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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Jeremy Parsons on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Jeremy Parsons on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Jeremy Parsons on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jdap?source=rss-d449a689477a------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[On getting it wrong]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jdap/on-getting-it-wrong-eb2048bc939d?source=rss-d449a689477a------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeremy Parsons]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 21 Feb 2015 13:00:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-02-21T13:00:19.007Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Like you, I’m guessing, I have mixed feelings about Apple. I love that it’s a company that wants to delight users. I hate that that wanting has such a short shelf-life — just until the next product release. And I’m mildly annoyed to have been proved wrong about how it’s played the market.</p><p>You see, I really thought Apple’s decision to neglect the low-to-middle market with iPhone was a blunder. Leaving all that market space to the Android ecosystem seemed to me a strategic error that the company would come to regret. Over time, the furnace of innovation would simply shift, and Apple would rediscover the truth that nearly killed it way back when — that the electronics world punishes brands that chase the upper quartile.</p><p>I should have known better.</p><p>You see, to make an innovating ecosystem viable for hardware manufacturers, you have to, well, allow those guys to innovate too. But Google has, apparently, zero interest in anybody’s commercial interests but its own. It seems to have assumed that its winner-takes-all approach built in pay per click advertising would be fine in this space too. So Android has become a vanity brooch on Google. The best Android phones are awesome. And totally interchangeable.</p><p>For the most savvy lawyers, florists, Software-as-a-service creators, cat clothiers and others, Google eating 100% or more of the profit margin on a sale works because the lifetime value of a new customer relationship is significant. But for the consumer electronics industry, the sales are too infrequent for that to work even in theory, while in practice Google has trained us not to care whose badge is on that phone or tablet.</p><p>What’s my conclusion? Well, I don’t see the Google leopard changing its spots. And Microsoft seems reconciled to a future holding being a leader in lots of niches. So for the next two or three years, Apple’s global profit harvesting is going to continue to work for Apple, while Google’s will continue both to erode and to punish its supporters. Consumers will feel they’re winning, but that will be because the rate of innovation is being managed — drip, drip, drip.</p><p>The optimist in me says — it only takes one breakthrough. But that was true for PCs too, and Microsoft held sway for decades.</p><p>Someone prove me wrong. Please.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=eb2048bc939d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Brilliant Customer Service by Design]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jdap/brilliant-customer-service-by-design-bc3b625f0347?source=rss-d449a689477a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bc3b625f0347</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeremy Parsons]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 17 Mar 2014 14:29:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2014-03-17T14:32:21.087Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>A lesson you should learn from Starbucks</h4><p><strong>Why do my children love Starbucks? Because they <em>love</em> what happens when they mess up</strong>: they get a “golden ticket” for any drink, for any size, for any extras, for free. It’s so simple, but run-of-the-mill businesses get this wrong almost every time for the best and worst of reasons.</p><p>Here’s a great reason your company is almost certainly messing up: 90% of customer problems come from problem customers. They got it wrong, so your job’s to fight them, right? Fair’s fair, after all.</p><p>If you’re a monopoly, then this stance is probably not going to kill you. But in competitive businesses, this is the wrong numbers game to be playing. Because once you have the mindset that the customer’s in the wrong until they can prove otherwise, <strong>you’ve framed negative experiences as battles</strong>. And it’s hard to learn anything of lasting value from a battle.</p><p>When Starbucks hand me the wrong drink, or they’ve run out of cups, or they’re out of hazelnut syrup, the moment I know about the problem, I also know I’m clutching a big, thick, friendly card for a free drink. And the same has been my experience when the problem was me — I knocked my drink over, or forgot I needed to be somewhere else and didn’t have time for my drink. That mindset — let’s sort out the problem first — frames the experience as <strong>a learning opportunity for both sides</strong>. I’ve learned that when it goes wrong, it’s going to be memorable in a good way. And they’ve instrumented customer problems: just counting tickets going out and tickets coming back in yields insight, never mind any invisible (to me) processes they have to record the specifics.