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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Jackson Kernion on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Jackson Kernion on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@jacksonkernion?source=rss-77da4f646b93------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Jackson Kernion on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jacksonkernion?source=rss-77da4f646b93------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why I Choose Politics]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/student-voices/why-i-choose-politics-bd1c7ab4747c?source=rss-77da4f646b93------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bd1c7ab4747c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[donald-trump]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[2016-election]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jackson Kernion]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 10 Nov 2016 05:25:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-06-19T11:00:24.158Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>What can be learned from our loss?</h4><p>Donald Trump won the American presidency yesterday. I’ve since been fixated on trying to weigh our loss.</p><p>How could we have been so wrong? Do we even know what we’re dealing with? What’s the appropriate response? And what, if anything, are we supposed to learn from all of this?</p><p>From one angle, it can seem like the lesson of Trump’s victory is relatively minor: we mostly keep in place our political views but we tweak both a) our assessment of political priorities (e.g. we realize we should focus more on trade policy), and b) our assessment of the breadth of the appeal of Trumpism (e.g. we realize that it appeals to ~50% of the public instead of ~40%). From a numbers perspective, this loss can’t mean that we were <em>all</em> that far off.</p><p>And yet that’s not how this feels. The “small tweaks needed” assessment normally <em>does </em>work after most electoral losses. But what’s distinctive about this loss is that it feels so much worse, so much darker, so much more distressing than a normal electoral loss. And so we feel stuck in our despair, trying to make sense of what’s different this time.</p><p>I think what we now feel we got wrong was not something <em>within</em> the political process — say, some particular particular issue like trade policy — but the political process itself.</p><p>We didn’t come to this election ignorant of those on the other side. We knew that not everyone was voting for our candidate, but we thought the electoral process and the corresponding political discourse ultimately <em>works</em>. So if we, as a country, turn our critical gaze towards an ideology that is (at the very least) unacceptably cozy with bigotry, surely the American people would see it for what it is and set things right at the ballot box.</p><p>What stings is that this should not have been a close call. This wasn’t a choice between two roughly equivalent forms of evil. Sure, our politics can temporarily fail to promote better and smarter taxation policy, but on certain key, fundamental issues, the democratic process, we thought, basically functioned in a consistent, reliable way.</p><p>In Trumpism, we discovered a disease that overwhelmed our democracy’s immune system, that didn’t whither in response the antibodies our politics produces.</p><p>Trump is many things — paranoid, narcissistic, intellectually lazy, and generally unhinged — but the trait that now sticks out more than anything else is his disdain for the slow, tedious, difficult work of politics. Trump prefers name-calling over argumentation, appeals to emotion over appeals to reason, nationalistic pride over timeless ideals which no country owns.</p><p>What now seems so threatening is that a candidate so thoroughly opposed to the process of politics won. So maybe we were foolish to have placed so much faith in that process. Maybe politics is futile. Maybe elections weren’t really ever about ideas in the first place. Maybe all we ever really had was the <em>illusion</em> of political agency. In reality, politics is a beast moved forward by something far more primal than reason and we’re just along for the ride.</p><p>When I dwell on this, I can start feeling pulled towards a toxic form of nihilism where I give up entirely on trying to engage with others.</p><p>We all know that politics isn’t supposed to be easy. But it’s supposed be <em>possible</em>. Though the process of litigating important issues via elections can be inefficient and exhausting, modest short-term disappointments are supposed to be vastly outweighed by awesome long-term achievements. Under the surface, at some deeper level that can be hard to pick up on when you’re wading through the thicket, politics makes us better people. We become more open. We become more rational.</p><p>Today, politics feels less possible than ever.</p><p>But it’s also more necessary than ever.</p><p>When we ask ourselves, “What now?”, we have two options.</p><p>One option is to put less faith in the wisdom of the democratic process. We could resort to other means that lie outside rational political discourse. We could stridently deny our opponent’s the legitimacy that politics requires. Or we could try to mimic their attempts to win gains through gerrymandering, voter ID laws, and their refusal to respect the institutional norms of democracy. Maybe our problem is that we <em>thought </em>we were in some grand philosophical debate, and, instead, politics is <em>really</em> about the acquisition of power, by any means necessary.