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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Jd Eveland on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Jd Eveland on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@jdeveland?source=rss-1f2071eae3dd------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Jd Eveland on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jdeveland?source=rss-1f2071eae3dd------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Real conspiracies]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/socio-techtonic-change/real-conspiracies-150d2fc6c342?source=rss-1f2071eae3dd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/150d2fc6c342</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[historia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[conspiracy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[conspiracy-theories]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jd Eveland]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 25 Mar 2018 19:56:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-03-28T20:38:56.256Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*WHM-U9-VHc0UaVnUZrB8jw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image courtesy of <a href="https://bit.ly/2IPr297">https://bit.ly/2IPr297</a></figcaption></figure><p>There is obviously a great deal of interest in the subject of conspiracies these days, and many different ideas floating around about who and what might be conspiring about what. The world seems increasingly divided between those who see conspiracies everywhere and those who are committed to denouncing the whole idea of conspiracy and vilifying those who believe in them. Did the US actually land people on the moon in 1969, or was the whole thing shot on a back lot in Burbank? Who really killed Kennedy? Is Justin Bieber a reptilian shape shifter?</p><p>I’m a well-known contrarian. I’m going to speak up on behalf of conspiracy theories generally. It isn’t necessary to accept full details of each and every widespread conspiracy theory in order to acknowledge that there actually are conspiracies affecting public life, and that some of them deserve serious investigation. (I’m not going to firmly commit myself on the Moon landing, at the moment, although I find the Bieber/reptilian connection oddly persuasive.)</p><p>The fact is, most of human history is nothing BUT conspiracies. What’s a conspiracy? It’s a relatively small number of people getting together at some point to plan and/or act on something to their mutual advantage. Sounds like your divisional staff meeting this morning? Like the PTA meeting last night? Getting together with some of your family to plan Xmas festivities? I would guess that each of us is up to our ears in 10–15 different conspiracies at any one time. We tell ourselves that since we are good people, we can’t possibly be conspiring, because conspiracy is something that only bad people do. The dynamics of conspiracy are pretty much the same whether the object is world domination or a better surprise birthday party.</p><p>Society exists and is managed as an intricate dance of different conspiracies (AKA “organizations”, groups, etc. — pick your level of aggregation.) Of course, some conspiracies have more effect than others. There are certainly well-documented conspiracies that have had and continue to have enormous impact on American public life. The federal Constitution was written by a conspiracy. From <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/titles/11091.html">Burr’s conspiracy</a> in the early 19th century to the <a href="https://timeline.com/business-plot-overthrow-fdr-9a59a012c32a?gi=e266844ef1d4">Bankers’ Plot of 1934</a>, there is a steady trail of ideas about overthrowing the government. The number of financial scandals and conspiracies throughout American history probably approximates the number of stars in this galaxy. The <a href="https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/british-and-u-s-regulators-fine-big-banks-3-16-billion-in-foreign-exchange-scandal/">relatively recent scandal involving manipulation of currency rates by a combine of British and American banks</a> provides clear evidence that we are still at it. The <a href="https://www.ted.com/talks/marco_tempest_the_electric_rise_and_fall_of_nikola_tesla/discussion">conspiracy between J.P. Morgan, George Westinghouse, and Thomas Edison to discredit and destroy Nikola Tesla</a> is also well-documented by historians, and continues to affect our day-to-day existence in deplorable ways. There is even an entire field of “<a href="https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1879&amp;context=mlr">government conspiracy law</a>” that is worth noting. <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/conspiracy/wiki/locc">Reddit’s “List of Confirmed Conspiracies” is a reasonably comprehensive summary of real conspiracies that have affected literally millions of people.