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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by J.J. Thompson on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by J.J. Thompson on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by J.J. Thompson on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[SECOPS Should Prioritize Alert Forward >]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/rook-security/secops-should-prioritize-alert-forward-7592711c0e27?source=rss-875d360624c4------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[opsec]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[J.J. Thompson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 17 Jan 2017 12:32:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-17T12:32:00.302Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In the last few years, alert-throwing technology has (mostly) done its job. So, now what? Focus on managing the alert forward.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WWmbcFdNY4pHG2FCKurgFg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Left to Right: Select, Tune, Implement, Manage //ALERTS// Security Resource Management, Threat and Vulnerability Management, Managed Threat Response (Monitoring + Incident Response), Team Management.</figcaption></figure><h3>Let’s talk about the birds and the bees. How are alerts made?</h3><p>Assets &gt; BIOS &gt; OS &gt; Configurations &gt; Software &gt; Events &gt; ( ) &gt; Alerts</p><p>I hope that what is contained in ( ) is (SIEM). Assets (servers, laptops, devices) have configurations and software running that write events (log messages) when something of interest happens. These events then need to be reviewed to determine if they are of interest or can be ignored. If they are of interest (meet some configured criteria or absence thereof) then (a SIEM) creates an “alert.” Alerts are sent to ticketing systems or to email inboxes from which analysts determine what should and should not be acted upon.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/802/1*LGVCAW2yFsLRxowMtg2n2g.png" /></figure><p>101 right? It may be basic. It may be simple. But it’s incredibly hard to do in a repeatable, efficient manner. Consistent performance should always result in measurable outcomes. When improvements are made, the impact should be measurable, and inputs adjustable for continuous improvement.</p><p>Which part is hard? In my experience, the majority of cyber security professionals focus left of the alert. OS configs, network configs, device types, logging and event management, and aggregation of events into alerts. Then the tsunami came.</p><p>The Mandiant APT-1 report opened a floodgate of common awareness that fundamentally shifted the expectations and awareness of Boards and executives.</p><p><a href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/02/mandiant-exposes-apt1-chinas-cyber-espionage-units.html">Mandiant Exposes APT1 - One of China&#39;s Cyber Espionage Units &amp; Releases 3,000 Indicators &quot; Threat Research Blog</a></p><p>The Target breach solidified the concept that security tools are doing their job. The methods and processes of reviewing the alerts, and acting on them is where teams struggle.</p><p><a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-target-breach-idUSBREA2C14F20140313">Target says it declined to act on early alert of cyber breach</a></p><p>If thats where the struggle is… then what? Is it reasonable to expect teams to be successful with managing alert forward with capabilities that exist today?</p><p>No. It’s not. Here’s why.</p><blockquote>“We often see organizations ignoring alarms like this because they’ve become numb to them, receiving too many false positives, or because they’re understaffed,” Chiu [of HyTrust] said. “You can have all the alarms you want, but unless you put security in a prominent position in the company and have enough staff to review them, those alarms don’t mean anything.”</blockquote><p><a href="https://www.scmagazine.com/target-did-not-respond-to-fireeye-security-alerts-prior-to-breach-according-to-report/article/539263/">Target did not respond to FireEye security alerts prior to breach, according to report</a></p><p>So what do you need to do? Buy better alert-throwing technology?</p><p><a href="https://www.fireeye.com/offers/stop-the-noise.html">Security Alerts: Stop the Noise | FireEye</a></p><h3>Clearly, even though FireEye has industry-leading technology rivaled only by Palo Alto Networks, it wasn’t enough. Alert fatigue still existed, and prioritization, workflow and policy decisions failed the Target Security Operations Center team.</h3><blockquote>As they uploaded exfiltration malware to move stolen credit card numbers — first to staging points spread around the U.S. to cover their tracks, then into their computers in Russia — FireEye spotted them. Bangalore got an alert and flagged the security team in Minneapolis. And then …Nothing happened.</blockquote><blockquote>For some reason, Minneapolis didn’t react to the sirens. A FireEye alert that indicated unfamiliar malware: “malware.binary.” Details soon followed, including addresses for the servers where the hackers wanted their stolen data to be sent. As the hackers inserted more versions of the same malware (they may have used as many as five, security researchers say), the security system sent out more alerts, each the most urgent on FireEye’s graded scale.</blockquote><blockquote>Poring over computer logs, Target found FireEye’s alerts from Nov. 30 and more from Dec. 2, when hackers installed yet another version of the malware. Not only should those alarms have been impossible to miss, they went off early enough that the hackers hadn’t begun transmitting the stolen card data out of Target’s network.</blockquote><p><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-03-13/target-missed-warnings-in-epic-hack-of-credit-card-data">Missed Alarms and 40 Million Stolen Credit Card Numbers: How Target Blew It</a></p><h3>The point is simple: Tools work. They’re (mostly) doing their job. They create alerts. A lot of alerts. Which one matters? Which should be addressed first? How long should you spend on each alert? What constitutes escalation? How do you escalate and track to resolution? How do you measure the effectiveness of your team at performing these tasks?