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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Jamie Brummell on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Jamie Brummell on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Jamie Brummell on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jamiebrummell?source=rss-48b182631d12------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Detecting Windows User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jamiebrummell/detecting-windows-user-account-control-uac-bypass-attempts-8ef14509b91a?source=rss-48b182631d12------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[threat-hunting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dfir]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jamie Brummell]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 10 Feb 2020 12:23:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-02-12T09:04:18.652Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Following on from my previous post…</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@jamiebrummell/hunting-evil-on-windows-hosts-with-behavioural-indicators-of-compromise-f3540b47c631">Hunting Evil on Windows hosts with Behavioural Indicators of Compromise</a></p><p>… and once again inspired by the work of <a href="https://twitter.com/CyberRaiju/status/1225363274293628928?s=20">others</a>, I looked at how BIoCs (detection rules in Palo Alto Networks’ Cortex XDR) could be used to identify potential Windows User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts.</p><p>Bypassing UAC is an adversarial privilege escalation technique defined by MITRE in their ATT&amp;CK Enterprise matrix as technique ID <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1088/">T1088</a>.</p><blockquote>“Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges to perform a task under administrator-level permissions by prompting the user for confirmation.</blockquote><blockquote>If the UAC protection level of a computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Windows programs are allowed to elevate privileges or execute some elevated COM objects without prompting the user through the UAC notification box.</blockquote><blockquote>Malicious software may also be injected into a trusted process to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user. Adversaries can use these techniques to elevate privileges to administrator if the target process is unprotected.”</blockquote><p>The <a href="https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME">UACMe</a> Github project provides an extensive list of UAC bypass methods, and the related binaries have been listed in a tweet by <a href="https://twitter.com/CyberRaiju?s=20">Jai Minton</a>:</p><h3>Jai Minton on Twitter</h3><p>Some binaries which have known UAC bypass techniques. wusa WSReset winsat tzsync TpmInit taskhost SystemPropertiesAdvanced sysprep svchost slui setupsqm sdclt schtasks rstrui recdisc pkgmgr osk oobe msconfig mmc migwiz mcx2prov iscsicli inetmgr GWXUXWorker fodhelper EventVwr</p><h3>Jai Minton on Twitter</h3><p>dismhost dccw credwiz consent computerdefaults CompMgmtLauncher clipup cliconfg BitlockerWizardElev May want to keep an eye on children processes of these binaries. More details on common known methods and current patching status can be found: https://t.co/5a9q29QTdG</p><p>Constructing a BIoC to ‘keep an eye on child processes of these binaries’, as per Jai’s advice, was a simple case of pasting this list into a new BIoC as follows:</p><p><strong><em>Process</em></strong> [ <strong>action type</strong> = execution <strong>AND</strong> <strong>name</strong> = * ] <strong>AND</strong> <strong><em>Process</em></strong> [ <strong>name</strong> = wusa.exe, WSReset.exe, winsat.exe, tzsync.exe, TpmInit.exe, taskhost.exe, SystemPropertiesAdvanced.exe, sysprep.exe, svchost.exe, slui.exe, setupsqm.exe, sdclt.exe, schtasks.exe, rstrui.exe, recdisc.exe, pkgmgr.exe, osk.exe, oobe.exe, msconfig.exe, mmc.exe, migwiz.exe, mcx2prov.exe, iscsicli.exe, inetmgr.exe, GWXUXWorker.exe, fodhelper.exe, EventVwr.exe, dismhost.exe, dccw.exe, credwiz.exe, consent.exe, computerdefaults.exe, CompMgmtLauncher.exe, clipup.exe, cliconfg.exe, BitlockerWizardElev.exe , <strong>cgo name</strong> = wusa.exe, WSReset.exe, winsat.exe, tzsync.exe, TpmInit.exe, taskhost.exe, SystemPropertiesAdvanced.exe, sysprep.exe, svchost.exe, slui.exe, setupsqm.exe, sdclt.exe, schtasks.exe, rstrui.exe, recdisc.exe, pkgmgr.exe, osk.exe, oobe.exe, msconfig.exe, mmc.exe, migwiz.exe, mcx2prov.exe, iscsicli.exe, inetmgr.exe, GWXUXWorker.exe, fodhelper.exe, EventVwr.exe, dismhost.exe, dccw.exe, credwiz.exe, consent.exe, computerdefaults.exe, CompMgmtLauncher.exe, clipup.exe, cliconfg.exe, BitlockerWizardElev.exe ]</p><p>This will alert when any of the above processes spawn a child process. Here’s how the BIoC appears in the Cortex XDR UI:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XNDd5b1UWb5oCxqYVkNieg.png" /></figure><p>You may want to start with Low or informational severity for this BIoC before moving to Medium in order to monitor for false positives.