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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Jacob Keegan on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Jacob Keegan on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Jacob Keegan on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[“Introduction to Post-Keynesian Economics”, part 3: Growth Models]]></title>
            <link>https://jacobmkeegan.medium.com/introduction-to-post-keynesian-economics-part-3-growth-models-ffa6975d3680?source=rss-ac3ee5496b7c------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[balance-of-payments]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[kalecki]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[inflation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[growth]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[demand]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jacob Keegan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 28 Nov 2021 00:30:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-01-10T05:42:08.092Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Today, we’ll finish off the book by covering chapter 5 and the conclusion. The previous two chapters can be found <a href="https://jacobmkeegan.medium.com/introduction-to-post-keynesian-economics-part-2-demand-employment-and-boxes-c6dbd14cb0c7">here</a>.</p><h3>Chapter 5. The Long Period: Old and New Growth Models</h3><h4>5.1 The Old Post-Keynesian Growth Models</h4><p>Post-Keynesians are well known for their models of growth, first developed by Cambridge economists Kaldor and Robinson in 1956. To examine these models, we’ll need some definitions. K is the capital stock, the growth rate g = I/K, and the profit rate r = P/K. Next, we refer back to Kalecki’s profit equation from last chapter.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/179/1*dnvlDrsK-WnSevwneFATkw.png" /></figure><p>This last equation is known as the Cambridge savings equation. The mirror image of this is, of course, an equation for the growth of investment. Per Robinson, that equation is:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/503/1*gicJVwqpWjH3Kl8rHhTMcw.png" /></figure><p>Where the last variable is the expected rate of profit, and the β coefficient decreases as the expected rate of profit increases. We can combine these two equations in the graph below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SkJUsYDCuxqa5bz691z-qA.png" /></figure><p>Note the intersections of the original curves at L and H. Which of these in a stable equilibrium? Consider an arbitrary growth rate g_0 that is less than g_h*. As you can see from the graph, at this value the realized profit rate r_0 is greater than the expected profit rate. So in the next period, the expected profit rate and therefore the growth of investment is higher. This continues until H is reached, where expectations align with reality.</p><p>Next, let’s examine whether the paradox of thrift is preserved in the long run. A decrease in the propensity to save flattens the growth of savings curve, as shown by the dotted line on the graph. This establishes a new stable equilibrium, H’, which is clearly greater than H. So, the paradox is maintained: lower savings leads to higher growth and output.</p><p>One feature of these old models is questioned by Kaleckians and Sraffians: the implied positive relationship between the profit rate r and the costing margin θ or Θ [see part 1 <a href="https://jacobmkeegan.medium.com/introduction-to-post-keynesian-economics-part-1-on-orthodoxy-and-micro-400b851c37ba">here</a>]. Post-Keynesians like Eichner and Wood justified this relationship by arguing that leading firms would increase the costing margin when higher growth was expected. But a higher costing margin means lower real wages. This negative relationship between real wages and growth is exactly what the Kaleckians and Sraffians reject.</p><p>In addition, Kaldor and Robinson’s model assumes no change in utilization rates in the long run. So, any adjustments between supply and demand are done through prices and costing margins, not quantities. This is in contrast to Keynes and Kalecki’s ideas on effective demand. So, new growth models were developed, often called Kaleckian growth models.</p><h4>5.2 The new Kaleckian model</h4><p>In these newer models founded on the principle of effective demand, the profit rate is exogenous instead of the utilization rate. All adjustments are now done through quantities. Say there’s an increase in aggregate income, either from higher capitalist consumption or higher real wages. As discussed in the previous chapter, this will increase output, and therefore capacity utilization in the short term. Capitalists will then increase investment in order to counteract the decrease in spare capacity. In short, higher effective demand leads to an increase in the growth rate in the long run. And as we’ll see, on the macro level, firms will fail to bring utilization back down to normal levels in the face of this increase in aggregate demand.</p><p>Let’s examine a simple form of this model with three equations. First is the aforementioned Cambridge savings equation. Second is a new investment growth equation:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/267/1*m6HaBsTxbPIvMuAawl8o2w.png" /></figure><p>As we can see, if the utilization rate (u) equals the normal utilization rate (u_n), firms will just want to invest to keep up with the growth in sales (α). But if u is greater (less) than u_n, they will want to invest more (less) to try and return to u_n.</p><p>Lastly is the following equation for the rate of profit:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1003/1*GHgPVYgwfdsT7S6LZbZpgA.png" /></figure><p>Substituting this profit equation into the Cambridge savings equation, we also have a new savings growth equation in terms of utilization:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/214/1*q-kkLZ2KxXO6WlliTit9cw.png" /></figure><p>Say we start at an equilibrium growth rate g_0*. What is the long-run effect of a higher real wage, keeping productivity constant? Such an increase would require a decrease in the markup, and therefore in the profit share. The savings function above would also decrease, as depicted below by moving from the solid to the dotted line.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/586/1*FWHDCqz4fsgHcYPwQMNqHA.png" /></figure><p>At first, growth would remain at g_0*. But with higher real wages comes higher sales, which firms will respond to with increased investment, moving the growth rate to g_1* at a higher rate of utilization. Recall also that only capitalists save here: so if the profit share decreases, then aggregate savings decreases. Yet, we’ve now seen that total output goes up. So, the paradox of thrift exists in this model.</p><p>Note that we can also combine the investment and Cambridge savings equations to get the effective demand profit rate: the profit rate at equilibrium.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*A_g3BJ7JV3fNRDH1-nHJKQ.png" /></figure><p>As we have shown, higher real wages lead to a higher utilization rate in the long run. So, the denominator of this equation increases. We have a version of the paradox of costs in this model too: higher real wages lead to a HIGHER profit rate by inducing investment, though the profit share goes down.</p><p>The existence of these paradoxes “underline the shortcomings of an analysis that would rely solely on individual behaviour within microeconomic markets, while ignoring their macroeconomic consequences.” A single firm decreasing real wages increases their profit rates: but this doesn’t work for the economy as a whole.</p><h4>5.3 Extensions and criticism of the Kaleckian model</h4><p>The Kaleckian model above doesn’t have much of a role for supply-side conditions, so we’ll examine them in this section. Let’s discuss the natural growth rate: the sum of the rate of technical progress plus the labor force growth rate. If the natural growth rate is less (or greater) than the real growth rate, then unemployment will continuously increase (or decrease). Yet in the Kaleckian model, real growth rates reach an equilibrium independent of the natural growth rate. Yet in the real world, unemployment doesn’t continually increase or decrease. So, the model is incomplete.</p><p>Kaleckians have two responses to this. First is to argue that profit margins are endogenous to labor bargaining power, and that such power increases (or decreases) when the unemployment rate is low (or high). This fact can push the real growth rate to the natural growth rate. The second is more radical, arguing that the natural growth rate itself is an endogenous variable, ultimately dependent on effective demand. This means it is affected by hysteresis: the actual state of demand today will permanently alter the natural growth rate in the future.</p><p>What mechanisms can cause this endogeneity? First, a strong economy can increase the labor force participation rate, as employers desperate for workers increase pay and drop job requirements, enticing new folks into the workforce. Second, technical progress could also increase quicker: perhaps due to economies of scale, or increased investment leading to more innovation. This effect is called Verdoorn’s Law. [<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Verdoorn&#39;s_law">Empirically</a>, a 10% increase in production is associated with a 4.5%–5% increase in productivity.] Given a constant markup, higher productivity means higher real wages. So, increasing real wages have even more beneficial long-term results than previously discussed.</p><p>“Contrary to neoclassical theory, and contrary in fact to what many Marxists and classical economists claim, there is no necessary inverse relationship between real wages and profit rates” in the Kaleckian model. Wage increases instead lead to increased profits, as growth is wage-led. But many Sraffian and Marxist economists dispute this, arguing that investment depends not only on the utilization rate, but also the profit share or the normal profit rate r_n. This would mean that the increase in consumption from higher real wages is offset to some extent by lower investment. In fact, it may offset the effect entirely, in which case an economy would be profit-led instead. To be clear, the paradox of thrift is still preserved: but the paradox of costs only holds for some values, depending on the effect of changes in real wages and profits on aggregate demand.</p><p>The Kaleckian model implicitly assumes a closed economy. Let’s relax that assumption, and examine a country’s balance of payments (BoP): the difference between all money flowing into the country in a particular period of time, and the outflow of money to the rest of the world. This has two parts: the capital account (reflecting net wealth) and the current account (reflecting net income). Crucially, the sum of all components of the BoP must be zero. Imports decrease the current account and increase the capital account, and exports do the opposite, for example. According to economists like Harrod and Kaldor, countries could grow faster if they were not constrained by their BoP. As countries grow, demand for imports increases. If demand for exports doesn’t keep up, then a country will run a current account deficit. This could be compensated by a capital account surplus, meaning more investment flowing into a country than out of it. But this isn’t sustainable in the long run, as more and more interest and dividends will have to be paid on that investment over time. The exception to this is the US dollar: since it’s stable and easy to convert between other currencies, foreign central banks hold them to help maintain their BoP. Crucially, no interest is paid on these holdings.</p><p>Thus, in the long run, the growth rate of a country depends on import and export demand. Stated formally, we have Thirwell’s Law:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iuwsHQb8SWJPWppqL8y3Jg.png" /></figure><p>This law has been verified empirically from 1960–1990 in all countries except the USA and Japan. In the former, growth has been higher than the law would predict, due to the aforementioned unique nature of the dollar. In the latter, growth has been lower than expected, due to accumulated current account surpluses.</p><p>Note an asymmetry here: countries who start running a current account deficit must eventually curtail their demand. But in the opposite case, countries do not need to boost demand. So in total, this constraint suppresses global aggregate demand. Some have suggested that an international monetary body like the IMF should force countries running current account surpluses to boost domestic demand, thus boosting demand for imports, and lessening the current account deficits of other countries.</p><p>Besides this external constraint to growth, there is the internal constraint of inflation. Marxist economists Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy have constructed a variant of the Kaleckian model with this constraint that undermines both the paradox of cost and thrift. By this model, when capacity utilization exceeds the normal level, inflationary pressures result. In response, the central bank (which aims to keep inflation low) will increase the benchmark rate, and therefore increase real interest rates. Eventually, this will slow investment and therefore growth. This resurrects the neoclassical ideas of lower savings leading to lower investment. But <a href="https://jacobmkeegan.medium.com/introduction-to-post-keynesian-economics-part-1-on-orthodoxy-and-micro-400b851c37ba">recall the cost curves from chapter 2</a>: a higher utilization rate only means higher costs when a firm moves past full capacity, NOT normal capacity. Beyond that, Verdoon’s Law helps to offset any inflationary pressure from high demand.</p><p>Post-Keynesians instead believe that inflation is mainly the result of class conflict between workers, rentiers, and entrepreneurs over the distribution of income. For example, high profit rates may lead unions to demand larger wage increases, especially if growth is strong and unemployment is low. But given the proper bargaining institutions, high growth need not mean high inflation. Also, <a href="https://jacobmkeegan.medium.com/introduction-to-post-keynesian-economics-part-1-on-orthodoxy-and-micro-400b851c37ba">recall</a> that post-Keynesians support buffer stock programs to keep prices on raw materials steady, since they do not face constant average costs. In short, “inflation is far from being inevitable; it is the unfortunate result of inefficient institutions”.</p><h3>6. General Conclusions</h3><p>Post-Keynesians believe capitalism by itself fosters waste, instability, unemployment, and low aggregate demand. Contrary to mainstream stories, this is not due to regulation, a lack of competition, or price stickiness. In fact, administered prices, norms, and legislation (like capital controls) actually help stabilize the economy. But many post-Keynesians, like Keynes himself, believe capitalism can be efficient if buttressed by a state that provides infrastructure, public services, and helps equalize the income distribution while boosting aggregate demand.</p><p>Cutting aggregate demand through austerity is simply no good way to manage an economy, even in the short run. Because of hysteresis, it will have permanent negative effects. “It is time to reverse the priorities of most governments and central banks, by making full employment — instead of inflation — the main priority.”</p><p>That being said, post-Keynesians do still care about inflation, they simply have different policies to address it while maintaining full employment. Some support permanent income policies. Some instead favor an employment buffer-stock, also known as a job guarantee. Under such a program, the central government would employ anyone who wants to work, but can’t find a private sector job, at a set wage.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ffa6975d3680" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[“Introduction to Post-Keynesian Economics”, part 2: Demand, Employment, and Boxes]]></title>