</p><p>Am I saying that the customer is always right? No. That you should always trust a customer’s word? Also, no.</p><p>All I’m saying is that every business <em>can</em> craft their interactions with customers to have a “problem-solved, positive experience” bias. Those that don’t — the vast majority — richly deserve to fail.</p><p>Starbucks for coffee, Zappos for shoes, Apple for gadgets, Google for the web, the list goes on. In industry after industry, the dead wood is falling as we all remember what corporations have tried to make us forget: <strong>it’s well worth crossing the street for outstanding customer service</strong>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bc3b625f0347" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Nottingham Outsiders: Florence Boot]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jdap/nottingham-outsiders-florence-boot-576685be5efe?source=rss-d449a689477a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/576685be5efe</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeremy Parsons]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 09 Oct 2013 15:13:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2013-10-09T16:19:11.826Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>The design force behind Boots the Chemist</h4><p>The story of Boots the chemist is usually told focused on Jesse Boot — son of the founder, and the driving entrepreneurial force behind the revolutionary retail chemist that changed the British High Street.</p><p>His Jersey-born wife Florence, whose 150th anniversary it is this year, was a full partner in this enterprise, and equally worth a glance — as an incomer to Nottingham who got behind her adopted city and made Boots not merely a factory, but a flourishing and creative enterprise.</p><p>I was struck by her words, on display in the reception of D90 — the Nottingham headquarters. Here’s what she says about good employment practice:</p><blockquote>“The basis of good welfare is good wages, and no welfare scheme can be successful which is created to prevent the employee from a careful consideration of the wages paid.</blockquote><blockquote>“It must not be paternal, granted by a benevolent management and dutifully received by an appreciative staff.</blockquote><blockquote>“The essence of the work is joint effort ; joint suggestions—joint criticism—and joint management. The collection of ideas and the organisation of combined work will probably necessitate the employment of one or more persons, but welfare work will only achieve its fullest result when every employee by interest, by action and by belief is a welfare worker.”</blockquote><p>This is strikingly modern. It challenges the idea that “the company knows best what’s for your own good.” I’d paraphrase part of what she says as, <em>“Don’t bang on about the wonderful opportunities you are creating for your employees, or how they’re the firm’s greatest asset. Pay everyone well, share responsibility for one another, treat people as not just tools to do some job but as people for whom work is one part of life — and make sure that every job has the opportunity to contribute to the social life of the organisation and to creative, innovative management.”</em></p><p>Today, we might call the Victorian Boots a design led company — and Florence was right at its creative core. She encouraged blending form and function — beautiful stores, thought through from top to bottom. She founded the Boots Book Lovers Library- the Netflix of its day, if you like, with lending at sixpence a book — and at its height well over half a million subscribers. She put cafes into stores — as a side-note the big eye-opener for me in book stores was Powell’s in Portland, Oregon, where new and used copies sat side by side, with engaged readers on the staff, and a cafe where you were actively encouraged to sit with a pile of potential selections. Florence’s cafes were rather elegant, and I suspect no books were read over the porcelain, but in many ways Florence made Boots the first mass-market “destination shopping” experience.</p><p>According to Christopher Weir, “[Florence’s] love of life prevented Jesse from becoming too inward looking or depressed.” As for their social life,”At the hub of it all was Florence, whose outgoing personality… attracted a constant stream of guests from all walks of life.” And she made a point of staying in touch with the company’s workers, especially female staff — and when she found that many staff at one site arrived for their working day not having had breakfast, she immediately instituted a daily cup of cocoa first thing. She sensed what (now in relation to children and schooling) we have recently rediscovered, which is that not just good wages, but starting the day well-nourished, are essential to work being fulfilling and a constant learning (and sharing, and teaching) experience.</p><p>As the industrial economy is transforming into the social economy, powered by tools for improving human connectedness, alongside technologies such as the Internet of Things, and additive manufacturing (where we can now download a product, tweak the design a bit, and print it into life right here or just down the street, “workers” are increasingly able to access a wide range of “employers.” In some new economy businesses, it’s already the norm that teams self-organise to share the workload and to create opportunities to grow and develop.