</h3><p>Simple. Through a <a href="https://blog.rooksecurity.com/security-operations-management-7c444cf2c33f#.4k94c3arg">Security Operations Management Platform</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7592711c0e27" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/rook-security/secops-should-prioritize-alert-forward-7592711c0e27">SECOPS Should Prioritize Alert Forward &gt;</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/rook-security">SECOPS</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Quack! Cyberwar. Quack. Quack.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@j.j.thompson/quack-cyberwar-quack-quack-eaa88ac9fc74?source=rss-875d360624c4------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[J.J. Thompson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 17 Jan 2017 03:16:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-17T03:16:28.250Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There seems to be confusion about what “war” is. Or maybe its “the cyber”. Or maybe its when they’re smashed together like a <a href="https://www.triplexxxfamilyrestaurant.com/Menu/Prime-Cuts">Duane Purvis</a>. Let’s explore.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WfS7XNktbS-tK7Dx4aKMyw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Meet Edwin. He’s yellow. He quacks. Pretty sure he’s a duck. (credit: <a href="http://www.edwintheduck.com/">www.edwintheduck.com</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>I’m flipping through LinkedIn and I come across:</p><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/cyber-warfare-more-than-influence-operations-rick-howard?trk=hp-feed-article-title-comment">Cyber Warfare is More than Influence Operations</a></p><p>A quick click and I read:</p><blockquote>This kind of sensationalism drives me crazy. Martin Belam claims that we might already be in a cyberwar (<a href="http://ow.ly/4cve3084356">http://ow.ly/4cve3084356</a>).</blockquote><p>Rick goes on to say:</p><blockquote>But any definition of war has to include the loss of life that results from nation states conducting operations to achieve some political purpose. That is a high bar standard on purpose.</blockquote><p>Wait. What? I’m sure I missed something here, so I read it again. No. I read it right. So I hit up google.</p><p><strong><em>war: wôr/ noun. a state of armed conflict between different nations or states or different groups within a nation or state.</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>war·fare: ˈwôrˌfer/ noun. engagement in or the activities involved in war or conflict.</em></strong></p><p>Ok. So I’m not completely losing it. It must be the word “armed”. Or attribution. Or conflict. Or something. I’m really not sure. So I flip to twitter and happen upon:</p><p><a href="http://ow.ly/JS1j30849iQ">We Are in a State of Cyber Cold War?</a></p><blockquote>Information Operations (IO). The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. (<a href="http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf">JP 1–02</a>)</blockquote><blockquote>Psychological Operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. (JP 1–02 and JP 3–13.2)</blockquote><p>Makes sense to me. Seems like what is happening fit into components of military doctrine on warfare. How about “cyber” war?</p><iframe src="https://drive.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=http%3A//www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf%3FAD%3DADA587698&amp;embedded=true" width="600" height="780" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/23f834299c16813723574c2dc5d810fa/href">https://medium.com/media/23f834299c16813723574c2dc5d810fa/href</a></iframe><blockquote>Cyber activities may constitute a use of force under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter in the event of death, injury, or significant destruction;23</blockquote><blockquote>and a state’s right of self-defense under Article 51 is applicable for cyber activities that amount to an armed attack or threat thereof.24</blockquote><blockquote>Mr. Koh’s discussion included the fact that these USG positions and points were also agreed upon diplomatically via U.S. engagement with the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts that deals with information technology issues.25</blockquote><h3>Seems to check out here too. Glad I’m not losing it. If it walks like a duck…</h3><p>— — — — -</p><p>More references for your reading delight below:</p><p><em>23 U.S. Department of State, The United Nations Conference on International Organizations. San Francisco, California, April 25 to June 26, 1945: Selected Documents (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1946). UN Charter, Article 2(4): “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”</em></p><p><em>24 Ibid. UN Charter, Article 51: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations . . .”</em></p><p><em>25 Harold Koh, “International Law in Cyberspace,” Opinio Juris blog, transcript posted 19 September 2012, </em><a href="http://opiniojuris.org/2012/09/19/harold-koh-on-international-law-in-cyberspace/"><em>http://opiniojuris.org/2012/09/19/harold-koh-on-international-law-in-cyberspace/</em></a><em> (accessed 30 September 2012).</em></p><iframe src="https://drive.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=http%3A//www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf&amp;embedded=true" width="600" height="780" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/b73bc1c2ed8067434b21d4e768a2352b/href">https://medium.com/media/b73bc1c2ed8067434b21d4e768a2352b/href</a></iframe><iframe src="https://drive.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=http%3A//www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf%3FAD%3DADA587698&amp;embedded=true" width="600" height="780" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/23f834299c16813723574c2dc5d810fa/href">https://medium.com/media/23f834299c16813723574c2dc5d810fa/href</a></iframe><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=eaa88ac9fc74" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[SECOPS Instead of Red vs. Blue Team]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/rook-security/secops-instead-of-red-vs-blue-team-47aac550db46?source=rss-875d360624c4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/47aac550db46</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[talent-management]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[J.J. Thompson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Jan 2017 13:22:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-12T13:22:36.119Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Red, white, blue. Combined together and you get the elite interdisciplinary and outcome-focused team you need to combat cyber threats.