuring they have a functioning technological infrastructure that is capable of performing in the digital age. And when a Ministry moves its data onto a cloud-based service, it doesn’t only buy IT support; it enters into an agreement wherein all critical services from crypto, recovery, data backup, security to service availability will have to meet standards imposed by the private entities, standards dictated by contract and ultimately managed from distant foreign lands. Sovereignty has not merely been curtailed. It has been subjected to a structural privatization of sovereign public utilities, transferred not by constitutional amendment but by the silent operation of terms of service.</p><p><strong>2. THE SOVEREIGN DEFENCE AND CORPORATE NEUTRALITY AXIS: THE PRECEDENT OF THE STARLINK SYSTEM</strong></p><p>International humanitarian law was born from a world centered around nation states. Underpinning the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols is a legal universe constructed on states, the organized armed groups operating against states, and individual civilian life. The material instruments of conflict, whether in the form of supply chains, communication networks, or infrastructure, was believed to be state-controlled, or sufficiently peripheral to combat operations that their private ownership raised no real problem. This prediction has proven wrong on a fundamental level.</p><p>In September of 2022, Ukrainian special operations forces attempted a submarine drone attack against Russian naval vessels docked at Sevastopol, Crimea. The operation was architecturally dependent on Starlink, a network of low-orbiting satellites deployed and controlled by the private American firm SpaceX. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ukrainian forces had integrated the Starlink communications and drone control system into military operations including real-time targeting. The drones, having entered waters where SpaceX had never activated Starlink service, lost connectivity not because an existing link was severed mid-operation, but because Ukraine’s emergency request to extend coverage into geofenced, Russian-occupied territory was refused by SpaceX’s leadership. The drone attack failed because that extension of service was withheld.</p><p>In the aftermath, the CEO of SpaceX, Elon Musk, acknowledged the decision. His justification was that extending the Starlink service in order to assist a strike against the Russian navy was the equivalent of a significant escalation and threatened to drag the U.S. into a nuclear conflict. The account appears in Walter Isaacson’s biography of Musk, and Musk confirmed its substance through public commentary on X in September 2023. The decision came solely from Musk without input from U.S. military officials or, obviously, the Ukrainians as the consumer in need of the service.</p><p>The company’s use policy states outright, “We may at any time and from time to time, in our sole discretion…modify, restrict, or terminate …access to the Services and the Equipment.” There is no service continuity clause covering governmental belligerency, and there is no provision that says SpaceX operations must conform to international law as it pertains to conflicts. The internal governance of SpaceX constitutes the operative rule when it comes to operating its satellite network in a warfare zone. And when a conflict arose between its corporate bylaws and Ukraine’s security needs, the former prevailed.</p><p>The episode, however, also prompted a significant institutional response that bears on the broader analysis. The U.S. Department of Defense subsequently contracted dedicated satellite communications capacity through SpaceX’s Starshield program, a defense-tier service operating under a government procurement contract rather than commercial terms of service. This shift was structurally important: by moving the capability from a consumer-grade commercial arrangement to a formal defense contract, the Pentagon reasserted a measure of state authority over the infrastructure, withdrawing it from the domain of unilateral corporate discretion and placing it within the accountability structures of U.S. government contracting law and the laws of armed conflict. The state, in other words, responded to the privatization of its defense infrastructure by renegotiating the terms of dependency. That such renegotiation was necessary at all illustrates the scale of the underlying problem.</p><p>The International Committee of the Red Cross’s commentaries on Additional Protocol I provide no guide to such disputes, which typically address issues of collateral damage and other battlefield rules of engagement. No guidelines govern situations in which a commercial entity becomes the bottleneck in a warfighting nation’s military infrastructure and then withholds service when and where its leadership sees fit. Whether SpaceX constitutes a “party to the conflict” is unknown, as is whether Musk’s decision constituted a violation of international law pertaining to neutrality. That a legal gap exists simply acknowledges a reality this category of situation does not accommodate. The problem is not unique to SpaceX. Private firms like Palantir provide targeting and analytics software to NATO’s military and have the capacity to make this capability available or not. Microsoft Azure Government provides cloud infrastructure under contracts with the U.S. Department of Defense and Google Cloud sells AI capabilities to government intelligence agencies. In each of these arrangements, private corporate decisions, whether driven by stock prices, internal ethical guidelines, or chief executives’ risk thresholds, can create or sever a state’s ability to wage war. Far from being anomalous, the Starlink episode illustrates a systemic pattern emerging from the incorporation of private enterprise into state-run warfare systems: the privatization of sovereign defense utilities.</p><p><strong>3.THE CLOUD EMBASSY AND THE LIMITS OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION</strong></p><p>The most legally innovative solution for addressing attacks on digital infrastructure is the data embassy model. Estonia has put considerable effort into devising such a model, being a country that, following some experience with cyberattacks in the past, knows exactly how exposed to this kind of vulnerability state infrastructure can be. Thus, in 2007, after the diplomatic conflict about the move of an old Soviet statue in the capital, the country experienced a sustained distributed denial-of-service campaign for three weeks that had serious impacts on its government ministries, financial institutions, and media outlets. Estonia found that such an operation had crippled their entire governmental public administration system, dependent on the X-Road data exchange platform, and was virtually brought to a halt, even though its physical borders had remained entirely unharmed. Consequently, Estonia started preparing plans for state continuation, in a context where territorial occupation or destroyed local infrastructure may no longer be entirely implausible, as 2017 saw the signing of a Data Embassies Act. In 2017, the Estonian parliament adopted an act that outlines the legal framework under which the country can accommodate governmental data and systems on servers physically located in another country while maintaining Estonian ownership over such infrastructure and sovereign control over the data it contains. Along these lines, Estonia and Luxembourg signed their first bilateral agreement on the issue, whereby designated data server space in Luxembourg is to remain under Estonian jurisdiction.</p><p>The legal mechanism behind the Data Embassies Act borrows from the framework established by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) as a conceptual point of departure. As a direct extension of Article 22 on the inviolability of diplomatic premises, Estonia views this space as an extension of its own territory where only Estonian law will apply and interference from Luxembourg authorities is not possible. The extraterritorial diplomatic protection of data thus arises directly from this extension of state sovereignty by equating digital government assets with diplomatic facilities. Article 27 on the protection of diplomatic correspondence has also been used to extend the principle of the freedom of communications to digital data. This legal fiction does create a number of operational as well as conceptual problems, though. The Vienna Convention applies to actual territorial space containing actual physical premises where diplomatic missions work and conduct their activities: what was adopted for real states and real territorial boundaries does not automatically apply for virtual state boundaries over digital resources, which are, more often than not, housed in facilities not owned by the Estonian government but the property of private commercial providers.</p><p>This gap is the main flaw in the system. These commercial providers remain subject to their national governments, which do retain the power to interfere in business or security operations even where a government-to-government agreement exists. It is important, however, to distinguish the precise legal instruments at play. The EU’s Network and Information Security Directives, NIS and NIS2, are instruments of cyber-resilience and systemic risk management, not mechanisms of state data-seizure compulsion; they do not in themselves empower member states to compel the disclosure or transfer of a foreign sovereign’s data held by a private operator. Luxembourg does, however, possess separate domestic legal instruments, including national intelligence frameworks and emergency criminal procedural law, through which it could theoretically compel a private data center operator on its territory to act in ways contrary to the bilateral arrangement. Such actions, while constituting a breach of bilateral commitment, would not give rise to direct legal recourse by Estonia against the commercial provider; they would result in a diplomatic dispute between the two states, leaving Estonia without an enforceable remedy against the private entity that physically controls the servers.</p><p>Ukraine provides live evidence of this problem’s practical dimensions. In the context of the war, Ukraine transferred significant amounts of government data to AWS and Microsoft Azure, citing Estonia’s model as inspiration and example. But the architecture of that migration was not equivalent to a sovereign-designated server arrangement governed by bilateral diplomatic agreement. The practical operation included the physical deployment of secure edge computing devices across Western borders by cloud providers, coordinated with U.S. and allied intelligence infrastructure, creating a hybrid matrix of corporate logistics and state security apparatus. Ukraine’s data, though protected from the ordnance falling on domestic infrastructure, remained subject to the legal frameworks and contractual discretion of operators headquartered in Seattle and Redmond, governed by American law and potentially available upon compulsion by the U.S. government under the CLOUD Act. Ukraine did not merely exchange a sovereign vulnerability for a private one; it integrated its state survival architecture into a composite system jointly managed by Western corporate infrastructure and allied intelligence services, demonstrating that digital sovereignty under wartime conditions is ultimately an extension of superpower alliance politics rather than bilateral contract law.</p><p>Beyond those limitations, a more general strategic challenge linked to the very nature of this approach to data security should be highlighted: the creation of a chain of interdependencies rather than a single point of control. The data embassy is conceived as a sovereign infrastructure solution on foreign territory, a remedy for the loss of effective control over the home territory; yet the success and reliability of the entire scheme depend on the political and institutional stability of the host country, the operational continuity of the cloud provider, the durability of the diplomatic agreements across successive governments in both states, and the political will of the host state not to exercise its sovereignty by coercing commercial partners on its territory. The failure of any one of these links breaks the entire system.</p><p><strong>4.TERMS OF SERVICE AS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW</strong></p><p>On January 8, 2021, Twitter permanently suspended the account of the sitting President of the United States. It did so via an internal decision process by its trust and safety team, which was approved by senior executives and carried out without judicial review, without due process under any constitutional standard, and without any appeal process comparable to what U.S. administrative law would require of a government agency with comparable power over public speech. The decision was based on its own internal rules and terms of service, texts generated by a private company’s lawyers, alterable at its board of directors’ whim. It was final. Many public commentators describe this incident as extraordinary. It is neither ordinary nor exceptional. It is the natural result of a system whereby private corporate texts have effectively superseded constitutional rights of expression for the major forums of public communication globally.</p><p>The First Amendment applies to government. It does not apply to Alphabet, Meta, or X Corp. The European Convention on Human Rights applies to state signatories. It does not apply to the forums through which most European citizens actually express themselves. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by 174 states, obligates them to safeguard freedom of expression. The technology platforms, by contrast, are not parties to the ICCPR. In 2011, UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights were adopted, a soft law instrument positing a “responsibility to respect human rights,” even “in the absence of a direct legal obligation” under state law. Hundreds of corporate sustainability reports reference this soft law; no mechanism for enforcement exists beyond voluntary uptake. Platforms have referred to the Principles in compliance filings while operating content moderation programs that bear no resemblance to the due process principles articulated within them.</p><p>We must describe the governance architecture precisely. The Meta Oversight Board, launched in 2020 and widely branded the company’s “Supreme Court,” delivers final decisions in specific content cases and recommendations in matters of global platform policy. It is composed of experts appointed through a trust formed with funding from Meta, and its jurisdiction and remit are defined within Meta’s governance documents. Funding flows from the company; authority flows from Meta; powers are circumscribed by Meta. The Board can overrule individual content decisions and can issue advisory opinions and policy recommendations for which Meta must respond publicly, but these actions never directly constrain Meta’s capacity to govern its content moderation at will. This is a judiciary whose jurisdiction, authority, and resources are managed by the entity it nominally supervises. No comparable domestic system would be considered a rule of law by any serious comparative constitutional scholar.</p><p>International human rights law is therefore systemically disrupted. Article 19 of the ICCPR establishes freedom of expression, which may be limited “only by virtue of law and where such limit is necessary … in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Content moderation practices by technology firms meet neither condition. They are determined not by law, but by corporate texts that have not themselves been legitimized through any democratic process; they are undertaken neither with democratic legitimacy nor for statutorily defined goals of democratic value; and proportionality remains assessed within proprietary algorithms subject to neither judicial review nor any other mechanism of accountability external to the corporation itself. The result is a de facto private international law governing public speech, with the content of that law set by private corporations subject to no effective oversight.</p><p>States have tried legislative measures to reclaim sovereign space. India’s Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 regulate significant social media intermediaries, mandating various disclosure and traceability obligations and placing strict 36-hour deadlines on the removal of specific categories of illegal content. The E.U.’s Digital Services Act, which took effect in August 2022, obliges “very large online platforms” to undertake regular risk assessments, enhance transparency regarding content moderation, and submit to external audits. Neither measure addresses the root cause. Both frame issues as a matter of regulation of service providers in light of public goods such as individual safety or political integrity, but they treat the relationship between user and service provider as primarily transactional, governed by terms of service which users are compelled to accept in an all-or-nothing manner.