</p><p>Creative entrepreneurial culture in the new economy owes a great deal to Florence Boot, an incomer to Nottingham who chose to be an insider in the city, but an outsider to the industrial norms of the day. She wasn’t engaged by the idea of a Boots that delighted its customers but merely deployed its workforce — but of an organic team looking both to one another and to the customer, in an environment that was consistent with that vision.</p><p>But you mustn’t imagine Florence as somehow embarrassed by the commercial side of the business. A secure business model was an essential underpinning. Jesse Boot disrupted an entire industry, and gave a heritage to the City of Nottingham and to future generations and incarnations of Boots; Florence’s creative drive made sure that copy-cat rivals could never clone the culture that was equally essential.</p><p>150 years since her birth, let’s salute her inspiring example. I don’t know if I can achieve a tiny fraction of what Florence accomplished. But if I try, and you try, and we all give a little more attention to the people we meet every day as workers, we could change our corner of the world. And sometimes — more often than you know — what comes out from Nottingham goes on to change the world.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=576685be5efe" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Saving the whale]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jdap/saving-the-whale-946cdd840467?source=rss-d449a689477a------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeremy Parsons]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 09 Sep 2013 08:11:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2013-09-09T12:33:58.973Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Nokia-Microsoft is a potent mix, but so was Lotus-IBM</h4><p>Since I’m in the mood for reminiscences, I want to think through the parallels between these business courtships, and ask the question, <strong><em>will the end result be less painful for Microsoft than for its formerly mighty partner IBM?</em></strong></p><p>Let’s start in the present. Here’s the story as I see it.</p><p>Microsoft became the one true winner of the second wave of the PC era. Nothing happened in that entire industry without Microsoft seeing it, and little of significance happened without Microsoft’s participation.</p><p>Nokia became the one true winner of the second wave of the cellphone era. No mobile network operator could afford to cut Nokia out, and their global reach was head and shoulders above the rest.</p><p>Microsoft and Nokia collaborated on many fronts, but they had rival products and contradictory strategies in smartphone. I saw those play out at first hand, starting back in the nineties.</p><p>In those days, Microsoft had a niche product, and an overwhelming arrogance. It believed its engagement model for PC vendors (we call the tune, you dance) would play out the same in the mobile market with operators and handset manufacturers. In fact, it had a series of niche products that made it a significant second tier player in smartphones.</p><p>Nokia had something very different: focus on the end user, and the capability to bring network operators all they needed to turn that into success — in the network, in the product range, in the store. Over time, that turned into volume leadership in smartphones, with Symbian (which started life in supercharged calculators) the sustained success story…</p><p>Both were wrongfooted twice, by the same players, but for different reasons.</p><p>Blackberry had a tight focus: delivering the best possible experience for high end corporate users. It created smartphones with tiny but amazingly usable keyboards, and it created servers that integrated those phones to become better tools than desktops and laptops for staying in touch. Oh, and it turned those into the answer to network operators’ prayers — massive average revenue per user (ARPU), measured by sales of handsets, service plans and server offerings.</p><p>Microsoft was wrongfooted because Blackberry was so darned compatible with their total story. Blackberry sucked at consumer experiences — so it shared no ground with Windows Mobile. And Blackberry customers were going to become more committed than ever before to Microsoft Exchange.</p><p>Nokia was wrongfooted because it saw only the surface: it turns out that corporate users and teenagers love phones with gazillions of plastic keys. Who knew? Well, we can do that too. And it’s true, phones like the E61 packed more power than Blackberries and delivered way more that discerning consumers were beginning to expect than the one trick Blackberry pony. In fact, you could say Nokia weren’t wrong-footed at all. This was a textbook response, and it should have preserved Nokia as volume leader and given it what it lacked — a position in US smartphones.</p><p>And then there was Apple. I’m not going to cover this ground again, only from the perspective of the wrong-footing.</p><p>Microsoft was wrong-footed because Apple shared its arrogance in dealing with operators — but unlike Microsoft, it was offering operators a (limited) share in the upside, including (in the early days) geographic exclusivity. So Apple looked like the competitor they could fight, leveraging their unassailable position in PCs, servers and infrastructure. Keep on long enough, and we’ll win.