            <link>https://jacobmkeegan.medium.com/introduction-to-post-keynesian-economics-part-2-demand-employment-and-boxes-c6dbd14cb0c7?source=rss-ac3ee5496b7c------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[profit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[banking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[employment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[demand]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jacob Keegan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 04 Nov 2021 06:44:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-12-10T20:46:36.116Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Today, we’ll cover chapters 3 and 4 of Marc Lavoie’s “Introduction to Post-Keynesian Economics”. You can find the previous two chapters covered <a href="https://jacobmkeegan.medium.com/introduction-to-post-keynesian-economics-part-1-on-orthodoxy-and-micro-400b851c37ba">here</a>.</p><h3>Chapter 3: A Macroeconomic Monetary Circuit</h3><p>“The principle of effective demand … — that is, the causality that runs from investment to saving — is best understood within the context of a macroeconomic explanation of the monetary circuit.” Post-Keynesians reject monetarism and the quantity theory of money, instead following endogenous money theory. They believe that “the banking system fixes a rate (or a set of rates) for the money market and then lends however much borrowers ask for, provided that they can offer satisfactory collaterals”. In other words, banks will make a loan as long as the person taking on the loan is a credible borrower.</p><p>Contrast this to the doctrine of loanable funds, still accepted by most new Keynesians. This theory says that the role of the central bank is to ensure the real interest rate equals a natural interest rate. When the former is less than the latter, inflation inevitably occurs. Post-Keynesians reject that such a rate exist.</p><h4>3.1 Main characteristics of post-Keynesian monetary analysis</h4><p>A key feature of this approach is that loans create deposits, which reverses the causation of mainstream economics. How does this work, exactly? Say the bank finds a credible borrower. To make the loan, they simply create and deposit money in the borrower’s account. Put another way: bank reserves are not required to make loans. They are only kept to follow rules set by the central bank, or to allow folks to withdraw cash if they want.</p><p>Additionally, “inflation is not caused by an excessive rate of growth in the money supply. If anything, the causality is also reversed. The growth rate of prices and output instead cause the stock of money to increase [through higher demand for loans]. The inflation rate is explained through other causes.”</p><p>We should take care now to separate out two types of banking systems. Asset-based systems are the norm in Anglo-Saxon countries, while Europe and Asia have overdraft economies. As we’ll explore, it’s less obvious that money is endogenous in the former systems, but post-Keynesians believe money is endogenous regardless of institutional setup.</p><p>Financial markets have many assets, each with different rates. At least one of these rates is set exogenously by the central bank of a country. We’ll call this the benchmark rate. Also known as the key or official rate, it serves as a reference point for all other rates. In most countries today, the benchmark rate is the overnight or interbank rate: “the rate at which commercial banks lend and borrow funds to and from one another in the overnight market, also called the federal funds rate in the USA.”</p><h4>3.2 The relationship between commercial banks and the central bank</h4><p>High-powered money (HPM) consists of currency supplied by the central bank, as well as bank deposits (reserves) held by commercial banks at the central bank. Reserves are a liability to the central bank, and an asset to private banks, as private banks can withdraw from them at any time. Similarly, your deposits at at bank are a liability to the bank, but an asset for you. And just as loans by banks create deposits, the central bank can create reserves by buying up assets.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/845/1*BFR2QHR8QFEVTTNOJR6PLg.png" /></figure><p>The balance sheet above is also helpful in differentiating overdraft and asset-based economies. In the former, banks hold few government securities (such as T-bills). So to obtain reserves, they must borrow them from other banks, or from the central bank as a lender of last resort. In the latter, the central banks hold “open-market operations” that buy and sell T-bills to influence bank reserves.</p><p>One thing we haven’t mentioned on the balance sheet yet are foreign reserves. In the mainstream Mundell-Fleming model with fixed currency exchange rates, a balance of payments surplus (meaning more money is flowing into a country than out of it) leads to an increase in bank reserves, which then increases lending and the money supply. But post-Keynesians instead believe in the compensation principle: that all surplus is absorbed by the central bank through selling T-bills or decreasing debt owed to the central bank by private banks. Either way, the overall money supply is not changed.</p><p>We can summarize by saying that the central bank does not directly control the supply of money in general, nor HPM specifically. Instead, they supply whatever the banking system demands at a certain price. What they do control is this price, the benchmark rate. It’s an administered price: just like the administered prices of last chapter, it’s re-evaluated and changed periodically. While the central bank can technically set the benchmark rate to be whatever it pleases, in practice it acts in response to economic conditions. This response is described by the central bank reaction function. It generally increases the rate when capacity utilization is high, unemployment is low, or inflation is rising, and decreases it under the opposite conditions.</p><h4>3.3 The relationship between banks and firms</h4><p>Lines of credit are a contract between a bank and a borrower which specify the maximum amount that can be borrowed, the rate at which it is borrowed, and any conditions on the loan. When a firm has higher debt, the risk to the bank of default is higher, so they charge higher rates to compensate for this. This is illustrated by Kalecki’s principle of increasing risk, as mentioned in the last article and shown below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*SJyyqGefI4qJd7PRGZoC4A.png" /></figure><p>As mentioned earlier, although money is endogenous, some people will still be left out because banks only lend to creditworthy borrowers. We can therefore separate out the notional demand for credit (which is the demand of everyone) from the effective demand for credit (which only counts creditworthy borrowers). As interest rates increase, notional demand for credit goes down. But effective demand goes down farther, since less borrowers will be deemed creditworthy. So, the gap between the two, and therefore the amount of credit rationing, increases with interest rates. Note that there can’t be an “oversupply” of money: banks will supply whatever creditworthy borrowers demand.</p><p>But what can cause an increase in interest rate? Well, the interest rate can be written like this:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/241/1*AJc2mTjIHQXaKibMbQFpIw.png" /></figure><p>Where i_b is the benchmark rate, and σ is the risk premium. So, either the central bank can increase the benchmark rate, or banks can increase the risk premium if they think loaning to a client has gotten riskier.</p><p>This relates to a key concept for agents in a monetary economy (first developed in Keynes’ “General Theory”): liquidity preference, or how badly savers want to hold their savings in a form that can be immediately spent. Of course, with more uncertainty, agents’ liquidity preference will go up. For banks specifically, higher uncertainty means an increase in the risk premium, so lending rates go up. At higher rates, fewer potential borrowers are found to be creditworthy, so lending goes down overall. But with lower uncertainty, the opposite occurs.</p><p>This leads us to Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis, or FIH for short. Minsky argued, by the logic above, that economic booms lead banks to make riskier loans. After all, the economy is in a good state, so they will mostly be repaid. But an economy full of riskier loans is more unstable, with more speculation and higher debt burdens. The central bank will likely raise the benchmark rate in response to the boom, thus increasing interest rates, making it harder to maintain those high debt burdens. This all adds up to a riskier environment: banks will now restrict lending more, perhaps leading to an economic crash if governments do not boost aggregate demand. The key insight of this process is the paradox of tranquility: economic stability leads to instability eventually.</p><h4>3.4 A systematic view of the monetary economy</h4><p>Here, we’ll systematize a mesoeconomic approach, which lies between the microeconomic analysis of individual agents, and the macroeconomic analysis of effective demand. This approach focuses on sectoral balance sheets and financial flows, displayed with matrices. It’s important to start with a model that’s stock-flow consistent, where every movement of money has a source and destination, and overall balance sheets always sum to zero. Such a model should include both real assets (like inventory and real estate) and financial assets (like loans).</p><p>Below is a highly simplified version of such a model in a closed economy, without a central bank or government (which would collect taxes, give out welfare, and employ people), without households borrowing from banks, and without intermediate goods. [You can see an example of a more complete model <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2664125">here</a>.] Note that this is representing what households, firms, and banks do in sum across the WHOLE economy, with banks and firms divided into their current and capital accounts.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*i-oA5bN0beUeRrLT0i1dsw.png" /></figure><p>Note that each row sums to zero: there is a balance between inflows and outflows. Flows here move from boxes with a negative sign to those with a positive sign on the same row. Each column sums to zero as well: all money a sector gets ends up somewhere, whether it’s spent on consumption or put into banks as deposits. Current accounts show the actual transactions of banks and firms, while the capital accounts show assets and liabilities. The subscript of -1 denotes the last period: for example, at the beginning of every period, households receive interest on deposits, equal to the interest rate on deposits times the total deposits last period.</p><p>The shaded boxes are all involved in initial finance. First, banks make loans to firms. Then, firms use loans to pay wages, and/or bring in inventory to sell. Before it can be spent, wages are deposited at banks, closing out the initial finance stage.</p><h3>Chapter 4: The Short Period: Effective Demand and the Labor Market</h3><p>A core idea in post-Keynesianism is that economies are demand-led. In other words, increases in demand lead to increases in supply. One result of this, contrary to neoclassical economics, is that a decrease in real wages does not increase the demand for labor. In face, it’s the opposite: lower real wages mean lower consumption, so firms will hire less labor. This chapter expands on this idea by focusing on the short period, defined here as ignoring the effect of investment on the capital stock, and assuming the goods market is in equilibrium.</p><h4>4.1 Effective demand and its components</h4><p>In neoclassical models, aggregate demand is a basically a function of fiscal policy and the money supply. However, money supply is endogenous to post-Keynesians. Simplifying by assuming a closed economy with no government, what then determines aggregate demand?</p><p>Aggregate demand, and therefore income, is:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/934/1*Uw8GU0QkM0NmT7TBshiuvw.png" /></figure><p>With these simple equations, we can now solve for profits, which are of course a core part of a capitalist economy:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/916/1*riS2_y7pY3ZMLA323boF6g.png" /></figure><p>Note that while individual capitalists can choose how much to consume and invest, they cannot choose to make an arbitrary amount of profits. So, the causality of this equation runs from right to left. In the words of Kaldor: “Capitalists earn what they spend, workers spend what they earn.”</p><p>We can contrast these ideas with the neoclassical approach when it comes to the role of deficits. To finance deficits, the government basically takes loans from the private sector by selling Treasury bills. Mainstream theory says that more deficit spending drives up the interest rate of these T-bills, and therefore the interest rate across the economy. This, in turn, “crowds out” private investment, as less investment is made at this higher interest rate.</p><p>But look back to our interest rate equation: the interest rate a bank charges is based on the benchmark rate and the risk premium. The interest on T-bills is not the benchmark rate, and more deficit spending could even decrease risk. Plus, if deficits that end up in the pocket of workers are spent like wages are, <a href="https://nathantankus.substack.com/p/where-do-profits-come-from">deficits actually end up INCREASING profits</a>! So if anything, there is actually a crowding-in effect in post-Keynesianism.</p><h4>4.2 The Kaleckian Model</h4><p>Let’s rewrite that profit equation a bit. Let P = pa, where P are profits, p is price, and a is real autonomous expenditures (real consumption out of profits plus real investment). Furthermore, let wages equal the average annual wage rate w times the number of workers, N. In this simplified model without government, income is again just wages plus profits, which is equal to aggregate demand.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/849/1*4jKMCvDQVQcXOBgUIQQkvA.png" /></figure><p>Using our knowledge from chapter 2 about firms, we’ll add a utilization function with constant returns when utilization is below 100%. In other words, production with a constant capital stock can be increased by hiring more labor that utilize machines more. “At the macroeconomic level, therefore, modern firms face only one constraint: effective demand”. However, individual firms are constrained by their market share.</p><p>The total quantity of goods produced, then, is the yearly output per worker (T) times the number of workers. In practice, firms can and will guess wrong about the level of demand. But here, we’ll assume they’re in a stable equilibrium overall. Since supply is determined by demand, the quantity of goods q = T*N = RAD. Rearranging this equation gives us one of two equations measuring the effective demand curve:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/259/1*9w0t5smlY_C9--Kl-RgWAg.png" /></figure><p>This is illustrated below with a graph of the effective demand curve. Employment is on the x-axis and real wages are on the y-axis.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/755/1*9_IjKQxVGL3BsMcNBjKi_g.png" /></figure><p>A few things to note. First, there is a thick line drawn at T because it’s the maximum for real wages. For firms to make a profit, T must be greater than real wages. Second, (w/p)_fe and N_fe respectively denote real wages and total employment at full employment. The labels a_1/T and a_2/T denote the effective demand curve at two different levels of autonomous expenditures, as we’ll discuss shortly.</p><p>For an individual firm, cutting wages while keeping prices the same (in other words, lowering their workers’ real wages) would increase their markup, and therefore their profits. But as the graph shows, a decrease in real wages means a decrease in employment too, as it decreases demand. This is in stark contrast to neoclassical economics, where the relationship is switched.</p><p>Of course, an increase in autonomous expenditures can increase demand instead, in which case the effective demand curve will shift right. For example, at a constant real wage (w/p)_1, an increase in autonomous expenditures of a_1 to a_2 would bring the level of employment from N_1 to N_fe. But why would such an increase happen? As Keynes noted, it could be induced by lowering the benchmark rate: but this might not be enough, especially in a recession. That’s why he favored public employment programs, so governments could simply increase investment directly.</p><p>Let’s now add the savings rate out of profits (s_c) to our equations. Note that a_cc is real capitalist consumption, and a_i is real investment, so p*a_cc + p*a_i = pa = P.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/662/1*ipFq5rcyvyKZT9PBa2-sgQ.png" /></figure><p>This is known as the Cambridge short-period profit equation. Here, we can see that total profits don’t directly depend on real wages (at least in the short term). So if capitalists as a whole decrease real wages and keep prices constant, thus increasing their profit rate, total profits will NOT change. Instead, the demand decrease exactly offsets the profit rate increase, though employment falls. This is known as the paradox of costs, first noted by Kalecki.</p><p>Using what we have learned so far, we can derive equations for the employment level and total output in terms of productivity, real investment, real wages, and the savings rate out of profits.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/840/1*7nUWRwRxcaSaQMCeEvacJg.png" /></figure><p>From the employment equation, we see that if real wages decrease while the savings rate and real investment are constant, employment decreases. From the final equation for output, we see that if the savings rate increases, output decreases: this is the paradox of thrift, first noted by Keynes.</p><h4>4.3 Further Developments of the Kaleckian model</h4><p>Many labor economists think that the labor supply curve is “backward-bending”. At first, higher wages induce more people to join the workforce. But as wages get high, workers will be richer and decide to take more leisure time. Below, we can see this implies two equilibrium employment positions, denoted by H and L.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/897/1*rwyP3QMyL2AJZeiqBRtkyg.png" /></figure><p>Which equilibrium will the economy tend towards? Let’s take an arbitrary point (denoted 0) between positions L and H to see. At this and all points, savings equal investment and the goods market is in equilibrium. But the labor market is not in equilibrium: there is an excess of labor supply. Absent any market rules or norms, the tendency would be for prices to stay the same as nominal wages decrease, until L is reached.</p><p>Put differently, market forces would push the economy into a worse equilibrium. Price flexibility here has clear negative effects. But luckily, we have ways to keep real wages from falling: unions, minimum wage laws, and public employment can all push wages up, acting against the market to get us to the high equilibrium.</p><p>We now turn to a classic question in economics: how does technical progress affect the level of employment? “Neoclassical authors are unanimous in arguing that technical progress can only have positive effects on employment, or at least that negative effects are only sector-specific.” Given how many normal folks are concerned about this issue, and how many economists have strong opinions on it, let’s examine it using the Kaleckian model.</p><p>Let’s start with an economy at full employment, with T = T_1. Next, we’ll move to T = T_2, with T_2 &gt; T_1, and assume capitalist savings and real investment remain constant.