</p><p>The power asymmetry bears description. The firm operating in hundreds of jurisdictions can navigate a diverse regulatory environment, taking on the costs in aggregate and reaping the benefits in global market share by offering superior functionality or slightly better service in certain markets, thereby gaining revenue for even marginal, strategically selective regulatory breaches. The government attempting to enforce its constitution has a difficult choice set: require compliance which the platform can circumvent in practical terms; accept what it offers; or cut off access to the platform for its citizens entirely. In every case, the firm retains significant leverage. No sovereign governs the digital public sphere, and its interaction with individual governments is typically characterized not by command and obedience but by engagement and regulatory arbitrage.</p><p><strong>5. THE ARCHITECTURE OF AN UNBUILT FRAMEWORK</strong></p><p>The failings of the present international legal order are a matter of fact, not interpretation. Although the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Information and Telecommunications Security has produced consensus reports stating clearly that international law is applicable in cyberspace, it has yet to elaborate on how such law regulates the specific situation of a tech firm holding operational authority over a combatant state’s communication systems and withholding it in the course of active conflict upon its CEO’s command and based on private strategic judgment. Similarly, while the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime provides jurisdiction over cyber crimes, its architecture is entirely unsuitable for regulating the exercise of sovereignty where it involves corporate control over critical digital infrastructure. The international legal system has developed no multilateral treaty imposing binding obligations on technology corporations comparable in their scope and structure to, for example, the Geneva Conventions for participants in armed conflict; with respect to content governance; or on matters relating to data governance and sovereignty.</p><p>In 2017, a Digital Geneva Convention proposal floated by Microsoft President Brad Smith, advocating for state guarantees of security for civilian digital infrastructure and, for the first time ever in a major diplomatic forum, calling for tech companies to pledge a form of neutrality in state-sponsored cyber conflicts, garnered some interest but has thus far proved politically inert. The international environment is one in which firms from states whose geopolitical rivals’ security often depends on their willingness to engage in espionage and cyber operations rather than their own sovereign decision-making power have gained considerable leverage because the ambiguity regarding sovereign control allows them to exploit those companies to their strategic advantage without facing the legal consequences of equivalent state activity.</p><p>The core deficiency in the international legal framework today, therefore, is not ambiguity but absence of content: no effective multilateral frameworks exist treating the technology corporations themselves as subjects, rather than objects, of international law. This gap is demonstrable in ways beyond mere conjecture. A Danish Silicon Valley diplomatic mission; an Estonian attempt to map Vienna Convention norms onto server infrastructure; Musk’s unilateral command over a sovereign war-fighting capability, reasserted by the Pentagon only through a separate defense procurement contract; an Oversight Board that acts as an unconstitutionally situated global judiciary over three billion people; an E.U. Data Act and a U.S. CLOUD Act which empower governmental control over the extraterritorial processing of the data of citizenry who may not have voted for governing authorities; the very operation of the latter itself, allowing for the extraterritorial search and seizure of its contents by foreign governments.</p><p>The Westphalian ordering system is being corroded, not by rival nation-states, but by the unintended logic of a new digital economy for which it was never designed. States that continue to act as though territorial control determines effective authority are not preserving Westphalian sovereignty. They are conceding it, incrementally and without legal contest, to the terms-of-service agreements of companies that answer to shareholders and not to citizens. The legal order adequate to this transformation has not been negotiated. Until it is, the corporation, not the state, holds the operative last word over the digital infrastructure on which modern sovereignty depends.</p><p><strong>SOURCES:<br></strong><a href="https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/westphal.asp">https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/westphal.asp</a><br><a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/united-states-v-microsoft-corp/">https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/united-states-v-microsoft-corp/</a><br><a href="https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/02/14/need-digital-geneva-convention/">https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/02/14/need-digital-geneva-convention/</a><br><a href="https://www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/the-budapest-convention">https://www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/the-budapest-convention</a><br><a href="https://disarmament.unoda.org/ict-security/">https://disarmament.unoda.org/ict-security/</a><br><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022R2065">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022R2065</a><br><a href="https://www.meity.gov.in/content/information-technology-intermediary-guidelines-and-digital-media-ethics-code-rules-2021">https://www.meity.gov.in/content/information-technology-intermediary-guidelines-and-digital-media-ethics-code-rules-2021</a><br><a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights">https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights</a><br><a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf">https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf</a><br><a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/first_amendment">https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/first_amendment</a><br><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/exclusive-ukraine-prepares-potential-move-sensitive-data-another-country-2022-03-09/">https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/exclusive-ukraine-prepares-potential-move-sensitive-data-another-country-2022-03-09/</a><br><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016L1148">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016L1148</a><br><a href="https://www.riigiteataja.ee/aktilisa/2280/3201/8002/Lux_Info_Agreement.pdf">https://www.riigiteataja.ee/aktilisa/2280/3201/8002/Lux_Info_Agreement.pdf</a><br><a href="https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf">https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf</a><br><a href="https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/akt/512122016001">https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/akt/512122016001</a><br><a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977">https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977</a><br><a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949">https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949</a><br><a href="https://gdpr-info.eu/">https://gdpr-info.eu/</a><br><a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/2383">https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/2383</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b8c64dbcdeb0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Why International Law Fails When Powerful States Break the Rules]]></title>
            <link>https://ironical02.medium.com/why-international-law-fails-when-powerful-states-break-the-rules-7a8752b5fcfa?source=rss-753e397ebb87------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7a8752b5fcfa</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[geopolitics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kanishk]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 13 Jun 2026 22:33:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-13T22:49:20.903Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>The Mirage of Global Order</strong></h3><p>On the morning of August 6, 1945, an American bomb rendered a whole city, Hiroshima, obsolete in seconds. The men, women, and children who died in that moment, and in the tens of thousands who went to their graves in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the following weeks and months, died not in pursuit of a clearly stated military objective. They died to show capacity. Their deaths broadcast to the world, irrevocably, that one nation now held the capacity to nullify the human race-not hypothetically, but practically.</p><p>Faced with that demonstration, the men who created the post-war world decided something fundamentally had to change. Their response was the UN Charter. Signed by 51 states in San Francisco in June 1945, its preamble begins with three words that have echoed down the corridors of eight decades of diplomatic speeches and legal treatises: “We the peoples.” Not we the governments. Not we the great powers. We the peoples.</p><p>It is important to consider for a moment the gulf between those words and the realities they sought to paper over. The Preamble’s liberal, universalist invocations were the window-dressing, not the mechanics, of the post-war world. The actual mechanics were hidden within the treaty: Chapter V of the UN Charter and, specifically, Article 27(3), wherein the five victorious great powers irrevocably gifted themselves unilateral, binding vetoes on any enforcement actions of the international institution they had simultaneously conjured into existence. The architects in San Francisco were not naive humanitarians who watched, despairingly, as their utopia was betrayed by realpolitik; they were hard-headed realists who understood that bringing the great powers into any framework for collective security at all required codifying in writing their exemption from it. We the peoples was the slogan; the veto was the brick upon which it was laid; and the tension between those two components is the source of every failure recounted below.</p><p>The broader framework of human rights instruments was, for the most part, genuine: The Geneva Conventions of 1949 legislated war and minimum humanitarian standards in conflict. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 articulated rights which the state could not legitimately remove from its citizens, regardless of its domestic political character. The Convention on Genocide made the purposeful extermination of any national, racial, or ethnic group an international crime-a step beyond what had been considered a purely internal matter prior to Nuremberg. The unprecedented tribunal of Nuremberg established criminal responsibility for crimes against humanity on an individual basis, regardless of what an individual’s sovereign state might demand. Collectively, they did represent an attempt to legally restrain the exercise of power. Enforcement, however, remained squarely within the jurisdiction of the Security Council, whose structure, as described above, assured a paralytic effect whenever any one of the veto powers was implicated in a breach.</p><p>After eighty years, the legal attempt is in a deep crisis. Not in the sense of total failure-there have been too many tangible achievements in arms control, in international trade, in human rights law, and in the gradual delegitimisation of colonial subjugation. Instead the crisis is precisely defined: it is a crisis of selective application, wherein selectivity aligns entirely too often with power. The law applies with full force when applied against states that have insufficient capacity to resist it; against other states, it appears more as advice.</p><p>The state that helped write many of these laws, that advocates most stridently for the rule-of-law international order, is today, for example, engaged in an unprovoked invasion of its neighbour, has renounced the jurisdiction of international courts when rulings have gone against its allies, has threatened economic sanctions against those same courts for seeking arrest warrants against those allies, and is at present modernizing its nuclear arsenal while being bound by treaty to dismantle it. Russia has illegally annexed territory from its neighbor and blocked every mechanism for international justice; China continues to build military installations on contested maritime territory in defiance of the unanimous ruling of an international tribunal. These examples are not aberrant, peripheral cases-they define the very practice.</p><p>The price for this state of affairs is not paid by the governments exploiting it. It is paid by the millions of ordinary people who believed-and with reasonable cause-that this rule-of-law world promised something more. This article surveys why international law has failed to uphold enforcement of the international order, identifies cases where the failure has been particularly costly, and considers the effect of making legal obligation contingent on the will of the powerful for human civilization.</p><h3><strong>The Paradox of Binding but Unenforceable</strong></h3><p>The fundamental problem of international law is one which legal theorists identified long before the contemporary state system came into existence. Law presumes a sovereign capable of enforcing it and there is none at the international level. This is not simply a minor inconvenience. This is a structural flaw that informs every case in which rules are brought into pressure by a powerful violator.</p><p>The domestic legal system is underpinned by what the sociologist Max Weber terms a “monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force.” Every court order is backed by the machinery of the state: by the police, the bailiffs, the prisons. It does not rely on the consent of the targeted party; rather it relies on the realistic threat of sanctions should the targeted party fail to comply with the order. That credible threat is what imbues a court order with the binding social force of law.</p><p>This certainty is almost entirely absent in the international system. The ICJ can hear cases brought against states by other states, it can issue judgments and declare that the State is in violation of its international obligations and it has done so in landmark cases ranging across eight decades. <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/case/70">In Nicaragua v. USA (1986), the ICJ held that the United States violated international law by mining Nicaraguan ports, arming and training the Contra rebels and by violating their obligations under the bilateral treaty between the US and Nicaragua. The judgment was unambiguous; the legal reasoning rigorous. </a>Washington withdrew from the compulsory jurisdiction of the court and refused to participate in proceedings and reparations were never paid. No sanctions were imposed.</p><p>This case perfectly illustrates the structural problem, as the US was not unaware of the underlying international law. Instead it had made a calculation; a correct one, that the formal consequences of ignoring the judgment were practically nonexistent. Under Article 94 of the UN Charter, a state can raise violations of judgments before the Security Council; with a veto in hand, the United States essentially invited the perpetrator to judge their own case.</p><p>The consensual basis of international law compounds this problem at every level; although it is important to note the distinction between the two different matters that get lumped together: forum jurisdiction and legal obligation. Forum jurisdiction is whether a court or tribunal has the procedural right to hear a given dispute. The ICJ has compulsory jurisdiction if both states have accepted the Court’s authority (via the optional clause under Article 36(2) ICJ Statute, or a treaty). ICC jurisdiction is established by ratification of the Rome Statute or via Security Council resolution. These are the points at which major states insulate themselves from legal responsibility. They do not extinguish legal obligation, but rather they circumvent enforcement by blocking access to judicial institutions. The United States never ratified the Rome Statute, but is a signatory; both Russia and China have never ratified the Statute. Washington rejected the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ following the Nicaraguan judgment for precisely the reasons illustrated by that case. These are intentional, strategic steps toward evading the forum jurisdiction.</p><p>This is not the same as negating legal obligation; Customary International Law (CIL) operates on a completely separate principle. CIL binding all states irrespective of whether they are parties to any treaty, irrespective of their accepting any judicial forum, and irrespective of whether they were parties to the drafting of the law; CIL is defined by a practice of states combined with an assumption of legally required practice, or opinio juris. The rule against torture, the prohibition of non-refoulement, the fundamental rules of armed conflict as laid out in the Geneva Convention, the prohibition of territorial acquisition through force, all constitute customary international law and apply to all states on the planet. States can’t escape their customary obligations by not signing treaties; they can either violate the law or comply with it. They cannot claim that it is not law. The United States invasion of Iraq, lacking any Security Council mandate, was a violation of CIL and the prohibition on aggressive war, a law completely independent of any treaty that states cannot ‘unratify’ themselves out of. Although, as we have already seen, that violation had no practical consequence in the form of punishment, it was absolute in legal terms, and this is important.