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*S1rYFNcRAUfraMy6OaWlPw.png" /></figure><p>When we were kids, most people wanted to be the heroes. The good guys. Somewhere along the line, we sexed up the nature of “red-teaming” to the point that the “blue-team” thinks that they aren’t as cool. And that is completely not true. Unless you run your blue team like a call center. Then you should fire yourself and free them up to be the awesome team they can be without you stunting their capabilities and regulating them to phone service order taking and routing.</p><h3>Standardization is good!</h3><p>A few years back, our team had grown and specialization followed suit. Standardization, process, workflow, metrics of course were part of the way of life. Somewhere along the way, we lost site of how we were pigeon-holing some incredibly talented minds into an assembly line. The assembly line is a great idea, and critical to success… if and only if it leads to increased automation for tasks that are repeatable and consistent, and free up the talented analysts to focus on higher value activities.</p><h3>Assembly line is good! Call center? Bad.</h3><p>Our assembly line had facilitated that for some but not all. Some became call center operators. They answered calls, filled out tickets, routed them to the next tier, and went on to the next. Interestingly, this was discovered through our <a href="https://www.15five.com/">15fives</a> and the SOC leader brought this to the leadership team meeting to discuss.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6LFzVMNmVBP872nmlHed3w.png" /><figcaption>Digging into troughs in 1:1’s revealed insights about “red vs. blue” and job satisfaction</figcaption></figure><p>We rapidly adjusted course, but not without realizing that there were other symptoms of the problem that we had — finally- identified. SOC team members were grumbling. They wanted to do pen-tests. They wanted to “be cooler” and red-team. They viewed “blue team” as call center and boring. Not good. Not good at all. Here we have some of the best and brightest actively seeking and eliminating threats, stopping attacks cold, and they didn’t feel like they were the rockstars they were!</p><h3>Whats in a name?</h3><p>The name mattered. The name reflects ethos. Brand. Vision. Finally, we understood that.</p><p>What does it change?</p><p>I want SECOPS pros like Garcia. Cyber ninjas who do hand-to-hand combat… when they need to… and do it better than their opponent.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FWqtbN_VHXVA%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DWqtbN_VHXVA&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FWqtbN_VHXVA%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="640" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/d03ba9a52920e61301e75d3acff3160f/href">https://medium.com/media/d03ba9a52920e61301e75d3acff3160f/href</a></iframe><p>What do ninjas want? They want to be valued. They want to do challenging work. If it can be automated, its not as challenging as someone would like because it doesn’t stimulate their frontal lobe. They get bored. Then its natural to wonder why, and look across the room and see the reason.</p><p>So what did we do? We did what we always knew we should do and combined skill sets into an initiative we called <em>hydra.</em> And it didn’t solve the problem. Why? We just moved the problem and gave it a new name. The changes in duties and operational skills didn’t follow suit fast enough.</p><p><em>Changing the way we operated </em>led to realization of why “SECOPS” mattered. The term meant something to our team. They understood that it was comprehensive. It changed the game for how they operated, how they communicated, collaborated, and teamed up to solve the issue, not just swatting down symptoms.</p><p>Don’t be a call center or a help desk. Make sure your team is <em>SECOPS.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=47aac550db46" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/rook-security/secops-instead-of-red-vs-blue-team-47aac550db46">SECOPS Instead of Red vs. Blue Team</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/rook-security">SECOPS</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[ODNI Rightly Focused on Intel, not Cyber]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/rook-security/odni-rightly-focused-on-intel-not-cyber-f6bf366c25eb?source=rss-875d360624c4------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[russian]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[J.J. Thompson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Jan 2017 22:33:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-07T14:28:30.792Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>After much speculation, the report had little to do with cyber attribution. It had everything to do with traditional tradecraft and sourcing.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eWTEaapK2qdeZjwfaETMYw.png" /></figure><p>Two groups exist in the INFOSEC community right now. Those who swear CrowdStrike’s attribution was right and those who swear their report was inadequate. I’m still firmly with the latter.</p><h3>Cyber attribution wasn’t the key factor according to the ODNI report.</h3><p>25 pages. More than 90% of the report was focused on other sources than cyber / technology, and the majority of the justification and basis followed suit. Behavior. Patterns. History. Tradecraft.</p><p>Here are my comments on the sections that pertain to my quick analysis.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Hq4eRJ09kqtjANK6VtDWGw.png" /><figcaption>Behavior. Patterns. History. Cyber was one vector, one tool.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1010/1*U-VEvbKXp1dE33Cafby3IA.png" /><figcaption>Guccifer2.0 notes match our SOC Intel team’s perspective from the summer. The content linkage is a big one. Excellent daisy-chaining of digital evidence. There’s a lot more to the highlighted bullet. Huge point.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3eLOKojVyXMWCWy2NwiBZQ.png" /><figcaption>It continues to be my belief that the evidence vs. attribution noted here is a leap. That doesn’t matter in the overall context of the report. Again, cyber was only 15% or so of the content.