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/755/1*WfosokrnXd0hHIIOeEH0Kg.png" /></figure><p>As we can see, real wages must be increased in order to maintain full employment. Otherwise, employment will fall to N_2. In fact, real wages must increase more than proportionally to maintain full employment. To see why, we return to this equation for employment:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/412/1*89F7F5p-Q_jPhMkHkRE1lQ.png" /></figure><p>If real investment and capitalist saving are constant, it’s the DIFFERENCE between T and real wages that must remain constant for employment to remain constant, not the ratio between them. In practice, it’s unlikely that wages will increase faster than T, so increased autonomous expenditures are needed to prop up aggregate output.</p><p>Crucially, output decreases too. To see this, start with our earlier equation for total output.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/390/1*onyFemfCkX7RONUIAPs2Lg.png" /></figure><p>Given a change in T as before, when will q decrease? In other words, when will output at a productivity of T_2 be less than at T_1?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/513/1*bOuwT2Jw43mkxJSGFKuBKQ.png" /></figure><p>In other words: in this scenario, output at a productivity of T_2 is less than at T_1, if T_2 &gt; T_1.</p><p>Assumptions aside, how technological progress plays out in real life depends on the business cycle. In an economic boom, unemployment is low, so workers will be able to bargain better for higher wages. Plus, the good times will likely make capitalists invest more (further increasing productivity), and may make households more comfortable spending more. But in a recession, cost-cutting measures are pursued to increase profit margins without lowering prices. Workers aren’t able to increase their real wages, so this higher profit lowers effective demand.</p><p>Let’s turn to a prescient example where this model is useful: the policy of work sharing, “whereby workers reduce their hours of work with the objective of increasing overall employment”. The idea is that if firms require a certain number of labor hours to meet their goals, and current workers reduce hours worked, they will have to hire more workers. But this ignores macroeconomic effects. Let’s reformulate some earlier equations in terms of hours to see why.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1003/1*b2cjBCzgEwxPciO5uWuM3A.png" /></figure><p>As is clear from the last equation, if a reduction in hours is accompanied by no change in productivity or the hourly wage, then employment will increase as intended. Suppose instead that a decrease in hours is exactly offset by an increase in productivity, such that T stays constant. If hourly wages remain the same, then annual real wages and therefore employment decrease. But if hourly wages were increased with productivity such that annual wages and productivity both stayed the same, employment would stay the same, yet workers would be paid a higher hourly wage. Thus, “Post-Keynesians only endorse work-sharing programmes and their reduced working week when they are accompanied by an increase in the hourly real wage”.</p><p>In the <a href="https://jacobmkeegan.medium.com/introduction-to-post-keynesian-economics-part-3-growth-models-ffa6975d3680">next article</a>, we’ll finish off with chapter 5 on growth, and the conclusion of chapter 6.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c6dbd14cb0c7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[“Introduction to Post-Keynesian Economics”, part 1: On Orthodoxy and Micro]]></title>
            <link>https://jacobmkeegan.medium.com/introduction-to-post-keynesian-economics-part-1-on-orthodoxy-and-micro-400b851c37ba?source=rss-ac3ee5496b7c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/400b851c37ba</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[pricing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[keynes]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[microeconomics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[kalecki]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[growth]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jacob Keegan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 22 Oct 2021 05:12:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-11-13T20:07:40.278Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Today starts a series of articles summarizing the key ideas of Marc Lavoie’s “Introduction to Post-Keynesian Economics”. Enjoy!</p><h3>Intro</h3><p>Lavoie was inspired to write this book after a visit to France. In bookstores, he found many economics books condemning “what the French call ‘la pensée unique’ (the single thought), or what the English-speaking world knows as ‘There Is No Alternative’ (TINA)”. The latter was a slogan popularized by Margaret Thatcher, claiming that free markets, free trade, and austerity were the only serious policy option. However, Marc found that these books didn’t present a coherent alternative to the neoclassical theories that supported TINA. Instead, many economists simply created more sophisticated neoclassical models, rather than starting from a fundamentally different basis. That basis, to be presented here, is post-Keynesian economics.</p><p>This book focuses on rebuking some common claims from elementary applications of neoclassical economics, such as:</p><ul><li>Higher demand always leads to higher prices.</li><li>Higher real wages increase unemployment or decrease profits.</li><li>Lower savings leads to lower investment or growth.</li><li>Budget deficits lead to inflation and a rise in the interest rate.</li></ul><p>As we will see, the key to economic prosperity is cooperation, not austerity and conflict.</p><h3>1. Post-Keynesian Heterodoxy</h3><h4>1.1: Who are the post-Keynesians?</h4><p>Heterodox economics is a big tent, encompassing Marxists, Sraffians, neo-Structuralists, Institutionalists, and more. Each of these schools focuses on different areas of the economy, with different core texts and sources of inspiration. Post-Keynesianism has its origins in John Maynard Keynes’ work, especially his book “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money”. Crucially, they interpret this work very differently than the neoclassical synthesis Keynesians (like Paul Samuelson and James Tobin) or the new Keynesians (like Gregory Mankiw, Alan Blinder, and Joseph Stiglitz). [For an in-depth post-Keynesian interpretation of “The General Theory”, I highly recommend Alex Williams’ ongoing series <a href="https://vebaccount.substack.com/">here</a>]. Core post-Keynesian ideas also come from contemporaries of Keynes like Joan Robinson and Roy Harrod, as well as neo-Marxist Michał Kalecki, neo-Ricardian Piero Sraffa, and Institutionalists like Thorstein Veblen and John Kenneth Galbraith.</p><h4>1.2: The characteristics of heterodox economics</h4><p>To delineate heterodox and orthodox approaches, we should start with presuppositions on how economic questions should be approached. Don’t worry, I’ll explain all the big words shortly.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/1*tuwwegb5FuQeW0QhMrBRPQ.png" /></figure><p>Epistemology is about how to obtain knowledge. Neoclassicals, following Milton Friedman, generally evaluate if a hypothesis is sound based on if it makes accurate predictions. The realist approach, meanwhile, starts with assumptions that reflect economic reality.</p><p>Ontology studies existence and being. Neoclassicals see the economy as being composed of individual, atomized agents. Institutions such as banks or companies are just intermediaries of individuals. But for heterodox economists, institutions are not just the sum of individual’s actions and preferences, and the macroeconomy is not just the sum of microeconomic results. We’ll see later that many economic decisions lead to opposite results if they are adopted by everyone instead of just an individual.</p><p>In the neoclassical account, rationality is based on perfect information (where all relevant information is known to perfect accuracy), or imperfect information (“where agents are also able to factor in the time spent searching for the optimal quantity of information”). Instead, heterodox economists think it’s regularly impossible to get crucial information. Agents instead aim for a “satisficing” outcome (compared to maximization in the neoclassical approach). They heavily rely on norms and rules of thumb, and create institutions to reduce uncertainty. Crucially, this is a perfectly sensible response to a world with such uncertainty.</p><p>Commonly, the goal of economics is defined as “the efficient allocation of scarce resources”. This reflects the neoclassical approach, where prices are generally a function of scarcity. But heterodox economists, following classical economists from Smith to Marx, start with the existence of a economic surplus, and examine how an economy maintains itself and distributes resources. Post-Keynesians especially emphasize that resources are basically never fully utilized.</p><p>Of course, a wide variety of economists with greatly varying politics can be placed in the neoclassical school. But ultimately, they think that without problems like imperfect information and externalities, flexible prices would bring the economy to an optimal state. Meanwhile, heterodox economists think markets face fundamental problems that limit their efficiency and stability. The state must position itself within markets to stabilize and regulate them.</p><h4>1.3: The essential characteristics of post-Keynesian economics</h4><p>Now that we’ve broadly compared heterodox and orthodox approaches, one might ask: what distinguishes post-Keynesianism? Two principles are essential, while five more are auxiliary.</p><p>We start with the principle of effective demand, which states that “the production of goods adjusts itself to the demand for goods. … The economy is therefore demand-determined, and not constrained by supply”. This notably includes the supply of savings, which is determined by investment rather than vice-versa. Marxists and new Keynesians, for example, may agree with this in the short run. But post-Keynesians think it holds in the long run too.</p><p>Next is dynamic historical time. Drawing from Robinson, post-Keynesians focus on how the economy adjusts to changes. Instead of changes being immediate and easily reversible, “Time is irreversible: once a decision is made and implemented, it cannot be reversed, except perhaps at a great cost”. Given this, the economy in the long run is NOT independent of the short run. Changes today have permanent effects in the future.</p><p>Now, onto auxiliary features. First is the view that flexible prices aren’t always good. More stable prices can help plan future business and investment, reducing uncertainty. And lowering wages during a recession, for example, would only worsen the situation by decreasing effective demand even more, thereby increasing the relative debt burden of firms.</p><p>Second is a focus on monetary production. Contracts are in terms of money, and households own financial assets, rather than directly owning the physical assets of companies. The role of banks is crucial, since only they can create the money needed to start production. How much they loan, and the interest rates they charge, largely depend on growth of the overall economy.</p><p>Third, we have the notion of fundamental uncertainty, closely tied to Keynes’ work on probability, as well as economist Frank Knight. Under fundamental uncertainty, “it is impossible to calculate either the probabilities of an event occurring or possible outcomes”. Confidence (or “animal spirits”, as Keynes said) is therefore crucial to production and investment. Some neoclassicals might respond that this would make the effects of any economic policy unknowable. But actually, we can predict real results from this concept: people hesitate to act because they lack information, and they aren’t likely to greatly change their behavior because of new information.</p><p>Fourth is a microeconomic approach which we’ll explore in chapter 2. And last is a commitment to pluralism. Since the economy is multi-faceted, different models may apply to different situations.</p><h4>1.4: The various strands of post-Keynesian theory</h4><p>A natural result of a realist approach is to draw from several different theories, as different parts of the economy simply act differently. So, post-Keynesian theory “is far from being a homogeneous approach”. But three main strands stand out.</p><p>First are the fundamentalists, such as Paul Davidson and Hyman Minsky. Mainly drawing from Keynes, they emphasize fundamental uncertainty, money, and financial instability. Notably, they consider neoclassical economics to just be a special case of their more general approach.</p><p>Next are the Sraffians. Through Sraffa, they are inspired by classical economists like Smith, Ricardo, and Marx. Their focus is on relative prices, the choice of production techniques, input-output analysis, and technical questions of value. The latter is important as the Sraffian approach counters both the neoclassical theory of distribution, and the Marxist labor theory of value.</p><p>Lastly, we have the Kaleckian approach. They are influenced by Kaldor and the Institutionalists, as well as by Marx through Kalecki. Kaleckians see their approach as more applicable to the real economy, rather than the more general approach of the fundamentalists.</p><p>Some post-Keynesians may reject attempting to integrate all three of these approaches. Yet, they share much overlap, such as a focus on effective demand or shared theories of growth. This book, while touching on all approaches, will mainly focus on the Kaleckian approach. It presents a clear alternative to TINA, while being relatively easy to grasp, and fitting for empirical research.</p><h3>2. Heterodox Microeconomics</h3><p>Post-Keynesianism disagrees with 2 core elements of neoclassical microeconomic theory. First is marginalism, the idea that price is related to marginal utility (the usefulness of one additional good). Second is decreasing marginal utility: that each additional unit of a good is slightly less useful.</p><h4>2.1 Consumer choice theory</h4><p>The origin of post-Keynesian micro theory is in marketing and psychology. Rather than starting from abstract assumptions, it starts from observations about actors in the real economy. Post-Keynesianism makes a distinction between needs (which can be ranked and prioritized) and wants (preferences within a category). For example, you might need a drink more than you need to eat, but want ginger ale more than you want water. Given that basis, we can now discuss 7 principles of post-Keynesian consumer choice theory.</p><ol><li>Procedural rationality means consumers will tend to follow habits and find shortcuts in making consumption decisions. Instead of maximizing utility, as in neoclassical approaches, they instead satisfice.</li><li>Wants are satiable. Beyond a threshold, more of a good won’t bring additional satisfaction. Compare this to neoclassical models, where more of a good always brings somewhat more utility.</li><li>Needs are separable into different categories. Taking into account comparisons of all goods on the market would be hard. Instead, consumers allocate a certain amount of money to each category. What they buy in that category then depends on relatives prices of those goods, rather than the relative prices of all goods. Studies back this up: “the price elasticities for major subgroups are extremely weak (between –0.003 and –0.072 according to one such study) and cross-price elasticities close to zero (in fact, inferior to 0.02, 30 out of 36 times; see Eichner, 1987, ch. 7)”.</li><li>The subordination of needs, which is similar to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. Income goes to one type of need until it is satisfied, then remaining money goes to the next level, and so on. Changes in relative prices within a level only change consumption of goods in that level.</li><li>As someone’s income grows, their level on the pyramid of needs increases, with the top level being moral and environmental needs.</li><li>Pulling from Galbraith, post-Keynesians believe needs are determined by marketing and imitation of others.</li><li>Consumer’s choices are not independent of order, but depend on past experiences.</li></ol><p>It’s important to note an asymmetry of the relationship between price and demand in post-Keynesian consumer choice theory. If a price of an essential good increases, then demand for luxury goods decreases. This is in line with neoclassical economics. But, contra to neoclassicism, if the price of a luxury good increases, the demand for essential goods doesn’t change.</p><h4>2.2 Oligopolistic markets and objectives of firms</h4><p>Post-Keynesian firms operate in oligopolistic markets, where a few mega-corporations dominate smaller firms. The former are price setters: they make the prices, they aren’t forced to take them by the market. Smaller firms are price takers, having to follow the prices set by big companies. Prices are not set to clear markets and equalize supply and demand. For simplicity, we’ll assume firm owners and managers have the same goal: survival of the firm in the long run. This isn’t always the heterodox approach: Galbraith, for example, instead emphasizes the conflicts between them.</p><p>In basic neoclassical theory, firms maximize profit and face increasing marginal costs. This second assumption is crucial: without it, the profit-maximizing point is no longer where marginal revenue equals marginal costs.</p><p>The post-Keynesian approach is different. Surveys show that increasing marginal costs are rare, and that management actually has many objectives. All of these objectives require the firm to survive. Survival, in turn, is aided by economic and political power. The main way firms acquire this power in the marketplace is through a high market share. So, as a simplification, we can say that firms maximize growth rather than profit.