</p><p>There is a positivist argument, attributed to scholars like Louis Henkin, that international law really is law because nations comply with it most of the time and that the social costs of transgression are sufficient to encourage compliance. Henkin notoriously stated “almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law almost all of the time” (Henkin, 1979). Whilst this is largely true, and indeed vital to the function of international law; this sentence leaves a lot of explanatory heavy-lifting for the word ‘almost’. Whilst rules based on CIL and treaties might function adequately for trade, diplomatic relations and postal exchanges; their functionality at the sharp end of the law, in the realms of war and the protection of human life is significantly reduced.</p><p>The social cost of non-compliance is insufficient to outweigh the pragmatic calculus of compliance where a state possesses enough power to ignore inconvenient obligations precisely in the realm where they are needed most. Reputational harm might be a restraint to states which rely on international support for their economic and security interests, however for a state possessing a veto on the Security Council, and a arsenal of nuclear weapons, that constraint is diminished to the point of insignificance. The word ‘almost’ therefore applies not only to state’s themselves, but to the type of cases covered by Henkin’s generalization.</p><p>The legal scholar Martti Koskenniemi characterized international law as “a gentle civiliser of nations” (Koskenniemi, 2001). In the context of the present discussion, this statement aged almost as soon as it was uttered, depending on your perspective. The law civilizes those who want to be civilized; and as those who do not are also those who carry enough economic and military clout to disregard it, the gentle civiliser does not have to try very hard.</p><h3><strong>The Architecture of Impunity: Veto Politics and Structural Paralysis</strong></h3><p>At the very core, the United Nations Security Council was constructed with one simple belief: the 1945 great powers must be integrated into a global security framework, and for that they must receive absolute security guarantees that they can never be targeted by the framework.</p><p>The veto provision embedded in UN Charter article 27(3) vests each of the five permanent members with absolute veto power over substantive resolutions. This means that the United States, Russia (formerly the Soviet Union), China, France and the United Kingdom can individually vote down a resolution authorizing enforcement action, sanctions or even the formal condemnation of conflict in which one of them holds a material interest. This was not an oversight but by design. Without such provisions the great powers would never have consented to participate and the institutions at San Francisco, mindful of the failed League of Nations which was partly due to the absence of the United States, refused to take such risk again.</p><p>The result was predictable at the time, and devastating since; a council that is institutionally prevented from acting on conflict in which a permanent member is a direct party or has some other stake. The amount of use of veto has concretized this structural reality. As of 2023 the United States have vetoed more than 80 times since 1970, many of which were on resolutions regarding Israel’s conduct in the Palestinian territories. Russia and before that, the Soviet Union, have used its veto more than 100 times and with increased frequency since 2011 with the Syrian crisis. The veto practice of China deserve a more detailed account. For the most of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath, China has preferred abstention over direct use of veto, reflecting a rational political calculation on cost and reputational damage it would incur by acting as a rogue veto player, while still avoiding decisions it opposes. China cast only 4 vetoes between 1971 (when it finally occupied the seat formerly held by Taiwan) and 2000. It has significantly altered its posture in the twenty-first century by joining Russia in numerous co-vetoes on Syria where the two jointly vetoed humanitarian access and accountability resolutions for more than a decade of civil war. The two powers have also used co-vetoes on Myanmar and Venezuela. China has also utilized or threatened to use the veto when resolutions regarding Taiwan’s presence at international forums were put to the test. This is a clear shift from strategic abstention to active joint vetoing on issues that are of global concern and has dramatically expanded the scope of conflict the council can and is expected to handle, but that it indeed cannot handle.</p><p>The problem of mechanics warrants much deeper scrutiny than it normally receives. There is no record of a veto as an institutional failure; it simply is not adopted. There is no institutional accountability link that connects the casting of a specific veto to human consequences on conflict left unaddressed. The relationship between procedural tool and human cost remains politically manifest yet legally hidden. For example, the casting of veto against resolution that asks to open a humanitarian corridor will not register in any register as a political decision to deny aid to the starving civilian population but as a procedural outcome.</p><p>The issue of composition adds to the structural one. The P5 reflect the geopolitical configurations of 1945; Germany and Japan have not been rewarded with permanent seats even as they rebuilt from war into global economies. India with its 1.4 billion population and one of the biggest militaries is not even at the P5, while other developing countries with immense population like Brazil, Indonesia, Nigeria and South Africa are denied permanent representation on a body that claims authority on their security. The council that manages power dynamics on the global plane functions on an eighty year old map and deliberates on conflicts the main protagonists of which were nowhere at the scene where the rule of engagement were laid out.</p><p>Discussions of reform have existed for decades and yielded almost no outcome. Expanding the permanent membership has been rejected by the current permanent members due to their collective desire not to dilute their influence, whereas veto reform is hampered by the veto itself as the mechanism needing reform is also the entity deciding when and how reform may occur.</p><h3><strong>Proliferation for the Weak, Modernisation for the Strong</strong></h3><p><a href="https://disarmament.unoda.org/en/our-work/weapons-mass-destruction/nuclear-weapons/treaty-non-proliferation-nuclear-weapons">The Non-Proliferation Treaty</a>, which entered into force in 1970, is the legal heart of efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the states already in possession of them. The NPT relies on what the drafters called a grand bargain. Non-nuclear weapon states will refrain from pursuing nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapon states commit in turn both to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and to pursue negotiations in good faith on complete nuclear disarmament as stipulated by Article VI.</p><p>That second bargain has never been fulfilled.</p><p>The US is pouring massive and growing sums into maintaining and modernizing nuclear weapons rather than downsizing them to the elimination stipulated in Article VI. <a href="https://www.cbo.gov/publication/59054">A CBO report in 2023 estimates the United States will spend around $756 billion on nuclear forces over the 2023 to 2032 </a>decade on new intercontinental ballistic missiles under the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent program, new nuclear-armed submarines, nuclear-capable bombers, and related command and control and infrastructure (CBO, 2023). Russia has developed entirely new weapon systems — including nuclear-armed underwater drones and hypersonic gliding vehicle nuclear weapons that are specifically designed to defeat current missile defense systems. The UK declared it will raise its nuclear weapon ceiling from 180 to 260 warheads in 2021. France is modernizing its submarine-launched ballistic missiles. China is expanding its nuclear arsenal at an “historically accelerated pace,”according to U.S. Intelligence.</p><p>The legal case for violating Article VI in these efforts is not fringe scholarship. <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/case/95">The International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion in 1996 concerning the legality of nuclear weapons where it unanimously confirmed that “there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects”. </a>This is not aspirational rhetoric. It is the court’s interpretation of binding treaty obligations. In the 28 years since that opinion was issued not a single nuclear weapons state has initiated or participated in negotiations aimed at the complete elimination required by the treaty. Once every five years, states party to the NPT meet for the Review Conference; the nuclear weapons states reiterate their commitment to Article VI and nothing structural changes.</p><p>This dichotomy becomes especially stark when viewed alongside the treatment afforded non-nuclear weapons states that seek to develop nuclear capability. Iran’s nuclear program, which operates under IAEA monitoring and subject to (contested but well documented) compliance, was subjected to crippling sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and consistent public threats of military attack. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, concluded in 2015 under the Obama administration, was a tangible non-proliferation win, capping Iran’s enrichment capacity subject to verification in exchange for sanctions relief, and the inspections to enforce compliance were considerably more intrusive than anything required of NPT’s nuclearized signatories. The United States under President Trump abrogated the deal in 2018, re-imposed sanctions, and had justifications, unrelated to nuclear compliance, for its withdrawal. The message sent to every government witnessing this was clear: the guarantees are unreliable, the deal asymmetrical.</p><p>North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 has resulted in six confirmed tests. Decades of mounting sanctions have not yielded tangible progress in denuclearization, while imposing immense human suffering on a civilian population powerless to influence their state’s strategic direction. Its nuclear program continues. The lesson analysts from Tehran to Riyadh to Seoul to capitals across the Global South draw is the same one that Ukraine drew from the Budapest Memorandum: sovereign states which forsake nuclear weapons, in exchange for international assurances that these powers are a security guarantee that cannot be reneged upon, do so at their own risk.</p><p>The international norm that has come to prevail, especially among states in the Global South, is not that the non-proliferation regime guarantees universal security, but that it permanently locks in place an unequal system of power designed by the states that already have nuclear weapons. It prevents new entrants into the club while freeing club members from the obligations that were intended to make the bargain worthwhile for all.</p><h3><em>Case studies and consequences</em></h3><p><strong>Iraq: When Superpower Logic Replaced Legal Process</strong></p><p>The March 2003 invasion of Iraq was the most significant exercise of superpower privilege over the process of international law in the post Cold War world. Its human cost remains immeasurable, its decision-makers never formally questioned.</p><p>The legal case that was to underpin the war waged by Washington and London relied on the text of <a href="https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/1441(2002)">UN Security Council Resolution 1441,</a> unanimously adopted in November 2002, which found Iraq in ‘material breach’ of previous disarmament obligations and warned of ‘serious consequences’. The argument that this resolution, combined with the previous resolutions on the Gulf War from the 1990–91 period, provided sufficient legal authority to launch an invasion without further endorsement was disputed by international legal scholars, France and Germany on the Security Council, and the Secretary-General himself. Hans Blix, the chief Weapons Inspector for the UN, had his teams working in Iraq, in precisely the verification the council required, and had not found the Weapons of Mass Destruction the invasion was claimed necessary to combat. The decision to act was nevertheless taken.</p><p><a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3661134.stm">Kofi Annan himself declared in a broadcast on BBC news on September 2004 that the invasion was illegal under the UN Charter </a>. The Chilcot Inquiry reported that seven years after the event that the legal justification for invasion had been ‘far from satisfactory’ and action was taken before peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. No judicial process has been initiated against any official in Washington or London. The argument of ‘preemptive self-defence’ under which the invasion was launched, pushing the definition of self-defence as laid out in Article 51 of the UN Charter well beyond that in accepted use, has never been debated before any international tribunal. It has been invoked, enacted, and accepted.</p><p><a href="https://www.iraqbodycount.org/">The Iraq Body Count project calculates that between 184,000 and 207,000 civilians had died in Iraq as a result of the invasion through to 2019.</a> <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/where-we-work/countries/iraq?dataset=POP&amp;yearsMode=range&amp;selectedYears=%5B2012%2C2026%5D&amp;level=OPR&amp;category=PTY&amp;fundingSource=ALS&amp;compareBy=%5B%22category%22%5D&amp;levelCompare=%5B%5B%22OIRQ_ABC%22%5D%5D&amp;viewType=chart&amp;chartType=bar&amp;contextualDataset=BUD&amp;tableDataView=absolute">Even by the end of 2006 a study published in the Lancet estimated that the death toll could be as high as 654,000. Over 4.5 million Iraqis were displaced at the height of the crisis . </a>The demolition of the state of Iraq, including its security forces, created the vacuum within which the Islamic State was formed, expanding the human cost across a decade of conflict and over a multitude of national borders. A report from the Costs of War project in 2021 concluded that the total number of dead from post-9/11 wars in Iraq (inclusive of associated conflicts) exceeded 275,000.</p><p>Those that died paid with their lives and had neither a vote, nor a voice in the deliberation process that led to the invasion, nor indeed redress when its outcome failed to achieve the endorsement of the international community as requested in its declaration of legality. Their suffering was not an consequence of the failure of law, but its content.</p><p><strong>Afghanistan: The Country the World Keeps Using</strong></p><p>Afghanistan’s experience of repeated foreign military interventions in the space of five decades stands as one of the longest illustrations of how concentrated geopolitical interests render a nation’s entire population the expendable, trans-generational collateral.</p><p>Getting the timeline behind the Soviet intervention requires care to expose the particular manipulative mechanism at work. A Moscow-friendly Communist government (the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan) had already seized power in the April 1978 Saur Revolution, well before the Soviets ever set foot in the country. By the end of 1979, that regime was fracturing from within; infighting between the Khalq and Parcham wings of the ruling People’s Democratic Party had destabilized it and Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin had undertaken a brutish effort at consolidating power that Moscow viewed as both strategically chaotic and diplomatically problematic. The Soviet military intervention of December 1979 was not an invasion to establish a client government from scratch. Rather it was a violent reordering of an existing one in a state of crisis-to depose and kill Amin and replace him with the pliable Babrak Karmal. The distinction illuminates the logic of superpower intervention in a way the simpler framing does not: the Soviets did not march into Afghanistan to erect a sphere of influence out of whole cloth, but to shore up and reposition one that was beginning to crumble. That shoring up operation took 1–2 million Afghan lives over the ensuing decade.