</p><p>Nokia was wrong-footed because it had one major blind-spot — the flip side of the coin. Apple had one product, and that product was culturally narrow. Sure, there were tiny variants, but this was a single product competitor. Nokia’s long haul to leadership had come largely out of its ability to find and serve market segments and tiny niches with positive experiences and finely tuned products, in every country on the planet. Nokia saw and stressed about Apple, but it was precommitted to the idea that product spread and fine-tuning would always win in the end.</p><p>The Nokia-Microsoft relationship is being consummated by Microsoft buying Nokia’s phone business, the only credible phone brand with a strong (total, as it happens) commitment to Windows Phone. So that’s a great position to muscle back into the smartphone market, right?</p><p>IBM created the hardware architecture of the second PC era, working with a “just good enough” operating system, PCDOS = MSDOS = CP/M tribute, sitting over a “just good enough” hardware base.</p><p>IBM planned an IBM-centric path to the future. That path was the PS/2, MCA (proprietary, licensable), OS/2 (a grown-up operating system) and Presentation Manager (a grown-up graphical user interface).</p><p>Microsoft was both a participant in that path, and owner of its own rival conception — Windows, built on the path that Xerox conceived, and Apple pursued first with Lisa and then with Macintosh.</p><p>Lotus was the software company that killed the first wave of PC makers by making the app you had to own, which only worked on IBM and clones.</p><p>So when Lotus committed to Presentation Manager as its path from DOS to GUI, how could IBM-Lotus fail?</p><p>IBM with its Lotus acquisition bought everything you need for success except one vital factor. They had vision, capability and credentials.</p><p>All they were missing was the ability to see reality.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=946cdd840467" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Sell, Marketer, Sell]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jdap/sell-marketer-sell-71b97cd2d3f4?source=rss-d449a689477a------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeremy Parsons]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 29 Aug 2013 07:08:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2013-08-29T07:14:54.351Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>A lesson I learned from Mike Heneghan</h4><p>Mike was the first boss I worked for twice — the first time, because he inherited me; the second, because he wanted someone he could trust with some of the necessary impossibilities of re-floating a sinking ship.</p><p>The first part of the lesson I owe to him was from a cartoon hanging on his office wall. Two people in business dress are standing at the foot of a giant can of Heinz Beans. One tells the other, “It’s not the tin they’re buying.”</p><p>The message was for people selling and marketing computers. For decades, computer customers had to buy a tin, and then fill it with beans themselves. So salespeople were expert in how tall and sleek the tins were, how our tin is so much more convenient than their tin, how much of a safe investment our tin is. And most marketers found ways to innovate tins incrementally, based on the feedback from sales: customers are looking for tins that are a bit smaller, more curvy, two compartments not one.</p><p>The smartest marketers took themselves far enough away from the sales front to notice that the tin buyers weren’t in control any more — a new buying practice was coming out of informed users, wanting their needs met, and focusing on the beans first and foremost.</p><p>Mike was a marketing person, with a track record of making a difference. And I learned from him why, at the scale of the company or division, it’s the marketers who have the opportunity and accountability to innovate in order to serve customers better, reach new markets and pull resource from propositions heading for a dead end.</p><p>I also learned that the thing I was getting excited about — doing deals — was just as available, exciting and worthwhile to marketers as to salespeople.</p><p>And now comes the clincher. Mike taught me… No, that’s wrong. Mike supported me in digging deeper into marketing <em>on condition that</em> I should spend a significant period in a full-on, quota-carrying sales role. And he advised me that, to be any use as a marketer, throughout my career I should deliberately and determinedly spend time selling.</p><p>I have a memory of the reason he gave, but I’m suspicious of it — it’s probably a false memory, logic worked back from later years. So let’s just let the instruction stand. Given that I’ve followed it, deliberately and determinedly, what has it meant for me?</p><p>First, I never had the option of stereotyping sales teams. Every time I’ve been involved setting up or reviewing commission plans, I’ve already understood how every wonderful plan embeds perverse incentives, and how often sales people are made inauthentic promises that punish top performers.</p><p>Second, I’ve kept the insight that selling is a fundamental business role, while marketing is a bucket into which is swept a bunch of activities, the vast majority of which are transitory. My favourite short definition of the term <em>marketing </em>is, “the business, seen from the customer’s perspective.” On that definition, talented marketers are people who strive to do themselves out of a job — they are plumbers, hunting out old runs of piping that sludge up the system, and pointing to places where water should be flowing.