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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Y. C. on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Humanity Trumps Everything Else]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@iscyang/humanity-trumps-everything-else-e23f799f362d?source=rss-c2315780e8b4------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[world]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hong-kong]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[political-science]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Y. C.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 07 Oct 2019 08:51:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-10-07T10:27:49.678Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In response to a former tutor of mine’s responses to a Facebook post related to the violent wing of the Hong Kong anti-government movement</p><p>This person – let’s call him Joe – holds an MPhil and is currently pursuing a PhD in political theory at an elite university in the UK, and therefore is arguably more knowledgeable than me on numerous topics. I fully acknowledge my relative lack of academic background but will go on to respond to parts of his one particular comment that I found at fault with considerable certainty. Other comments also contained questionable points, which I shall not explore in this article.</p><ol><li>‘I wonder how you become [sic] a staunch liberal democrat…’</li></ol><p>I have never claimed to be a liberal democrat in my recent discussions of the Hong Kong crisis. My personal political ideology is relevant to my critical engagement with current affairs because my interest lies in an <strong>internal critique</strong> of a given political movement in an attempt to expose its self-contradictions within the fundamental premises set by its participants themselves. (This is also known as the <strong>Socratic method</strong>.)</p><p>In the case of Hong Kong, since protesters claim to be fighting for freedom and democracy and have appealed to Western liberal democracies such as the UK and the US for support, naturally the default theoretical framework within which to assess the logical coherence of the protesters would be liberal democracy.</p><p>Perhaps my failure to clarify the nature of my endeavour led to Joe’s presumption of my political ideology, which, again, is irrelevant.</p><p>2. ‘it is to a large extent holy liberal democratic values that have brought us to where we are now… There is no liberal democracy that is not also entirely capitalist; defending these values is at the same time defending the economic arrangement that embeds them.’</p><p>By ‘where we are now’, Joe seems to refer to the political crises we have seen in various Western countries. This is an entirely different topic that this article unfortunately does not adequate scope for. It suffices to say that the malfunctioning of liberal democratic systems today is largely a result of the intrusion by unprecedented levels of capitalism of the social and political institutions whose integrity is necessary for the proper functions of liberal democracy (media, education, healthcare, elections, etc.). It is rather simplistic to attribute the downfalls to liberal democratic values.</p><p>I also struggle to think of any example of an existing liberal democracy operating an ‘<em>entirely</em> capitalist’ system. Capitalism is first and foremost defined by the private ownership of the means of production and their operation for profit. By this definition, almost every country in the world today has a mixed economy combining characteristics of both capitalism and socialism, albeit to a wide range of degrees. Even the US, as one of the most capitalistic Western countries, has an mixed economic system whereby the state controls many goods and services. High levels of socialist elements exist in the economy of Canada, certain European countries, and Australia, all of which are considered liberal democracies.</p><p>Defending liberal democratic values does not entail defending capitalism. The former is a political structure whereas the latter is an economic model. The coincidence of the two today is a historical contingency, rather than a logical necessity.</p><p>3. ‘Let’s drop false hopes of peacefulness and civil order.’</p><p>Philosophically, I invite readers to refer to the doctrine of <em>jus bellum justum. </em>There is a sea of literature discussing the necessary criteria for any use of violence for political aims to be morally justified. I have yet to see<strong> unqualified</strong> endorsement of the use of force in political theories. Perhaps Joe will become the pioneering theorist in this regard.</p><p>Historically, let’s look at… Where do we even start? Nazi Germany?</p><p>Pragmatically, yes, foregoing peacefulness and civil order will persuade Beijing to grant Hong Kong the democracy some of the population want. Sounds about right.</p><p>4. ‘Besides, it is naive to think that one could meaningfully change what you have so correctly identified as Hong Kong’s exploitative system by reformist measures.’</p><p>Perhaps I am reading too much into this, but it does sound to me that Joe is putting words in my mouth again: I never claimed that ‘reformist measures’ can ‘meaningfully change’ Hong Kong’s exploitative economic system.</p><p>Taking a step back, more socialist elements in the economic system, such as higher minimum wage, better working conditions, more public housing, more state investment in healthcare and education, etc. will indeed improve ordinary Hong Kong people’s lives without completely overturning the generally capitalist system. Think Canada. Think Germany. Think Australia. Would that not be meaningful in the slightest?</p><p>A side point: it is very rich to call others ‘naive’ while finding fault with the use of terms such as ‘cognitive rigidity’. The former is arguably way more judgmental and condescending than the latter.</p><p>5. ‘None of these will change the exploitative practices from which you and I, the entire middle class and upwards, so greatly benefit while in Hong Kong.’</p><p>I struggle to understand what ‘exploitative practices’ Joe thinks I benefited from in Hong Kong.</p><p>I received a decent education from a government-funded public university — a socialist element</p><p>I enjoyed cheap and efficient public transport, such the MTR, which is partially owned by the Hong Kong government — a socialist element.</p><p>I enjoyed a safe environment ensured by a professional police force, who have been demonised in recent protests, and efficient government services — not inherently socialist but definitely not exploitative.</p><p>On the other hand, I struggled with my hugely unaffordable rent, as a result of property developer tyranny — classic neoliberalism. Coming from a single-parent household with an income much lower than the average income in Hong Kong, I believe I can relate to the underprivileged in the city more than someone from a country with one of the highest average incomes in the world and whose social media suggests a rather lavish lifestyle.</p><p>I can only assume Joe, due to his more privileged socio-economic position, benefited a great deal from ‘exploitative practices’.</p><p>6. ‘What happens in Hong Kong today can very quickly (and perhaps does already) happen [on] the mainland.’</p><p>An age-old prediction that has again and again failed to actualise. Western authors, such as Gordon G Chang and David Shambaugh, have proposed various China Collapse Theories, which the Communist Party, fortunately or unfortunately for the people, has defied with its endurance.</p><p>In fact, the recent upheavals in Hong Kong have pushed many liberal-minded Chinese intellectuals formerly sceptical of the government towards supporting the Chinese leadership and applauded their restraint from interfering. The racist attacks, reactionary colonial nostalgia, and widely spread violence have unfortunately alienated mainland liberals who used to sympathise with pro-democracy fractions of the Hong Kong population.</p><p>Disclaimer: this is an anecdotal observation that I formed through my interaction with numerous Chinese intellectuals on social media and my private conservations with close mainland friends both in China and overseas.</p><p>I would be interested to hear about what Joe’s assessment of the public sentiment on the mainland was based upon. Personal experience with a large number of mainland citizens? Analyses published in Western media by ‘China experts’ holding Western-centric world views and hardly able to speak the language?</p><p>7. ‘“Violence” comes in various forms…’</p><p>The ordinary meaning of ‘violence’ as defined by OED is ‘behaviour involving physical force intended to hurt, damage, or kill someone or something’. I used the term in its ordinary meaning.</p><p>Instead of directly responding to my condemnation of the ordinarily defined violence we have seen against law enforcement officers and civilians (both locals and mainlanders), Joe shifted to talk about a figurative meaning of the word ‘violence’, namely ‘what the government has done to the poorest and most underprivileged members of its society’.</p><p>The logic embedded in Joe’s and many others’ comments seems to be as follows:</p><p>The government failed the poor in Hong Hong. Therefore, people are angry. Therefore, whatever they do out of anger is justified, including violent acts against police officers and civilians.</p><p>No principles of justice that I know of supports this line of reasoning. Even the most crude theory of ‘an eye for an eye’ only justifies a wrong inflicted upon the original wrongdoer, not innocent bystanders.