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*h_4LLQuDRAtpgk87G_YCaA.png" /><figcaption>GRU comments appear to be related to behavior and timing of source material releases when paired with (think intelligence SIEM) other patterns on RT, chatter, twitter trolls etc. “cyber operations” can mean twitter trolling, spearfishing, etc. Does not say whether or not they were successful.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ecsqOyobgZVO6o2J5LcMiA.png" /><figcaption>Multiple sources. Non technical focus. Multiple could be two- Crowdstrike and a 3LA for instance. Again, doesn’t matter. The rest of the report makes the case without the cyber components.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Ym15sX3le8taPNQu_6n3LQ.png" /><figcaption>Non cyber. Traditional intelligence. Very good reporting.</figcaption></figure><iframe src="https://drive.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https%3A//www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf&amp;embedded=true" width="600" height="780" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/0137dc98dc17f1862b82de2e559efd4a/href">https://medium.com/media/0137dc98dc17f1862b82de2e559efd4a/href</a></iframe><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f6bf366c25eb" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/rook-security/odni-rightly-focused-on-intel-not-cyber-f6bf366c25eb">ODNI Rightly Focused on Intel, not Cyber</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/rook-security">SECOPS</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[DNC Hack Movie Release Date]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/rook-security/dnc-hack-movie-release-date-103c7a47f624?source=rss-875d360624c4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/103c7a47f624</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russian]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cdn]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[J.J. Thompson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Jan 2017 16:12:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-06T16:15:55.330Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Its inevitable that there will be a movie about the DNC hack and the ripple effects it will have for years to come. After all is said and done, what will the script look like? Here’s one rendition that may just leave you thinking “its possible”.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IdAmHe_sHNgX7XrB_u_4Kw.jpeg" /><figcaption>SH33PD0GS Monitor the 2016 Elections from the Rook Security Operations Center in Indianapolis</figcaption></figure><p><em>Sarah Volkov stared cautiously around the room as the intensity increased. Back in January Hillary, a shoe in for the Presidency, requested that her team prepare a “plan B” in case the unlikely event that citizens began to lean toward electing her opponent. It was now June. Months before the election and news just broke that was surely to put Trump’s poll numbers into a tailspin. The DNC had been hacked and the hired cyber-sleuths had concluded that the attackers were from not only Russia, but were part of a state-sponsored hacking group. The media began to speculate that the hackers were acting on behalf of business associates trying to gain favor with Manafort, one of Trump’s top advisors. There was no hiding the palpable optimism around the table as jubilant staffers began to envision themselves in their new offices in the White House. Fortunately, “plan B” would never go into action as there is no way Trump could recover from this devastating blow. Sarah glanced at the Chief of Staff, Myriam Khaled, and was surprised to see that her boss seemed distant, almost distracted and unaware of the jubilant atmosphere around her.</em></p><p><em>The pounding in her ears was intensifying. Myriam could barely breathe as the realization that it was going to happen battled with her fear of being discovered. So far, all had gone as planned. The investigation was headed exactly where it was intended to as the forensics team found the trace evidence — remnants of IP addresses and malware left precisely where they would look for it. They had taken the bait. When their preliminary findings came back the team was thrilled. Not only had FlockSwipe identified the malware but they traced it back to eastern european IP addresses. Instead of using IP ranges known to send spam messages, therefore showing up in cyber security block-lists, these IPs were clean. This created a false flag that led the analysts to think that the IP addresses were utilized by more advanced adversaries instead of script kiddies. The malware was grabbed from a paste site where it had been placed right after it was used in an un-related attack. AdobeARM was chosen as the dropper as FireEye and other cyber groups had previously identified them as being of Russian state-sponsored origin. This had been reported on in a german site in 2015.</em></p><p><a href="https://netzpolitik.org/2015/digital-attack-on-german-parliament-investigative-report-on-the-hack-of-the-left-party-infrastructure-in-bundestag/">Digital Attack on German Parliament: Investigative Report on the Hack of the Left Party Infrastructure in Bundestag</a></p><p><em>Articles like this were everywhere and it linked directly to the source intelligence report. And while its easy to obtain the malware online, the industry doesn’t question the analyst reports from analysts working at these giant companies.</em></p><iframe src="https://drive.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https%3A//www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt28.pdf&amp;embedded=true" width="600" height="780" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/9dcd46aabab26f57b6bfbb274ca61ff9/href">https://medium.com/media/9dcd46aabab26f57b6bfbb274ca61ff9/href</a></iframe><p><em>All we had to do was find a cyber nerd who could find the malware, re-purpose it, but maintain the majority of indicators so it would appear to be nearly identical in style, methods, and authorship to code previously attributed to Cozy Bear and Fancy Bear.</em></p><p><em>It was a bit more difficult to figure out what to do once that attribution link was made as no one knows who exactly are the members of those two groups. Except for intelligence agencies. Fortunately, I still had that card from Geneva, where I met Minister Paplov. A few quick conversations later and we were all set. I needed to take pressure off of #emailgate, and with Trump climbing in the polls, needed to decrease his appeal. This move would do both.