</a></p><p><a href="https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-02-23/1967-he-cia-created-phrase-conspiracy-theorists-and-ways-attack-anyone-who-challenge">The phrase “conspiracy theory” was dreamed up by the government as a generic way of smearing and discrediting any alternatives to the official narrative</a> regarding the Kennedy assassination. It continues to be used primarily as a term of insult applied to any alternative to any official narrative. And there is no shortage of pundits and op-ed writers happy to condemn any and all conspiracy theories and denounce anyone who professes belief in any of them. Simply labeling a narrative as a conspiracy theory is generally sufficient to shut it down completely, to provide reason not to examine any evidence put forth, and to discredit anyone expressing such a narrative.</p><p>On the contrary, I would argue that a reasonable attention to the possibility of conspiracy is simply responsible public policy analysis. If anyone seriously believes only all of the official narratives, s/he is simply too naive to participate in today’s society. This is wrong, and does not contribute to the growth of a healthy body of social information. The Latin phrase “cui bono?” ought to be front and center in any meaningful analysis of political, social, and/or economic developments. We owe it to ourselves and our society to be both suspicious and attentive to all the social narratives put forth. We no longer have a journalistic “fourth estate” on which we can rely to dig up the real stories; that’s a casualty of the new information environment. So responsible citizenship now requires our own personal attention to the social and political narratives with which we are confronted, since we can be almost certain that the public versions are carefully edited to match the interests of those who originate them — that is to say, a conspiracy of one form or another.</p><p>Once upon a time, almost everyone tended to believe the official narratives. Also once upon a time, scientists believe that the earth had developed gradually and uniformly over a long period of time, with only minor changes taking place at a given moment. Now, we understand that the Earth’s development is much more like a set of punctuated equilibria, where periods of more or less stability alternate with periods of catastrophe and fairly dramatic changes. Now also, it’s time to understand that our social institutions do not always deliver optimal solutions to everyone, and that they are not necessarily on your side, since these institutions are largely owned and operated by conspirators acting on their own behalf. We call this giant intersecting batch of conspiracies “the market”, and we desperately hope that enough of the conspiracies will cancel each other out or reinforce each other to keep things more or less stable overall. Except, of course, for when they don’t.</p><p>Paranoia is the idea that people may be conspiring against you to do evil to you. Of course, just because you’re paranoid doesn’t mean they aren’t out to get you. There is also a parallel concept called “pronoia”, or the idea that people may be conspiring to do you good. For some reason, this is a much less prevalent delusion than paranoia, although it’s not uncommonly experienced.</p><p>It’s certainly true that much of what tends to be attributed to conspiracies is actually the result of simple incompetence or stupidity. But there is no doubt that there is a core of determined conspiracies that will succeed, and one of the tests of their success is that you won’t ever know that they did. History, as they say, is written by the victors, and those who achieve their victory through conspiracy aren’t likely to broadcast the fact. They’re much more likely to tell you “Move along now, nothing to see here.” You’d be surprised at how successful even arrant nonsense can be when it’s backed up by the police power of the state.</p><p>It’s also true that there is a tendency to expand theories about conspiracies, and to link different kinds of conspiracies together as a result of the same set of conspirators. The result is often an overblown or highly improbable combination of conspiracies that tends to cast doubt on all of its components. For example, it’s not necessary to accept the full range of theories about 9/11 to find some things extremely suspicious about, for example, the collapse of building number 7 as a probably controlled demolition. Nor is it necessary to endorse the proposition that the British Royal family are lizard shape shifters who eat babies in order to accept that members of the family have enormous financial resources that they use in some very strange ways. It’s also unlikely that elite American men meet annually at the Bohemian Grove primarily to have sex with children, but there’s no doubt that there are many varieties of financial conspiracies that are doubtless consummated in that environment. Trying to wrap all the minor conspiracies up into one grand overarching conspiracy such as the illuminati control of the world limits our ability to find and prosecute the specific smaller scale conspiracies that really make life difficult.</p><p>Conspiracy theories are a hard sell, even in today’s environment. Despite all the evidence of history, most people are desperate to believe that they are not being conspired against. Like the devil, the greatest success of any conspiracy is convincing you that it doesn’t exist. Dismissing the idea of conspiracies altogether just gives carte blanche to the real conspirators. Good luck with that.