<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Jacob Phillips on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Jacob Phillips on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@jacobphillips?source=rss-a52eba1d1f35------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 23:53:12 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@jacobphillips/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[After Taste: Self-Policing Speech and Free Speech]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jacobphillips/after-taste-the-self-policing-of-speech-52a31c0d2cdd?source=rss-a52eba1d1f35------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/52a31c0d2cdd</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[hate-speech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[culture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[free-speech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jacob Phillips]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 18 Jun 2018 13:24:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-06-18T13:51:51.359Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/618/0*FJ9Ezu-N_z_DUkVr.jpg" /></figure><p>In the first half of 2018 in the UK, a sequence of events raised the profile of debates around freedom of speech. Lauren Southern, who once filmed an alleged ‘experiment’ in which she handed-out ‘Allah is gay’ leaflets in Luton, was <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/right-wing-canadian-activist-lauren-southern-detained-at-calais-and-barred-from-entering-uk-a3787886.html">banned from the UK</a>. As if designed to ensure maximum internet traffic, the same weekend Martin Selner (founder of Europe’s identitarian movement ‘Generation Identity’), and his girlfriend author Brittany Pettibone , were <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-security-deportations/british-authorities-ban-three-foreign-right-wing-activists-idUKKCN1GO2LO">prevented from entering the UK</a> to read a speech on immigration and European identity at Speaker’s Corner. Most notoriously of all, the YouTuber Count Dankula was <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/count-dankula-nazi-pug-salutes-mark-meechan-fine-sentenced-a8317751.html">prosecuted</a> for a video intended to be humorous, in which his girlfriend’s pug gave a Nazi salute to the command “gas the Jews”.</p><p>Meanwhile, there were attempts by Antifa to no-platform speakers on University campuses. One of which targeted another YouTuber, Sargon of Akkad, who has been proclaimed the victor of what the internet now calls ‘<a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/education/education-news/anti-fascist-protesters-kings-college-london-university-antifa-carl-benjamin-alt-right-talk-a8242181.html">the battle of King’s College</a>’. A less impressive kerfuffle gained more <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-bristol-42926535">attention</a>, however, being intended to silence the thoroughly mainstream figure Jacob Rees-Mogg in Bristol, apparently for his stances on same sex marriage and abortion. Things then reached a crescendo of sorts with the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/06/thousands-of-far-right-protesters-march-in-london-in-support-of-free-speech">#dayforfreedom event</a> on Whitehall over the May Bank Holiday weekend. Sargon, Gavin McInnes, Milo Yiannopolis, and various other self-described ‘free speech advocates’ spoke to a crowd of thousands, with Lauren Southern giving her talk via videolink.</p><p>The debates surrounding these events seem to recall the Charlie Hebdo debates of 2015–6, as they involve questions around whether or how offensive, inflammatory or inciteful sentiments can or should be legally regulated. But the current British context is different because the state authorities and police seem to favour silencing the sentiments in question, on the basis that they constitute hate speech. The UK’s Hate Speech first laws made their way into the statutes in 1986 to forbid action which is deliberately intended to harass, or cause ‘alarm, or distress’ to another with ‘threatening, abusive, or insulting’ behaviour, writing, or imagery. As always, the devil is in the detail. Various tweets have been doing the rounds which highlight a particular point of tension around policing hate incidents, articulated as follows on the Leicester Police <a href="https://leics.police.uk/categories/hate-crime">site</a>:</p><p>“Even if what happens isn’t a criminal offence, if someone does something and you believe it was motivated by prejudice or hate, it may still be possible to charge them with an offence.”</p><p>Those claiming to defend to free speech are up in arms about the possibility of charging people for an offence when no criminal action <em>as such</em> has been performed. Or put differently, when some action is deemed criminal on the basis of what motivated it, i.e. on the basis of what the person thinks. When thought becomes criminal, they say, the Orwellian dystopia is on upon us.