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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Mostefa Jakboub on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Mostefa Jakboub on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@jakboubmostefa?source=rss-7c486c853b5------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Mostefa Jakboub on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[SharePoint ToolShell: The Most sophisticated Enterprise hack of 2025]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jakboubmostefa/sharepoint-toolshell-the-most-sophisticated-enterprise-breach-of-2025-7acb4bf71222?source=rss-7c486c853b5------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[security-breach]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mostefa Jakboub]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 26 Jul 2025 03:24:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-26T03:25:49.984Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By Mostefa Jakboub | Threat Hunter &amp; Security Researcher</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nzMXZ6amzMAMpnD43VUMoA.png" /></figure><h3>Introduction</h3><p>The cyber threat landscape just got uglier. In what is shaping up to be the <strong>most sophisticated zero-day campaign against enterprise infrastructure in 2025</strong>, a new exploit chain targeting <strong>on-prem Microsoft SharePoint servers</strong> has surfaced. The campaign — dubbed <strong>ToolShell</strong> by Microsoft — is more than just another RCE. It’s a strategic assault by advanced threat actors, leveraging deep knowledge of internal SharePoint mechanics to gain <strong>unauthenticated remote code execution</strong> and establish long-term persistence.</p><p>After reading through Microsoft’s disclosures, diving into threat intelligence reports, and filtering signal from noise, here’s what I, as a threat hunter and malware analyst, believe we’re really dealing with — and why this incident may have opened the floodgates for lateral movement and ransomware deployment at scale.</p><h3>What We Know: The Exploit Chain</h3><p>ToolShell is a <strong>multi-stage exploitation chain</strong> that began as far back as <strong>July 7, 2025</strong>, with exploitation peaking around <strong>July 18–19</strong>. The original chain was based on:</p><p><strong>CVE-2025–49704</strong> — Remote Code Execution in SharePoint</p><p><strong>CVE-2025–49706</strong> — Spoofing vulnerability used for privilege escalation</p><p>Those two were quickly bypassed by a new set of zero-days:</p><p><strong>CVE-2025–53770</strong> — The big one. An <strong>unauthenticated RCE</strong> bypass for CVE-49704.</p><p><strong>CVE-2025–53771</strong> — A new spoofing bypass for CVE-49706.</p><p>According to Microsoft, these vulnerabilities allowed attackers to <strong>create forged access tokens</strong>, deploy <strong>web shells</strong>, and <strong>extract MachineKey values</strong> from the server. The MachineKey access implies <strong>the ability to sign or decrypt session tokens and cookies</strong>, meaning complete trust impersonation.</p><p>This is not the usual scan-exploit-dump loop. This was a <strong>surgical killchain</strong>, likely deployed through automation in the early stages, and then followed by <strong>manual post-exploitation</strong>, including credential harvesting and lateral movement.</p><h3>Scope: Who Got Hit?</h3><p>At the time of writing, confirmed victim organizations exceed <strong>400 globally</strong>, including:</p><ul><li>U.S. <strong>energy providers</strong></li><li><strong>Universities</strong> in Europe and Asia</li><li>A <strong>major telecom operator</strong></li><li>The <strong>U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)</strong>, according to Bloomberg</li></ul><p>While Microsoft has not officially tied the exploitation to a specific nation-state, they did attribute the activity to three China-aligned groups:</p><ul><li><strong>Storm-2603</strong></li><li><strong>Linen Typhoon</strong></li><li><strong>Violet Typhoon</strong></li></ul><p>Storm-2603 is particularly interesting, as it’s been tied to <strong>Warlock ransomware deployments</strong> in follow-up phases. That connection is important — it hints at a new reality: <strong>ransomware operators and state-sponsored actors may be merging playbooks</strong> or working from a shared toolkit base.</p><h3>Initial Access: The ToolPane Smoking Gun</h3><p>One standout artifact in this campaign is the consistent use of:</p><pre>_layouts/ToolPane.aspx</pre><p>Attackers exploited this endpoint to deliver payloads and drop web shells — very likely by abusing deserialization or token injection weaknesses. This alone tells us a lot: these actors are <strong>well-versed in SharePoint internals</strong>, including deprecated features and legacy .NET behaviors.</p><p>If you’re doing threat hunting or IR, filter your logs for any POST or GET activity on ToolPane.aspx between <strong>July 7 and July 21</strong>, especially from unauthenticated sessions or suspicious IPs.</p><h3>Speculation: Where This Is Likely Headed</h3><p>As someone who’s spent a fair amount of time studying post-exploit behavior in APT campaigns, here’s what I believe:</p><p><strong>1.MachineKey extraction was not just about SharePoint abuse</strong> — attackers likely moved on to sign their own cookies for <strong>OWA (Outlook Web Access)</strong> and other web apps running on the same machine. Once you have MachineKey, you’re <strong>root inside every .NET-based app</strong>.</p><p><strong>2.Persistence was baked into the initial payload</strong> — not just web shells, but possible memory-resident implants or scheduled task chains that re-enable exploitation even after patching.</p><p><strong>3.Patch != Clean</strong> — Admins who only applied the July 20–21 SharePoint patches may be sitting on <strong>already-compromised infrastructure</strong>. Without rotating the MachineKey and cleaning all dropped artifacts, they’re still owned.