</p><p>I prefer a second option: we could reaffirm our commitment to reasoned discourse and democratic rule. We could try, more than ever, to engage our opponents in a good faith effort to find common ground. We can fight to make a not-democratic-enough process more democratic. Organize to repeal voter ID laws. Mount a constitutional amendment campaign to address its most egregious flaws. Our opponent’s unwilling or unable to be self-critical? Lead by example. Be unflinching in your commitment to fairness, even when that involves calling out members of your own team. When your opponent makes a good point, acknowledge that. And while you may want to shout at them when they don’t grant you the same decency in return, continue to insist on decency both in yourself and others.</p><p>We will move forward, we will continue to engage, we will not take the easy path, and we won’t become cynical. Because we don’t have any other choice. On the basic legitimacy of politics, we all take sides, whether or not we want to.</p><p>And today, more than ever, I choose politics.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bd1c7ab4747c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/student-voices/why-i-choose-politics-bd1c7ab4747c">Why I Choose Politics</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/student-voices">Student Voices</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[In Defense of Diagnosing Trump]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jacksonkernion/in-defense-of-diagnosing-trump-f96ff19eb6c7?source=rss-77da4f646b93------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f96ff19eb6c7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[2016-election]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hillary-clinton]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mental-health]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[donald-trump]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jackson Kernion]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 12 Aug 2016 17:40:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-02-12T22:29:04.271Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Vox just posted <a href="http://www.vox.com/2016/8/12/12447742/diagnosing-trump-sham-psychology">a piece about how public ‘diagnoses’ of Trump’s mental illness are sloppy and hurt both the public understanding of psychiatry and our politics</a>. I vey much disagree with this article. Let me explain why each central claim is wrong.</p><h3>“Airmchair psychiatry undermines the scientific legitimacy of psychiatry.”</h3><h4>Mistake #1: This mistakes non-exhaustive analysis for inconclusive analysis.</h4><p>The sort of behavioral ‘evidence’ we have on Trump is not worth nothing. It’s not the same as a structured diagnostic test. But this sort of ‘data’ is precisely the same sort of data that would be part of by a professional diagnosis of Trump. And such data, in some cases, may be conclusive. I‘d argue that we have all the evidence we need in order to diagnose Trump as a sociopath with narcissistic personality disorder.</p><h4>Mistake #2: This assumes that psychiatry is a science ‘just like’ other sciences.</h4><p>It’s a mistake to portray psychiatry as a rigorous science in the same vein as cancer treatment. You can’t do cancer treatment from the couch, but the sorts of things psychiatrists do <em>can</em> be done from the couch. This doesn’t mean psychiatry is bunk. It’s just not exactly like other sorts of medical disciplines. And we understand much less well the underlying conditions that psychiatry studies. It’s just plain wrong to portray the psychiatric diagnostic tests as equivalent to the diagnostic tests for other medical conditions — the structure of these tests and how to interpret their results are highly contested. We should be able to hold two thoughts in our head at the same time: mental health is a real thing, but it’s very different in nature from other health issues.</p><h3>“Hallmarks of any mental disorder include dysfunction and suffering.”</h3><h4>Mistake #3: This makes it seem like all or most people with a mental health condition don’t have their lives together, and that isn’t true.</h4><p>What’s ‘disordered’ is one’s thought patterns/mental functioning. And plenty of people with mental health ‘conditions’ are both a) not aware of their own ‘disorders’, and b) lead otherwise normal lives.</p><p>It’s also harmful to suggest that “you must not be suffing from any mental health problems because you’re doing fine”. Plenty of people who are outwardly successful nevertheless struggle with mental health problems. And we shouldn’t make these people feel as though their problems aren’t real.</p><h3>“Efforts to label Trump with a mental disorder let our political culture off the hook.”</h3><h4>Mistake #4: Trump’s mental condition is not irrelevant to political analysis.</h4><p>If we want to try to understand Trump’s appeal, it’s not irrelevant what sort of psychological traits he displays. We’re unlikely to succeed in understanding Trumpism if we don’t allow ourselves to recognize someone who is pathologically incapable of self-criticism. This is likely part of his appeal.</p><h4><strong>Mistake #5: It’s not unimportant for voters to know whether Trump really is a narcissistic sociopath.</strong></h4><p>We’re electing the President of the United States. If one of our candidates likely suffers from sociopathy and narcissim, that’s something I want to know about as a voter.</p><h4>Mistake #6: diagnosing Trump does not preclude other analyses.</h4><p>We can do two things at once: analyze Trump’s psyche, and analyze the abstract politics of Trumpism. These are not mutually exclusive.