</p><p><strong>NOTE:</strong> Edited 3/28/18 to provide links to the “List of Confirmed Conspiracies” and the CIA’s role in coining the term “conspiracy theory”.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=150d2fc6c342" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/socio-techtonic-change/real-conspiracies-150d2fc6c342">Real conspiracies</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/socio-techtonic-change">Socio-techtonic Change</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Civil conversation?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/socio-techtonic-change/civil-conversation-ff2fd98f3e8a?source=rss-1f2071eae3dd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ff2fd98f3e8a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jd Eveland]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 19 Mar 2018 22:30:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-03-19T22:30:13.476Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/194/1*zZC3eGJ1bLBG8yJBEK8TAA.png" /><figcaption>The effect is cumulative…it won’t happen right away</figcaption></figure><p>A recent article in Vox entitled “<a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/3/15/17113176/new-york-times-opinion-page-conservatism">The real problem with the New York Times op-ed page: it’s not honest about US conservatism</a>” pointed out some rather stark truths about the current state of public conversation. In particular, the article noted that there is an increasing inability of various wings of American politics to speak the same language about things, and a consequent alienation of various groups. This is not healthy for the development of the true civic conversation that we desperately need in these times of change.</p><p>By passing along this analysis, I am not suggesting that it was either complete or inevitable; simply that it was a reasonable diagnosis of the state of division that we seem to have achieved currently. It’s not the first time that we’ve had deep social divisions reflected in deep political divisions in this country — certainly those that led to the Civil War were at least as serious, and we weathered equally complex divisions in the 1930s without Civil War — but it’s perhaps the first time that these divisions were so widely publicized and knowledge of them shared so broadly. What may be different this time is the pace of change and the speed of the feedback loops that make consequences of decisions readily available for examination.</p><p>The <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/hillary-clinton-middle-america-looking-backwards-lost-election-donald-trump/">recent speech by Hillary Clinton regarding reasons for her defeat</a> — good people voted for her, bad people voted for her opponent — embodied the current “liberal malaise” in a caricaturist fashion. If you set out to write a speech satirizing how mainstream Democrats are thinking, you could hardly do better. There is no path to victory, or even reasonable compromise, that lies through that particular Valley. On the other hand, the task of the Right has been vastly simplified by Trump and his dog whistles. They don’t even really have to propose serious public policies at this point; all they have to do is shout “emails”, “collusion”, “Benghazi”, or any one of half a dozen other codewords that summon up the image of the presumed liberal elite for public flogging.</p><p>Their task is further simplified by the simple fact of organizational behavior that it is far easier not to do something than to do something. If a particular process requires approval by five different parts of an organization in order to go forward, then there are five ways it can be obstructed for every one way it can be brought to success. Since the essence of the Republican platform involves unrestricted behavior by private actors in virtually every sector except national security (and even that largely privatized), all they need to do is effectively paralyze certain chokepoints in the governing process to achieve their ends. Pruett at EPA, DeVos at Education, and Perry at Energy are doing their jobs perfectly, finding the chokepoints and disabling them. In another couple of years, these organizations will be so dysfunctional that they may have to be completely scrapped and reinvented by any administration committed to serious governmental action. It doesn’t take a lot of termites to bring the house down; just enough time undisturbed.</p><p>It’s not impossible to see how dialogue across the divide might be restored by mutual respect and willingness to engage one another. The country could be pulled back from the brink by renewed civic conversation. It’s much harder to see what the motivation for such conversation might be on either side. For the right, it’s enough to keep the air full of distracting bubbles while the termites energetically chew up government. For the left, deploring the right is a source of endless satisfaction and virtue signaling. For a large part of the left, that’s all they need, since they don’t really give half a damn about the poor anyway, and the hard steps necessary to really change society for the better are too much trouble to really invest much effort in. At the moment, despite various pundit handwaving (including my own), the civic dialogue actually meets the needs of an awful lot of the participants.