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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Shailesh Gupta on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Shailesh Gupta on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@ishaileshgupta?source=rss-459f4aad2cf8------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Shailesh Gupta on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ishaileshgupta?source=rss-459f4aad2cf8------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 01:19:53 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[How to decide marketing budget of your startup in early days]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ishaileshgupta/how-to-decide-marketing-budget-of-your-startup-in-early-days-ee885e4ea593?source=rss-459f4aad2cf8------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[advertising]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[marketing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shailesh Gupta]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 11 Jul 2016 04:24:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-07-11T04:24:11.631Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>John Wanamaker — a celebrated merchant, religious leader &amp; political figure of his time — once said</p><blockquote>“Half the money I spend on advertising is wasted; the trouble is I don’t know which half.”</blockquote><p>It was true until last decade when it was difficult to track eyeballs and attribute campaigns to sales.</p><p>2016 is different. Today, biggest ad dollars are spent online — Google AdWords, Facebook Ads, Retargeting, Paid Instagram &amp; Twitter Ads, Snapchat — you name it and there is a tech company leveraging its network reach to drive you closer to your audience.</p><p>Today, as a professional marketer, I know how many people see my ad (impressions), how many click it (CTR), how many sign up (sign up conversion rate), how many try out my product (activation rate), how many engage with my product (engagement rate) and how many buy it (revenues).</p><p>Let’s dive straight into predicting how much marketing budget you need to drive target sales.</p><p>Assuming pure B2C sales approach, you need to know</p><ol><li>Your ad cost per thousand impressions (CPM)</li><li>Your ad click through rate (CTR)</li><li>Your visit to sign up rate (Signup Rate)</li><li>Your sign up to activation rate (Activation Rate)</li><li>Your free to paid conversion rate (Conversion Rate)</li><li>Your revenue target for the month (R)</li></ol><p>Assuming you know your conversion rates at each step of your funnel (by channel) and average order value (AOV) of your customer (by channel), your total digital marketing budget would be:</p><pre>R / (CTR * Signup Rate * Activation Rate * Conversion Rate) * CPM</pre><p>Here is what monthly marketing budget will look for a company with different target new sales and different funnel ratios</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*g78fnZJfmzN_edYl3Kb-IQ.png" /><figcaption>Sample Monthly Marketing Budget Calculation</figcaption></figure><p>Now, this is overly simplified, but you get the idea. If you have multiple distribution channels for your company (Google, Fb, Affiliate etc), you need to account for each channel and take weighted average of their contribution to arrive at true marketing cost.</p><p>Also, as in practice, all your customers will not come on day 1. If you do pro-rata billing, you will need to account for time of the month. As a simple rule, you can assume 2X of your monthly marketing cost to be your actual marketing cost (assuming new sign-ups are spread equally throughout the month).</p><p>If you like this post, please hit the heart button below. Also, if you want me to cover any other topic of your choice, please let me know in the comments below.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ee885e4ea593" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[A Woman’s Confession To Her Lover]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ishaileshgupta/a-womans-confession-to-her-lover-883e7d639da1?source=rss-459f4aad2cf8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/883e7d639da1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[poetry]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[love]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shailesh Gupta]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 27 Jun 2016 00:20:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-07-02T07:05:07.215Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I don’t know if I love you or the idea of you sometimes.</p><p>A headstrong, super affectionate man who steers towards his true north and has childish fun along the way.</p><p>A deep thinker who wants to do something really big.</p><p>A big heart preserving itself in an environment of self orientation.</p><p>A lazy baby who sometimes just wants to watch the world go by.</p><p>A tentative thrill seeker who can spend a lot of time standing indecisively on the edge and then jump from very high.</p><p>A reader with inadequate time trying to catch up with a thousand stories all at once.</p><p>A deep lover with the patience of a moonlit night.</p><p>A mercurial talker with the attention span of humming bird.</p><p>Holding on tightly with the appetite to let go.</p><p>The man doesn’t know sometimes how much the man loves.