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f96ff19eb6c7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Progressives Will Learn All the Wrong Lessons From the 2016 Primary]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jacksonkernion/progressives-will-learn-all-the-wrong-lessons-from-the-2016-primary-2c0c8c0d1d3e?source=rss-77da4f646b93------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2c0c8c0d1d3e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bernie-sanders]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[2016-election]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hillary-clinton]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jackson Kernion]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 11 Jun 2016 00:31:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-06-01T01:08:16.947Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Matt Taibbi has <a href="http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/democrats-will-learn-all-the-wrong-lessons-from-brush-with-bernie-20160609">a piece out in Rolling Stone</a> about how the Democratic party will ‘learn all the wrong lessons’ from Hillary’s primary fight with Bernie. His argument goes something like this: party insiders and establishment types have successfully insulated themselves from the unrest of disgruntled Americans who want a fundamental rethink of the structures of government/the economy. Those in politics who ignore this will only serve to fan the flames of populist resentment and risk getting wiped out by an inevitable populist wave.</p><p>Taibbi’s piece follows a series of other pieces about how Bernie is the future of the Democratic party. (Like <a href="http://www.vox.com/2016/4/20/11466376/bernie-sanders-future-democrats">this one</a>.)</p><p>I’m skeptical of this analysis. And I want to run through some of the reasons for my skepticism.</p><h3>Bernie’s appeal can’t be explained by the appeal of fundamentally different policy goals</h3><p>The central idea behind Taibbi’s piece (and others like it) seems to be that Bernie’s policy goals that focus on economic fairness are more appealing than the mish-mash of standard Democratic policy goals. And since the appeal of these goals will only increase, the Democrats ignore these policy goals at their own peril.</p><p>I agree on the appeal of Bernie’s goals, but this overlooks something super important: Bernie’s policy goals are mostly the same as those already included in the Democratic establishment’s policy platform.</p><p>(The one major exception is trade policy, but: (a) this issue is not something most Americans have strong feelings about, and (b) it’s unlikely that an anti-free-trade position would hold up well in a nation-wide debate over trade policy.)</p><p>Take two representative examples: financial reform and “getting money out of politics”. Hillary and Bernie are both advocating for substantial changes in how the financial sector operates so that the financiers can’t just “skim off the top”. (It’s worth pointing out that anyone who understands the current banking system and takes the time to read through Hillary’s financial reform proposals agrees that <a href="http://www.vox.com/2015/10/9/9483329/hillary-clinton-banks">her plan does much more</a> to <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/hillary-clinton-gets-bernie-sanders-doesnt-wall-street">address the fundamental problems</a> of the financial sector than Bernie’s plan.) Hillary and Bernie both argue that moneyed interests have too much power in Washington. (And both are incredibly vague about what they’d do to change this because this problem has no obvious easy solution.)</p><p>Much more can be said here, but I take it to be fairly obvious that Hillary and Bernie fundamentally agree in their diagnosis of America’s problems.</p><p>So I suspect that what Taibbi and others <em>really</em> mean to be targeting (though they don’t always make this clear) is a difference in <em>style</em> rather than <em>substance</em>. But this version of the prediction is both more fuzzy and less ‘obviously’ right.</p><p>In any case, it’s worth considering, at this point, what else besides substantive policy differences might explain Bernie’s success, and I find that a careful examination of alternative hypotheses leaves little room for the “Bernie-style socialism is the future” explanation.</p><p>(I find it more likely that hardcore Bernie supporters, here, aren’t so much disgruntled by Hillary’s policy proposals but by the taint of her connections to the rich and powerful. “Sure, Hillary <em>says</em> she wants to do these things,” these people say, “but how can we trust her? She pals around with the rich and powerful, and she can’t help but be influenced by this.” Fine. But just note that this isn’t a direct criticism of Hillary’s ‘neoliberalism’. In any case, skip the needless wink-wink/nudge-nudge routine and get right down to the policy debate. And those hardcore Bernie supporters who think that there’s a large group of zealous, ideologically pure socialists who side with Bernie in this debate over nitty-gritty policy details are, I think, fooling themselves.)</p><h3><strong>Bernie’s appeal is better explained by </strong>a collection of accidental/local features of this particular primary</h3><p>Regardless of how you feel about my ‘they basically agree’ point, it’s still worth considering alternative explanations for Bernie’s success and see how well they hold up against scrutiny. In the end, I think the following ‘accidental’ factors are much more likely to explain the bulk of Bernie’s appeal:</p><h4>1. Hillary is ‘unlikable’ and Bernie is authentic</h4><p>Hillary is a bad politician. And by that I mean: she’s not good at faking enthusiasm, at carefully calculating when she should/shouldn’t stick to her principles, honing in on a simple, easy-to-digest, compelling message. (Those who, here, bring in gender to explain her low ‘likability’ scores are on to something. But I also think this tends to get overblown. Consider a counterexample: Elizabeth Warren is viewed as more charismatic and likable even though she’s a woman. So something else has to be going on here.)</p><p>Bernie, on the other hand, clearly believes everything he says. And his message is simple to a fault.