</p><p>Whether or not UK legislators have genuinely trespassed into the private realm with the policing of ‘hate speech’ remains contentious. Some answer with a resounding yes, and argue that thoughts, feelings, and convictions can be as outrageous as one can imagine, as long as they’re not inciting criminal deeds. But if ‘hate speech’ should not be a matter for the statute books at all, it is curious that the same advocates invoke the legislative and juridical concept of freedom of speech in their defence. Those who see the UK descending into an Orwellian dystopia claim that freedom of speech and hate speech are synonymous. The muslim YouTuber Ali Dawa <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L1KBpNyL1f4">complained</a> to Lauren Southern that the leaflets stating ‘Allah is gay’ were not expressing free speech but hate speech. She replied: ‘<em>they’re the same thing</em>’. At the #dayforfreedom, Mcinnes <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=21M29XIDaF0">said</a> that defending hate speech is the main reason ‘why you fight for free speech’.</p><p>But can the centuries-old concept of freedom of speech can be so closely aligned with the much more recent coinage ‘hate speech’? And if these two are actually different, maybe the questions we’re dealing with here aren’t just about legal boundaries and test cases, but much broader questions about the character of public and social discourse, about the underlying values and ideals of a community’s self-understanding. If hateful expressions are on the rise, the answer might not always be to plead for legislators and police deal with the problem through state coercion, but rather to investigate where things have gone wrong, and take responsibility for the quality and character of our speech.</p><p>Freedom of Speech vs Hate Speech</p><p>With these two concepts, there are at least good historical grounds to suggest that we are dealing with two different things, because they came about for different reasons. A quick glance at classic moments in the development of freedom of speech makes this clear. When Erasmus said ‘in a free state, tongues should be free’, he was giving a hypothetical example to show that not even the alleged tyrants of the Roman Empire would be so petty as to punish someone for speaking ill against them or their interests. When the 1689 Bill of Rights granted ‘freedom of speech’ for the English Parliament, this was to ensure the legislative body could ‘debate and pass resolutions freely on subjects of its own choosing’, against the background of the overthrow of the alleged absolutist James II. It was about checks and balances on constitutional power, not limitless free expression. Similarly, the crafting of the first amendment of the US Bill of Rights was about reassuring anti-federalists against the possible absolutism of the federalist agenda. Even Voltaire’s oft-repeated (but perhaps apocryphal): ‘I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it’, was about a book being burned for philosophical sentiments which the authorities thought could lead to atheism, not about permitting anyone to cause offence per se.</p><p>The contexts of the above examples show that freedom of speech has a very different genealogy to hate speech. Hate speech is not really about the centuries-old tension between state power and the freedom of citizens. Hate speech is not about designing legal frameworks for preventing a concentration of state power over the people, but about either protecting individuals from harassment, or, more controversially, protecting individuals and groups from sentiments deemed offensive or threatening. In the latter case, language designed to safeguard sectors of society from state absolutism (‘protection’ and ‘freedom’ etc) has been transposed into the ambiguous world of human emotion and perception. It thus provides a legal framework for policing the checks and balances on such intangible stuff as anxiety, fear, resentment, dislikes, insult, and even, at worst, hurt-feelings.</p><p>Freedom of speech and hate speech now find themselves like a couple locked in a custody battle over the public square, but who barely knew each other before they entered the divorce courts. We must ask how the transposition of one into the other has come about. It seems fair to suggest that public discourse was once relatively self-policing in democratic societies, and that the linking of legality and coercion with human emotion and perception is to some extent new. So why has society’s ability to self-govern its speech started to break down?</p><p>One clue is given by returning to the 21st Century’s very own Nosferatu: Count Dankula. His video was widely condemned for being in ‘poor’ or ‘bad’ taste, and often by <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/film/count-dankula-s-nazi-pooch-another-tedious-post-from-the-edges-of-taste-1.3436673">those</a> who argued that the it wasn’t a criminal matter. Indeed, some commented that the Count Dankula case was so worrying, precisely because it <a href="https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2018/04/count-dankula-and-the-death-of-free-speech/">shows</a> the state becoming the arbiter of <em>taste</em>. Anyone who studies the clothes or the music tastes of British front bench politicians will soon realise that state arbitration over taste would be a very bad thing indeed. But, looking at matters more deeply, it can be argued that taste is, in a way, something which innately arbitrates in and of itself.