</p><p>That said, I am fully on board with the criticism against the government’s neoliberal economic policies and collusion with business interests that have resulted in the appalling level of wealth disparity in Hong Kong today. I made this point crystal clear in the very beginning in my replies and previous articles. This is why I attributed many of Hong Kong’s problems to unfettered capitalism. With due respect, I find it logically puzzling how Joe found fault with me criticising Hong Kong’s high degree of capitalism while also quick to express grievances about the social issues precisely brought out by it.</p><p>Back to physical violence:</p><p>I have always made it clear that my main criticism publicly voiced was directed at the<strong> violent fraction</strong> of the protesters <strong>only, </strong>especially those inflicting violence on innocent civilians, because I thought this would be rather uncontroversial. Clearly I was wrong. None of the commenters, including Joe, have explicitly concurred with my qualified condemnation of violent acts. They may not remember the doctrine of <em>jus in bello </em>taught in their political theory class. The lack of sympathy shown to the victims of barbarian acts of certain protesters calls for concerns with these commenters’ moral integrity. It is especially troubling considering some of them may become university faculty.</p><p>Had I stayed in Hong Kong after university, I could have been one of those mainlanders viciously attacked on the streets for speaking Mandarin, one of the Chinese dialects that have been spoken in Hong Kong since at least early 20th century, or for being born somewhere that I did not choose to.</p><p>In the original post, I opened up for the first time publicly about my previous severe mental health issues, which led to suicidal thoughts in my final days in the city, partially as a result of the the daily racism I had experienced over 3.5 years. Several friends from other Asian countries have confessed similar feelings to me. Neither did Joe acknowledge that in any significant way in his multiple responses. Perhaps because he was of the clearly preferred race in the former colony. This factor matters because it helps us contextualise the current movement with regard to Hong Kong’s history, the wider history of colonialism and Sinophobia in the West.</p><p>I have attempted to take an academic pall approach to explore these issues from philosophical, historical, economic and psychological perspectives and to keep my discussions as impersonal as possible. I never judged the protesters on a personal level because I understand their world views are a product of the particular social environment of Hong Kong. I never intended to be patronising and tell the protesters what to do. My mission is to offer alternative perspectives to understand the crisis in contrast with the mainstream narrative we have seen in Western media outlets.</p><p>My intended audience is people who are interested in investigating the movement as a case study to learn more about civility, not the protesters.</p><p>However, when the violence got out of hand and I realised I could have easily been one of the victims, dark memories of the discrimination and bullying made a comeback. Rioters crossed a line and represented anything but liberal and democratic values that the fetishised version of Hong Kong supposedly embodies.</p><p>When I condemn the violence and the pretentiousness, some seem totally unbothered by the hate speech and malicious violence taking place on Hong Kong’s streets on a daily basis. The lack of awareness of one’s privilege demonstrated by these people is rather worrisome.</p><p>Humanity trumps everything else.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e23f799f362d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Lessons Hong Kong Has Taught Us about Colonialism and Identity Politics]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@iscyang/lessons-hong-kong-has-taught-us-about-colonialism-and-identity-politics-fd177900c9e8?source=rss-c2315780e8b4------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[world]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hong-kong]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[colonialism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Y. C.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 25 Sep 2019 07:26:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-09-26T06:34:48.959Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Since the publishing of my first article on Hong Kong, I have received mostly positive feedback. However, a few from young Hongkongers were provocative at best and abusive at worst. They all brought up widely spread misconceptions that I had already rebutted in the original article, such as that the mainland judicial system is wholly untrustworthy, and that the Hong Kong Police have used more violence than the police of any civilised country (which, in many Hong Kong youth’s eyes, means the likes of Britain and America) would have in similar circumstances. And invariably and unsurprisingly, instead of engaging in rational and factual discussions, they all ended with an ugly personal attack explicitly or implicitly along the lines of ‘You are brainwashed by the Chinese state and totally uncredible because you are from mainland China’. Sounds familiar?</p><blockquote><a href="https://time.com/4473972/donald-trump-mexico-meeting-insult/">Donald Trump</a> kicked off his presidential bid more than a year ago with harsh words for Mexico. “They are not our friend, believe me,” he said, before disparaging Mexican immigrants: “They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.”</blockquote><p>And more concerningly,</p><blockquote><a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/nazi-racism-an-overview">The doctrine of racism</a> asserts that blood determines national-ethnic identity. Within a racist framework, the value of a human being is <strong>not determined by his or her individuality, but instead by membership in a so-called “racial collective nation.”</strong> … Racism, including racial antisemitism (prejudice against or hatred of Jews based on false biological theories), was always an integral part of German National Socialism (Nazism).</blockquote><p>This brings us to one of the most important points I hope to make about the protests: it is an identity politics movement characterised by nativism and sinophobia in a postcolonial, neoliberal setting more than anything else that it purports to be.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/0*CWKMBI-ZphSMSnlD" /><figcaption>You just can’t make this up. Former colonial subjects waving the colonial flag and telling their fellow countrymen to get out of Chinese soil.</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Jewish Self-hatred</strong></p><p>Loosely speaking, the term ‘Self-hating Jew’ refers to a Jewish person who holds certain types of antisemitic views. The phenomenon of auto-antisemitism started in 18th and 19th centuries Germany. When Jews became accepted in German society as fellow citizens after centuries’ oppression and discrimination, some Jews pursued further integration and social recognition by adopting the Gentile lifestyle, which, for some, meant conversion from Judaism to Christianity, receiving a German education, speaking German instead of Yiddish, etc. For them, Germanness and Jewishness became two opposing identities: modern versus ancient, good and bad, civilised versus backward. Later in the 19th and 20th centuries, some Jewish progressives started criticising their own people. Some took it to extremes and expressed views that would be considered antisemitic today.</p><p>Some of these critiques were not genuine self-reflection, but rather blind internalisation of European society’s long-held prejudice and discrimination against Jews.</p><p>This phenomenon has been explained in modern social psychology with the theory of internalised oppression. For example, <a href="http://www.jcpa.org/phas/phas-046-levin.htm">Kenneth Levin</a>, a psychiatrist and historian at Harvard University, attributed the Jewish self-hatred to the following causes</p><blockquote>Segments of populations under chronic siege commonly embrace the indictments of the besiegers, however bigoted and outrageous. They hope that by doing so and reforming accordingly they can assuage the hostility of their tormenters and win relief. This has been an element of the Jewish response to anti-Semitism throughout the history of the Diaspora.</blockquote><blockquote>The paradigm on the level of individual psychology is the psychodynamics of abused children, who almost invariably blame themselves for their predicament, ascribe it to their being “bad,” and nurture fantasies that by becoming “good” they can mollify their abusers and end their torment.</blockquote><p><strong>Racism in British Hong Kong</strong></p><p>A parallel can be drawn between Jews in pre-Nazi Germany and local Chinese in British Hong Kong to a large degree.</p><p>British Sinophobia traces all the way back to Shakespeare’s days and is well documented in history. There is a wealth of <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057%2F9780230288508_6">literature</a> that can be drawn upon. It could be seen all across the British Empire, in America, Australia, and undoubtedly, Hong Kong. Similar to Jews in 18th century Germany, Hong Kong Chinese were seen as backward and therefore treated as second-class citizens for the most part of the colonial era.