</p><p>All these and more…</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=883e7d639da1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[How Embibe Set Me Up For Success]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ishaileshgupta/how-working-at-embibe-set-me-up-for-success-d851798f1d13?source=rss-459f4aad2cf8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d851798f1d13</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[embibe]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shailesh Gupta]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 21 Apr 2016 17:46:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-04-25T11:36:20.242Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>And how I will use these learnings for life</h4><p>I wanted to share three important facets of building a startup that are not always discussed, but are critical to get right.</p><h4>1. Data Is New Oil</h4><p>Wealth creation in early 20th century was centered around infrastructure and natural resources. Andrew Carnegie built an empire around steel, Cornelius Vanderbilt grew from a steamboat entrepreneur to the head of railroad empire and John D. Rockefeller made gigantic empire through oil.</p><p>21st century isn’t like that. Infrastructure is commodity. Personalization is key. Today’s creative monopolies, a la Google, Facebook, Amazon are built around personalizing product to each individual. Education, Healthcare, Finance monopolies will be no different. We have seen early signs of it in products from Knewton, Fitbit and Wealthfront.</p><p>Embibe is a data first edTech company, capturing 2100 insights per attempt from the day we began testing.</p><blockquote>Govind Lahoti — All India Rank 3, IITJEE — took more than 8 tests and spent several hours analysing his results on Embibe in the penultimate month before taking his real exam.</blockquote><p>Being an IITian, I know how much top students value their time. They won’t spend an hour where they don’t think it’s worth their time. But we were seeing rankers spending 24+ hours in final months leading to exam.</p><p>This marks a stark contrast from peers in the industry. While companies are selling content by kilos and hardware by units, Embibe is selling tangible score improvement per student in India’s hyper-competitive education market.</p><p>In 2015 we set up our own Data Science Lab headed by Keyur Faldu (ex-Principal Data Scientist, McKinsey). We have seen some excellent insights coming out of it and have baked them back into the product to improve the experience. As a result, we have seen hockey stick growth in time spent which shot up from 6,000+ hours to 100,000+ hours in 5 months.</p><p>Next, we saw the opportunity of using data science in designing game mechanics. <strong>We are probably the only product company from India truly leveraging game mechanics for monetisation and for making average student results 1oX better than even offline classroom experiences.</strong></p><h4>2. Only Product Prioritization &amp; Undeterred Focus Will Save You</h4><p>In early 20th century, Germany was strong enough to fight any one mighty opponent. But forced to fight on three fronts (defense in the west, some forces in Africa and the major offensive against USSR) proved to be fatal.</p><p>Same with startup. Startups, with their limited resources and strong incumbents, can fight and probably win only one front at a time. The rationale goes as follows: Each startup undergoes through three phases:</p><ol><li>Commando: team size of 10</li><li>Army: team size of 1000</li><li>Policing: beyond 1000+</li></ol><p>In commando stage, founders are responsible for everything. They are the key decision maker and everything revolves around them. As you grow, it’s impossible to make every key decision. So, you organize yourself into an Army. You assign generals in charge of key initiatives and focus your energy on hiring, strategizing and resourcing to feed your army. As you grow further, you evolve into policing. You create redundancy in the system to protect it against any unforeseen failure point.</p><p>Until your startup goes into policing phase and can afford redundancy, you are better off focusing only one problem at a time. If you can focus on multiple problems simultaneously, then you need to ask yourself whether the problem you are solving is worth it.</p><p>At Embibe, we made it a deliberate decision to focus only on one project at a time. As such, we re-architected the core product and launched new products viz. <strong>learn</strong> <em>(knowledge graph of 14,000+ inter-related concepts for higher secondary curriculum)</em>, <strong>ask</strong> <em>(doubt resolution forum)</em> and <strong>mobile app</strong> in flat 4 months with a lean team of 15 people.</p><p>Had we not kept laser sharp focus, we would still be running with loose threads waiting to be knit together into a work of beauty.</p><h4>3. Perseverance Is key</h4><p>Steve Jobs, Elon Musk, Richard Branson, Jack Ma and all other successful entrepreneurs have one thing in common — they didn’t give up in face of adversity. Every startup goes through ups and downs. It’s common and understood by everyone in the industry. It’s those troughs when you feel like throwing your hands up in the air. However, if you just persevere through that tough time, you will be amazed at what awaits you on the other side of the tunnel.</p><p>I experienced this first hand at Embibe. We were going through a tough time in Q1, 2015. Our users complained about extremely high latency. Our business partners complained about inadequate tech support from our team. Our internal marketing and academic content creation team constantly complained that the technology team did not support their requests to improve productivity.