</p><p>Yet, we know that firms still care about profits. The reason why is simple: growth requires investment, in R&amp;D or just to build new plants and the like. So, firms need to have money left over after paying their costs. Crucially, profits also allow firms to borrow from banks. But they cannot borrow totally freely: as Kalecki’s principle of increasing risk notes, all else being equal, banks will be less willing to lend to a firm who is more indebted relative to retained earnings. Firms can prove their creditworthiness and decrease borrowing costs by increasing retained earnings. In short, “profits are the solution to the financial requirements that constrain the growth-maximizing objective of the firm.”</p><p>To examine the relationship between profit and growth explicitly, we need to think of two frontiers. First is the expansion frontier, which shows the maximum growth rate that can be achieved with a given profit rate. In other words, if investment is done as efficiently as possible. At first, the slope of this function is increasing, as new technology is deployed to decrease costs. But at a point, the slope is decreasing, as the firm expands into new and uncertain markets. [Notably, the same basic analysis applies if the slope is instead constant after a certain point, as <a href="http://www.economia.unam.mx/biblioteca/Pdf/bibliografia/Kalecki_Theprincipleofincreasingrisk.pdf">Kalecki appeared to think</a>.]</p><p>Second is the finance frontier, showing the minimum profit rate needed to obtain a given level of growth. Banks lend at a multiple of retained earnings, which we’ll call ρ. Therefore, the maximum amount of investment is given by the equation below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/282/1*8cjUFw-2JBxo5pzAiCENwA.png" /></figure><p>Where I is investment, P is profit, and i is the interest rate on capital K. Note that both i and ρ depend on bank confidence and the macroeconomy. Next we’ll define two more variables: the profit rate, r = P/K. And the growth rate of capital, g= I/K. By dividing both sides of the equation above by K, and some simple algebra, we obtain the equation for the finance frontier:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/184/1*3BsFkN2sXg40yxiRNToj1A.png" /></figure><p>The two frontiers are combined below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/712/1*VwSbIHFTaqo9P_lEWMqdCg.png" /></figure><p>Being growth maximizing, firms will want to reach point G, not the profit-maximizing point R. Note that all firms (in the medium run) must exist in the area between, or on, the frontiers. It’s not possible to invest more efficiently than the expansion frontier, and if a firm drops below the finance frontier, it would not be able to make its interest payments, and would default.</p><h4>2.3: The Shape of Cost Curves</h4><p>The post-Keynesian approach to costs collows the Leontief production function, in which there is a fixed quantity of labor and capital required to produce a good. These quantities are determined by technology. The neoclassical approach instead uses Cobb-Douglass functions, where labor and capital can be substituted for each other.</p><p>A few definitions before we continue. Unit cost (UC) is simply the average cost needed produce 1 unit of a good. Unit direct cost (UDC) is unit cost minus overhead, such as administration. Lastly, marginal cost (MC) is the extra cost needed to produce 1 more unit of a good. Note the distinction between average and marginal costs.</p><p>We’ll be using a few stylized facts in this section, depicted in the graph below with output on the x-axis and cost on the y-axis.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/703/1*2enmO6Tb5Q4UgpXFwCUWKQ.png" /></figure><p>Firms are made up of different plants or locations, which are in turn made of up of different segments (like assembly lines). Each of these segments has a practical capacity (also known as the engineer-rated capacity). The level of full capacity for a firm is q_fc, the sum of practical capacity across all segments. Past this point, marginal costs increase because of overtime pay, machines breaking from overuse, and/or workers becoming overworked. q_th is the level of theoretical capacity, which is the maximum level of output possible.</p><p>Empirically, firms’ capacity is between 70% and 85% of full capacity. This isn’t some accident of mismanagement: they prefer to have spare capacity. To explain why, recall fundamental uncertainty. Firms just don’t know exactly what demand will look like in the future. Excess capacity, and stored inventory, allow companies to react quickly to an increase in demand without changing prices. Building a new factory, for example, could expand capacity too. But that would take a comparatively long amount of time. In that time, shortages could occur, and the firm could lose customers as they shift to other products.</p><h4>2.4 Price setting</h4><p>“All post-Keynesian models rely on cost-plus pricing”, where a costing margin is added on top of some measure of cost to obtain the final price. Prices are administered: determined well in advance of products coming to market. There are 3 main models of administered pricing, each with a different method of determining the costs or markup.</p><p>First is the oldest and simplest method, still used by some small and medium-sized businesses, called markup pricing. This was first laid out by Kalecki, and is often used in post-Keynesian macroeconomic models. The equation is below, with θ being the gross costing margin, which covers overhead.</p><p>P = (1 + θ)(UDC)</p><p>Next is normal or full-cost pricing, from Hall and Hitch’s study of firm’s pricing strategies in 1939. This is a more realistic method, common among large firms for at least 100 years. In the equation below, NUC stands for normal unit cost (the unit cost at a normal level of capacity utilization) and Θ is the net costing margin.</p><p>P = (1 + Θ)(NUC)</p><p>Lastly we have a method generally preferred by large and medium-sized firms: target-return pricing, as discussed by Lanzillotti in 1958. This is the most complicated, as it requires knowing the value of a firm’s capital. The equation is the same as for normal-cost pricing, but Θ is set to achieve a specific target rate of return on the firm’s capital.</p><h4>2.5: The determinants of the costing margin</h4><p>It may be hard to believe that firms freely change their prices when unit costs change. But it’s important to note that these pricing methods are based on costs in normal times. Firms prefer to absorb short term changes in costs by lowering the profit margin while keeping prices constant. This keeps buyers loyal: a surprise change in prices could mess with buyers’ plans.</p><p>As noted before, different firms tend to set the same prices. Yet less efficient firms have higher unit costs, and therefore need a lower costing margin to keep prices competitive. This lower margin, in turn, means those firms have less profit, and less money to invest. That means lower growth: other firms in their industry will outpace them. The inefficient firm will shrink relative to competitors, and eventually fail.</p><p>It’s reasonable to ask at this point what exactly determines the costing margin. Different traditions offer different explanations.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/841/1*TH2GnBGfILiNEueCWRfFxA.png" /></figure><p>Which one of these is correct? Well, all of them are probably true to some extent. In fact, we can combine these explanations with the frontiers from earlier. Lower bargaining power of capitalists or lower monopoly power, for example, shifts the expansion frontier downward. We can augment the finance frontier equation like this:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/645/1*OWPtpzy-7i9poKRVt99c6Q.png" /></figure><p>With i_n being the trend interest rate (as managed by the central bank), and g_s being the growth rate of the firm or industry. Thus, these explanations are compatible with each other.</p><h4>2.6: Consequences for macro theory</h4><p>The micro discussion above carries important implications for macroeconomics. For example, in post-Keynesian theory, an increase in aggregate demand generally does NOT lead to an increase in prices. Exceptions to this exist for raw materials and agriculture, which act more like the neoclassical model. In those cases, post-Keynesians support buffer stock programs to ensure higher prices don’t cause inflation elsewhere through higher costs. Also, higher demand does lead to higher prices at sustained full capacity: so, avoiding supply bottlenecks is key.</p><p>Chapters 3 and 4, discussing the macroeconomic monetary circuit, effective demand, and the labor market, are covered <a href="https://jacobmkeegan.medium.com/introduction-to-post-keynesian-economics-part-2-demand-employment-and-boxes-c6dbd14cb0c7">here</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=400b851c37ba" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[“The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism”, part 4: Ending with Post-Industrial Development]]></title>
            <link>https://jacobmkeegan.medium.com/the-three-worlds-of-welfare-capitalism-part-4-ending-with-post-industrial-development-72e77c8abcaf?source=rss-ac3ee5496b7c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/72e77c8abcaf</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[services]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[employment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[welfare]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[post-industrial]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[capitalism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jacob Keegan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 28 Jun 2021 04:29:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-06-28T17:24:54.204Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>See the last part <a href="https://jacobmkeegan.medium.com/the-three-worlds-of-welfare-capitalism-part-3-welfare-work-and-full-employment-2cc1f1cf73e7">here</a>, and read on for the ending to this summary!</p><h3>Chapter 8: Three Post-Industrial Employment Trajectories</h3><h4>Theories of Service-Employment Growth</h4><p>A clear tendency in developed countries is that innovations and automation in industrial labor advance productivity, making industrial goods cheaper. This, coupled with a continued increase inaverage income, means there is a clear shift over time towards spending on services. A key question is whether the jobs lost to higher productivity (you need less workers to make the same amount of stuff, after all) will be made up for in an expanding service sector. Economist William Baumol proposed the idea of Baumol’s cost disease: as productivity increases in some jobs, wages in other jobs will go up due to competition, even if those other jobs experience no productivity gains. One issue in the application of this concept to the service sector is that service productivity is hard to measure. You can clearly see how many cars a factory produces, and how much those cars sell for. But what exactly is the value of, say, a teacher or doctor? Also, if workers become more productive, then service work that helps <a href="https://twitter.com/ColinJMcAuliffe/status/1254820449223151616">produce or rejuvenate</a> workers (from medical care to education) would naturally be more productive too!</p><p>We also need to be careful to differentiate between types of service work. It’s not like services are new: some service work even existed before the Industrial Revolution, like bartending or cleaning services. We are concerned with post-industrial work here. As we’ll examine, in developed countries, most employment growth has come from health, education, and welfare (HEW), some from leisure and eating, and some from business service and FIRE (finance, insurance, and real estate).</p><h4>Three Trajectories of Service Employment Growth</h4><p>We’ll be focusing on the US, Germany, and Sweden here: the prime examples of our three welfare regimes. Also, we’ll look at changes over approximately the past few decades [before this book was published]: 1960–1985. We should note some differences in overall work structure in these countries. First, the labor force participation rates for folks aged 16-65:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/533/1*9mRPxa6Y6O3sCjeRVb7x5A.png" /></figure><p>And the change in total work hours from 1960–1985:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/351/1*apMA4wNw9jQP9QML3Si5nQ.png" /></figure><p>Now, let’s look to some post-industrial data, first on overall employment growth.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/772/1*VTmatv03Qqctu7w1Wk0eYQ.png" /></figure><p>And second, on different occupational groups.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/767/1*OH8_VgHAUnHdH0AsT3Hk9g.png" /></figure><h4>Occupational Trends in Employment Growth</h4><p>First, let’s address a key question that comes to mind when looking at HEW employment, which governments often have a lot of involvement with: What is the government’s role in the structuring of employment growth? As seen below, these countries give very different answers to that question.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/767/1*0sDePI79cAfdFJiHHYVxlQ.png" /></figure><p>One note to add onto the Swedish data: 87% of HEW employment growth in Sweden comes from women. Combine that with the high percentage of female public sector workers, 67%, and you get a unique feminization of the welfare state. On the flipside of this is the US, where public employment rates actually shrank. But luckily, women have found plenty of new employment opportunities in the private sector.</p><h4>Post-Industrial Structures</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/790/1*tLQZrRztJJ-6qBgJbEre0w.png" /></figure><p>A couple of main differences are clear. First, Germany is about 50% less de-industrialized than the US and Sweden. Second, employment in producer and fun services (entertainment, dining, hospitality) is about twice as large in the US. Lastly, Sweden employed around twice as many HEW workers.</p><h4>The Post-Industrial Occupation Structure</h4><p>We also might want to know the quality and kind of jobs that people have across these countries.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/783/1*xE24V1M99izJHzmtt3iUxA.png" /></figure><p>What accounts for the US’ high number of managerial positions? The US lacks a developed welfare state, as noted many times elsewhere. A lot of benefits, like paid leave or health insurance, are instead fringe benefits. Administration of these benefits creates more managerial positions. Second, industrial relations are combative, with no overall structure to manage labor disputes. So, more managers are added to police normal workers. Lastly, the US lacks agencies to match employers with employees, or to train workers. Companies must therefore hire folks to do this work themselves. Compare this to Sweden, with universal government benefits, centralized union negotiations, and ALMP, who have a massively lower number of managers.</p><p>Sweden notably has an extraordinary number of nurses, social service workers, and teachers, due to large public employment in those areas. They have significantly more professional workers too, and many less junk jobs (which are generally of low pay with tough working conditions).</p><h3>9. Welfare State Regimes in the Post-Industrial Structure</h3><p>Before World War 2, states were visible through their militaries and policing. In that time, traditional liberal or Marxist views of the state (emphasizing infringement on individual liberty and violent enforcement of private property respectively) made sense. But today, welfare plays an increasingly prominent role, in everything from child-rearing to retirement. Between social stratification, labor decommodification, control of working life, and employment, it’s clear that three broad models of welfare capitalism have evolved. All of them actively shape politics and the economy.</p><h4>The Welfare State in Post-Industrial Employment</h4><p>Social democratic welfare regimes generally have high employment, meaning less early retirement than elsewhere in Europe. However, their Achilles heel is that wage restraint is required to keep welfare generous and employment high. This leads to instabilities that capitalism has not shown an ability to resolve. Meanwhile, conservative welfare regimes combine a lack of full employment policy with generous (but stratified) pensions. In the long run, this leads to issues funding the welfare state. After all, less employment means less tax money, but more folks needing welfare. This has been supported by case studies of Sweden and Germany respectively.</p><p>Meanwhile, the US is in an unusual position, with highly expansionary policy, more protected markets, and higher population growth. This has meant fairly high growth and employment, even with their weak welfare state. However, that weakness has its drawbacks with regard to employment: the labor market is warped by fringe benefits like health insurance. Instead of direct provision of services like college or medical care, employment in those industries is subsidized through the tax code. The US does have more equal gender and race outcomes in the private sector, at least in some areas. But certainly, affirmative action programs and equal opportunity regulation helped there, moreso than welfare structure.</p><h4>Stratification and Conflict in Post-Industrial Society</h4><p>Notably, wage moderation is required of public employees too under the social democratic regime. In Sweden, new conflicts have developed between public and private unions, each largely representing women and men respectively. After all, higher taxes on the private sector could fund higher wages in the public sector. Meanwhile, Germany’s bargains to reduce employment of older folks and bring in foreign workers to increase productivity leads to several potential conflicts. First, there is a risk of tax revolt, as workers reject the extra tax burden needed to sustain an increasingly large population on welfare. Second, the scarcity of jobs risks attacks on foreign workers, and anger from the many without jobs. Lastly, we look to the US, where new potential conflicts are less clear. Gender disparities have broadly decreased, as have race disparities to a lesser extent. However, women and people of color remain disproportionally in worse, lower-paying jobs. This trend of less inequality between sexes and races, but greater inequality within them, is likely to continue.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/773/1*K27UT1vbszQr6wUA_UJTkA.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=72e77c8abcaf" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[“The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism”, part 3: Welfare, Work, and Full Employment]]></title>