</p><p>Third, I’ve understood that to be a good marketer, a good manager and a good leader, I have to want to and work to prioritise spending time with customers past, present and prospective. Sales experience gives a great toolset for just that. Every sales person knows the difference between a friendly meeting and an order; every sales person knows the importance of walking calmly into, not running swiftly away from, bad situations where someone is unhappy.</p><p>And finally, I know that while I will never be the multi-talented paragon I would love to be, by being practised in asking deep questions and listening deeply to other people, every single day I can make a difference for someone.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=71b97cd2d3f4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Successful innovation feeds on stories]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jdap/successful-innovation-feeds-on-stories-99ad8bcdd544?source=rss-d449a689477a------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeremy Parsons]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 21 Aug 2013 12:17:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2013-08-21T12:17:42.865Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>A lesson I learned from Stephen Beynon</h4><p>UK telecoms, like telecoms in most places for two full generations if not more, was a monopoly. The plan to competition included a period of duopoly, which gave new entrant Mercury Communications an opportunity to build scale and scope without being crushed by incumbent BT.</p><p>These days, it’s no big deal creating a new operator, whether virtual or network-based. Everything you need — people and processes, systems and skills, everything — can be hired, borrowed, bought or built.But that wasn’t true in the 1980s, so it’s no criticism to say that Mercury was cobbled together. Pioneer businesses have to be.</p><p>When I started, hired to solve the problem of pricing (Mercury had one story: “we’re <em>much</em> cheaper than BT,” and it was wearing very thin), I was both awestruck by an organisation that wanted to be different than its rival, and shocked by the way in which the company had fallen into a trap it had dug itself. Seeing its core systems weren’t fit for purpose in a competitive market, it had a bold initiative to deliver totally new systems. And those systems would be ready, well, in a year or two, as long as we got the spec right. And the spec was gathered from users, so it must be right, mustn’t it?</p><p>Stephen came back from a visit to a US operator with a story. The story was that whenever a call came in, if it was from a number that could be identified as a customer, the systems would grab the customer details, and see if there was a price plan that would have saved the company money. There usually would be — and that meant that the first thing the customer would hear would be good news… which is important because if you’re a phone company and a customer is phoning you, chances are they have a problem or are a step or two down the road to switching to one of your rivals.</p><p>Anyone in Mercury hearing that story — and I am certain that Stephen spread it widely — got <em>news from the future</em>.</p><ul><li><strong>Systems people</strong> heard that billing system features that weren’t even on the roadmap that had been carefully constructed based on user interviews, may be essential to the company’s survival — and they also heard that it was possible to get there</li><li><strong>Marketing people</strong> heard that they needed to learn a whole new set of skills, because churn (customers leaving for another provider) was going to play out differently when choice went from one, to two, to two hundred telecom companies — and they also heard that there were already bridges being built to tap into the knowledge and insight that was out there</li><li><strong>Customer service people</strong> heard that their job was going to become even more critical to the success of the business — and that they could and should ask for better tools to do their job</li><li><strong>Finance people</strong> heard that the future was going to be far more complex than the past — and that the marketing / finance / operations / customer services relationship had to grow stronger and deeper</li><li><strong>Senior business people</strong> heard that the company would have to reinvent itself from top to bottom, or else exit the market before more agile competition cut in</li><li>And I heard that there was at least one person in the company, someone who was respected, liked and trusted, who had my back</li></ul><p>Most organisations, actual or nascent, are full of specifiers, speculators and systematizers. Those are all useful, even vital skills.</p><p>But it’s the storytellers, who craft the right story, and tell it in the right places, simply and doggedly so it carries far and wide — it’s those people who spark meaningful innovation.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=99ad8bcdd544" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Entrepreneur or innovator?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jdap/entrepreneur-or-innovator-e4263cfd8f0c?source=rss-d449a689477a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e4263cfd8f0c</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeremy Parsons]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 07 Aug 2013 15:36:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2013-08-08T06:55:04.529Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>A lesson I learned from Andy Johnson-Laird</h4><p>Back in the days that software arrived through the post, and probably hadn’t been tested on the computer you were using, part of my job was getting other people’s software un-broken.