</em></p><p><a href="http://observer.com/2016/05/game-over-emailgate-just-crippled-the-clinton-express/">Game Over: EmailGate Just Crippled the Clinton Express</a></p><p><em>And we wouldn’t even have to make the claim publicly. All I needed was for the Minister’s friends at the GRU to cooperate with the Kremlin and make a few comments here and there that would lead the public and the media to Manafort and his business relations with Russia. Of course they were more than happy to, as this would give increased status to Putin on the national stage and assist his defiance of the UN. The rest will happen on its own. In Schindler’s own words,</em></p><blockquote>Covert action by itself cannot create political conditions, it can only exploit what already exists.</blockquote><p><a href="http://observer.com/2016/12/former-nsa-analyst-debunks-three-myths-about-russian-hacking/">Former NSA Analyst Debunks Three Myths About Russian Hacking</a></p><p>Eagerly jumping to support CrowdStrike’s attribution.</p><p><a href="http://www.threatgeek.com/2016/06/dnc_update.html">Findings from Analysis of DNC Intrusion Malware</a></p><p>The news coverage that inspired the post.</p><p><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-government-hackers-penetrated-dnc-stole-opposition-research-on-trump/2016/06/14/cf006cb4-316e-11e6-8ff7-7b6c1998b7a0_story.html?utm_term=.33145fba7fd1">Russian government hackers penetrated DNC, stole opposition research on Trump</a></p><blockquote>DNC leaders were tipped to the hack in late April. Chief executive Amy Dacey got a call from her operations chief saying that their information technology team had noticed some unusual network activity.</blockquote><blockquote>That evening, she spoke with Michael Sussmann, a DNC lawyer who is a partner with Perkins Coie in Washington. Soon after, Sussmann, a former federal prosecutor who handled computer crime cases, called Henry, whom he has known for many years.</blockquote><blockquote>Within 24 hours, CrowdStrike had installed software on the DNC’s computers so that it could analyze data that could indicate who had gained access, when and how.</blockquote><blockquote>The computers contained research going back years on Trump. “It’s a huge job” to dig into the dealings of somebody who has never run for office before, Dacey said.</blockquote><blockquote>CrowdStrike is not sure how the hackers got in. The firm suspects they may have targeted DNC employees with “spearphishing” emails. These are communications that appear legitimate — often made to look like they came from a colleague or someone trusted — but that contain links or attachments that when clicked on deploy malicious software that enables a hacker to gain access to a computer. “But we don’t have hard evidence,” Alperovitch said.</blockquote><p>While I believe this story is the one that will sell the most tickets, there were other great plots that could be adapted:</p><ul><li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clear_and_Present_Danger">Clear and Present Danger - Wikipedia</a></li><li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shutter_Island_(film)">Shutter Island (film) - Wikipedia</a></li><li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duplicity_(film)">Duplicity (film) - Wikipedia</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=103c7a47f624" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/rook-security/dnc-hack-movie-release-date-103c7a47f624">DNC Hack Movie Release Date</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/rook-security">SECOPS</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Security Operations (SOC) Management Components & Terminology]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/rook-security/security-operations-soc-management-components-terminology-f241d632510b?source=rss-875d360624c4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f241d632510b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[opsec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[J.J. Thompson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Jan 2017 15:50:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-08T03:46:46.201Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>At its most basic elements, the objective of a Security Operations Management Program is to enable prevention, detection, management, and elimination of cyber threats.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xBA1vs096nsUaZAl_PJcKQ.png" /><figcaption>Security Operations Center (SOC) services and processes during discussion at the Rook Security SOC</figcaption></figure><p>To accomplish this core objective, there are two foundational components: <em>monitoring &amp; response</em>. These <em>inputs</em> come from service requests, alerts, which are driven by endpoint, network, and other core security technologies. From there, there are numerous other <em>services</em> that can be provided depend on your internal resource levels (people, process, and technology), maturity, and strategy.</p><p>The whole program should be designed and operated in a manner whereby activities and capabilities are traceable to outcome-focused, measurable outcomes. These outcomes lead to management decisions based on organizational resource levels, risk, and customer preferences. These governance decisions then effect the inputs of <em>resource levels </em>(people, process, and technology), <em>strategy</em>, and the <em>service offerings</em>.</p><p>While operating the program, there are key decisions that are made both formally and informally. There are escalation preferences, threat classifications, and other triggers, throttles, rules, and communication preferences. We call these <em>policy decisions.</em></p><p>With these elements in mind, it is possible to begin <em>evaluation of your current capabilities</em>, and determine how to <em>build</em> or <em>optimize</em> your Security Operations Management Program to facilitate prevention, detection, management, and elimination of cyber threats.</p><blockquote>The Rook Navigator series is a set of enablers intended to assist operators and leadership determine when to build vs. partner on Security Operations Management programs of varying sizes and levels of complexity. Through sharing real-world examples, lessons learned, and applied successes, this guide helps security professionals navigate the dynamic challenge of Digital Security Operations Management.</blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f241d632510b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/rook-security/security-operations-soc-management-components-terminology-f241d632510b">Security Operations (SOC) Management Components &amp; Terminology</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/rook-security">SECOPS</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Attribution + Russia = Misdirection]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/rook-security/attribution-russia-misdirection-43e1f2692c8d?source=rss-875d360624c4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/43e1f2692c8d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[attribution]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[data-breach]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russian]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[J.J. Thompson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 04 Jan 2017 18:03:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-04T18:03:37.559Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote>When the trees move, the enemy is coming; when there are many blinds in the undergrowth, it is misdirection. — Sun Tzu</blockquote><p>My first story on Medium will not be data driven. It will not be repeating the well thought out posts by Lee and <a href="https://medium.com/u/19d78c0a990d">Jeffrey Carr</a> where observations are shared whereby they argue that there were <a href="http://www.robertmlee.org/analytical-leaps-and-wild-speculation-in-recent-reports-of-industrial-cyber-attacks/"><em>Analytical Leaps and Wild Speculation in Recent Reports of Industrial Cyber Attacks</em></a><em>; that </em>the <a href="https://medium.com/@jeffreycarr/fbi-dhs-joint-analysis-report-a-fatally-flawed-effort-b6a98fafe2fa#.at43ajx66"><em>FBI/DHS Joint Analysis Report: [is] A Fatally Flawed Effort</em></a><em>;</em> and Graham’s <a href="https://twitter.com/erratarob/status/816433316001943552"><em>rant</em></a> about the inadequacy of the DHS provided IOCs. These links were shared with trusted social friends, political leaders, and with other intellectuals who focus on emerging challenges in matters of NATSEC and politics. What follows is the bilateral stream of thought that resulted from those discussions.</p><h3><strong>First Public Release of Cyber Threat Intelligence “Goes Viral”</strong></h3><p><a href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/02/mandiant-exposes-apt1-chinas-cyber-espionage-units.html">Mandiant Exposes APT1 - One of China&#39;s Cyber Espionage Units &amp; Releases 3,000 Indicators &quot; Threat Research Blog</a></p><p>Feb 19, 2013: Mandiant releases APT1 report, exposing Chinese state-sponsored “APT1” and their multi-year, enterprise-scale computer espionage campaign. Result: mainstream media becomes aware in a manner in which was unprecedented of this topic called “attribution”, beginning the public disclosure of threat intelligence race in the cyber security industry. The result of which is captured in jest on a mug in our office.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yQ268-XBiDUIQlchEClm5A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Attribution and Inductive Fallacy Mug in the <a href="https://medium.com/u/fa8033ab36b">Rook Security</a> SOC</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>DNC Hack Investigation Detail Released Publicly</strong></h3><p>Fast forward to 2016. June 14th, 2016. News breaks of a report by Crowdstrike that they identified who hacked the DNC. In this case, “news breaks” meant “unprecedented public release of detailed findings during an on-going investigation by the endpoint protection company conducting the forensics investigation on behalf of the DNC”. The vast majority of the information security community jumped on-board at the whiff of “Indicators of Compromise” (IOC’s), simplified to be “digital evidence relating to a potential or verified compromise of a computer system”.</p><p><a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-hack-idUSKCN0Z0205">Russians steal research on Trump in hack of U.S. Democratic Party</a></p><h3><strong>How Infosec Messes Up with IOC’s</strong></h3><p>IOC’s are like “hacker fingerprints”… only not. They’re more like the gun. Or the shell casing from a round. IOC’s are not a fingerprint, and certainly not DNA. Yet some members of the informations security Digital Forensics and Incident Response (DFIR) community of ninjafied cyber investigators seem to regard them as such.</p><p>After being <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/07/25/experts-hard-prove-russians-behind-dnc-hack/87529230/">challenged</a> by claims from a few in the infosec community as well as reports from “a person <a href="https://guccifer2.wordpress.com/2016/06/15/dnc/">claiming</a> to be guccifer 2.0”,</p><ul><li><a href="http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/07/25/experts-hard-prove-russians-behind-dnc-hack/87529230/">Experts: Hard to prove Russians behind DNC hack</a></li><li><a href="https://guccifer2.wordpress.com/2016/06/15/dnc/">Guccifer 2.0 DNC&#39;s servers hacked by a lone hacker</a></li></ul><p>Crowdstrike stated that “CrowdStrike stands fully by its analysis and findings identifying two separate Russian intelligence-affiliated adversaries.”</p><p>To believe this statement based on the data in the CrowdStrike report as of the date of the report and the statement, one would need to think that at a minimum:</p><p>a) CrowdStrike can prove the link between the code recovered in their investigation, the digital assets from which the code originated (usually IP address + computer), the person who used the computer, and the individual is a member of the group “cozy bear” and / or “fancy bear”;</p><p>b) publicly available code reportedly used by “cozy bear” and /or “fancy bear” was only used by people in those groups.</p><p>I should stop there. <strong><em>CrowdStrike has not — even to the date of this article- proven “a”, nor have they proven “b”. Therefore, they have not substantiated their asserted attribution. </em></strong>Neither can anyone else without access to the capabilities of our intelligence community.</p><h3>The “Industry” Rushes to Support CrowdStrike</h3><p>June 20th. Industry leaders voiced their opinions in support of the CrowdStrike report.