<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by James on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by James on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@jasdnldterry?source=rss-14b20f1ffe44------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 12:43:38 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@jasdnldterry/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Does history (as a discipline, or practice) have a direction?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jasdnldterry/does-history-as-a-discipline-or-practice-have-a-direction-df694dd65049?source=rss-14b20f1ffe44------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/df694dd65049</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[national-security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[James]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 24 Sep 2019 01:47:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-09-24T01:47:07.187Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote>Is History Progressive?</blockquote><p>Does history (as a discipline, or practice) have a direction? In other words, do historical explanations improve over time? Naively, we may assume that growth in historical knowledge is definitional: we know more history at present because we have more history to know about. So, in this sense, the historical database does increase, and this may be taken as axiomatic.</p><p>But absolute growth in data in no way implies better — more accurate — understanding. At present, we have access to more historical information, more quickly, then at any point in history, but correct interpretation of that information has not scaled commensurately. Far from seeing growth, history as anything other than a descriptive discipline is falling further and further behind. Even worse, few seem even aware of the problem. Historians are drowning in data, and have nowhere evolved their structures to address this. It is remarkable that the practice of history — how history is produced — would be immediately cognizable by Herodotus, the “father of history” himself! The Lindy Effect, first identified by Albert Goldman, and later given its modern definition by Benoit Mandelbrot, predicts that the work model of the historian for all practical purposes is unassailable; but perhaps a sufficiently committed vanguard may demonstrate via practice superior returns in utilizing novel methodologies. The key is not to change all minds, but just one mind if that is the kind of mind you want. As any historian should recognize, it isn’t the majority that is history’s primary agent of change.</p><p>No one, for any real world problem, asks “where are the historians?” Nor, if they did, would the answers they received resemble anything actionable. While it is not the purpose of the historian to provide road maps for politicians or the business class, the obvious inability of historians to do so if reflects the blunt reality that historical understanding is of an entirely different category from understanding in the sciences. Understanding — knowledge — in history is a preferred — and wholly arbitrary — perspective, a frame or lens that serves as the selection function for the data to be incorporated into the analytical framework. This is why Herodotus, Thucydides, or Gibbon all remain relevant as historians, and why Thales of Miletus has none as a scientist. Scientific explanations converge to unity (consensus) over time; there is no such equivalent social dynamic in history. Historical debates never resolve; they may be abandoned, but are as liable to subsequently return as otherwise, and the issues themselves remain live. This is precisely the kind of phenomenon non-progressive fields demonstrate.</p><p>Yet it is not incoherent to speak of truth in history. History really did happen just one way, and the discipline’s goal should be to approach, as nearly as possible, that absolute. History’s failure to do so to date is not evidence that the task cannot be accomplished. But to do so, history itself needs nothing less than a cultural revolution.</p><p>Interestingly, the most creative people are likely to be more often wrong, on average, than their less creative counterparts. If you look at the most successful industrialists — or politicians, for that matter — they often exhibited outré views or simply outlandish beliefs. (Alan Brooke, wartime Chief of the [British] Imperial General Staff during the Second World War, once reflected that Winston Churchill had ten ideas per day, of which perhaps one was good, and that the crux of the matter was identifying which one was which). We most often celebrate geniuses for being right, and retrospectively edit out all the instances in which they were wrong. In one sense, it is wholly appropriate to do so (as being right really does matter). But this is of no practical use, as the rightness of an idea can only be tested over time, and there is no objective test in the moment, at the point of hiring (or funding), that can identify which idea may be a loser, or a unicorn. So perhaps we should look instead to evidence for the rate at which a person produces ideas, and one way of doing so is to identify people with a high quotient of ideas that appear, on first review, simply wrong.</p><p>The reported combination drone and missile strikes on the Saudi oil production facility at Abqaiq and Khurais underscores a step change in the military capacity of low-ranked military powers. Perhaps using its Houthi clients as a cut-out, the Iranian government was able, at least temporarily, to halve Saudi oil production, and at a total cost of doing so most likely no more than U.S. $10 million, and probably much less. By contrast, Saudi Arabia boasts the world’s third-highest military budget. There is no better real-world demonstration of the declining utility of military high technology. The operation would be easily repeatable, and at a much-enlarged scope, if so desired. The cost, again, would be minimal. The counter-force expense on the part of coalition forces, American or Saudi, would be three orders of magnitude greater.</p><p>The Pentagon should be listening; Beijing certainly is. Force protection for U.S. military assets is much more robust than that at Saudi oil facilities, but the delta is perhaps not as great as might be assumed, and U.S. defenses would likely be overwhelmed if seriously tested in a similar fashion. This is all shades of the 2002 Millennium Challenge war game overseen by U.S Joint Forces Command, when Van Riper, a Marine general commanding the enemy “red team” destroyed a full U.S. Navy carrier task force in a matter of minutes using a combination of missiles and small, very fast suicide boats loaded with explosives. Make the appropriate substitutions, and you have a scenario eerily prescient of the Abqaiq and Khurais attacks.</p><p>The current atmosphere in Washington is emphasizing great power conflict and pushing out the military technological frontier: hypersonics, directed energy, infantry exoskeletons, a Space Force. This is a science-fiction force structure, against which only China is positioned to compete. But as the U.S. moves up the military value-added ladder towards greater complexity and sophistication, it should be forewarned against abandoning the bottom rungs, dominated by lower orders of military life, rapidly evolving, into forms and modes awkwardly addressable, if at all, by the apex predators. Don’t forget: even the king can be felled by the bacillus and the virus.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=df694dd65049" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[You Don’t Memorialize the Present]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jasdnldterry/you-dont-memorialize-the-present-4835ee7e312d?source=rss-14b20f1ffe44------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4835ee7e312d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[James]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 29 May 2018 05:06:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-05-29T05:06:31.935Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For good reason, current U.S. law prohibits memorials to conflicts less than a decade in the past. Opinions change: events tend to lose their frisson given time, absent new efforts contrariwise. World War One was the War To End All Wars; in the U.S. today, it is all but forgotten. World War Two continues its unlimited rise as the War to Beat All Wars, the classic conflict of Good vs. Evil. Vietnam, so vital for the Baby Boomer generation, has lost its charge and likely will be forgotten, relegated to the list of conflicts including the Korean, Spanish-American, and Mexican-American Wars, not to mention Gulf I, virtually without resonance in the public imagination.</p><p>Memorials, by their nature, are inflexible. They freeze a moment’s considered opinion or compromise, for all time. The Vietnam Memorial would doubtless look very different if it was built today at half-a-century’s remove, rather than less than a decade after Saigon’s fall. So too if the Second World War memorialization (not incidentally, a supremely elegant design) had been completed in 1950, with memories much rawer.</p><p>This goes doubly for ongoing conflicts. It speaks to the inchoate nature of that political construct “The Global War on Terror” that this conflict would be commemorated in media res. At least with the previous efforts events had reached a concluding note. It is unusual to celebrate a campaign that one has not yet won.