</p><p><em>A Concise History of Hong Kong</em> written by Prof John M. Carroll, a leading historian in Hong Kong history and my former lecturer, provides a fantastic account of colonial rule.</p><blockquote>Sources do not reveal much about how the Chinese viewed the Europeans, but Europeans often complained about the smells and sounds from the Chinese community: open-air markets and incense, musical instruments and firecrackers from religious ceremonies, and the cries of hawkers and peddlers. European residents also frequently criticized the government for allowing Chinese residents to run “houses of disreputable women” in or near European neighborhoods and to profane the Christian Sabbath by holding theatrical performances on Sunday. Both European residents and colonial officials often complained that the Chinese built flimsy wood structures that were too close together, increasing the risk of fire and the spread of disease. This contact between Chinese and British led to racism on both sides, but it particularly made many Europeans think of themselves as members of a special community.</blockquote><p>Even after the emergence of a new class of Hong Kong Chinese who had become wealthy through business endeavours in the late 1800s and early 1900s, local Chinese continued to face prejudice and discrimination.</p><blockquote>Despite their status and wealth, the members of the Chinese bourgeoisie, like all Chinese in Hong Kong, continued to face racial discrimination at every turn. Racial segregation was enforced both legally and informally. In 1901 a group of Europeans petitioned the colonial government for a separate school for Europeans, arguing that integrated education harmed the morality and character of European children. Although one Chinese resident complained in the local press that “to exclude Chinese from certain schools means to go against the law of nature and to aggravate the hatred between Chinese and foreigners”9 and Secretary for the Colonies Chamberlain condemned the proposal, it enjoyed great support among European parents and the colonial government. Ironically, the new school, the Kowloon British School, had originally been built and presented to the colonial government by the Eurasian Robert Ho Tung as a school for all races. Ho Tung now reluctantly agreed, regretting a decision “so opposed to the spirit which prompted my offer of the school to the Colony.” Chinese were barred from the Hong Kong Club and the Hong Kong Jockey Club, and in some hotels Chinese guests could stay only in certain rooms or could not stay overnight.</blockquote><p>Victoria Peak, one of Hong Kong’s most iconic scenic spots today, was reserved as an exclusive residential area for non-Chinese between 1904 and 1930 under the Peak Reservation Ordinance.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*HIsW0NwuJFU64klI.jpg" /><figcaption>Government House, the former official residence of the Governer of Hong Kong and the current residence of the Chief Executive</figcaption></figure><blockquote>According to Hong Kong’s constitution, laid out in the Letters Patent of April 5, 1843, Hong Kong would be run by a governor appointed by the British Crown. The governor would administer the colony with help from a lieutenant governor, a colonial secretary, an Executive Council, and a Legislative Council. The two councils were each to have both official and nonofficial members appointed by the governor. Often described as the governor’s cabinet, the Executive Council was mainly an advisory body with members drawn primarily from the British business elite. Its members, however, sometimes disagreed with the governor and served to restrain his power. Until the 1880s, members of the Legislative Council were almost all non-Chinese. Although this basic constitutional framework saw minor modifications over the years, it experienced no significant changes until the early 1980s.</blockquote><p>In face of racial discrimination, local Chinese elite and Eurasians responded by adopting Western social activities and establishing their own exclusive social spaces similar to those of the Europeans.</p><blockquote>As in the British clubs, the Chinese Recreation Club’s screening process was rigorous, and membership fees were high. Club rules were strict, and proper cricket and tennis whites were required. The club’s directors and members were some of the best-known Chinese and Eurasian men of the colony.</blockquote><p><strong>Emergence of A Local Identity</strong></p><p>Up until the 1967 riots launched by local factory workers against exploitation, <a href="https://www.ghi-dc.org/fileadmin/user_upload/GHI_Washington/Publications/Supplements/Supplement_6/bus6_079.pdf">‘Hong Kong had operated under the typical colonial marriage of authoritative government and a small but powerful community of businessmen and industrialists’</a>.</p><p>The riots eventually prompted the colonial government to invest in public infrastructure and social welfare and increase representation of local Chinese in the government. Meanwhile, the government implemented a number of policies to cultivate a<a href="https://www.ghi-dc.org/fileadmin/user_upload/GHI_Washington/Publications/Supplements/Supplement_6/bus6_079.pdf"> Hong Kong identity</a>.</p><blockquote>After the suppression of the rioting, the British continued to be wary of the revolutionary zeal still raging in China at the time of the Cultural Revolution. It was, consequently, important, for thesake of eff ective governance, to nurture a sense of Hong Kong identity to counter the Chinese threat. Using various measures, such as cultural and recreational activities, the government started a long-term campaign to promote Hong Kong as a modern, orderly,<br>international city, in contrast to China, which it portrayed as chaotic,<br>poor, and backward.</blockquote><p>Since the Communist Party took over the mainland in 1940s, there had been huge contrasts between Hong Kong and mainland China: stability versus chaos, capitalism versus communism, Western versus Chinese, free versus unfree, wealthy versus poor, developed versus backward. These contrasts were especially pronounced during a series of tragedies that happened on the mainland, such as the Great Famine and the Cultural Revolution.</p><p>As China opened up itself to the outside world and industrialised rapidly, Hong Kong has become a lot less special. However, a sense of specialness endured among mang Hong Kong people, especially the young. Post-handover, the old colonial system with which the British governed is still very much in place. The difference is, local business tycoons have replaced their old British partners as the new overlords of Hong Kong. The continuation of this system has led to appalling levels of income disparity and social segregation along economic and cultural lines. China becomes an easy target for ordinary people to direct their anger at. Anti-China sentiments in Western media were quickly picked up by local youth and taken to extremes. Mainstream local media have been full of negative coverage of China, from misbehaving mainland tourists, to product quality scandals.</p><p>On the other hand, by glorifying the colonial history, even the ordinary people can maintain a sense of moral and cultural superiority to their mainland counterparts. All colonial legacies, regardless of their impact on Hong Kong, have become cherished.</p><p>For example, English, the former ruler’s language, remains one of the two official languages of Hong Kong and is widely used as the business and academic language. A high proficiency is necessary for young people to enter ‘high-end professions’, such as finance, law, medicine and academia. Wealthy Hongkongers tend to send their children to ridiculously expensive English-speaking international schools and eventually English-speaking countries for university education. The insistence on English in elite industries has constituted a barrier for those who are not fortunate enough to receive an English-language education. Nonetheless, Hong Kong people take great pride in their ability to speak (some) English, a symbol of their mixed heritage, despite the noticeable decline of English proficiency since the handover.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/768/0*DwmPL9IU9oILxQ0h.jpg" /><figcaption>The SAR government’s plan to demolish the Queen’s Pier drew fierce demonstration in 2007.</figcaption></figure><p>My alma mater, the University of Hong Kong, as the oldest university in the territory, is a prime example of such deeply engrained racial and cultural hierarchy in Hong Kong society. It brands itself as a Western-style university with English as the main instruction medium while most non-academic activities are dominated by local students and conducted in Cantonese. Non-local students who do not look Western enough (read ‘Caucasian’) routinely face isolation at best, hostility at worst, from local students. Juwon Park, a recent graduate, wrote a brilliant <a href="https://medium.com/@Iamjuwonpark/was-i-too-part-of-hku-76aacea6f8ae">article</a> on this issue.</p><p>Another colonial legacy that has yet to be repealed is the <em>lassez faire</em> economic policy. With free flow of capital, little government intervention and low taxes, Hong Kong has become a capitalist heaven, constantly ranked as <a href="https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings">one of the best places to do business</a> in the world. Neoliberalism is more pronounced in Hong Kong than in the US or the UK and has caused serious social problems, such as wholly unaffordable property prices. However, Hong Kong has yet to see a socialist movement akin to those that have taken shape in the West in recent years, exemplified by Jeremy Corbyn and Bernie Sanders.