</p><blockquote>Mandiant, a cyber-forensics firm owned by FireEye, based its analysis on five DNC malware samples. In a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cyber-researchers-confirm-russian-government-hack-of-democratic-national-committee/2016/06/20/e7375bc0-3719-11e6-9ccd-d6005beac8b3_story.html?postshare=8921466456399160&amp;tid=ss_tw">statement</a> to The Washington Post, Mandiant researcher Marshall Heilman said that the malware and associated servers are consistent with those previously used by “APT 28 and APT 29,’’ which are Mandiant’s names for Fancy Bear and Cozy Bear, respectively.</blockquote><p>Followed by</p><blockquote>“Based on our comparative analysis, we agree with CrowdStrike and believe that the Cozy Bear and Fancy Bear . . . groups were involved in successful intrusions at the DNC,” Michael Buratowski, a senior executive at Fidelis, <a href="http://www.threatgeek.com/2016/06/dnc_update.html">said</a>.</blockquote><p>Both stated that they believe the work to be conducted by Fancy Bear and Cozy Bear based on malware analysis. That does not satisfy “a” or “b” above. Malware is the weapon or the bullet (depending on metaphor strategy). Let’s assume its the weapon. Malware would be like an AK-47.</p><p>In July, I noted:</p><blockquote>Just because AK-47s were made in Russia doesn’t mean that when a crime is conducted using an AK-47, that the Kalashnikov Concern (Russian arms factory) was the culprit. If you’re in the camp that thinks that its the gun manufacturer’s fault, they are likely to believe Crowdstrike’s argument that the malware (the gun) was fired by the manufacturer (coder).</blockquote><blockquote>Its critical for executives to overlay threat intelligence sources with operational experience so valuable threat intelligence isn’t used to reach errant conclusions, especially when dealing with NATSEC.</blockquote><p>Whether or not you believe the metaphor to be properly worded, the point stands. The issue is that anyone could have accessed, repackaged, and used the publicly available malcode that was believed to be attributed to “cozy bear” or “fancy bear” (as groups, let alone the individuals comprising those groups). This would be like picking up an AK47 on the street. Or buying it used. And then when its left behind at a crime scene, trying to claim that the (pick a gang) did it. Because they commonly use AK47s. Good enough. You get the point.</p><h3>October 12, 2016. Infragard INFRASEC Conference Talk on Inductive Fallacy</h3><p><a href="https://medium.com/u/4ef7fb83397a">Tom Gorup</a> and I gave a talk on <em>Inductive Fallacy</em> based on this and other cases. As of this date, the group was mixed on opinions about whether or not Russia was to blame for the DNC hack. It was clear the industry was still divided.</p><h3><strong>Election Night— Election Monitoring, Indianapolis</strong></h3><p>An exceptionally skilled group of people from different higher education institutions, government agencies, law enforcement, and intelligence, convened to utilize their expertise to monitor state reporting sites, digital voting system vendor IP space and terms, and other locations for evidence of election hacks, DDoS attempts, etc.</p><p><a href="http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/11/05/election-2016-cyber-hack-issues-homeland-security-indiana-pennsylvania-election-protection-verified-voter/93262960/">Cyber &#39;SWAT&#39; teams gird for Election Day trouble</a></p><p>Even as of the night of the election, “a” or “b” had not been substantiated, yet the topic of Russian interference in the election was at the forefront of discussions. The quiet night left me uneasy. Too <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/world/us-election/us-election-all-quiet-on-the-cyber-front-20161109-gslvy4.html">quiet</a>.</p><p>That night, questions poured in from friends who were anticipating cyber attacks. Questions inevitably turned back to “did Russia do it?”.</p><h3>December 30, 2016. FBI/DHS Joint Analysis Report Released.</h3><p>Result? The infosec community on twitter was exceptionally vocal about their opinions of the report. I found it interesting that the community was ok with looking past the aforementioned attribution issues. Predictably, questions came in. <em>What now? What do you think? Does it change your opinion? </em>I sent them links to what Lee and Carr have written.</p><ul><li><a href="http://www.robertmlee.org/analytical-leaps-and-wild-speculation-in-recent-reports-of-industrial-cyber-attacks/">Analytical Leaps and Wild Speculation in Recent Reports of Industrial Cyber Attacks</a></li><li><a href="https://medium.com/@jeffreycarr/fbi-dhs-joint-analysis-report-a-fatally-flawed-effort-b6a98fafe2fa">FBI/DHS Joint Analysis Report: A Fatally Flawed Effort</a></li></ul><h3>A Few Hours Later, Story Leaked that The Grid Was Hacked</h3><p>The Washington Post publishes a story stating that an east coast utility reported to DHS that they had a hit on the IOC’s released in the JAR.</p><p><a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20170104032307/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-hackers-penetrated-us-electricity-grid-through-a-utility-in-vermont/2016/12/30/8fc90cc4-ceec-11e6-b8a2-8c2a61b0436f_story.html">Russian operation hacked a Vermont utility, showing risk to U.S. electrical grid security, officials say</a></p><p>News of the supposed hack had set off a firestorm of recriminations, with Vermont leaders calling Russian President Vladimir Putin “a thug” earlier Saturday, after one of the state’s electric utilities found a virus on a laptop computer.</p><p>Infosec practitioners lit up twitter. Politicians prepared for unrest and black-outs.</p><h3>January 1st, 2017. Washington Post Retracts Vermont Utility Hack Story</h3><p><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-hackers-penetrated-us-electricity-grid-through-a-utility-in-vermont/2016/12/30/8fc90cc4-ceec-11e6-b8a2-8c2a61b0436f_story.html?utm_term=.9896d83591a0">Russian operation hacked a Vermont utility, showing risk to U.S. electrical grid security, officials say</a></p><p>The “<a href="https://nypost.com/2017/01/01/washington-post-retracts-story-about-russian-hack-at-vermont-utility/">story that never was</a>” shows us how dangerous this is. How scared people are. Our profession is supposed to be full of sheepdogs. We’re supposed to be the defenders of the digital space. The ones who can be ambassadors of truth and provide a foundation of calm, analytical, fact-based methodical decision making in the face of digital terror. Too much? not if you ask the political leaders who were terrified that the grid had been hacked and that power would be shut down. People don’t understand “the cyber”. Its terrifying to them. So they turn to people who they trust. Those people need to be believable, and trustworthy. Or they’ll turn to people who tell them what they want to hear. And then act on bad information.