</p><p>I started with the obvious strategy: if our customer had a problem, and I could reproduce it, I’d call the author’s technical support line and raise the issue, so it could get fixed.</p><p>Nobody ever told me off for doing it this way, even though it cost time to get the issue raised (I was in the UK, and most of the authors were in the USA), and there was no guarantee it would progress further (if the brand of computer wasn’t widespread in the USA, well, when was <em>that</em> issue going to get serious attention?).</p><p>Being curious, though, I’d generally load the software in a debugger, and if it crashed, disassemble the code (i.e. turn all those noughts and ones in the computer’s memory back into the instructions that a programmer had typed) and try and see what went wrong. If it was another kind of issue, I’d step through the code from the start, looking for tell-tale signs of common issues.</p><p>Sometimes this was the work of a few minutes, often it was hours, and occasionally it would take up all my spare time for a week or two.</p><p>Often there was <em>one</em> obvious issue — obvious why it caused the problem, obvious why it wasn’t causing a problem in the USA, obvious how to sort it out in a way that would achieve the programmer’s intent by a different method.</p><p>So that gave me a new strategy.</p><p>Having found the problem, I’d work out how to fix it. Then, if the fix meant adding code, I’d hunt around for an area of cruft (code or data in the program that never got used) I could safely overwrite with my fix, and make up a new software manufacturing master so that our customers wouldn’t hit the problem. And if I could find a way, I’d send the fix to the author (this was before the web, and in the days that “email” meant lots of different systems, most of which talked to each other reluctantly or not at all).</p><p>I never got told off for that strategy either. And, because it felt like my job, I never thought to tell anyone else.</p><p>Eventually, Andy saw me disassembling chunks of code, and writing paper maps that filled several desks. He asked me what I was doing, and I explained. He seemed interested, and amused, but that first conversation didn’t seem significant to me at the time.</p><p>Now, this was around the time that software available for the IBM PC, and only for the IBM PC, was killing established PC makers. Some were well down the line with creating clones, but many more had created systems that were different. Usually “better” — faster, better graphics, bigger memory capacity, whatever. But different enough that the new breed of software titles, that broke all the rules for “good practice” and depended on the specifics of the IBM PC, wouldn’t run.</p><p>Andy knew this from the inside. We had been involved in the PC project, and were one of the many software companies using clean room methods to produce a non-infringing “ROM BIOS” — the bit of code that sat between the chips and interfaces of the physical computer and the operating system (MS-DOS / PC-DOS, and other systems of the time such as CP/M-86, XENIX).</p><p>So he made up a story called Softclone, which was a combination of clever software, and painstaking software engineering work of the sort I’d been doing, to “fix” programs like Lotus 1-2-3, and which would buy time for PC makers while they got true PC clones out of the door.</p><p>I innovated a method, and made a few scores of companies less unhappy with their copy of some word processor or spreadsheet. But Andy, the entrepreneur, invented a small industry that created huge value, for a short time, for PC manufacturers facing extinction.</p><p>We need innovation. We need entrepreneurship. When innovation and entrepreneurship <em>meet</em>, the world changes.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e4263cfd8f0c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Microsoft must remember its history differently]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jdap/microsoft-must-remember-its-history-differently-568022459e1c?source=rss-d449a689477a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/568022459e1c</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeremy Parsons]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 02 Aug 2013 16:51:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2013-08-03T07:48:11.593Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>An innovator’s dilemma</h4><p><em>It’s tough near the top.</em> Microsoft has vast resources, enough cash cows to fill a dairy, and a history of surging into and cleaning out whole categories in the computing industry. The problem is that it’s lost affinity with its community, and it’s lost credibility in formulating strategy and in executing new and renewed product ranges. This needn’t be terminal, though that’s the direction of travel. And that’s a shame — because at its very best, it’s been a research superpower, a true visionary and pioneer in computing, and a force for good.</p><h4>History Microsoft needs to forget</h4><p>Microsoft had nearly two decades at the very centre of home and office computing, dominating the desktop and taking impressive market positions in corporate computing.