</p><p><strong>Sinophobia in Postcolonial Hong Kong</strong></p><p>Negative sentiments against mainland Chinese are certainly justified in certain cases, given China’s mixed international reputation and a flux of mainland tourists who grew up in Mao’s China or its destructive legacies. However, such innocent grievances can easily lead to an us-versus-them nativism, especially when combined with often grossly exaggerated coverage by local media, Hong Kong’s declining economic superiority and cultural influence, deeply engrained colonial hierarchy, and widening wealth gaps.</p><p>With 92% of its population being ethnic Han-Chinese, Hong Kong is Chinese. The proportion in other Han-majority jurisdictions: mainland China (91.51%), Taiwan (95%), Macau (95%) and Singapore (76.2%).</p><p>Legally speaking, the vast majority of Hong Kong’s permanent residents are PRC citizens and hold the <strong>HKSAR passport</strong>, a type of PRC passport specially designed for Hong Kong residents of Chinese nationality.</p><p>Some Hongkongers who were born prior to the 1997 handover also hold the <strong>British National (Overseas) passport</strong> and thereby are British nationals. However, they are not British citizens and the ‘British’ passport does not grant them the right of abode in the UK. The supposed British nationality is also unrecognised by the EU.</p><p>Despite their cultural heritage being predominantly Chinese with Western influences and their legal status as PRC citizens, many protesters have hurled anti-Chinese racial slurs this year while branding themselves as ‘Hongkongers’, a distinct and, inferrably, superior category from ‘Chinese’.</p><p>On 21st July, thousands of anti-government protesters vandalised Beijing’s Liason Office in Hong Kong and spray-painted ‘fk Chee-na’ on the walls.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*HthVELfGSriMKvIC.jpg" /></figure><p>The use of the term ‘Chee-na’ by young localist activists in Hong Kong dates years back. Successful in the 2016 Legislative Council election, Sixtus Leung and Yau Wai-ching, two pro-independence activitists who had participated in the Umbrella Revolution in 2014, pronounced ‘China’ as ‘Chee-na’ during the oathtaking ceremony. Yau also inserted the f-word in her oath. Both were subsequently disqualified.</p><blockquote>Jan Kiely, a professor of Chinese studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, said in an email that “strong feelings” were stirred in Chinese people when the Japanese Empire used the word to refer to China during its incursions into Chinese territory, from the 1894–95 Sino-Japanese War through World War II. For many Chinese today, Professor Kiely said, Chee-na recalls the sufferings of the occupation and references a Japanese imperial sense that the Chinese were inherently inferior.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*GIjTKaZZwaojbeZJ.jpg" /><figcaption>Sixtus Leung wearing a flag written ‘Hong Kong Is Not China’ at the ceremony.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/717/0*3phb-XfUVftdh5TM" /><figcaption>In 2012, angry at mainland prenant women entering Hong Kong to give birth, localists advertised on a local newspaper, depicting mainland women as lotuses, a common insult against mainlanders.</figcaption></figure><p>Using the same term as used by Japanese imperialists who inflicted decades of inhuman atrocities upon millions in China who they deemed inferior is a clear demonstration of the nativist nature of at least a considerable part of the current movement. It bears striking resemblance with the alt-right movement in America. Therefore, it should not have come as surprise that protesters marched to the US consulate in Hong Kong calling for Donald Trump to <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/09/08/asia/hong-kong-us-protests-0809-intl-hnk/index.html">‘liberate Hong Kong’</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/780/0*0Bgu2qejYdM4tJLl.jpg" /></figure><p>The ‘pro-democracy’ movement may not be as noble as it sounds. There is nothing wrong with fighting for democracy with legitimate means. However, the use of racist language goes against the very spirit of liberal democracy.</p><p>One of the values often cited by protesters is the freedom of political expression. Even in Western political discourse, this freedom, like many other freedoms, is not without limits. Hate speech on racial grounds is legally prohibited in many Western countries.</p><p>There is no doubt that some among the protesters are genuinely fighting for democracy for its own sake. For others, given the strong Sinophobic rhetoric used, one could not help but wonder if demanding a Western-style democratic system is yet another way for them to distinguish themselves from the backward Chinese that the colonialists looked down upon for centuries.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fd177900c9e8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Hong Kong Political Crisis and London Stock Exchange]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@iscyang/hong-kong-political-crisis-and-london-stock-exchange-ddf1594c1684?source=rss-c2315780e8b4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ddf1594c1684</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[stock-market]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[london]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brexit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hong-kong]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Y. C.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 15 Sep 2019 16:34:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-09-16T03:52:15.143Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>A geopolitical analysis of LSEG’s rejection of HKEX acquisition proposal</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/620/0*AZp93M5lzWSQyD0V" /></figure><p>Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing (HKEX) made a £32bn bid to take over the entire capital share of the London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG), only to be rejected almost immediately with a ‘unanimous’ decision of the LSEG board. A <a href="https://www.lseg.com/resources/media-centre/press-releases/rejection-conditional-proposal-hkex?accepted=7fb14a8832df8bd1588e1b0fc2e9fd44">letter</a> written by the LSEG chairman, Don Robert, to HKEX’s Xiaojia Li and Laura Cha was published by the Group, implying the UK company’s global strategy, including its China strategy, amid Brexit, political tension in Hong Kong and China’s financial liberalisation.</p><ol><li><strong>The Acquisition of Refinitiv</strong></li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/620/0*3ETmzLVM68Arz03H.jpg" /></figure><p>Termination of LSEG’s announced acquisition of Refinitiv was one of the conditions attached to the proposal by HKEX. In response to this, LSEG reaffirmed its commitment to the transaction</p><blockquote>It is a transformational transaction, strategically and financially. The combined global business will be headquartered and domiciled in the UK with a premium listing in London.</blockquote><p>Refinitiv is a global provider of financial markets data and infrastructure jointly owned by Blackstone Group LP and Thomson Reuters. The £22bn all-share deal has been considered a strategic move by LSEG to compete with Bloomberg LP for the domination of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/aug/01/london-stock-exchange-agrees-22bn-deal-to-buy-refinitiv">global financial infrastructure</a> and expand in America, the world’s biggest financial market, and Asian markets. This is a deal that will boost LSE’s global reach and bring about technological upgrades of its businesses that will generate long-term benefits. The proposed HKEX transaction is way less appealing by contrast, the reasons for which will be explained below.</p><p><strong>2. Hong Kong-Mainland Relations</strong></p><p>The months-long turmoil in Hong Kong has greatly jeopardise its reputation as an international financial centre with safety, stability and the rule of law. LSEG’s confidence in the city’s future naturally would dwindle.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/283/1*bhd_Pi0IJgXO3TKHC-Tgig.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.ig.com/au/trading-strategies/what-are-the-largest-stock-exchanges-in-the-world--180905">World’s top 10 stock exchanges by cap as of March 2018</a></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iC1koRzVW6WlWxrUTztqog.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.fool.com/investing/2018/10/12/the-top-10-largest-stocks-in-hong-kong-2018-vs-200.aspx">Mainland companies replaced Hong Kong/UK ones over the years.</a></figcaption></figure><p>The financial and insurance sector is the single largest industry of Hong Kong, accounting for <a href="https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/sp80.jsp?tableID=189&amp;ID=0&amp;productType=8">18.9% of the GDP</a> in 2017, and it relies <em>disproportionally</em> on the Chinese market.</p><p>Hong Kong Stock Exchange, owned by HKEX, is the world’s fifth-largest stock market by capitalisation. Half of its listed companies and nine out of the ten biggest companies listed there are from mainland China (HSBC the only exception). These nine mainland companies are all state-owned except Tencent. In 2018, the Hong Kong stock exchange <a href="https://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/2179283/hong-kong-easily-regains-2018-global-ipo-crown-new-york-thanks">dethroned</a> New York as the largest IPO market in the world, boosted by major listings of Chinese tech giants, such as Xiaomi and Meituan Dianping.