</p><p><strong>4.</strong>This was <strong>not opportunistic</strong>. The fact that the exploit was used for weeks without public detection tells me it was <strong>kept tight in private exploit kits</strong>, likely used only against high-value targets — until it blew up.</p><h3>Why This Hack Matters</h3><p>ToolShell represents a <strong>shift in offensive posture</strong> by state actors: not just stealing secrets, but pre-positioning themselves inside enterprise infrastructure for <strong>multi-use access</strong> — espionage, ransomware, supply chain disruption.</p><p>And it’s not just about SharePoint. This attack proves once again how <strong>legacy enterprise software continues to be the weakest link</strong> in modern environments. While cloud platforms get most of the security updates, many orgs are still running <strong>10-year-old SharePoint servers with default configs</strong>. That’s unacceptable in 2025.</p><p>This isn’t just a patching problem. It’s a mindset problem. If you’re still thinking of SharePoint as just a document repo, wake up — it’s <strong>an identity platform, an execution platform, and now an attack surface</strong>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7acb4bf71222" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Write up : Business Logic Flaw in Payment Discount Calculation Allows Excessive Discount…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jakboubmostefa/write-up-business-logic-flaw-in-payment-discount-calculation-allows-excessive-discount-19d567f5da18?source=rss-7c486c853b5------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[vulnerability]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mostefa Jakboub]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 18 Sep 2024 00:23:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-09-22T17:34:56.641Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Write up : Business Logic Flaw in Payment Discount Calculation Allows Excessive Discount Exploitation</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*A3HrJDal4R_3H_43u4x3YQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Platform: private program <br>Severity: Medium<br>Reward: €450<br>Bug Type: Business Logic Flaw</p><p><em>Company name and screenshots will not be disclosed , because its a private program “obviously “.</em></p><p><strong>Description:<br></strong>While Hunting and staying up night to get lucky through a private program, I came across a bug in the discount calculation mechanism in regard to the payment of users. In this bug, users will be in a position to receive an extra discount while purchasing items. Which can lead to some financial loss for the company and benefit malicious users by unfair means.<br>The company uses a system to provide discounts to the customers upon meeting certain criteria; this can include using a promotion code, customer loyalty points, among others. In any case, I could always bypass the application logic and stack discounts over and above the limits set by the designers.</p><p><strong>How to Reproduce …</strong></p><p><strong>Initial Purchase</strong>: Log in into my account on the website of the company and add several items in the shopping cart, amounting to €200.</p><p><strong>Apply Discount Code</strong>: I applied a valid 20% discount code provided by the company for some promotional activity. The expected total price was indeed reflected at €160.</p><p><strong>Business Logic Manipulation</strong>: The application did not check for the proper stacking of multiple discounts with the use of the discount feature. Therefore, I was able to get an larger discount than expected by doing the following steps:</p><p>I added another discount code, which was actually to be given to only a certain category- “Books Only — 15% Off”.<br>The application gave this discount on the whole order, not on the category it was supposed to be given to, resulting in the total of €136 instead of €160–15%.</p><p><strong>Bypass Checkout Validations</strong>: Further testing showed that, by directly manipulating the discount field in the client-side payload sent to the server, using browser developer tools, I can inject multiple discount codes simultaneously. The server did not appropriately validate these changes and recalculated the total price down to an excessively low amount.</p><p><strong>Final Payment</strong>: I used many discounts and went to checkout. The final price, however, was € 90 whereas it should have been € 160.</p><p><strong>Expected Behaviour<br></strong>The system should not allow more than one code per transaction or at least check that the combined discounts will not exceed a certain limit predefined. Also, category-specific discounts should apply to only the eligible items in the cart.<br><strong>Actual Behaviour<br></strong>Because of the lack of server-side validation, it is possible to stack more than the intended number of discounts via the application. Also, category-wide discounts are applied wrongly to the ‘entire cart’.<br><strong>Potential Impact</strong><br>An attacker could use an exploit to obtain merchandise at considerably lower prices. This may lead to loss of revenue for the company. If the flaw were to be automated for bulk purchases, it could lead to even greater financial damage.</p><p>TIME TO CASH OUT!!!</p><p><strong>Recommendations</strong><br>Add server-side validation to ensure:</p><p><strong><em>Only one coupon code can be utilized per transaction!!!!!</em></strong><em><br></em>Category-specific discounts will only apply to the items that are included in that category.<br>The maximum discount cannot exceed a certain percentage threshold value.</p><p>Validate the input data at the beginning to prevent malicious usages of coupon code at the client side.</p><p>Do logging in server side for suspicious tries about coupon stacking.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=19d567f5da18" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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