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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by James Renton on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Ozymandias at Old Trafford]]></title>
            <link>https://jamesrenton10.medium.com/ozymandias-at-old-trafford-516b07b05a9c?source=rss-83c6fb7c1865------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[football]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[manchester-united]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[premier-league]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[James Renton]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 14 Nov 2026 05:40:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-14T05:40:45.555Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*h0bJ-VSC9_IGze8o" /></figure><blockquote>“Look on my Works, ye Mighty, and despair!”</blockquote><p>Percy Bysshe Shelley’s poem <em>Ozymandias</em> (1818) describes a traveller encountering the remains of an enormous statue in the desert. Once a monument to a supposedly mighty ruler, its pedestal bears an inscription that proudly proclaims his greatness. Yet the irony is that nothing remains of the empire the statue was built to commemorate.</p><p>The statue is broken, its face fractured, and the surrounding landscape is nothing but endless desert. Shelley’s poem speaks to the impermanence of power, the arrogance of rulers and the inevitable decline of even the most seemingly indestructible empires.</p><p>There is an obvious historical parallel between Ozymandias and Manchester United in the years following Sir Alex Ferguson’s retirement. For decades, the club operated from a position of extraordinary institutional strength, with its commercial power, global following and reputation underpinned by an era of sustained sporting success.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*AEQ9EXq4QQPZ209K.jpg" /></figure><p>Yet, look at where things stand today. United continue to operate with the expectations, financial resources and historical prestige of one of the world’s biggest football clubs, but have repeatedly struggled to establish the sporting foundations necessary to sustain that position. There is something rather poignant about that.</p><p>The club has spent the better part of 13 years attempting to reclaim the status of an institution it once was, without consistently addressing the reasons it stopped being one.</p><p>A few days ago, Manchester United parted ways with yet another head coach, this time Michael Carrick. It was death by a thousand paper cuts for the former United midfielder, who was left to maintain a public façade of normality while the club seemingly spent weeks deliberating over a decision that was inevitable.</p><p>Carrick’s departure had become increasingly difficult to ignore throughout the week, particularly after reports emerged on Monday that his successor, Mauricio Pochettino, was being lined up to take over at Old Trafford. As Nick Miller wrote in <em>The Athletic</em>, Carrick, “like a good company man, is expected to carry on as if nothing is happening, because United are faffing.”</p><p>Whether fans believed Carrick was the man to lead the club towards future success, or whether United should have made the decision not to appoint him permanently in the first place, is almost a secondary consideration. The more concerning question concerns the manner in which the club has handled the situation, and what it says about the people responsible for overseeing its footballing operations.</p><p>Where is the trust in INEOS, particularly Sir Jim Ratcliffe, Omar Berrada and Jason Wilcox, to execute a process that is not only decisive but respectful towards all parties?</p><p>Miller’s reporting was particularly effective in capturing the almost farcical nature of the situation, observing that it appeared everyone needed to “solemnly gather in the same physical space, at a leisurely time convenient to… someone… for it to be confirmed.”</p><p>It is an extraordinary way for a club of Manchester United’s stature to conduct its business, particularly when the uncertainty surrounding Carrick’s position was allowed to linger for so long.</p><p>With Carrick’s departure confirmed, United have since officially confirmed the appointment of Mauricio Pochettino, who will oversee the United States national team’s final two games against Haiti before heading to Old Trafford. There is an oft-repeated cliché in football that timing is everything, and it is difficult not to consider whether United have missed the train when it comes to the Argentine.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*OwaK6yssKf0-Vj01.jpg" /></figure><p>His name has been associated with the Old Trafford vacancy for several years, particularly following his spell at Tottenham Hotspur. Yet, after exploring other managerial avenues, it has now been revealed that while the INEOS component of the club hierarchy favoured Eddie Howe, it was the Glazer family who stepped in and sought out Pochettino, with Sir Jim et al. falling in line.</p><p>Whether Pochettino represents the right appointment is an entirely legitimate debate. But the circumstances surrounding his potential arrival are perhaps more revealing than the appointment itself.</p><p>“This is Manchester United, the club that somehow always manages to get things wrong.”</p><p>Another particularly telling observation from Nick Miller, and one that perhaps captures the prevailing mood among a supporter base that has become increasingly accustomed to disappointment. A managerial appointment that should ordinarily generate a degree of excitement and optimism is instead being met with something approaching indifference.</p><p>That, in itself, is quite an indictment of the institution.</p><p>In 2024, United co-owner Sir Jim Ratcliffe outlined what appeared to be a relatively straightforward philosophy for the club’s footballing operation:</p><p>“We’re not going to oscillate from a (Jose) Mourinho style to a (Pep) Guardiola style. That’s not the way we’ll run the club… We’ll decide that [that] playing style… In modern football, you need to decide what’s your path and stick to your path.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*KZX0JEImClfXMDXC" /></figure><p>With the benefit of hindsight, those comments have aged rather poorly. The decision-making of Ratcliffe and his footballing hierarchy has reflected anything but the consistency he promised, with the club’s managerial appointments seemingly contradicting the very principles he outlined.</p><p>Consider the transition from Carrick to Pochettino, where there are clear differences in the demands placed upon players, particularly from a physical standpoint.</p><p>Pochettino has historically built his teams around an aggressive, high-intensity approach, with a considerable emphasis on pressing, direct attacks and the physical capacity to sustain those demands. Carrick, by contrast, appeared to favour a less physically demanding approach during his tenure.</p><p>The now-infamous exchange between Rio Ferdinand and Youri Tielemans, in which Ferdinand asked the Belgian whether there was “lots of running” under Carrick, only to receive a rather relaxed “no” in response, offered an amusing insight into those differences.</p><p>But the broader question is considerably more serious. If Manchester United are genuinely committed to establishing a recognisable footballing identity, how does the appointment of Pochettino advance that objective? What are the principles that will remain consistent, regardless of who occupies the managerial position?</p><p>Because if every new appointment represents a fundamental shift in the club’s footballing direction, it becomes increasingly difficult to argue that United have any meaningful direction at all.</p><p>There is little doubt that Pochettino has long been interested in the prospect of managing Manchester United. He arrives at a time when the club appears increasingly uncertain of its direction, both on and off the pitch, and is arguably in greater need of a reset than at any point in recent memory.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*R7BGWDwSuPmHg7L7" /></figure><p>In terms of what to expect tactically, I watched an interesting breakdown by Harrison (who goes by HTO on Twitter) on The Overlap, which explored the evolution of Pochettino’s approach over the past few years, particularly when compared to his time at Tottenham.</p><p>During his five years in north London, Pochettino built a side renowned for its intensity, aggression and verticality. Tottenham’s approach was underpinned by an extraordinary physical output, with heavy pressing, counter-pressing and an emphasis on winning the ball back quickly before attacking space. Narrow wingers were complemented by particularly aggressive fullbacks, who provided width and made frequent overlapping runs. It was a style that demanded considerable physical commitment, but also created a side with a clear collective identity.</p><p>His subsequent spell at Chelsea, however, suggested an attempt to introduce a more controlled, possession-oriented approach. There was a greater emphasis on patient build-up, central combinations and longer periods of possession, with the intention of giving his side greater control over the rhythm of games. The execution was often inconsistent, though, with questionable player profiling and an imbalanced squad contributing to some of the structural problems that emerged.</p><p>More recently, his work with the US men’s national team has offered perhaps the clearest indication of how his ideas have developed. Rather than abandoning the principles that underpinned his success at Tottenham, Pochettino appears to have found a more convincing way of combining them with some of the possession-based concepts he experimented with at Chelsea. The result is a side that retains its aggression out of possession while incorporating more sophisticated possession structures, positional rotations and coordinated movements ahead of the ball.</p><p>This is where the intrigue lies. One of the more interesting aspects of his work with the USA has been the use of counter-movements, with players constantly adjusting their positioning to create space for teammates and disrupt the opposition’s defensive structure. Rather than simply occupying predetermined positions, there is a greater emphasis on movement and the relationships between players. It represents a notable contrast to what we’ve seen from United in recent times, where possession has too often become static, with a lack of movement ahead of the ball limiting their ability to progress through opposition defensive lines.</p><p>So, how might that translate to the squad Pochettino would inherit at Old Trafford?</p><p>There will inevitably be some adjustments required, particularly in terms of the personnel available to implement his preferred approach. His willingness to use aggressive fullbacks to provide attacking width could be particularly beneficial to United’s forward line, allowing players such as Matheus Cunha and Bryan Mbeumo to move into more central areas, where they are arguably better suited to operating. The likes of Patrick Dorgu and Diogo Dalot could consequently be entrusted with greater attacking responsibility, providing the overlapping and underlapping runs that create space for those ahead of them.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*-mO3MzP-80bZGADZ.png" /></figure><p>That approach, however, comes with its own set of challenges. The more aggressively the fullbacks advance, the greater the responsibility on the midfield and defensive line to provide adequate cover when possession is lost. United have hardly been convincing defensively in recent seasons, and Pochettino’s willingness to commit numbers forward could expose some of the existing weaknesses in the squad. His success will therefore depend not simply on improving the team’s attacking output, but on establishing the collective organisation necessary to make that aggression sustainable.</p><p>Beyond the tactical considerations, there is also the question of what Pochettino might bring to the club culturally. One of his defining characteristics has been his ability to establish a strong collective identity and generate buy-in from his players. Speaking about his approach with the US national team, he described culture as a fundamental component of success, arguing that: “The quality of coaching, strategy, game plan, and tactics are secondary to culture… Without the right culture, energy, trust, and confidence, it is impossible for the team to play well.”</p><p>That is perhaps just as important as anything he might introduce on the pitch. United need a manager capable of establishing standards, creating a sense of collective responsibility and getting the dressing room moving in the same direction. Pochettino’s personality and approach to man-management could provide a much-needed starting point.</p><p>There are certainly reasons to be optimistic about what Pochettino could bring to Manchester United. His ability to improve the physical standards of a team, develop attacking players and establish a recognisable collective identity are all qualities that have been demonstrated throughout his managerial career. More importantly, his recent work suggests a willingness to evolve tactically, rather than remain wedded to the methods that brought him success at Tottenham.</p><p>But none of that should absolve Manchester United of the responsibility that comes with making this appointment.</p><p>Pochettino cannot be expected to resolve the club’s recruitment shortcomings, establish a coherent footballing structure and repair the relationship between its supporters and ownership, all while trying to build a competitive team. Those responsibilities extend well beyond the manager’s remit, and they are precisely the areas in which United have repeatedly fallen short.</p><p>There is a difference between appointing a manager who can improve a football team and building a football club capable of sustaining that improvement. United have spent much of the last decade confusing the two.</p><p>Perhaps Pochettino can provide the energy, personality and footballing direction that the club has so desperately lacked. Perhaps his ideas can bring the best out of a squad that, at times, has looked considerably less than the sum of its parts.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*XcSK8ZHliq9yVOgL.jpg" /></figure><p>But the real test of this appointment will not simply be whether United win football matches. It will be whether the people responsible for running the club finally provide a manager with the structure, clarity and support necessary to build something lasting.</p><p>Manchester United have spent long enough attempting to recapture the institution they once were. The appointment of another manager, however exciting or promising, will mean very little if the institution itself remains unchanged.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=516b07b05a9c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Jekyll & Hyde]]></title>
            <link>https://jamesrenton10.medium.com/jekyll-hyde-53df75da150c?source=rss-83c6fb7c1865------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/53df75da150c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[tactical-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[a-league]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[perth-glory]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[James Renton]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 23:53:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-31T22:37:10.254Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4IITrAqJkIqUctwCrk1Xsw.png" /></figure><p>Sunday’s clash against Adelaide United at HBF Park will offer no place to hide for Perth Glory. But, in a more positive sense, it also presents an opportunity for Adam Griffiths’ side to kick-start their season.</p><p>Yes, we’re only two games in, and it is still very early days. That caveat must be stressed from the outset.</p><p>The first two games Perth have played this season, both away from home against Macarthur and Brisbane Roar, offered some contrasting takeaways.</p><p>Against Macarthur, there were encouraging signs. For the first hour or so of general play, the Glory were largely the side in control. While they struggled to translate their territorial advantage into consistent attacking incision, it was hardly a surprise when they eventually took the lead in the second half, courtesy of Tom Lawrence’s well-placed strike from outside the box.</p><p>It would not be reductive to then suggest that Perth Glory lost the game in the space of the final five minutes. A contentious penalty decision was awarded (twice) against Calem Nieuwenhof and subsequently Cher Deng, following an encroachment infringement, before a peach of a delivery from Ryan Fraser’s free kick was met uncontested by Jonathan Aspropotamitis.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*R9EnaAKAaIvY3nKc.jpg" /></figure><p>On the flipside, the trip to Queensland offered considerably less encouragement, particularly in the first half. Adam Griffiths summed up his side’s performance rather bluntly after the game:</p><blockquote>“The first half wasn’t good enough. We were terrible with the ball. We weren’t connecting passes. We weren’t confident, we weren’t brave.”</blockquote><p>Keep that quote in mind as we turn our attention to Round 3, with the Glory returning to HBF Park for the first time this season on Sunday. Before looking ahead to Adelaide, it is worth examining how the side has performed thus far, both statistically and tactically.</p><p>Off the bat, Perth Glory’s underlying numbers are more encouraging than their results. However, they also expose a fairly clear problem with how the team progresses the ball and deals with certain attacking situations.</p><p>That is not to suggest the alarm bells should be ringing, despite Perth’s current position of 12th. Nevertheless, there are legitimate questions to be asked about the team’s current approach.</p><p>Firstly, the Glory’s underlying performances have arguably been better than their actual results suggest. According to FotMob, their underlying data indicates they should be sitting 10th, with two points on the board, while Ben Griffis’ xPts model, which combines Opta’s data with his own modelling, places them slightly higher in seventh, with an expected points total of 2.66.</p><p>Perth Glory’s overall expected goal difference (xGD) of -0.23 (7th) is relatively encouraging. More tellingly, their Pts-xPts differential of -1.33 (11th) supports the argument that their results have not necessarily reflected the underlying performances.</p><p>However, two games represent an extremely small sample, and expected points are not a guarantee of what a team should have collected. Nor do they tell us whether the underlying processes are sustainable.