</p><p>Given the outsize role played by mainland Chinese companies in the stock market of Hong Kong, the escalating anti-government unrest in the city surely is going to take a toll on Hong Kong’s appeal to mainland companies. So it should not come as a surprise that the LSEG board considered ‘unattractive’ the HKEX shares consideration proposed as 3/4 of the total consideration.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2Fvideoseries%3Flist%3DPLU53TFeKvG2f5SDmC-jSpbynAsKRjbKPr%26start%3D0&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D0R6-vM8_bAY&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2F0R6-vM8_bAY%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/cee351c9be68ec479c6bd67a31d82360/href">https://medium.com/media/cee351c9be68ec479c6bd67a31d82360/href</a></iframe><blockquote>We note that three-quarters of your proposed consideration is in HKEX shares, representing a fundamentally different and much less attractive investment proposition to our shareholders. We see the value of your share consideration as inherently uncertain. The <strong>ongoing situation in Hong Kong</strong> adds to this uncertainty. Furthermore, we question the sustainability of HKEX’s position as a strategic gateway in the longer term.</blockquote><p>HKEX’s high concentration on Asian markets also does not align with LSEG’s strategy to achieve worldwide reach.</p><blockquote>In stark contrast, the <strong>high geographic concentration</strong> and <strong>heavy exposure to market transaction volumes</strong> in your business would represent a significant backward step for LSEG strategically.</blockquote><p><strong>3. Ties with HKSAR Government</strong></p><p>Another factor that has caused concern for LSEG executives is HKEX’s ties with the Hong Kong government, who is the biggest shareholder of the company and appoints half of its board members. Consequently, the published letter, Robert expressed his company’s doubts regarding the deliverability of the proposal, citing a number of potential hurdles</p><blockquote>Your proposal would be subject to full scrutiny from a number of financial regulators, as well as governmental entities under, for example, the UK Enterprise Act, the CFIUS process in the US, and the ‘golden powers’ regime in Italy. There is no doubt that your <strong>unusual Board structure</strong> and <strong>your relationship with the Hong Kong government</strong> will complicate matters. Accordingly, your assertion that implementation of a transaction would be “swift and certain” is simply not credible. On the contrary, we judge that <strong>the approval processes would be exhaustive </strong>and that support from relevant parties, vital for the transaction, is highly uncertain. This would pose serious risk for our shareholders.</blockquote><p>The following examples are to illustrate how the transaction is likely to have been struck out in LSEG’s major markets during the approval processes as a result of HKEX’s board and ownership structures.</p><ul><li><strong>CFIUS (Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States)</strong></li></ul><p>The CFIUS process is an important mechanism of the US’s long-arm jurisdiction (which Western media rarely criticise).</p><p>The Committee was created in 1988 by the <em>Exon-Florio Amendment to the Defense Production Act </em>(1950) and its statutory power was amended by the <em>Foreign Investment and National Security Act </em>(2007). Under this framework, the President may review ‘any merger, acquisition, or takeover … by or with any foreign person which could result in foreign control of any person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States’ through the Committee. Transactions deemed risky to US national security can be suspended or prohibited or have conditions imposed on them by the President.</p><p>The jurisdiction of CFIUS extends to all transactions involving ‘US businesses’, which include <a href="https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/overview-CFIUS-process">‘foreign-to-foreign deals in which the target has one<br>or more US subsidiaries or significant US assets or operations’</a>. The proposed transaction clearly is within the scope, with LSEG owning multiple subsidiaries in America (e.g. LSEG US Holdco Inc, FTSE Russell and MilleniumIT).</p><p>Amid an ongoing US-China trade war, HKEX’s close ties to the Hong Kong government, and by extension, Beijing, would give the US a perfect excuse to prohibit the transaction as far as LSEG’s US operations are concerned.</p><ul><li><strong>‘Golden Powers’ Regime</strong></li></ul><p>This regime in Italy is similar to the CFIUS framework, granting a number of powers to the State which may be exercised in the event of any extraordinary<br>transactions concerning companies doing business in ‘strategic sectors’ (defence, national security, communications, energy, and transport). In this regard, LSEG owns Borsa Italiana, Italy’s only stock exchange, and Cassa di Compensazione e Garanzia (CC&amp;G), an Italian-based risk management and clearing service provider.</p><p><strong>4. LSEG’s China Strategy</strong></p><p>HKEX’s market competitiveness lies in its role in connecting fast-expanding mainland Chinese businesses with the global market. However, Hong Kong may not be able to capitalise on its status as a financial gateway to China for much longer.</p><p>The increasingly violent protests have jeopardised the city’s reputation as a safe place to conduct business. The failure of the police force to effectively enforce the law upon rioters pose questions to the integrity of the rule of law in Hong Kong. The growing anti-China sentiment among the city’s youth and direct challenges to China’s sovereignty over Hong Kong also will discourage China-related listing and trading activities.</p><p>Perhaps most importantly, Hong Kong is not as irreplaceable to the Chinese economy as it used to be. The Chinese market has become much more closely connected with the global market through Beijing’s various initiatives.</p><p>In June 2019, both the Chinese and the UK financial regulatory bodies approved the establishment of the <a href="https://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2019/07/launch-shanghai-london-stock-connect">Shanghai-London Stock Connect</a>, through which eligible companies listed on either the LSE or the Shanghai Stock Exchange can issue, list and trade depositary receipts on the other. The SLSC gives both sides direct access to each other’s primary market and secondary market. The following quote from Robert’s letter is a strong vote of confidence in SLSC’s value to LSEG</p><blockquote>We recognise the scale of the opportunity in China and value greatly our relationships there. However, we do not believe HKEX provides us with the best long-term positioning in Asia or the best listing / trading platform for China. We value our mutually beneficial <strong>partnership with the Shanghai Stock Exchange</strong> which is our <strong>preferred and direct</strong> channel to access the many opportunities with China.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*MPn5Ib4taFNPHC8u.jpg" /></figure><p>London has also capitalised on China’s push for RMB internatialisation. In 2018, the UK was the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/3e47f0c6-2acb-11e9-a5ab-ff8ef2b976c7">biggest offshore RMB trading hub</a> in the world. According to the <a href="https://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/business/asia-programme/greater-china/Documents/london-rmb-business-quartely-july-2019.pdf">London RMB Business Quarterly</a> published in July, London now represents nearly half of all RMB foreign exchange trading. ‘This report shows yet again that London continues to dominate the RMB offshore market. More importantly, it reveals that the fundamentals of London remain strong in the face of uncertainty, particularly in terms of foreign exchange,’ said Catherine McGuinness, policy chair at the City of London Corporation.</p><p>Given the post-Brexit uncertainty facing London, the city will foreseeably push ever harder to become China’s most preferred overseas financial service provider.</p><p>Domestically, China has made numerous policy moves to further open up its financial sector to foreign markets. In October 2018, the pilot Free Trade Zone in Shanghai issued a ‘negative list’ for cross-border services trade, which contains special management measures for foreign investment in certain industries, with a focus on the financial industry. Sub-categories featured on the list include currency-related financial services, capital markets services, insurance, and other financial services. Similar opening-up measures will likely be rolled out in other FTZs as the Shanghai FTZ has long been a testing ground for China’s economic reforms.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*gbN1bGaC_nkFDZO1.jpg" /></figure><p>Just over the border, Shenzhen is poised to become the testing ground for another round of bold legal and financial reforms, announced by Beijing a month ago, amid unprecedentedly intense anti-government protests in Hong Kong. The detailed plan unveiled included an expansion of financial regulations and financial products available to trade bonds and foreign exchange.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2F4g-XqKmatLs%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D4g-XqKmatLs&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2F4g-XqKmatLs%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/1a5ea254f1ef0c668411e2d53c24b451/href">https://medium.com/media/1a5ea254f1ef0c668411e2d53c24b451/href</a></iframe><p>These wide-ranging reforms will attract an increasing number of international corporations to move their regional headquarters from Hong Kong to Beijing or Shanghai, or even Shenzhen.