            <link>https://jacobmkeegan.medium.com/the-three-worlds-of-welfare-capitalism-part-3-welfare-work-and-full-employment-2cc1f1cf73e7?source=rss-ac3ee5496b7c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2cc1f1cf73e7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[welfare]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[social-democracy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[solidarity-wage-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[kalecki]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[full-employment]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jacob Keegan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 26 Jun 2021 06:51:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-08-16T19:46:18.119Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Today, we’ll be continuing the summary of this book by discussing the welfare state in the employment structure. In the <a href="https://jacobmkeegan.medium.com/the-three-worlds-of-welfare-capitalism-part-1-why-do-welfare-states-exist-a0467260df5c">previous</a> <a href="https://jacobmkeegan.medium.com/the-three-worlds-of-welfare-capitalism-part-2-stratification-pensions-and-crystallization-282e2683cab3">parts</a>, we categorized three welfare regime types, and looked at what political powers may have caused them. But how do these regimes influence other economic variables?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/787/1*rjSuPWIX7yt6r1o9KtAmNw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/802/1*xmnNMELz5NNhj8ldssEJ5A.png" /></figure><p>“The core idea of social policy was always to safeguard persons against the exigencies and risks that confront them in their life-cycle, especially when their working capacities fail”. Since <a href="https://www.peoplespolicyproject.org/2018/09/18/the-best-way-to-eradicate-poverty-welfare-not-jobs/">welfare is mainly needed by non-workers</a>, it’s easier to maintain a welfare state with higher employment. At the same time, welfare may disincentivize work to some extent: social democratic welfare states especially offer a serious alternative to working. It is of crucial importance how the welfare regimes navigate this contradiction.</p><h4>Chapter 6: Welfare State and Labor Market Regimes</h4><p>We’ll focus on three ways welfare interacts with labor markets. First is the exit from work into welfare, like retiring. Second are paid leave programs, and last is direct employment of workers.</p><h4>Exit and Labor Supply</h4><p>Conservative welfare states like Germany and France led in creating early retirement programs in the 1970’s, on the basis that they let companies shed less productive workers. The social democratic approach was different: states chose to keep labor demand high through public policy, such as expansionary fiscal policy. Even in the presence of generous benefits, workers would often not retire early in a strong labor market. To bring in some data: in 1985, the labor force participation rates of males aged 55–64 was 58% and 50% in Germany and France, respectively. Compare this to Sweden and Norway’s numbers of 76% and 80%. This higher employment meant better labor utilization, and also freed up welfare state resources to be spent elsewhere.</p><h4>Paid Work Absence</h4><p>Benefits for paid leave can be very generous, sometimes replacing 100% of previous income. Social democratic regimes were especially generous, with many categories of leave, like sickness, maternity, parenthood, education, vacation, and union activities. Additionally, there were less restrictions on taking this time off: think about paperwork or doctor’s notes needed to take sick leave, for example. This serves the goal of full employment: instead of leaving their jobs, sick workers or new parents can take time off and simply return to work after.</p><p>The numbers for absenteeism in Sweden are particularly shocking. On any given day, 15% of workers are absent from work, yet paid. Numbers like this go beyond just a useful benefit. Fundamentally, an employee sells <a href="http://www.umass.edu/preferen/gintis/Bowles-gintis%20Politics%20and%20Society%201990.pdf">control of their time</a> in return for a wage. Paid leave this generous gives control of time back to laborers: labor time itself becomes decommodified to some extent. Compare this to places like the US, where there isn’t even a legal framework to guarantees any paid leave.</p><p>In one group, the effect of these policies is particularly evident: women with young children. Labor force participation rates for women with kids aged 0–2 in Sweden was 43% in 1970. Over the next 15 years, Sweden expanded many paid leave policies, and adopted maximum female participation as a social policy goal. The results were dramatic: in 1985, that rate moved from 43% to 82.4%! However, of those employed mothers, 47.5% were absent on any given day. Importantly, the high cost of this paid leave was borne by the government: if it was employer-funded instead, employers would lower costs by hiring less folks who may become pregnant.</p><h4>The Welfare State As Employer</h4><p>“State employment is, in itself, nothing new. But its expansion begs a re-examination of its significance. The public sector may pay wages’ and offer labor contracts like any other employer, but it is not a genuine market, and conventional market principles operate only marginally.”</p><p>This is especially true of employment in healthcare, education, and welfare service (HEW). Below, the data is grouped into social democratic, conservative, and liberal categories respectively.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/781/1*u048G-i_jvYu5Tc3PZitBw.png" /></figure><p>Most notable about this data is how well-developed HEW is among social democratic countries, and how it’s absolutely dominated by public employment. Other countries have much lower HEW, and conservative countries generally have significantly more public employment that liberal ones. The exception is the United Kingdom, no doubt due to the NHS.</p><h3>Chapter 7: Institutional Accommodation to Full Employment</h3><h4>Institutional Problems of Full Employment</h4><p>Full employment comes with many benefits, like a more productive economy, higher wages, and more worker power. But there are many obstacles to obtaining it. First, per economist Micheal Kalecki’s famous “<a href="https://delong.typepad.com/kalecki43.pdf">Political Aspects of Full Employment</a>”, business leaders will likely resist such efforts. They prefer disciplining workers through unemployment and the business cycle. Second, there’s the Phillips curve, which hypothesizes a tradeoff between inflation and unemployment rates. The idea is that as employment gets high enough, wages get pushed upwards as labor becomes more scarce. These wages make end products more expensive. Workers need higher wages to afford those prices, so they demand even higher wages. And so on, into an inflationary spiral. New institutions would be needed to manage these wage demands.</p><p>Because of this difficulty, full employment is rare. Only Norway and Sweden have maintained unemployment rates under 3% throughout the post-war era [until the publishing of this book in 1990, of course]. Even when full employment has been temporary, it’s mostly been confined to years between 1960 and 1974. But all is not well, even in these countries:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/778/1*SB6dRTUum7E29LqGvKWRIA.png" /></figure><h4>The Crystallization of Institutional Arrangements in the Post-War Era</h4><p>How the conflicts brought about by full employment were managed varied greatly by nation. In the US, the New Deal coalition made large progressive gains. But progress was fundamentally held back by the South rejecting welfare and employment programs that helped black folks. By the end of World War 2, price stability had become the dominant concern in the US, not full employment.</p><p>In the UK, successful welfare programs and a high level of employment led to inflation pressures. The lack of union cohesion closed off many potential avenues to fighting this pressure. Instead, wage and price controls were established, alienating unions from the Labor government.</p><p>Next there’s Germany, whose “social market” model obtained price stability and high growth. This came at the cost of austerity (public spending wasn’t allowed to grow faster than GDP) and little upward pressure on wages, due to a weak union and social democratic movement. The Nordics, being small and open countries, faced unique problems here. High wages could hurt international competitiveness, severely weakening their economies. Each country responded differently. In Denmark, liberal farmers were particularly strong. They pushed for price stabilization and sometimes even austerity, preventing full employment in the first place. In Norway, the Labor party held an absolute majority in parliament from 1945–1961, making government particularly strong. Government boards worked with unions to set economic guidelines and growth targets, enforced through government control of investment.</p><p>Lastly is Sweden, with its highly unified and powerful labor movement. They embraced the Rehn-Meidner model, created by union economists Gösta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner. In short, this model <a href="https://jacobmkeegan.medium.com/summary-of-wage-dispersion-and-productive-efficiency-evidence-for-sweden-9ba5ed9aec02">greatly equalized wages</a> across firms and industries. This had two effects. First, where a firm or a developing industry was performing exceedingly well, wages were moderated, and competitiveness maintained. But if firms or industries were performing poorly, they wouldn’t be able to keep up with these centrally-set wages, and would go under. Add in active labor market policies to help move workers laid off by failing firms into more productive ones, and full employment, competitiveness, and growth would all be maintained. Price stability, meanwhile, was obtained through budgetary restraint at full employment. But this required a very specific institutional setup: centralized, solidaristic unions in cooperation with government, employer confidence, and high investment were all needed.</p><h4>The International Convergence of Full Employment</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/769/1*7n9TZ--0SDdXEj3v8YwAfw.png" /></figure><p>Significant wage pressures (in brief, when wages rise faster than productivity) mainly emerged in the 60’s and peaked in the early 70’s. This coincided with inflation, lowered profitability, and trade difficulties. Broadly, there were four responses to these difficulties.</p><p>The first was a deflationary policy response, attempting to cool the economy. Although this was attempted in many countries, it was mainly a one-shot measure, instead of a return to the political business cycle. Second, there’s incomes policy: redirecting wage demands into welfare expansion. Denmark led on this front with a package in 1963. Thirdly, new “neo-corporatist” institutions, which included unions in policy-making, were created to manage these pressures. In Sweden, this included union control of pensions and ALMP. In Norway, public investments were increased, allowing bargains that developed poorer areas. However, in countries like the UK and Germany, attempts to create these institutions weren’t successful. The last response was an attempt to bring new workers into the workforce, either women or folks from other countries.</p><h4>The Incompatibilities of Sustained Full Employment</h4><p>In brief: though most developed nations had experienced at least spells of full employment, a stable equilibrium involving full employment had yet to be found. There were unresolved conflicts involving unions and government, inflation, and between workers (better off workers were less effected by attempted wage restraint, and were often given higher benefits to compensate). Returning to the focus of this book, a lot of these pressures were put into welfare expansion.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/855/1*xTrrbF0rhK12KgfW4ND9Eg.png" /></figure><p>However, increased welfare benefits at full employment, when the economy grew slowly, were inflationary if deficit-funded. And if tax-funded, they cut into, and perhaps even lowered, worker’s real wages. Clearly, a problematic solution. Alternatively, pressures were put into industrial democracy, in the Nordics especially. In Sweden, “workers were given representation on company boards, job-tenure rights, a large degree of control over safety and health conditions, and even over technology decisions”. But this push against employer sovereignty in decision-making began breaking the social contract between capital and labor: simply put, class conflict heightened.</p><h4>The Re-Emergence of Employment as the Quid Pro Quo for Wage Restraint</h4><p>The early 1970’s brought serious pain to Western economies. The international monetary system of Bretton Woods broke down, and inflation rose with the infamous oil shortages starting in 1973. The shift began away from full employment, and towards counter-inflationary policies. Somewhat higher employment was maintained in the US through large deficits. Sweden and Norway managed to keep unemployment below 3% until recessions in the 80’s. But the cost of this was high. First, some data on Norway, where oil revenues helped fund increased spending. Production subsidies as a percentage of GDP ranged from 5.3% in 1972, to 7.7% in 1978, to 6.1% in 1983. Meanwhile, with strong opposition to cutting wages or benefits, Sweden’s only recourse was deficit spending to finance employment. By 1980, their deficits were 10.4% of GDP, up to 12% three years later. This, plus taxes and profits from state-owned wealth, added up to over 60% of GDP as government spending.</p><p>The 80’s were a tumultuous time for Sweden. Though the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP) lost control of parliament in 1976, they regained it in 1982. That same year, they introduced wage earner funds. Originally proposed by Meidner, their goal was to transfer company ownership to employees over time. The funds would be controlled by union representatives, and used to fund pensions and invest in jobs. This faced massive employer opposition, as expected. The next year, business managed to break off steel workers, who composed a third of the LO, from their central union agreement, greatly weakening union power.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gLp2nfPgzbJtudMRcl4ssQ.png" /></figure><p>[Esping-Anderson was right: just a year after this book was published, in 1991, the new conservative government in Sweden ended the wage-earner funds].</p><p>Meanwhile, Germany was a different story. Austerity won out over social democracy, neo-corporatism, and expansionist fiscal policy. They attempted to increase productivity by inducing early retirement through various social programs, to dramatic effect. Labor force participation for folks aged 60–65 dropped from 75% to only 44% from 1970 to 1981. However, unemployment still rose throughout the period. So not only were a lot more folks on welfare, but there were less people employed to fund it, which greatly restricted welfare spending.</p><h4>Conclusion</h4><p>Per Kalecki’s arguments, everyone agrees new institutions are needed to sustain equality, efficiency, and full employment. Different existing regimes led to different attempts at these institutions. However, they all failed. The question, then, is if these new institutions require severe weakening of private ownership.</p><p><a href="https://jacobmkeegan.medium.com/the-three-worlds-of-welfare-capitalism-part-4-ending-with-post-industrial-development-72e77c8abcaf">In the final article</a>, we look at how post-industrial development has affected welfare states.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2cc1f1cf73e7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[“The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism”, part 2: Stratification, Pensions, and Crystallization]]></title>