</p><p>The more significant concern lies in the relationship between the quality of the Glory’s chances and the volume of attacking opportunities they are generating. Consider the following data, courtesy of Opta and Ben Griffis:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*oLVjE_9zFi1hpmy9aWDoNA.png" /><figcaption>Perth Glory’s 2026–27 attacking data (courtesy of Opta/Ben Griffis)</figcaption></figure><p>At first glance, the numbers make for fairly uncomfortable reading. They reinforce concerns courtesy of the eye test surrounding Perth’s attacking play to start the season, particularly the team’s difficulty in consistently generating dangerous attacking situations.</p><p>Their relatively low rankings for both field tilt and passes in the opposition half suggest that not only are Perth Glory spending a comparatively small proportion of possession in advanced areas, but they’re also struggling to establish sustained possession higher up the pitch in the first place.</p><p>Meanwhile, their rankings for passes into the box and expected threat (xT) indicate that the Glory are getting the ball into dangerous areas relatively infrequently, with their attacking actions generating the lowest expected threat in the competition.</p><p>There is, however, an interesting contradiction.</p><p>Despite their lack of attacking volume, Perth currently boast the league’s best open-play xG per shot. That is perhaps unsurprising given the quality of some of the opportunities they have created, and subsequently failed to convert.</p><p>Against Macarthur, Sebastian Despotovski’s mis-hit in the first half, Lachie Jackson’s header cleared off the line and Pieter Jacobsz’s volley that flashed narrowly past the post all spring to mind.</p><p>Against Brisbane, Jacobsz unfortunately passed up a gilt-edged opportunity from a promising position in the first half, while Stefan Colakovski’s missed one-on-one against young goalkeeper George Plusnin was another notable example.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*bxwc4HoglajwXWPg" /></figure><p>These are not insignificant opportunities. Indeed, the Glory’s ability to create some genuinely high-quality chances is reflected in their equal-third ranking for big chances.</p><p>The problem, however, is that these opportunities are relatively few and far between.</p><p>Perth Glory are capable of creating the occasional excellent chance, but teams can rarely sustain themselves indefinitely on a handful of high-quality opportunities. When a team’s attacking volume is already limited, any fluctuation in finishing or chance creation becomes considerably more consequential.</p><p>In other words, the issue isn’t necessarily that Perth cannot create chances. It’s that they aren’t creating enough of them.</p><p>So, why is that?</p><p>Part of the answer lies in the game plan. The other part comes down to player execution, decision-making and off-ball movement.</p><p>Against Macarthur, there were several occasions, particularly in the first half, when the Glory enjoyed more of the ball but could have been considerably more aggressive. Whether through more ambitious passing or better-timed forward runs, there were opportunities to exploit the spaces available to them.</p><p>Perth Glory are an inherently vertical team, currently ranked third in the competition for vertical tendency. That is hardly surprising given Griffiths’ stated preference for this style of football.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*6E-WYwH1dwluA0O2.jpg" /></figure><p>At times, that verticality manifests itself through direct balls forward. Increasingly, however, the Glory have looked to utilise the ball-playing capabilities of Cher Deng and Lachie Jackson to break opposition lines and progress possession through the thirds.</p><p>But vertical football requires more than simply playing forward. It demands quick combinations, intelligent movement and a willingness to recognise and exploit opportunities before they disappear.</p><p>There was an early moment in the first half against Macarthur when Will Freney received the ball facing forward, with an opportunity to attack the opposition. For a team looking to play with such vertical intent, there appeared to be scope for some quick combination play in a relatively tight area.</p><p>As the still below illustrates, there were potentially two options available: a pass out wide to Lawrence or a more aggressive line-breaking pass into Stefan Colakovski.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*f05LtQxpRjK2JGPFsRtwvA.png" /><figcaption>Will Freney with options either side of him, or more aggressively to Colakovski</figcaption></figure><p>Instead, the opportunity went unused, and the move eventually lost its momentum.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uYYugcsLFKHgtKNBr7wowA.png" /><figcaption>The move dissipates and Glory are left to recyle possession from a deeper area</figcaption></figure><p>A little later, Freney again received possession in a promising position in Macarthur’s half. He instinctively turned, seemingly anticipating a run in behind from Colakovski. However, the Glory winger remained relatively static near the touchline.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6roek4CZuwRCb8RsuuRDGg.png" /><figcaption>Freney, as he got his head up, would’ve been expecting a run in behind from Colakovski</figcaption></figure><p>Griffiths could actually be heard shouting for precisely the sort of forward movement that was missing.</p><p>Around the 37th minute, another opportunity presented itself. Colakovski had possession in a promising position in the opposition half, while Henry Hore had found an excellent position in the inside-right channel, with Tadi Kuzamba positioned a few metres ahead of him.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JMkCfjN_XxrTl99FyMLjmA.png" /><figcaption>Colakovski on the ball, with Henry Hore in a great position</figcaption></figure><p>The conditions were there for a potentially dangerous diagonal pass into Hore. However, Colakovski took too long to recognise the opportunity, allowing Macarthur to recover defensively and get numbers back behind the ball. By the time the pass could have been made, the opportunity had largely disappeared.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*T-_EK9tfBfUWrfNXwn2lmQ.png" /><figcaption>How quickly things change in a matter of seconds</figcaption></figure><p>These are relatively small moments in isolation, but they illustrate a broader issue.</p><p>The Glory had opportunities to exploit space against Macarthur, particularly when they had possession and the opposition were not yet fully organised defensively. Too often, however, those opportunities were missed through delayed decision-making, insufficient off-ball movement or a lack of conviction in possession.</p><p>For a side that wants to play vertically and attack with aggression, recognising those moments is just as important as having the technical ability to execute the pass itself.</p><p>Against Brisbane, however, some of the Glory’s shortcomings were more self-inflicted, stemming from both selection decisions and poor execution.</p><p>The Roar relentlessly targeted Andriano Lebib in the first half, with the defender playing out of position at left-back and looking particularly uncomfortable when passing and receiving on his left foot. While that was understandably a major talking point among supporters, there were broader concerns with Glory’s approach during the opening 45 minutes.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*3YA00ZRM_pKwdVEQ.jpg" /></figure><p>The intention was seemingly to exploit the space in behind Brisbane’s defensive line by finding the likes of Sam Sutton and Stefan Colakovski. However, the execution was rushed, predictable and largely devoid of any real sophistication.</p><p>Glory directed 65% of their attacks down the left-hand side, while their attempts to progress down the right were typically characterised by diagonal long balls towards Colakovski. The latter approach rarely, if ever, yielded any reward.</p><p>The numbers further illustrate the disparity between the two sides’ execution. Brisbane attempted 32 long balls, completing 53% of them, while Glory attempted 29, with an accuracy of just 17%.</p><p>The issue was not necessarily the decision to play long, but rather the frequency with which Glory resorted to it, and the circumstances in which they chose to do so. There was seemingly little appetite to test Brisbane’s high press through shorter combinations and controlled build-up, which was particularly surprising given the relatively technical midfield personnel available to Griffiths on the day.</p><p>One example came around the 11th minute, when Matt Sutton opted to play long despite there being an opportunity for Glory to attempt to build out from the back.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vwBTf85Uno91J-cc_elUew.png" /><figcaption>Matt Sutton going long, despite there being opportunities to bait Brisbane’s press high up</figcaption></figure><p>Instead, Sutton’s pass towards Jacobsz was comfortably intercepted by Milorad Stajić, with the move breaking down before Glory had even managed to progress into the opposition half.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YnXxtd7l9fasXQQ0m5pMfA.png" /><figcaption>Simple intervention for Stajić</figcaption></figure><p>A similar problem persisted after the interval. Glory looked to stretch Brisbane vertically by creating depth in behind, but there was little patience or variation in how they attempted to do so.</p><p>Consider Lachie Jackson’s position on the ball in the still below. The lack of variation in the movement ahead of him was striking. There were few players looking to drop towards the ball, occupy different vertical lines or attempt to disjoint Brisbane’s defensive structure.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JaeuQMyCpBk4XMmQGPsjLg.png" /><figcaption>Jackson on the ball, with no Glory players looking to drop — instead making runs in behind</figcaption></figure><p>With Glory’s attacking movement largely concentrated on threatening the space behind, Brisbane were afforded a relatively straightforward task: hold their defensive line, protect the space in behind and deal with the inevitable long ball.</p><p>The problems with progression became even more apparent later in the game, as Glory increasingly chased an equaliser. Their attacking players and full-backs frequently converged on the same horizontal line, with very little staggering between the different lines of attack.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8sNVL2o-Ma6w7nEJEg4J1w.png" /><figcaption>Tom Lawrence about to receive the ball, facing a static Glory frontline</figcaption></figure><p>Rather than stretching Brisbane’s defensive structure through a combination of depth, width and supporting movements, Glory often presented the Roar with a crowded and relatively predictable attacking picture.</p><p>In that sense, the Brisbane performance exposed another side to Glory’s attacking issues. It wasn’t simply a matter of failing to recognise opportunities in transition, as against Macarthur, but also an inability to constructively progress possession against an organised defensive structure.</p><p>Playing vertically can be an effective attacking philosophy, but verticality without variation, movement or patience quickly becomes predictable. Against Brisbane, Glory too often confused the two.</p><p>From a defensive standpoint, it’s been a mixed bag. However, there are enough encouraging signs to suggest this could provide a platform for Glory to build their season upon.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*33YGdQm2Idvef-1MaZdAjw.png" /><figcaption>Perth Glory’s 2026–27 A-League defensive data (courtesy of Opta/Ben Griffis)</figcaption></figure><p>What worked particularly well against Macarthur was Glory’s ability to press high, adopt a man-oriented approach and deny their opponents opportunities to progress into dangerous areas. Against Brisbane, however, things were considerably less convincing. The midfield was repeatedly pulled apart, individual errors compounded the problems, and a particularly difficult first half exposed some significant vulnerabilities in how Glory defended their own box.</p><p>Despite that, there is still room for Glory to be considerably more aggressive in their pressing, and, importantly, to generate more tangible outcomes from it.</p><p>Their average PPDA of 13.46 is by no means disastrous, but it is not quite at the level required if Griffiths wants to develop a side capable of dominating games and consistently controlling proceedings in the opposition half. At the conclusion of Round 2, Western Sydney Wanderers (8.56), Brisbane Roar (9.33) and Newcastle Jets (9.90) all boasted particularly impressive PPDA figures, with their aggressive approach also reflected in their ability to generate high regains.</p><p>That makes not only Sunday’s meeting with Adelaide United intriguing, but also the subsequent Round 4 clash against Newcastle, which will likewise take place at HBF Park.</p><p>Griffiths spoke ahead of the Adelaide fixture about his side’s desire to take the game to the Reds. At this early stage of the season, that is precisely what needs to be demonstrated. It’s one thing to talk about playing on the front foot; it’s another to consistently translate that ambition into performances on the pitch.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jYhevdtWqlgvbpdq_DxaTg.png" /></figure><p>Ultimately, however, the attacking side of the game remains the most glaring area in need of improvement.</p><p>More specifically, Glory need to do a considerably better job of establishing territory in the opposition half and generating a higher volume of quality chances. Eight shots per game, an expected threat (xT) of 0.27, field tilt of 41.78% and just 6.5 crosses per game collectively suggest a side that is struggling to consistently generate threatening attacking sequences.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=53df75da150c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Finals Or Bust]]></title>
            <link>https://jamesrenton10.medium.com/finals-or-bust-00830b9d3f58?source=rss-83c6fb7c1865------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/00830b9d3f58</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[perth-glory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[a-league]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[James Renton]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 08:21:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-28T08:21:09.241Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jWNP078DCR6HOtplodkdWQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Pressing. Physicality. An aggressive team playing in their half.</strong></p><p>Those comments from Adam Griffiths following Perth Glory’s 2–0 win against Adelaide United in Bunbury are, from a personal standpoint, exactly what I want to hear the team setting out to be ahead of what will be a crucial campaign for the Glory this season.</p><p>By no means is a pre-season result an indication of how a side will perform during the actual campaign. However, given last season’s pre-season efforts saw the Glory, against A-League opposition, lose all four games while conceding nine goals and scoring just twice, the last few weeks have represented a reasonably encouraging turnaround.</p><p>A 1–1 draw away against Melbourne City followed by Sunday’s 2–0 win against the Reds represents a positive start to the pre-season, but more importantly, it puts into sharp focus what will in many ways be this season’s defining question.</p><p><strong>Are the Glory finally ready to take that next step?</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CJGzizDOxAea_-u0x7Kkuw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Recruitment efforts suggest the club actively sought to reshape the squad to better fit the style of play Griffiths is looking to implement this season.</p><p>For fans who feel the squad is lacking recognised quality, particularly in attack, there is a valid argument to be made. Losing the likes of Adam Taggart and Lachie Wales is a blow, particularly given the goals and experience that left the squad with them.</p><p>What I can confirm, however, is that the club did attempt to replace those players while also adding players who fit the profiles Griffiths had requested. The issue, to a significant extent, was the current financial reality of the league.</p><p>With a hard cap of sorts effectively in place, combined with the financial demands associated with bringing foreign players to Australia, the lack of latitude available to not just Perth Glory but almost every A-League club left little room for manoeuvre when it came to attracting top-line talent.</p><p>While the Glory still have a visa spot available to use in the January transfer window, in recent weeks they have increasingly pursued something resembling a moneyball strategy, with the likes of Pieter Jacobsz, Sebastian Kukucka and Matt Ellis arriving from NPL or equivalent environments.</p><p><a href="https://jamesrenton10.medium.com/shifting-from-competing-to-controlling-6b6f13b7fcc4?source=user_profile_page---------5-------------83c6fb7c1865------------------------">I discussed the Glory’s initial transfer business a few months ago</a>, however, the signings that have been made since then deserve further consideration.</p><p>Lachlan Jackson and Cher Deng have been added to the Glory’s defensive stocks. Jackson, a proven performer in both the A-League and K-League, should add some steel to the backline while also providing a greater aerial presence.</p><p>Deng, on the other hand, impressed in the Lions’ Round of 32 cupset against the Glory earlier this year, and so far the feedback surrounding him has been encouraging. Quick, physical and aggressive, with a reasonable level of composure on the ball, he shapes as one of the more intriguing young players in the squad and could have a significant year ahead of him.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/810/0*neCBCnwN9ZI1fNDE" /></figure><p>Pieter Jacobsz has also finally been given his opportunity, in what has been a move that has felt long overdue. His arrival was warmly received by the Glory faithful and, more broadly, the WA footballing community. Three consecutive NPLWA Golden Boots is an impressive feat, so the hope will be that he can translate that prolific record into a strong first A-League campaign.</p><p>Matt Ellis and Sebastian Kukucka remain more difficult to assess. Ellis arrives from New Zealand, while Kukucka joins from Sydney Olympic, with both appearing to offer pace, directness and a willingness to take opponents on in one-versus-one situations.</p><p>Naturally, fans would love to see a top-line Spaniard or Brazilian arrive, and there were genuine efforts made to sign players of that ilk. Predominantly, however, financial considerations ultimately made those deals exceedingly difficult to complete.