</p><p>Moreover, China has evolved into a world leader in FinTech and mobile payments. (Last time I visited Hong Kong, there were still cash-only restaurants. This would be imaginable even in a third-tier city in mainland China.) The list goes on.</p><p>Even Hong Kong’s comparative advantage of having a fleet of Chinese-English bilingual professionals has greatly diminished. In Beijing and Shanghai today, there are large numbers of Western-educated young mainlanders who are just as proficient in English as are their Hong Kong peers, if not more. Looking further away, Singaporeans arguably speak both better Mandarin and better English than the younger generation in Hong Kong.</p><p>Hong Kong’s only advantage that has remained intact is perhaps its independent common law judiciary. However, this advantage alone is insufficient to retain businesses. Peter Guy <a href="https://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/1652505/hong-kongs-future-financial-hub-under-threat-mainland-china">commented</a></p><blockquote>Hong Kong has a reliable judiciary, but this only means that banks will keep a minor presence in the city in order to maintain a Western legal entity. The mainland’s legal system is ill-suited for litigating complex financial transactions, so this will probably require a large, dedicated, legal and compliance team based in Shanghai or Beijing.</blockquote><p>This also explains the rapid expansion of top-tier UK and US law firms on the mainland.</p><p><strong>The lesson from the failed deal—</strong></p><p>Hong Kong’s prosperity has owed much to China’s economic growth over the last few decades. It has been a mutually beneficial relationship. However, Hong Kong no longer has the bargaining power as in the past. Its future economic prosperity lies in Beijing’s hands. Democracy or not, Beijing’s growing suspicion over Hong Kong’s loyalty is bound to prove costly to the city’s most valuable industry, among others. As Peter Guy pointed out,</p><blockquote>Hong Kong will have to reinvent itself again because it has underestimated the mainland’s ability to adapt and evolve. Ironically, perhaps Hong Kong could become more like Vancouver, where the absence of manufacturing, corporate and bank headquarters has resulted in a chronic shortage of good jobs. At the same time, the mainland’s demand for property has made Vancouver an expensive place to buy a home, like Hong Kong.</blockquote><blockquote>Hong Kong continued to prosper as the mainland’s financial service provider after losing all of its [manufacturing] industry to the mainland. But Hong Kong’s private and public sectors need to start planning today for a future without an international financial industry.</blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ddf1594c1684" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What the (Western) World Got Wrong about Hong Kong Protests]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@iscyang/what-the-western-world-got-wrong-about-hong-kong-protests-350356dcc567?source=rss-c2315780e8b4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/350356dcc567</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[democracy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hong-kong]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[protest]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rule-of-law]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Y. C.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 11 Sep 2019 23:01:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-09-24T07:00:08.589Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>What the World Got Wrong about Hong Kong Protests (Part I)</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/736/0*iOKdBbefnQKXe5Vh" /></figure><p><em>The ‘world’ in the title really just refers to the Anglophone world. This is a series of articles written in response to the grossly biased and one-sided coverage of this year’s Hong Kong protests in Western English-language media based on legal, economic and socio-historical analysis, and my living experience of witnessing the escalation of the political crisis as a former university student in Hong Kong in 2014 — 2018. As a believer in liberal democratic values, I do not side with either Beijing or the protesters on this particular issue, but only facts, logical coherence, and open discussion.</em></p><p><em>The current unrest is about much more than the extradition bill. It is deeply rooted in Hong Kong’s unique history, political and economic structure, and cultural identity. This article mainly introduces the legal technicalities surrounding the proposed amendment itself, whereas upcoming articles will seek to address the broader issues facing Hong Kong and causes thereof.</em></p><ol><li><strong><em>‘The Extradition Bill was China’s effort to further erode Hong Kong’s freedoms.’</em></strong></li></ol><p>Many seem to assume that the Chinese government was behind the initial proposition of the bill despite the total lack of evidence suggesting such. On the contrary, at a recent closed-door meeting with a group of Hong Kong business elite, Carrie Lam admitted</p><blockquote>This is not something instructed, coerced by the central government. This is out of a good intention, myself and some of my key colleagues to try to plug legal loopholes in Hong Kong’s system, very much prompted by our compassion for a single case, and this has proven to be very unwise given the circumstances.</blockquote><p>according to a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-protests-carrielam-transcrip/exclusive-if-i-have-a-choice-the-first-thing-is-to-quit-hong-kong-leader-carrie-lam-transcript-idUSKCN1VO0KK">recording</a> obtained by Reuters.</p><p>Hong Kong currently has extradition agreements signed with <a href="https://www.doj.gov.hk/eng/laws/table4ti.html">20 jurisdictions </a>around the world. In contrast, for example, the UK has <a href="https://www.gov.uk/guidance/extradition-processes-and-review#extradition-from-the-uk-european-arrest-warrant-eaw">pacts</a> with 28 European jurisdictions under part 1 of the Extradition Act 2003 and 116 territories under part 2 of the Act, including UAE and a number of Latin American and African countries.</p><p>The proposal was ostensibly prompted by the murder of a pregnant Hong Kong woman by her Hong Kong boyfriend in Taipei, who fled back to Hong Kong after the alleged crime. Without an extradition arrangement between the two jurisdictions, the killer was unable to be extradited to Taiwan to stand trial. This is, without denial, a major ‘legal loophole’, and it is not hard to imagine how Hong Kong may have served a haven for fugitives from many other jurisdictions in the world, including mainland China, for the same reason.</p><p>As Grenville Cross QC, former Director of Public Prosecutions of Hong Kong, said, the bill was ‘an important initiative in terms of international criminal justice’ and ‘Hong Kong undoubtedly has an international obligation to help other jurisdictions to combat crime’.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2Fss6cctgILkU%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3Dss6cctgILkU&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2Fss6cctgILkU%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/34b16c170ae622d407306b3fa48d500b/href">https://medium.com/media/34b16c170ae622d407306b3fa48d500b/href</a></iframe><p>The proposed amendment was not directed at mainland China or Taiwan either, but rather to <a href="https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr18-19/english/hc/papers/hc20190412ls-65-e.pdf">allow for extradition</a> on a case-by-case basis with any place in the world not already covered by mutual agreements.</p><blockquote>2. The main purposes of the Bill are to:</blockquote><blockquote>…</blockquote><blockquote>(b) amend the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Ordinance<br>(Cap. 525) so that arrangements for mutual legal assistance made<br>between Hong Kong and <strong>any place outside Hong Kong</strong> (including any<br>other part of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”)) may be given<br>effect.</blockquote><p>Admittedly, Carrie Lam may well have had in mind the goal to add a political achievement to her tenure that would be well appreciated by Beijing. It nonetheless will remain a groundless presumption that Beijing instructed her to propose the amendment for the purpose of eroding Hong Kong’s legal independence until compelling evidence suggests so. To attribute the indeed ‘unwise’ proposal to Beijing’s prerogative not only is presumptuous but also constitute an apparent conspiracy theory to stir up the already growing anti-mainland sentiments in Hong Kong, especially among the youth, which directly led to the initial eruption of protests. Such speculatory accusations have been given the effect of facts in Western media’s coverage, which is hardly surprising given the assumption that China is the biggest enemy of liberal democracy in current Western political discourse.</p><p><strong><em>2. ‘The Bill, if passed, would have allowed Beijing’s perceived dissidents to be sent to the mainland and subject to arbitrary sentencing.’</em></strong></p><p>It suffices to make three points on this widely spread misconception.</p><p><em>a) The mainland criminal justice system may not be as gruesome as it sounds.