</p><p>While everyone — product, design, marketing, content, business development — was firing on all cylinders, getting bottlenecked by one critical team kept company’s morale at its ebb. Any sane founder would have given up. But we persisted as a team. We decided not only to persist, but excel at what we do i.e. build awesome products for our users.</p><p>We outsourced product upkeep to a dev shop in Bangalore while we were headhunting to rebuild our engineering division. After interviewing tons of candidates, we hired<a href="https://medium.com/u/febbf7aa7ad"> </a><a href="https://medium.com/u/febbf7aa7ad">Vallieswaran Valli</a> (our awesome SVP Engineering, was employee #6 at Flipkart). He hired couple of tech leads, software engineers. Few months later, we hired Sourav Sachin (our awesome CTO, was ex-Director, Flipkart). This team was joined by hiring some of the best in class product, design and quality assurance people to keep release cycles tight.</p><p><strong>A year later, we are proud to say that Embibe’s engineering, data science and product team is one of the best in the country.</strong> It feels truly great looking back at what we achieved with the limited resources we had. However, there is yet so much to achieve. As Robert Frost said,</p><blockquote>The woods are lovely, dark and deep. But I have promises to keep, and miles to go before I sleep.</blockquote><p>We have some exciting times ahead. We are launching some new tools to help educators and parents to participate and play a meaningful role in child’s journey through education. We are developing some new features to help students appreciate what they learn, assess their understanding of concepts and help them with quick revision before crucial exams. Wish us luck!</p><p>These are just a few things I am thinking about as I begin on my new journey. As I have just started down the path of building a new venture, I’d love to jam with like minded folks. Feel free to reach out to me at contact DOT shaileshgupta AT gmail DOT com.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d851798f1d13" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What Most People Don’t Understand About How Startup Companies are Valued]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/best-stuff-on-internet/what-most-people-don-t-understand-about-how-startup-companies-are-valued-bbbe42ca4a86?source=rss-459f4aad2cf8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bbbe42ca4a86</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shailesh Gupta]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 14 Feb 2016 02:14:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-04-19T10:22:48.100Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There is much discussion online and also in small, private groups, about why the price of technology companies — public and private — are falling. Valuing any company can be difficult because it requires a degree of forecasting future growth &amp; competition and ultimately the profits of the organization.</p><p>And two big changes have happened that are widely known — in the past quarter the value of some very high profile companies such as LinkedIn and Twitter have fallen substantially plus Fidelity (usually a public market investor) has written down the value of many of it’s later-stage private-company investments and made the downward valuations known.</p><p>Most venture capitalists who have been in this business for a long time foresaw this correction and have been talking about it privately for the better part of the last year or two. I’d like to explain as best I can my opinion on what is going on because most of what I hear from entrepreneurs is not only wrong but is reminiscent of what I heard in 1997–2000.</p><p><strong>What is the True Sentiment of VCs?</strong><br> I recently survey more than 150 VC friends from all stages and geographies what they thought about the market by asking “Which of the following statements best describes your mood heading into 2016?” and you can see that the balance of caution vs. optimism is 82% to 18%.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/954/0*Z4bEzqjqYphI6UtU.png" /></figure><p>I want to emphasize that this is “blind” data (I do not know which person or firm said what making this confidential and less biased) and nobody responding had any motive other than just telling us how they were feeling.</p><p>There is reason for despondency. Most are sitting on large portfolios of private companies that are raising money now or will need to do so in the future and they know that they’re up against some headwinds. 61% of the VCs survey said that prices in Q4 last year had started to drop and 91% said they expected them to continue to drop in the first 6 months of this year (with 30% expecting serious drops).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/954/0*b7kRhprkXq6v5a-s.png" /></figure><p><strong>The Motive for Speaking Up</strong><br> I have been talking about my concerns about valuations for the past couple of years because, well, they’ve been rising very rapidly the past two years!</p><p>It pains me to see the typical (and predictable) responses on Twitter, “VCs want prices to drop!” “This will be great for VCs and bad for entrepreneurs.” “Mark has a vested interest in talking down valuations of startups.” “Sure, prices are dropping. That’s just because the VCs are constantly saying so and making this a fulfilling prophecy.