</p><p>Now, while the intent to acquire top-level wingers was clear, perhaps there could have been more robust planning on the Glory’s part to ensure they entered the window in a stronger financial position, reducing the likelihood of encountering those difficulties later in the recruitment process.</p><p>That caveat aside, what Perth Glory do have is a predominantly young squad.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SfXYCebb82u827h7RxiXBQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>At the time of writing, they and Sydney FC have the equal-second-youngest average squad age in the competition at 23.5 years, with only the Central Coast Mariners, at 21.8, boasting a younger squad.</p><p>For players such as Cher Deng, Tadi Kuzamba, Will Freney, Lucas Scicluna and Sebastian Kukucka, this season presents an invaluable opportunity to establish themselves and play a significant role in the senior side.</p><p>We saw last season, particularly with Newcastle and Adelaide, that young squads containing talented players can still put together strong campaigns. So for Perth Glory, the question is simple.</p><p><strong>Why not?</strong></p><p>Of course, youth cuts both ways.</p><p>Having a young squad provides enormous potential upside, but there is a significant difference between having young players capable of producing A-League moments and having a young squad capable of producing an A-League season consistently.</p><p>Tactically, as I touched on in <a href="https://jamesrenton10.medium.com/ceiling-or-foundation-35744e23c079?source=user_profile_page---------0-------------83c6fb7c1865------------------------">my most recent piece</a>, there are some clear areas for Adam Griffiths to address if the Glory are to make the jump from the bottom rungs of the table to a genuine position inside the top six.</p><p>Two of those areas were explicitly mentioned by Griffiths following the Adelaide game: <strong>pressing and territory.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*tIF9FRomcCn9HvjF" /></figure><p>The two go hand in hand.</p><p>Last season, the teams that were above average in PPDA (passes per defensive action) tended to record stronger Field Tilt numbers — the share of possession a team has in the opposition’s attacking third.</p><p>Auckland, who went on to win the championship, recorded the best average PPDA in the competition last season at 10.77, alongside the fourth-best Field Tilt at 52.81%. The Glory, by comparison, recorded the second-worst PPDA at 14.4 and the second-worst Field Tilt at 43.08%.</p><p>In simple terms, Perth Glory struggled to consistently press with enough intensity to win the ball back high up the pitch, while also struggling to keep the ball in the opposition half once they had it.</p><p>If Griffiths’ vision is for an aggressive team that plays in the opposition’s half, then these are two of the clearest metrics by which we can eventually judge whether that vision is actually taking hold.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*teqc5atfkjIyCS0-orzO_g.jpeg" /></figure><p>The Glory don’t necessarily need to become Auckland overnight. But a meaningful improvement from last season’s numbers should be expected if this tactical evolution is genuine.</p><p>Offensively, the major question is whether the Glory’s attack has enough alternative mechanisms to compensate if the striker position produces fewer goals.</p><p>Adam Taggart’s departure inevitably creates a hole, but the answer cannot simply be asking Jaiden Kucharski or Pieter Jacobsz to reproduce his output individually. Perth Glory will need contributions from across the front line.</p><p>When looking at the best attacking teams from last season, the common factor was relatively simple: they generated a high volume of quality attempts on goal.</p><p>That sounds exceptionally reductive, but the Glory’s inability to generate sufficient attacking volume in the first place was a major issue last season. It is therefore not simply a question of whether Perth Glory can find another player to score Taggart’s goals, but whether they can create enough good attacking situations that the burden of replacing those goals is shared across the team.</p><p>Which makes the return of marquee attacking midfielder Tom Lawrence particularly significant. Lawrence was one of the Glory’s most important creative players before his injury, and his availability effectively gives Adam Griffiths another attacking weapon without requiring the club to sign another player.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*afUHkhu6VpTRKBUlOGaylw.jpeg" /></figure><p>But it also raises another question: <strong>how dependent can Perth Glory afford to become on one player for creativity?</strong></p><p>With a squad containing a number of technically capable central and interior players but comparatively fewer proven wide threats, how Griffiths structures the team to create width and stretch opposition defences could become one of the defining tactical questions of the season.</p><p>The additions of Ellis and Kukucka may go some way towards addressing that, but whether either can consistently provide the one-versus-one threat Glory lacked last season remains to be seen.</p><p>There is another variable that could have a significant bearing on how this season unfolds: the fixture list.</p><p>It is no secret that the Glory face one of the toughest starts to the 2026/27 A-League campaign, with just five of their first 15 games at home and the remaining ten on the road.</p><p>I touched on this point briefly in <a href="https://jamesrenton10.medium.com/the-long-game-d3d3fd4bdba4">a separate piece</a>, and ideally, after the first ten games, Perth Glory need to have accumulated enough points to remain within touching distance of the top six.</p><p>For me, that means somewhere around 15–16 points.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*reNfFimLRlroKFojQ0pY0w.jpeg" /></figure><p>The importance of that opening stretch is magnified by what comes afterwards. Eight of Glory’s final 11 games are at HBF Park, providing a very different opportunity to build momentum during the latter stages of the season.</p><p>That creates a number of questions that will probably only be answered as the campaign unfolds:</p><ul><li>Does the new system survive away from home?</li><li>Can Glory avoid digging themselves into a hole during the opening three months?</li><li>Can they turn HBF Park into a genuine advantage later in the campaign?</li><li>Does the young squad mature as the season progresses?</li><li>Can the team turn greater territorial control into greater consistency on the scoreboard?</li></ul><p>Those questions ultimately bring us back to the title of this piece.</p><p><strong>Finals or bust?</strong></p><p>While new CEO Ben Leaver recently suggested in <em>The West Australian</em> that there was “no written expectation of that”, the reality is that there needs to be significant improvement from the club this season.</p><p>Adam Griffiths does, by default, carry the weight of being another assistant-turned-head coach who was given another opportunity by the club following a mixed first season, and who has since been backed both on and off the park.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6uSq-2dLiCvLwjm382zSUQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>That doesn’t mean, by any stretch, that he is destined to meet the same fate as some of his predecessors such as Richard Garcia, Ruben Zadkovich or, more recently, David Zdrilic. But the rhetoric around Griffiths, now that he has been backed with a two-year contract extension, should reasonably come with an expectation of a more consistent product on the park — one that can genuinely stack up against the competition.</p><p>That expectation can, fairly, extend to the football department itself.</p><p>Can the Glory afford to talk about another finals push, only for that ambition to culminate in another bottom-three finish? Would the same level of patience be afforded to football director Stan Lazaridis if the new signings fail to deliver the intended improvement?</p><p>Those are questions that cannot really be answered until the season plays out. What can be said now, however, is that the Glory should be expected to look substantially better than they did last season.</p><p>As things stand, I expect improvement on the park, and that should coincide with a rise up the ladder.</p><p>How high the Glory go, however, could depend heavily on whether they can weather the storm of the gauntlet that awaits them at the beginning of the season.</p><p><strong>My current prediction is 7th.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zfNLJsBoRpWBWZXHLK_vaQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>That would represent a significant jump from where Perth Glory have finished in each of the last five seasons, but it would still leave them outside the finals. The reasoning is not necessarily that I believe the Glory lack the squad to challenge for sixth; rather, there remains too much uncertainty around whether they can consistently translate the changes made over the off-season into results.</p><p>The opening 15 games, with just five at home, could prove critical. A young squad adapting to a new-look attack and a more aggressive tactical approach will have very little margin for error during that period.</p><p>There is also, as yet, limited evidence that Griffiths can take the Glory from being a competitive side into one that can sustain a top-six challenge over an entire season.</p><p>That said, this is unlikely to be a season where the ladder separates itself into neat tiers.</p><p>Several clubs have had fairly ordinary transfer windows, while relatively few appear to have significantly strengthened their squads. I would expect the likes of the two Melbourne clubs, Sydney FC, Auckland and potentially a rejuvenated Western Sydney Wanderers to feature heavily around the top six.</p><p>But beyond that, there appears to be a genuine opportunity.</p><p>If the pressing improves, if the team can consistently establish territory in the opposition half, if the attack generates more volume and quality, and if the younger players can mature quickly enough, then the gap between seventh and the finals may not be particularly large.</p><p>So why “Finals or Bust” if I don’t have the Glory making the finals? Because the title isn’t necessarily a prediction of where Perth Glory will finish, rather a reflection of where the club’s expectations should now sit. There is a difference between saying finals are guaranteed and saying finals should be the benchmark.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=00830b9d3f58" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Ceiling Or Foundation]]></title>
            <link>https://jamesrenton10.medium.com/ceiling-or-foundation-35744e23c079?source=rss-83c6fb7c1865------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/35744e23c079</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[perth-glory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tactical-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[a-league]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[James Renton]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2026 04:34:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-14T05:10:41.094Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WSa0injLdVW3iIdaGXnEaw.png" /></figure><p>With the 2026/27 A-League season just over a month away, it feels worthwhile returning to the football side of things for Perth Glory after so much of the discussion during the off-season has understandably centred on matters away from the pitch.</p><p>The club made the decision to stick with Adam Griffiths ahead of this season and beyond, following what was ultimately a mixed 2025/26 campaign. There were genuine highs, particularly in the early stages of the season, but they were ultimately accompanied by enough inconsistency — both in performance and underlying process — to leave the Glory outside the top six.</p><p>There was, understandably, plenty of context used to explain why Perth Glory’s performances lacked the consistency and capacity required to genuinely compete with the teams fighting for finals football.</p><p>But context is not justification.</p><p>Griffiths’ circumstances during the 2025/26 season are relevant. He inherited the job after two rounds, initially as an interim manager before being appointed permanently for the remainder of the campaign. There is a valid argument that it would therefore be unreasonable to solely assess his first season as though he had entered the campaign with a full pre-season, complete authority over recruitment and a squad constructed around his preferred ideas.</p><p>There is, however, a shelf life to that argument.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RNHkK4WIbMW8oCF5ziVvuw.jpeg" /></figure><p>By the time Round 1 arrives, Griffiths will have had a full pre-season, a two-year contract, considerably greater influence over recruitment, a much better understanding of his players and the league, and, more importantly, a season’s worth of evidence about what did and didn’t work.</p><p>The standard therefore has to rise. There needs to be improvement, but more importantly, there needs to be <strong>evolution</strong>.</p><p>That was a word I repeatedly returned to throughout most of last season, and it still remains central to the discussion heading into 2026/27. If the objective is to move Perth Glory from a side that can periodically compete with teams to one capable of consistently controlling matches, then simply reproducing the same underlying mechanisms and hoping for better outcomes won’t be enough.</p><p>So, before looking forward, it is worth looking back, because the problems the Glory experienced last season were not isolated incidents. There were recurring structural themes that appeared across the campaign.</p><h4>The Problem Of Progression</h4><p>One of the most fundamental issues Perth Glory experienced was an inability to consistently progress the ball through the opposition.</p><p>This wasn’t necessarily because the Glory were incapable of playing out from the back, as there were certainly periods where they could — albeit sporadically. The problem was what happened when the opposition removed the obvious first option.</p><p>Quite often, Glory could establish the first phase of possession but struggled to create the second or third progressive solution. That frequently produced a recurring sequence of:</p><p>CB → full-back → wide player → CB → long ball.</p><p>The issue was hence less about whether the first pass existed and more about whether the structure provided the next one.</p><p>Consider one of Griffiths’ early games in charge against the Central Coast Mariners. In the frame below, Khoa Ngo had received the ball with his back to goal and had little available in front of him. Rather than a productive attacking sequence developing, the ball eventually returned to Scott Wootton, who resorted to a long pass.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GZrjqGLOV8IL8uQuVUV6Ww.png" /></figure><p>The same problem remained evident several months later against the Newcastle Jets at home.</p><p>That match was an intriguing tactical battle between two coaches whose ideas and principles appeared, at least superficially, to share some similarities. Yet it was Newcastle who ultimately demonstrated the greater ability to manipulate the opposition with the ball and control the game, winning 3–1.</p><p>In the example below, the Glory weren’t sufficiently occupying the spaces around Newcastle’s lone defensive midfielder and lacked simple third-man connections that could have allowed them to play around the pressure. Instead, the front four were relatively passive, with limited movement to test or manipulate Newcastle’s defensive structure.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PZYtpv269psqUjQ1anJTmw.png" /></figure><p>This distinction is important because the issue wasn’t that Perth Glory couldn’t play out from the back. The issue was that they struggled to consistently produce a second or third solution once the opposition took away the obvious first pass.</p><p>That is a much more significant tactical problem.</p><h4>A Geometry Problem</h4><p>Closely related, but slightly different, was the inconsistency of Perth Glory’s positional structure.</p><p>There were numerous moments throughout the season where the relationships between players became disconnected, either because the positioning itself was suboptimal or because the game model did not consistently create the geometry required to progress and control possession.</p><p>Some of the recurring problems included:</p><ul><li>The full-back and winger occupying the same vertical line</li><li>Players becoming stacked vertically</li><li>Insufficient occupation of the half-spaces</li><li>Insufficient central occupation</li><li>Too much responsibility being placed on Tom Lawrence — or at times Nicholas Pennington — as the lone attacking midfielder</li><li>Forwards positioned too high</li><li>An insufficient number of players underneath the ball</li></ul><p>The interesting thing was that these problems could manifest at both extremes. At times, the Glory were too wide and disconnected. At others, they became too central and congested. So the problem wasn’t simply a lack of central occupation or a lack of width. It was the geometry between the two.</p><p>Take Perth Glory’s 1–0 home win over the Western Sydney Wanderers, prior to the red card that significantly altered the game.</p><p>There was an opportunity for Sebastian Despotovski to move inside, potentially dragging the Wanderers’ full-back with him and creating space for Trent Ostler. Alternatively, had Despotovski started in that pocket, it could have created greater uncertainty for both the Wanderers’ midfield and defensive lines, potentially opening a direct option towards Adam Taggart.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3IvbW-Y_WYICe8G66mmwww.png" /></figure><p>Instead, this happened.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*aseTF15xUo5W-ZZH5tz0mg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AHktIZix7iDt6YZFtw2rIQ.png" /></figure><p>The structure effectively removed several of the Glory’s potential solutions.</p><p>And if the Western Sydney example demonstrated a problem with the relationship between the wide players, the away match against Brisbane Roar showed what happened when the response became almost the opposite.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*L7CF7giPxTBt9h2UWyDRjw.png" /></figure><p>Here, Perth Glory effectively formed a bizarre conglomeration of players in the middle of the pitch without any obvious degree of spacing or intent to manipulate Brisbane’s defensive structure.</p><p>Central occupation, in isolation, wasn’t the answer either. The apparent lack of tactical clarity therefore resulted in the Glory becoming either too wide and disconnected, or too central and congested.