</em></p><p>China certainly does not have a proud record in terms of the rule of law. Nonetheless, as Cross <a href="https://youtu.be/ss6cctgILkU?fbclid=IwAR1TWcLRjfvovPXWUO1ZcWfCJfKdV8oEhuDNu-7tdkUc4l2ZyVmKkR4hloU">points out</a>, over 50 countries, including nine EU countries ‘who have signed up to every human rights treaty’, have signed extradition treaties with the country. Among them are Spain, France, Austria, and Belgium, which are some of the <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019/map">freest countries</a> in the world. Their willingness to enter extradition agreements with China is testimony to the progress that has been achieved in China’s legal system, as noted by Cross in <a href="https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/3009141/opponents-hong-kongs-extradition-bill-are-blind-progress">an article</a> written for <em>South China Morning Post</em></p><blockquote>Much comment on the mainland’s legal system has been deliberately erroneous, giving the impression that it is unchanged since the Cultural Revolution. However, since the 1980s, when former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping said “we must build a modern legal system for China”, reformers have greatly improved things, often after studying the Hong Kong paradigm.<br>Until about 20 years ago, mainland judges had little legal training; but all this has now changed. Anyone who wants to be a judge — or a prosecutor or lawyer — must now pass the difficult National Unified Legal Professional Qualification Examination. Many of the new breed of judges and legal officials have studied law abroad, and are familiar with Western notions of criminal justice. Since last year, professional judges, when trying criminal cases, sit with people’s assessors, who are similar to Hong Kong jurors and can provide independent scrutiny, with cases being decided by majority voting.</blockquote><p>It is understandable that many in Hong Kong would fear the legal system operating in mainland China, given that a large proportion of the population fled lawless chaos that embroiled China during the Cultural Revolution to Hong Kong as refugees. Even the young people on the streets today may have heard horror stories from their parents and grandparents. That being said, there certainly is a lack of understanding of the significant differences between today’s China and China in the old era.</p><p><em>b) There are multiple safeguards in the proposed law to ensure criminal justice.</em></p><p>Firstly, only 46 categories of serious offences were included in the original amendment and nine types of mostly white-collar crimes, including some related to bankruptcy, tax, and securities and futures trading, were later struck out due to the business sector’s lobbying. (Hong Kong being the heaven for capitalism, what else would you expect?) The finalised list looked like this</p><blockquote>Murder or manslaughter, including criminal negligence causing death; culpable homicide; assault with intent to commit murder.</blockquote><blockquote>Aiding, abetting, counseling or procuring suicide.</blockquote><blockquote>Maliciously wounding; maiming; inflicting grievous or actual bodily harm; assault occasioning actual bodily harm; threats to kill; intentional or reckless endangering of life whether by means of a weapon, a dangerous substance or otherwise; offences relating to unlawful wounding or injuring.</blockquote><blockquote>Offences of a sexual nature including rape; sexual assault; indecent assault; unlawful sexual acts on children; statutory sexual offences.</blockquote><blockquote>Gross indecency with a child, a mental defective or an unconscious person.</blockquote><blockquote>Kidnapping; abduction; false imprisonment; unlawful confinement; dealing or trafficking in slaves or other persons; taking a hostage.</blockquote><p>Is it really unreasonable to ensure that fugitives of grave offences receive the punishment they deserve?</p><p>Secondly, for an offence to be extraditable, it must be punishable by <a href="https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/05/30/breaking-hong-kong-security-chief-john-lee-announces-concessions-extradition-bill-pressure-pro-beijing-camp/">at least seven years’ imprisonment</a>, whereas, in the 20 fugitive surrender arrangements that Hong Kong currently maintains, the restriction is only one year. Additional conditions must also be met, namely</p><blockquote>the offence in question is a crime in both Hong Kong and the requesting jurisdiction</blockquote><blockquote>the offence in question is <strong>not of a political character</strong>, and</blockquote><blockquote>the offence is not punishable by death</blockquote><p>Right before the first reading of the bill in April, Secretary for Justice Teresa Cheng <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3004462/hong-kong-will-look-real-reasons-extradition-requests">confirmed</a> that political fugitives would not be transferred under the proposed law. This condition would have effectively guarded against political persecution that protesters allege to be Beijing’s motive behind the bill. How many of them, though, are even aware of the existence of this safeguard?</p><p><em>c) There are numerous further safeguards built into the extradition process</em>, as <a href="https://qz.com/1635504/everything-you-need-to-know-about-hong-kongs-extradition-law/">summarised</a> below</p><blockquote>If the justice department determines that the conditions are met, then it goes before Hong Kong’s chief executive, who can decide whether to veto or proceed with the extradition request. At this point, the suspect <strong>can apply for judicial review</strong>, <strong>with a right to appeal in the city’s highest court</strong>. If the request proceeds, an arrest warrant is issued, after which the subject is immediately barred from leaving Hong Kong. Once the subject is arrested, the case moves to the courts, where <strong>a preliminary hearing</strong> is held. Once the court decides that <strong>there is no political motive</strong> behind the extradition request, and that there is <strong>sufficient prima facie evidence</strong> that there is a possible case, it can then make an order of committal. At this point, the suspect <strong>can appeal</strong>.</blockquote><blockquote>With the judicial process over, the request goes back to the chief executive, who can again decide to deny the extradition request<strong> on humanitarian grounds</strong>. Here, the subject <strong>can petition</strong> the chief executive to oppose extradition. Should the chief executive decide to proceed with the extradition, an extradition order is given. At this stage, the suspect <strong>can again appeal to the courts</strong> to stop the extradition. If the suspect decides not to appeal, or if the appeal is unsuccessful, the suspect is extradited. The process could take years, which is typical of extradition proceedings.</blockquote><p>The<em> Basic Law</em>, Hong Kong’s <em>de facto</em> constitution, guarantees the separation of executive, legislative and judiciary powers, as is the case in most common law jurisdictions. Hong Kong’s judicial independence has remained in good shape since the 1997 handover, with Hong Kong ranked 16th worldwide by the <a href="https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP-ROLI-2019-Single%20Page%20View-Reduced_0.pdf">WJP Rule of Law Index 2019</a>, just trailing behind Australia and the UK and ahead of France and the US.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/956/0*nsw1oI1IKPN8nMu4.jpg" /><figcaption>The current site of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal</figcaption></figure><p>The Court of Final Appeal, having replaced the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London as the final appellate court of Hong Kong, boasts highly distinguished jurists from across the common law world. The majority of non-permanent judges are from other jurisdictions. Most of the ‘local’ judges also hold foreign passports. To think that such a judiciary would bend under Beijing’s political pressure, risking jeopardising their own professional reputations, is rather senseless. On the contrary, on numerous occasions, Hong Kong courts have ruled much to Beijing’s dismay. In <a href="https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/02/17/police-officers-jailed-for-assault-against-occupy-activist-ken-tsang/">one case</a> involving an alleged assault against a so-called pro-democracy activist by several police officers during the 2014 protests, the court found the defendants guilty, causing an outcry on Chinese state media.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*osE_1W9m5DRdDyEA_-Ylrw.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Court_of_Final_Appeal_(Hong_Kong)">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Court_of_Final_Appeal_(Hong_Kong)</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>3. ‘Hong Kong protesters’ “five demands” are just and reasonable and therefore should be satisfied.’</em></strong></p><p>Weeks into the protests, five demands were put forward by certain protesters</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*lRQ-tNwBd4rTO0VX" /></figure><p>a) withdraw the bill</p><p>In July, Carrie Lam announced that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/09/hong-kong-carrie-lam-says-extradition-bill-is-dead-but-stops-short-of-withdrawal">‘the bill is dead’</a>, suspending the legislative process. This response did not satisfy protesters, who demanded a complete withdrawal of the bill. This was essentially a meaningless demand, as similar bills can be proposed in the future, even if the current one is withdrawn. With her tenure presumably ending in 2022, Carrie Lam will not and cannot promise that no similar bills will be put forward by her successors. Recently, Lam finally <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-49575381">announced</a> a formal withdrawal, which perhaps should come much sooner.