</p><p>Further, the effort risks conflating many disparate narratives. al-Qaeda was solely responsible for the September 11, 2001, atrocities. That the U.S. in 2018 would be fighting, in some cases, the sons of Taliban foot soldiers not yet born when the 2001 attacks occurred should cause our political class pause. That it does not is an indictment in itself. But to explain 2018 by 2001 requires a blithe calculus. The same for Iraq; it is of course perfectly impossible to imagine Gulf War II without the events of September 11. In this way, as with ongoing U.S. efforts against the Taliban, can a thread be drawn connecting each to the other. But to claim that either was or is about terrorism as such is simply wrong. Should the logistical operation supporting the Saudi air war over Yemen be included? Or the disaster in Chad October last?</p><p>There is a distinction between the cause for which one fights and the soldiers who fought. Much of the support for a Global War on Terrorism Memorial has centered on honoring the service — and sacrifices — of the latter. Functionally, it is not possible to separate the two; a memorial to post-September 11, 2001, veterans as veterans solely (without context) has no precedent in American history, and would (justifiably) fail to satisfy any constituency. Yet the attempt to memorialize both simultaneously risks the problems discussed above.</p><p>The veterans of America’s current overseas wars deserve recognition. But this should be done in a way respectful to their sacrifices, which means being honest about the choices Washington has made in sending them in harm’s way, and for what reasons. Allowing our politicians to conflate their decisions with the crimes of September 11 does not meet this standard.</p><p>The Global War on Terrorism is now in its seventeenth year. Given what we know about the expected lifetimes of entities without natural limits, we can expect that it will be ongoing in 2035. This should produce caution, not haste. Time reveals perspectives we either lack awareness of or the knowledge for in the moment. A memorial, although deserved, can wait.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4835ee7e312d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Robot Love]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jasdnldterry/robot-love-1d6e1d7f04b5?source=rss-14b20f1ffe44------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1d6e1d7f04b5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[future-of-work]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[robotics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[robots]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[James]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 11 Feb 2017 02:43:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-02-25T16:06:57.464Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The word robot is of recent pedigree, less, in fact, than a century old. It was popularized by Karel Capek, a twentieth-century Czech dramaturge, social critic, humanist, and man of letters, who borrowed it from his brother. Beforehand, they were most often known as automata, Mechanical Turks, or androids. He cribbed it from the Old Church Slavonic <em>rabota</em>, or forced servile labor, which spoke to an East European world of aristocratic landlords, village communes, and uncompensated work for tenancy. A mode of life for centuries, Capek mapped it to the twentieth century industrial world of mass manufacturing and the assembly line. His play, <em>Rossum’s Universal Robotics, </em>named after the eponymous company, abbreviate R.U.R., that produces machine workers, in English robots, that perform any labor a human is capable of, but by nature lack a soul. There are, it doubtless does <em>not</em> astonish, no shortage of demand. The ambit of tasks to be automated constantly expands, encompassing not only the arduous (heavy physical or repetitious labor) and the dangerous (military service), but eventually human reproduction itself (human women forget how). Humanity’s creation becomes its doom, as in a Greek drama, and with machine competence extending to all useful and vital functions of society, the robots themselves understand humans to be surplus to requirements, and bloodily purge them. This automaton apocalypse is itself fertilizer for renewal, as two robots, of opposite genders, discover within themselves an awakening of emotions, a mutual recognition of this in the other, and from this seed a kind of renewal.</p><p>It does not take a deep understanding of European politics in the twentieth century to see in <em>Rossum’s Universal Robotics</em> a thinly-veiled allegory of workers, capitals, and Red Revolution. In fact, it is not at all obvious that Capek had much interest in robots <em>as</em> robots; he followed in a long line of science fiction writers who worked out critiques of the contemporary world by locating their literary efforts in a future far removed from the present (and, hopefully, from the censor’s pen, or more to the point, jail). But the play has endured as a triumph of science fiction craft, albeit today more referenced than read (or performed). It certainly recapitulates many of the associations frequently ascribed to robots, including dehumanization, deskilling, and zero-sum conflict between humanity and humanity’s artifice.</p><p>Automation, and automation’s opportunities, are a theme of this website, which is resolutely optimistic about the promise of robotics (with automation as the general case) in this generation. Clear-eyed, this website does not seek to avoid or downplay the disruptive aspects of extensive automation, but remains a confirmed believer in the progressive potential of all aspects of technology, in particular the specific case of robots. Above all else, this website believes worry and fear are actively unworthy both to America’s past example and to what we are now, the wealthiest and safest society in all human history.</p><p>Yet all too often, it is the Jeremiahs who hog the limelight. “Already” we are seeing jobs disappearing; hundreds of millions of jobs are threatened; this is merely a taste of what is foretold. Inequality will rise, capital will disappear behind moats and high walls (guarded, no doubt, by more machines), and the masses will be left to succor themselves on the scraps of the productive few lucky enough or best situated to benefit from the race against the machine. Alternatively, the view from the coin’s observe is a world where the productive few are threatened by the obsolescence of those who lack the marketable to produce economic value, and where those few risk being pulled down by lesser beings, stopping innovation’s engine, foreclosing future’s promise. Each perforce see the robot as the active principle in this development.</p><p>Yet it is to be strongly suspected that the robot is mere football in the working out of a much greater tectonic process between clashing political economies. The analysis and commentary to date is silent as to this framing, however, preferring an ontological claim about the directionality of history itself. This website is constitutionally agnostic about history’s arrow, real or otherwise, but has strong convictions as to robotics itself.</p><p>When you think about robotics, are you fearful? Pessimistic? Do you see robots as lost jobs, lost hopes, lost futures, a shift in economic equilibrium from labor to the owners of capital? Do you see all the ways it can go wrong?</p><p>That’s not what I see. I see robots as labors of love. I see late nights, long hours, obsession, sweat, tears, passion, failure, childhood dreams coming to fruition, and sometimes to naught. I see, in short, a very <em>human</em> technology, like any other technology, which gains its meanings only from those we ascribe to them. If robots are put to malicious purposes, this is because humanity itself is not always an attractive animal, and is sometimes capable of great malice, cruelty, or destruction through thoughtlessness or carelessness. But equally we are capable of sublimity of action and creation. Where the balance is between the two is, as always, up to us.</p><p>This is what I think when I think about robots.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1d6e1d7f04b5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Hippie and the Profit]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jasdnldterry/the-hippie-and-the-profit-bb2dcf9ab9ab?source=rss-14b20f1ffe44------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bb2dcf9ab9ab</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economic-history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[James]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 30 Jan 2017 05:10:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-30T05:10:39.852Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Portland, as a wit once put it, is where the young go to retire. This was deemed worthy of immortalization as an American sketch comedy<em>, Portlandia</em>, a skewering of the studied pretension of West Coast precious. The series undeniably captures a moment of early 21st century urban millennial Americana; as a matter of political economy, it is also decidedly inapposite. This is not to measure <em>Portlandia</em> by the wrong rubric; the show’s core conceit is a hothouse effete, twee aesthetic made possible only in the unreality of grotty Portland granola.</p><p>This is an old cultural critique given new flesh. <em>H.</em> <em>sapiens </em>seems congenitally predisposed to declinist narratives: they are the traffic of Mark Lilla’s “shipwrecked minds” of every age. For a species that ages, this kind of worldview is perhaps dyed-in-the-wool. It is a way of thought that views the new as intrinsically suspicious, fallen by definition. Hippies, hipsters, hoodies: moral bankrupts, all.</p><p>I have no truck with cultural criticism. But I do maintain a lively interest in what cultural innovations signal; cultural outputs, in fact, can serve as useful heuristics to identify broader (and deeper) changes in the structural composition of an economy.