</p><p>But just note that the ‘populist’ wing of the party doesn’t have a monopoly on authenticity. Just look at Obama. Or Cory Booker. In any case, “the future of politics/the Democratic party is authenticity” is not the message Taibbi and others are embracing.</p><p>In fact, what’s remarkable is that Hillary won the primary <em>without</em> being particularly likable and charismatic. The takeaway, here, should be that her formula for victory is so fundamentally sound that she didn’t even need to compete on this. That is, what should be surprising is how <em>weak</em> a simple economic-populism-all-the-way message is.</p><h4>2. Bernie wasn’t subjected to the kind of sustained scrutiny that we can expect for future Bernie-style candidates</h4><p>Hillary fought this primary on the edges. She never went all-in on a “here are Bernie’s fundamental weaknesses” strategy. She and the Democratic establishment didn’t want to alienate Sanders supporters, so they played the long game and just waited for him to lose. (I think this a long-term strategic mistake, but I also think this accurately captures their reasoning.)</p><p>If there’s to be a future Democratic primary in which a Bernie-style candidate runs against a ‘conventional’ Democrat, I fully expect to see a much more robust and substantive debate over whether a Bernie-style ‘revolution’ is preferable to Hillary/Obama-style pragmatism. And because most politicians are better politicians than Hillary, I’d expect them to be better at framing this message.</p><h4>3. There were no other non-Hillary alternatives</h4><p>Liberals are, constitutionally, uncomfortable with the sort of “fall in line” message they heard coming from the Democratic establishment this cycle. And liberals, in general, tend to be a rebellious bunch. So when the establishment lined up behind a somewhat weak candidate, there was a wing of the party that was bound to chafe at this and look around for another option. So long as there was a plausible outlet for dissatisfaction with Hillary, this ‘underdog’ was bound to do pretty well.</p><p>That is, it’s not unlikely that a large number of Bernie supporters supported him for no better reason than “He seems authentic, ‘more progressive’, and I don’t much like Hillary”.</p><h4>4. We’re in a historically unique moment of Republican obstructionism</h4><p>We’re in a historically unique moment where one party has decided to do all they can to obstruct a sitting president of the opposing party <em>no matter what the cost</em>. The result of this can, I think, be misread by casual political observers as a kind ‘failure’ of Obama-style ‘stay-the-course’, calm moderation.</p><p>But it’s likely that the next 8 years will be a lot different. There are signs that the Republican fever is breaking. And, even more promising, if the fever doesn’t break, the Republican party will simply cease to be a party that’s competitive on a national level. Either way: there’s reason to expect huge legislative victories for the Democrats in the near future. This will both: (a) reverse the vague sense that Democrats are sitting on their asses and (b) validate Obama’s cautious pragmatism.</p><p>(A detailed treatment of this would require another post, but I think the Republican party’s slow march towards insanity can be seen as a direct consequence of Obama’s inability to be unreasonable. In short, Obama made Republicans choose between engaging in a respectful, good faith dialogue of ideas and blind, unreasonable intransigence. The Republicans chose the latter, but the consequences are roughly the same: massive victory for Democratic policy goals and–eventually–re-establishing a norm of respectful dialogue.)</p><p>The bottom line diagnosis:</p><p>Hardcore Bernie supporters don’t seem to entertain these plausible alternative explanations of Bernie’s success, and so they overestimate the enthusiasm for a more ‘pure’ Bernie-style party.</p><h3><strong>What exactly does this Bernie-inspired future party look like?</strong></h3><p>Putting all that aside, it’s not even clear to me what a Bernie-ified Democratic party is supposed to look like. Taibbi hints at this alternative vision when he writes:</p><blockquote>The maddening thing about the Democrats is that they refuse to see how easy they could have it. If the party threw its weight behind a truly populist platform, if it stood behind unions and prosecuted Wall Street criminals and stopped taking giant gobs of cash from every crooked transnational bank and job-exporting manufacturer in the world, they would win every election season in a landslide.</blockquote><p>The question I want to ask of Taibbi, and all the Bernie supporters who bring up this alternative, is: precisely what steps do you think the party should take? And does the party actually oppose taking these steps?</p><p>At this point, things get fuzzy and I lose track of what exactly this ‘future’ is supposed to look like. If the idea is that the Democrats should merely change their message without changing the policies they try to enact…well, then, okay. Fine. But if, instead, the proposal is that Democrats ought try to push through something like Bernie’s medicare-for-all plan or his free-public-college-for-all plan, then I think we have good reason to be skeptical.</p><p>Here, again, I think Bernie supporters confuse Republican obstructionism with the lack of desire on behalf of Democrats. Do they remember the debate over Obamacare? Why, exactly, do they think such policy pushes would go any differently?</p><p>And this gets to what I think is a fundamental misunderstanding lying behind the analyses I’ve targeted. They confuse the our actual situation with some fantasy situation:</p><p><strong>Actual Situation:</strong> There’s broad agreement amongst the populace that we should pursue a center-left policy agenda, but the Republican party has obstructed that agenda. And it’s difficult to overcome that obstruction for structural reasons.