</p><p>b) for Carrie Lam to step down</p><p>Article 52 of the Basic Law provides</p><blockquote>The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region must resign under any of the following circumstances: <br>( 1 ) When he or she loses the ability to discharge his or her duties as a result of serious illness or other reasons;<br>( 2 ) When, after the Legislative Council is dissolved because he or she twice refuses to sign a bill passed by it, the new Legislative Council again passes by a two-thirds majority of all the members the original bill in dispute, but he or she still refuses to sign it; and<br>( 3 ) When, after the Legislative Council is dissolved because it refuses to pass a budget or any other important bill, the new Legislative Council still refuses to pass the original bill in dispute.</blockquote><p>None of the circumstances listed above have materialised. Therefore, this demand lacks a legal basis. Moreover, a change of leadership at the moment is likely to add to the chaos that has embroiled Hong Kong. I fail to see how it would improve the situation.</p><p>From Carrie Lam’s perspective, having caused such a major political crisis, she may want to take up her responsibilities and fix the situation as much as she could. After all, there currently is no apparent candidate successor capable of solving the issues. Having had to renounce her UK citizenship to run in the elections, she perhaps indeed wishes to redeem herself and contribute to the future of Hong Kong, a city she repeatedly expressed deep love towards.</p><p>c) an independent Commission of Inquiry for police brutality</p><p>The Hong Kong Police have shown great restraint in the protests. Just imagine if protesters had hurled <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/hong-kong-protests-latest-demonstration-petrol-bomb-police-fire-water-cannon-tear-gas-city-a9086426.html">petrol bombs</a> at police officers or aimed hundreds of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/08/01/hong-kong-protesters-are-using-lasers-distract-confuse-police-are-pointing-them-right-back/?noredirect=on">high-powered laser pointers </a>right into their eyes potentially causing permanent eyesight damage in London or Washington DC.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/968/0*BSqop8q9R3pMzKSm" /><figcaption>The use of force by Hong Kong Police pales in comparison to their American counterparts</figcaption></figure><p>Both Hong Kong and foreign media have been using a microscope to scrutinise any police use of force and turned a blind eye towards certain groups of protesters’ violence against both the police, fellow citizens and mainland visitors. After all, only this angle would fit into the overarching narrative where evil police, as apparatus of a pro-Beijing SAR government, brutally crack down on innocent democracy fighters. On both Twitter and mainland social media, large numbers of videos showing the other side of the confrontations have emerged yet failed to be featured in mainstream media.</p><p>This, of course, is not to say that police brutality did not exist. It may well have, as would be the case in any such lengthy large-scale protests where the police are working under enormous pressure and constantly provoked.</p><p>The protests have been ongoing for months. Alleged instances of excessive use of police force would range across a large span of time and involve hundreds and thousands of people hardly identifiable not least because of the masks worn by protesters.</p><p>Henry Litton QC, a former Court of Final Appeal judge, says</p><blockquote>Take the proposal ‘to examine the range of causes of series of large scale protests, serious conflict with the police etc., etc.’ for example. Plainly, those ‘causes’ spring from very many different sources of discontent, including the ever-widening gap between the rich and the poor, the exorbitant rents for substandard housing, the diminishing prospect of meaningful employment for the young, fear of repression, etc, etc.</blockquote><blockquote>Assume that a Commissioner, say, a senior judge (serving or retired) is appointed. That person would have to hear evidence from a huge range of people to begin to understand the background issues: and before he/she conducts any ‘sittings’, those assisting the enquiry would have to take witness statements from potential witnesses, from the Chief Executive to the black-shirted student; and of course the Police Commissioner down to the individual officers on the ground. The process would take years, and could never come out with an answer acceptable to everyone — whether in government or not.</blockquote><blockquote>The Commissioner would be asked, in effect, to assume the role of the government of the HKSAR, with none of the resources of that government.</blockquote><p>Hong Kong currently already has the <strong>Independent Police Complaints Council (IPCC)</strong>, a civilian body independent from the police, in place to investigate complaints against the police force.</p><p>d) amnesty for those who have been arrested</p><p>This demand arguably is the least reasonable of them all, as it is a <a href="http://t.cn/AiRxxKU2">‘direct challenge to the rule of law’</a>, as rightly pointed out by Cross. Those who have committed criminal offences, such as vandalising public property, assaults, and use of deadly weapons, rightfully need to be punished by law. This is the most basic meaning of the principle of the rule of law. As to those who were allegedly wrongfully arrested, Hong Kong’s world-class independent judicial system will give them due justice, if they indeed are innocent. The demand for their releases is a blatant attack on due process and judicial independence.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/0*yH9gqkL07syrojlv.jpg" /><figcaption>Would any Western country allow their legislature to be evaded in this way?</figcaption></figure><p>The protests have been self-claimed and indeed described by many media outlets as a ‘civil disobedience’ movement. Many, however, do not seem to understand the meaning and history of the term. The doctrine of civil resistance is largely a legacy of Gandhi from his movement against British colonialism. The major principle of non-violence clearly has been violated in the current Hong Kong protests. Another important rule proposed by Gandhi for <em>satyagrahis</em> to follow is ‘voluntarily submit to arrest’. Today’s violent protesters clearly do not understand the meaning of these noble-sounding terms that they have so enthusiastically adopted to justify themselves.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/620/0*HjOUJKwP6-iJEVDD" /><figcaption>Protesters set fire to Central MTR entrance</figcaption></figure><p>e) more democratic freedoms, i.e. universal suffrage and direct elections of all Legislative Council seats</p><p>Such a high level of democracy would be a nice thing to have indeed, but at this stage, it is simply wishful thinking given the political reality of China.</p><p>Henry Litton QC’s remarks shed light on this par excellence</p><blockquote>There are few certainties in life. One of them is this: the common law system underpinning Hong Kong’s ‘core values’ is destined to expire in 27 years’ time… All the calls for freedom, democracy, etc. have no meaning if the common law crumbles. If the protesters truly value their professed aims, their focus should be on demonstrating to Beijing and to the rest of the world that the One Country Two Systems formula works, and to promote an atmosphere in which Beijing feels comfortable with the system — and when the time comes, to extend the Basic Law for another 50 years, 100 years. Then liberal democratic norms and values might have a chance to flourish…</blockquote><blockquote>It is beyond the power of the Hong Kong SAR government to devise the governing model for the future. Pressing the Hong Kong government to promote greater democracy is futile. Rightly or wrongly, that power lies in Beijing. Nowhere else. Hong Kong enjoys freedoms found nowhere else in China. To think that unlawful assemblies and demonstrations, and violence in the streets, would soften Beijing’s attitude towards Hong Kong is absurd. Common sense suggests it would have the opposite effect.</blockquote><p>Acts committed by certain riotous protesters seemingly in challenge of China’s sovereignty over Hong Kong, such as the vandalisation of the Hong Kong emblem at the Legislative Council and the national emblem at the Liason Office of the Central Government, and the waving of the British colonial flag, only fed Beijing’s paranoia. As far as China is concerned, Two Systems is premised upon One Country, not the other way around. The repeated provocations against Beijing’s authority is leading Hong Kong towards a bleaker future in terms of freedom.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4HXSsUDCxgdnUK8LTukvyw.png" /><figcaption>How much of Hong Kong’s freedom has been eroded since 1997? (Source: <a href="https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/human-freedom-index-files/human-freedom-index-2018-revised.pdf">https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/human-freedom-index-files/human-freedom-index-2018-revised.pdf</a>)</figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=350356dcc567" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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