</p><p>Some would look at fringe groupings and see these as epiphenomenon of wealth: an economy so productive it can afford for certain members to be, in economic terms, idle. This particular interpretation sees these individuals as a cost on the economy as a whole. I disagree. Rather than tangential to production, I see these individuals as part and parcel of it. Red Portland? Hardly. Rather, Portland-upon-Baumol: it is a way of redistributing (or capturing) excess profits from the productive rich. Thus investors should look to hippies not as symptom of a collapsing work ethic, but as heralds of boom. [Note: by “hippies” read <em>courage</em>: those who ACT on how they think different. Thought is not sufficient. To crib a Peter Thiel-ism: IQ is surplus to courage, but courage is infinitely more important as a historical force. Majorities normalize to the recalcitrant. Human social and economic reality is power lawed: driven by the extremes]. Hippies thus betray the “dark matter” of innovation (as captured, imperfectly, by the absence/presence of profit); they flourish in the presence of growth. This is a better understanding than Richard Florida’s “creative class” which he sees as driven by the presence/absence of tolerance, a culturally relative, as opposed to universal, value correlated with but not causal of innovation. Florida sees the model as tolerance -&gt; innovation. I see it, rather, more as innovation -&gt; tolerance. But be careful: innovation does not necessarily yield tolerance. Instead, we should see the progenitors of the <em>snilleindustrierna</em> (beautiful Swedish; literally, “genius industries,” e.g., those corporations built on invention and operating at scale) as <em>forcing</em> society-at-large to normalize to a greater diversity of <em>types</em> or <em>ways</em> of being human. In other words, development is synonymous with an ever longer tail: in the Stone Age, you could specialize as a knapper of stone, say, but programming computers was a closed niche. By contrast, advanced economies today provide opportunities for plenty of software engineers <em>and</em> stone tool builders besides (not to mention literally millions of additional specialisms). A century hence, society will be even more baroque than at present, <em>while preserving all current specialties</em> (albeit not necessarily in the same proportions).</p><p>This provides us with a wedge to attack an obsession of this website: development, in particular the why of it. The problem of development — specificially, <em>why something and not nothing</em>? — remains open. Understanding development’s drivers thus takes the form of an insurance policy, an option drawn again future calamity: that which we do not understand is in danger of being lost. That all measured inputs in production (capital, labor, energy) do not account for total output has been understood since at least Robert Solow (famously) and Robert Swan (less famously) in 1956. The usual explanation for the remainder once all inputs are removed is technology, or more broadly, information/knowledge. This is the kind of argument that at once explains everything and nothing. The former, because it is self-evident; the latter, because it simply pushes the fundamental question back one further remove: why better technology or knowledge? Quite clearly, these are not produced by all societies equally; further, even today, societies benefit hugely unequally from the production of both quantities, despite being able to draw (in theory) from the same global stock of each.</p><p>When pressed, historians (and political scientists, sometimes economists) often fall back upon “the Enlightenment,” a final explanatory redoubt girded to repel naysayers. The Enlightenment is <em>precisely</em> the kind of answer intellectuals would create if it did not exist: it makes noble brows history’s prime movers. For this reason alone I would deprecate “Enlightenment thinking” as an explanation. Undoubtedly thought matters: but it cannot <em>alone</em> be sufficient, unless one assumes history is random. To claim this is to overthrow history as a discipline, as you abandon the historian’s core assumption, that cause precedes effect; more generally, path dependence. We want to know where the thought (whatever it might be) came from, and why others did not (or could not) have that same thought. The Enlightenment is a kind of analytic <em>deus ex machina</em>: it allows you to square the development circle. Analogously, as John Adam’s wrote on the American Revolution, that future historians would reduce the causes of American independence to the “smote” of “Dr. Franklin’s electrical rod.” This is superb drama; for understanding, it is less than generative.</p><p>Intellectuals place idea-makers to the fore. Businesspeople, and some economists, champion the entrepreneur as the active principle in growth. Others — Bernard Mandeville, Adam Smith, Fredrich Hayek, complexity and information theorists — self-organization. Politicians frequently advance educators, or scientists. I put it differently. Growth, development, made possible the flourishing of <em>all</em> these. The development <em>fons et origo </em>remains will-o-the-wisp.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bb2dcf9ab9ab" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The End of History]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jasdnldterry/the-end-of-history-b2f3cf58c9a5?source=rss-14b20f1ffe44------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b2f3cf58c9a5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[2016-election]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[book-review]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[James]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 23 Jan 2017 20:17:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-23T20:17:07.672Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Does history have an arrow? Is there a directionality to events? Can we develop an historical teleology? Or is history, literally, a sequence of events, quite without pattern, or harmony, rhyme or reason? (Please note: herein we will consider only non-theological explanations yielding viewer-independent claims without recourse to a set of fundamental beliefs or axioms accepted without challenge).</p><p>Francis Fukuyama, in his famous book <a href="https://www.amazon.com/End-History-Last-Man/dp/0743284550/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&amp;ie=UTF8&amp;qid=1484964675&amp;sr=1-1&amp;keywords=the+end+of+history+and+the+last+man"><em>The End of History and the Last Man</em></a>, thought so, fleshing out a line of argument first advanced in the summer 1989 issue of “National Interest.” In it, he reduced History (capital-H) to a series of opposing ideologies, or ways of organizing society. Lower-case history he separated out; this was the study of events, who said what where, when, and why. Viewed through this lens, History appeared as a grand arena of clashing worldviews. Questions of this type are not susceptible to proof; one’s answer might be defended by a consilience of facts relative to a given social, political, or economic context, and appeals to logic, or emotion, but by their nature were not equivalent to a mathematical theorem, which is timeless and context-free. One unfortunate consequence of this is that politics is zero-sum, very unlike (say) economics, where trade benefits both sides.</p><p>For Fukuyama’s purposes, this meant History was composed of a series of death-struggles between rival ideologies. Incautious critics might object that this was an argument perfectly sized to a person who had grown up during the Cold War and who worked in Ronald Reagan’s State Department. But Fukuyama, a careful political scientist with a historical bent, took a broader view then this. He saw ideology not just a political-economic abstractions labeled “communism” or “capitalism” but also modes of civilization: hunter-gatherer, agricultural, industrial. Each pushed the previous system either to extinction or the margins. By the beginning of the twentieth century, at the latest, it was obvious that industrialization was table-stakes for development; more than the “best” way to organize one’s polity, it was, quite literally, the only game in town. With industrialization’s triumph, the combat shifted to which <em>type</em> of industrial society was best fit: fascist, communist, or liberal? That was the question of the 20th century; it was answered, definitively, by 1989: liberalism, in both politics and economics, rules-based, individualistic, and secular. <em>This</em> was history’s prime attractor, with all human development to that point as prelude.</p><p>Fukuyama’s thesis received wide celebrity in the 1990s and with the Soviet collapse and China’s embrace of free market reforms, coupled with the <em>expansion</em> of U.S. power and influence post-Cold War, underpinned by the digital revolution, seemed to have been borne out by events. The terror attacks of September 11, 2001 knocked confidence in this ineluctable trajectory badly askew. Fukuyama, first prophet, was now useful idiot.</p><p>Francis Fukuyama remains widely respected and a prolific author. His most cited work remains <em>The End of History</em>, however, and its reputation has not worn well. When cited today, it is usually as an example of American hubris, entirely of its moment, perhaps tinged with nostalgia, depending on one’s source. I believe, however, that Fukuyama’s thesis is due for a rehabilitation. Certainly, Fukuyama is ascribed beliefs he himself did not hold. <em>The End of History</em> never claimed the end was circa 1990, only that there was no logical development beyond liberalism, that in terms of society organization is was a global maximum. Fukuyama was well-aware many societies in the 1990s were far from liberal, and that many individuals held beliefs either antithetical to liberalism or openly hostile. His claim was solely that liberalism represented a kind of highest common denominator representing the best outcomes for the broadest number. Any other conceivable system would necessarily privilege a narrower constituency. This group might benefit more than under a liberal regime, but its gain was at the expense of others.