</p><p>The United States (through the CIA, with arms filtered through the Pakistani ISI) armed the mujahideen to drive the Soviets out of the country by 1989, succeeding on that front with an obvious geopolitical win for Washington. The outcome was a fractured country awash in weaponry and without an operable state structure able to support a peace settlement. That generated a civil war that killed an estimated 50,000 civilians in Kabul between 1992 and 1996 alone (Human Rights Watch, 2001), and ultimately spawned the Taliban. The September 11 attacks provided a cleaner legal rationale for subsequent US intervention than most other conflicts detailed here, and <a href="https://docs.un.org/S/RES/1368(2001)">UNSC Resolution 1368 affirming the right to self-defense </a>has much greater backing that it did at the time of the Iraq war, yet the clarity on those fronts should not be mistaken for anything other than entirely separate from the issue of a sound strategy; the distinction between the two determined twenty years that began as counterterrorism and were remade as nation building of unprecedented scale and expense. I<a href="https://costsofwar.watson.brown.edu/paper/afghanistan-and-after-20-years-war-2001-2021">t concluded with the Taliban’s return to Kabul in eleven days after leaving in 2001, far ahead of schedule than the most optimistic projection made by US military strategists. The Costs of War Project estimates the conflict killed over 240,000 Afghans and Pakistanis, including over 70,000Afghan civilians, while displacing 5.9 million people in total by 2021 </a>;the amount of money and expertise invested into institutions and development did not create a sustainable state structure capable of surviving its patron states’ departure. Women who had secured professional standing as doctors, engineers, lawyers and teachers, had their livelihoods and status erased almost immediately with the collapse of the post-2001 government structure. The story of Afghanistan is not the story of a failed intervention per se. It is the story of a country treated as a strategic pawn for so long by so many great powers that the needs of its people were relegated to second place in calculations made in Washington, Moscow, London and Islamabad. They paid the price for Soviet ambition, for US cold war policy and post-9/11 counterterrorism, for a messy withdrawal tailored to US domestic politics. They had a little to do with any of those decisions in any meaningful way.</p><p><strong>Gaza and the selective enforcement of international humanitarian law</strong></p><p>The conflict that began in Gaza in October 2023 has seen the fastest proliferation of intense international legal processes that we can observe in the post-cold war era. Not one has resulted in a single measurable improvement of the situation on the ground.</p><p><a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/case/186">The International Court of Justice issued provisional measures on an application by South Africa against Israel in January 2024 ordering that Israel take “all measures within its power” to prevent genocide. In July 2024 the ICJ ordered Israel to terminate its occupation of the Palestinian territories finding it illegal under international law and ordered arrest warrants issued by the ICC against the Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and defense minister Yoav Gallant in November 2024 for crimes against humanity and war crimes</a>. Several resolutions have been adopted by the UN General Assembly. Numerous instances of systematic violations of humanitarian international law by targeting civilian evacuation routes, hospitals and aid workers have been documented by the UN Special Rapporteurs and investigative commissions. The United States vetoed several draft Security Council resolutions calling for a ceasefire in October, December and February before finally acquiescing to a non-binding resolution in March which neither side honored in the field. Congress reacted to <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-state-palestine-icc-pre-trial-chamber-i-rejects-state-israels-challenges">ICC arrest warrants </a>in November by pushing through legislation to impose sanctions on ICC officials and judges, while senior U.S. Administration officials branded the warrants “outrageous” and questioned their legitimacy, framing their objections not around an argument that the Court had been incorrect in its analysis of the relevant law, but that it should not be attempting to apply that analysis to an ally.<a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/content/flash-appeal-occupied-palestinian-territory-2024"> A direct distinction was drawn between who international law applies to, and who it does not. By early 2025, the Health Ministry had documented over 45,000 Palestinians killed since Oct. 7th </a>(a figure supported by numerous U.N. Agencies), near total annihilation of the territory’s civilian structures , and <a href="https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-146-enarhe">1.9 million persons displaced (over 85 percent of the population) ; the vast majority killed were civilians, and a large fraction were children. </a>The reason the situation in Gaza is critical to this analysis goes beyond its own unprecedented tragedy is that it illustrates the structural mechanics of international law enforcement. Each formal legal mechanism was enacted as designed. The ICJ heard the application, considered the evidence, rendered provisional measures and advisory opinion, the ICC heard the case and issued warrants, the General Assembly voted overwhelmingly. It was only the enforcement mechanism, the Security Council, that was brought to a halt by the lone veto of the council’s leading power and in precisely the manner it was designed to stop when an ally was implicated.</p><p><strong>Crimea and the permanent dismantling of territorial integrity</strong></p><p><a href="https://docs.un.org/A/RES/68/262">Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is not ambiguous. All member states shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Adding specific binding commitments of Russia on Ukrainian territorial integrity</a>, the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 in which the United States, Russia and the United Kingdom promised security assurances to Ukraine for Ukraine’s cession of its nuclear arms inherited from the Soviet Union to Russia, added “a specific set of Russian commitments, made in terms of direct promises concerning Ukrainian territorial integrity”.</p><p>Russia illegally annexed Crimea in March 2014 in the wake of a referendum held under military occupation which afforded no possibility of maintaining the pre-crisis constitutional order, and which was held in circumstances which prevented any possibility of free and fair voting. In Resolution 68/262 of the UNGA (which passed 100–11) this referendum was deemed illegal, and Ukraine’s territorial integrity was affirmed (UNGA, 2014). Russia’s veto of the corresponding Security Council resolution meant that enforcement options were structurally impossible. Western powers issued targeted sanctions aimed at incurring costs but avoiding escalation with nuclear-armed Security Council permanent member; the annexation stood.</p><p>Particular stress must be put on the Budapest Memorandum as it is directly related to the proliferation argument made above. Ukraine in 1994 had the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world. It surrendered this for the security assurances made by Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Twenty years later, these assurances have been completely, and directly, violated by Russia. While the other parties to the memorandum, the United States and United Kingdom, have provided diplomatic support and eventual military aid since the February 2022 full-scale invasion, the designed mechanism for enforcing these original assurances, specifically the United Nations Security Council, could not act, due to Russia’s veto power.</p><p><a href="https://ukraine.ohchr.org/en/search/node?keys=ukraine">From the 2014 annexation to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, approximately 14,000 people were killed in the eastern conflict and about 1.5 million were displaced. </a>The full-scale invasion created the biggest refugee crisis in Europe since WWII. <a href="https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/ES-11/1">The invasion was condemned by the UNGA resolution ES-11/1.</a> No action was possible by the Security Council. The law was breached. The consequences were largely diplomatic and economic sanctions coupled with the military aid provided to the victim, but not the enforcement of the rules that were broken.</p><p><strong>The South China Sea: When Legal Victory Yields Nothing</strong></p><p><a href="https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/7/">The judgment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in Philippines v. China on July 2016 was, as a legal determination, one of the most comprehensive and conclusive in international maritime law to date. It held that China’s “nine-dash line” claim over most of the South China Sea had no legal foundation, and that China had violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights in its exclusive economic zone, inflicted serious damage to the coral reef ecosystem through its artificial island building project, and aggravated the dispute through its conduct, rather than managing it </a>. No representative of the PRC attended any hearings. The judgment’s binding force, however, was unaffected by the PRC’s non-participation.</p><p>On the day of the judgment China had issued a declaration that the award “is null and void and has no binding force”. Island building and deployments continued and the maritime militia regularly harassed fishermen and coast guard vessels of neighbouring states (Vietnamese, Malaysian and Filipino fishing boats were regular targets). Beijing maintained a strategy of complete, consistent and deliberate non-compliance.</p><p>In this case the structural problem is slightly different to the Security Council veto cases, and somewhat more concerning. It is the fact that the Permanent Court of Arbitration has no enforcement mechanism of its own and that UNCLOS provides no mechanism beyond the tribunal proceedings themselves. The security council is unable to act as China sits as a permanent member. What this means, as seen three decades earlier in the Nicaragua case, is that a state that seeks to avoid adjudication under even a compulsory jurisdiction regime like that established under UNCLOS will often succeed due to lack of enforcement capacity. The award is not void; it doesn’t cease to exist but it yields no result on the water and no result in legal practice apart from its text.</p><p>The Filipino fishermen, who traditionally fished in the Scarborough Shoal and waters around Second Thomas Shoal, as their family had done for generations, gained nothing in the July 2016 award regarding the coast guard vessels which prevented their access to these traditional fishing grounds. I<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/philippines-china-trade-accusations-over-south-china-sea-encounter-2024-04-06/">n April 2024, China Coast Guard used water cannons against a Filipino supply ship headed for Second Thomas Shoal where BRP Sierra Madre, a grounded Philippine warship used for the resupply, sits. Philippine sailors were injured, and the boat damaged.</a> This happened, not in the absence of a ruling, but eight years after a unanimous and complete judgment that stated these exact waters are sovereign Philippine territory. The distance between what the law said and what the sea held was measured not in abstraction, but in bodies of injured sailors and confiscated supplies denied to those aboard their vessel. A binding and exhaustive ruling, unanimously delivered and impeccably reasoned, accomplished less to alter the situation of those Filipino fishermen than a functional Coast Guard vessel would have. Such is the particular contribution of the South China Sea to the main thesis: legal victory without enforcement is a delusion cloaked in the attire of judicial vindication.</p><p><strong>Syria: The Arithmetic of the Veto</strong></p><p>Over a period of a few years, the civil war in Syria went from being a political uprising with definable players and goals to a multi-front war between the Syrian state, Russian troops, Iranian backed militias, an divided opposition backed by Western states and the Gulf monarchies, Kurdish forces fighting for a separate political cause, and ISIS using the chaos of the collapsing state. During all this, the one structural constant was that the Security Council could not act. Russia vetoed Security Council resolutions calling for cross-border humanitarian access, imposing sanctions on the Assad regime for chemical weapon use, establishing independent accountability mechanisms and referring the situation to the International Criminal Court. Russia and China vetoed over sixteen draft resolutions on Syria between 2011 and 2022. <a href="https://www.opcw.org/media-centre/news/2020/04/opcw-releases-first-report-investigation-and-identification-team">In 2020, OPCW Investigation and Identification Team attributed Syrian Arab Air Force units at Ltamenah with two sarin attacks against civilians in March 2017</a> , Russia vetoed the Security Council resolutions calling for accountability for the attacks. The sequence was not a difficult series of geostrategic choices. The sequence was the routine use of permanent member privilege to immunize a client from accountability for demonstrated crimes. In 2022, the UN estimated the war has killed more than 350,000 people, a figure widely considered a low count given the limitations on reporting in conflict zone over more than ten years. <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/emergencies/syria-emergency">The UNHCHR recorded 6.6 million Syrians as refugees abroad (UNHCR, 2022) and another 6.7 million internally displaced within Syria (UNHCR, 2022), making it the world largest displacement crisis at the time of the reporting. </a>In Aleppo, in Ghouta, in Idlib the human cost of a paralyzed Security Council was not statistics and abstracts, it was families buried in rubble, children treated for nerve agent poisoning with failing equipment, hospitals routinely attacked in ways that the<a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/iici-syria/independent-international-commission"> UN Commission of Inquiry </a>has established are systematic. Each veto was a legal act. Technically it was valid. Institutionally it is protected. The veto is directly linked to the conditions that generated the deaths.</p><h3><strong>The Global Psyche’s Collapse</strong></h3><p>There is a passage in Thucydides’ account of the Melian Dialogue-which was part of his retelling of the Peloponnesian War-in which Athenian envoys tell a small, neutral city that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” Thucydides wasn’t saying that this was wisdom; he was saying that it was confession and designed the story such that Athens eventually paid the price for its hubris. He wasn’t an optimist; he was a warning. The post-1945 order of international law was supposed to negate the logic of Melos institutionally, to declare that might made right had no place within the structure of international justice, to declare that there were bounds upon what strong states could do with their power, and that weak states had recourse other than relying solely on their powerful neighbours’ mercy. The six cases in this study mark some of the highest stakes in the ongoing experiment of whether this order was successful. It was not. The nature of its failure, moreover, is specific enough to warrant a specific account. The invasion of Iraq was not the result of Washington’s ignorance of international law. Its most senior legal advisors were fully aware that Security Council Resolution 1441 did not permit war. Kofi Annan knew it, as did France and Germany. Hans Blix’s inspection teams were still in the country. The United States went to war because it judged that the consequences of its actions would be controllable and that there were no enforcement mechanisms capable of holding a nation of America’s size to account. That judgment was correct. The prohibition on the use of aggressive war, to which all states are bound regardless of treaty ratification, was breached, but with no criminal accountability for those who initiated it, no reparations paid to those who suffered, and no enforceable precedent being set, apart from the establishment of a strategic vacuum in the region-one that created the Islamic State alongside 207,000 verified civilian deaths and five million displaced people. The case of Afghanistan only serves to compound this error: over the course of one generation, two different superpowers launched invasions of the country, pursuing agendas defined by their own interests and not what the Afghan people wanted or needed. The Soviet occupation, aimed at propping up a crumbling client state with military force, unleashed a decade of war that cost two million lives, while the subsequent U.S.