</p><p>All of these are false.</p><p>When I started blogging it was because I was inspired by <a href="https://twitter.com/bfeld">Brad Feld</a>. When I was an entrepreneur there was no public information about how term sheets worked or how investors thought. Brad was openly writing about this and it felt like he was giving the VC playbook away for free! I always wanted to work with Brad for this reason so I started blogging because I figured if transparency worked for Brad I would try the same approach.</p><p>Nearly EVERY smart VC I know has been talking privately for the past two years about how ridiculous valuations in private markets have gotten and how a reckoning was coming. Most prefer not to say this publicly for two reasons: 1) they have an entire portfolio of startups, many of whom are raising capital and 2) they prefer not to be attacked publicly or seem “anti entrepreneur.”</p><p>But I promise you they’ve been saying it privately. So my talking up over the years is more trying to shine transparency on what we’re already saying in private rooms.</p><p>But let me be even more clear. I do 2–3 deals per year and our firm does maybe 10–15 maximum. We write about $40 million of first-checks into new deals / year and about $40 million of follow-on investments. In 2015 in the US there were $77 billion written into startup tech companies. I’ll spare you the math and point out that this means we funded 0.104% of the market.</p><p>I am highly unlikely to fund your company strictly based on math and my only motive for publicly telling you what is going on privately is to help prepare you if in fact I’m right about the funding environment. If I’m wrong — at least you’ll have more data to decide how you raise &amp; spend your company’s money. If I’m right my only hope is that more companies actually get funded and more companies reduce burn and survive.</p><p>That’s the entirety of my motivation.</p><p><strong>Do Investors WANT Valuations to Drop?</strong><br> Mostly, no. For good reasons — not the ones you think — yes.</p><p>Let me give you a non tech &amp; thus non politically charged example. Let’s say you own a bunch of real estate property and you’ll likely buy more. You own 10 properties and you’ll probably buy 1–2 more per year for the next 10 years. When some properties have appreciated you like to sell them to get some liquidity and sometimes you sell the bad properties to get your money back and move on.</p><p>So prices start dropping. Are you thinking to yourself, “Awesome! Now I can buy more properties cheaply!” Of course life is more complicated. You’re really thinking that you had wanted to sell 2 of the properties that you thought has been over-valued and you were hoping to unload some poor performers. No you’re kind of fucked because nobody wants to buy any at all and your bank is calling you concerned that you may need to slow down your pace of new purchases for a bit.</p><p>This is how VCs feel. Many experienced partners are funds have 7–10 boards and most of these will need more capital. So when prices go down their first reaction is, “Shit. I better roll up my sleeves and help my companies get funded.” And while it was much nicer to call their LPs and tell them how great every company was going now they’ve got some explaining to do.</p><p>Yes, long-term they know that paying more grounded prices for future companies will likely produce better returns. But I promise you nobody I know is actively enjoying the correction in the way that some entrepreneurs seem to think VCs are. Right now it’s more pain than gain.</p><p><strong>Can Investors Spook the Market into Falling?</strong><br> In short — no. This is the biggest red herring of them all.</p><p>“10 angel investors walk into a bar …” <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angelgate">Do you remember AngelGate at Bin38</a>? Back then Michael Arrington accused some of Silicon Valley’s top seed funds of “colluding” by meeting secretly to talk down the valuation of startups. What hogwash. Of course a group of 10 seed funds can’t fix the prices of a market. For the past 7 years prices have risen steadily.</p><p>Individuals simply can’t spook a market into behaving how it wants because it is, well, a market! I’m sure the head of the Federal Reserve Bank could spook the market or the heads of state of the US, China or Iran could. But not a VC or Bill Gurley or myself would have spooked it 2 years ago. For every bear there’s somebody else thinking they have an opportunity. That’s the beauty of markets and of capitalism.</p><p><a href="http://techcrunch.com/2008/10/10/sequoia-capitals-56-slide-powerpoint-presentation-of-doom/">Remember the RIP Good Times by Sequoia</a>? That was written in September 2008. How’d that do at spooking the markets? And to this day I know people who think Sequoia did this <em>knowing</em> that the markets were going to go back up and they simply wanted to “head fake” other VCs and entrepreneurs. Puh-lease. They had no such motive and no such power. Even Sequoia.</p><p><strong>Why Valuations in Recent Years Were Irrational</strong><br> If you want the <em>real</em> story, here it is.</p><p>1. Social networking finally came of age connected the planet and leading to enormous wealth creation for Facebook employees and investors</p><p>2. Smart phones finally took off leading to enormous wealth creation for Apple employees and investors but also helped propel Google, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Snapchat, WhatsApp and others.