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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by JC Zhang on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by JC Zhang on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@jc-zhang?source=rss-cdf7a952920a------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by JC Zhang on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Insights into Permissionless Perpetual Market]]></title>
            <link>https://jc-zhang.medium.com/insights-into-permissionless-perpetual-market-8e2756adee2b?source=rss-cdf7a952920a------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[derivatives]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[JC Zhang]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 23 Dec 2021 10:19:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-12-23T10:55:16.408Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MPWH7GiL5mQ3txuv5L6UCw.png" /></figure><p>A few interesting stats have emerged from Qilin’s permissionless V2 testnet that I find worth sharing. The significance of these stats is twofold:</p><ul><li>We have not seen any structured stats from a permissionless derivative protocol thus far;</li><li>The sample size behind the stats is substantial enough for broader discussions on intricate differences from permissionless perps.</li></ul><h3>Background on the V2 Testnet</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4pyiZj3bqgZ-2uTxi-5yPg.png" /><figcaption>BEAR-USDC trading pair on Qilin V2 Rinkeyby testnet</figcaption></figure><p>Qilin’s V2 testnet was conducted over a 3-week period to test the key features of the V2 design on the Rinkeby testnet. During the test, users were able to:</p><ul><li>Permissionlessly launch perpetual contract markets for any assets on Rinkeby;</li><li>Trade perpetuals with tokens or stablecoins;</li><li>Receive LP rewards from transaction fees and funding rates as liquidity provider; and</li><li>Liquidate bankrupt positions and receive liquidation fees.</li></ul><p>Each testing address received three testnet tokens:</p><ul><li>20,000 BEAR (priced at $1.591 at the end of testing)</li><li>20,000 OX (priced at $1.049 at the end of testing)</li><li>50,000 USDC</li></ul><h3>Some numbers</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Fj5bQ2VamrU0gktXBYuGjA.png" /></figure><p>Up next we’ll dive into these numbers and dissect them into new observations we’ve derived for the perpetual market. In fact, we’ve found that many conventional wisdoms falter in face of these new stats.</p><blockquote>Conventional wisdom 1: stablecoin dominates and will always dominate the perpetual market.</blockquote><p>The derivative marketplace in crypto currently runs at $100 billion in 24 hr volume — on par if not already more than the spot volume. Most of this volume comes from perpetual marketplaces. Currently, the CEX perpetual marketplace is dominated by stablecoin contracts. Most perpetual swaps traded are settled in stablecoins.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*izwTuZkoLousv7hoNu0ggg.png" /></figure><p>Naturally, there is more volume across linear perps than inverse perps. However, Qilin’s recent testnet has pointed to somewhere different.</p><blockquote>Observation 1: inverse perpetual contracts will see much higher growth in on-chain markets and permissionless environments.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FaxINfgmrJZTDp37XV-_CQ.png" /></figure><p>From the over 800 users that participated in the testnet, inverse marketplaces have won out against linear/stablecoin-settled marketplaces. These inverse pools were community-created by community LPs with their OX/BEAR testnet tokens.</p><p>We expect growth in the inverse perpetual market coming primarily from two sources:</p><ul><li><strong>The democratization of perpetuals</strong>: community traders from non-top-tier assets will participate more in the previously institutionally dominant derivative sector;</li><li><strong>Yield-seeking opportunities</strong> emerging in the perpetuals market.</li></ul><blockquote>Conventional wisdom 2: yield opportunities primarily exist in the lending market and come from the time-opportunity cost.</blockquote><p>Non-inflationary yield has seen significant growth in DeFi based on the composable lending market. The revenue sources for LP have been transaction fees and interest rates.</p><p>Liquidity pools in the derivative market can change the yield landscape in DeFi and create a new yield asset class.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*av0vuevZYi_6-h4kAVDnYw.png" /></figure><p>The testnet’s perpetual liquidity pool APYs show significantly higher yield compared to the lending markets. Double-digit yield is common in these markets. The detailed yield sources can be broken down further below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kWwdcVHnRIwUNkxNv2qMYQ.png" /></figure><p>LPs in perpetual liquidity pools primarily earn 3 sources of yield:</p><ul><li>Transaction fees</li><li>Funding rates (risk-based)</li><li>Liquidation fees</li></ul><p>The one aspect that differentiates perpetual-based yield pools is the risk fees (funding rates on Qilin). Qilin’s funding rates are calculated based on LP risk exposure. This currently constitutes the majority of LP revenue.</p><blockquote>Observation 2: risk-based fees make derivative-based LP yield much more competitive than that in the lending market.</blockquote><h4>Addition benefits:</h4><p>The overarching threads of benefits of DeFi derivatives — inverse contracts and LP yield — are the primary engines for growth in DeFi derivatives.</p><p>We have also discovered some further benefits within this market and will leave them as food for thought:</p><ol><li><strong>Community growth bootstrap tool</strong>: permissionless derivative market means that any project can launch perpetuals contract margined in any asset and indexed in any asset, thus making pairs such as LINK/SUSHI possible. This can create deep value bonding between two token economies as value from volatilities can be realized in each other’s asset.</li><li><strong>Composability</strong>: permissionless derivative markets create additional composable tools such as derivative LP tokens and liquidity debt/bond tokens that can be used in other protocols as primitives. It’s another evergreen track similar to how spot DEXes will continue through market cycles.</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8e2756adee2b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Introducing Liquidity Debt/Bond Token]]></title>
            <link>https://jc-zhang.medium.com/introducing-liquidity-debt-bond-token-1ca43e14cf4a?source=rss-cdf7a952920a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1ca43e14cf4a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[JC Zhang]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 14 Dec 2021 11:03:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-12-14T11:03:28.062Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Z24Y4eTE7DiVsAG_UiWj9A.png" /></figure><p>Interest-bearing tokens have been used as composable debt in lending and swap markets. In this article, we introduce a liquidity bond token for the derivative market.</p><h4>Permanent Loss in Derivative</h4><p>The idea of a liquidity bond token came about as I was discussing the issue of “permanent loss” for liquidity providers as trade counterparty in the derivative market within the Qilin Protocol team. The “permanent loss” stood out to us as a particular issue for adoption of DeFi derivative, as “impermanent loss” does not affect the LP’s liquidity position, but “permanent loss” means position wipeout in the context of trade counterparty.</p><p>This is a big problem for derivative liquidity design for both vAMM and Peer-to-Pool, as the LP is usually token holders or project teams, not exchange trading teams with hedging abilities.</p><h4>Liquidity Debt/Bond</h4><p>A liquidity debt/bond design is intended to address permanent loss for derivative LPs.