</p><p>None of this was quick, easy, but you have to really look hard <em>before</em> that period to shake off the sense that Microsoft somehow was the natural winner. Here are some of their bragging rights:</p><ul><li>Microsoft was <em>streets</em> behind Apple on graphical interfaces, but punched out version after version of Windows, each just good enough to show progress for customers and software authors,so that Apple was ground down, confined to a niche and very nearly consigned to the history books</li><li>Core office applications and productivity brands such as Lotus, Wordperfect, Ashton-Tate and Borland that were arguably the real force behind the DOS era were swept aside as Microsoft came from nowhere to write, port, buy and bundle office applications that became the preferred choice for almost everyone, Microsoft Office</li><li>Microsoft’s deep roots in the software development community, and a generation of developers who cut their teeth on DOS and Windows helped punch Wintel (Microsoft Windows, Intel processor) architectures into high-end workstations and servers of every size</li></ul><p>Microsoft hasn’t come to terms with its losses, as Apple and Google have each created leadership positions that have outflanked them. <em>It must forget</em> this period of seemingly boundless success, because the memory and all its associations is clouding its judgement.</p><h4>Case Study: Trouble under the Surface</h4><p>When Microsoft decided to launch a range of its own branded tablets and hybrids, it made a series of implicit statements.</p><ol><li>It means to take ownership of innovation in the physical realisation of devices, going head-to-head with Apple</li><li>It is positioning tablets relative to phones as not merely a bigger form factor, but a bigger experience</li><li>It is positioning tablets relative to laptops (and ARM-based architectures relative to Intel ones) as an inherently lesser experience</li><li>The future of computing will look like the past — in particular, it will look like and even transcend the pinnacle of the “Microsoft era”</li></ol><p>As a package, there are strong parallels with their “long march” to dominance. But their strategy with Surface only made sense if each and every one of those statements is smart, or true, or truly achievable. So let’s check, one by one.</p><ol><li><strong>Microsoft the tablet-maker</strong> should be worried on at least three counts: first, the nearest it’s got so far to a successful whole computer-based product is Xbox, which is hardly an example of profitable dominance; second, in the overlapping smartphone market Microsoft is committed to the <em>exact opposite</em> strategy; third, its action has apparently caused laptop makers to shelve or downscale their own activities, or to focus on other operating systems</li><li><strong>“Tablets have to be very different than big smartphones”</strong> is just plain wrong, according to everybody but Microsoft themselves</li><li><strong>“Tablets are the poor relations of laptops”</strong> is certainly debatable — it’s not self-evidently false, but it’s certainly not self-evidently true, and even Apple have so far avoided having to take a position by focusing on what an iPad can be great at, without worrying overmuch how this relates to MacBook</li><li><strong>“Microsoft owns the emerging age of the ‘Intimate Computer’”</strong> — well, it certainly doesn’t own hearts and minds, and it’s delusional to aspire to fix or recreate the past</li></ol><p>Maybe I’m being over-harsh, and a couple of these statements are actually smart, or at least far smarter than they look to me. But all four together? I just don’t buy it.</p><h4>Tough decisions</h4><p>Of course, Microsoft’s predicament is that of any successful public company facing powerful competitors and new competitive models. Financial focus virtually guarantees that a company will be blindsided by, or unable to respond to, even the most evident industry changes.</p><p>If you owned Microsoft Office, for instance, financial focus would likely take you in one of three directions.</p><p>First, you may say, “this is a cash cow, so my job is to maximise quarter-by-quarter profit by milking it as long as possible and by reducing costs along the decline curve.” That sounds sensible — text-book sensible. But it essentially guarantees a long-term exit from the market, and a constant brake on risking or reducing short-term revenues based on a wider business case — for instance by ring-fencing the cash cow as a division.</p><p>Second, you might go for another page from the text book, and extend the range, constructing a mesh of products with different capabilities and for different platforms, with some kind of commercial linkage allowing you to harvest revenues in more ways (so you might invent Office 365, and deliver quite separate free products like Windows Mail that are always just good enough to use, never good enough to threaten Office).</p><p>Third, you might in fact decide that the cash cow days must end, the question is, when? And here there’s no rule book, just the painful awareness that every day feels a bit too soon to be sure… while in industries from automobile manufacture to video rentals to aviation, giant after giant has waited too long to make its move — often missing the critical moment by years. Just like Microsoft itself did with smartphones, for instance, milking the small cash cow that was Windows Mobile while first Blackberry reinvented the business smartphone, then Apple reinvented the entire handset industry.