</p><p>3. The US Fed has in essence held interest rates at zero for years and has undertaken <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantitative_easing">quantitative easing</a> to stimulate the economy. The billions of dollars managed by mutual funds, hedge funds, insurance companies, university endowments, pensions, foundations, sovereign wealth funds and the like need to find returns for their money. “Safe” investments have no yield so they have allocated more money to private markets including the tech markets chasing returns.</p><p>As you can see below, investments have skyrocketed — up 300% since 2009.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/457/0*-hHMfhgPOh9Xzkb2.png" /></figure><p>The vast majority of this recent boom in prices is not being driven by VCs but rather by hedge funds, mutual funds, corporate investors and other sources of non-traditional venture funding. In the chart below you can see that a decade ago for every dollar a VC raised from LPs a dollar went into a startup. Now for every dollar a VC raises $2.50 goes into a startup.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/939/0*McDnlqZDuulzjIr1.png" /></figure><p><strong>The Laws of Supply &amp; Demand</strong><br> I know that there are some corners where people believe that understanding how markets work isn’t really a requirement for being a great investor but the truth is the market dynamics play a huge role in determining which companies are valuable and which are not.</p><p>Let me start with the simplest explanation for anybody who didn’t take economics in university (for my sins I took it for 7 years at UCSD and then University of Chicago). The most basic chart of microeconomics is a supply &amp; demand curve. Demand represents a buyer and supply a seller. In the case of startups the “buyer” is the VC looking to part cash for “purchasing” equity in your startup.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/407/0*GMutgHU9eEoNOvDJ.png" /></figure><p>The principle of microeconomics is that at a market-clearing price for any product the right amount of sellers and buyers will emerge and a price will be set. Some products are “inelastic” meaning when prices go up demand doesn’t fall much (think cigarettes, alcohol or even elicit drugs). Other products “elastic” meaning demand falls off quickly when prices go up.</p><p>But for the most part you have an “equilibrium” of supply &amp; demand and this quantities supplied and price.</p><p>What changes this equilibrium? Usually only an “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exogeny">exogenous event</a>” that causes a shift in the amount of supply or demand. In the case of venture funding that shift was massive amounts of non-VC capital in search of higher returns and emulating the successes of Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter plus the expectation of huge returns at Uber, Airbnb, Dropbox, etc.</p><p>In economics we call this a “demand curve shift” as outlined below</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/799/0*XcVNi1WotUJHeXFJ.png" /></figure><p>In short hand, the $50 billion of extra capital that came suddenly into the market shot prices up dramatically: A classic demand shift curve.</p><p>The result? Median valuations went up 3x in just 2 years, followed by a precipitous drop in Q4 of 2015.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/956/0*-Jz-JVIHVoUHBZDh.png" /></figure><p><strong>Reversion to the Mean</strong><br> Another way of looking at this from an economics point-of-view is what we call a “reversion to the mean,” which simply means that when you have outlying data points where performance is better than usual for a period the data comes back down to a historical average.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/765/0*CugoBVuTbWAm0YsH.png" /></figure><p>As I’ve pointed out previously, this is perfectly captured by Joe Floyd here tracking SaaS multiples over time. You’ll see here that in 2007 people were willing to pay 7.7x forward revenue for SaaS businesses when in the years before it had been less than 5x. This corrected only to go back up to 13.4x in 2013 and then reverted back to 4x — a little bit below the historical mean.</p><p><strong>How Public Market Valuations Can Affect the Price of Seed Rounds</strong><br> I’ve written before about how <a href="http://www.bothsidesofthetable.com/2015/08/24/making-sense-of-the-stock-drops-in-relation-to-venture-financing/">public valuations affect private market valuation</a>s and <a href="http://www.bothsidesofthetable.com/2015/08/25/the-morning-after/">here</a> amongst others.</p><p>In short — late-stage investors (growth funds, PE funds, hedge funds, mutual funds) set price in their private rounds on the expectation of making a return when a company goes public. They are more sophisticated in their pricing models than, say, seed funds who are investing in products &amp; teams more than financials. So the multiples paid by publics matter and when they drop, the late-stage markets drop, too. Must more slowly because there is less frequent pricing.</p><p>If you’re a B-round investor used to paying $50–100 million pre-money and you had a few years of later-stage investors paying $200 million+ 18 months after you invested you suddenly become less price sensitive. But when you see some of your deals not getting done (as happened in Q4 2015 and is continuing) then when you look at <em>new</em> deals you suddenly get more price sensitive.