</p><p>What they lacked was the correct geometry between the two, because progression is rarely about one player simply finding space. It is about creating relationships that force the opposition to make decisions.</p><h4>Direct Play Wasn’t THE Problem</h4><p>A common criticism of Glory’s football last season could have been superficially reduced to one word: hoofball.</p><p>But that by itself was never really my criticism, rather it was the structure surrounding the long ball.</p><p>Direct football can be an extremely effective mechanism when it is deliberately constructed. A long pass can bypass pressure, exploit space behind a defensive line, create territory, generate second balls and ultimately produce a different type of attacking advantage.</p><p>The question is what happens next.</p><p>This was particularly evident in Perth Glory’s Round of 32 Australia Cup defeat to NPL side Lions FC just a few months ago. As shown in the frame below, the Glory’s defensive line was unable to push high enough behind the first contest, meaning the midfielders around the initial ball could not adequately squeeze forward.</p><p>The longer pass therefore created more time, and consequently more space between the lines.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*t2euJ5Ag74yqe-Raue0A2A.png" /></figure><p>Matt Sutton went long 29 times throughout the match, and while Adam Taggart won the first contact in this particular instance, the Glory’s structure did not sufficiently support what came next.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YlCZk1n81eD0P-70K2CIsA.png" /></figure><p>Because the Lions players were able to recover the second ball in a favourable area, while Perth Glory’s last line remained relatively deep, the initial direct pass effectively created the conditions for Lions to attack quickly.</p><p>In other words, the Glory often played the first ball without adequately structuring the second ball. That is the crucial distinction, because the problem with direct play wasn’t necessarily its directness. It was that the direct game lacked sufficient connectivity around the contest.</p><p>If you’re going to play directly, the structure around the first ball has to give you a strong chance of winning the second. Otherwise, you are simply surrendering possession and territory.</p><h4>The Press Was Another Structural Problem</h4><p>Defensively, there were areas of genuine improvement last season.</p><p>The number of goals conceded improved compared with previous seasons, while the quality of the shots opposition teams generated — particularly when measured through non-penalty expected goals per shot — also showed signs of improvement.</p><p>But there were still clear problems in the pressing structure.</p><p>A couple of examples from later in the campaign illustrate this particularly well. Against the Central Coast Mariners away from home, Perth Glory attempted to press the first two lines while maintaining a +1 advantage at the back.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3VtUpNEUlptMzkPXIWjCLQ.png" /></figure><p>The problem was that the Mariners were able to break through that structure relatively easily.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pC4ZxCitjhCLA-xdpGFByg.png" /></figure><p>A similar pattern emerged against Wellington Phoenix away from home and, not long afterwards, against Sydney FC.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fv8KE1muRIi7nKNZVZezVQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ckCNKsUUmIaYFJcLRGzBPA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1qmGRRpjf8g6jGSsqPwX1Q.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dtADHuI15WkMSjb7Au7i6Q.jpeg" /></figure><p>The recurring structure was fairly clear: a stretched first line, a man-oriented second line and a zonal backline with a +1 or 2 advantage that was reluctant to step forward. The opposition could then manipulate those relationships in almost exactly the same way.</p><p>That is important because it suggests the issue wasn’t simply a lack of intensity, but that it was also coordination.</p><p>A pressing system can look aggressive while still being structurally passive. If the first line jumps without sufficient protection underneath, or if the second line follows players rather than controlling spaces, the opposition can manipulate the press and create gaps elsewhere.</p><h4>The Bigger Problem: Adaptation</h4><p>But there is a broader issue that ties all of these individual problems together. When Adam Griffiths came into the job, there were tactical ideas that worked reasonably well, which established a baseline.</p><p>The problem was that as the sample size increased and opposition teams became more familiar with Perth Glory’s mechanisms, those ideas became easier to nullify. Disappointingly, the Glory did not consistently replace them with something else.</p><p>Instead, the structure became increasingly congested. Progressive options disappeared. The team became more reliant on direct play. The direct play itself became less effective because the structure around the first and second ball wasn’t sufficiently developed.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yvXy9I6RlYtf1BTHY9nAsg.jpeg" /></figure><p>The same cycle then fed into the defensive side of the game.</p><p>Fewer players underneath the ball meant poorer transition protection. Poorer transition protection meant less effective counterpressing. A less effective press then gave opponents greater opportunities to progress.</p><p>It became less about controlling the game and more about responding to what was happening within it. That, ultimately, is the distinction between competing and controlling.</p><p>A simple summation of Griffiths’ first season would therefore be this:</p><p>His initial tactical ideas worked sufficiently well to establish a baseline, but not sufficiently well (or flexibly enough) to remain effective once opposing teams adapted.</p><p>Which is why the upcoming 2026/27 season becomes particularly interesting.</p><h4>Griffiths’ Test</h4><p>During the off-season, Adam Griffiths made an interesting comment on the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sp667Om05lI&amp;t=2350s"><em>BackChat</em> podcast</a>:</p><blockquote><em>“I think one of the things football, I believe, is lacking is more quality in terms of the questioning to get more into the in-depth tactical area of the football game.”</em></blockquote><p>That comment is particularly relevant given what last season showed.</p><p>The tactical discussion around Perth Glory shouldn’t be reduced to whether the team had enough quality, whether individual players executed well enough or whether they worked hard enough.</p><p>The more important question is whether the structure gave those players enough viable solutions. That is what control actually means. It isn’t simply having more possession, but rather having more answers.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*d8q2oPhzGGV5aM0r6Dpnrw.jpeg" /></figure><p>If the full-back is closed, can the ball go inside?</p><p>If one of the defensive midfielders is screened, can a third-man connection be created?</p><p>If the half-space is occupied, can the opposition full-back be manipulated?</p><p>If the first ball is played long, are there enough players around it to win the second?</p><p>If the opponent presses aggressively, can the Glory play through it?</p><p>If the opponent sits off, can the Glory create enough width and movement to disorganise them?</p><p>Perhaps most importantly, when an opposition coach identifies and removes one of those mechanisms, do Perth Glory have another one ready?</p><p>That is the evolution I was referring to last season.</p><p>My previous piece, <a href="https://jamesrenton10.medium.com/shifting-from-competing-to-controlling-6b6f13b7fcc4"><strong><em>Shifting From Competing To Controlling</em></strong></a>, was ultimately built around the idea that Glory needed to move beyond being a side that could make games competitive and towards one capable of dictating them.</p><p>The recruitment over the off-season appeared to recognise part of that equation.</p><p>There was a clear emphasis on improving technical quality, progression and profile diversity. The additions of players such as Lucas Scicluna, Calem Nieuwenhof and Henry Hore suggested an attempt to give Glory more ways of advancing the ball and accessing different areas of the pitch.</p><p>But recruitment only provides the tools. It doesn’t determine how those tools are used. That is now Griffiths’ responsibility.</p><h4>The Squad Has Changed, But What About The Shape</h4><p>This is where the tactical implications of the off-season recruitment become particularly interesting.</p><p>Henry Hore, for example, is not the archetypal touchline-hugging winger, as he is more comfortable operating inside, combining and finding pockets.</p><p>That is potentially significant given the problems Glory experienced last season. If more of the attacking personnel naturally want to operate inside, however, then width cannot simply disappear with them.</p><p>Someone has to provide it.</p><p>While it’s understood the Glory are implementing a new game model ahead of this upcoming season, featuring a more fluid shape on the ball, it’s worth having different options for the Glory to switch to in possession.</p><p>Hence why I feel that a structure built around two interior attackers could be worth exploring.</p><p>A 3–4–2–1 shape in possession, for example, could potentially provide a cleaner relationship between the different attacking zones: wing-backs providing width, two attacking midfielders occupying the half-spaces and pockets, a striker providing depth, and two central midfielders providing support underneath the ball.</p><p>That structure could also provide a more natural platform for direct play and second-ball situations while maintaining greater security behind the ball.</p><p>But critically, and this point must be stressed, the shape itself is not the solution. An in-possession structure of 3–4–2–1 with passive wing-backs and poor spacing simply produces the same problems in different positions.</p><p>The underlying question remains the same, in terms of whether the Glory could create enough relationships around the ball to consistently give themselves multiple solutions. That’s the tactical problem Adam Griffiths has to solve.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*g83knn9lZwVq0l1jcl3nmw.jpeg" /></figure><p>And recruitment has made that problem potentially more solvable.</p><h4>The Final Piece</h4><p>There is also one obvious personnel issue that remains.</p><p>Adam Taggart’s departure to Hanoi FC was unfortunate timing given how close it came to the end of the transfer window, and it appears Glory will pursue a local option to replace him.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bGJv1kexb7zmWulasLCa-g.jpeg" /></figure><p>But regardless of how that particular situation unfolded, the broader squad-building question remains.</p><p>Perth Glory still need a high-level right-sided winger. That was something I identified in my previous piece, and it has arguably become even more important now.</p><p>One of the reasons the Glory struggled to progress the ball last season was the lack of a consistent threat from wide areas. A dynamic winger capable of hugging the touchline, beating a defender, creating separation and threatening the opponent’s goal does more than simply provide another attacking option.</p><p>They change the geometry.</p><p>A genuine 1v1 threat forces the opposition full-back to make a decision. That can create room inside. It can open passing lanes for midfielders. It can create isolation. It can prevent the opposition from simply compressing the central areas and waiting for the Glory to eventually go long.</p><p>That is why the profile matters more than simply filling the position, which brings us back to the broader question.</p><p>My first piece back in late June asked whether Perth Glory had acquired the tools required to shift from competing to controlling.</p><p>The next question is whether Adam Griffiths can build the machinery to use them. Because the 2025/26 season provided Griffiths with an important foundation, but it also exposed the limitations of that foundation.</p><p>The excuses are now fewer. The evidence is greater. The preparation is longer. The squad is increasingly reflective of the profiles the coaching staff want.</p><p>That means the standard has to change.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6uSq-2dLiCvLwjm382zSUQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>It is no longer enough for Perth Glory to be competitive.</p><p>It is no longer enough to have periods where the football looks good.</p><p>It is no longer enough to produce the occasional high-quality performance before falling back into the same structural patterns.</p><p>The challenge for Griffiths in 2026/27 is to demonstrate that last season was a foundation rather than a ceiling.</p><p>To turn tactical ideas into repeatable mechanisms.</p><p>To give players multiple solutions rather than one obvious answer.</p><p>To make the team harder to manipulate.</p><p>To turn Perth Glory from a team that can compete with the opposition into one that can make the opposition play on their terms.</p><p><strong>That is the real shift from competing to controlling.</strong></p><p><em>*All images are courtesy of </em><a href="https://x.com/aus_tactics"><em>Aus Tactics</em></a><em>; please make sure to follow his work on X.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=35744e23c079" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Anticipation]]></title>
            <link>https://jamesrenton10.medium.com/anticipation-fe6d76cb7544?source=rss-83c6fb7c1865------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fe6d76cb7544</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[manchester-united]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[premier-league]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[James Renton]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 22 Aug 2026 01:42:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-22T01:42:03.482Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*E0yfCNGY4KNJZX_d3HOlqw.png" /></figure><p><strong>It is the absolute silence at the crest of a waterfall — that suspended, glass-still moment where the water bends before finally giving itself to gravity.</strong></p><p>You cannot see where the mist clears at the bottom, nor can you tell which of the surrounding currents will hold. Everything is momentarily still, yet the plunge is inevitable. There is something both terrifying and exhilarating about that precipice: the knowledge that whatever comes next will be impossible to stop.</p><p>Manchester United’s 2026/27 campaign is almost upon us, and for perhaps the first time in years, there is a shimmer of optimism beginning to emerge within the fanbase. Not expectation, necessarily. Not yet. Rather, something more cautious — and perhaps more valuable — than that: belief.</p><p>In seasons past, there has often been a sense of perturbation surrounding United. Even when there were reasons for optimism, they were accompanied by an uneasy feeling that the foundations beneath it were not quite sturdy enough.</p><p>Ruben Amorim’s persistence with a game model that, despite being reinforced with greater attacking quality, raised genuine questions over its long-term sustainability. Erik ten Hag’s inability — or reluctance — to move United towards a style more reminiscent of his Ajax side, compounded by a recruitment strategy that never quite possessed the pedigree required to take the club to the next level. Progress, when it appeared, always seemed conditional.</p><p>This feels different.</p><p>Not because Manchester United suddenly possess all the answers. They plainly do not. Michael Carrick’s squad enters the new season with plenty of questions still hanging over it, and there is no guarantee that the momentum of the past six months will survive contact with an entire campaign. But therein lies the difference: for once, the uncertainty does not feel inherently ominous.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*GWgp3PXVzfgxSPJu.jpg" /></figure><p>Could anyone have predicted what Carrick would do from early January onwards? That he would take a United side seemingly destined for another season of frustration and drag it into a run that transformed an unlikely campaign into one of genuine promise — culminating in Champions League football and, perhaps most importantly, a reason for fans to believe again?</p><p>Probably not.</p><p>And perhaps that is precisely why the mood feels different.</p><p>For the first time in years, Manchester United find themselves standing on the precipice without knowing exactly what lies beyond it. But rather than fearing the fall, there is a growing sense that they might finally be ready to embrace the plunge.</p><p>A title charge is probably too soon for Carrick’s side. In February 2014, José Mourinho famously described his Chelsea team as a “little horse that still needs milk and needs to learn how to jump”. The same analogy could be applied to Manchester United. The foundations are beginning to look considerably healthier, but this remains a side in the early stages of a rebuild — one that is slowly, and perhaps deliberately, being equipped with more substance and more weapons.</p><p>There is, however, an amusing irony to the way United have arrived at this point.</p><p>For years, fans called for a replacement for Michael Carrick after his retirement almost a decade ago, while simultaneously bemoaning the club’s inability to properly address the midfield as part of any genuine rebuild. It is fitting, then, that it took Carrick’s return to Old Trafford for United to finally perform something resembling open-heart surgery on one of the most glaring weaknesses in the squad.</p><p>The scale of the intervention was evident before the window had even opened. United had reportedly earmarked £150 million for three midfielders, with approximately £80 million reserved for a long-term replacement for Casemiro. On Matchday 1, they appear to have achieved precisely that, with the latest reports suggesting United have agreed a fee of approximately £70 million with Brighton for Carlos Baleba, completing a midfield rebuild that has already brought in Andrey Santos for £50 million and Youri Tielemans for £35 million.</p><p>The significance, however, is not simply the amount United have spent. It is the logic behind it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*lpkFXCFASe3zGPH-.jpg" /></figure><p>INEOS’ strategy has at times been frustratingly opaque, particularly given the lack of consistent reporting surrounding their plans. Yet the broader pattern is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. After systematically reshaping the attack during the 2025/26 season, United have now turned their attention to the midfield. The common thread is not simply talent, but fit: players with Premier League experience, defined profiles and the capacity to address specific structural deficiencies within the squad.