</p><p><strong>Fantasy situation: </strong>Americans are becoming fervent believers in Nordic-style socialism and we’re bound to overcome all the previously insurmountable structural barriers by inspiring a large-scale movement for ‘revolution’.</p><p>So, given the Actual Situation, here’s the smart play and the play that will, in fact, shape the future of the Democratic party: stay calm while the Republican party implodes, send out a broad pro-progress message, carefully explain how much a of no-brainer current progressive policy proposals are, and reap outrageous electoral/legislative rewards.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2c0c8c0d1d3e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Trumpism represents a Gamergate-style backlash against PC culture.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jacksonkernion/trumpism-represents-a-gamergate-style-backlash-against-pc-culture-672d65058999?source=rss-77da4f646b93------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/672d65058999</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[2016-election]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jackson Kernion]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 28 May 2016 20:22:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-06-01T22:12:27.669Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What explains Donald Trump’s appeal? Some theories have been floated in the aftermath of Trump’s primary victory:</p><h4>Trump as entertainer</h4><p>First, some point to the Trump’s weirdly compelling made-for-reality-TV persona and his ability to expertly wield that persona to manipulate the media.</p><p>If this is right, Trump’s appeal isn’t representative of any larger trend. Perhaps he’s taken advantage of a party that is in a historically weak position, but it’ll be hard for others to follow his entertainer-turned-political-outsider path. And so it’s a mistake to take Trumpism too seriously.</p><h4>Trump as violent nationalist</h4><p>Then there’s the theory that Trumpism represents a particularly vile–and violent–strain of American nationalism and xenophobia. (Vox, for example, has been <a href="https://youtu.be/0ZKDmYfhMhQ">heavily</a> <a href="https://youtu.be/5YU9djt_CQM">promoting</a> this theory.) Trump’s ‘achievement’ lies in identifying and amplifying sectarian impulses that have grown stronger during the Obama years. Trump’s form of pugnacious populism and overt tribalism has found success in eschewing coded language and embracing an openly hostile stance towards the ‘others’.</p><p>Under this theory, it’s a mistake to think that Trump has no ideology. Instead, this ideology has an appeal the media elite were either unwilling or unable to appreciate. Even so, it’s an ideology that is unlikely to survive the scrutiny of a general election campaign.</p><p>Perhaps these theories <em>partially</em> explain Trump’s success, but I doubt they get at the root of Trump’s support.</p><p>The ‘Trump as entertainer’ theory maybe explains how he’s been able to effectively communicate his message, but it doesn’t say much about why his message has proven so attractive to so many people. Other buffoons are entertaining, but they don’t inspire the kind of intense support that Trump has enjoyed.</p><p>And I have a hard time believing that violent nationalism, by itself, is a primary motivation for Trumpism.</p><p>Trump-style nationalism is perhaps unique for it’s willingness to proclaim that America is ‘losing’ right now. But the positive message about America’s underlying greatness seems not much different from the typical, nonspecific “America is the best” nationalism of traditional Republicans. So perhaps the brash <em>style</em> of his enthusiasm is noteworthy, but it’s not as if past Republicans were insufficiently gung-ho about America.</p><p>Maybe what’s new about Trump-style nationalism is its embrace of authoritarianism and violence. But authoritarianism and violence aren’t really ideologies–they’re <em>tactics</em>. That is, people find authoritarian solutions attractive only after they’ve been convinced that there’s some dire threat that their leader has clearly identified and targeted. So authoritarianism is a <em>symptom</em>, not a <em>cause</em>. We should want a theory of what’s <em>causing</em> Trump supporters to get so riled up in the first place.</p><p>So I think any convincing theory of Trump’s success has to explain why so many Americans feel threatened right now. And I think the most plausible <em>general</em> theory requires that we understand Trumpism as backlash against a culture of political correctness.</p><h3><strong>Backlash against PC culture</strong></h3><p>To those of us who live happily in cosmopolitan enclaves, it can be hard to appreciate and understand just how aggrieved ‘real America’ feels. When they watch TV, go to the movies, go online, and welcome their kids come home from college, they feel bombarded by the message: “You are culturally backwards. And if you try to argue against us, that’s just another sign of how culturally backwards you are.” That kinda stings.</p><p>The grievance here is less “We disagree with your progressive values” and more “We disagree with the way in which you treat any deviance from progressive orthodoxy as illegitimate.” For instance, I suspect that plenty of Trump supporters self-identify as sympathetic to gender and racial equality, but they can’t stand the smug extremism of progressives who think you’re a bigot for, for instance, suggesting that maybe affirmative action is a bad policy.