</p><p>It has the following components:</p><ul><li>A percentage threshold that stops further LP loss and payments to profitable positions once crossed (e.g. LP stops paying once pool suffers a loss over 80% of the pool)</li><li>A liquidity debt/bond issuer that gives traders debt/bond tokens promised future payments for current unrealizable profit</li><li>A redeem design that allows for debt/bond redemption for profit once the LP recovers in pool value (tx fees, funding rates, etc.)</li></ul><h4>Debt vs Bond</h4><p>A UX concern/tradeoff exists on implementing the “guaranteed future profit payments.”</p><p>If it’s done through a debt model, then traders don’t receive the time value for their unrealizable profit. But even centralized exchange’s insurance fund doesn’t cover traders’ full cost. However, a debt model gives the LP a better chance of paying back.</p><p>A bond model puts more stress on the LP, but then this would mean a better trader UX even compared to CEX, while disincentivizing LP to a certain degree.</p><h4>Applications</h4><p>A liquidity bond implementation is similar to interest-bearing tokens in the lending markets and has high composability. We have not seen composability as a characteristic of DeFi derivative. This could be a useful addition to the LP position tokens that some derivative protocols are implementing. Whereas LP position tokens are at risk of bankruptcy, a liquidity bond token, hinging on the profitability of the pool, theoretically has less risks.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1ca43e14cf4a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[MemeCoins as a New Token Class]]></title>
            <link>https://jc-zhang.medium.com/memecoins-as-a-new-token-class-90457cc39f0f?source=rss-cdf7a952920a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/90457cc39f0f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[shiba-inu]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dogecoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[JC Zhang]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 21 Nov 2021 13:54:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-12-23T06:45:04.864Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*8vkWCMQzzCbPgivT.png" /></figure><p>The growing interest and potential mainstream adoption of $SHIB token has garnered attention for the token in the crypto community and in the wider financial community.</p><p>There has been a list of recent events that characterize the “Shiba” phenomenon:</p><ul><li>In terms of market activity, On October 27, 2021, Shib briefly overtook the trading volume of Bitcoin;</li><li>In terms of adoption, more than 400,000 traders have petitioned Robinhood to open a market for Shib on its platform; and AMC Theaters CEO has announced that its chains will start accepting the token in 2–4 months in its payment system;</li><li>In terms of the overall crypto industry, there are two memecoins — Shib and Doge — in its top 10 ranking by market cap.</li></ul><p>From the outset, the predominant market sentiment on Shiba has been that Shib, together with Doge, possesses nothing but speculative value. We will offer a new take on this class of assets known as “memecoins” that is a non-speculative investment thesis behind this phenomenon.</p><p>And due to the general lack of formalized structure to evaluate new asset classes in crypto, a primarily relativistic comparative model is used in our analysis. We would often cite Bitcoin and Ethereum as a benchmark for comparison, due to the fact that they remain the most accessible cryptocurrencies to date.</p><p>This article is structured as follows:</p><p>1) Consensus &amp; the ladder of complexity</p><p>2) Financialize a Culture</p><p>3) What is Metaverse Natives</p><p>One important reason for the success of Bitcoin has been its ability to gather and enlarge its circle of consensus. Bitcoin started off as an “internet money.” The level of complexity of understanding what “internet money” is relatively low, say compared to what is required of a financial analyst to understand the fundamentals of a company. Anyone who understands the internet and the concept of money or cash could accept Bitcoin’s thesis with relative ease.</p><p>This low level of complexity has propelled Bitcoin’s consensus with its community from the outset. Although it was initially released to an exclusive circle of cryptography enthusiasts, soon, its user group expanded to the general technologists and then to regular internet users.</p><h3>Reducing Complexity</h3><p>If we understand “ease of consensus” via a ladder of “reduced complexity of the thesis”, we can quickly deduce a rationalized model that explains the current market caps of various cryptocurrencies. In this model, ease of consensus has a linear correlation with reduced complexity.</p><p>For example, Bitcoin, as “digital cash,” would have the lowest level of complexity, as cash is an economic component that exists in every economy — a medium of exchange that people use daily. Ethereum, on the other hand, as “a decentralized database for applications” would have an added layer of complexity, as “database” is a much more sophisticated subject than cash.</p><p>Further, we would have various DeFi primitives such as a DEX or a lending protocol. These platforms would have one more added layer of complexity, as they are applications built on top of decentralized databases and people who do not engage in complex economic activities would probably not use these applications.</p><p>On a spectrum of complexity, we have ranked as follows:</p><h3>Consensus in the Age of Internet Populism</h3><p>If digital cash as an economic component that is easy to gain consensus, what would be something that could gain consensus even faster than an economic component?</p><p>Bitcoin first picked up steam among the “cypherpunks” who were interested in cryptography. Their place of gathering was the “cypherpunk mailing list” and an online forum. Today, we have multiple online venues that harbor such a community. One must not forget that the WallStreetBets community, a trader/speculator community on Reddit, pumped up GME shares up 3,000%, a feat that cost major financial institutions billions.</p><p>Feats of online populism such as GameStop short squeeze can carry significant financial consequences. However, the financial ramification of WallStreetBets’ effort was never as lasting as that of the cypherpunk mailing list. For one, Robinhood quickly halted the buying of GameStop stocks on its platform afterwards. This limited how far spread the rally could be given that Robinhood had been the platform for retail traders.</p><p>One key observation emerges from the fiasco is that first, online community is able to mount significant financial weight for a purpose and second, censorship limits how far out an online movement could spread.</p><p>The retail trader culture in the WallStreetBets Reddit community consists of populist sentiments such as anti-censorship and anti-establishment — one reason why it achieved massive momentum — or consensus.</p><p>One may discover through the incident is that culture is the most consensus-able existence in the age of online community. And there is no shortage of culture. Plenty of WSB-like cultures exist. Various meme cultures are great examples of how the internet has changed how online identities communicate with each other. In this respect, WSB is not special.</p><p>What is special about WSB, however, is that it is the first culture that achieved significant financial implications. If we browse through various online cultures, we find meme cultures, digital religions, and political groups. But WSB is one of the first of such a financialized nature.</p><h3>Tokenize a Culture</h3><p>However, one would not find a financialized culture to be something rare anymore in the crypto world. Shiba Inu, a Japanese dog breed, has been tokenized into a financial unit.</p><p>One important distinction between Shiba ($SHIB &amp; $DOGE) and WSB is the media through which they are expressed. Shiba has leveraged the uncensorable tool of blockchain to financialize the meme culture behind it, whereas WSB was limited by centralized censorship on Robinhood. Once uncensorable, we find the potential of a culture to be a highly liquid unit that is also valuable in real terms.