</p><p>Until we can think systematically about how to change the incentives operating on both political elites and the public generally in favor of cooperative dialogue and away from self reinforcement, we’re pretty much stuck where the Vox article leaves us. I haven’t had much success in thinking about what such incentive changes might be; perhaps you have.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ff2fd98f3e8a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/socio-techtonic-change/civil-conversation-ff2fd98f3e8a">Civil conversation?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/socio-techtonic-change">Socio-techtonic Change</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A new religion — The Church of Posterity]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/socio-techtonic-change/a-new-religion-the-church-of-posterity-af65ae3e46c6?source=rss-1f2071eae3dd------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[religion]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[worship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[descendants]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jd Eveland]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 21 Feb 2018 23:09:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-02-21T23:15:39.457Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/512/1*TNLI0Ek21lyhDoAQ5hoIIQ.png" /></figure><p>For a large part of human history, a major component of religion has been the worship of one’s ancestors. We’ve looked back on those who preceded us, and concluded that they were much better people than we were, and therefore they deserve reverence if not actual worship. The presumption is that they are still out there somewhere, and in a position to intervene on our behalf if we ask nicely. Even if we don’t actually ask our own ancestors for intervention, religion tends to ask other people’s ancestors for help. Jesus, Mohammad, Abraham, Gautama, Zoroaster — all human beings presumably real at some point in time — are invoked as models or guides toward correct human conduct. In all cases, the assumption is that the older you are or at least the longer you’ve been dead, the more worthy you are of reverence.</p><p>I come from a rather select population — those who actually have a pretty good idea about their real ancestry, at least for the last few hundred years. We are largely confined to those of primarily Western European descent, where records have been kept and maintained and lines of familial connection can be effectively traced. For a large part of the world, this is simply not true. The kinds of records necessary to trace ancestry are pretty fragile, and tend to run out fairly quickly. On the other hand, for those of us with ready access to something like <a href="http://ancestry.com/">ancestry.com</a>, with its access to large numbers of databases, it can be a lot of fun to chart out one’s family. I’ve been able to trace my mother’s family back to at least a knight who participated in the Norman Conquest (1066 CE), and my father’s family through one line that apparently goes back to Ragnar Lodbrok, or at least his slightly less mythical son Ivar the Boneless, around 840 CE. Obviously, these lines of descent represent only one small part of the overall families, but it’s those who managed to get themselves documented. I’ve even been able to <a href="http://jdeveland.com/archives/1519">determine that both my mother and my father were descended from the same man,</a> a preacher who lived in Springfield MA about 1620 ; Mother was a descendant of one of his sons, Father a descendant of another. I also had one Native American ancestor sometime in the 1740s or so. Other than that, almost all were Anglo-Saxons of one form or another, or Rhineland Germans.</p><p>The interesting point is that there really isn’t much interesting about any of them. None of them apparently committed either great evil or great good in their time. A few of them were moderately distinguished — a couple of early governors, for example — and there are entertaining stories about a few of the others, but none of them had any great impact on human history, let alone enough standing to warrant being worshiped. Undoubtedly virtually all of them shared the common prejudices and erroneous beliefs of their time, even though a couple may have pushed the envelope a bit. My grandmother, for example, was in the class of 1903 at Colby College, at a time when relatively few women were involved in higher education of any form. But other than shaping my personality in some strange ways, she did not have a lot of impact on the world at large. All in all, my ancestors were mostly farmers and petty bourgeois, with a sprinkling of lawyers. Probably a pretty typical sampling of the people of their time.