-led coalition, while better supported legally, demonstrated that imposing a foreign military structure on the country was unable to generate genuine political legitimacy and that the women of the country, who rebuilt their lives with the support of the international community in post 2001 Afghanistan, were ultimately subjected to that violence because a state’s desire to exit the country trumped their safety. In Gaza, international law did act. The International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, the General Assembly, all performed, all adopted resolutions, all issued judgements and warrants against actors. All of it, however, was without enforcement mechanisms beyond the UN Security Council, where a permanent member with a powerful interest in the conflict was able to negate the efforts with its veto power, thus resulting in a humanitarian catastrophe documented, real-time, and precisely as pre-designed in 1945 by those who wrote Article 27(3) of the UN Charter. The crisis of Budapest Memorandum concerning Crimea proved that security assurances offered without a formal, legally binding treaty with verifiable enforcement mechanisms were only as good as the political will of the states making the assurances. Ukraine traded away its nuclear arsenal in exchange for security assurances which were reneged upon twenty years later and the lesson for every government who observed that sequence of events is that there is an asterisk next to every commitment the international community makes: ‘unless a permanent member of the UN Security Council feels like not it.’. The eight year long argument of what constituted legally legitimate ownership of territories in the South China Sea, for example, proved fruitless: regardless of a unanimous International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea judgement, Beijing continued to build and militarise island territories and harass fishing fleets; that judgment went unheeded for eight years. The gap between what was legal and what was real didn’t shrink and the reason was because there was simply no mechanism for enforcing the judgement against a power like China. In Syria, over 350,000 died, largely because of a protracted diplomatic process driven by the parallel vetoes of two permanent Security Council members whose material interests dictated that no meaningful resolution of the conflict could ever be agreed. That those who were guilty of heinous war crimes-including the use of chemical weapons-were not punished, was a consequence of the fact that the system itself has a flaw which has historically enabled it to punish minor breaches and misdemeanours, but fail entirely to address systematic violations committed by powers like Syria (supported by Russia) and North Korea. If one of these violations can be explained away as an isolated consequence of geopolitical particularity, then the six examples together paint a much broader, and frankly more dangerous, picture: a global system of justice designed not to eliminate violations of international law but to penalise them, thus gradually eroding the credibility and legitimacy of the very system it was established to create. This system, in essence, is not flawed; it is precisely as the founders intended when they drafted the UN Charter in 1945: based on the notion of “We the peoples,” with P5 veto as its central support beam. What this means for the long run is that every country, every leader, can rationally draw conclusions from the evidence that they see and it suggests to every state that it is better to build up and militarize to achieve ends rather than rely on international legal commitments, as seen from the example of Ukraine and its decision to surrender its nuclear weapons. While the argument for Security Council veto reform or expanded permanent membership may sound abstract and far-off in its required political strength for amending the UN Charter, or the need to hold members who ignore rulings against them to account by way of sanctions-as is the case of many nations regarding rulings against the use of chemical weapons in Syria-the lesson learned from the six examples given should be clear: the status quo is a lie. If the world cannot agree on what rules will apply, it can expect a return to the Melian world, albeit with far deadlier weapons at hand.</p><p>What the WTO’s dispute settlement body, before its appellate mechanism was neutralized by American intransigence, had demonstrated is that even powerful states will accept adverse decisions on topics where there is a clear cost of backing out. It is a mistaken idea that what an architecture of effective international law looks like is merely a concept; an architecture of effective international law actually exists and operates in specific sectors. The project is to carry it over to that sector that matters above all.</p><p>But without addressing the political fact which has been stymieing reforms of all these types for the past eighty years, no such reform will materialize. The states which are in the best position to construct an architecture of effective international law are also precisely those which have the most to fear from such an architecture. Veto reform implies you will have to face the possibility that the Security Council may ultimately move against you. Real ICC jurisdiction implies you are ready to accept the possibility of the prosecution of your own officials. Honor Article VI implies that you are willing to give up the capabilities that your current security doctrine categorizes as essential. There is nothing politically palatable about concessions of these sorts, and the states that must make them are invariably unwilling to do so once the cost calculus begins to appear undesirable.</p><p>The citizens who bear the weight of that refusal, of course, are not those who work in Washington or Moscow or Beijing or Brussels. Those citizens are those who live in the rubble of Aleppo and the refugee camps in Gaza and the prisons in Kabul, a Kabul which was both built by and abandoned by the international community. They are the sailors in the Philippines, fired on by water cannons in waters declared sovereign territory by an international tribunal, eight years before that incident occurred and eight years after the decision declaring those waters to be such. They are the citizens to whom the framers of the post-war order appealed in the writing of “We the peoples,” in a document which simultaneously enshrined guarantees that those peoples would not have access to enforcement mechanisms if those powerful states decided to pay no heed to that document’s language written in their name.</p><p>The gap between that rhetoric and the reality detailed in this article should not cause we who work on and believe in international law to give up on it. The gap should encourage we who work on international law to be clear about what it is that has been built, who is being protected, who is being left behind and who is not, and what it would actually require for that protection to become a reality. This transparency will be uncomfortable for governments who benefit from the current arrangement. It will be essential for everybody else.</p><p>To continue maintaining an international legal order that is rule-based in name alone does not actually support that order; it delegitimizes it. Delegitimizing an order which guarantees the powerful the protection of non-accountability, while failing to offer it to the weak, does not fend off the logic of Meli; it slowly adopts it.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7a8752b5fcfa" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Why colonial borders are reason for the current conflicts]]></title>
            <link>https://ironical02.medium.com/why-colonial-borders-are-reason-for-the-current-conflicts-3c59465f4cdd?source=rss-753e397ebb87------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3c59465f4cdd</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kanishk]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 06 Jun 2026 06:26:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-11T09:55:44.445Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Abstract</strong></p><p>This article argues that many of the ongoing bloody and protracted armed conflicts of the world today are at least partly a result of cartographic choices of European imperial powers during the 19 th and 20 th centuries. Examining examples from the South Asian subcontinent, the Middle East and Africa, we argue that drawing boundaries irrespective of ethnic, religious or cultural differences resulted in unstable geography and unstable political circumstances. India and Pakistan, the Balochistan insurgency, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the outcomes of the 1884 Berlin Conference all serve to show how colonial geography continues to contribute to human suffering today. We also consider the ramifications of uti possidetis juris — where existing territory becomes existing boundaries and blocks boundary revisions, ensuring that post-colonial states would have to contend with colonial boundaries, irrespective of their suitability.</p><p><strong>Introduction</strong></p><p>While the links between the creation of colonial boundaries and ongoing warfare have been established, many historians and political scientists failed to explore this topic in sufficient depth. Generally, conflicts were discussed in terms of proximate causes, i.e. Religion, ethnicity or geopolitics, and there was rarely an attempt to link ongoing events to the structural situation, established by colonial map-makers. In this paper we aim to explore this structural situation for four cases where colonial boundaries were a direct and obvious cause of ongoing armed conflict.</p><p>There are currently over 100 territorial and sovereignty disputes worldwide, and over 60 of them in Africa alone. The Kashmir dispute is almost 80 years old and resulted in 3 full scale wars between two nuclear powers. The Balochistan insurgency has entered its 5th stage and causes over 100 disappearances annually. The Israeli- Palestinian conflict was caused by a string of British commitments made between 1915 and 1917, commitments which were contradictory. These examples clearly demonstrate how colonial boundaries, and administrative decisions made under colonialism, became a structural linchpin, and a prerequisite cause for the nature of modern conflict, although of course not its only cause.</p><p>We do not claim that the drawing of colonial borders were the only causes of these conflicts — post-colonial failures of governance, resource contests, intervention by superpowers during the Cold War and individual actors certainly played a role — but we argue they were a structural precondition without which these conflicts, in their current form, would not be possible; that given the principle of uti possidetis juris (the inability to alter boundaries without international agreement once they are established), such boundaries may not be so easily dismantled.</p><p><strong>Theoretical framework</strong></p><p>Colonial borders differ from international boundaries today in that the colonial powers responsible for the borders themselves had no vested interest in the populations they divided. While all international boundaries may, and usually do, represent something off on the ground demographic or political reality because the entities drawing them have an interest in territory where they live, colonial borders were drawn in European capitals by those in possession of no more than imperfect maps and operating on a principle of strategic convenience without any consideration for the actual peoples of the territory in question.</p><p>The clear illustration of this can be found in the 1884–85 Berlin Conference where 14 European nations, not including any representatives of Africa, established the framework and principles that would govern the</p><p>colonization of Africa, known to history as the Scramble for Africa. This yielded the division of 90% of the continent into colonies with borders drawn for practical purposes and with no attention to existing ethnic, linguistic or religious lines; nearly half the colonial borders in Africa are straight lines, and they divided more than 177 ethnic groups. As cited in Abraham (2007) the boundary-drawing process was one of the most effective elements of the conflict process and was a ‘tea and macaroon’ decision-making that preordained future boundary disputes.</p><p>There are other versions of boundary-drawing, which do not constitute the direct copying of longitude lines or other geographic attributes, and the results for peoples living there were similar: when the Ottoman Empire was partitioned between Britain and France following the First World War, three mutually irreconcilable promises were made by the British Empire to three different parties for the future of Palestine in 1915, 1916 and 1917-the McMahon-Hussein correspondence, the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration respectively.</p><p>Renton and Sabbagh-Khoury (2019), in a piece for the Journal of Palestine Studies, noted the imperial duplicity and prioritization of strategic gain above all else in these actions, which also were not the result of parliamentary debate but of the immediate needs of wartime. South Asia is another example; in India the border was drawn at the time of independence in July 1947 by Cyril Radcliffe, a British lawyer whose knowledge of India consisted solely of the maps that contained the territory to be divided. According to Chester (2009) the Radcliffe Commission had five weeks in which to divide India and its 88 million people into India and Pakistan, and the hurriedness of this partition and lack of preparation for the mass migration of populations that accompanied it caused a significant portion of the violence that has been endemic in the Indian subcontinent since independence.</p><p>Preserving these borders in the period of post-colonialism is the principle of uti possidetis juris, or that territory, once belonging to a particular colonial state or administrative unit, becomes part of the international law and territory of the new post-colonial state. The OAU formally established this as a principle of post-colonial international law in their 1964 Cairo Resolution.</p><p><strong>The Kashmir conflict</strong></p><p>It is hard to overstate the significance of the partition of British India in August 1947; a border drawing by colonial power that is arguably the most consequential in the twentieth century, which is still creating politically motivated violence today. The human cost of the communal riots that broke out after the publication of the Radcliffe line remains disputed due to scant data, but experts agree the toll ranged from 500,000 to 2 million lives lost. More than ten to twelve million people crossed the newly demarcated borders between Punjab and Bengal, one of the largest forced migrations in recorded history. This is not mere academic or statistical fact: the immediacy of the disaster to the lives of millions at the hand of an un-expert man whose own admission was that he lacked the necessary qualifications for the job is striking-this border was drawn in five weeks by Clement Attlee’sappointed commissioner, Sir Cyril Radcliffe.</p><p>The Kashmir conflict-now the cause of most of the tension in India-Pakistan relations-was a direct result of commission decisions. The award of Gurdaspur district to India gave India the necessary land corridor with the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, without which Kashmir would not have bordered India. Indian Independence Act gave the princes the ability to formally accede to either dominion, but Kashmir’s peculiar circumstances-majority Muslim population, Hindu ruler, bordering India and Pakistan-rendered the notion of “freedom of accession” a fiction. Following the invasion of the princely state by Pakistan-backed tribesmen in October 1947, the Hindu ruler of Kashmir, Hari Singh, signed an Instrument of Accession to India in exchange for military intervention. The accession was conditional on a referendum, which India has perpetually promised but failed to hold. India claims the accession was a binding legal contract; Pakistan counters that the state, which had a Muslim majority, should have accessioned to Pakistan based on partition logic. Both positions are structurally sound; the tension between them was inherent in the original commission award. Chester (2009) argues the partition as a process-not the border line per se-produced the crisis, and although he is persuasive, one cannot overemphasise the significance of Gurdaspur in making a conflict inevitable regardless of subsequent political decisions.</p><p>India and Pakistan have since engaged in three wars over Kashmir (1947, 1965 and 1971), nearly brought their countries to nuclear conflict (1999) and the issue remains one of the longest running territorial disputes in the</p><p>world today. Both countries possess nuclear weapons. In this conflict as in so many others arising out of colonial borders, the underlying conditions were not the inevitable result of pre-colonial politics; they were created by a five-week process and a colonial committee in 1947 which did not, at that time, even begin to consider the ramifications of the decisions it made.</p><p><strong>Balochistan Issue</strong></p><p>Although Balochistan does not get nearly as much international press as Kashmir, it has been one of the clearest case studies of the problems that colonial border-drawing creates due to the persistent lack of global attention on the resulting conflict. British India, Persia and Afghanistan partitioned Balochistan along a number of colonial borders established in the 19th century by treaties that concerned only Britain’s imperial interests in Central Asia, not Baloch political interests.