</p><p>Aristotle, the father of political science, held that there were only three basic types of government: by the one, the few, or the many. Two-and-a-half millennia latter, we have been unable to identify a fourth, likely because there <em>is</em> no fourth option. In this sense, Fukuyama was merely footnoting a truth inherent in Aristotle’s original analysis.</p><p>In truth, the only defensible critique one can charge Fukuyama with is that he got his timing wrong. This is a particularly thin reed. Fukuyama may have personally suspected, but did not argue in <em>The End of History</em>, that liberalism’s victory was nigh. Fukuyama’s thesis is robust to authoritarian revanche (this is why China’s failure to democratize or Putin’s consolidation of power do not falsify Fukuyama). <em>The End of History</em>, at its core, is the belief that there <em>is</em> no fourth option, and that the best implementation of the third option (government by the many) is liberalism.</p><p>From the perspective of 2017, the near-absence of Islamism in <em>The End of History</em> is glaring. It is untrue that Fukuyama did not mention the Islamist dissent; he did, but in passing, noting that it was a particularist agenda incapable of universal appeal. Undoubtedly, he did not foresee its success to date in the twenty-first century. But this is irrelevant to the merits of his thesis. Again, <em>The End of History</em> nowhere argues <em>when</em> that date will come, or that backsliding is forbidden. Rather, <em>The End of History</em> predicts that the Islamist project will ultimately fail.</p><p>Almost a generation on from its authorship, <em>The End of History</em> has stood the test of time. It has not, contrary to its many critics, been falsified. It is worth remembering that, today, more than ever, the basic <em>correctness</em> of liberalism. But, and this is Fukuyama’s claim, even if liberalism were to disappear everywhere, in every society, to replaced (perhaps) by a technodistopic alliance of AI and ethno-authoritarianism, its disappearance would only be followed, in time, by its rebirth. It is liberalism’s incapacity for evolution that is the true driver of History’s end. Liberal polities can collapse, but there can be no supersession.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b2f3cf58c9a5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Europe and the Conquest of the World]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jasdnldterry/europe-and-the-conquest-of-the-world-9eaf4462b04f?source=rss-14b20f1ffe44------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9eaf4462b04f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[book-review]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[James]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 23 Jan 2017 20:15:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-23T20:15:29.821Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There is one great question in historiography: why something, not nothing? In other words, why human development? (Industrialization is the most important form of development, which otherwise encapsulates not just this intensified developmental mode but properly understood extends to every form of human societal organization, including hunter-gather, agricultural, etc.). Every other question can be considered a facet of this meta-question. Frustratingly, it remains unanswered. But once seized by its essential mystery, it is difficult to escape thinking about anything else.</p><p>Many historians (and anthropologists; e.g., Jared Diamond) have proven dab hands at offering explanations to it (or even, in some instances, explaining it away) but the lack of consensus is proof of the effective failure to converge on an observer-independent, rigorous answer. (Note that one aspect of any such answer must necessarily be <em>predictive</em>: in other words, <em>if</em> this explanation is true <em>then </em>any society adopting its components <em>in their entirety</em> will without fail achieve industrial takeoff. If not, then the explanation is <em>at best</em> a special case of the true, correct understanding. Note further the assumption here that there <em>is</em> a universal model, a spatially- and time-free logic by which development occurs. If there is not, this statement fails).</p><p>Within the <em>why something, not nothing</em> debate there is a disproportionately active locus of attention, that is: <em>Why Europe</em>? In other words, why not China? a caliphate? the Mughals? etc. What made Europe distinctive, uniquely innovative (this seems incontrovertible), unparalleled in its ability to project power globally? To a first-order analysis, Europe seems unprepossessing and unpromising, down to (at the latest) c. 1500, although Kenneth Pomeranz suggests an outlier late date, c. 1800, for European <em>sorpasso</em>. Ian Morris advocates for the opposite, a long-run European developmental advantage. (The long-run school itself has a long history; see, for instance, the — mistaken — Movius Line). Sieferle pushed an energy thesis; Joel Mokyr, information; Terence Kealey, tinkering; McCloskey emphasizes the rise to power in the political economy of the entrepreneur and bourgeois striver, at the expense of clerks, warriors, and titled sponging aristocrats; Eric Williams and, two generations later, Edward Baptist, exploitation; Ha-Joon Chang, the power of the state; also Peer Vries; so does Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson; Landes champions the Protestant Work Ethic; Jared Diamond, domesticated animals and the zoonotic virus; Robert Marks, contingency or luck; Victor Davis Hanson selects military power and what he sees as an unusual European preference for shock battle; I could go on, but will forbear from doing so. Certainly, the field has not suffered from an absence of either heat or light.</p><p>A recent intervention in the debate is Philip Hoffman’s <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Conquer-Princeton-Economic-History-Western-ebook/dp/B00U58Y4EA/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&amp;ie=UTF8&amp;qid=1485059491&amp;sr=1-1&amp;keywords=why+europe+conquered+the+world"><em>Why Did Europe Conquer the World?</em></a> I want to emphasize here that I have not (yet) read this particular text. Instead, I want to set down some opening thoughts before reading, then return after completion. If this proves a useful exercise, I might return to this model in the future.</p><p>Hoffman is an economist and, interestingly to my point of view, and the reason for my choosing this work, he has identified the military as the critical variable between Europe’s success — and (in an alternative history) failure. This is not a typical approach for an economist and will hopefully bring some quantitative rigor to the military history field, which is dominated by people who often are self-selected for a love of battlefield color and an eye for a dramatic anecdote thereby overdetermining individuals and emphasizing “who said what where when” narratives that are superficially seductive but on closer examination provide little understanding.</p><p>Military history <em>sells</em> (just look at any Barnes &amp; Noble and weight the history section by topic). But what military history <em>reveals</em> is, to my mind, serious underexamined. The drama (and inherent risk) of military action, I suspect, serves to shield the military field from serious analytic attention to what military history <em>means</em> from a macro-perspective. It is overly-strong dismiss wars from a <em>longue-durée </em>perspective as the Count Maurepas, a French naval minister no less, who once dismissed naval battle as amounting to “piff-poff” that “leaves the sea as salty as before.” But the point is well-made.</p><p>To a first approximation, empires are products of conquest, and conquest requires the military, and war. One component of European divergence is, incontrovertibly, colonization. This is, without exception, related to European <em>economic</em> divergence. (Not to intervene in whether the economic or the political is primary). In other words (think alternative histories), European power projection enable European empire, and it was European economic development that made <em>global</em> power projection not conceivable nor inevitable but possible and more importantly <em>realizable</em>, for the first time in human history. It is defensible, but not provable, that industrialization made European empire sustainable (in terms of cost or proportional resources consumed) as well.</p><p>Yet embracing the military as the determining variable begs the questions. The military is necessary, yes, if one wishes to “conquer the world.” But is it sufficient? I would venture no, without fear of challenge. For what gave Europe its ability to deploy military resources globally? Most societies are challenged to mobilize resources to fight a war next door: witness, for instance, the Roman Republic’s centuries-long war with the Volsci; yet, by the late Republic, a single Roman general, Julius Caesar, conquered Gaul and invaded Britain, within the space of a single decade; a generation later, another Roman warlord, Octavian, crossed the Red Sea to attack the Sabaeans of modern-day Yemen. This was a change in military power not in degree, but kind. It speaks, if nothing else, to the ability of a sovereign to marshal enormous resources and concentrate them to a single purpose. This requires substantial capacity on the part of a state to do so without impoverishing the state as a whole. (We do not have data to know definitively if the Roman state was able to support its military for a period of centuries without reducing the living standards of its population. The archaeological record suggests that Rome was increasingly prosperous through at least the 3rd century AD; the degree of inequality, however, is orthogonal to this finding). Europe in the modern period (for our purposes, post-1500) was able do both: per capita incomes <em>and</em> military capacity both rise. The state additionally gained the ability to redistribute resources (some to the military) without needing to engage in extensive (and politically expensive) debates over whether butter or guns should be deprecated.