</p><p>That represents a considerable departure from the way Manchester United operated under the Glazer ownership.</p><p>United could have continued down the familiar path of spending enormous sums on the biggest available names. They were linked with Elliot Anderson, Mateus Fernandes and Sandro Tonali — all of whom eventually commanded fees exceeding £85 million, with Anderson and Tonali moving for more than £100 million. Instead, United have taken a markedly different approach.</p><p>There is an almost uncanny discipline to the way INEOS have operated in the market. There has understandably been scepticism in sections of English football over the absence of the traditional “marquee” signing — particularly for a club of United’s stature — but perhaps that misses the point entirely.</p><p>For a decade, Manchester United behaved as though every transfer window required a statement.</p><p>INEOS appear increasingly interested in making a statement through the squad itself.</p><p>The signings of Santos, Tielemans and Baleba are therefore significant not merely because of their individual quality, but because of the dimensions they add to a midfield that has been conspicuously short of them for years.</p><p>Baleba is perhaps the clearest example.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*XZ3Aikx9GS68_fl9.jpg" /></figure><p>United have been linked with the Cameroonian for some time, and his arrival would represent a much-needed injection of defensive security. His performances for Brighton last season were not without shortcomings: he made 31 Premier League appearances but started only 23, averaging just 54 minutes per appearance — a considerable regression from the level he had demonstrated during the previous campaign.</p><p>Yet the appeal of Baleba lies overwhelmingly in his profile.</p><p>As demonstrated by The Athletic’s player dashboard, he possesses many of the qualities United have lacked in defensive midfield: the ability to cover enormous amounts of ground at high speed, the physicality to compete in open games and, crucially, the capacity to provide protection in rest-defence when United commit numbers forward.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1x4gSI51i0Atf25k2E0Y6A.png" /></figure><p>That last point could prove particularly important under Carrick.</p><p>United do not simply need a midfielder who can win the ball. They need someone capable of allowing the players ahead of him to take risks without leaving the team structurally exposed when possession is lost.</p><p>Baleba’s ball-carrying provides another layer to the equation. His ability to progress possession through the middle third gives United an alternative means of escaping opposition pressure, particularly against sides employing different pressing structures. Rather than relying on Bruno Fernandes, Matheus Cunha or Bryan Mbeumo to drop deeper to receive the ball, Baleba can potentially carry United through the first line himself, allowing their more dangerous players to remain higher up the pitch.</p><p>This brings us to Tielemans.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*N9z_KolKUHfsHuvC.jpg" /></figure><p>His profile complements Baleba almost perfectly. The Belgian has previously benefited from playing alongside physically dominant midfielders such as Wilfred Ndidi at Leicester City and Amadou Onana at Aston Villa, allowing him to occupy the spaces in which his technical qualities are most valuable.</p><p>At £35 million, acquiring a 29-year-old with extensive Premier League experience and a proven ability to dictate possession represents good business — even if the obvious caveat remains that United could have signed him for nothing when he was available as a free agent in July 2023.</p><p>Nonetheless, Tielemans brings something United have lacked almost as acutely as defensive protection: composure.</p><p>As The Athletic’s analysis of his profile suggests, he is a midfielder naturally inclined towards supporting build-up play, retaining possession and progressing the ball through the lines. He is defensively competent, but his greatest value may come from allowing Baleba and Santos to absorb more of the physical and defensive burden while he dictates the rhythm of possession.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*m0cOkqkVzW6kKkQGYM-JwQ.png" /></figure><p>His ability to consistently execute line-breaking passes could, in turn, help create the very thing United have lacked for years: a midfield capable of delivering the ball to their forwards in dangerous areas without asking those forwards to manufacture everything themselves.</p><p>Santos, meanwhile, completes a rather intriguing trio.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*lma2zh0gdvHN2ii1.jpg" /></figure><p>United’s first signing of the window, the Brazilian is a technically polished midfielder who combines reasonable defensive robustness with the sort of intelligence that should make him particularly compatible with Carrick’s pass-first system. He is a high-IQ, press-resistant deep-lying playmaker — or, depending on how Carrick chooses to deploy him, a stabilising №6 — whose greatest strengths lie in recycling possession, breaking opposition lines with sharp vertical passing and protecting the defensive line through positional discipline rather than sheer physical dominance.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0Jpki0LvKYXNzaC9geg9bA.png" /></figure><p>Taken individually, none of these signings necessarily screams “title contender”. Taken together, however, they begin to resemble something much more important: a midfield designed with an actual idea in mind.</p><p>That, perhaps more than any individual transfer, is what makes this United rebuild feel different.</p><p>Most people believe Arsenal will win the Premier League this season. Last season’s champions represent the most balanced and settled of the traditional big six, and they will no doubt look to go from strength to strength after some impressive business in the transfer market, including Bruno Guimarães, Ezri Konsa and Christos Tzolis.</p><p>Beyond Arsenal, however, it is anyone’s guess what the top four will look like.</p><p>Manchester City could enter a period of transition following the departures of Pep Guardiola — the man who revolutionised the club into the juggernaut it is today — and talismanic midfielder Rodri. Chelsea have their own uncertainty following the arrival of Xabi Alonso, while Liverpool are beginning a new era under Andoni Iraola and still possess questions over the depth and quality of their defence and attack. Tottenham have spent heavily, but it would take a considerable leap of faith to assume that two consecutive 17th-place finishes can suddenly be transformed into a top-four campaign.</p><p>That uncertainty creates an intriguing opportunity for Manchester United.</p><p>The objective this season is progression. That means building upon the foundations established during Carrick’s remarkable run last season while simultaneously negotiating the added demands of Champions League football. The foundations themselves, however, have been strengthened: the arrival of Carlos Baleba, Youri Tielemans and Andrey Santos has given United a midfield with considerably greater flexibility, technical quality and tactical variety than the one Carrick inherited.</p><p>For the first time in a long time, the pieces appear to be beginning to fit together.</p><p>That does not necessarily make Manchester United title challengers. There remains an enormous amount of work to be done, and expecting Carrick to bridge a 13-year gap between Premier League titles in the space of one season would be bordering on unreasonable. Even Carrick himself acknowledged ahead of the upcoming clash with Hull City that a genuine title challenge would represent a “jump” — albeit one he would “never say” United could not make.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*_HvHI141X2VLtGbb.jpg" /></figure><p>Perhaps that is the most appropriate way to view the season ahead.</p><p>Manchester United do not need to prove that they are ready to win the Premier League in August. They need to prove that the direction of travel is finally the right one.</p><p>The attack was rebuilt last season. The midfield has now undergone its own transformation. Carrick has inherited a squad increasingly constructed around complementary profiles rather than individual names, with a clearer tactical identity and, perhaps most importantly, a platform upon which something meaningful can be built.</p><p>That is why the optimism around Old Trafford feels different.</p><p>For years, the unknown was something Manchester United fans feared. Every new season carried the possibility of another false dawn, another expensive signing that failed to solve the underlying problem, another managerial reset that simply postponed the inevitable.</p><p>Now, standing on the precipice of another campaign, the unknown feels different.</p><p>The water is still.</p><p>The plunge is still coming.</p><p>But for the first time in years, Manchester United fans are looking over the edge and wondering not how far they might fall, but how high they might eventually climb.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fe6d76cb7544" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Cost Of Silence]]></title>
            <link>https://jamesrenton10.medium.com/the-cost-of-silence-8012503ea83e?source=rss-83c6fb7c1865------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8012503ea83e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ross-pelligra]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[perth-glory]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[James Renton]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 28 Jul 2026 06:45:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-29T00:02:25.120Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DLUSaiBWPvWSw2_gnwFbxg.png" /></figure><p>There comes a point in every football club’s story when the conversation changes.</p><p>At first, fans are asked to be patient. They understand rebuilding takes time. They accept difficult decisions. They believe promises made today will bear fruit tomorrow. Then come the questions. Eventually, if enough questions go unanswered, something else begins to disappear.</p><p><strong>Trust.</strong></p><p>I believe Perth Glory has reached that point.</p><p>This isn’t an article about one late payroll, one poor season, nor is it even about Ross Pelligra himself. It’s about how a club that desperately needed stability has instead found itself asking the same questions it hoped were left behind with administration.</p><p>When Ross Pelligra acquired Perth Glory in February 2024, there was genuine optimism. Not because fans expected miracles, but because they expected leadership. After years of instability, uncertainty and financial collapse, the Glory finally had something they hadn’t possessed for a long time.</p><p>An owner with resources. An owner who spoke about reconnecting the club with its community. An owner who spoke about long-term sustainability. An owner who promised infrastructure. An owner who promised ambition.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*xDQ_geEHj4voIP8I.jpg" /></figure><p>For perhaps the first time in years, the members and fans allowed themselves to believe the hardest days were behind them. That optimism wasn’t naïve; it was earned.</p><p>Patience was never the problem. I’ve written extensively about this ownership group over the past two years. Every article I’ve written has asked questions rather than demanded immediate conclusions. I defended patience. I argued rebuilding takes time. I accepted difficult inheritances. Football clubs emerging from administration don’t become contenders overnight.</p><p>Mistakes were always going to happen. Poor recruitment can happen. Bad coaching appointments can happen. Difficult seasons happen. None of those things alone defines an ownership; it’s how it responds. One issue is explainable. A pattern is harder to ignore.</p><p>Every concern that has emerged over the past two years has had its own explanation.</p><p>A poor season? The squad needed rebuilding.</p><p>Another poor season? The culture required changing.</p><p>Delayed infrastructure? Construction projects are complicated.</p><p>Late wages? Timing issues.</p><p>Reports of unpaid superannuation? The club stated affected staff had been fully compensated and denied broader financial concerns.</p><p>Questions surrounding Catania? A different football club in another country.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*VxqfdySueqMQeSEf.jpg" /></figure><p>Individually, each explanation may have merit. Collectively, something else begins to emerge.</p><p>On the field, Perth Glory have struggled to establish a clear football identity. Off the field, turnover has continued. Senior personnel have come and gone. Recruitment has continually been reset. Fans have repeatedly been asked to start again.</p><p>Then came the reports that shifted the conversation. Delayed wage payments. Public reporting of superannuation delays. Questions surrounding suppliers and operational resources. Staff describing uncertainty. Similar financial questions emerging around another club within the Pelligra football portfolio.</p><p>None of these, individually, prove a club in crisis, yet together they raise legitimate questions about governance and financial management. Those questions deserve answers. Trust is built quietly. It is also lost quietly. Football supporters rarely lose faith because of one result. Trust erodes gradually.</p><p>One unanswered question. One delayed payment. One broken promise. One rumour that goes unaddressed. One week of silence. Then another.</p><p>For me, this has become the defining characteristic of the Pelligra era.</p><p><strong>Silence.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*yQ7VTi3PMEp0DhCy.jpg" /></figure><p>Not simply media silence. Leadership silence. As fans have repeatedly sought engagement, it’s worth mentioning the owners have never attended a meeting with the club’s official Fan Representative Group despite repeated invitations. That matters, not because fans expect ownership to seek approval, but because communication builds confidence.</p><p>When the fans feel they learn more about their football club from journalists than from the club itself, something fundamental has broken down.</p><p>In May, respected Perth sports broadcaster Peter Vlahos publicly reported significant dissatisfaction within Perth Glory directed towards vice-chairman Jason Bontempo, claiming senior staff were considering leaving because of the way the club was being managed. Those claims have not been publicly addressed by the club.</p><p>Whether every allegation proves accurate is almost secondary. The fact such concerns could emerge publicly without subsequent clarification only reinforces the perception of a club whose governance has become increasingly opaque.</p><p>Leadership isn’t simply about making decisions. It is about creating confidence in those decisions. Accountability starts at the top. Football clubs are hierarchical organisations. Managers answer to executives. Executives answer to owners.</p><p>Ultimately, ownership answers to no one except the people whose trust sustains the football club. That isn’t shareholders. It’s the fans. No owner can guarantee success; however, they should be able to guarantee transparency.</p><p>This is no longer about football. Wooden spoons can be overcome. Poor signings can be replaced. Managers can be changed.</p><p>What becomes much harder to rebuild is trust. Because trust isn’t measured in league tables. It’s measured by whether players believe they’ll be supported. Whether staff believe they’ll be paid. Whether suppliers believe they’ll be honoured. Whether fans believe they’re being told the truth.</p><p>So where does that leave Ross Pelligra?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*rXkkJqMWRHici74u.jpg" /></figure><p>There was a time when questioning Pelligra’s ownership felt premature. I don’t believe we’re at that point anymore. That doesn’t mean every criticism is fair. Nor does it mean every rumour is true. It does mean enough evidence now exists for supporters to legitimately ask whether the ownership has delivered on the promises made in February 2024.</p><p>That isn’t an emotional reaction. It’s an assessment built over time. The question we can no longer avoid.</p><p>Over the past two years, I’ve written about dysfunction. About accountability. About the future. About communication. Each article ultimately reached the same conclusion. Ask questions. Wait for answers. Hope things improve.</p><p>Today, I find myself asking a different question. Not whether Ross Pelligra cares about Perth Glory. Not whether he intended this outcome. But whether he has earned the trust required to continue leading one of Australia’s oldest football clubs.</p><p>Because football clubs don’t belong solely to those who own them. They belong to generations of people who invest their time, money and identity into them. Ownership is temporary. Stewardship is earned. Right now, after two years of promises, silence, governance questions and growing uncertainty, that stewardship has never felt more fragile.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8012503ea83e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Long Game]]></title>