</p><p>Take, for example, Trump’s proposed ban on Muslims entering the U.S. Trump supporters, I think, aren’t ideologically committed to the effectiveness of this particular policy. Instead, they <em>are</em> ideologically committed to the disdain for PC culture which makes this policy position possible. That is, maybe the ban on Muslims is a bad idea–but it’s not <em>obviously</em> so (according to these Trump supporters). If terrorists were typically wine enthusiasts, then it wouldn’t be stupid to suggest banning the entry of wine enthusiasts until we came up with a better strategy. They feel that the same reasoning might support a ban on Muslims. What’s worrying to Trump supporters is that liberals seem to dismiss such a proposals out of hand simply because they hurt people’s feelings. And, according to them, that kind of response is not just misguided, it’s dangerous.</p><p>So the disagreement, here, is not over whether such policies are <em>wise</em>. It’s instead over whether such policy proposals are <em>legitimate</em>. Trump <em>hears</em> their complaints in ways that both Republican elites and the left have <em>refused</em> to hear their complaints.</p><p>If this is right, it helps explain a number of heretofore puzzling features of Trumpism. It explains why Trump’s changing positions don’t much matter to his supporters. Again, they care about his rejection of policies motivated solely by political correctness, not about any particular policies. And it explains why the media has been so ineffective in their attempts to ‘call out’ and shame Trump. Such attempts, since they focus on the illegitimacy of Trump’s positions, only serve to further antagonize and inflame his base.</p><p>Understanding Trumpism as a <em>cultural</em> movement also helps explain why Trump supporters are so passionate. The fight over PC culture is personal in a way that fights over, say, fiscal policy aren’t. Keynesians don’t accuse those who support austerity measures of being morally inferior garbage people. But, according to Trump supporters, that’s precisely what ‘social justice warriors’ do when they accuse their opponents of holding views that could only be motivated by nasty racism, sexism, and bigotry. The target of criticism here isn’t some abstract model–it’s fellow Americans and their culture.</p><h3><strong>Gamergate as the future of the culture wars</strong></h3><p>If my diagnosis is right, then Trumpism isn’t particularly novel. It’s remarkably similar to another recent outburst of anti-PC furor: Gamergate.</p><p>If you’ve never heard of Gamergate, I envy your ignorance. I don’t have the patience to give a detailed etiology of the ‘controversy’. Besides, I think such analyses tend to obscure what’s an otherwise straightforward, easy-to-understand situation: Gamers felt that they were being told that their enjoyment of games was wrong and that they were bad people for feeling otherwise. So a bunch of gamers fought back, and the result was probably the biggest, most nastiest internet fight of all time. We’re talking about death threats, casual hate speech, and all other forms of internet bullying. It got so bad that a number of journalists and game developers decided to leave the industry.</p><p>So what exactly led to this eruption of anger? It’s really quite simple: game studios and gaming journalists, as members of civilized, respectable society, have become increasingly aware of the institutional biases of the gaming industry, and they are trying to take action to change the industry for the better. That means: adding more diverse playable characters, supporting non-traditional games that appeal to new audiences, and avoiding sexed-up lady characters that lack agency.</p><p>Gamers have taken all this extremely personally. They see it as an attempt to take away from them something about which they care deeply. They just want to play Call of Duty and they want you to leave them alone.</p><p>What I find so interesting about all this is the ideology of aggrievement that gamers developed in their attempts to ‘fight back’ against ‘social justice warriors’. It turns out that lots of people feel persecuted by the what they see as the tyranny of culturally elite progressives.</p><p>It’s also interesting to note that Gamergate’s vitriol was aimed primarily at the gaming media. It’s gaming publications that introduced progressive critiques of gaming culture, and some gamers feel like these publications haven’t accurately represented the views of actual gamers. And these outsiders are responsible for the industry’s move away from appealing narrowly to existing gamers. (Note that the industry is still hyper-focused on serving young, straight, white males.) Trumpism follows Gamergate in its intense scrutiny of the media and it’s role in distributing cultural ‘propoganda’. On their view, it’s the media that shoves PC culture down our throats and normalizes the hatred of regular Americans.</p><h3><strong>What this means for the Left</strong></h3><p>The left can respond to the backlash against PC culture in one of two ways.</p><p>First, it can fight tribalism with tribalism. Marginalize Trump and his coalition. Call him a bigot, a racist, a bully. Mock him. Laugh at him. Call him out. Such a strategy is likely to succeed. The left’s tribe is simply bigger, and it will only continue to grow.</p><p>But I prefer a different path: transcend tribalism. This means committing to the hard work of understanding Trumpism and explaining how it’s misguided in terms that Trump supporters will understand. This strategy also requires a kind of self-criticism that I’m not sure the left is currently capable of — we have to be willing to admit when other lefties have gone too far, even when they’re responding to comparatively worse wrongs committed by those on the right. In my view, this stratagy is a more honest expression of progressive ideals.</p><p>But debates about how to respond to Trumpism can only take place after we understand it. And I fear that liberals don’t currently understand Trump’s appeal.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=672d65058999" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Harvard wants to ban gender discrimination. Here’s why that’s smart.