</p><p>So the focus on “the military” seems at once inappropriate, as well as obvious. Obvious, because empire is <em>by definition</em> a phenomenon of state violence; inappropriate, because it neatly sidesteps the much more contentious debate over the fount of development in the first instance. This might be an authorial strategy on the part of Hoffman; I’ll return to it in my after-action review.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9eaf4462b04f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Diversity and the Robot]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jasdnldterry/diversity-and-the-robot-3125a04f93ea?source=rss-14b20f1ffe44------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3125a04f93ea</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[future-of-work]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[self-driving-cars]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[automation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[James]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 16 Jan 2017 20:50:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-16T20:50:49.172Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The robots are coming. Fears over automation come in cycles; we are currently in an upswing now. If fear of outsourcing (replacement by foreign workers) characterized 20XX, its counterpoint for 201X is automation (replacement by machine). Supercharged by neural nets and deep learning, no one is safe. Labor, it seems, is going the way of the dodo; perhaps the owners of capital will benefit, but the laboring masses are soon for history’s ash heap.</p><p>My intent here is not to argue for, or against, the putative obsolescence of the working stiff. This is a historicist claim, to borrow a Popperian phrase, that there is an built-in arrow to history’s unfolding. My focus here is narrower: the next few decades. As Keynes remarked, in the long run, we are all dead. This is <em>not</em> equivalent to believing the future is unimportant; rather, that the long run is N integrated “short runs,” and that the future is composed of the decisions we make now, now + 1, now + 2, etc. We should focus on that which we most immediately can control.</p><p>Some overexcited commentary suggests that a tidal wave of automation is upon us, and that entire swaths of the workforce are in imminent danger of the sack. Sebastian Thrun tells us “no office job is safe.” An Oxford report from the Martin School (2013) suggests almost half of all U.S. jobs will be computerized. Martin Ford believes the future will be jobless. All point to time horizons of several decades.</p><p>[Heuristic aside: deprecate predictions with time frames &gt; 5 years and &lt; 50 years. (Note: the numbers are suggestive, not absolutes). The reasoning for this is straightforward. Predictions fewer than 5 years away are apt to be remembered; predictions greater than half a century’s length are too distant to matter. The sweet spot for the professional prognosticator — to be found preferably in TV studios and TED talks — is in this middle: soon enough for you to care (you can imagine yourself living during this time, or your children and grandchildren) but not too soon that you will hold the predictor to it. In other words, if I tell you that next week a thing is going to happen, and it doesn’t, and assuming you acted as if it were, you might justifiably hold me to account. (Weather reporters lose their job if they forecast sun for tomorrow instead of rain too often). But if I tell you a thing will happen 125 years from, this is meaningless for virtually everyone. (Climatologists do not lose their jobs due to the real -world inaccuracy of their modeling). The relevancy for the period <em>in which I can act</em> is attenuated to the vanishing point. Predictors need attention, but also need to escape accountability. The compromise is the 5–50 year time frame: soon enough to scare you, far enough off that plenty of interceding factors can explain any divergence between your predictions and real-world outcomes].</p><p>Automation comes in two basic flavors: brawn or brain. A heat engine, for example, can do a job, say pulling a heavy load, that in theory could be done by dividing it between several workers, each carrying a portion of the total. Every car’s engine, in principle, represents the potential jobs of hundreds of people. Practically-speaking, this example is absurd: assuming a billion cars on the road today (this is an under-estimate, made for the sake of simplicity), assuming further that 1 humanpower = 1/7 horsepower, than each car would require 7 people, for the total number of people living today, not excepting the youngest infant, to provide each car with a single horsepower equivalent. Obviously, this is not what people have in mind when they consider the problem of automation, but it does usefully illustrate that at the margins <em>any</em> output of <em>any</em> machine can be thought of as a substitution for human labor. This perforce includes <em>any</em> task which <em>never</em> was intended, but of course could in theory be performed, by people.</p><p>So much for brawn. In practice, concerns over automation focus on substitution for <em>skilled</em> labor: that is to say, for jobs that require some degree of expertise to perform. This is another way of saying these tasks require time — i.e., expense, either in income forgone or expended — to acquire the skills necessary to complete them. This, incidentally, was the root of the early nineteenth-century Luddite movement, which did not oppose machines atavistically, but rather the displacement of skilled laborers, i.e., those commanding a price premium for their work, by unskilled workers who could operate machines carrying out the work previously only possible by skilled labor.</p><p>Historically, tasks of the above type have required a mix of both muscle and brain, but computation promises to automate even processes of pure mind: take Deep Blue, which defeated Garry Kasparov at chess in 1997, or AlphaGo, which triumphed over Lee Sedol at Go in 2016. These are games which traditionally have represented the intellectual acme; now, they can be mastered by circuitry. If a world champion can be humbled, surely a mere mortal at an office park cubicle stands not a chance.</p><p>Which brings us full circle to the original question: how many, and what types, of jobs are currently threatened by the machine? We can dispense with the first question easily. Let us assume a job category (it need not matter what kind, except that it is capable today of being fully automated) of one million workers. (This represents approximately 1/123 of all full-time jobs in the U.S. today). Let us further assume a rate of automation of 2% a year; that is, each year 2% of total workers in the category are replaced by a machine. After 30 years, 550K of these workers are still employed. At a 10% rate of automation, 50K still remain. At 20% per annum, only 2.5K remain; at this point, we can reasonably conclude that the entire job category has been fully automated. [Note that for the sake of argument I have <em>not</em> considered off-setting employment growth in job categories relating to oversight, programming, etc. of all these automated systems. Nor have I included the effects of overall economic growth, instead selecting a toy model in which output is static]. The point here is that automation is a <em>process</em>, not an all-at-once “big bang” which much of the popular translation of the literature on automation seems to implicitly assume. In the real world, transitions have costs. You need to integrate new machines into your existing production flows. You also need to fully depreciate the costs of your <em>previous</em> generation of machines that your current workforce is already utilizing. You have to train workers to use the new machines, and to account for the learning curve in their use before the full productivity benefits of the new machines are realized in your bottom line. It does little good if the new generation of machines are potentially more productive if the learning curve is shallow enough that it would make financial sense to keep the previous familiar generation of machines instead.</p><p>Don’t forget that these job losses are in a category representing 1 out of every 123 jobs in the U.S. Proportionally, the impact is small (although the political effects might be amplified). For a true “jobless future” to emerge in anything like a meaningful time frame (e.g., within the working lifetimes of people living today) like Martin Ford and fellow travelers have irresponsibly made out, you need to assume both high rates of automation <em>without offsetting employment gains</em> plus <em>across-the-board</em> automation additionally. It does no good to say job X or job Y is in danger of being automated. You need to say <em>all</em> job categories (or most) are in danger of being automated, at high rates, for this to be a meaningful prediction, and not a form of talking head entertainment that characterizes too much of our political discourse today. This begs the question of where all this putative automation will come from. Robots and their control software are hard (and expensive to develop). The people and companies capable of producing this kind of automation are in short supply. At the minimum, this will force prioritization in terms of what tasks will be automated. Safety via anonymity may seem cold comfort (if we for the sake of argument accept that this is the only relevant variable in the automate/no automate equation: all jobs will be automated, but some sooner than others), but it is a badly needed brake on the overheated rhetoric surrounding automation in the present climate.