            <link>https://jamesrenton10.medium.com/the-long-game-d3d3fd4bdba4?source=rss-83c6fb7c1865------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d3d3fd4bdba4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[perth-glory]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[James Renton]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 04:08:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-16T04:13:34.002Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ySaaNlSI4ozymWbkdL3rFw.png" /></figure><p><strong>To encapsulate Perth Glory’s 2026/27 A-League fixture list in a single sentence, it is a season that won’t be won or lost in the opening months, but in how effectively the club navigates them.</strong></p><p>On paper, the fixture list clearly presents a significant challenge. The first half of the campaign is arguably one of the most difficult baptism by fire the Glory have faced in recent years, yet a remarkably favourable run home balances it.</p><p>For Adam Griffiths and his squad, the objective shouldn’t necessarily be to establish themselves comfortably inside the top six by Christmas. Rather, the priority is ensuring they remain within touching distance of the finals positions by February, when the fixture list begins to swing heavily in their favour.</p><p>Clearly, the aspect of the draw that stands out the most is its imbalance. Across the opening 15 matches, Perth Glory will play just five games at HBF Park, while travelling for the remaining ten. There is also only a single home fixture between 7 November and 8 January, meaning fans will go almost two months without regularly seeing their side at home.</p><p>The Christmas and New Year period, traditionally a time when clubs can capitalise on holiday crowds and build momentum, offers no home fixtures whatsoever.</p><p>The second half of the season tells an entirely different story.</p><p>Eight of the Glory’s final eleven matches will be played at HBF Park, with only three trips required after 20 February: Adelaide United, Central Coast Mariners and Melbourne City.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*etLrxRDydKDGfs6xGScoGg.jpeg" /></figure><p>From a football perspective, this presents a significant opportunity. At the point in the season where finals races are won and lost, the players will spend more time sleeping in their own beds, training in familiar surroundings and avoiding the logistical challenges that have historically made life difficult for the club.</p><p>There are legitimate concerns that such a home-heavy finish may create challenges of its own. Five of the final six matches are at home, which places pressure on the club to maintain fan engagement throughout the season. However, from a purely footballing perspective, it is difficult to view the arrangement as anything other than advantageous.</p><p>As a result, it is useful to think of the Glory’s 2026/27 campaign as two separate seasons.</p><p>The first is about survival.</p><p>The second is about attack.</p><p>The opening five fixtures will provide an immediate indication of where Perth Glory truly stand in their development:</p><ul><li>Macarthur (A)</li><li>Brisbane Roar (A)</li><li>Adelaide United (H)</li><li>Newcastle Jets (H)</li><li>Central Coast Mariners (A)</li></ul><p>While three of those five matches are away from home, there is an important distinction to make. The challenge comes primarily from travel, not necessarily from opposition quality. The likes of Auckland FC, Melbourne Victory and Sydney FC are absent from this stretch, meaning Perth Glory cannot simply point to the fixture list as an excuse if results disappoint.</p><p>If the club genuinely believes its recruitment has strengthened the squad and that Griffiths’ footballing philosophy is beginning to take hold, then these are opponents the Glory should back themselves to compete with.</p><p>The first two fixtures, in particular, carry added significance.</p><p>Perth Glory have not won their opening match of an A-League season since the 2020/21 campaign, while they have not collected four or more points from their opening two matches since the club’s Premiership-winning season in 2018/19. A positive start would not guarantee success, but it would immediately signal a shift from the patterns that have plagued the club in recent years.</p><p>Conversely, a slow start could prove damaging.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*K16hgBK-r--5anwwhOjp-A.jpeg" /></figure><p>Given the fixture imbalance, the Glory cannot afford to spend the opening months constantly chasing the competition. While Perth Glory managed 13 points from their opening ten matches last season, anything below that mark would raise genuine concerns. Historically, the finals cutoff tends to fall somewhere between 38 and 40 points. Falling significantly behind that pace early would require a substantial turnaround later in the year.</p><p>Realistically, 15 to 16 points from the opening ten matches should be viewed as a strong return.</p><p>Such a total would likely leave the Glory within striking distance of the top six despite having played seven away fixtures. More importantly, it would position them to fully capitalise on the favourable schedule awaiting them later in the season.</p><p>That challenge becomes particularly pronounced during what could be the defining stretch of the campaign.</p><p>Between Round 7 and Round 10, Perth Glory face Melbourne City at home before travelling to Sydney FC, Brisbane Roar and Melbourne Victory. It is a block that combines quality opposition, extensive travel and short recovery periods.</p><p>If the Glory can emerge from that sequence intact, they will place themselves in a strong position heading into January.</p><p>The reason is what comes next.</p><p>Following the trip away to face Melbourne Victory, Perth Glory will host Macarthur and the Central Coast Mariners in consecutive home fixtures. These games have the potential to become a turning point in the season.</p><p>Should the Glory take a result from Melbourne and then back it up with victories at home, a return of seven points from three matches would generate significant momentum before a demanding New Zealand double-header against Auckland FC and Wellington Phoenix.</p><p>Momentum matters, particularly for a team attempting to rebuild belief after consecutive seasons near the foot of the table.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-O12R7y8DhyB80CEnIMd7g.jpeg" /></figure><p>This is where the fixture list becomes especially intriguing.</p><p>By the time the Glory reach February and March, the squad should theoretically be stronger than it was in October. New signings will have settled, partnerships across the pitch will be more established, and players should possess a clearer understanding of Griffiths’ game model.</p><p>In other words, Perth Glory will receive the majority of their home fixtures at precisely the point where they should be approaching their peak.</p><p>The importance of that cannot be overstated.</p><p>Imagine two possible scenarios.</p><p>In the first, the Glory sit 11th after Round 15 with 14 points. Even with eight home games remaining, belief would’ve largely evaporated and the favourable fixture list becomes irrelevant.</p><p>In the second, they sit 7th with 20 points. Suddenly, the narrative changes. The rest of the competition sees a side with eight home matches remaining and genuine momentum building towards the business end of the season.</p><p>The fixture list itself has not changed, only Perth’s position within it. Hence, the first half of the season is so important. It’s not about building an insurmountable advantage, rather remaining close enough for the second half to matter.</p><p>Should Perth Glory achieve that, the run home becomes extremely attractive. All the heavyweights and likely finals contenders will all travel west during the period where finals positions are being decided.</p><p>Historically, that has been where the Glory have been at their best.</p><p>The club’s strongest seasons have often been built upon turning HBF Park into one of the most difficult venues in the competition. In recent years that advantage has largely disappeared. Re-establishing it is essential if Perth Glory are to return to finals football.</p><p>From February onwards, familiarity, routine, training continuity and reduced travel fatigue should all work in the Glory’s favour. If they can take 20 to 22 points from their final eight home matches, a finals challenge becomes a genuine possibility.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iOopPhhfEYPWI7rGVw3N9Q.jpeg" /></figure><p>The final three home fixtures against the Western Sydney Wanderers, Wellington Phoenix and Adelaide United could prove particularly significant. Depending on ladder positions, they may effectively operate as a mini-finals series. If the Glory are in contention, the club should be doing everything possible to maximise attendances and create an atmosphere capable of carrying the team through the closing weeks of the campaign.</p><p>In many ways, the fixture list evokes memories of Perth Glory’s finals campaigns under Kenny Lowe in 2015/16 and 2016/17. Those sides were not built upon explosive starts. Instead, they survived difficult periods, remained competitive, improved throughout the year and launched strong second-half surges.</p><p>That blueprint may be more relevant than ever.</p><p>For a club entering its 30th anniversary season, there is little room left for excuses. The Glory’s history deserves celebration, but recent seasons have served as a reminder that tradition alone carries little value without progress on the pitch.</p><p>Ultimately, this fixture list is not asking Perth Glory to be a championship contender from Round 1.</p><p>It is asking them to be competent.</p><p>If the Glory are organised, resilient and sitting somewhere between sixth and eighth after Round 15, the schedule becomes a genuine asset and the possibility of finals football becomes very real. If they continue to concede soft goals, lose structure away from home and find themselves ten points adrift by February, the favourable run home will count for very little.</p><p>20 points after 15 rounds should be the target to begin with.</p><p>Given that ten of those fifteen matches are away from home, reaching that mark would place Perth Glory in an excellent position to take advantage of one of the most favourable run homes in the competition and mount a genuine challenge for a return to the A-League finals.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d3d3fd4bdba4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Beyond Egypt: The Real Question Facing Australian Football]]></title>
            <link>https://jamesrenton10.medium.com/beyond-egypt-the-real-question-facing-australian-football-df55491bd908?source=rss-83c6fb7c1865------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/df55491bd908</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[fifa-world-cup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[world-cup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[socceroos]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[James Renton]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2026 02:27:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-06T10:58:55.699Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*r_c3Cjr7HlErw2NQRduwvQ.png" /></figure><p><em>“We’ve got to stop talking about when we’re going to qualify, we’ve got to start talking about when we’re going to win World Cups.”</em> — Johnny Warren</p><p>That quote from the great man himself has long set the wheels in motion for one of the most enduring debates in Australian football.</p><p>At what point do we stop celebrating qualification for World Cups and occasional appearances in the knockout rounds as the pinnacle of achievement? At what point do we begin asking more difficult questions about where Australian football wants to go and what it ultimately hopes to become?</p><p>The key issue facing Australian football is not a lack of talent, nor is it any single coaching decision. Rather, it is the absence of a clearly articulated and accountable long-term football vision from Football Australia.</p><p>In the aftermath of the Socceroos’ exit from the 2026 FIFA World Cup at the hands of Egypt via a penalty shootout, one thing became immediately apparent: the reaction could not be explained by the result alone.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*URtaXhoZGu9mItVf.jpg" /></figure><p>Penalties are, by their nature, a lottery. Likewise, losing to Egypt is neither a humiliation nor a historic low for Australian football. Yet the discourse that followed was heated, as fans were not merely reacting to elimination; they were expressing a broader frustration with the perceived direction of Australian football.</p><p>Debate quickly emerged around Tony Popovic’s risk-averse tactical approach, the decision to substitute Patrick Beach for Mat Ryan moments before the penalty shootout, Football Australia’s immediate backing of Popovic following the defeat, and the broader question of whether the Socceroos are genuinely progressing or merely standing still.</p><p>The real question, therefore, is not whether Australia should have beaten Egypt. It is why so many fans and also prominent football people feel uncertain about where Australian football is heading.</p><p>Recently, I had a discussion with a friend about this exact issue. We found ourselves sitting in opposing camps: one of pragmatism and the other of ambition.</p><p>Historically, Australia’s success has been built on realism. We have rarely possessed the technical depth of the world’s elite football nations and have therefore relied upon organisation, discipline, physicality and resilience.</p><p>Or, in more familiar language, the so-called “Aussie DNA”.</p><p>This philosophy has often served Australia well. The 2006 World Cup side embodied many of those qualities. So too did Graham Arnold’s 2022 squad, which earned widespread admiration for its performances in Qatar. Even aspects of the current team reflect that tradition.</p><p>However, a new tension has emerged.</p><p>Australia is increasingly producing players with stronger technical foundations, developed in professional environments and attracting interest from major European clubs. While it would be premature to declare this generation another golden one like 2006, there is a legitimate argument that it represents one of the most technically promising young cohorts Australian football has produced in some time.</p><p>Players such as Nestory Irankunda, Alessandro Circati and Lucas Herrington have already generated interest from clubs competing in Europe’s top leagues. Whether they ultimately fulfil their potential remains to be seen, but their emergence has fuelled a growing belief that Australian football may be capable of aspiring to more than simply remaining competitive.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*pBe2wvA46QGivFv8.jpg" /></figure><p>Tony Popovic himself captured that sentiment when he said:</p><blockquote>“Regardless of age, regardless of experience or where they are at, why not this group do something extraordinary and do something special and go further than ever before? I believe it will happen.”</blockquote><p>That belief raises an important question: Is merely being competitive at World Cups still enough?</p><p>The pragmatist argues that Australia must maximise its existing resources, accept its limitations and prioritise results. The Socceroos are unlikely to possess the player depth of France, Spain or Argentina any time soon, and therefore a pragmatic approach remains the most rational path to success.</p><p>The aspirationalist sees things differently. They argue that results should be used as a platform for long-term evolution, that Australian football should focus on developing a stronger football identity, and that national teams should be built around a vision that extends beyond simply surviving tournaments.</p><p>Neither position is inherently wrong.</p><p>The real issue is that Australian football has never fully resolved the tension between them. This is where the debate inevitably turns towards Football Australia.</p><p>It would be naïve and reductive to suggest that Football Australia does not have a plan. None of us can know that with certainty. However, it is entirely reasonable to argue that whatever plan exists has not been convincingly communicated to the broader football public.</p><p><a href="https://www.smh.com.au/sport/soccer/to-shed-the-underdog-tag-australian-soccer-needs-to-have-some-tough-conversations-20260705-p60cnf.html">Vince Rugari’s recent comments in the Sydney Morning Herald captured the essence of the problem:</a></p><blockquote>“If Australia want to fully realise Circati’s ambitions, it will take more than one coach and one tournament. It will take the entire game, and a level of expertise, strategy, investment and foresight hitherto unseen from Australian soccer’s leaders.”</blockquote><p>Rugari went further, stating that Football Australia often relies on the identity of the coach to determine the identity of the national team.</p><p>That observation raises a number of fundamental questions.</p><p>What style of football should the Socceroos play?</p><p>What is the ideal player profile?</p><p>What should success look like in 2030?</p><p>How should national teams reflect domestic development priorities?</p><p>Most importantly, what is the long-term football identity that links grassroots football, coach education, player development, domestic competitions and the national teams?</p><p>These are questions Australian football has been asking for decades, yet clear answers remain elusive.</p><p>The issue is not whether Australia should replicate Spain, Japan or Argentina. Every football nation must develop an identity that reflects its own circumstances.</p><p>The issue is whether Football Australia can identify the strengths of Australian football and build a coherent pathway that aligns every level of the game around a shared set of principles.</p><p>At present, many fans remain unconvinced.</p><p>This uncertainty is precisely why calls for greater accountability have grown louder.</p><p>Mark Milligan’s passionate post-match critique following the loss to Egypt resonated with many fans because it reflected concerns that have surfaced repeatedly following major tournament exits. Milligan’s argument was not simply about Egypt, but about the broader direction of Australian football and what the game ultimately wants to stand for.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/Sachk0/status/2073179711665242297&amp;image=https%3A//i.embed.ly/1/image%3Furl%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fpbs.twimg.com%252Fprofile_images%252F2015691605236477953%252FskU71tQX_200x200.jpg%26key%3Da19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/cf2f90641487571674924f59d179e58f/href">https://medium.com/media/cf2f90641487571674924f59d179e58f/href</a></iframe><p>The response from Sarah Walsh, a former FA executive who was also on SBS’ panel, that “it’s a four-year cycle” and that “the real test is the Asian Cup”, was met with considerable pushback. While the comments may have been intended to emphasise long-term planning, many fans interpreted them as illustrative of a mindset that remains focused on regional success rather than broader global ambition.</p><p>Similarly, comments from Football Australia’s current executive leadership regarding the future direction of the Socceroos often lacked the level of detail many fans were hoping to hear.</p><p>The subsequent press conference involving Football Australia’s executive director of football, Heather Garriock, further fuelled debate. Garriock indicated that changes were coming and spoke of a desire for the Socceroos to become more attacking, yet many fans were left wanting greater specificity regarding what Football Australia’s long-term football philosophy actually entails.</p><p>Comments from Football Australia CEO Martin Kugeler, suggesting that every supporter believes they are a national team coach, were also poorly received in some sections of the football community. While understandable in isolation, such remarks risk reinforcing the perception that legitimate concerns about the game’s direction are being dismissed rather than engaged with.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*CcYQ8veBXKpk4qNr.jpg" /></figure><p>This matters because accountability becomes difficult when objectives are unclear.