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jacksonkernion/harvard-wants-to-ban-gender-discrimination-heres-why-that-s-smart-b9d4a5652fbb?source=rss-77da4f646b93------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b9d4a5652fbb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[college]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[feminism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jackson Kernion]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 10 May 2016 23:26:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-05-11T01:13:22.936Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Harvard will start sanctioning members of single-gender, off-campus social clubs. This is a huge move, and it will, in due time, force all such clubs to go co-ed. (If the ban on leadership positions and scholarship eligibility doesn’t prove an effective nudge, <a href="http://www.harvard.edu/president/news/2016/letter-on-single-gender-social-organizations">Faust’s letter to Dean Khurana</a> suggests that they’ll ratchet up these sanctions until they find something effective.)</p><p>These actions are widely seen as specifically targeting the all-male final clubs. These clubs have, historically, been particulalry influential, and they’ve helped make the social scene on Harvard’s campus what it is today. (See <a href="http://www.vox.com/2016/5/7/11609404/final-clubs-harvard-explained">Dylan Matthews’ entertaining piece</a> if you want to better appreciate their negative influence.) While the clubs have long been criticized by both Harvard undergrads and the administration, recent criticism has focused more on their role in abetting sexual assault.</p><p>Yet the newly-announced sanctions affect <em>all</em> single-gender organizations, not just the all-male final clubs. And their public announcement focused instead on discriminatory membership requirements. In her letter, Faust writes:</p><blockquote>Although the fraternities, sororities, and final clubs are not formally recognized by the College, they play an unmistakable and growing role in student life, in many cases enacting forms of privilege and exclusion at odds with our deepest values. The College cannot…endorse selection criteria that reject much of the student body merely because of gender. …They encourage a form of self-segregation that undermines the promise offered by Harvard’s diverse student body. And they do not serve our students well when they step outside our gates into a society where gender-based discrimination is understood as unwise, unenlightened, and untenable.</blockquote><blockquote>I join you in urging the unrecognized social organizations to discard their gender-based membership practices, to adopt an open application process, and to establish greater overall transparency.</blockquote><h3><strong>The Question We Should Be Asking</strong></h3><p>So, of course, Harvard students, Harvard alumni, and Harvard-adjacent people have freaked out about all of this. These moves have been called violations of the freedom of association. (They aren’t.) Some say such moves set a dangerous precedent and could lead to other discriminatory rules, like the banning of religious clubs. (It won’t.) Somewhat more convincingly, many have criticized these sanctions as indiscriminate, unfairly targeting <em>all</em> single-gender social organizations, even the ‘blameless’ all-female final clubs and sororities.</p><p>It’s worth separating out a few different issues here:</p><ul><li>Should universities ever exercise authority over independent, off-campus student organizations?</li><li>Should universities ever place any restrictions on how student organizations are run?</li><li>If we accept that universities can place restrictions on student organizations, which restrictions are wise?</li></ul><p>I want to focus just on this last issue. In particular, is it wise to require that clubs not consider gender when accepting new members? (The other two questions are, I think, much easier to answer, but have distracted conversation away from this harder, more interesting question.)</p><p>I think Harvard’s new policy can be defended even if it’s not, in principle, <em>always</em> a wise policy. (Contingent facts about Harvard’s history make it especially important to force the all-male final clubs to go co-ed, and this might be the best way to achieve that goal.) But I want leave that aside and address the general principle: is it a good thing to force a move away from instutionally-gendered social spaces towards more integrated, mixed-gender social spaces?</p><p>If anti-gender-discrimination policy is put in place and enforced, the transition to a new status quo will no doubt be painful and costly, especially for current students. But, again, we can set that aside for now and try to figure out whether the goal of non-gendered social organizations is worth pursuing.</p><p>Before this move, Harvard’s non-discrimination policy for recognized student groups didn’t garner much controversy or attention. Is there something special about social clubs?</p><p><em>(Note that Harvard already requires all recognized student organizations to have merit-based membership policies that don’t take things like gender or religion into account. In practice, such non-discrimination policies don’t ‘ban’ organizations like Women in Business or Hillel. But such organizations have to be open to anyone who wants to join, including non-women and non-Jews. The new sanctions are merely an instrument by which Harvard hopes to extend previously uncontroversial policies to currently unrecognized student groups.)</em></p><h3><strong>Why Gender Discrimination Is a Bad Idea</strong></h3><p>Try to earnestly consider: What’s the point of single-gender social organizations anyway? What are the benefits (and costs) of making gender serve as a qualification for entry into such clubs?