</p><p>There is another way. To find it, Microsoft needs to remember just a little back into its past.</p><p><strong>Remember, remember</strong></p><p>The story Microsoft needs to remember differently is the story of IBM’s PC project — a story in which Microsoft was a key player, a close observer and (alongside Intel) the chief beneficiary.</p><p>IBM had largely missed out on the emergence of minicomputers, and was conspicuous by its absence from personal computing. Culturally, it was hard to break out of the mindset that PCs were either super-charged typewriters, smart terminals to connect to mainframes, or tactical devices that would get just enough computer power onto the spot fast — or at least faster than you could install a mainframe connection.</p><p>With all that in mind, the IBM PC project was both a breathtakingly bold departure from “business as usual,” and a difficult birth that needed intensive care for years.</p><p>Today, you would probably call the IBM PC an attempt to create a Minimum Viable Product (MVP). The project was first and foremost an exercise in shipping <em>something</em> fast by doing just enough design work, based on every possible hardware and software component being bought in. This went against almost everything IBM thought it stood for. (And, of course, gave Microsoft the opportunity to sell IBM an operating system it didn’t have, but found and acquired from Seattle Computer Products.)</p><p>Because it was IBM, there were customers ready to buy, and industry experts ready to inspect. So they found out two important things. First, compared to other systems, there wasn’t much software that ran on the IBM PC. Second, what software there was tended to be more limited, and run less well, than the same or similar software on other PCs.</p><p>So IBM not only tolerated, but actively encouraged companies that wanted to write software for their PC to tear up the software rulebook and do whatever it took to get the most out of the hardware — bypassing the operating system whenever necessary in order to squeeze out maximum capability and optimum performance. Products like the Microsoft Flight Simulator (bought from subLOGIC).</p><p>One breakthrough product was Lotus 1-2-3, which made its appearance around 18 months after the launch of the IBM PC. This product wasn’t the first PC spreadsheet by any means. Visicalc had blazed the trail on the Apple II, Supercalc was market leader across a range of platforms, and Microsoft was gaining a toe-hold with Multiplan. But Lotus was in another league. Salespeople, finance teams and general managers <em>loved</em> Lotus, and if you had to have Lotus, you had to have an IBM PC, or something virtually identical… Which spawned an entirely new industry of IBM ‘clones’ that kept as close as possible in every important detail so that they could run any important software program written for the IBM PC (which, of course, had to include Microsoft’s MS-DOS).</p><p>Sometimes you’ll hear this story told as a warning. IBM created the blueprint for the explosion of PCs, but couldn’t control, lost leadership in, and finally exited the PC market. I think that’s how Microsoft remembers it, and even how Apple remembers it. But in my view, that’s just plain wrong.</p><p>If they’d weighted down the PC project with the obligation to do things the IBM way, the PC project would have produced the best ever suitcase-sized companion to ‘proper’ IBM mainframes.</p><h4>So what, for Microsoft?</h4><p>Windows RT lets tablets be the best ever near-laptop-sized companion to ‘proper’ Microsoft Windows PCs.</p><p>Which is the best news ever. Assuming you’ve been asleep for the last five or ten years.</p><p><em>So what should Microsoft do?</em></p><p>Well, according to me at least, they need to take a few lessons from a selection of A-list corporations.</p><p>From Amazon, they need to (re)learn that there are some amazing business opportunities that flow from giving your customers better value than your accountants and competitors think you should.</p><p>From Apple, they need to (re)learn that sometimes, you just have to end the pursuit of compatibility with legacy software and systems, when the market is going forwards and you’re going backwards.</p><p>From ARM, they need to (re)learn that the tighter the constraints, the greater the artistry of innovation.</p><p>From AstraZeneca, they need to (re)learn that when the world is clearly changing, you need to reshape your business model to fit the new world, and develop new strategies to maximise innovation</p><p>And from AT&amp;T, they need to (re)learn that it’s the markets you’re forced out of or choose to withdraw from that help you see, and cross, the chasm.</p><p>But what about practical steps, decisions they could take right now?</p><p>Well, one they might want to consider is to find the right person to lead Microsoft’s Intimate Computing project, give them charge of Windows Phone, Windows RT, games, media, search, Microsoft Research and Microsoft’s accessories businesses, cut all ties and obligations to all other Microsoft desktop, server, cloud, services, office and business applications, databases, and everything else I’ve missed out, and forbid them to use just one word ever again in a brand.</p><p>That word is, “Windows.”</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=568022459e1c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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