</p><p>The most prominent of these colonial borders is the Durand Line: in 1893, Sir Henry Mortimer Durand signed an agreement with Afghan Emir Abdur Rahman Khan that carved a 2,640km line through the Baloch and Pashtun homelands. The Durand Agreement is widely regarded to have been signed under duress due to Britain’s overwhelming power in the region and its contents have never been officially accepted by any of Afghanistan’s regimes from the monarchy to the present Taliban administration (a fact which underscores that the original colonial border in question is one that has never been agreed upon by one of the Parties it affected). By the end of the nineteenth century, Balochistan had been divided into British Balochistan, various princely states, and territory incorporated into Persia and Afghanistan; The EFSAS noted this was “formalized through a series of colonial border agreements and treaties like that of Kalat” and upon the formation of Pakistan, this arrangement was incorporated wholesale due to the doctrine of uti possidetis juris. The first uprising of the Baloch against Pakistan took place a year after the creation of the state.</p><p>What makes Balochistan particularly instructive in the study of the conflict created by colonial border-drawing, is the fact that the region holds vast natural resources and has vast wealth, yet its population lives in dire conditions; it accounts for 44 percent of Pakistan’s total land mass, but it only comprises approximately 14.8 million of its total 240 million citizens and holds most of Pakistan’s natural gas resources, in addition to being the location of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. The GIJA observes that the province continues to suffer “federal underrepresentation, resource exploitation and coercive policies rooted in its colonial past”, and the authors argue that Pakistan’s policies towards Balochistan have mirrored colonial policy. The Human Rights Council of Balochistan recorded 601 enforced disappearances and 525 killings in 2023, with these figures rising to 830 enforced disappearances and 480 killings by 2024. Pakistan’s Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances has claimed to have received reports of over 3,000 disappearances since 2011, although Baloch civil society groups estimate this figure to be as high as 7,000. The UN and various other human rights organisations have spoken out against the arbitrary arrest and killing of civilians by the Pakistani army and access to journalists and independent researchers to the province is tightly controlled by the state, likely indicating that official figures grossly underreport the situation.</p><p>The Baloch rights movement has both an armed resistance dimension and a prominent civil society dimension. The BYC has organized some of the largest non-violent protests in recent Baloch history, headed by physician Dr. Mahrang Baloch. She first led a protest at age 16 after the abduction of her father and she later lost him and her brother to similar abductions. In July 2024, Dr. Baloch led a march that brought 2 million Baloch to Gwadar and, despite having recently been named by TIME as one of 100 emerging global leaders, having been included in the BBC’s list of 100 Women for 2024, and having been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize, she was arrested in March 2025 and remains detained without trial. The state’s decision to arrest the province’s most visible, non-violent advocate points to little to no substantive change in its management of political resistance in Balochistan, armed or otherwise. It would be an error to view the Pakistani state’s current management of political resistance in Balochistan solely as a problem of current Pakistani governance. Such a view fails to account for the fact that a Baloch nation with its own political desires and a justified complaint about how its land was incorporated into the Pakistani state is the direct result of colonial boundary-drawing.</p><p><strong>Contradictory mandates and territorial contradiction in Palestine</strong></p><p>The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is perhaps the most documented of all current conflicts in terms of its colonial origins. The structural conditions for conflict were laid down in the sequence of British decisions between 1915 and 1917 where incompatible and overlapping commitments were made about the future of Ottoman Palestine and contradictions were never addressed before the British left.</p><p>McMahon-Hussein correspondence of 1915 created an expectation of Arab self determination in former Ottoman lands which the Arab nationalists read as inclusive of Palestine. The Sykes-Picot agreement of May 1916 between British negotiator Mark Sykes and his French counterpart Francois Georges-Picot divided the region into spheres of influence under Britain and France. The Balfour declaration of November 1917 then declared British support for a Jewish national home in Palestine but with the qualifier ‘provided that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.’ Mejcher (1999) writes that these three commitments were a result of a foreign policy apparatus pursuing at once Arab military assistance, French cooperation, and Zionist engagement in Britain and the United States with no institutional mechanisms to ensure contradiction was addressed.</p><p>None of the three declarations were the result of parliamentary debate and all three were wartime tactics. Contradiction among them was evident when, two months after the Balfour declaration, the Bolsheviks made public the Sykes-Picot agreement causing both Arab nationalists and Zionists to feel they had been double crossed. Both saw Palestine as promised to them; Sykes-Picot, and by extension the British, had no intention of giving it to either; and a long period of anti-colonial violence by both communities against the British and one another ensued under the Mandate. Britain relinquished her mandate in 1947 and turned over the issue to the UN; who devised a plan to partition Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state, the former accepted, the latter rejected; an Israeli declaration of independence in May 1948 followed; the first Arab-Israeli war ensuing in which around 700,000 Palestinians were displaced.</p><p>The argument here is not that conflict over Palestine between Jewish and Arab people would not have existed had it not been for British colonial rule. The argument is that political and legal form it took, and thus how it evolved and in which form the conflict takes place today, was profoundly determined by British colonial decisions to allow contradictions to exist between promises without any meaningful attempt at reconciliation, and that the international community has been dealing with those contradictions ever since.</p><p><strong>The Sykes-Picot framework and Levantine state fragility</strong></p><p>Palestine was not the only place for whom the Sykes-Picot logic dictated how the state should be created. The Anglo-French territorial mapping of the Middle East produced a set of states the institutional composition of which made stable governance structurally difficult from the beginning.</p><p>Iraq for example was a state which combined three previously Ottoman provinces: the Sunnis in the centre of the country in Baghdad; the Shia majority in the south in Basra; and the Kurds in the north around Mosul.</p><p>These three regions had different ethnic and religious majority make-ups; and historically had been completely independent entities. They were brought together through colonial decree in part for administrative ease, and in part for Britain to retain influence in a region where oil had been discovered in Kurdish lands. Dodge (2003) writing about the Iraqi state explains it as a quasi-state built upon unstable and badly constructed institutional foundations where a Suni ruling elite appointed by the British governed over a Shia majority without any genuine political voice. Churchill then appointed a Hashemite prince, Faisal, at Cairo in 1921 without any prior knowledge of Iraq; with the Kurds — promised their autonomy in Sevres 1920- wholly excluded from the process.</p><p>Iraq has since experienced repeated military coups, a genocidal dictatorship, chemical weapons attack on the Kurds, the US invasion of 2003, sectarian civil war and the rise of ISIS (its claim to have liberated Mosul from the Sykes-Picot order stated in their propaganda) and the ongoing Syrian civil war can be attributed in part to a very similar logic: a colonial state formed to hold together, through authoritarian coercion, several disparate ethnicities with their distinct languages, religions and histories together until such coercion eventually failed (killing over 500,000 people and displacing over half of Syrian population).</p><p>The Kurds are at the center of this whole logic: thirty to forty million Kurds constitute the largest nation on earth with no territory of their own, divided between Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran as a result of Anglo-French decisions after WWI at Lausanne in 1923 when strategic interests in Mosul’s oil combined with Turkish nationalism to deny the Kurds any state. The result has been almost a century of violent Kurdish irredentism across four separate states without any clear end in sight.</p><p><strong>Africa and the Berlin Conference</strong></p><p>From 1884–1885 the Berlin Conference set out the legal and procedural framework for the partition of Africa. Prior to 1870 just 10 percent of African territory was controlled by Europeans, but following the Berlin Conference that proportion increased to 90 percent by WWI. The ensuing territories had boundaries drawn through 190 distinct cultural groups, with more than 2000 ethnic groups partitioned by their colonial state border. 30 percent of all African border divisions are represented by straight lines drawn across landscapes which the cartographers never bothered to observe.</p><p>The impact of these divisions has been measured. Using a statistical analysis the AEA found that ethnic homelands partitioned by colonial powers were 57 percent more violent than those that were not, and after accounting for all geographical variables including natural resources, disease prevalence and coastal proximity; the effect is equal in magnitude to that of petrol which remains one of the most powerful correlates of civil violence in academic literature. Analysis of civil conflicts between 1960 and 2018 found colonial legacy remained a statistically significant determinant of violence regardless of controls with regards to pre and post conflict variables and despite differences in colonial power and region; with the results holding true. The Somalis had territory split amongst five states, consequently provoking many years of irredentist conflict and instability. The DR Congo is a similar story where the border divisions lumped together disparate ethnicities who historically held enmity towards each other, within a territory blessed with huge mineral wealth, that has been the site of decades of multiple conflicting armed groups. Rwanda and the 1994 genocide; had institutionalized racial division imposed by the Belgians under an identity cards system which had transformed a category of fluidity and social variation to one of permanent bureaucratic rigidity that produced the slaughter of 1994. Mamdani (2001) in analyzing the political history of the genocide argues it was a colonial product where it was a racial division in the minds of the people.</p><p><strong>Why Do These Borders Remain?</strong></p><p>The question the evidence above naturally poses is simple: why, if colonial borders cause conflicts, have they not been changed? There are two reasons.</p><p>Firstly, legally, through uti possidetis juris, formalized by the OAU’s 1964 Cairo Resolution, and consistently reiterated by the International Court of Justice, colonial borders have been extremely difficult to change through legitimate means. The logic was correct: post-independence states were deeply worried that attempting to open border questions would lead to a cascade of rival territorial claims that would be far more destabilizing than inherited borders. The effect has been to cement these colonial boundaries in a way the men who created them probably never envisioned, and that the peoples they enclosed never agreed to. There has been one post-colonial territorial secession in Africa since 1957: South Sudan. All others have been crushed, or at least contained, within these colonial-era lines.</p><p>Secondly, post-colonial elites often have vested interests in upholding the borders they inherited because the borders themselves constitute the territory of their own power. Armies, clientelist networks and state institutions are built around existing administrative units, and the groups most benefited by existing territorial arrangements will also tend to be those best positioned to resist a change. This results in a scenario where the peoples most harmed by colonial borders possess little to no power in institutions to alter them, while those who profit from those borders possess little to no incentive.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>All of the cases examined above share a basic structural feature: they manifest in political forms which owe their shape to colonial policy, and the reason they have not been transformed in post-colonial time is that they have been rendered effectively permanent by the rules of international law. This does not mean these are simple conflicts, nor does acknowledging colonial roots automatically resolve them. But it does mean that analyses of these conflicts that focus solely on the immediate dynamics of India-Pakistan hostility (on its religious underpinnings), Israeli-Palestinian negotiations (on their security calculations), or Iraqi politics (on its ethnic dynamics), without reference to the conditions that have molded them, are inadequate.</p><p>As Michopoulous and Papaioannou (2016) and Chadefaux (2025) have both shown on large empirical grounds, colonial border-drawing dramatically and measurably increased the level of political violence post- independence. These cases demonstrate a key part of why this has occurred: artificial states unable to generate consent of their populations, partitioned peoples who identify across colonial lines, and unmet colonial promises which inform contemporary political claims in the absence of the colonizers.</p><p>Dealing seriously with such conflicts requires confronting the conditions that have produced them. In practice, this suggests, among other things, more of an international willingness to recognize the role colonial history plays in the contemporary landscape, institutional mechanisms to foster negotiated autonomy solutions without border revision, and a more honest accounting within former colonial powers for the policies they chose. None of this will be easy, but it will be far more analytically defensible than treating the post-colonial map as a given and wondering why people living within it refuse to stay put.</p><p><strong>References</strong></p><p><a href="https://www.africanelements.org/news/africas-tragic-borders-unravel-colonial-legacy/">African Elements (2025). Africa’s tragic borders unravel colonial legacy.</a></p><p><a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2024/10/why-is-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-wracked-by-conflict/">Amnesty International (2024). Why is the Democratic Republic of Congo wracked by</a> <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2024/10/why-is-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-wracked-by-conflict/">conflict?</a></p><p><a href="https://balochvoiceforjustice.org/">Baloch Voice for Justice (2025).</a></p><p><a href="https://britainpalestineproject.org/mcmahon-sykes-balfour-contradictions-and-concealments-in-british-palestine-policy1915-1917/">Britain Palestine Project (2020). McMahon, Sykes, Balfour: Contradictions and</a> <a href="https://britainpalestineproject.org/mcmahon-sykes-balfour-contradictions-and-concealments-in-british-palestine-policy1915-1917/">Concealments in British Palestine Policy 1915–1917.</a></p><p><a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Radcliffe-Line">Britannica (2026). Radcliffe Line.</a> <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Durand-Line">Britannica (2026). Durand Line.</a></p><p><a href="https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/104/2/640/8068537">Chadefaux, T. (2025). Colonial legacy and contemporary civil violence: a global study from</a> <a href="https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/104/2/640/8068537">1960 to 2018. Social Forces, 104(2).</a></p><p><a href="https://www.efsas.org/publications/study-papers/balochistan-history-and-cpec/">EFSAS (n.d.). Balochistan: Colonial and Post-Colonial Governance, Insecurity, and CPEC.</a> <a href="https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2025/03/14/the-balochistan-quagmire-a-cycle-of-violence-political-mobilization-and-repression/">Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (2025). The Balochistan Quagmire.</a></p><p><a href="https://geographyworlds.com/blog/straight-line-borders-africa/">Geography Worlds (2026). Straight-Line Borders of Africa.</a></p><p><a href="https://geopol.uk/historical/sykes-picot/">Geopol (2026). The Sykes-Picot Agreement: The Map That Made the Modern Middle East.</a> <a href="https://historyandpolicy.org/policy-papers/papers/iraq-past-present-and-future-a-thoroughly-modern-mandate/">History and Policy (2025). Iraq, past, present and future: a thoroughly-modern mandate?</a> <a href="https://intpolicydigest.org/the-platform/partition-s-dark-legacy-the-enduring-kashmir-conflict/">International Policy Digest (2024). Partition’s Dark Legacy: The Enduring Kashmir Conflict.</a> <a href="https://spectator.africa/2024/11/22/impact-of-colonial-borders-fuels-political-tensions-across-africa/">Spectator Africa (2024). Impact of Colonial Borders Fuels Political Tensions Across Africa.</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-was-the-sykes-picot-agreement-and-why-does-it-still-affect-the-middle-east-today-246332">The Conversation (2026). What was the Sykes-Picot agreement, and why does it still affect</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-was-the-sykes-picot-agreement-and-why-does-it-still-affect-the-middle-east-today-246332">the Middle East today?</a></p><p><a href="https://thediplomat.com/2025/10/the-true-cost-of-enforced-disappearances-in-balochistan/">The Diplomat (2025). The True Cost of Enforced Disappearances in Balochistan.</a></p><p><a href="https://www.thestatesman.com/opinion/mess-made-by-the-westii-1503582612.html">The Statesman (2026). Mess Made by the West II.</a><a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/research/are-colonial-era-borders-holding-africa-back">Michalopoulos, S. and Papaioannou, E.</a> <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/research/are-colonial-era-borders-holding-africa-back">(2016). Are colonial-era borders holding Africa back? American Economic Association.</a></p><p><a href="https://www.trtafrika.com/english/article/4fb2a0dabfdf">TRT Afrika (2025). Berlin Conference: How Colonial Cartography Created Africa’s Turmoil.</a> <a href="https://utsynergyjournal.org/2020/12/10/radcliffes-line-in-the-sand-the-colonial-legacy-of-the-boundary-commission-lord-mountbatten-and-the-1947-partition-plan/">University of Toronto Synergy Journal (2020). Radcliffe’s Line in the Sand.</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3c59465f4cdd" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[A Forensic Audit of the Petrodollar’s Fifty-Year Run]]></title>