            <link>https://jacobmkeegan.medium.com/the-three-worlds-of-welfare-capitalism-part-2-stratification-pensions-and-crystallization-282e2683cab3?source=rss-ac3ee5496b7c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/282e2683cab3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[socialism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[inequality]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[welfare]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[liberalism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pensions]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jacob Keegan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 10 Jun 2021 03:51:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-06-28T05:35:28.767Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This article will round out the first part of the Esping-Andersen’s book from 1990. You can find the previous part <a href="https://jacobmkeegan.medium.com/the-three-worlds-of-welfare-capitalism-part-1-why-do-welfare-states-exist-a0467260df5c">here</a>. Enjoy!</p><h3>Chapter 3: The Welfare State as a System of Stratification</h3><p>Many sweeping generalizations about welfare are incorrect. For example, you might hear someone argue that it lessens class divisions. But not all welfare is created equal: some welfare policies lessen class divides, but some enhance them. And the redistributive effect of even the same amount of welfare spending can vary greatly. Mirroring the regime types, there are 3 “ideal types” of welfare stratification.</p><h4>Conservative</h4><p>The origins of conservative stratification comes from two related phenomena: etatism and corporatism. Etatism, pioneered by Bismarck, means giving preferential treatment to public sector workers to ensure their loyalty to the state. Meanwhile, corporatism ties benefits to where you work, harkening back to the medieval era. The pre-capitalist idea of “noblesse oblige” mixes with Catholic ideology to create a system that generally helps the poor more than the liberal type does. Benefits can also be occupationally-segmented: Italy, for example, has 120 occupational pension schemes.</p><h4>Liberal</h4><p>On principle, liberalism is opposed to stratification, viewing state interference as creating paternalism and elitism. Interference is thus kept to a minimum through stingy, means-tested benefits. But the state is not a neutral actor in liberal regimes: rather, it’s actively involved in centering the market in society. This can be seen in schemes like tax deductions for occupational benefits: a liberal state artificially promotes such things over social democratic alternatives. This all adds up to a highly stratified system, with the poor relying on stigmatized means-tested benefits, the middle class on subsidized and individualized social insurance, and the rich on the market. “Liberalism’s universalist ideas were contradicted by the dualism and social stigma it promoted in practice.”</p><h4>Socialist</h4><p>Unsurprisingly, the social democratic or socialist approach aims to build solidarity and prevent the divisions of state paternalism, exclusionary corporatism, and the market itself. Yes, socialists opposed the pacifying welfare of Bismarck <a href="https://jacobinmag.com/2019/12/otto-von-bismarck-germany-social-democratic-party-spd">for example</a>. But welfare could be used as a base to strengthen working class power. This idea was not new: Marx thought similarly about the British Factory Acts, for example. As mentioned previously, early attempts to build solidarity outside the state through cooperative and fraternal societies proved inefficient. Not only was there stratification between members and non-members, but worker-financed funds were always severely weakened during economic downturns due to unemployment. The unemployed were also a problem for the socialist project, as they undercut working class power (making strikes and high wage demands less effective), while not having much power themselves. We’ll return to this problem in the next article.</p><h4>Comparative Dimensions of Welfare State Stratification</h4><p>Now, we turn to some data on stratification. Corporatism is measured by the number of occupationally distinct public pension schemes, and etatism is measured by the percent of GDP spent on public employee pension. Universalism is measured by an average of coverage rates for sickness, unemployment, and pension benefits. Lastly, average benefit equality is measured by the ratio of minimum to maximum pension benefits. As you can see, divisions into welfare types are not perfectly clear cut: countries have a mix of different kinds of policy.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uGpnMM04TCI4fYvtyFOSVA.png" /></figure><p>We also have countries clustered by the strengths of various welfare state logics.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uu4c-kcZ2xEwb-jYP2l6SA.png" /></figure><p>Of particular note are two extreme cases. In the US, conservatism and socialism score a 0, while liberalism gets the highest possible score. Conversely, in Sweden, conservatism and liberalism score a zero, while socialism gets the maximum score. Note that a score of 0 for liberalism doesn’t mean that Sweden has, for example, absolutely no means-testing, just that it scores low on all categories associated with the liberal welfare state.</p><h3>4. State and Market in the Formation of Pension Regimes</h3><p>Special attention should be paid to generally the biggest welfare expenditure: pensions, including both old-age and disability pensions. Governments grant very different social rights here, varying from generous public pensions to schemes that push for occupational or individual pensions. So, the coverage of different types of pensions matters. But how much of retired folks’ income is actually from different pensions matters too: government granting you a social right to a pension doesn’t mean the quality of that pension is good.</p><p>Pensions were not always significant though: they played a marginal role until World War 2. After all, as late as 1870, most employment was agricultural outside the UK. Less commodification of labor meant less of a reliance on wages or old-age insurance. Instead, the elderly relied on family support and poor relief. For example, in the US in 1927, private charity was over 6 times greater than public welfare spending. With an aging population and further commodification, demands for pensions grew. Both public and private pension spending grew, crowding out pre-capitalist support and poor relief.</p><h4>Restructuration in the Post-War Era</h4><p>“The hope that a minimalist state and buoyant market would complement one another in a harmony of capitalism and welfare was falsified even before the Depression shattered it entirely.” In 1939, the countries we’re studying averaged pension coverage rates of 40%, with replacement rates of 15.5%. This was woefully inadequate, even if you were lucky enough to get a pension (only 5% did in the US). But much changed in World War 2. First, due to wage controls, employers started offering fringe benefits like pensions to attract workers. The high taxing and spending common to the war also expanded the baseline for what was acceptable for government to do. Some numbers from the US: from 1945-1950, private pension spending increased 68%. From 1950-1960, it increased a staggering 364%.</p><p>Still, many were left behind. Pensions often worked on an actuarial basis, meaning you got out what you paid in, plus returns on investment. This hurt mobile workers and women (who often took significant time off to raise kids). Worsening this were rules that prevented you from getting a pension unless you put enough years in.</p><p>Unsurprisingly, we can separate out 3 pension regimes.</p><p>1. Corporative: segmented based on status and occupation, which divides employees and glorifies management.</p><p>2. Residualist: market-dominated. Governments use tax expenditures to push private pensions (like 401k’s in the US), in a classic example of the state creating markets.</p><p>3. Universal: state-dominated. Grants population-wide social rights.</p><p>We can differentiate these by looking at pension spending by type, as below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/848/1*5rJTGcvBgCAmeIjbCa6ZRQ.png" /></figure><h3>Chapter 5: Distribution Regimes in the Power Structure</h3><p>Several explanations have attempted to explain why nations crystallize into certain welfare structures. First is functionalist moderation, which argues that economic development naturally leads to average folks demanding services the market can’t provide, which governments respond to. However, this can’t explain why similarly developed countries have different welfare state structures. There’s also the power-centered approach, which argues that governments are not necessarily responsive to the people. As such, policy is changed through power mobilization, of the working class. However, this is a very one-dimensional view: the working class can be mobilized in lots of different ways, depending on the structure of unions and the role of parties. Whether right-wing parties are unified and the structure of parliament may also play a role in how this power mobilization works.</p><p>It is at least clear that “being captive to market forces, workers are irrational if they do not seek a modicum of decommodification”. This protects them from the whims of bosses, but it also promotes solidarity, helping to stop workers from undercutting each other through strikebreaking, for example. Thus, “whether under the banner of social democracy, communism, or laborism, almost all parliamentarian labor movements converge with respect to their principles for social policy and designs for welfare-state reforms”. However, the working class may choose to organize towards ends other than class solidarity, like a focus on family and the Church.</p><p>We can’t limit ourselves to quantification of the modern situations in developed countries either. We must look towards history too. We’ll use a few variables to study how welfare states form over time. First is working-class mobilization, a weighted average of legislative and cabinet seats for leftist parties. This will be denoted by WCS (weighted cabinet shares). Seats are used instead of vote share to account for differences in how parliaments assign seats. Since union strength is highly correlated with this measure (with a coefficient of 0.816), and the focus is on welfare policy through legislation, we will exclude it as a separate variable. Next are variables measuring the strength of Catholicism, at first through measuring the share of Catholics in a country, and then through measuring legislative seats held by Christian Democrats, once those parties emerged around 1950. Third, we have a variable for absolutism, measured by the past strength and duration of absolutist rule, weighted by the year when universal suffrage was made law. We should expect this to correlate with etatism.</p><p>Lastly, we have two measures to account for non-power mobilization explanations. First is the average rate of GDP growth from 1960–1980 (when welfare states matured). Second is the rate of elderly folks relative to the population, since of course this would be a source of welfare expansion demands.</p><p>First, some notes on abbreviations: r is the correlation coefficient, B measures the slope of the relationship, R sq. measures how much variance in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variable, the higher F is, the less likely the relationship is from random chance, and N.S. stands for “not significant” here.<br>First, we simply measure the correlation between the variables above and social spending as a percentage of GDP.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/831/1*QVZXgRipbiQtSbdLbHZ0lA.png" /></figure><p>Clearly, basically nothing has a statistically significant correlation. The exception is the rate of elderly in the population (indeed, once you control for this, the correlation with WCS in 1977 goes away). This is compatible with our hypothesis: different groups want different welfare structures more than a certain amount of welfare spending in and of itself. But of course, more elderly folks just means more people who need welfare, though it took time for them to become a significant force. It’s somewhat surprising that Catholic party strength or WCS is not even significantly correlated, though: we would expect their policies to generally increase spending.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/782/1*gB6WFeMhbh1zrureQcAVIQ.png" /></figure><p>The above table is noteworthy for the very strong relationship between corporatism and absolutism. This is a bit strange (we would expect it to be more strongly related to etatism), but still in line with our welfare typology.</p><p>Next is the dependent variable of “social security bias”, which refers to how much pension spending is public. Social democracy aims to crowd out private insurance in areas like this. We also add an independent variable measuring how long bureaucracy has been round: some theorize that, once established, welfare bureaucracies aim to increase their own power by increasing spending.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/798/1*h8dpbECJOrSoygFlE4F08w.png" /></figure><p>WCS explains ~47% of the variance here, lending some support to our theory of social democratic goals. Also, it’s important to note that the bureaucracy variable has an insignificant, but NEGATIVE relationship to social security bias, addressing a common right-wing talking point.</p><p>Lastly, we’ll see how well our measures correlate with the different welfare regime types.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/775/1*2q8RTd689vkDTmolT-36OA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/771/1*VYXORmNHX6lve_KCD6OSmw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/798/1*nnlT7ZgGr1Vmj4FVOvS5Tw.png" /></figure><p>The above data suggests that working-class power has not been successful at reversing conservative welfare structures. However, the opposite is true of liberal welfare. As expected, measures of conservative power are negatively related to socialist welfare structures, though not significantly.</p><h4>Conclusion</h4><p>The data overall supports our hypothesis: political differences have a strong effect on how welfare states are structured. But it also urges caution. None of these relationships are perfect: some are weaker than expected, some may be spurious. And history is always hard to put hard numbers to. We should also note that these relationships may not hold forever: whether they even hold today is something only more modern research can address. Plus, one important aspect has been largely left out of these discussions: how these welfare regimes approach employment. <a href="https://jacobmkeegan.medium.com/the-three-worlds-of-welfare-capitalism-part-3-welfare-work-and-full-employment-2cc1f1cf73e7">The next article</a> begins to address that question.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=282e2683cab3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[“The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism”, part 1: Why do welfare states exist?]]></title>
            <link>https://jacobmkeegan.medium.com/the-three-worlds-of-welfare-capitalism-part-1-why-do-welfare-states-exist-a0467260df5c?source=rss-ac3ee5496b7c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a0467260df5c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[socialism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[liberalism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[commodification]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[welfare]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[social-democracy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jacob Keegan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 19 Apr 2021 03:26:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-06-28T05:32:39.961Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This will be the first in a series of articles about the excellent “The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism” by Gøsta Esping-Andersen, first published in 1990. It focuses on 18 developed Western countries, with extensive data covering decades. Enjoy!</p><h4>Introduction</h4><p>The 1960’s and 1970&#39;s saw dramatic expansion and empowerment of welfare states. No longer was welfare a marginal role of the state: instead, it reshaped how society and the economy was organized. But different welfare structures shaped countries differently with regard to decommodification, stratification, and employment. Crucially, these effects cannot be determined just by looking at the amount of welfare spending: it’s more complicated than that. Chapter 1, acknowledging this, will re-conceptualize the welfare state with a sociological approach. Chapters 2–4, drawing from political economist Karl Polanyi, will discuss how welfare relates to social rights. Chapter 5 will attempt to identify how different political forces led to the welfare policies we see in the data. Chapter 6 analyzes ties between welfare states and labor markets, while Chapter 7 focuses on full employment specifically. Lastly, Chapters 8 and 9 examine the post-industrial transformation.</p><h3>Chapter 1: The Three Political Economies of the Welfare State</h3><p>Let’s start addressing the question up top: why do welfare states exist? Esping-Andersen examines a few theories from the time. First is the structuralist approach, which has two forms, both focused on the structure of the economy as an explanatory variable. The first goes like this: industrialization destroyed the traditional power of families, churches, and guilds, necessitating the state to take over some of their function in the form of welfare. The second, the Marxist structuralist approach, says welfare comes from the state attempting to smooth over class conflict caused by capitalism.</p><p>One problem with these approaches is that, historically, welfare states often took decades to develop after industrialization occurred. Also, they don’t explain why countries came to different types of welfare states. All Western countries industrialized: but not all have similar welfare states.</p><p>There’s also the institutional approach, focusing on the role of democracy. It says that under political democracy, the median voter will support increases in public spending or social rights, to the detriment of markets. Yet, some early welfare came about before democracy to try and stop it-most famously the first welfare state in the world, <a href="https://jacobinmag.com/2019/12/otto-von-bismarck-germany-social-democratic-party-spd">made by Otto von Bismarck</a> to try and siphon support from socialist opponents.</p><p>Lastly is the class mobilization view, whereby working class power determines economic outcomes, welfare included. After all, strong class organization can pass laws that go against the interest of the rich and employers. This argument has some merit, but it’s no surefire thing. Perhaps working class mobilization only works if right parties are divided. We also have to be careful: “we can’t assume socialism is the natural basis for wage-earner mobilization”, because the question of why wage-earners become socialists would still remain. They certainly don’t become committed socialists in every country! Lastly, it’s important to note that the role of the traditional working class in industry is going down, replaced by service and white-collar workers. So, the working class alone can’t get you serious power.