</p><p>Taste is a discriminatory and selective power, by which humans define phenomena as ‘pleasing’ or ‘displeasing’. Collectively, societies define phenomena as pleasing or displeasing on the basis of things inextricable from culture: from ideals and shared meanings. Nearly everyone will agree that the state should not the arbiter of taste, but we might still ask why ‘taste’ is not functioning to enable the sort of non-coercive, self-governing, ‘quality control’ over the public square that it once did. To answer this, we can give some attention to changes in the cultural ideals and meanings on which the function of taste depend.</p><p>Ideals</p><p>In the first place, the last 125-years or so have seen huge changes in how culture itself is understood. This means seismic transformations in the values by which societies live. Many of today’s academics define culture as widely as possible. It includes almost everything human beings do: language, mannerisms, dress, media, art, customs, politics etc. There’s much to be said for this now dominant approach, but studying the history of the term shows this is a hugely significant change.</p><p>‘Culture’ was originally an agricultural term, meaning ‘a piece of land to be cultivated’, or <em>cultura </em>in Latin.<em> </em>Only in the late 18th Century did it become something about human affairs. The timing of this is important. Culture became a ‘thing’ because the old arbiters of morality were losing their place. Before then, culture was synonymous with religion. Study the paintings in the National Gallery, and you’ll see how little art was non-religious before the Renaissance and Enlightenment.</p><p>Culture was about defining and maintaining the values of a society where the traditional authority had been dethroned. Culture was intertwined with morality: with decency, right conduct, ideals and goals. Hence the agricultural metaphor. It was about human flourishing and flowering, about human growth. Culture was meant to cultivate the best in people, to edify. It had as its end nothing less than human perfection, as put by Matthew Arnold: ‘Culture is properly described as the love of perfection’</p><p>This will no doubt seem alien to most people today. The shockwaves of the tectonic shift between then and now are most intense with the First World War. The confidence in the self-understanding of European cultures and their sense of human perfectibility were gravely shattered by the mechanised mass-killing of the trenches. Around this time, radically and deliberately transgressive forms of cultural expression grew in their provenance. The paradigmatic statement then became Ezra Pound’s ‘make it new!’, in sharp contrast to Arnold’s claim that culture is ‘the best which has been thought and said’ by our predecessors. Culture was now about exposing the chimera of the old morality, to find something more genuine underneath it.</p><p>It was then just a few years before T.S.Eliot defined culture as ‘all the characteristic activities and interests of a people’, including, ‘the dart board, wensleydale cheese, boiled cabbage cut into sections [and] beetroot in vinegar’. The same logic can be seen recently from Robert Winder, who claims English culture is about ‘tea, beef, gardening, beer, curry, cricket [and] Shakespeare’. But if culture includes anything and everything, it is no longer linked with ideals to be striven for. Stripped of ideals, what is ‘pleasing’ becomes what merely entertains. We then find ourselves in a world where pornography is more readily available than the latest film, as is footage of every other imaginable activity on YouTube. But what entertains is not necessarily pleasing in the sense of being ‘in good taste’, and thus a vital self-governing facet of society has lost sway through losing its basis in ideals. Moreover, what is most entertaining is often that which is ‘in bad taste’, and sometimes, in the worst imaginable taste.</p><p>Meaning</p><p>The conviction that culture should cultivate the best in people has changed, into an approach to culture which is at best morally ambivalent (like tea or Wensleydale), or at worst, something which mistakes effect for profundity.</p><p>With a breakdown in ideals comes an inability to discern what makes things meaningful. Cultural theorists, most famously Hans Georg Gadamer, defined meaning situating parts in relation to a whole. The terminology comes from the interpretation of written texts. We discern what a part of a story means by situating it relation to the whole. Mr Darcy’s proposal in <em>Pride and Prejudice</em> is meaningful because the whole novel seems to lead to it, which in turn tells us a great deal about what the book means. The most memorable encounters with ‘meaning’ happen when one can understand something in relation to the whole of one’s own life. This is why meeting the person who becomes your spouse for life is so much more meaningful than meeting someone who asks for directions in the street.