</p><p>What is revolutionary about $SHIB and $DOGE is that they are examples of a highly efficient financialization tool that is blockchain — its capable of just about financializing everything. Conventionally, for a piece of art or culture to express its value, an incredible amount of resources had to be spent to evaluate (for the art work) and to build an economy (for the culture). An economy takes centuries if not a millennium to gain the sophistication that we have in our society today, but blockchain can realize its value in seconds.</p><p><strong><em>Blockchain is the ultimate financialization tool. Shiba is the first financialized culture that can be exchanged.</em></strong></p><p>Hence, we would have the new Complexity ladder here:</p><p>[Plus Culture (Shib/Doge) &amp; Art (NFT)]</p><p>The implication of SHIB having a lower level of complexity than Bitcoin is considerable. In terms of asset properties, we have observed that such “cultural tokens” could carry a significant risk profile. On the other hand, the risk profile is the growth potential of “cultural tokens” is much higher.</p><p>From $1 billion to $20 billion in market capitalization, it took</p><p>- Bitcoin: 4 years</p><p>- Ethereum: 1 year</p><p>- Dogecoin: 4 months</p><p>- Shiba Inu: 5 months</p><h3>A New Asset Class</h3><p>On a fundamental level, “cultural tokens” can be regarded as an asset class. So far in our discussion we have implicated Dogecoin and Shiba Inu as the primary examples. But they are no different from <a href="https://www.coingecko.com/en/categories/sports">sports tokens</a> and <a href="https://www.coingecko.com/en/categories/social-money">social tokens</a> in terms of their cultural properties. The difference lies in the expanse of the cultures represented by these tokens.</p><p>For example, a sports token of a football club is the tokenized culture of the club, but this culture is only shared within the club and the fans of the club, and so goes the culture for a particular influencer’s social token. Shiba Inu, however, as a meme, does not have such restrictions and is a global cultural symbol.</p><p>Hence we could develop a map for the “cultural token” class as follows:</p><p>These cultures carry different financial implications. But the rule of thumb goes back to the consensus theory, in that the broader the consensus is shared, the more supporters for the token.</p><p>Previously we mentioned the correlation between “ease of consensus” and the “complexity of the thesis.” Bitcoin’s community base was the cypherpunk community. This begs of the question of what community underlies Shiba Inu. For one, the backers of a token sheds light on where it could be used.</p><p>Dogecoin is the predecessor of Shiba Inu and is based on a proof-of-work blockchain. It inherits the mechanism from Bitcoin. Yet Dogecoin does not require the sophistication of Bitcoin’s “digital cash,” double-spend-proof thesis. In a sense, it is a simplified Bitcoin.</p><p>Shiba Inu takes one step further. It does not even require the proof-of-work blockchain and solely exists as smart contracts. In this sense, it is a simplified Dogecoin.</p><p>What further simplifies Shiba Inu is that it is not tied to any blockchain ecosystem. It is not the official platform token of a lending protocol or an exchange, so similar to how Bitcoin is not viewed as the money of a particular government, Shiba Inu does not carry the burden of being valued tied to one specific blockchain application.</p><p>If we view the metaverse as the aggregate existence of multiple sub-existences such as DeFi primitives and gamefi protocols, Shiba Inu’s simplicity makes it a strong candidate to be the medium of exchange in this aggregate world. And we have seen it in #Shibarmy, which consists of supporters from multiple ecosystems unlike #LinkMarines and #BitcoinMaxis, which more or less have an exclusive tone.</p><p>In this post, we discussed the various properties that have made us believe that a new token class has been created by Shiba Inu and its peers. Also, Shiba Inu stands out against its peers in terms of its simplicity and its universal nature of the culture and community that underlies it. In some aspects, it is even superior to Bitcoin. It is because of these findings, we expect that, in terms of real implications, it would not be far-fetched to see SHIB-based trading pairs to appear in the market soon.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://medium.com/@codexdao/memecoins-as-a-new-token-class-97526f900ce3"><em>https://medium.com</em></a><em> on November 21, 2021.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=90457cc39f0f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[On-Chain Funding Rate as a Yield Enhancer]]></title>
            <link>https://jc-zhang.medium.com/on-chain-funding-rate-as-a-yield-enhancer-cb6d2da0bacb?source=rss-cdf7a952920a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cb6d2da0bacb</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[JC Zhang]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 18 Nov 2021 16:56:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-12-14T09:51:26.389Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*p_IqFsG6WJWmlTDB.png" /></figure><p>Perpetual Protocol’s V2 Curie launch introduces the role of makers into its vAMM. After DYDX introduced a USDC liquidity provider pool that launched with its StarkWare release, Perpetual became another derivative protocol that has made derivative liquidity provision more accessible.</p><p>As liquidity provision on derivative protocols becomes more ecentralized, a new yield market will emerge in derivative in addition to the lending and swap yield pools. While this will create new yield opportunities for yield seekers and boost asset holding value, derivative liquidity pools will also face competition from swap and lending pools. As makers and LPs in derivatives take on relatively higher risk profiles, a competitive APY becomes crucial in attracting liquidity.</p><p>In this post, we look at the current landscape of derivative liquidity pools and ways to enhance yield.</p><h3>DYDX &amp; Perpetual</h3><p>DYDX currently hosts a USDC liquidity pool for their approved market makers such as Wintermute and Amber. Stakers of USDC receive about 0.02 DYDX token as yield for every thousand USD staked, which factors to about 11% APY at $16 per DYDX token. Compared to USDC yield in the lending market, DYDX’s pool stands at the medium-to-high end against other pools.</p><p>Perpetual Protocol takes on a different approach to compensate their liquidity providers. On Perpetual Protocol’s Curie V2, makers receive a portion of the fees collected by its clearing house. This ties the yield of staking USDC on the protocol to the trading volume of the pool’s pair. Hence incentivized trading can boost the LP earning in this design.</p><p>In comparison to DYDX, without direct tokenomic incentive, LPs on Perpetual would more or less rely on the commercial success of the protocol. If trading volume is sufficiently large, the trading fee reward could outweigh the potential loss of makers.</p><p>On the other hand, how will DYDX maintain its liquidity pool after the reward phase is a good question. Right now, trading fee on DYDX is not activated as a liquidity reward source. Market makers can profit off market making trades while stakers get token compensation for bearing the risk of potential market making loss.</p><p>As new liquidity pools emerge on derivative protocols and the derivative TVL expands. The question of risk profile of derivative LP becomes more obvious.</p><h3>Lending LP vs Derivative LP</h3><p>It is not without reason that DYDX decided to decouple the role of market makers and liquidity providers. In the derivative market, the risk profile of liquidity provision is inherently higher than in the swap and lending markets.