</p><p>As I’ve said, the balance has shifted from FOMO (fear of missing out, or “greed” as market analysts call it) to a pragmatic “I can take it or leave it” mentality otherwise known as “fear.”</p><p>And if you’re an A-round investor who usually paid $15–20 million pre but through competition started paying $40 million pre, the problems trickle down to you.</p><p>Even seed. In 2009 many deals got done at $4–5 million pre and in the past few years some of these deals have gotten done at $10–12 million pre (or higher). But if you’re a seed investor and you’re worried that the A-round won’t get done if your post-money is too high you suddenly start paying less.</p><p>And so it goes.</p><p><strong>Why Financing in Falling Markets is So Damn Difficult</strong><br> Back to my non-VC example. If you’re thinking about buying a house — you’ve always wanted to own! — but prices are dropping, you’re much more likely to wait a month or two (or five) before buying. Why buy today if you think it will be less valuable in 6 months and there are always more houses available in the future!</p><p>In investor terms it’s called “catching a falling knife” and psychologically investors hate it. So deals get delayed as investors feel out prices and also spend time worrying about their own portfolios. Here’s a graphic I’ve published before that shows that investors expect funding to take longer going forward.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/954/0*NgwwdIe6edFXTRwP.png" /></figure><p><strong>Why Inside Rounds are Difficult?</strong><br> Many founders don’t understand why inside rounds are so difficult. “If you liked my company last year so much why don’t you just give me more money to get through “Winter?”</p><p>For starters there is inter-investor politics. One investor might be willing to do his or her $3 million prorata but with 3 other investors around the table she doesn’t want to fund unless everybody his doing her share. “Why should I bail out you if you’re not willing to do your part?”</p><p>Plus, there’s “triage” meaning that if a VC firm has 10 investments all needing money at the same time and all struggling to raise money then the VC needs to figure out which companies deserve the cash and which don’t.</p><p>And imagine this … if you’re doing triage on your own portfolio and spending hours negotiating with other VCs and with entrepreneurs who don’t want to cut costs … then how likely are you to want to look at other people’s deals?</p><p>So inside rounds get delayed and when there are non-participants you often find “recaps” or “structure” or “pay-to-play” provisions. Call it high-stakes chicken.</p><p>Those with money don’t want to bail out those who don’t have it.</p><p>And I haven’t even mentioned internal partner dynamics where a firm feels 1–2 partners have more shitty deals than others and therefore each partner might be jockeying to get his or her deals saved and with scarce resources some will get what they want and some won’t. Some firms are more collegiate, some less so. But to pretend these dynamics don’t exist is to stick one’s head in the ground.</p><p><strong>Why Down Rounds are Harder Than You May Think</strong><br> Down rounds are hard. A slight down round is achievable but massive “hair cuts” are very hard to do. For starters most new investors don’t want to piss off existing investors by forcing a lower price because they know they’ll have to work together again in the future. It’s easier to pass and just look at your next deal.</p><p>Also, new investors will be worried that the down round will cause founders or senior management to depart and no VC wants to replace management.</p><p>Plus, down rounds trigger anti-dilution provisions. And down rounds might favor later-stage investors over earlier-stage investors who get wiped out. Or down rounds might favor earlier-stage investors because the liquidation preferences of later stage investors get reduced.</p><p>In short, there are complicated negotiations that go on that make it difficult to get alignment. This is why VCs mostly only like to invest with people they know and trust. Because we know in tough times we have to count on our co-investors to be good actors. Either fund your share or accept the consequences to your previous investment. But many inexperienced investors would rather hold the company hostage than accept the new realities.</p><p><strong>In Summary</strong></p><ul><li>Markets set valuations for startups and no single investor or groups of investors “talking down the market” can force the market prices lower. There’s enough historical data to refute this claim</li><li>People like me who speak up aren’t wishing for a massive reckoning. For any future potential gain in more rational prices we have a lot more short-term pain helping our portfolio companies through the tough market</li><li>Private markets have been over-valued for years. Just as with the late 90s there is no new “business model” that defies the laws of gravity. Companies are valued based on the expectation of future profits. A reversion to the mean should be expected</li><li>If you believe the outlook will make funding more difficult (in time and price) you owe it to yourself to keep your burn rate in check so you can last longer until you need money and either “grow into your valuation” or at least get through a period of time where raising capital is more difficult</li></ul><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://www.bothsidesofthetable.com/2016/02/14/what-most-people-dont-understand-about-how-startup-companies-are-valued/"><em>www.bothsidesofthetable.com</em></a><em> on February 14, 2016.