</p><p>So, where do we go from here for explanations? We should look to what welfare policies historical actors and parties actually chose, and why. To do that, we must first examine their underlying ideologies.</p><h4>Ideological Approaches to the Welfare State</h4><p>Different ideologies, unsurprisingly, have massively different views on welfare. They follow from answers to fundamental questions about the role of the state, democracy, property, and markets. First, we start with the classical liberals. Adam Smith, for example, embraced markets as a way to attack class, inequality, and privilege. This seems strange in our modern times, where markets have produced serious class divides and inequality. But he lived in a time when the privileged class was monarchs and aristocrats, not CEO’s or company owners. The state at the time was controlled by this class: thus, the classical liberal opposition and wariness towards the state makes sense. They saw markets as a way to free people from these, and other, traditional institutions.</p><p>One response to this comes from the conservatives, who of course are fond of these traditional institutions! They defend these hierarchies, as well as traditional gender roles, from attacks of the liberal or socialist variety. [For example: you can clearly see that, despite rhetoric, the focus of the modern US Republican Party is on upholding hierarchy, rather than any real commitment to free market principles.]</p><p>As capitalism developed, new class distinctions became clear. From this arose socialists, who <a href="https://twitter.com/LittleKeegs0/status/1376795593943756802?s=20">saw a state controlled by the owning class</a> (a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, as Marx said), similarly to the classical liberal view. Therefore, seeing no potential in parliamentary government (Lenin called it “little more than an empty shell”), they advocated revolution. Meanwhile, most liberals , somewhat with the exception of the UK liberal party, held tight to free markets over their more egalitarian ideals. Lastly, conservatives saw in these new classes a new way to maintain hierarchy, discipline, and order. Edmund Burke, the father of conservatism, thought aristocrats could basically maintain their positions by becoming rich employers in the market.</p><p>Yet, beginning in the early 1900’s, something fundamentally new emerged: political democracy, backed by expansions of suffrage. With it came the real chance that the working class could take power. Liberals reacted to this with hesitancy: after all, by the institutional logic above, they might vote to undermine the market. But a certain branch of socialists, especially in Nordic countries, embraced political democracy as a method to advance socialism: <a href="https://bobocheesechimp.medium.com/clearing-up-the-confusion-about-the-nordic-countries-and-socialism-a9c6f884abe3">the social democrats</a>. They came to power not on the working class alone, but on a coalition involving the working class, the emerging white-collar industry, and farmers. We can look to other countries with strong working-class power, like Austria, and see different welfare outcomes: this can be chalked up to different coalitions. The US had a similar situation with the New Deal coalition, yet the South stopped further welfare state advancements.</p><h4>Features of the Welfare State</h4><p>Capitalism is centered around the labor market, in which you sell the ability to do labor (labor power) in exchange for a wage. While markets existed before capitalism, this omnipresent labor market is new. Capitalism commodified labor. But welfare can decommodify it to an extent by giving you income outside of the labor market (full decommodification would entail you get paid the same whether you’re working or not). Again, decommodification here describes the “degree to which individual, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of [labor] market participation.” This is a key feature by which to analyze welfare states. In general, Anglo-Saxon countries have low decommodification, as their benefits are meager and means-tested. Germany has compulsory social insurance, with fairly high benefits. Yet the benefits mainly rely on contributions from work, so it’s far from highly decommodified. Lastly we have the Scandinavian model, which decommodifies labor the most. Benefits are universal, with generous minimums, yet also with high replacement rates for most folks.</p><p>Another aspect to analyze is how welfare states affect social stratification. Welfare does not always build solidarity and unity: it can instead create new divisions. For example, means-tested welfare states seperate the poor from the rest of the populace, and they face <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/15218879/">stigma</a> and administrative barriers to accessing welfare. [The impetus for some welfare reform in the UK and Scandinavia came from the middle class “wanting in” on generous benefits given to poor folks, see the reference to Peter Baldwin <a href="https://www.filesforprogress.org/memos/the-public-infrastructure-for-care.pdf">here</a>.] Meanwhile, Bismarck and France tied benefits more to occupation. Bismarck wanted benefits for state workers to ensure their support and allegiance. For a more quantitative example, France in 1980 spent ~3 times as much, as a percentage of GDP, on pensions for public employees than Norway, Sweden, or Denmark. Italy meanwhile has over 120 different occupational pensions. These corporatist policies divide people on occupation.</p><p>Socialists, too, faced the problem of stratification and stigma, but from a different direction. This passage is worth quoting in full:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/655/0*Jg4LHbzwiz07TDUK" /></figure><p>So, many socialists embraced parliamentary reformism instead to empower the working class and build solidarity. Initially, some pursued Beveridge-type welfare, with basic, equal, and universal benefits. But in developed countries, these meager, flat benefits weren’t sufficient for the growing middle class, or to offer a real alternative to work. This, too, led to stratification, as the better-off turned to private insurance to cover them. Everyone faces risks and costs from normal life, from having kids to getting sick, and properly covering these risks is crucial to getting folks to support the welfare state. Social democrats realized that to ensure solidarity and equality, the private market must be <a href="https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/equality-isnt-cheap">crowded out</a> of areas like old-age and health insurance.</p><h4>Meet the Three Worlds</h4><p>With that background in mind, let’s finally address the three welfare state regimes that form the basis of this book.</p><p>Liberal/residual welfare states offer meager, means-tested assistance. They are careful not to displace the market, meaning decommodification is low. Often a work ethic that wants to condition welfare on “proper moral behavior” is present, through drug testing and making welfare beneficiaries look for work for example.</p><p>Conservative welfare states uphold status differentials in the market and the family. They do this in part through corporatism (benefits tied to occupation), as well as excluding non-working women from welfare (encouraging them to be stay-at-home mothers). You can think of their motto as this: “the state will only interfere when the family’s capacity to service its members is exhausted”.</p><p>Lastly is the smallest and best regime-type: the social democratic welfare state. Universalism is key, and decommodification is high. Costs formerly borne by a family are socialized, from raising kids to childcare. This, combined with individual rather than household benefits, leads to a high degree of individual freedom. Private insurance is purposely crowded out in favor of state provision. “All benefit; all are dependent; and all feel obligated to pay.” As we will be returning to much later, full employment is key to a successful social democratic welfare state, as it generates the high tax revenues needed to support non-workers, and prevents potential class divides between the employed and unemployed.</p><h3>2. Decommodification in Social Policy</h3><p>Before capitalism took hold, one’s capacity for survival depended on their relations to lords, their family, and the church. This is pre-commodification, as opposed to the commodification of labor that came with capitalism. It’s important to note that this commodification wasn’t natural: for example, the UK’s poor laws made the cash nexus, the market, the “linchpin of existence”. This process of commodification led to new demands: “with no recourse to property, and no state to which human needs can be directed, the market becomes to the worker a prison within which it is imperative to act as a commodity in order to survive.” Thus, labor movements often pushed for the next stage, decommodification. It’s important to note that decommodification is a scale. It’s a question of what standard of living folks can have outside of the market.</p><p>While under liberal welfare states, “the commodity logic is supreme”, it is not perfect. Non-workers still must be cared for. Liberals were pushed to support some kind of welfare policy, because to do otherwise would undermine the ability for workers to participate in the market.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/775/0*Br4E3KXNj0N8xvYr" /></figure><h4>Socialists Against Commodification</h4><p>As part of their goal to end class conflict, early socialists wanted to end labor’s commodification, as it caused competition (and thus alienation) between workers. Marx praised and pushed for worker rights, like the 8 hour day, that fought commodification. Marxist theorists Karl Kautsky and Rosa Luxemburg both praised the social wage (providing income outside of work). In the early 20th century, Lenin created a split among socialists. While revolutionary communists “believed that the roots of revolution lay in crisis and collapse [of capitalism], the reformists realized that the human misery that crisis breed would only weaken the socialist project”.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ETtHgUeTrbaa2kPuXnwZ1A.png" /></figure><p>The reformists, social democrats, fumbled with welfare state design for awhile. By the 60’s and 70’s, they had settled on welfare that didn’t just spend a lot, but was also of high quality and with extensive coverage.</p><h4>Data on Decommodification</h4><p>For our first test of our welfare regimes, we’ll measure decommodification. We’ll use an index in which easier access, longer duration, higher income replacement, and a greater range of coverage leads to higher scores. Entitlement could depend on need (like Supplemental Security Income in the US), on work performance (as in Germany), or simply on the basis of being a citizen (the most decommodified option). The index will measure scores for pensions, sickness, and unemployment benefits, then combine them into a single number.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*Pe8w24MBl_y9v2NvHOsg4w.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/812/1*UHQiJsNQ0g7mdWThn4V5nA.png" /></figure><p><a href="https://jacobmkeegan.medium.com/the-three-worlds-of-welfare-capitalism-part-2-stratification-pensions-and-crystallization-282e2683cab3">Here’s part 2!</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a0467260df5c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The ol’ Arrow ‘63]]></title>
            <link>https://jacobmkeegan.medium.com/the-ol-arrow-63-4cf053d2dbbc?source=rss-ac3ee5496b7c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4cf053d2dbbc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[efficiency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hospital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[healthcare]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jacob Keegan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 16 Jan 2021 08:21:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-03-27T21:37:31.530Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Arrow ‘63</h3><p>Today, I’ll be summarizing the classic <a href="https://web.stanford.edu/~jay/health_class/Readings/Lecture01/arrow.pdf">“Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care”</a> by Kenneth Arrow. I think it provides a powerful and commonsense explanation of why medical care is different from most other goods and services. My personal notes will be in brackets [like this].</p><h4>I. Introduction, Scope and Method</h4><p>First, it should be noted that we’re focusing on medical care specifically here, rather than health in general. Many things affect health beyond just medical care. We’ll be comparing it to the norm in economics of a product sold under perfect competition, where firms don’t have the individual power to set prices, there are no restrictions on supply or demand or transaction costs, and markets are complete (meaning you can buy and sell anything that exists in the market, and can make bets on all possible future states of the world). Under these conditions, the so-called welfare theorems apply. The first welfare theorem shows that such a market will be Pareto stable, meaning no one could be made better off without making someone else worse off (this is also misleadingly called Pareto efficient or Pareto optimal). But this isn’t all that useful, because lots of things can be Pareto stable, even highly unequal societies. So we will prefer some Pareto stable allocations to others. This is where the second theorem comes in: it says that every Pareto stable state corresponds to some initial distribution of wealth with this model.</p><p>In some ways, this is a strong result. It basically says that if these conditions hold, governments need not concern themselves with interfering with markets at all: they just have to redistribute, and markets will get to an optimal state. In another way, this is also a weak result, because these conditions are far from reality. There are a limited number of products you can buy, and often high transaction costs for example. The farther this model is from the real world, the more intervention is justified. So the question is, how well does medical care fit this model? To answer that, let’s examine three crucial assumptions underlying the welfare theorems: the existence of competitive equilibrium, the marketability of all relevant goods, and non-increasing returns.</p><p>First off, there’s an obvious example where marketability fails: spreadable disease. For example, if I go outside without a mask or ignore social distancing, I put others at risk for my own benefit. I could get them sick and leave them with crushing medical debt, while I get no symptoms. In other words, I’m imposing a cost I don’t have to pay for. Second, there’s the fact that illness in general is unpredictable. You could be in perfect health for 30 years, and suddenly get cancer and rack up medical bills. So, it’s best to have insurance, to pay smaller amounts every year rather than a big amount at once. Thus the existence of health insurance. But health insurance lumps in a bunch of different risks, for everything from broken bones to lupus. Any glance at the real world will show you cannot buy insurance for every single one of these possible risks you face. So, not all relevant things are marketable.</p><p>There is an additional, more subtle problem. Illness is not just a known risk, it’s often unpredictable (take the example of cancer before). So, information that can lower that unpredictability becomes worth something to people. Of course, this in turn means that this information will concentrate among those who can make money from it. Yet the exact value of this information is hard to know. Take a concrete example. Say you have a pain in your lungs, and you’re worried about it. Naturally, you go to see a doctor. In that appointment, you’re basically paying them for information, about what’s wrong with your lungs specifically. Maybe the doctor will have no idea what’s wrong. Maybe they catch something that could have cost you tens of thousands of dollars, or even your life. But you have no way of knowing, AND no way of knowing how likely each outcome is, because the doctor is the one with that information. In other words, the very fact that you were paying the doctor for this information implies you don’t know the value of that information, which is obviously an issue if you want to ensure you’re paying the correct price for it. So, the competitive equilibrium does not necessarily exist.</p><p>Lastly, we turn to medical research. The free market naturally under invests in research, because its benefits accrue to more than just the firm who discovers it, and medical research is no exception. Beyond that, once you discover something through research, it’s incredibly easy to reproduce. This means there are increasing returns to scale.</p><p>So, these conditions needed for the market to be efficient do not hold. As we will examine more below, society in some way recognizes and tries to correct for this. “Society” here doesn’t just mean the government, but also licensing in the medical care industry for example. Yet those corrections often introduce other problems.