</p><p>In the lending market, LPs can enjoy passive yield on their liquidity. In the derivative market, LPs consistently have a risk exposure as the counterparty trader. Professional market makers could develop trading strategies to achieve delta-neutral market making on derivative contracts. The downside of this model is that although risk is mitigated for liquidity providers, rewards would also be split between the market maker and the LP, whereas in the lending market, all rewards go to the same participant.</p><p>In Curve, for example, both the base fees and the CRV token rewards would go to the staker. In DYDX, the staker receives a portion of the token reward, and even though the foundation team enact trading fee reward in the future, what the distribution looks like between the various participants remains a question of governance.</p><h3>A Risk-Adjusted Reward Design</h3><p>Because of the inherent risk nature of derivative liquidity provision, if we were to design a maximally efficient liquidity provision model that only involves a singular participant, the liquidity provision mechanism must include risk adjustment design that auto-balances the risk-reward ratio.</p><p>For example, if the counterparty liquidity risk exposure is high, the reward should also be high. The higher reward could come from a higher cost to opening trade in a way that is like how slippage is imposed on the trader in a swap during relative liquidity shortage.</p><p>Or we can reason from how the funding rate is traditionally used in a volatile market to balance the longs and shorts. One side pays the other side for moving the mark price with its buying pressure.</p><p>Either way, to arrive at goal of mitigating the risk exposure, the result should be something that raises the LP reward during high-risk periods and produces an APY based on trading fees plus other incentive during regular times to reach parity with lending pool APYs.</p><h3>Rebase Funding Rate</h3><p>We introduce the idea of rebase funding rate as a feasible candidate to achieve risk-reward balance for derivative liquidity provision.</p><p>We arrived at this mechanism during our work on Qilin Protocol and have found it to be potentially applicable to the wider market. We will walk through the design on a high level and attach more details in the end for further interest.</p><p>In one sentence, rebase funding rate is a to-LP funding rate scheme that collects funding rate payments from the pool of trading margin for the liquidity pool through rebase, based on the current liquidity risk exposure calculated by the ratio of unmatched positions to the liquidity pool value.</p><p>The first thing to notice here is that it does not look like the traditional funding rate, which is applied between two sides of the trader. Rather, it goes between the traders with unmatched positions to the liquidity pool. This is because liquidity provision in DeFi derivative is counterparty liquidity whereas on an order book, a market maker is a trader as well.</p><p>The second feature of the design is that the rate is risk-adjusted. The mechanism abstracts the liquidity risk by comparing the value of unmatched positions to the liquidity pool. Once abstracted, the ratio can be used as a standard risk index of a trading pair. For the funding rate, the larger the index, the higher the funding rate payment, and the more reward the LP receives.</p><p>The third feature is that it is a rebase design, which reduces the overall protocol expenditure and eliminates the costly action of reward claiming on the part of liquidity providers. But since this has more to do with protocol efficiency than risk mitigation, we will leave it here.</p><h3>Applications</h3><p>Overall, the application of a risk-adjusted funding rate reward mechanism has several prerequisites. Although it achieves something like what hedge strategy achieves for a market maker, it fundamentally does away with the order book model. So this risk mitigation scheme is suited for a counterparty liquidity model such as peer-to-pool or AMM. The positive aspect of this choice though, is that in peer-to-pool or AMM, asset choice is much more permissionless compared to order book market making, as a consolidated liquidity provider equipped with risk mitigation has less restrictions around which currency to use as the base asset of the derivative pair.</p><p>Ultimately, we see risk mitigation as a crucial component of a permissionless derivative market as the liquidity provision market expands in DeFi derivative. The protocol that gets this right would gain an advantage in attracting LP users.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://medium.com/@codexdao/on-chain-funding-rate-as-a-yield-enhancer-dfadd4ca1422"><em>https://medium.com</em></a><em> on November 18, 2021.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cb6d2da0bacb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Qilin: How to Scale Decentralized Derivative Market]]></title>
            <link>https://jc-zhang.medium.com/qilin-how-to-scale-decentralized-derivative-market-525510343b5e?source=rss-cdf7a952920a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/525510343b5e</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[JC Zhang]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 18 Nov 2021 09:42:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-12-14T09:52:47.131Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*womuEWiWdRU6xZu1.png" /></figure><p>There are three areas of decentralization in DeFi. That is, permissionless trading, permissionless marketplace creation, and permissionless market making.</p><p>Permissionless trading has so far been the most widely adopted as on-chain Web 3.0 wallets have become a mature DeFi primitive adopted by almost all DeFi protocols. In comparison, decentralized marketplace creation and market making are more recent capabilities enabled by AMM.</p><p>A careful look would reveal, however, tat AMM has not led to equal adoption of decentralized marketplace creation and market making between the spot and derivative. In the spot, a market can be created for any asset paired with any other asset, and if such a pair does not exist, a swap can still be done by routing through an intermediary asset such as USDC. Although liquidity must be supplied on both sides of the pair for grid trading on AMM, liquidity can still be denominated in any asset without base asset restrictions. This makes the spot a highly composable market and one that is easy to integrate for tokens. The success of AMM with long-tail assets (we tentatively define the long-tail as ranked 50th-500th in capitalization) indicates a connection between token-native liquidity and adoption.</p><p>If we look across the derivative market, we see some protocols attempting to bring more adoption to DeFi derivatives. Perpetual Protocol was able to remain as a leader in perpetual trading volume until recently when DyDx overtook it and dominated the perpetual market with its StarkWare launch.</p><p>Perpetual Protocol’s solution to on-chain perpetual liquidity is its vAMM, a virtual liquidity machine that uses a human-calculated K value for its constant product to supply long and short liquidity. The highlight of this liquidity provision model is that it eliminates liquidity provider risks by eliminating the role of liquidity provider altogether. The K value is backed by a reservoir of funds from the project team that is locked in a smart contract.</p><p>The tradeoff of this design is that the LP risk is transferred to the team, but the existence of liquidity pool as a yield tool for asset holders is sacrificed. The risk is whether the protocol would be able to offer a scalable perpetual market. Currently, Perpetual Protocol supports 18 trading pairs, all USD-settled contracts that do not support margins in any other cryptocurrencies, with new listings possible through the project team. Perpetual Protocol hence can be placed in the “on-chained, but not permissionless” category of DeFi protocols.</p><p>In this model, it is cast in doubt whether decentralized protocols could really offer an edge over the order book like on FTX, which offers more than 150 stablecoin-settled perpetual contracts.