</p><p>When I was young, I had “great potential” — <a href="https://shop.schulzmuseum.org/SelectSKU.aspx?skuid=1000232">as Linus once noted, a great burden in itself</a>. But I certainly didn’t really have much to recommend me. At 20, I hadn’t done anything; I had a lot of thoroughly useless knowledge but hardly any practical knowledge or experience of any form; I had no particular talents or qualifications — no music, no athletics, minimal math. I did have a fairly adequate acquaintance with Latin, an extremely quirky sense of humor, and a pretty endless curiosity about just about everything, but I had very little self-awareness and only minimal sensitivity to other people. Through a combination of a good deal of unconscious privilege, a substantial portion of basic good luck, and the goodwill of most everybody I ran into, I managed over the next 50 years or so to put together a career of modest professional accomplishment, to be appreciated by a large portion of the people I dealt with, to alienate relatively few people, and to enjoy an interesting and varied life. I also made an enormous number of mistakes and misjudgments, false starts, violations of basic common sense, and fundamental social gaffes, and still live with the consequences of many of them. But all told, I think there’s little doubt that I am a better person now than I was at the age of 20. And I’m certainly no worse a human being than most of my ancestors, if not particularly any better.</p><p>I do have hopes for the future. As Steven Pinker has noted in his new book <a href="https://www.amazon.com/dp/B073TJBYTB/ref=dp-kindle-redirect?_encoding=UTF8&amp;btkr=1"><em>Enlightenment Now</em></a>, we live in many ways in the most positive and fulfilling kind of world that humanity has ever experienced. As always, the unknowns are terrifying, both now and for the future. But there is reason to believe that if we can overcome some of our present crises, that things may get even better. I certainly won’t be around to see that happen, and since my only current descendant is my daughter, my direct influence on the future is likely to be minimal. But I do believe that humanity has within itself the capability and capacity to do great and wonderful things.</p><p>It is in the spirit that I propose that in place of worshiping our ancestors, we think about instead worshiping our descendants. You might immediately object on the grounds that they can’t do anything for us — but then again, neither can our ancestors. And if certain physicists are correct that at the quantum level, there may be a principle of retrocausality under which future events may shape the current events, then there may be hope. In any event, posterity seems at least as worthy of our worship as any of the weird Gods that humanity has dreamed up at one point or another. At least posterity hasn’t demanded that we kill or otherwise damage each other’s lives — more than can be said for most of our gods throughout history.</p><p>I’m willing to assume the burden of Archbishop of this new Church of Posterity (<a href="http://members.optusnet.com.au/pennywyatt/Interests/FlandersSwann/DropOfaHat/At%20the%20Drop%20of%20a%20Hat02.html">“Hello, posterity!”</a>). But I’m also willing to take applications for bishops, for a small processing and handling fee. Any takers?</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=af65ae3e46c6" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/socio-techtonic-change/a-new-religion-the-church-of-posterity-af65ae3e46c6">A new religion — The Church of Posterity</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/socio-techtonic-change">Socio-techtonic Change</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[We are in national trouble]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/socio-techtonic-change/we-are-in-national-trouble-a9d271d98a8?source=rss-1f2071eae3dd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a9d271d98a8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[tax-reform]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[graduate-school]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jd Eveland]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 01 Dec 2017 22:55:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-12-01T22:55:34.211Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iaCrTgSvyDv4qtO3BwdMkw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image from <a href="https://tarnmoor.com/2014/12/17/a-true-life-adventure-not-really/">https://tarnmoor.com/2014/12/17/a-true-life-adventure-not-really/</a></figcaption></figure><p>Do we have any idea where we are going as a country? The sober fact is that the Congress is within hours of passing a massive tax “reform” bill that will absolutely devastate not only the discretionary spending of the US but the health care system as well, and wreak pure havoc with graduate-level education, particularly doctoral education. Making grad stipends and tuition remission into taxable income will put graduate education out of reach for all but the wealthiest students, and why would they want to get a degree anyway? The losses of students will in turn destroy department after department. Only a few well-endowed graduate programs will survive. And here’s the point — NOBODY SEEMS TO CARE! This is an absolutely foreseeable result — no “unforeseen consequences” here! For most of the Republicans, this isn’t a bug — it’s a feature. They’ve never liked pointy-headed intellectuals anyway, and this is a dandy way to cut them down to size. Let the Chinese take over world-class scientific research — who cares? There may be a couple of Republicans somewhere who actually believe in their own magic of “dynamic scoring”, but most of them understand that it’s a crock and that the tax bill will do next to nothing for investment. It’s a payoff for their donors, as some have openly acknowledged.