            <link>https://ironical02.medium.com/a-forensic-audit-of-the-petrodollars-fifty-year-run-d1c16a530065?source=rss-753e397ebb87------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d1c16a530065</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[petrodollar]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[geopolitics-and-energy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[geopolitics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kanishk]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 14:14:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-09T20:27:41.121Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There is a story about modern history that starts with a ship called the USS Quincy, docked in Egypt’s Great Bitter Lake in February 1945. Roosevelt was on his way back from Yalta, and on Feb. 14, 1945, he and the Saudi King Abdulaziz Ibn Saud met for the first ever meeting of a US president and a Saudi king, a meeting that would be the cornerstone for the US having guaranteed access to Saudi oil supplies for generations. Roosevelt was clearly a dying man. He had weeks to live, with a blood pressure of 260 over 150, and believed that Saudi Arabia would be fundamental to America in the post war world thanks to its oil supplies. The terms on which the two men agreed were not laid out in a single, official treaty, but they were very simple; the Americans would guarantee the security of the House of Saud, and the Americans would have an assured access to Saudi oil. It is arguably the most important bilateral arrangement in the history of modern geopolitical interactions, and it was concluded by a man whose death would come just two months later.</p><p>Oil was discovered in Bahrain in commercial quantities in 1932 by the Standard Oil Company of California, which acquired a concession in Saudi Arabia in 1933, and found oil in commercial quantities in 1938. Before the arrival of the Americans, the Gulf was essentially a British preserve. For over a century London had ruled the region through a series of informal empire, via treaties with local rulers that provided security in exchange for commercial and strategic control. It was primarily a corridor to India. The Americans arrived in the Gulf not to dismantle this architecture, but to replace it quietly. Britain after 1945 was broke and exhausted. The US was <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/september-23/standard-oil-geologists-arrive-in-saudi-arabia">neither.</a></p><p>The US system built in the Gulf was not a colony, but a much more sustainable edifice; an network of dependencies. In return for cash, military hardware, security assurances from external threats and internal threats to regime stability, the monarchies of the Gulf provided America with oil, bases, and regional power at a fraction of the cost it would have taken to rule the region as a direct imperial power. The deal was a franchise rather than an occupation, and for thirty years, it worked.</p><p>The first serious moment of friction was in 1956 when Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, prompting Britain and France to combine their military might and attempt to take it back by force with the Israelis, a truly audacious scheme. Eisenhower, outraged, refused to provide financial assistance when Britain needed dollars in order to acquire oil on the open market. This forced Britain, France, and Israel to withdraw from Egypt. The Suez crisis reduced Britain and France to the level of second-tier global powers alongside the US and the Soviet Union, and signaled an important moment; the US was the world power in the Middle East now and it would call the shots from then on. Britain would no longer be calling any shots at all.</p><p>The arrangement continued through the 1960s and the contradictions continued to mount. The Arab states had been humiliated in 1948 by their failed attempts to prevent the establishment of Israel. They were once again humiliated in 1967 when Israel wiped out the Egyptian air force on the ground and conquered the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights in six days. The US was implicated by its sponsorship of Israel and absorbed much of this anger. Arab nationalism was taking hold, and under the politics of the street, the oil producers were beginning to realize the clout that they <a href="https://www.history.com/articles/suez-crisis">wielded.</a></p><p>In October 1973 they used that power. Egypt and Syria joined forces to launch an attack on the Israeli front in order to regain the territories occupied in 1967. When Nixon requested an additional $2.2 billion in aid to Israel from Congress, Saudi Arabia imposed a total oil embargo on the US. The price of oil quadrupled; people queued around the block to fill up their cars, and this, coupled with inflation brought on by the Vietnam War, dollar devaluations, and a boom in commodity prices, Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns would later claim, shattered the US economy. The embargo lasted five months and had enormous geopolitical and economic implications worldwide.</p><p>It also served as the precipice to one of the most low-key but important diplomatic developments of the twentieth century. In 1971 Nixon had already taken an action that he knew would be explosively problematic economically; he had ended the convertibility of the dollar into gold, and, effectively, ended the Bretton Woods system of the international financial order. Nixon and Kissinger knew that by severing the link between dollars and gold, they would dramatically reduce artificially-induced demand for the dollar, and that sustaining demand for the dollar would be crucial to maintaining America’s capacity for unlimited spending. Dollars were no longer backed by gold, they were backed by nothing more than the faith of the global economy in American institutions. Henry Kissinger found one in the wake of the 1973 <a href="https://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/how-the-nixon-shock-remade-the-world-economy">crisis.</a></p><p>A 1974 bargain between the United States and Saudi Arabia, wherein the Gulf state would sell only oil for US dollars in return for military aid and security assurances from Washington, underpinned the petrodollar system. The pact’s four conditions stated that oil pricing would be in dollars; that dollars earned would be recycled into the US economy through investments in treasury bonds and bank deposits; those dollars would be lent to developing economies who would buy US equipment and agricultural products; and finally, that the US would defend Saudi Arabia from the Soviets and regional adversaries. By 1975, all OPEC members had adopted a dollar pricing mechanism for oil sales, which would soon become the standard for all oil producing nations. This restoration and enhancement of the demand for dollars in the foreign exchange market ultimately meant that the US could run deficits which no other currency could sustain; borrow cheaply because dollar holdings were a global necessity; finance wars, welfare programs and bases on a global scale on terms that no other country could match, terms some critics referred to as ‘exorbitant’.</p><p>However, the privilege came at a steep price. The security pact with Saudi Arabia meant that the US implicitly guaranteed the survival of an absolute monarchy; and looked away from many realities, including domestic suppression of dissent, export of a particularly austere strain of Islam which had immense political ramifications, and pervasive wealth disparity within the country and the region. Direct confrontation with these issues threatened the delicate balance of the system.</p><p>This also meant that the United States repeatedly made decisions that led to long-term blowback. With the overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the advent of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Washington lost its other pillar of support in the Gulf. When Iran and Iraq went to war in 1980, the United States sided with Saddam Hussein. In 1988, towards the end of the war, intelligence documents showed that American intelligence had knowingly provided the Iranian troop positions to the Iraqis and that Hussein’s forces had used chemical weapons, including the nerve agent sarin, a fact the CIA had undeniable proof of and that did not prevent continued US support. The overarching objective was the containment of Iran, but the consequence was an empowered and militarized Iraq, fraught with grievances, debts and a leader aware of the negotiability of American stated <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/26/exclusive-cia-files-prove-america-helped-saddam-as-he-gassed-iran/">ideals.</a></p><p>The invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein in August 1990 was triggered by disputes over oil revenues, humiliation over debts incurred in the Iran war, and miscalculation of American response based on a conversation with the US ambassador. He was wrong, and the subsequent Gulf War of 1991 served as a defense of the entire petrodollar architecture. Kuwait was a critical oil producer and directly threatened; US forces gathered in Saudi Arabia, expelled the Iraqis from Kuwait, and stopped at the Iraqi border. The deliberate choice not to march to Baghdad was driven by the understanding that regime change in Iraq would destabilize the region through fragmentation. The Bush administration was acutely aware of this reality, which is why they avoided that course of action.</p><p>Twelve years later, a different administration opted for a different path. A <a href="https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001156395.pdf">2004 CIA report</a> concluded that Saddam Hussein did not possess weapons of mass destruction at the time of the US invasion in March 2003, nor had he initiated a weapons program, falsifying the justification for war. In post-invasion Iraq, the US military was disbanded without presidential or Pentagon approval, leaving a power vacuum that extremist groups would exploit. Rather than providing a clean start for Iraq, the invasion created conditions for the rise of ISIS, providing its ranks with seasoned commanders and fighters from the former Iraqi army. What eventually emerged was known as ISIS.</p><p>While the 2003 invasion is often characterized as an error driven by ideological zealotry, it also exposed a fundamental structural flaw. A superpower that relied on Gulf oil for its global financial system found itself increasingly incapable of defining coherent goals for the very region where the oil was located. The petrodollar demanded stability, but US policy perpetuated instability, and these two elements remained irreconcilably at odds.</p><p>This divergence intensified in the 2010s. The Arab Spring of 2011 led to a brief, exciting moment of popular upheaval followed by a drawn-out, ugly counter-revolution. Saudi-led forces, supported by US and British weaponry, launched a war in Yemen which has created one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. Syria descended into a multifaceted conflict with the US, Russia, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf states taking opposing sides, resulting in the survival of Assad and hundreds of thousands of deaths. In each scenario, a familiar pattern emerged: regional actors used proxies to pursue power competition amid America’s waning ability to mediate.</p><p>Concurrently, the underpinnings of the petrodollar system itself began to erode. The boom in American shale production transformed the US from a major oil importer to the world’s leading producer. Asia now comprises the principal market for Gulf oil; Saudi Arabia exports nearly five times as much crude to China as to the United States. The economic logic for the petrodollar, though more nuanced than publicly presented, lost its original geographic foundation.</p><p>The 1974 deal between the United States and Saudi Arabia created the petrodollar system. Under this arrangement, Washington agreed to provide Saudi Arabia with military security, while Riyadh committed to selling its oil exclusively in US dollars. Contrary to online rumors, no formal 50-year treaty with a specified expiration date of June 2024 exists, as financial historians attest. The petrodollar system is under severe structural strain today, however, due to the rise of American shale production, which has converted the US into an oil and gas exporter, thus firmly shifting the primary market for Gulf crude towards Asia. This shift in energy geography has exacerbated the diversification of currencies, as Saudi Arabia actively seeks membership in the BRICS economic bloc and has shown interest in participating in alternative digital currency projects like Project mBridge, as well as using currencies other than the dollar for oil transactions, such as the <a href="https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/04/04/war-in-iran-tests-the-petrodollar-as-chinas-yuan-gains-ground/">Chinese Yuan.</a></p><p>By 2025, the dollar’s share in global foreign exchange reserves had declined to 56.77%, its lowest level on record since the IMF began tracking this data. Commerzbank analysts suggest that semiconductor trade may now rival petrodollar flows in volume and that computer chips traded in dollars could be more critical for the dollar’s dominance than oil from the Gulf. The issuance of yuan-denominated bonds by foreign entities has tripled in March 2026, exceeding the entire 2025 total within the first few months of the <a href="https://www.tmgm.com/en/analysis/market-news/article/usd-petrodollar-shift-and-chip-trade-commerzbank-202604010619">year.</a></p><p>The death of the petrodollar is not what is happening now, the collapse does not take place in this order, there is an erosion, there still is the dollar in charge, there is the Gulf monarchies remain to be the US clients in all of the functional sense and there still is a substantial American military presence in the region. However the logic of the system was based on two factors: that American could protect the security of the Gulf, and that, at least in its beginning, the purchase and sale of Gulf oil was based on a need of the buying countries of the American financial infrastructure (according to Deutsche bank, a number of issues related to the petrodollar were there before the current crisis: the U.S. Sanctions against Russian and Iranian oil which pushed them to use alternative currencies for non official trading, as well as the membership of Saudi Arabia in a project for a central bank digital currency led by China, which represents an influence to the dollar based payment systems) that is the two preconditions upon which the system was built were challenged and truly questioned for the first time in the last 50 years.</p><p>The history of oil in the Gulf, beyond many things, is the story of the distance between what the powerful powers state they do and what they truly do, Roosevelt claimed to have building a partnership of mutual benefit with Ibn Saud; Kissinger stated that the dollar was strong due to its economic foundations, Bush that the invasion was to free democracy. Each statement holds a bit of truth with a bigger complexity in the real world, which was simply that a superpower needed an asset and would pay it with security, weapons, and deliberately ignorant to the internal matters of the countries he was protecting.</p><p>That arrangement has created the modern world, in much greater and complex ways that those who benefited from it can truly acknowledge; that system is breaking down, slowly, yet noisily.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d1c16a530065" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Judiciary and the Crisis of Institutional Legitimacy]]></title>