</p><p>Compared to Perpetual Protocol, DYDX can be seen as a more decentralized perpetual trading protocol. First, its liquidity provision is not restricted to the project team. Holders of USDC can stake their coins in DYDX’s liquidity pool and lend them to a group of “approved” market makers to provide liquidity in the market. In return, stakers get a certain amount of DYDX tokens as reward.</p><p>The USDC lending pool on DYDX opens permission of liquidity provision to everyone. Although users provide liquidity through an intermediary group of approved market makers, it does make liquidity provision for derivatives more accessible.</p><p>However, market making profits do not go to the liquidity providers in this model. We can interpret the DYDX tokens rewarded to USDC liquidity providers as a pseudo-yield farming program, though with a low APY even compared to other stablecoin APY pools.</p><p>In addition, it remains in question if liquidity provision will be expanded into other assets on DYDX. Stablecoin contracts (a.k.a. linear contracts) offer a manageable risk profile for market makers, whereas crypto-settled perpetual contracts (inverse contracts) generally feature a higher risk profile and are more difficult to hedge. That is why professional market makers are willing to make markets for stablecoin contracts but not inverse contracts and why centralized exchanges offer few inverse perpetual pairs. All perpetual pairs on FTX, for example, are stablecoin-margined.</p><p>Without margin support for assets outside stablecoin, there would be no liquid derivative market for thousands of assets that are otherwise liquid in spot. The lesson from DEXes like Sushiswap and Uniswap is that although ETH and stablecoin pairs are very high in market shares, the rest of the crypto assets can still provide around 50% to 60% of the volume, offering a competitive edge over centralized marketplaces.</p><p>The key to permissionless derivatives is a liquidity provision model that LPs can and want to use. If a protocol can answer the product-market fit, they solve the liquidity issue for derivatives. Perpetual Protocol’s answer to this is that to ensure liquidity, they replace the role of LP with a vAMM, and DYDX’s answer is approved market makers through official partnerships. However, as we can see above, neither of these two options offer a scalable solution to the derivative marketplace and suffers from points of centralization.</p><p>A perpetual product that does not have margin restrictions is inverse contracts. Inverse contracts mean that for traders, they can trade in the token that they have and do not have to have stablecoins to trade, and for LPs, they can provide liquidity in a similar manner.</p><p>There are several advantages for using inverse perpetuals. For tokens ranked outside the top 50 by market cap but before, let’s say, the 500th, there’s usually a holder community — “altcoin hodlers” if you will. However, a lot of these tokens don’t have the yield market that top-cap assets like Ethereum and stablecoins do. The inverse contract liquidity pool would provide a yield pool for these assets and incentive holding.</p><p>Another benefit is that for traders, they can profit from the volatility of a token in a token-native way. Unlike stablecoin contracts, the value accrual of volatility in inverse contracts goes to the token economy itself rather than to the stablecoin. Traders can earn more tokens by betting on the price of this token. We may call this token-native value accrual. As volatility of these tokens are generally higher than assets like ETH, profit opportunities are greater as well.</p><p>For liquidity provision, a peer-to-pool model for inverse contracts can generate higher capital efficiency compared to AMM. In AMM, LPs would have to provide liquidity in both the base asset (margin asset) and the foreign asset (index asset) — we will explore synthetic AMM in another post as it has problems of a different kind. However, in a peer-to-pool model, LPs only need to provide liquidity in the margin asset as counterparty liquidity.</p><p>On a macro level, the biggest advantage we see in inverse perpetuals is its ability to scale the derivative market. From stablecoins to crypto assets, from LP tokens to index assets, given a price oracle, they enable perpetual contracts creation denominated in any asset. From what we currently see in DeFi 2.0 for example, protocols and DAOs have gained massive success by creating a use case for LP tokens. We see a similar growth vector in the enabling of all crypto assets in derivatives.</p><p>Currently, there are thousands of marketplaces on DEX, the derivative market can have a scale at least the size of DEX with inverse contracts, and with leverage, it should have a trading volume multifold that of spot.</p><p><em>Disclosures: Qilin Protocol is the product we have built to instantiate the analysis included in this article.</em></p><p>Join Qilin’s community on <a href="https://discord.gg/9wqWtYVYh3">Discord</a> for its V2 testnet, and follow us on <a href="https://twitter.com/QilinProtocol">Twitter</a> for updates!</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://medium.com/@codexdao/qilin-how-to-scale-decentralized-derivative-market-719f4f34870e"><em>https://medium.com</em></a><em> on November 18, 2021.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=525510343b5e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Qilin in 5 Explainer Blog]]></title>
            <link>https://jc-zhang.medium.com/qilin-in-5-explainer-blog-fb369e35c299?source=rss-cdf7a952920a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fb369e35c299</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[JC Zhang]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 03 Mar 2021 04:58:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-03-03T04:58:31.501Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/880/1*nx_Px3VIbnDDCp8kvPcVbA.png" /></figure><p><a href="https://qilin.fi/">Website</a> | <a href="https://twitter.com/QilinProtocol">Twitter</a> | <a href="https://github.com/CodexDao/QiLin">Github</a> | <a href="https://docs.qilin.fi/">Documentation</a> |<a href="https://www.notion.so/Qilin-Protocol-7e06737bf217406fa7abe6d73795e15c"> Whitepaper</a> | <a href="https://discord.gg/My28vAPMHg">Discord</a></p><p>Got 5 minutes? Here are all things you need to know about your favorite new project in the town of DeFi in a concise blog, where complex concepts in Qilin’s innovation are broken down into digestible bites that you can share with your fellow DeFiers.</p><h3>Overview</h3><p>Qilin’s testnet will be launched in the 3rd week of March along with a trading competition that awards NFT bearing retroactive rewards to the top traders. After the audit process is complete the mainnet will be launched in mid-April.</p><p>Qilin is a derivatives trading platform that allows traders to trade high-leverage perpetual contracts and liquidity providers to own shares of the liquidity pool that measure the time value of their assets while earning optimized APY yields.</p><p>In essence, it is a decentralized derivatives trading protocol that realizes the time value of liquidity assets.</p><p>The Qilin protocol achieves the time value of liquidity assets with a new liquidity pool instrument and a new liquidity pool model: <strong>Liquidity Share Token</strong> and <strong>Elastic Liquidity Pool</strong>.</p><h3>Liquidity Share Token</h3><p>Why can we not own liquidity in the pool like we own the stock of a company? The Liquidity Share Token solves the problem.</p><p>The Liquidity Share Token (LS Token) is the unit of ownership of the Liquidity Pool and entitles the shareowner to that fraction of the pool’s total locked value plus the earnings.</p><p>From the perspective of the LP holding the token, it is traded at a loss if the pool’s value is lower than the value at the time of the token purchase and at a profit if the pool is profitable compared to the value at the point of entry.</p><p>It can be traded in the open market just like other ERC-20 tokens and the market determines its demand. The profitability of the corresponding Liquidity Pool is publically accessible for the market to determine the value of the token.