</p><h4>II. A Survey of the Special Characteristics of the Medical Care Market</h4><p>As noted before, illness can be very costly. But not just in terms of direct medical costs: serious illness can also reduce future income, either by dropping you out of the labor force for a while or disabling you in some way (not to mention dying, of course). Combined this fact with the unpredictable demand for healthcare, and a customer cannot really test medical care to see if they like it. You can’t simply test out chemotherapy, or try different treatment centers for different prices. To be clear, the problem isn’t that you don’t know how a certain procedure or treatment works: That’s normal for commodities, you generally don’t know how stuff is made. The problem is there is inequality in the information about the consequences of a purchase. It’s a simple fact that the medical practitioner will know much more than you, and this simply can’t be overcome. So while you may expect your landlord or utility company to act in their self-interest, that’s not seen as acceptable for medical workers. After all, acting in their self interest could make your life hell for years, or even kill you, and you wouldn’t know. This means you have to trust them, which normal markets don’t require. Several things result from this. First, it’s common for hospitals to label themselves as non-profits. Second, there’s medical licensing, which in a literal sense delineates which practitioners you should and shouldn’t trust, as getting a license requires years and years of education. Lastly, you’ll expect to stick with the same doctor you trust, instead of always looking for better options like you do with other goods.</p><p>This unintentionally leads to several problems. First off, medical licensing restricts the supply of doctors, and such restrictions are inefficient in the normal market model. This is especially a problem because of the high cost of getting a medical education. Licensing also restricts the range of different medical products that can be sold. For example, you don’t need the person giving you a shot to have the same medical experience as someone giving you brain surgery or even therapy. Licensing reduces this to a binary.</p><h4>III. Comparison with the Competitive Model under Certainty</h4><p>Usually, people don’t go out of their way to support the consumption of others. It’s not like you’d be particularly moved by someone not getting a computer they wanted, for example. But individuals seem to want to help the health of others. Additionally, there are increasing returns to medical care. Think of how many more things a large hospital can have than a small one, including many things that aren’t divisible, like specialists or medical equipment. This is especially an issue in low-density areas with few, smaller hospitals.</p><h4>IV. Comparison with the Ideal Competitive Market under Uncertainty</h4><p>Even if they were insurance policies for all conceivable risks, medical care would still face issues. Since people are risk averse, they will prefer a guaranteed income of X over a non-guaranteed income with an average payout of X. This is, at its core, where insurance companies can make their money: by charging more than X for premiums. It should be noted that there are significant economies of scale here. Administrative costs as a percent of total spending will decrease as the insurer gets bigger. Plus, when the risk pool of customers is larger, there are more people to spread risk around to, so they can offer a lower price.</p><p>In the real life insurance market, you get insured against stuff you control, which could lead to you acting in riskier ways with regard to your health (since you know it will be covered). A physician should act as a check on this, ensuring any medical care given is actually needed. Of course, in the real world, often the exact opposite happens. In normal insurance markets, you pay more if you face a higher risk (like paying more in flood insurance if your area is often hit by hurricanes). Yet for health insurance, that would mean people with pre-existing conditions paying more [which we have already found unacceptable and banned under Obamacare].</p><p>As touched on earlier, you can’t really pay for medical care based on the results. Thus, there’s social pressure to make sure physicians are treating patients well. People “replace direct observation by generalized belief in the ability of the physician”. So a big part of what you’re buying is this obligation, this trust that they will treat you well. But if they instead were looking for their own profit, as normal workers would, this would certainly weaken trust. The freedom of choice of care is given to the doctor, who is expected to tell you the best treatment, regardless of cost.</p><h4>Postscript</h4><p>Lastly, a note: Society will naturally create institutions to correct severe market failures. This applies to everything from physician licencing to unions. So we should be careful to decry things for interfering with the free market: they may exist to fix certain problems in the market. But of course, whatever ad hoc way society has of dealing with such problems is not necessarily the best way.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4cf053d2dbbc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Summary of “Wage Dispersion and Productive Efficiency: Evidence for Sweden”]]></title>
            <link>https://jacobmkeegan.medium.com/summary-of-wage-dispersion-and-productive-efficiency-evidence-for-sweden-9ba5ed9aec02?source=rss-ac3ee5496b7c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9ba5ed9aec02</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sweden]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[equality]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[productivity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[unions]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jacob Keegan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 30 Nov 2020 04:38:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-11-30T23:17:32.720Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hey everyone, hope all is well! Today I’ll be summarizing <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/209976">this piece</a> by Douglass A. Hibbs Jr. and Hakan Locking from 2000, analyzing how different union policies in Sweden effected productivity and growth. Swedish wage bargaining was centralized and produced very equal outcomes, but broke down somewhat in 1983. This allows us to examine how this breakdown effected certain economic measurements. My own notes, as usual, will be in brackets [like this].</p><h4>1. Introduction</h4><p>From 1956–1983, the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (abbreviated LO in Swedish) covered and negotiated for basically all blue-collar workers, while the Swedish Federation of Salaried Employees in Industry and Services (PTK) represented white-collar workers. They negotiated with the Swedish Employers Association (SAF). We’ll be focusing on the LO, since their data is more extensive and complete.</p><p>Swedish unions had tremendous success at compressing wages, reducing variance by 75%. In 1983, a 30% increase in wage for a blue-collar worker was enough to bring them from the bottom to the top decile of wages. For comparison, at this time that number would be 200% for the UK and 400% for the US. [Today in Sweden, this number is <a href="https://www.peoplespolicyproject.org/2020/03/02/fareed-zakaria-is-completely-ignorant-about-the-nordics/">about 130%</a>]. These numbers were likely similar for the PTK as well.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/660/1*DteZ9PwjN2TKlr7EK7Fb0A.png" /></figure><p>Broadly speaking, the approach to union bargaining from economists at the time took one of 3 forms. The first, from trade union economists, focused on the growth and productivity improvements from decreasing inequality <strong><em>between </em></strong>different<strong><em> </em></strong>sectors [formalized <a href="https://jacobmkeegan.medium.com/summary-of-egalitarianism-and-growth-c1a6aded79d6">here</a>] and firms. The second, the fair wage hypothesis, states that decreased inequality <strong><em>within </em></strong>firms would increase cohesiveness, effort, and therefore productivity. The last, the neoclassical view, saw the imposition of wage bargaining as an inefficient economic distortion. All these theories will be examined here.</p><h4>2. A Brief History of Postwar Swedish Wage Formation</h4><p>Broadly speaking, there were 3 phases of wage bargaining.</p><p>Phase 1, from 1956–1969, focused on wage leveling between industries and plants. The goal was “equal pay for equal work”, regardless of a company’s profitability or ability to pay (thus the decreased inequality between firms). If this sounds familiar, it’s because this is the story right-libertarians tell us about how the free labor market works: that you get paid what you’re worth. It’s simple to see why this doesn’t happen in the real world. Compare a very productive and profitable firm, let’s call it firm A, to a less productive and profitable firm B. Firm A obviously has a greater ability to pay workers. So a worker will be paid more (a wage premium) in firm A than firm B, even if they’re equally productive either way. You might respond that workers would move to A, but various barriers prevent workers from freely doing so in real life. Under union bargaining in Sweden, this wage premium was nearly eliminated, while it remained large in places like the US.</p><p>Phase 2, from 1970–1983, LO focused on wage leveling within plants. The goal became closer to “equal pay for all work”, focusing on raising wages of the least paid especially. PTK followed suit, as part of a deep, ideological commitment to equality. This intensified conflict between the SAF and union confederations.</p><p>Phase 3, starting in 1983, saw the all-encompassing and highly centralized wage bargaining system break down. This began when employers in metal industries pried metalworkers away from the LO with promises of new wage agreements with higher wage differentials. These workers represented a third of the LO workforce. As expected, evidence of rents accruing to more productive and profitable firms increased.</p><h4>3. Results</h4><p>Now we turn to an analysis of the data. Phase 1 policy increased productivity and output by up to 8% and 20% respectively, while phase 2 policy counteracted those productivity gains entirely, and halved the output increase. This is reflected by debates in the LO at the time about the tradeoff between equity and efficiency. This supports the trade union view, and “the regressions yield no support of the thesis… that wage leveling within workplaces enhances productive efficiency”, though the thesis may hold true for less extreme equalization of wages. Once centralized bargaining broke down, productivity and output did not change much overall, as higher inequality between firms and industries decreased output and productivity, while higher inequality within firms increased it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/524/1*6cfTqLyv3rDyFHQy7IFYag.png" /></figure><p>Meanwhile, wage dispersion increased by 50% overall, including a 76% dispersion increase between different industries.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9ba5ed9aec02" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Summary of “Egalitarianism and Growth”]]></title>
            <link>https://jacobmkeegan.medium.com/summary-of-egalitarianism-and-growth-c1a6aded79d6?source=rss-ac3ee5496b7c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c1a6aded79d6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[unions]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sweden]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bargaining]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jacob Keegan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 15 Nov 2020 21:14:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-11-15T21:14:20.159Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hey there folks! Today, I’ll be examining some economic theory from <a href="https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/ces_wp34.pdf">this paper</a> by Jonas Agell and Kjell Erik Lommerud from 1993. It models solidaristic wage bargaining (SWB): the practice by sectoral unions of bargaining pay equality not just within or across firms, but across industries and sectors as well. This practice was especially strong in the height of social democratic power in the Nordics in the 50’s to 80’s, and brought tremendous gains. My own notes will be in brackets [like this]. Let’s get started!</p><h3>Egalitarianism and Growth</h3><h4>I. Introduction</h4><p>Post-World War 2, Scandinavia had tremendous growth coupled with very low unemployment. Strong, centralized unions [union membership in Sweden in Denmark was <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_comparisons_of_trade_unions">around 95%</a>] had tremendous wage-setting power. Yet traditional economic theory suggests this equalized wage-setting should lower efficiency, productivity, and employment. Much of this theory neglects the difference between firm-specific and sectoral unions: the latter, by encompassing many firms and even multiple industries, can factor in external effects of wages into the wage-setting process. We’ll examine the effect of wages on growth here.</p><p>To quote trade union economist Gösta Rehn, labor is not “like mercury, requiring only small level differences between two areas in order to float quickly, and in large quantities, from one of them to the other”. What that means is labor will not easily flow from old, less productive industries to new, more productive ones in the free market. As such, new industries will need to pay higher wages to attract workers. This leaves old industries at an advantage, because they don’t have to pay these higher wages. We’ll call the difference between these wages the wage premium.</p><h4>II. The Basic Model</h4><p>Our model in this paper has 2 sectors that produce goods, a traditional and a modern sector, both with perfect competition. The model assumes that workers always prefer to work in the traditional sector, all else (especially wages) being equal. This is of course a strong assumption, that should if anything work against SWB. But it can be partially justified by the additional training costs that could be needed to enter the modern sector, or the pain of having to switch jobs, including moving. This preference is the origin of the wage premium. While economics often focuses on capital that is slow to move to new industries, this model interestingly centers on labor that is slow to move to new industries! We assume the existence of “learning-by-doing”: as more work is done in the modern sector, workers become more efficient, simply through practice and minor innovations. This learning speeds up if more people are employed in the modern sector.</p><h4>III. Competitive Wage Premia, Growth, and Distribution</h4><p>Labor in the modern sector must be paid a wage premium, but this is not true for capital. Since the cost of labor is higher in the modern sector, less of it will be used, and more capital will be used. Here we see a core reason why the wage premium is bad: it encourages higher capital usage and lower labor usage in the modern sector, yet more labor usage would increase productivity and growth. The conclusion from this model is that the free-market equilibrium, which leaves a wage premium, is <strong><em>not</em></strong> efficient. One more interesting note: a higher capital intensity in the modern sector drives inequality compared to if the wage premium was zero, because (under capitalism at least) capital ownership is very unevenly distributed. Even if we look to the far future in this model, “though the growth rate of wages eventually catches up to that of capital, the inequality gap created during the transition will not be closed”.</p><h4>IV. Solidaristic Wage Policies</h4><p>The argument for SWB flows naturally from this result. If the wage premium harms productivity and growth, it must be ended. That is, wages in the traditional sector must be forced to be about equal to those in the modern sector. Of course, many in the traditional sector likely can’t afford this level of pay over time, compared to the increasingly productive modern sector. This means low-productivity firms will be forced out of business, pushing workers towards the modern sector. Workers should be, and were in the height of social democratic power, assisted and compensated in this transition through active labor market policies (ALMP) to train folks and generous unemployment insurance are needed. Crucially, if ALMP works as intended, every worker who loses employment in the traditional sector will gain a job in the modern one, meaning that SWB is perfectly compatible with full employment. And the data confirms this: in 50’s and 60’s Sweden, for example, unemployment averaged 1.5%.</p><h4>V. Omissions and Extensions</h4><p>This simple model does not take international trade into account. If you do, the case for SWB grows stronger. In an open economy, there’s more of a risk of an economy with free-market wage setting getting “trapped” in traditional employment by specializing in it. Meanwhile, when taking mobility of labor and capital into account, the case for SWB may be weaker. The authors suggest inflows of immigrants triggered by the promises of higher wages could lower wages [though more modern economic research <a href="http://davidcard.berkeley.edu/papers/new-immig.pdf">suggests otherwise</a>]. By pushing out low-productivity firms and preventing high capital intensity in the modern sector, SWB could also cause the exit of capital. This may explain why Scandinavian countries at the time often had capital controls to restrict movement of capital.</p><h4>VI. The Demise of the Scandinavian Model?</h4><p>“In Sweden, the highly centralized wage bargaining system dissolved in 1983”, though it maintains somewhat centralized bargaining to this day. In Norway in the 1980’s, the main union confederation was challenged by two competitors, undermining the ability to centrally negotiate wages. An important lesson is that politics matters here. SWB being good economic policy does not guarantee its existence: you must have high union membership, cohesion among the union movement, and tight ties between unions and government to maintain proper ALMP and wage-setting. How to get there is a crucial question, but beyond the scope of this paper.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c1a6aded79d6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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