</p><p>As anyone who’s ever been in such a group will tell you, things are just different when the other gender isn’t around. And this different mode of socializing can be attractive. It allows for a kind of ‘bonding’ that might not occur in mixed-gender groups. For women in particular, all-female groups can provide a much-needed welcoming and supportive community when the wider community is so often subtly (or no so subtly) hostile towards women.</p><p>But it’s not obvious that these benefits come without significant costs.</p><p>Here, I can speak from experience. I was a member of an all-male a Capella group, the Harvard Krokodiloes. This group gave me so many amazing experiences: I got to travel the world, perform with some incredibly talented people, form close relationships, and learn to be a little less selfish and weird.</p><p>But lots of things about my experience weren’t so great, and the all-male aspect of the group was definitely not-so-great. Casual misogyny was pretty common. The bro-y culture lent itself to certain kinds of relationships/socializing and not others. I found myself indulging in this culture in ways that, in retrospect, I’m pretty uncomfortable with. This both made it a little easier for me to enter ‘bro’ mode and left other aspects of my personality unnurtured.</p><p>And we simply had more awesome opportunities because of the institutional legacy of our all-male group. Our sister group, the all-female Pitches, didn’t have the same legacy and the prestige that went along with it. As a result, they had fewer connections and fewer opportunities. Kinda sucks, doesn’t it?</p><p><em>(By the way, The Krokodiloes, as an officially recognized student organization, do not explicitly take gender into account when auditioning members. They will audition a tenor, baritone, or bass of any gender.)</em></p><p>For both men and women, single-gender groups can reinforce and help perpetuate gendered stereotypes. The ‘sensitive’ male can be made to ‘toughen’ up. A young woman can feel alienated from a group that, for instance, talks about how each other looks in a way that makes her feel uncomfortable.</p><p>But these are just small examples. And I think careful reflection should reveal that the supposed benefits of single-gender groups aren’t all that beneficial. Single gender socializing can be superficially satisfying, in the same way that some single-race socializing can be superficially satisfying. Maybe you’re more ‘comfortable’ in such a setting, but is that really a good thing? We’d (hopefully?) never allow this to justify race-based membership policies. And prohibiting groups that explicitly exclude particular genders or races doesn’t mean minority groups won’t be able to come together and discuss their difficulties in a supportive space–it just means that our <em>institutions</em> shouldn’t help fossilize and support the differences between races/genders.</p><p>We don’t support a ‘separate but equal’ policy when it comes to race. So why think it’s appropriate when it comes to gender?</p><h3><strong>Why Appeals To ‘Innate’ Differences Aren’t Relevant</strong></h3><p>Here, I expect many will object that the analogy to race is not appropriate. The differences between men and women are not like the differences between races. Men and women, due to biology, tend to have different personalities/values/interests and tend to enjoy different kinds of activities. So maybe there’s something beneficial in coming to appreciate one’s identity as a male or female through single-gender organizations.</p><p>I don’t think this analysis is right–the personality differences between the genders are easily over-emphasized, can potentially be (partially) explained by cultural expectations, and are relatively minor compared to all that we have in common. But even if it <em>were</em> true that the genders were different in fundamental and unchangeable ways, this still wouldn’t justify gender segregation.</p><p>We find race-based discrimination gross not because the races are identical (either in principle or in fact). Rather, it’s gross because we think that race is not the right variable to be tracking. We can accept that blacks and whites tend to be different in certain ways without thereby finding it acceptable to use race as measure for the things we actually care about.</p><p>Go ahead and form communities around particular values, but don’t use gender as a lazy elligibility metric for community membership. Just as it would be unwise to limit “Tall People Club” membership to only men (who tend to be taller), it would be similarly unwise to limit membership to, say, a fashion club to only women (who tend to be more interested in fashion). And while it’s, perhaps, understandable that the interests/abilities that a fashion club wants to track won’t be evenly distributed between the genders, it’s much harder to argue that men and women have meaningfully different interests/abilities in socializing.</p><h3><strong>A Worthwhile Goal</strong></h3><p>So those who oppose Harvard’s attempt to discourage single-gender social organizations need to explain why the single-gender aspect of these clubs are a good thing. Without a rationale, it’s just arbitrary discrimination.</p><p>And the rationale for mixed-gender organizations seems pretty reasonable: If there aren’t fundamental differences, then there’s nothing gained by limiting membership to a single gender. If there <em>are</em> fundamental differences (either innate or cultural), then it should be valuable to have diverse perspectives on the activity that brings you all together.</p><p>A non-discrimination policy won’t ‘make’ the genders equal at Harvard, just as similar policies don’t ‘make’ blacks and whites have ‘equal’ experiences. But such inequalities shouldn’t be institutionalized. And non-discrimination policies help speed up progress.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b9d4a5652fbb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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