</p><h3>You Have the Football. Make the Call.</h3><p>If you were President Obama or President-elect Trump, what would you think at this point? What would you do? How would you find your foundation of truth? You think my analysis, absent of facts is wrong? Ok. Lets look at what others have said.</p><p>CrowdStike’s Alperovitch says <em>malware was used by Cozy Bear and Fancy Bear to hack the DNC, sponsored by Russia.</em></p><p><a href="https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/">Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee &quot;</a></p><p>Mandiant and Fidelis “verified” the “attribution”. June 2016.</p><ul><li><a href="https://theintercept.com/2016/07/26/russian-intelligence-hack-dnc-nsa-know-snowden-says/">If Russian Intelligence Did Hack the DNC, the NSA Would Know, Snowden Says</a></li><li><a href="http://www.threatgeek.com/2016/06/dnc_update.html">Findings from Analysis of DNC Intrusion Malware</a></li></ul><p>Schindler asserts that <em>Wikileaks sharing the DNC emails is a clear attack by Putin on Clinton’s </em>potential success. July 2016.</p><p><a href="https://www.google.com/amp/observer.com/2016/07/wikileaks-dismantling-of-dnc-is-clear-attack-by-putin-on-clinton/amp/">Wikileaks Dismantling of DNC Is Clear Attack by Putin on Clinton</a></p><p>Lee states that <em>Russia hacked the dnc.</em></p><h3>Robert M. Lee on Twitter</h3><p>Did Russia hack the DNC? Yes. Is the DHS/FBI report good? No. Does either have anything to do with the electric utility in Vermont? Nope.</p><p>Carr states that <em>there is also ZERO technical evidence to connect those Russian-speaking hackers to the GRU, FSB, SVR, or any other Russian government department. </em>December 2016.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@jeffreycarr/we-blame-russia-because-we-cant-blame-russians-3de58bc11cc4">How To Get To “Reasonable Certainty” on a Russia Finding</a></p><p>Assange:</p><p><a href="http://time.com/4620806/julian-assange-russia-hack-fox-hannity/">Julian Assange Says He&#39;s 1,000% Sure Russia Didn&#39;t Hack the DNC&#39;s Emails</a></p><p>CIA Director Brennan says ”Earlier this week, I met separately with (Director) FBI James Comey and DNI Jim Clapper, and there is strong consensus among us on the scope, nature, and intent of Russian interference in our presidential election.”</p><p><a href="https://www.google.com/amp/s/amp.cnn.com/cnn/2016/12/16/politics/john-brennan-cia-donald-trump-russian-hacking/index.html">CIA director reassures staff: Intel agencies similar in hacking assessment</a></p><h3>Russia Has Won This Battle.</h3><p>Regardless of what the intelligence agencies have from source intelligence. Regardless of what detailed technical evidence emerges that brings finality to the technical argument of fact. Regardless of how any of us feel about it. Russia won this battle. No evidence has been presented that they “hacked the election” (I’m taking a bit of liberty here). No evidence has been presented that shows that they hacked the grid. The “evidence” provided that shows that they tampered with the election by manipulating the minds of Americans by hacking the DNC doesn’t matter. People <em>think</em> that they did. Therefore they did. When policymakers get together, they have already been conditioned to believe that not only is it possible, <em>it happened. </em>Russia won. Millions believe that the reason our new President will take office in inauguration day is because of Putin. That Putin has minions that can hack the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cybersecurity-firm-finds-a-link-between-dnc-hack-and-ukrainian-artillery/2016/12/21/47bf1f5a-c7e3-11e6-bf4b-2c064d32a4bf_story.html?utm_term=.c567a2b18d0b">DNC</a>, the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/09/us/obama-russia-election-hack.html?_r=1">RNC</a>, the <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/02/politics/digital-fingerprints-russia-hacking/index.html">election</a>, the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-hackers-penetrated-us-electricity-grid-through-a-utility-in-vermont/2016/12/30/8fc90cc4-ceec-11e6-b8a2-8c2a61b0436f_story.html?utm_term=.cd5dfab51ec2">grid</a>, <a href="https://medium.com/@jeffreycarr/the-gru-ukraine-artillery-hack-that-may-never-have-happened-820960bbb02d#.bq4v2jfp0">Ukrainian Artillery</a>… You name it, Putin can hack it. Or so “we” believe.</p><p>If every time we look into the bushes, we see Russian cyber adversaries, even if they aren’t there, what will that become?</p><p>Here’s what needs to happen.</p><ol><li>We need to fix the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) role. And / or create a new Director of National Cyber Security (DNCS) cabinet role. We cannot operate as effectively as needed without enhancing the cyber intelligence roles within our agencies.</li><li>We need a common standard and US based group for attribution verification. This needs to be extended to an international group for attribution.</li><li>The infosec industry needs to be careful with the knowledge and trust bestowed upon us. We need to be the foundation of truth and trust. Not purveyors of half answers and fear. Say what we know. Say what we don’t know. Share what needs to be done to come to an answer. Execute.</li></ol><p>They cannot win the war.</p><h3>Misdirection — Success.</h3><blockquote>The whole secret lies in confusing the enemy, so that he cannot fathom our real intent. — Sun Tzu.</blockquote><p>Was it Russia? China? Someone else? Regardless, they have succeeded.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=43e1f2692c8d" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/rook-security/attribution-russia-misdirection-43e1f2692c8d">Attribution + Russia = Misdirection</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/rook-security">SECOPS</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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