</p><p>But what about the horse? If there is <em>any</em> analog to irrelevance via technological advance, it would certainly be the horse, or so it is often suggested, as Carnot and Tesla meant the equine was doomed for the knacker’s yard. The history, however, offers a somewhat different lesson. The horse population actually grew during the Industrial Revolution, in part because of population growth, in part growing economic demand for their labor. Rather than a neat substitution effect (engines for horses) the expansion of horseless transportation (first the railroad, later cars; also rickshaws and safety bicycles) increased the demand for horses, not least in the “last mile” gaps between distribution and destination that proved resistant to closure for decades. Militaries too relied on horses for off-road transportation. Materiel might be brought to the front by railcar (and, less often, by truck) but capillary distribution to front-line troops was more often than not accomplished by horse. The world wars, it turns out, mobilized more horses than any other wars in human history.</p><p>Later, it is true, the horse population underwent a precipitous decline. In the U.S. the horse population seems to have peaked in the second decade of the 20th century at around 20 million total (in dense urban environments, the horse population peaked decades earlier, perhaps as soon as the 1870s). It then went into precipitous decline, reaching a trough in the 1950s at under 5 million: a precipitous collapse of 75%.</p><p>The horse analog is often rejected as irrelevant: people are not horses. People, unlike horses, can invent new tasks to earn revenue. Nothing so focuses the mind as the prospective of approaching penury. As a bit of folk wisdom, this is acceptable, but I would prefer something less hand-wavy. It is true that horses do not think up new modes of employment for themselves, but then again, neither do most people. It is also true that people task horses, and in the event people did not find new objectives to gainfully employ unneeded horses (aside from the slaughterhouse, which is an abrupt termination to one’s economic utility). Instead, the solution was to shrink the overall population. Given that the working life of a horse could be as little as 3 years (after which it was usually sold off to a rendering facility) and that people controlled the reproduction rate, this could be effected in short order. The depreciation rate for a newly acquired horse is consequently high.</p><p>By contrast, machines have much more gradual depreciation rates, and if well-maintained can be operated for decades fully depreciated. So job displacement via robot will be a more drawn-out affair. The same cannot be said for horses. Further, the horse analogy, even if not entirely apposite, does provide perhaps the starkest (certainly the most well- known) real world example of technological obsolescence, and it does provide partial comfort, in that after its 1950s nadir, the horse population has rebounded to at present 45% of peak (absolute, not per capita). There has been no “jobless” future for horses; given the greater flexibility of human beings, this increases confidence in an evaluation that the future will not be the dole for all.</p><p>I wish to conclude with the second half of my two-part question: namely, what jobs are most liable to automation? Here I wish to introduce the concept of <em>dynamism</em>, and contrast it with the <em>static</em>. It is the latter category that is most susceptible to being automated away within the careers of people alive today. A static job is a task in which the context in which the work takes place is isolatable and capable of being broken down in discrete components. A dynamic job, on the other hand, is <em>not</em> separable from its environment, and is resistant to obvious ways in which to “carve nature at its joints.” Dynamic jobs are tasks in which high-level objectives may be set, but the particular way in which the job is accomplished is fluid.</p><p>Dynamic vs. static does not recapitulate white collar and blue collar, or college vs vocational. Nor is it equivalent to whether or not a job is outsourceable. The dynamic and static cross-cut all these categories and scramble our assumptions as to what constitutes a “good” or “secure” job. Chess and Go (mentioned above) are both static jobs. The sample space of possible moves in both chess and Go is vast, but both games are produced from the concatenation of individual single moves selected from a limited library. The difficulty comes in the combinatorial explosion of <em>possible</em> moves beyond the opening salvos. Clever programming and the exponential deflation in the cost of computer cycles reduced this to a solvable problem.</p><p>Take custodial work. This is an example of a dynamic job. It is so not because it is exciting or well-compensated, but because the environment in which it takes place is resistant to being reduced to a single set of instructions. Janitorial work consists of a few high-level commands — mop! remove trash! sweep floor! do not erase boards! <em>do</em> erase boards! — then mapped dynamically onto different contexts. A room you are cleaning may have been rearranged since the last time you saw it. There may a late-night meeting in another. The faucet may be running. The security guard might be absent and not made arrangements to grant you access to the building. Many janitors work for a contractor, and clean multiple locations. Their terms of employment typically rely on their having access to a vehicle. Thus the ability to drive is another requirement of the job.</p><p>Any <em>one</em> of these tasks is straightforward to automate. But the cumulative total of tasks is daunting. The greatest impediment (as with truly autonomous cars) is that the environment was not built with machines in mind, but for humans. We would have Level 5 autonomy in ground transportation <em>today</em> in fact <em>decades</em> ago if the environment in which the vehicles operated was designed for machines-first and if you could keep pesky human beings from entering it (except as passengers). This is why haul trucks in mines are being rapidly automated; this is why it is railroad operators, not truck drivers, who should worry about being robotized. These are all examples of static jobs.</p><p>Take open-cry pit trading. This is perhaps the poster child of superficial dynamism. Everyone yells until hoarse, the gestures are rapid, the facial movements histrionic. But this type of trading has most disappeared, precisely because it is <em>not</em> dynamic, but actually quite static: a few basic moves, endlessly repeated, simple to reduce to circuits.</p><p>Take medicine. Doctors are highly compensated workers. Their skills are laboriously acquired, and there are high barriers to entry. Yet much of medical work is static in our terms. Diagnosis and surgery especially are tasks which are highly susceptible to automation. Open-heart surgery, for instance, is both isolatable from external considerations and repairs (especially common repairs) are reduceable to a “formula.” Perhaps not in every instance: there will be edge cases where a surgeon will need to step in. But this is a question that will be answered by the mean not the extremes. The same with routine diagnosis, such as X-ray screenings, which has often been outsourced in the 1990s and Aughts. These types of jobs are likely to “return” to the U.S. — it will be cheaper to run these diagnoses in the Amazon Cloud. This is also an example of jobs flowing <em>back</em> to the developed world from developing economies; the opposite of many people’s instincts (and fears) about economic reality.</p><p>Finally, commercial truck driving, often said to be the next job category teed up for displacement by machines. In my terminology, is it dynamic, or static? Here, I am uncertain (which is why I left this example for last). From one perspective, truck driving seems static, hence ripe for automation. This is especially so for long-haul trucking (don’t forget Carnegie Mellon’s “No Hands Across America” drove 3100 miles cross-country 98% of the distance autonomously <em>in 1995</em>). Perhaps between major distribution centers; it’s simple to imagine Wal-Mart connecting its central hubs by autonomous vehicles. These are usually located in lower density neighborhoods, by interstates and highways (simpler operating environment). Also, Wal-Mart personnel will be present at both ends for loading and off-loading. Contrast this with moving trucks: the drivers are contractors, and the loaders day-laborers. Even if the driving component is automated, the driver still needs to ride with the tractor-trailer, which defeats the purpose of splashing out on the sensors and processors in the first place. For other delivery trucks, the driver also serves as an off-loader as well. Since the driving automation only solves one of the jobs the driver is tasked with, in this instance (unlike with surgeons) it is the edge case, the instance <em>most</em> recalcitrant to automation, that will keep drivers in their seats. (It doesn’t make sense to automate one component of the task but not the others unless there is an off-setting factor: for instance, longer hours on the road).