</p><p>Fans can assess wins and losses. They can debate player selections. They can critique tactics. What they cannot easily assess are strategic decisions, investment priorities, pathway development or long-term planning.</p><p>Without transparent benchmarks, every World Cup becomes a referendum. Every Asian Cup becomes a referendum. Every coach becomes a lightning rod for frustrations that may extend far beyond their control.</p><p>Concerns regarding accountability have not been limited to fans. Former Socceroos Mark Bosnich and Robbie Slater voiced similar frustrations on Stan Sport’s <em>Added Time</em>. Bosnich suggested there remains a reluctance within Australian football to ask difficult questions about the game’s direction, while Slater argued that meaningful accountability becomes difficult when those conducting reviews lack the requisite football expertise and authority.</p><p>The question should not simply be whether coaches are being held accountable.</p><p>It should also be how Football Australia itself measures success and communicates progress.</p><p>Published objectives, measurable milestones, regular reporting and clearly articulated footballing KPIs should be standard practice. Not because fans are entitled to every internal discussion, but because trust is difficult to maintain when stakeholders cannot see how success is being defined.</p><p>The same principle applies to Football Australia’s financial position.</p><p>Recent financial losses do not automatically indicate incompetence. Sporting organisations frequently invest heavily in development programs, infrastructure and long-term initiatives. However, substantial losses inevitably increase scrutiny regarding how resources are allocated and what outcomes those investments are producing.</p><p>Fans are more likely to embrace short-term pain when they can clearly see the long-term vision behind it.</p><p>Perhaps the most important question facing Australian football is whether it still wishes to define itself primarily as an underdog nation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Z-BxpHHOw1lB_6Eq.jpg" /></figure><p>Australia’s willingness to embrace the underdog role has been one of its greatest strengths. It has brought about a sense of resilience, unity and a capacity to exceed expectations.</p><p>However, there is a danger when that mentality becomes institutionalised. If every setback is explained by a lack of talent, ambition becomes constrained by assumption. How does a nation ever move up a tier if it constantly frames itself as belonging in its current one?</p><p>This does not mean pretending Australia is Spain. It does not mean abandoning pragmatism. It means asking a far more important question: What are we doing today that will allow Australian football to become stronger tomorrow?</p><p>Ultimately, the response to Australia’s World Cup exit should not be reduced to a debate over whether Tony Popovic deserves to keep his job. Nor should it be reduced to a discussion about one substitution or one penalty shootout.</p><p>The most important review following this World Cup should be broader than any individual coach.</p><p>Australia’s elimination should prompt a serious examination of football identity, governance, accountability, development and ambition. The challenge facing Australian football is not simply to continue exceeding expectations. It is to create the conditions that raise those expectations in the first place.</p><p>The question is no longer whether Australia can qualify for World Cups. The question is whether Australian football is finally prepared to define what comes next.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=df55491bd908" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Shifting From Competing To Controlling]]></title>
            <link>https://jamesrenton10.medium.com/shifting-from-competing-to-controlling-6b6f13b7fcc4?source=rss-83c6fb7c1865------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6b6f13b7fcc4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[perth-glory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[a-league]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tactical-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[James Renton]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 24 Jun 2026 05:32:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-25T05:27:40.942Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CXg496uMztmDuuRPjmXwGw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Pre-season preparations for Perth Glory’s 2026/27 campaign officially commenced on Monday, and while the 2026 FIFA World Cup continues to dominate discussion across Australian football circles, attention will gradually turn towards the realities awaiting the club closer to home.</strong></p><p>For the Glory, this is simply not just another season. Yes, that rhetoric has become beyond tiresome post-COVID; however, with the club entering its 30th anniversary, there is a growing sense that season 2026/27 represents a significant juncture in its modern history.</p><p>That significance should not be lost on anyone within the organisation. Players, coaching staff and club executives alike will be acutely aware that, by the time the A-League Men season begins in mid-October, supporters will expect to see a side that is organised, professional and ready to hit the ground running. After several years of inconsistency and at times severe underperformance, there can be little room for another slow start.</p><p>In that regard, the Glory have been among the more active clubs in the transfer market during the opening stages of the off-season.</p><p>The departures of experienced campaigners such as Nicholas Pennington and Lachie Wales have been accompanied by the exits of younger players including Joel Anasmo and Kaelan Majekodunmi. While fan reactions to player departures are often understandable, it is worth recognising the broader context in which clubs are now operating.</p><p>With the introduction of a hard salary cap in some form expected ahead of the upcoming campaign, A-League clubs are increasingly being forced to make difficult decisions in pursuit of greater squad balance and long-term sustainability. Under the ownership of the Pelligra Group, the Glory have developed a reputation for carrying squads that were far larger than necessary. Streamlining the playing group and creating greater flexibility within the wage structure was therefore always likely to be a priority this off-season.</p><p>Of those who departed, I would have liked to see both Luca Tevere and Zach Lisolajski offered fresh contracts, with the pair ultimately returning to Victoria to join NPL side Preston Lions.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*PMWmKoY4c47WVAvd.jpg" /></figure><p>Tevere’s technical quality was evident long before his transition from the NPL to the A-League and, while opportunities were limited, there were enough glimpses to suggest he possessed attributes capable of translating to a higher level.</p><p>Compared with other A-League wingers, Tevere ranked within the league’s top 10 per cent for dribble success rate and smart passes, while also posting above-average numbers for metrics such as non-penalty expected goals per shot, progressive passing and defensive actions. Statistics never tell the complete story, but they do point towards a player who may have offered more had he been afforded greater continuity and opportunity.</p><p>As for Lisolajski, injuries have been particularly cruel. What stood out during his early appearances was a willingness to defend aggressively while maintaining composure in possession. His performance in the Australia Cup Round of 32 against Melbourne City two seasons ago remains one of the more encouraging examples. At just 20 years of age, there appeared to be considerable scope for further development, which makes his departure somewhat disappointing from a long-term perspective.</p><p>Supporters’ concerns regarding the loss of Nicholas Pennington are also understandable. Across his two seasons at the club, Pennington established himself as one of the Glory’s most reliable performers and, in my view, was unfortunate not to claim the Most Glorious Player award at least once. Whether deployed in his preferred midfield role or asked to fill gaps elsewhere on the pitch, his work rate and consistency rarely wavered. Last season, operating largely out of position under Adam Griffiths, he still managed to contribute five goals.</p><p>However, Pennington’s departure also highlights the difficult reality facing clubs under a more restrictive salary framework. While it is understood the Glory were eager to retain his services, the constraints imposed by the cap ultimately mean that difficult decisions are inevitable, and even highly valued players can become casualties of broader squad-building priorities.</p><p>In terms of the players brought in by Adam Griffiths and Stan Lazaridis, I think Perth Glory have largely recruited well thus far, particularly when considering both the squad’s needs and the realities of the market.</p><p>At last season’s Most Glorious Player awards night, I had the opportunity to speak with Griffiths at length about the types of profiles required to improve the side and, more importantly, how the club intends to consistently implement the style of football he wants to see. While the specifics of that conversation will remain private, one theme was abundantly clear: technical quality remains a priority.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*d8q2oPhzGGV5aM0r6Dpnrw.jpeg" /></figure><p>That should come as little surprise. Griffiths has long advocated for a progressive and proactive approach to how he builds his game model. During his time with NPL NSW outfit Manly United in 2022, he outlined a philosophy centred on continual evolution and recruitment aligned to a defined playing identity.</p><blockquote>“We have a certain playing style that we want to continue to evolve into — it’s a progression. We started when I first came in, and then we brought in certain players that could continue that and again this year that’s the intent as well, to continue to bring in players that can fit into our playing style, and then hopefully that will translate into the games with high-quality technical and attacking football.”</blockquote><p>Whether the Glory can consistently realise that vision next season remains to be seen. However, based on the profiles recruited so far, there is genuine reason to believe the club is attempting to build a squad better equipped to execute it.</p><p>Starting in defence, the signing of Matt Dench represents an intriguing addition. The former Glory academy product returns to Western Australia after a brief stint with the Brisbane Roar and appears well-suited to the demands of the modern full-back role.</p><p>Dench profiles as an aggressive ball-progressor. Compared to other full-backs last season, he ranked among the league’s elite for accelerations with the ball, dribble success rate, defensive duel success and fouls won. Those metrics point towards a player capable of advancing play through both athleticism and directness, while also competing effectively in physical contests.</p><p>That said, there are still clear areas for refinement. His crossing accuracy, passing progression and overall defensive action volume all sat below league averages, suggesting there is still considerable development required before he becomes a complete A-League full-back.</p><p>Nevertheless, the upside is evident. Dench has demonstrated an ability to win individual moments and carry the ball into advanced areas; the next stage of his development will be improving the consistency and quality of his end product.</p><p>The midfield additions of Calem Nieuwenhof and Lucas Scicluna are perhaps even more telling when viewed through the lens of Griffiths’ broader football philosophy.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*QYjU2yscvVtbERXt.jpg" /></figure><p>The departure of Rhys Bozinovski last season left a noticeable void within Perth Glory’s midfield. Beyond his defensive and workrate qualities, Bozinovski provided valuable ball-carrying ability and progression through central areas — attributes that were often lacking throughout the campaign.</p><p>While Nieuwenhof’s time at Hearts was heavily disrupted by injury, his 2022/23 season with the Western Sydney Wanderers demonstrated exactly why he remains such an exciting acquisition.</p><p>If he can regain full fitness, Nieuwenhof possesses many of the qualities required to replace some of what Perth Glory lost with Bozinovski’s departure. During that standout campaign, he ranked above average among midfielders for both progressive carries and accelerations with the ball, highlighting his ability to break lines, drive beyond opponents and move his team into dangerous attacking positions.</p><p>In possession, he may not possess the passing range of specialists such as Luke Brattan or Alex Rufer, but he remains a capable distributor. His willingness to play longer passes and switch the point of attack provides another avenue of progression, while his attacking output should not be overlooked.</p><p>His underlying shooting metrics during that season were comfortably above average, particularly regarding shot quality, suggesting he can contribute meaningful numbers in the final third. For a side that struggled to consistently create and convert chances last season, that added threat from midfield could prove invaluable for the Glory.</p><p>Scicluna, meanwhile, arrives as something of an unknown quantity at A-League level, though the indicators are encouraging.</p><p>Having spoken with <a href="https://x.com/scout_aussie">Aussie Scout</a> earlier last month, the assessment was that Scicluna shares many of the same technical traits as his brother Dylan, albeit with a slightly different stylistic profile. Less combative perhaps, but potentially possessing greater quality on the ball.</p><p>In many respects, Scicluna feels like a classic Moneyball signing: a player arriving without significant fanfare but with underlying numbers that suggest genuine upside. During the 2024 NPL NSW season with the Central Coast Mariners, he ranked among the competition’s elite for accelerations with the ball while also producing above-average numbers for progressive passing and dribble success.</p><p>Taken together, the arrivals of Nieuwenhof and Scicluna provide further evidence of a deliberate recruitment strategy centred around increasing technical quality and improving Perth Glory’s ability to progress possession through midfield.</p><p>Importantly, this should not be interpreted as an indictment of the current midfielders in Will Freney or Giovanni De Abreu. Rather, it reflects the need for greater profile diversity within the squad. Different tactical problems require different solutions, and the Glory’s midfield now appears to possess a broader range of tools than it did twelve months ago.</p><p>If these signings perform as expected, they should help reduce one of the more frustrating tendencies of last season’s side: the overreliance on direct, low-percentage long balls as a primary method of progression.</p><p>Further forward, the return of another academy graduate in Henry Hore represents smart and proactive business.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*T_pIHzX7DOfvFTuL.jpg" /></figure><p>Perth Glory’s need for additional attacking depth, particularly in wide areas, has been obvious for some time. While Hore endured a difficult campaign with the Brisbane Roar last season, it is worth acknowledging the context. Brisbane were among the league’s poorest attacking sides and rarely provided a platform for their forwards to thrive.</p><p>At his best, Hore has already shown he can be an effective A-League contributor.</p><p>Stan Lazaridis heavily implied in the club’s announcement that the Glory view Hore primarily as a left-sided attacker, and that role appears well-suited to his strengths. Rather than operating as a traditional touchline winger, he seems likely to occupy interior channels and combine with players such as Sam Sutton and Tom Lawrence in advanced areas.</p><p>Most importantly, Hore has demonstrated a capacity to score goals. His 2023/24 campaign yielded seven goals despite the turbulence surrounding Brisbane both on and off the field, highlighting an ability to remain productive in difficult circumstances.</p><p>His finishing profile is particularly encouraging. Across the two seasons prior to last year, Hore consistently converted between 17 and 18% of his chances, indicating a player capable of making the most of opportunities when positioned in dangerous areas.</p><p>That may ultimately be the key to unlocking his value for the Glory. The challenge will be ensuring Hore regularly receives the ball in zones where he can influence matches close to goal. If Perth Glory are to emerge as genuine finals contenders next season, they will require significantly greater attacking output than they produced last year, and Hore looks likely to play a central role in providing it.</p><p>Before turning to the profile that still appears most in need of addressing, it would be remiss not to acknowledge the players who have recommitted to the club over the past month.</p><p>Securing the futures of academy products such as Will Freney, Giovanni De Abreu and Sebastian Despotovski, alongside recent arrivals Charbel Shamoon and Jaiden Kucharski, represents more than simple squad retention. In many respects, it is a vote of confidence in the direction the club is attempting to take under Adam Griffiths and Stan Lazaridis.</p><p>The same can be said for Stefan Colakovski, who enters the new campaign with the benefit of a full pre-season behind him. Given the flashes he showed after returning to Perth last season, there is every reason to believe he can become an important contributor should he remain fit and available.</p><p>Of course, the two most significant signatures were always going to be Adam Taggart and Tom Lawrence.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*j-zYlEFsUVWcX9XPrHwBqg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Given the financial realities facing A-League clubs, there was understandable uncertainty surrounding whether Perth Glory could retain both players. Throughout the second half of last season, I regularly discussed that very possibility with football director Stan Lazaridis and, to his credit, he remained consistently confident the club would find a way to keep both.</p><p>Retaining them is significant not simply because of their individual quality, but because the Glory’s hopes of becoming a genuine finals contender next season remain heavily tied to their influence.</p><p>Taggart’s situation is particularly interesting.