</p><p>But it is precisely the ‘whole’ of collective self-understanding that is so difficult for Western societies to grasp today. Again, religion once had this job. Then, perhaps, cultural ideals, science, and the developing nation state. For many 20th Century academics, the Marxist view of history provided the overarching schema for collective self-understanding which defined what was meaningful. But these have all been questioned, and this — in essence — is what early postmodernism sought to define, with Jean-François Lyotard’s ‘collapse of grand narratives’.</p><p>A grand narrative provides a ‘whole’ — it provides a framework for discerning meaning. It is no conincidence that a thinker from the same thought-world as early postmodernism, Guy Debord, coined the phrase: ‘the society of the spectacle’. A society without some overarching sense of direction and ultimate purpose can no longer define what constitutes things as meaningful, and then the ‘impact’ of meaningfulness (profundity) is replaced with mere effect, with spectacle, or ‘shock and awe’.</p><p>This brings us back once again to Count Dankula. The 18th Century philosopher Edmund Burke, tried to understand why it is that people are attracted to apparently unpleasant (‘terrifying’) things. He argued that the human apprehension of things which are in and of themselves unpleasant, provokes the instinct for self-preservation. We thus undergo an intensification of experience (a sense of ‘triumph’) when we behold ‘terrible’ things without genuine ‘danger’. Burke did not mean transgressive cultural expressions, he was no Marquis de Sade. But mentioning his writing here highlights that, even in an 18th Century context, there was an attempt to tether the challenging and counter-intuitive in a broader narrative, in this case, human yearning for longevity and endurance.</p><p>Now many will no doubt balk at the culturally pessimistic position being outlined here. This is perfectly understandable, because so many of us today <em>do</em> live meaningful lives with noble sets of ideals. But the problem is that these ideals and meanings are not shared with our fellow citizens. Deep cultural plurality means that peoples with different values live alongside each other. The British government have acknowledged that this is problematic and tried to respond to it, however clumsily and ineffectively, by defining certain ‘British values’. There is also the ever-growing prevalence of today’s ‘culture wars’. The fact the differences at stake are termed in language of culture shows the all-encompassing degree of difference between the warring allegiances at play.</p><p>John Stuart Mill’s classic essay <em>On Liberty</em> includes a classic statement of freedom of speech. He writes that ‘the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is’ to rob ‘the human race’. If the expression is something ‘right’, people are robbed ‘of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth’. If ‘wrong’, says Mill, they are robbed of ‘the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth’ provided by the contrast. But, as John Gray has recently <a href="https://www.the-tls.co.uk/articles/public/john-gray-hyper-liberalism-liberty/">pointed out</a>, this presupposes at least the shared commitment to truth as value which is good in itself. Those on the left who have criticised the Count Dankula prosecution <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/mar/25/being-offensive-should-not-be-illegal-in-society-that-defends-free-speech">tend</a> to use pluralism as their reasoning. In a plural society, we can rarely define what is ‘pleasing’ or ‘displeasing’ with widespread consensus.</p><p>Gray argues that there is an apparent contradiction in Mill’s <em>On Liberty</em>, for Mill defines freedom as ‘a radical type of personal autonomy — the ability to create an identity and a style of life for oneself without regard for public opinion or any external authority’. Public opinion was once closely related to the proper functioning of taste. Mill’s freedom of speech requires shared identity and commitments between people living alongside each other, and yet mandates the limitless self-expression which threatens to make this extremely difficult to maintain. Similarly, today’s debates are those of policing speech after taste has ceased to function effectively, without a sense of cohesive common goods.</p><p>The solutions to such vast problems seem to be beyond our reach at present. Highlighting the shifts which have led to us entering this post-taste era, however, would suggest that rather than simply decrying a descent into Orwellian tyranny, we should discern and interrogate the values by which we live. Freedom in and of itself can mean all manner of things. Maybe we should use our freedom to improve the quality and the calibre of what we say.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=52a31c0d2cdd" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>