</p><p>Alternatively, you can completely break down and rebuild the business model of the industry (and the context in which trucks operate). There are no standard delivery modes for trucks. Sometimes you park at the front, others at the back; some, at the side. At one stop there might be a delivery bay, in others, lack of room forces you to park in the lot and schlep your goods. This is precisely what I mean by dynamic: you cannot isolate the operating environment. It might seem like trucking involves only a few basic moves, and these in principle should be automatable. If chess can be conquered, surely the delivery van? But unlike in chess, in delivery new events intrude. The distinction with chess (or surgery) is the impossibility of isolation: chess and surgery can freely ignore any variable <em>not directly pertaining</em> to the task at hand. But with delivery, you can’t, at least not in most instances (transportation between hubs is a special case). From weather, to strikes blocking the road, to new construction replacing the old delivery door with a spiffy new ramp and motorized belt, the new constantly intrudes.</p><p>The solution, of course, is to eliminate diversity, to standardize, to make the world interpretable by machines. What made ports automatable was the container. Every container is precisely the same as every other. This was a massive increase in efficiency. It also made the environment static, and capable of automation. Hearts too are largely standard, as are their problems. Messes are not, which is why janitors are safe. Same (in some cases) with delivery trucks. If — when?! — we have true autonomous vehicles where I don’t look up from closing the door until arrival, this will be because we made the road system fit computers, just as previously we made the road system fit cars, not buggies or trollies. This isn’t good or bad; it just is. But, and I conclude here, perhaps for dynamic vs. static, we should instead read diverse as against monodimensional.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3125a04f93ea" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[You Don’t Have a Phone]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jasdnldterry/you-dont-have-a-phone-f1decf6d7790?source=rss-14b20f1ffe44------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f1decf6d7790</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cell-phones]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mobile]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[apple]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iphone]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[James]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 10 Jan 2017 19:16:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-10T19:16:38.668Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>We live in the age of the phone. The phone is the defining technology of our times; it is the best-selling product category ever; it is the only product (leaving aside basics such as eating utensils) where the number of users is 1:1 with the total population of the Earth.</p><p>The definitive version of the phone is, of course, the iPhone. 2017 is the iPhone’s 10th anniversary. The year of its announcement, Time Magazine named it Invention of the Year, writing that Job’s innovation had “changed phones forever.” Google recognized the truth of this; its Android project prior to iPhone was cast in the Blackberry mold. After, it was glass, slabs, and touch.</p><p>iPhone’s meaning for Apple was less clear, however. That iPhone would go on to be the best-selling product, in the best-selling product category, on pace to earn $1+ trillion in gross receipts, not to mention hundreds of billions in profits (representing ~90% of cumulative mobile industry profits) was anticipated by precisely <em>no one</em>. A closed ecosystem device, sold at a premium price, with a proprietary architecture: this was Apple performing precisely to type. Sure, iPhone was beautiful to look at, revolutionary even. Jobs was a genius, absolutely. It was like he had gone to the future, and brought something back with him. He’d done the same with the Apple Macintosh. But as a <em>business</em> strategist, well, he left a lot to be desired. Hardware gets commodified; the money was in software. This was the lesson of the PC wars. So we were told, repeatedly (not least by Clay Christenson, intellectually encumbered by a weighty Harvard chair, and his all-purpose disruption theory model).</p><p>In retrospect, all the analysts had overlearned the history they had lived through. They forgot the alternative futures, branching tree histories foreclosed by events, until the pruning left a solitary survivor: now known, portentously, forever, as <em>history</em>: a dynamic living process now dead, preserved in memory’s aspic. If you induct from only your experience, you will make serious errors of judgement (unless lucky).</p><p>The mobile phone was a generation old by 2007: the first handheld mobile call was placed in 1973 by Martin Cooper, a Motorola researcher. The market was “mature,” we were told. Maturity is an overused term; it means nothing, expect perhaps that the person saying it doesn’t expect anything new to ever happen. Mobile consumers were fickle: device loyalty (expect perhaps to the Crackberry) was low; margins per device were low; to stay competitive you had to constantly refresh your lineup. Apple was the opposite of all this: its consumers exhibited high brand loyalty and trust; its margins were fat; it sold only a few basic products; its refresh rate per product was on a yearly cycle or even longer. Plus, it had never made a phone; it made computers and music players. This seemed like a classic example of domain switching and misplaced confidence: if I’m good here I must be good <em>there</em> too. Competence does not necessarily translate across domain boundaries: a great trial lawyer is not guaranteed to be a world-class chef.</p><p>Sometimes, however, invasion brings a yeasty hybrid vigor born of cross-fertilization. Apple saw, although it did not make explicit, that the <em>phone</em> component of the phone would be deprecated in the future. No phone would be complete without the ability to make calls, but the calling function would consume an increasing small percentage of overall user engagement with the device. (From this perspective, the Blackberry was a transition device, optimized for text and email, with calling a secondary function). Apple still called its device a phone. This was smart marketing. One of the hardest tasks in business is making the case for why anyone should buy your product in the first place. This task is exponentially harder for <em>new</em> product categories users have no previous experience with. Everyone, for instance, understands why mops are useful. As a business, you don’t have to make a utility case for the platonic category of “mop.” In this sense, your task is half-complete. Your prospective customer is already sold on the idea of a mop. To close, you need to convince him that he wants <em>your </em>mop. Apple knew that its customers already owned phones. They already understood why phones were usefully devices to own and have on their persons. So Jobs marketed his iPhone as a <em>better</em> phone: it was a phone that was <em>also</em> a music player<em> and</em> also a mobile internet browser. What Apple did <em>not</em> do was sell you a pocket computer. Apple did <em>not</em> say they had miniaturized a Macintosh, or put OS X in your hand. This would not have been grokked by consumers. iPhone customers already had “the computer” in their homes, backpacks, or briefcases. What good would another one do? But they did need a phone. In time, this phone became its users primary computing device, relegating the desktop or laptop to a special purpose role.</p><p>In a narrow sense, the analysts <em>were</em> right: Apple didn’t beat the phone manufacturers, and the phone industry <em>was</em> “mature.” It’s just that the analysts drew the wrong conclusions from this. Like Thomas Malthus, they knew their past and reasoned the future would be more of the same. There was certainly no “fact” you could point to disproving this line of argument (precisely why overreliance on “facts” renders you less understanding of the world, not more). What the analysts <em>didn’t</em> include in their analysis, precisely because it didn’t (yet) exist, was that the phone was disappearing. Apple’s victory was not product of defeating the phone manufacturers directly; Apple won by creating a <em>new</em> market category, and this category drained the demand for pre-existing products as consumers stampeded elsewhere. At Macworld 1997, Jobs remarked that “we have to let go of this notion that for Apple to win Microsoft has to lose.” Too many CEOs and businesses focus on competition. In this conception, winning is about beating the other guy. This is the kind of progress that yields incremental advances. Apple’s ascension to the world’s most valuable company by market capitalization, the world’s most profitable corporation, and arguably the most innovative company of the 21st century (so far) was not because Apple beat its competition. It was precisely because Apple <em>didn’t</em> have any competition. It pioneered a new product category where by definition no competition could exist because the category itself was Apple’s creation. Apple does have competition today, as other corporations squatted on Apple’s territory. But the initial victory was the result of doing something unique. This is the kind of innovation that yields exponential, step-change advances.</p><p>The nature of Apple’s victory was disguised by Apple’s adopting a word from the mobile industry’s lexicon — phone — emptying that world of its previous content and applying a very different meaning to it. By phone, Apple meant computer. Consumers heard <em>better</em> phone. Analysts smelled cash burning. Apple chose, mostly, not to explain itself. It was fine with being misunderstood, for while. Success would be its own vindication (although not with analysts, who as a class — there are honorable exceptions — seem reluctant to grant Apple credit for anything, and consider it one miscue from Chapter 11). The rest is history.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f1decf6d7790" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Review of “Red Globalization.”]