</p><p>If the demand is high, the price of the LS Token goes up, just like a stock share.</p><h4>LS Token vs LP Token</h4><p>The pricing of the original LP Token is complicated and fails to act as an instrument to measure the time value of the share of the liquidity pool. The LS Token measures it based on a concise pricing model:</p><p>(Locked Value + Earnings)*Fraction of the Share</p><p>LPs can realize their earnings by selling their share.</p><h3>Elastic Liquidity Pool</h3><p>Sick of liquidity earnings diluted in an underutilized pool? The Elastic Liquidity Pool model only adds liquidity when there is more demand.</p><p>Each Liquidity Pool on Qilin launches with an Initial Liquidity Offering (ILO) to bootstrap the initial liquidity needed for trades and closes the pool once the offering cap is reached.</p><p>Only when the trading volume of the pool gets above a certain level does the liquidity pool opens again for new liquidity deposits for LS Token purchase at the current market price.</p><p>Essentially, Qilin’s liquidity pools are like funds — only accepts investment based on the market size.</p><p>Qilin redefines “Liquidity Pool” as a yield-based financial product.</p><h3>Risk Backstops &amp; more</h3><p>There are other risk-mitigating mechanisms in Qilin such as the Dynamic Algorithimic Slippage and the Rebase Funding Mechanism to further optimize liquidity risks. But the two key innovations above should be enough for you to digest. Take a look at our <a href="https://www.notion.so/Qilin-Protocol-7e06737bf217406fa7abe6d73795e15c">Whitepaper</a> and <a href="https://docs.qilin.fi/">Gitbook</a> if this 5-Minute summary makes you hungry for more.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fb369e35c299" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Introducing Qilin]]></title>
            <link>https://jc-zhang.medium.com/introducing-qilin-b32a0ea0057d?source=rss-cdf7a952920a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b32a0ea0057d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[JC Zhang]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 24 Feb 2021 01:13:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-03-03T04:59:05.818Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lrwhzuPe66lFsHulRRPwfg.jpeg" /><figcaption>A Decentralized Liquidity Risk Mitigating Protocol for Derivatives Trading</figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://qilin.fi/">Website</a> | <a href="https://twitter.com/QilinProtocol">Twitter</a> | <a href="https://github.com/CodexDao/QiLin">Github</a> | <a href="https://docs.qilin.fi/">Documentation</a> |<a href="https://www.notion.so/Qilin-Protocol-7e06737bf217406fa7abe6d73795e15c"> Whitepaper</a> | <a href="https://discord.gg/My28vAPMHg">Discord</a></p><p>Qilin is an idea that began its story in early 2020. At the time the protocol was conceived as a decentralized liquidity aggregator that pools liquidity from different DEXes — very similar to what 0x is now. Over the year, the DeFi space has evolved into a suite of “<a href="https://www.gemini.com/cryptopedia/compound-finance-defi-crypto">money legos</a>” that processes over $3 billion daily in <a href="https://defiprime.com/dex-volume">asset swapping volume</a> and has another $3 billion in locked <a href="https://defipulse.com/">liquidity for derivatives trading</a>. With early 2021 witnessing <a href="https://medium.com/qilinprotocol/the-gamestop-saga-its-brothers-sisters-in-the-centralized-world-a8ced7390f42">a series of events of breach of trust</a> from the traditional finance world and roaring public interest, capital and liquidity continues to move into DeFi.</p><p>Meanwhile, there is one of the most important groups of participants in the DeFi space called Liquidity Providers. While the amount of liquidity provided, referred to as TVL, continues to grow in overall DeFi, the gap between liquidity for asset swapping and the liquidity for derivatives trading is hard to ignore considering the high price fluctuations such as in the crypto market normally attract derivatives trading. However, due to higher risks for liquidity in DeFi’s derivatives trading, the annualized percentage yield (APY) for liquidity pools on derivatives trading protocols is actually higher than in asset swapping. This makes an unconvincing case for the higher APY yield for derivatives trading liquidity being sufficient safeguards against liquidity risks.</p><p>For DeFi to become a full-fledged financial system capable of delivering services in both asset swapping and derivatives trading, the need for liquidity risk mitigation has never been stronger. <strong>Qilin has hence evolved to meet the challenge of its time.</strong></p><h3>DeFi Primer: Yield Products &amp; Liquidity Efficiency</h3><p>The crypto-backed loans currently in DeFi that yield higher APYs than yield products in the traditional financial system are a result of the efficiencies of smart contracts’ algorithmic execution on digital collateral that reduce the intermediate cost of custody, settlement, and escrow in the traditional system. Specifically, in the derivatives trading market, smart contracts reduce the complex dedicated counterparty market-making operations to distributed pooled risk through smart contracts that hold liquidity deposits. Coupled with the perceived high risk in the fledgling DeFi system, these efficiencies naturally attract value to decentralized ledger. As the risk in DeFi converge on the risk profile in traditional finance, the risk-averse nature of capital will lead to a capital migration from TradFi to DeFi.</p><p>The efficiency of smart contracts, in essence, reduces the cost of financial operations while enabling higher-APYs products. These products start with derivatives pools based on crypto-asset pairs, but as alluded to above, the efficiencies of decentralized systems should encourage more complex yield-based derivatives to relocate from the legacy system. Qilin helps facilitate this transition by making the decentralized derivatives trading system more liquidity-risk-free and more attractive to both liquidity providers and traders.</p><p>There is a massive market for liquidity seeking low-risk or even “riskless” yield-based products. This allows for the pools with various risk-mitigating mechanisms to compete for liquidity. Consistently improving on risk-mitigation attracts liquidity closer to DeFi’s yield.</p><h3>A Decentralized Derivatives Trading Protocol &amp; A Liquidity Risk Mitigator</h3><p>Qilin is first a derivatives trading protocol, and optimization of the trader UX is accomplished through ensuring ample liquidity in the liquidity pools. Establishing a competitive risk profile and APY yields for liquidity pools attracts liquidity among the plethora of yield products in DeFi.</p><h3>1. Liquidity Share Token (LS Token)</h3><p>Before the use of smart contracts as APY-yielding liquidity reservoirs, the value-accruing instrument of crypto-assets was synonymous with the store of value of the assets. However, liquidity pools now have become the new DeFi-native yield products that have constituted a new asset class. From asset lending to asset swapping to derivatives trading, different assets and asset pairs correspond to different risk profiles and yield returns of the liquidity pools. The ownership of the asset in the liquidity pool on projects like Uniswap is denoted through an instrument called the liquidity provider token (LP token). LP tokens act as proof of ownership of the underlying liquidity collateral provided by the individual liquidity provider. However, the market expectations of the profitability of the liquidity pool as a yield product are not represented by the LP token. That is why Qilin starts with completing the liquidity pool as a yield product with an instrument that measures market expectations of the pool — the Liquidity Share Token.