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8ef14509b91a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Hunting Evil on Windows hosts with Behavioural Indicators of Compromise]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jamiebrummell/hunting-evil-on-windows-hosts-with-behavioural-indicators-of-compromise-f3540b47c631?source=rss-48b182631d12------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dfir]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[threat-hunting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jamie Brummell]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 31 Jan 2020 14:53:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-02-01T08:28:30.476Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Inspired by <a href="https://twitter.com/robtlee">Rob Lee</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/mikepilkington">Mike Pilkington</a>’s excellent ‘<a href="https://digital-forensics.sans.org/community/posters">Hunt Evil</a>’ guidance, I started exploring how Palo Alto Networks’ Cortex XDR could be configured to do this hunting automatically.</p><blockquote>“Knowing what’s normal on a Windows host helps cut through the noise to quickly locate potential malware.”</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*uh8twwb6eWCCvs-731blaw.png" /><figcaption>SANS DFIR — Hunt Evil</figcaption></figure><p>Hunting in Cortex XDR is carried out with either Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) or Behavioural Indicators of Compromise (BIoCs).</p><blockquote>“Instead of hashes and other traditional indicators of compromise, BIOC rules detect the behaviour of processes, registry, files, and network activity.”</blockquote><p>A BIoC to hunt for an encrypted PowerShell reverse shell would look something like this:</p><p><strong><em>Network </em></strong>[ <strong><em>action type</em></strong><em> = Outgoing</em><strong><em>, </em></strong><em>Failed</em><strong><em> AND remote port</em></strong><em> = 443</em> ] <strong><em>AND Process </em></strong>[ <strong><em>cmd</em></strong><em> = *web*downloadstring*.ps1*</em><strong><em>, </em></strong><em>*web*downloadstring*.exe*</em><strong><em> AND name</em></strong><em> = powershell.exe</em> ]</p><p>If those conditions are true on any Windows host running XDR with that BIoC enabled (assuming the severity is set to ‘Low’ or above), an alert will be created for further investigation.</p><p>Cortex XDR automatically receives numerous pre-configured BIoCs from Palo Alto Networks. Some examples are shown below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*inAucFYuhVhrUIlI4b0zow.png" /><figcaption>A sample of Cortex XDR BIoCs</figcaption></figure><p>One such BIoC looks interesting for our ‘Hunt Evil’ purposes. It looks for unsigned processes masquerading as legitimate Windows processes.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*t6iX7ueNULyaf3Gky6yhHw.png" /><figcaption>BIoC created by Palo Alto Networks</figcaption></figure><p>This BIoC should have its severity changed to Medium or High in order to generate an alert and related incident in XDR for further investigation.</p><p>We may also want to add additional processes to the list that is checked by that BIoC, as per those listed on the Hunt Evil guidance (taskhostw.exe, runtimebroker.exe, and lsaiso.exe).</p><p>However, this BIoC is reliant on an implicit trust of the Windows CryptoAPI. As we’ve recently discovered (thanks to our friends at the NSA) with the Windows CryptoAPI Spoofing Vulnerability (CVE-2020–0601), perhaps we cannot always trust apparently legitimate, signed processes.</p><p>This got me thinking about other ways to define ‘Hunt Evil’ BIoCs for Windows hosts that do not rely on checking the process signer.</p><p>Thankfully this is fairly straightforward, as we can look at the username launching the process, parent/child process relationships, execution path, command-line arguments, and more :-)</p><p>The screenshot below details a few I created:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*b1S2EsksoYaMOX5aF93klQ.png" /><figcaption>Hunting Evil automatically without reliance on checking the process signer</figcaption></figure><p>There are many more BIoCs we can construct to verify that Windows processes are running with expected parameters.</p><p>Hopefully this is enough to get you started if you think this kind of automated hunting might be useful in your environment.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f3540b47c631" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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