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bbbe42ca4a86" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/best-stuff-on-internet/what-most-people-don-t-understand-about-how-startup-companies-are-valued-bbbe42ca4a86">What Most People Don’t Understand About How Startup Companies are Valued</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/best-stuff-on-internet">Best Stuff On Internet</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Demistifying Business Plans]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ishaileshgupta/demistifying-business-plans-5f34c9210270?source=rss-459f4aad2cf8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5f34c9210270</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shailesh Gupta]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 14 Apr 2014 19:42:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2014-04-14T19:42:36.900Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>What they don’t teach you in startup bootcamps</h4><p>Many first time entrepreneurs are confused about what should go into making their business plan. They are often guided by hearsay and start something on the lines of I want to (a) start something of my own, (b) do start-ups because jobs are uncool, or worse (c) create social impact. Lets be clear: VCs who are investing in you are not there to humour you and your fantasies. They have raised money from filthy rich individuals (also know as Limited Partners) and are in the business of investing capital in to startups (also knows as resources) to generate more capital (something similar to what investment banks do, but with steeper risk / reward profile). Here are couple of broad areas which first time entrepreneurs should think about before deciding to take that final plunge.</p><p><strong>Be crystal clear of what problem you are trying to solve:</strong> Don’t try to delude yourself into fake problems — else you will keep trying to solve fake problems with fake solutions for the rest of your start-up life and no one will ever believe you — be it your friends, family, employees and / or investors. It will be a hard time for everyone to wrap their head around what you are saying.</p><p><strong>How big is the opportunity?</strong> It takes nearly as much effort to create a million dollar startup in a small market as it takes to create a billion dollar startup in a big market. Startups success rate is abysmal (though it depends on how your define success rate — I choose it to be IPO or company’s acquisition for its revenues) and if you are going to win, it should be worth it. Investors also use same metrics to shortlist fundable startups.</p><p><strong>Understand your risks:</strong> You are not expected to fully appreciate the risks of starting a start-up (else you will not start it in the first place), but you ought to be aware of the risk profile of your venture to take right decisions at the right time. Your investor would also expect you to talk about risks in your business to understand whether you fully know your business or are just scratching the surface half-heartedly.</p><p><strong>Which ecosystem you are going to ride on?</strong> It will more or less define your business strategy, hiring strategy and execution plan. If you are going to ride on channel partners, your cost structure and hiring requirements will be very different than if you were planning to ride on top of social media. Once decided about the kind of distribution media for your business, think about comparable markets, substitutes in those markets, guys who operate like your service and guys who directly compete with you. By this time, you should have a fairly advance understanding of what you are up to.</p><p><strong>Metrics to measure your progress:</strong> At early stage, their are hardly any metrics to measure. Nevertheless, you should look up common metrics applicable in your industry (such as growth rate, stickiness, revenues / eyeballs etc) and try to measure them (or have provision for measuring them) from day 1.</p><p><strong>The team:</strong> Here you want to ask yourself (a) are you the right team to pull this project? (b) if no, who else you need to hire?</p><p><strong>Financials:</strong> At seed, accelerator or angel round, financials are joke (unless you are serial entrepreneur at which point you will know general business expenses). Investors also know it, but they want to see if you can think commercially and can put up a viable business plan for your venture. So take out that spreadsheet and through some sensible numbers to it to complete the picture.</p><p>Summarising, a business plan (at entry level) consists of:</p><ol><li>Industrial Overview</li><li>Problem</li><li>Solutions</li><li>Technology</li><li>IP / Legal Status</li><li>Market Size</li><li>Marketing Strategy</li><li>Competition</li><li>Financials</li><li>Team</li><li>Risks</li></ol><p>Let me know how much you liked it? Also let me know what you would like to know next. Till then, cya.</p><p>Credits: GSF Accelerator, Rajesh Sawhney, Shyam Kamadolli, Shailesh Vikram Singh</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5f34c9210270" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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