</p><p>The Liquidity Share Token (LS Token) represents a new asset class in DeFi based on the liquidity-backed yield products. To measure the profitability of the liquidity pool, the LS Token denotes the value of the underlying share of the pool, as opposed to the value of the underlying liquidity deposit denoted by the LP token. When the total value of the liquidity pool goes up, the value of its shares also increases, reflecting the profitability of the pool, and vice versa when the liquidity pool is at a loss. Further, as the market has expectations on the future value of the pool’s profitability, LS Token’s price fluctuates and may deviate from its underlying value. In essence, LS Token becomes a “share” of the collateral-backed liquidity pool.</p><p>In the longer time scale, we expect the LS Token to be one of the primary derivatives of the liquidity pools as they become a more mature yield product.</p><h3>2. Elastic Liquidity Fund</h3><p>A demand-adjusted liquidity funding model for liquidity.</p><p>Currently, the funding model of liquidity pools on projects such as Uniswap, Aave, and Hegic is open on a rolling basis where the correlation between the demand for liquidity and the value supplied is low. This creates capital efficiency issues such as a low utilization ratio of the liquidity and idle liquidity, and dilutes the yield profile of the pool.</p><p>The funding model of Qilin’s liquidity pool adopts demand-adjusted mechanism that adjusts the amount of the fundable liquidity of a pool based on the trading-volume-to-liquidity value ratio that measures the demand. Only when the ratio exceeds a level that is deemed at risk of liquidity insufficiency is the pool open to further funding. Liquidity providers get the full benefit of maximizing capital efficiency in the model.</p><h4>Initial Liquidity Offering‌</h4><p>A new fundraising model for liquidity-based yield products.</p><p>Based on Qilin’s Elastic Liquidity Fund, a pool require an initial fund to bootstrap its launch and initial demand. Each pool’s launch is conducted through an Initial Liquidity Offering (ILO) for LS Token sales at a fixed price. Afterwards, the LS Token can be listed on exchanges just likeany other ERC-20 token.</p><h3><strong>3. Rebase Funding Mechanism</strong></h3><p>A liquidity-risk-mitigating mechanism that protects liquidity from open positions.</p><p>The risk of open positions to the liquidity pool is measured with the ratio of the size of open positions against the liquidity value. When the ratio exceeds a certain threshold, a funding payment is transferred from the open positions to the liquidity pool to hedge against liquidity risks. This incentivizes liquidity against extreme market volatilities without changes to the trader UX compared to the traditional funding rate mechanism.</p><h3>4. Dynamic Algorithmic Slippage</h3><p>Similar to Rebase Funding, Dynamic Algorithmic Slippage is a liquidity-risk-mitigating mechanism based on the measure of risk of open positions, but is a implemented through a slippage applied on the AMM.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b32a0ea0057d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How Bad Has Centralized Finance Got?]]></title>
            <link>https://jc-zhang.medium.com/how-bad-has-centralized-finance-got-42aaf91ce26f?source=rss-cdf7a952920a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/42aaf91ce26f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dogecoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[robin-hood]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[JC Zhang]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 02 Feb 2021 03:19:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-02-02T03:19:34.933Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FhO8lWqV7Du-Tmq3MTO22Q.png" /></figure><p>This is the mockery of a generation.</p><p>When the system of centralized finance — and by that I mean the broker-dealer, the clearing firm, the hedge funds, and the whole caboodle (even the Dow Jones) — is getting creamed, the one that’s cheering is an internet meme coin, which, like the meme community that started this whole saga by trading a “meme stock,” upset the status quo and everyone who believed in it.</p><blockquote>When the Wall Street is middle-fingered by a meme, you know it’s bad.</blockquote><p>(Even Elon Musk has liked several tweets related to DeFi so keep the steam going defiers~)</p><p>So just how bad has centralized finance got and what does it for decentralized finance?</p><p>First, it’s safe to say that custodial wallets like Cash App, payment services like Square, and broker-dealers even like Robinhood and the clearing firms behind them are not going away anytime soon. The speed of them being disrupted depends on how they evolve as accidents like this happen in the future and how fast the decentralized financial services as an alternative matures. (And as of right now, to my fellow defiers, DeFi services need at least the same UX to appear under the mainstream radar).</p><p>Second, however, cryptocurrencies are beginning to be taken seriously as a financial alternative — you can look at the pandemic as well — even just as a meme revenge/mocking tool towards the centralized financial space.</p><p>Third, what this incident with Robinhood and the hedge fund people proves is that, bastardizing what Chamath Palihapitiya said in the latest CNBC interview: these people on Reddit (and in crypto) aren’t as stupid as the mainstream think they are.</p><blockquote>People usually think of things that are funny as being not serious, but memes turn out to be funny and seriously valuable at the same time.</blockquote><p>To close I just want to use this opportunity to send a message to my fellow defiers that decentralized finance should use opportunities like this to accelerate the adoption of DeFi. DeFi infrastructure may still be under construction, but <strong>at least this time, although we may still be a meme, Wall Street is a joke.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=42aaf91ce26f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Gamestop saga & its brothers & sisters in the centralized world]]></title>
            <link>https://jc-zhang.medium.com/the-gamestop-saga-its-brothers-sisters-in-the-centralized-world-a8ced7390f42?source=rss-cdf7a952920a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a8ced7390f42</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[gamestop]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[JC Zhang]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 29 Jan 2021 05:02:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-01-29T05:06:24.858Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nlYEMbGxFETl7ss4FjWEDw.png" /></figure><p>Centralization sucks. That’s why centralized everything is ending.</p><p>This article is a walk-through of the failing points of centralization that currently govern our daily lives, issues that have long been boiling in our minds and hearts for a long time and finally reached a breaking point — revealed with the help from the $GME drama and the WSBers behind it.</p><p>That’s right, the problems revealed by the GME-WSB saga — if you’re new to the party — are long-standing issues that have favored the assholes and screwed over regular folks over and over. If you didn’t know, you now need to know.</p><p>So what’s the story. Well, it all starts with something called market volatility, and this is what it looks like:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pmINtBaaPFh1RGfTYrdk-A.png" /></figure><p>The price chart is from Bitcoin, but it can be anything as long as you see those big rises and dips. They are market volatility. With price fluctuations of several 100% being normal, cryptos are famous for their extreme market volatilities.</p><p>Now, with volatility comes uncertainty and risk, and that’s bad for making money. But here’s the twist, although as an individual retail investor, you may not have much risk-hedging capacity, institutional investors have a good way to avoid their exposure to market volatility —and it’s really genius once you know how it works.</p><p>And here’s where the media comes in.