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jasdnldterry/review-of-red-globalization-7c5abcfd1c80?source=rss-14b20f1ffe44------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7c5abcfd1c80</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[book-review]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[globalization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economic-development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[James]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 29 Dec 2016 01:57:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-10T23:13:49.497Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Every coin’s face has its obverse, every earthly imperium a counterpart, every war the mirrored hatreds of its participants. In the Cold War, it was the dialectic of Moscow and Washington, command and free enterprise, dictatorship and democracy, globalization and autarky that served as the organizing principle of the world. The two superpowers, alike in strength, diametric opposites in constitution, whose ambition reached the last margins of the earth, locked in a twilight struggle at which nothing less than the “soul of mankind” was at stake, to borrow words from George H. W. Bush.</p><p>After World War II, each side spun out an international order with itself at the center. Each side competed fiercely for allies, each side defended vigorously its previous acquisitions from incursion or subversion. “Everyone,” Joseph Stalin observed in April 1945, “imposes his own system as far as his army can reach.” In Western capitals, that reach was feared long, indeed. For his own part, Stalin, who understood as well as anyone how weakened his country had become as the price of defeating Hitler’s Reich, felt the same of the West. Wartime alliance was born of necessity, not conviction. When the guns fell silent, the erstwhile allies fell out, and a vast waking nightmare of walls, checkpoints, apparatchiks, penal colonies, and the secret police took half of Europe in its pitiless grip. The West looked on, and imagined it had midwifed the rise of one superpower in the process of expunging another.</p><p>Thus things stood for 40 years. Then Gorbachev, glasnost, perestroika, German unification, the end of the Soviet Union itself. Looking back, Fred Colman, <em>U.S. News &amp; World Report</em> bureau chief, Moscow correspondent, in <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Decline-Fall-Soviet-Empire-Yeltsin/dp/0312168160/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&amp;qid=1482976414&amp;sr=8-1&amp;keywords=Decline+and+Fall+of+the+Soviet+Empire"><em>The Decline and Fall of the Soviet Empire</em></a>, observed that it had all been a mirage. The Soviet Union was a Potemkin village, a paper tiger, Upper Volta with missiles. It could put a man in orbit, or a probe on Venus, but not manufacture television sets without a predilection for explosion (defective wiring in Soviet-made televisions was a leading cause of apartment fires in Moscow, for instance). The Soviet New Man had feet of clay, the communist New Jerusalem was a latter-day Oz, with a politburo standing in for the wizard.</p><p>In his own idiosyncratic way Anders Aslund, an economist, argued much the same in <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Russias-Capitalist-Revolution-Succeeded-Democracy/dp/0881324094/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&amp;qid=1482976441&amp;sr=8-1&amp;keywords=Russia%27s+Capitalist+Revolution"><em>Russia’s Capitalist Revolution</em></a>. The Soviet Union was an economy on par with Brzil, yet possessed of a first world military and scientific sector. It could afford this only by massively suppressing the consumption of its population. Any other state would have thrown in the towel; not the Soviet leadership, which through sheer force of will put itself in the front rank of nations.</p><p>The United States especially was happy to oblige. The Soviet Union was a colossus, a revisionist power, bent on remaking the U.S.-centric international order so carefully put together after World War II in its own ideological image. It was expansionist, aggressive, militaristic. It was another world, the dark side of the moon. What it was <em>not</em> was a weak state, making the best of the cards it had been dealt, all too aware that it could engage economically only at the bottom of the value-added ladder, at the forbearance of the developed capitalist economies.</p><p>Which is precisely what makes Oscar Sanchez-Sibony’s <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Red-Globalization-Political-Khrushchev-European/dp/1316635295/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&amp;qid=1482976460&amp;sr=8-1&amp;keywords=Red+Globalization"><em>Red Globalization</em> </a>such a welcome read. Sanchez-Sibony is a fluent writer, dryly funny in places, with a pugnacious punchy quality driving him to bait the big beasts of Cold War historiography, nowhere better than Odd Arne Westad’s <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Global-Cold-War-Interventions-Making/dp/052170314X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&amp;qid=1482976513&amp;sr=8-1&amp;keywords=the+global+cold+war+by+odd+arne+westad"><em>The Global Cold War</em></a> in which he makes plain that the uncritical acceptance of Churchillian Iron Curtains and Zhdanov’s Two Camps is an interpretive fossil artifact. That it continues to be widely parroted (look no further than John Lewis Gaddis’ <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Cold-War-New-History/dp/0143038273/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&amp;qid=1482976551&amp;sr=8-1&amp;keywords=The+Cold+War+Gaddis"><em>The Cold War: A New History</em></a>, which Sanchez-Sibony makes clear is in fact a very <em>old</em>, i.e., completely conventional history) is indicative of the difficulties with which even experts in a field, or maybe <em>especially</em> experts, have in unlearning old, but very wrong, lessons. If <em>Red Globalization</em> is nothing else, it is a warning against intellectual iatrogenics. It also serves as a salutary reminder of how the historical clerisy and the D.C. foreign policy community form a self-exciting circuit. The post-2016 U.S. presidential election resurgence of Russia-baiting only serves to underscore the the last, plus a salutary reminder of the existential validation many derive from binaries. Its analogue amongst Beltway foreign types is overseas intervention, military or otherwise.</p><p>Sanchez-Sibony has benefited from yeoman’s work in the Moscow archives of the Soviet trade authorities and transcripts of central committee debates. The Soviet Union that emerges from his reconstruction is more cautious, passive, and aware of its limitations than the propaganda of the Pentagon’s <em>Soviet Military Power</em> Public Diplomacy booklets. This is a Soviet Union that prided itself on always paying its bills, and eschewed politics in its dealings. Leave it to the Western powers to talk politics; Soviet trade negotiators focused on the language of deals, deliverables, and the mutual advantages of free commerce between states. This <em>might</em> produce political benefits; then again, it might not. The question was orthogonal to the issues at hand.</p><p>The Soviet Union was a developmental state. This was true not only during the Stalin-era Five Year Plans in Four and crash industrialization of the 1930s, but afterwards as well, during the period now pigeonholed as the “Cold War.” The autarky of the interwar Depression error was not an ideological choice, the <em>dirigisme</em> of hermeticism, but the effects of economic collapse. It derailed Soviet plans; irony of ironies, the Soviet Union was one of the last to abandon hope in the international market. Post-WWII, when the opportunities presented themselves, the Soviet Union eagerly reengaged. It did so not in stilted ideological terms, but in prosaic business-like language of profit, loss, and national advantage. If Marxism-Leninsim <em>was</em> present, it was worn very lightly indeed.</p><p>The Soviet Union also emerges as much more of a bit-player in the post-WWII era; it was <em>not</em> the essential state, which was, and remained, the United States (and the West more broadly). Even that tried-and-true stratagem of Third World leaders of playing each side against the other for maximum advantage turns out to be more about extracting better terms from the West than a true flirtation with the Soviet system. The exceptions to this are those states, like Cuba, or China, or North Korea, that were the victims of U.S. military and economic aggression.</p><p>So, in the final analysis, what <em>was</em> the Cold War? Sanchez-Sibony does not offer any definitive answers. But he does argue, persuasively in my view, that the inveterate opposition of two states in ideological death-struggle, is almost everywhere massively overdetermined. The Soviet Union (outside its Eastern European glacis) was a special case of a twentieth-century developmental state, acutely aware of its deficiencies vis-à-vis the developed capitalist countries. It was extreme, in the way that Russia seems to accentuate global developments and trends to an <em>n</em>th degree, but it was on a spectrum nonetheless. There was no difference in kind. The U.S. had the power, wealth and — yes — privilege to attempt to cast out the Soviet Union from the community of nations: to label it as an unacceptable type of regime unfit for the international community. Ultimately, the U.S. succeeded in its ambitions, although not necessarily in the way many cold warriors intended (albeit not Kennan).</p><p>Sanchez-Sibony’s is a very different Cold War. It presents a very different world from the one usually understood, and taught in U.S. hagiographies. It deserves a wide audience.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7c5abcfd1c80" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>