</p><p>There has been considerable discussion amongst supporters regarding what role the club captain should play moving forward, especially when his future remained unresolved earlier in the year. Some of that debate was understandable. Over the last two seasons, injuries have repeatedly interrupted his rhythm, limiting both his training continuity and his ability to string together extended runs of matches.</p><p>That context is important, but it should not completely shield him from scrutiny.</p><p>For Perth Glory to take meaningful strides forward next season, they need a rejuvenated Adam Taggart. Not necessarily the Golden Boot-winning version that scored 20 goals, but certainly a more influential and potent presence inside the penalty area than we have seen recently.</p><p>The underlying numbers support that assessment. His finishing metrics have declined significantly over the last two campaigns, suggesting that criticism of his performances was not entirely without foundation.</p><p>The hope for the Glory is that a consistent pre-season, improved fitness and a greater volume of creative support around him will allow Taggart to rediscover some of the sharpness that previously made him one of the competition’s most dangerous forwards.</p><p>As for Tom Lawrence, there is little debate regarding his quality.</p><p>When available, the Welsh marquee man has been nothing short of transformative. I recall speaking with one member of the playing group early last season who described Lawrence’s first training session, where his first meaningful action was to rifle a strike into the top corner. It quickly became apparent that Perth Glory had acquired a player operating at a different level technically.</p><p>His performances throughout the campaign reinforced that impression.</p><p>The hat-trick against Melbourne City in the 3–1 away victory remains one of the standout individual displays of the season, while his performance in the 3–0 win against the Central Coast Mariners, which included an Olimpico and an assist for Taggart, demonstrated the variety of ways he can influence matches.</p><p>Perhaps most importantly, Lawrence arrived in Perth having completed virtually no pre-season preparation. Add the subsequent challenges posed by plantar fasciitis and it becomes easier to appreciate why supporters may not yet have seen the very best version of him.</p><p>If both Lawrence and Taggart can remain fit for extended periods, there is every reason to believe their partnership could become one of the most influential attacking combinations in the competition.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*afUHkhu6VpTRKBUlOGaylw.jpeg" /></figure><p>To complete the squad, however, it remains abundantly clear that Perth Glory need to use their final visa position on a right-sided winger.</p><p>Speculation has already linked the club with players such as Joe Lolley, Miguel Di Pizio and Bozhidar Kraev, though whether either move proves realistic remains unclear. In my last piece on the Glory, I explored a number of possible targets, both domestic and international, so there is little value revisiting the same names.</p><p>What matters more is the profile.</p><p>The next winger must be capable of consistently winning 1v1 situations, creating separation from defenders and providing genuine attacking threat from wide areas. Too often last season Perth Glory’s attack lacked variation, predictability became an issue, and opposition defences were rarely forced into difficult decisions.</p><p>A player in the mould of Joe Lolley would address many of those concerns.</p><p>Forward runs. Ball-carrying ability. Creativity. Goal threat. Final-third production.</p><p>Those are the attributes the Glory still need to add.</p><p>Identifying a player capable of delivering all of those qualities within the club’s financial constraints will be no easy task. However, it is difficult to escape the feeling that this final signing may ultimately become one of the defining decisions of the Glory’s off-season.</p><p>Perhaps the bigger question from here isn’t who Perth Glory sign next: it’s what they become. All four signings share a common characteristic, in that they provide progressive value, particularly through their ability to carry the ball and advance play. That is unlikely to be a coincidence.</p><p>If Adam Griffiths is to successfully implement the style of football he has repeatedly spoken about, Perth Glory must become more consistent in the way they move the ball through the thirds and create attacking opportunities.</p><p>Last season, too much of the Glory’s progression relied on direct play, transitional moments or individual flashes of quality. While those approaches can be effective in isolation, they rarely provide the platform for sustained success.</p><p>The recruitment undertaken thus far suggests an attempt to address that issue.</p><p>By increasing the squad’s technical level, the Glory should become better equipped to navigate build-up phases, retain possession under pressure and create advantages through controlled progression rather than necessity. Ideally, there will be more players capable of receiving in tight spaces, combining quickly with teammates, carrying the ball beyond opponents and advancing attacks with purpose.</p><p>Exactly how Griffiths chooses to structure that process remains to be seen. Recruitment alone does not guarantee tactical evolution. However, if there is one overarching takeaway from the Glory’s business so far, it is that the club appears to be assembling a squad better suited to playing on the front foot.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vbfAlOSvt1X_YfKjf52Jxg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Ultimately, that is where the conversation surrounding Perth Glory’s 2026/27 season becomes most interesting.</p><p>The challenge is no longer simply to compete.</p><p>The challenge is to control.</p><p>Too often last season, Perth Glory were reactive rather than proactive. They could match their opponents physically, remain organised defensively and occasionally produce moments of attacking quality, but rarely did they dictate the rhythm, territory or tempo of matches for extended periods.</p><p>The best sides do not merely survive games; they shape them. They force their opponents to adapt, rather than constantly adapting themselves.</p><p>Viewed through that lens, the Glory’s recruitment begins to make considerably more sense. Dench, Nieuwenhof, Scicluna and Hore are not simply individual additions. Collectively, they represent an attempt to build a side capable of sustaining possession, progressing the ball more effectively and spending more time imposing itself on opponents.</p><p>Whether that translates into results remains the defining question of the season ahead. But if Perth Glory are to return to the finals and re-establish themselves as a genuine force within the competition, the shift from competing to controlling may prove just as important as any individual signing made during the off-season.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6b6f13b7fcc4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Ceiling On Potential?]]></title>
            <link>https://jamesrenton10.medium.com/a-ceiling-on-potential-49f600f8ffe1?source=rss-83c6fb7c1865------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/49f600f8ffe1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[tony-popovic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[world-cup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[socceroos]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tactical-analysis]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[James Renton]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 22 Jun 2026 01:26:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-22T02:00:54.072Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YBdgyx_6AuJf3F7PQIN5hQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>“How sustainable is this approach?”</strong></p><p>In many ways, that was the question lingering after the Socceroos’ 2–0 defeat to the United States in their second group game of the 2026 FIFA World Cup. While much of the post-match discussion centred on Tony Popovic’s team selection and Australia’s lethargic first-half performance, the bigger issue was arguably more fundamental: can the Socceroos’ current game model consistently succeed against elite opposition?</p><p>That question matters because the defeat to the United States did not simply expose a poor performance. It exposed the limitations of a style of play that is heavily dependent on defensive organisation, yet often struggles to provide enough attacking threat to relieve pressure when facing stronger teams.</p><p>It is evident that the coaching staff remain committed to their approach. Following the clash with the Americans, assistant coach and former Socceroos captain Mile Jedinak pushed back against criticism surrounding the team’s selection decisions.</p><blockquote>“You’re never going to make everybody happy. We understand that. But what happens is we have access to the players all the time and these decisions have to be taken. It’s never easy.”</blockquote><p>That response came as part of a broader question which, while touching on selection, was primarily focused on Australia’s overall approach to the game.</p><blockquote>“A lot of the punditry from players that just came before you and some you played with is that Australia was sent out to soak up pressure, to be defensive rather than be proactive and force themselves on the game. What do you make of that reaction?”</blockquote><p>Instead of engaging with the broader discussion around the Socceroos’ style of play, Jedinak largely focused on the selection aspect of the question. Yet the conversation around Australia’s approach is a valid one and deserves scrutiny.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*S6PmIsTtiq2Th8sc.jpg" /></figure><p>While Jedinak argued that it is “a pretty narrow view” to categorise teams as either attacking or defensive, the reality is that Tony Popovic’s teams have consistently been built from a defensive foundation. Whether at Perth Glory, Western Sydney Wanderers, Melbourne Victory or now with the Socceroos, defensive structure has always been the cornerstone of his football.</p><p>Popovic is renowned across Australia for relentlessly drilling defensive positioning, spacing and organisation to an almost obsessive degree. Perth Glory media manager Gareth Morgan described the process in an <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/fifa-world-cup-2026-socceroos-tony-popovic-coaching-style/23k10gzyy">interview with SBS:</a></p><blockquote>“I’ve never seen a defence worked so hard on the training ground. We played a back five at the time, and they were just drilled relentlessly day in, day out. It was almost like autopilot in terms of knowing where the other players were.”</blockquote><p>That level of organisation is clearly visible in the current Socceroos side, and to be fair, it has produced results.</p><p>Against Türkiye, Australia’s defensive structure was outstanding. The Socceroos denied Türkiye genuine high-quality opportunities despite facing 30 shots. Türkiye generated just 1.33 expected goals from those efforts — an average of only 0.04 xG per shot — while Australia produced 0.77 xG from significantly fewer chances.</p><p>Opta’s shot map from the game reflects that reality. Most of Türkiye’s attempts came from low-quality positions, validating the effectiveness of Australia’s defensive setup.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Q_ws7EZrvZ4Ug9MI.jpeg" /></figure><p>However, the Türkiye match also demonstrated something equally important: Popovic’s system works best when it has a genuine transition threat. Australia were prepared to concede possession and play more directly, with 21.4% of their passes classified as long compared to Türkiye’s 4%. Crucially, they had Nestory Irankunda’s pace to threaten in behind, which directly contributed to Australia’s opening goal in the 2–0 victory.</p><p>That is where the sustainability question begins to emerge.</p><p>Against Türkiye, Australia had both elements of the formula: defensive organisation and an attacking outlet. Against the United States, they only had one.</p><p>The Socceroos entered the match with the same defensive mindset and structure, but without the players best equipped to provide an escape valve in transition. Both Irankunda and Connor Metcalfe were dropped to the bench in favour of Nishan Velupillay and Matthew Leckie, removing much of Australia’s pace and dynamism.</p><p>The consequence was predictable. Australia could defend, but they could not relieve pressure.</p><p>Of course, context matters. The Socceroos were facing an outstanding United States side coached by Mauricio Pochettino. The Americans’ use of a front two occupied Australia’s three centre-backs, creating a domino effect that allowed them to exploit both their technical superiority and physicality throughout the first half.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*yVn0ryQ4Y1eXF-WN.jpg" /></figure><p>Yet the larger concern was what happened whenever Australia regained possession.</p><p>Defending deep is a perfectly legitimate strategy. The problem arises when there is no credible threat once the ball is won back. <a href="https://football360.com.au/world-cup-analysis-socceroos-australia-usa-paraguay/">As noted by Aussie Scout during Football360’s post-match analysis</a>, the Socceroos had just 30% possession in the first half and lacked any meaningful outlet. Possession was repeatedly turned over, pressure immediately returned, and Australia found themselves trapped in a cycle of defending.</p><p>The second half brought tactical adjustments. The Socceroos pressed more aggressively man-to-man and introduced Irankunda, Connor Metcalfe and Cristian Volpato from the bench. The performance improved, and Australia found better situations from which to attack.</p><p>But even then, the limitations of the approach remained apparent.</p><p>Too often, Australia’s attacks became one-dimensional. Repeated lofted crosses were directed towards Irankunda, operating as a lone striker, despite him being significantly outmatched aerially by three aggressive American centre-backs. The Socceroos created moments, but rarely looked capable of generating sustained pressure or consistently high-quality chances.</p><p>That ultimately circles back to the original question: how sustainable is this approach? Defensive organisation can keep Australia competitive against stronger opponents, and against teams like Türkiye it can be highly effective. But at World Cup level, defending alone is rarely enough. Without reliable attacking outlets capable of relieving pressure, progressing the ball and threatening in transition, the margin for error becomes exceptionally small.</p><p>The question is less about whether the Socceroos should defend and more about the intent behind how they defend.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*yv9jAJdEdhLn5yoo.jpg" /></figure><p>In the first half against the United States, Australia often sat in a passive mid-block that was exploited far too easily. One of the more common observations after the match was how deep the wingbacks were positioned within the defensive structure, leaving them with significant distances to cover whenever they attempted to engage their direct opponents. The result was a defensive shape that often appeared reactive rather than disruptive, allowing the Americans to progress the ball with relative comfort.</p><p>It inevitably circles back to the same question that has hovered over this team throughout the tournament: how sustainable is this approach?</p><p>One comment on social media captured the debate particularly well:</p><blockquote>“If we had a foreigner in charge that sets up the way Popa does, he’d be accused of not understanding the Australian way. Not having a go … I hope Popa gets held to the same standard with the regressive way he sets us up. I may be in the minority, but even the Turkey game, I’m not going to say we were lucky as we somewhat planned for it. But how sustainable is this approach? Sit deep (and Popa deep is different to a normal deep), the minute we stepped our lines and pressed, we looked a different team.”</blockquote><p>What made that observation compelling was that the second half appeared to support it.</p><p>With the introduction of Nestory Irankunda, Connor Metcalfe and Cristian Volpato, as well as Jason Geria’s arrival into the back three, Australia were able to push higher up the pitch and engage the United States further from goal. The Socceroos looked more proactive, more aggressive and, perhaps most importantly, more capable of managing the game with and without the ball. While they still struggled to create clear-cut chances, the Americans generated very little of note after halftime.</p><p>That contrast is what makes the broader discussion so interesting.</p><p>There is little doubt that Popovic’s model can produce results. The Socceroos automatically qualified for this World Cup for only the second time in their history, while his club career has consistently demonstrated the effectiveness of well-drilled defensive organisation. Against many opponents, particularly within Asia, that structure can provide a platform for success.</p><p>The concern is whether that same approach places a ceiling on what this current generation can achieve against elite opposition.</p><p>This is a young and talented squad with players who often thrive in aggressive, transition-based and attacking environments at club level. Yet the national team’s game model frequently asks them to prioritise control through defensive organisation rather than initiative through possession, pressing and attacking play. There is nothing inherently wrong with that choice, but it does raise legitimate questions about whether Australia are maximising the strengths of their player pool.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*UP9MaqtDBU4CHGxR.jpg" /></figure><p>Those questions are unlikely to disappear anytime soon, particularly given Football Australia’s decision to extend Tony Popovic’s contract before the tournament. This is clearly the direction the federation believes the Socceroos should take.</p><p>Perhaps the answer will arrive over the coming weeks. If Australia can secure a result against Paraguay and progress into the knockout rounds, the debate may quieten. If the Socceroos continue to struggle against stronger opposition, however, scrutiny of both the tactics and the personnel choices will only intensify.</p><p>Ultimately, the discussion should not be about whether the Socceroos are defensive or attacking. It should be about whether their approach gives them the best chance of competing against the world’s strongest nations.</p><p>For now, that remains an open question. One that may ultimately define both this World Cup campaign and Tony Popovic’s tenure as Socceroos coach.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=49f600f8ffe1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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