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Ts4v2-KYCEC5cR91qw7jQA.png" /><figcaption>A confrontational exchange between CNBC anchor &amp; investor Chamath Palihapitiya on the Gamestop saga</figcaption></figure><p>In the secondary market, a lot of stock activities center around information. It could be a news piece, a company’s quarterly report, or a live interview with an industry leader. Market responds to this information. Whoever has access to the information first gets a first-mover advantage on making a profit. But who gets to decide what information to release to the market?</p><p>Simple answer: whoever controls the media channel which releases the information.</p><p>It makes sense, right? Positive information causes a positive price movement on the stock market and negative information causes the reverse. A lot of times government policies are the information, and that’s why many policymakers make a lot of money in the stock market — because they are the ones who determine the information prior to its release in the media.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*oe3cDY5wGXfw-5j3vs4LTQ.png" /><figcaption>CNBC anchor in an argument with the Winklevoss twins over the Gamestop saga</figcaption></figure><p>And ever wonder who the media represents? For one, they’re not elected. So they don’t represent the public. That’s why they’re called corporate media. Because they are companies owned by shareholders who want to maximize profits. And if the people who own the media channel and the investment institutions are the same guys? You got the idea.</p><p>These people, with both the information channel and the capital, can influence the direction of market volatility and market momentum takes care of the rest.</p><p>When market momentum finishes, institutions have pulled out with profits from the retail investor. One chapter of market volatility ends. Genius…</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/250/1*rMDJTlr1fGJkohwaYFEZLQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>But what if somehow the retail investors bet on the right direction of the market and are winning a lot of money. This happens a lot, especially in a highly volatile market like… crypto. You have this:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*S5dRpTe3NyCKYSvq53oVIQ.png" /></figure><p>And this…</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9QoQbWZKh5aqnuRw-NckqA.png" /></figure><p>So the system always needs maintenance during highly volatile market conditions… Rings a bell?</p><p>Yep. Robinhood just did it with GME. They literally shut down the trading service:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*ZZfTDUHGhhgOoYMuyolanQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Again, when institutions are taking huge losses already, they probably would want to limit further losses right?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PEHGU-k-e1Fl83Ek37kiZA.png" /><figcaption>Screenshot from Cointelegraph</figcaption></figure><p>And here’s another twist: because the stock market is less volatile compared to the crypto market relatively speaking, this kind of service shutdowns happen less often, but boy once it happens, the buzz is way louder and people see the problem much more clearly than if it happens in the crypto market.</p><p>Oh, one last thing. You can’t complain about it on the app store where problematic apps like Robinhood is listed either. The app store is also centrally controlled:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cIjWACW0B6ExyucSmyIEmg.png" /><figcaption>Low-star comments got deleted on Google Play after Robinhood suspended GME stock purchases</figcaption></figure><p>So what’s the problem:</p><p>Centralized media where only corporate voices are broadcasted.</p><p>Centralized finance where only institutions are allowed to make money.</p><p>Centralized software platforms where users are not respected.</p><p>Remedy?</p><p>Decentralize everything.</p><p>Soft pitch here: that’s why you should join defi &amp; crypto— decentralized finance to start the change.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a8ced7390f42" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Qilin: risk-optimized liquidity funding, LP Token & derivatives trading]]></title>
            <link>https://jc-zhang.medium.com/qilin-risk-optimized-liquidity-funding-lp-token-derivatives-trading-297b4bc37700?source=rss-cdf7a952920a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/297b4bc37700</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[JC Zhang]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 28 Jan 2021 20:14:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-01-28T20:14:11.079Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*EkoRdFzoDmMgpwausIH0fw.png" /></figure><p>I’ve categorized risks for providing liquidity in DeFi into two types:</p><ul><li>The first type of risk is low APY — this one is obvious. You lose out on the profit from higher-yield assets with low APY and are unprotected from the price fluctuation of the asset itself.</li><li>The second type of risk is unrealized opportunity cost and unrealized time value. Since providing liquidity for an asset pair early runs a higher opportunity cost (also asset-dependent) than participating only when the trading volume is stable, early LPs inherit a higher risk of losing out on profit elsewhere.</li></ul><p>Currently, you have LPs “sniping” high-yielding pools and swarm them with liquidity, diluting the value of the LP Token. In the meantime, the pool never needed the additional liquidity, reflected in the utilization ratio that never goes above 80%.</p><p>Qilin (soon to be released for testing) attacks the liquidity risk issue with an elastic liquidity funding model and elastic LP Token pricing.</p><p><strong>Elastic Liquidity Fund</strong></p><p>What determines how much liquidity is needed in a pool? For asset swapping, it’s hard to know. But for derivatives trading, if you implement a P2Pool model, the total value of naked positions could serve as a benchmark to measure the liquidity requirement for sufficient depth.</p><p>We set the value of the liquidity pool as LP and the value of the naked positions as V. Hence we can derive a Deviation Ratio D = V/LP. If D gets larger than a pre-set Imbalance Threshold (I), then more liquidity is demanded in the pool. Otherwise, the pool remains closed from further funding after the initial funding at the creation of the pool.</p><p>LP rewards from traders also get directly deposited into the pool, causing an increase in the total pool value. A loss-making pool would then have a negative movement of the liquidity pool value. Therefore, the varying value of the liquidity pool indicates the profitability of the pool.</p><p><strong>Elastic LP Token Pricing</strong></p><p>Based on the Elastic Liquidity Fund model, the pricing of the LP Token is more obvious. The LP Token reflects the share of the liquidity deposit against the total pool value. If the pool value increases, the share of the pool reflected by the LP Token also increases in value, and vice versa.</p><p>New LP Token distributed for public purchase when the pool opens for liquidity, at the price of the current LP Token value determined by the pool’s profitability.</p><p>LP Token is tradable anytime in the marketplace where there is supply and demand. If the token owner shorts the liquidity pool, they could sell the LP Token and give up the right to that share of the liquidity, and vice versa. During a profitable period of the pool, the tokenholder can sell the token on the market at a profit and purchase it back at a lower price during a loss-making period.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>Qilin wants to optimize the liquidity-side risks that currently exist in DeFi but have been largely ignored by many devs because of the fast-paced nature of DeFi’s evolution. The Elastic Liquidity Fund feature realizes the opportunity cost of early LPs, and the Elastic LP Pricing model invents a new way of LP Token as a crypto asset.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=297b4bc37700" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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