            <link>https://ironical02.medium.com/justice-is-pending-103e9328f61e?source=rss-753e397ebb87------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/103e9328f61e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[indian-judiciary]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[judiciary]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kanishk]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 19 May 2026 09:42:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-12T19:04:52.304Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The judiciary of the “worlds largest democracy” is failing miserably.</p><p>There’s something uncomfortable about criticising the institution you want to build a career inside. You worry it looks ungrateful, or naive, or like you don’t understand how things work.</p><p>But I think that discomfort is exactly the problem. Too many people who know exactly what’s wrong with Indian courts have decided that speaking up isn’t worth the trouble. Lawyers who’ve watched colleagues get contempt notices for a tweet. Judges who wait until retirement to say anything real. Law students who learn quickly that the right career move is to keep your head down.</p><p>I don’t want to start my legal career like that.</p><p>So here it is: the Indian judiciary is in serious trouble. Failing the farmer waiting a decade for a land dispute to be heard. Failing the undertrial prisoner who’s been in jail longer than his alleged crime would have put him there. Failing the people who walk into a courtroom believing, still, that the law will treat them fairly.</p><h3>Fifty Million Pending Cases.</h3><p>As of 2024, there are over 50 million pending cases in Indian courts. The Supreme Court has more than 80,000 cases sitting in its backlog. High Courts are holding nearly 60 lakh. And the district courts, where most Indians will ever actually step foot, carry the<a href="https://www.scobserver.in/journal/supreme-court-reduces-case-backlog-by-over-900-in-july-2024/"> rest.</a></p><p>I don’t think we let ourselves properly feel how absurd that number is. These aren’t files. They’re people. People who filed a case, paid a lawyer, showed up, and are now just… waiting. Some of them have been waiting longer than I’ve been alive.</p><p>The reason isn’t complicated. India has 21 judges per million people. The Law Commission said we need 50. Thousands of judicial posts are sitting vacant right now , not because there’s no one to fill them, but because the process of filling them is buried under a pile of bureaucratic back-and-forth between high court collegiums and state governments that nobody seems particularly urgent about fixing. At the current rate of disposal, several High Courts would need decades to clear their backlogs even if not a single new case came in tomorrow. The Allahabad High Court has the largest by caseload in the entire world. It routinely sees litigants die before their matters are decided.</p><p>The Supreme Court has held that a speedy trial is a fundamental right under Article 21. The same court has an 80,000-case backlog. I’m not sure how we’re supposed to sit with that contradiction without it bothering us.</p><h3>The Corruption in Judiciary</h3><p>Ask any young lawyer about their first week inside a district court and they’ll tell you things that aren’t in any textbook. Which clerk you need to know to get your matter listed without waiting six months. Whose number to have saved if you need a date changed. The way certain interim orders seem to have a logic that has nothing to do with the law.</p><p>A 2005 study by the Centre for Media Studies, published by Transparency International India, found that 80% of those who had interacted with courts believed the judiciary was corrupt, and estimated that Indians paid Rs. 2,630 crore annually in bribes to the lower judiciary alone. That was twenty years ago. The structures that made it happen — underpaid court staff, zero oversight, no way to complain without making an enemy are still largely <a href="https://transparencyindia.org/">intact</a>.</p><p>Higher up, it gets subtler and in some ways worse. Everyone in legal circles knows about the “uncle judge” problem. Lawyers who happen to have a relative on the bench winning cases at rates that stretch credulity, while the rest of the bar watches and says nothing because what exactly are you going to do about it? Then there’s the collegium: a system where Supreme Court judges pick their own successors in closed-door deliberations, with no obligation to explain why one person was chosen over another. When Parliament passed the National Judicial Appointments Commission in 2015 — an attempt to bring some transparency to the process , the Supreme Court struck it down. The court decided, essentially, that it would continue to choose itself. I challenge anyone to name another democracy where that’s considered acceptable.</p><p>And then there’s 2019. A sitting Chief Justice of India faced a sexual harassment allegation. A bench he headed took suo motu cognizance of the matter, framing it as an attack on judicial independence. The woman who came forward faced retaliation. Nothing happened to anyone who mattered. If that had happened in any other institution: a corporation or a university, there would have been consequences. Because it was the Supreme Court, there <a href="https://thewire.in/law/supreme-court-justice-sacrifice-sexual-harassment-allegations-ranjan-gogoi">weren’t</a>.</p><h3>A Court That Thinks It’s Above the Classroom</h3><p>The Supreme Court takes the word “supreme” in its name very seriously : in February 2026, the court banned an NCERT Class 8 Social Science textbook.</p><p>The reason? The textbook had a chapter called “<strong><em>The Role of the Judiciary in Our Society” </em></strong>and somewhere in it, it mentioned that corruption, pendency, and shortage of judges were challenges facing Indian courts. The court did not ask for a review. It did not call for a correction. It issued show-cause notices to the Secretary of School Education and the NCERT Director asking why criminal contempt proceedings should not be initiated against them. It ordered every physical copy seized and every digital version taken <a href="https://www.deccanherald.com/india/row-over-chapter-on-judicial-corruption-heads-must-roll-supreme-court-bans-sale-of-controversial-ncert-class-8-textbook-3912339">down</a>.</p><p>What makes this particularly extraordinary is that the textbook was not citing opinions. It was citing government numbers. These are figures that the Law Minister himself had stated on the floor of the Lok Sabha. Between 2016 and 2025, 8,639 complaints were received against sitting judges. In 2024 alone, 1,170 complaints were registered — the highest in any single year. The textbook put those numbers in front of thirteen-year-olds. The Supreme Court decided that thirteen-year-olds shouldn’t <a href="https://theprint.in/india/over-8600-complaint-against-sitting-judges-since-2016-govt-tells-lok-sabha/2854161/">know</a>.</p><p>Think about what that means. The court that is supposed to uphold the right to information, to education, to free expression used its contempt powers to stop children from learning that courts have problems. Not false information. Not propaganda. Government statistics, in a government published textbook, about a government institution. Banned.</p><p>And if you’re wondering whether this is consistent with the Prashant Bhushan contempt case. Perfectly, depressingly consistent. The pattern is the same: any acknowledgment that the judiciary is imperfect, from any source, in any format, gets treated as an attack to be crushed rather than a criticism to be considered.</p><h3>When Protection Becomes a Weapon</h3><p>I want to be careful with this section, because it’s easy to get it wrong and because the issue genuinely matters.</p><p>Women in India face real, serious, chronic violence whether its at home, at work or in public. The laws that exist to protect them: Section 498A on dowry harassment, the Domestic Violence Act, POCSO were passed because those crimes were happening and being ignored. They were necessary. They remain necessary.</p><p>But here’s the thing about 498A specifically: it’s a cognizable, non-bailable offence. Which means the moment a complaint is filed, the accused can be arrested. No warrant. No preliminary inquiry. No filter between allegation and handcuffs. The Supreme Court itself said in <strong><em>Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar</em> (2014)</strong> that the section was being “used as a tool for personal vendetta and settling of scores.” NCRB data has consistently shown a high proportion of these cases ending in acquittal or discharge.</p><p>The problem isn’t that the law exists. It’s that a law with no cost for misuse, no preliminary screening, and immediate life-altering consequences for the accused — job gone, reputation gone, entire family dragged in will inevitably be misused. And when it is, it doesn’t only hurt the people it’s wrongly applied to. It erodes the credibility of every genuine complaint that follows.</p><p>And then there is the question of who is sitting on the bench deciding these cases. In September 2024, Karnataka High Court Judge Justice Vedavyasachar Srishananda was caught on video making a sexist remark to a female lawyer , telling her, in open court, that she seemed to know so much about him she might even reveal the colour of his undergarments. This wasn’t a private slip of the tongue. It was on camera, in a courtroom, directed at a practicing lawyer doing her job. The judge later apologised, but that’s almost beside the point. The fact that a sitting High Court judge felt comfortable saying something like that in public, on the record tells you everything about the culture the institution has allowed to take root inside itself. It fits with a broader, dismal <a href="https://theprint.in/judiciary/karnataka-judges-remarks-have-riled-legal-community-hc-live-proceedings-now-come-with-disclaimer/2276704/">picture</a>.</p><p>Out of 719 sitting High Court judges across India, only 99 are women. At the Supreme Court level, the numbers are even worse. An institution that looks nothing like the society it serves, and where the people on the bench have sometimes shown they hold views that belong in a different century, is going to struggle to deliver justice equally. That’s not an opinion. It’s a structural reality</p><p>Protecting the vulnerable and not creating new victims aren’t opposing goals. A well-designed law does both. Right now, this one doesn’t always — and the people interpreting it aren’t always helping.</p><h3>The Court That Can’t Be Questioned</h3><p>Here’s a thing that should genuinely disturb anyone who cares about democracy: in India, you can write an op-ed calling the Prime Minister corrupt. You can stand outside Parliament with a placard. You can file a PIL against a state government for anything from pollution to policy failure. But if you say, in public, that the Supreme Court has been falling short you could face criminal contempt proceedings.</p><p>Not theoretically. In 2020, senior advocate Prashant Bhushan was convicted of contempt of court for two tweets. One questioned the Chief Justice’s conduct during the pandemic. The other offered a critical view of four recent Chief Justices. He was fined one rupee. But a criminal conviction for a tweet about a public institution just shows how “supreme” the court actually is..</p><p>The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 allows courts to punish speech that scandalises their authority. That phrase “scandalizes” is doing a lot of work. It’s vague enough to cover almost anything. And since the Supreme Court is simultaneously the institution being criticised and the institution deciding whether that criticism crosses a line, there is no check on how far it extends. No appeal. No external review. No independent body with the authority to say: this has gone too far.</p><p>The NCERT case made this even more explicit. The controversy centred on a section in the Class 8 textbook’s chapter titled “The Role of the Judiciary in Our Society,” which referred to challenges such as corruption in the judiciary, pendency of cases, and shortage of judges. That’s not a polemic. That’s a syllabus. And the Supreme Court treated it as a threat. Every other powerful institution in India is subject to scrutiny. Parliament answers to voters. Ministers answer to Parliament and to courts. But the Supreme Court which holds the final word on your rights, your liberty, the validity of every law in the land answers to no one. It has been almost eight decades since independence and not once has the process resulted in a judge actually being removed from office.That’s not judicial independence. That’s something closer to judicial impunity.</p><h3>The Aravallis and What They Tell Us About Judicial Judgment</h3><p>Sometimes a court’s failings show up not in how it handles power, but in how it handles knowledge.</p><p>In November 2025, the Supreme Court was asked to settle a long-running dispute about the definition of the Aravalli Hills. A two-billion-year-old mountain range stretching across Delhi, Haryana, Rajasthan, and Gujarat, which serves as a critical ecological buffer against desertification for the entire Indo-Gangetic plain. The court accepted a government-led committee’s definition of the Aravalli Hills as landforms with an elevation of at least 100 metres from the ground. Straightforward enough, until you understand what that definition actually means on the ground.</p><p>An internal assessment by the Forest Survey of India found that just 1,048 hills out of 12,081 in Rajasthan meet that 100-metre threshold. Which means roughly 11,000 hills which is an overwhelming majority of the ancient range would fall outside the definition and lose their legal protections, opening them up to mining, real-estate development, and corporate acquisition. The amicus curiae appointed by the court itself warned that accepting this definition would “totally endanger the environment and ecology of the mountains” and strip the range of its continuity and integrity. The court accepted the definition<a href="https://india.mongabay.com/2025/12/with-a-new-identity-the-aravalli-hills-stare-at-an-uncertain-future/"> anyway</a></p><p>The ruling effectively undoes three decades of legal safeguards and removes protection from nearly 90 percent of the world’s oldest hills. The public backlash was swift enough that on December 29, a bench led by newly appointed Chief Justice Surya Kant decided to revisit the matter and stay the definition until a fair, impartial, independent expert opinion could be sought. Which is good. But it also raises the question: why did the court need a public firestorm to tell it something its own amicus had already put in writing?</p><h3>So What Actually Changes?</h3><p>The frustrating thing is that the solutions aren’t unknown. They’ve been sitting in Law Commission reports for decades, cited in speeches by retired judges at conferences where everyone nods and nothing happens.</p><p>Fill the vacancies. Create a transparent, time-bound appointment process. Expand fast-track courts aggressively. Replace the collegium with an appointments body that includes non-judicial voices. The UK, Canada, and South Africa all manage this without their judiciaries collapsing. Amend the Contempt of Courts Act to cover only demonstrably false, malicious statements, not honest criticism. Add a mandatory preliminary inquiry before arrest under provisions like 498A. And perhaps most urgently — stop treating public criticism of the court as an existential threat. A textbook that tells children courts have problems is not an attack. It’s civic education. The difference matters.</p><h3>Why I’m Still Here</h3><p>I want to end by being clear about something. I’m not writing this because I’ve decided the Indian judiciary is beyond saving. I’m writing it because I think it’s worth saving and because pretending the problems don’t exist is not the same as being optimistic.</p><p>This is the institution that delivered judgments on privacy, on environmental protection, on caste discrimination that genuinely changed lives. It has judges who are doing extraordinary work under conditions most people couldn’t imagine. That matters.</p><p>But good intentions inside a broken structure produce broken outcomes. And at some point, the people who care about the institution have to be the ones willing to say so.</p><p>That’s why I want to study law. Not to join a system and defend it as it is. But to understand it well enough to argue for what it should be.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=103e9328f61e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>