</p><p>Barring some last-minute miracle,<strong><em> this is going to happen</em></strong>. There won’t be any last-minute miracles. All the swing votes have been bought off — Lisa Murkowski is having wet dreams at the thought of all that lovely oil flowing out of the ANWR; McCain, Flake, and the others are being good little party folks so that they don’t cut off their future lobbying jobs. In agency after agency, low-level political functionaries are energetically ripping out the governmental infrastructure that would ordinarily maintain continuity of policies in critical areas; they don’t even need secretaries and assistant secretaries; just a bunch of “special assistants” to do this work. The president’s Office of Science and Technology Policy for all practical purposes no longer exists, just as its role becomes more critical than ever.</p><p>Mick Mulvaney at OMB very well understands the essential fragility and vulnerability of the governmental apparatus, and knows just which props to pull out to make the whole thing come crashing down. How they believe that this is going to result in a better society is something I can’t fold my brain around, but they do. Within another year I don’t know if there will be enough left of the government, other than the Department of Justice (to prosecute pot growers), ICE, the Bureau of Prisons, and the Defense Department, to either ensure domestic tranquility or promote the general welfare. Medicare is about to take a $50 billion hit next year, more to follow. And Tillerson’s work gutting the State Department appears almost complete, so he’s going to be toast — reminiscent of nothing so much as the replacement of Yagoda by Yezhov at the NKVD once the Old Bolsheviks had been exterminated. You may find the butcher useful, but you don’t invite him to dinner.</p><p>Any thought that this whole pattern is going to be reversed by a sudden flash of national sanity and/or conscience is magical thinking. There is simply no cultural demand for an alternative vision, and no set of institutions strong enough to act as a core for its mobilization. Local committees are not going to spring up and demand change. There is no national media worthy of the name that isn’t hopelessly compromised. Most national politicians are so terrified right now about their private lives and conduct anytime over the last 30 years being exposed that they won’t lift their heads out of their bunkers. A solid 25–30% of the voters (their power vastly expanded by gerrymandering and vote suppression) are absolutely ecstatic about the havoc being wreaked on government, and would cheerfully participate in stoning anyone who tries to stop it, even as their own lives are rendered more and more difficult. The cascading failures of government at all levels will mean nothing to these people other than that they were right all along. In the meantime, all the discretionary resources of the country will have been scooped up by the rentier class and sequestered in offshore banks to pay for offshore luxuries.</p><p>After a lifetime spent studying organizations, I have come to respect, if nothing else, their power to preserve themselves. Just as large objects like suns and big planets warp the spacetime around themselves, so too do large powerful organizations (both the visible and invisible ones) warp the society around them in their own presumed interests. But the almost complete divorce of ownership from management — Elon Musk being one of the few exceptions — pretty much guarantees that those “presumed interests” will be short-term enrichment that the managers can feed from. For the past 50 years, we’ve be churning out MBAs who believe that this behavior is God-ordained, and who wouldn’t recognize a long-term investment if they slept with it. I won’t quite say that academia deserves its forthcoming collapse, for both its embrace of the managerial mind-set and “political correctness” as well as curricular short-sightedness and general indifference, but it’s a close call.</p><p>I’d love to believe that the country will pull back from the brink and that as a consequence an angel will get his wings, but you’ll have to offer a great deal more than hopes and faith. I’ve pretty much run out of those.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a9d271d98a8" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/socio-techtonic-change/we-are-in-national-trouble-a9d271d98a8">We are in national trouble</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/socio-techtonic-change">Socio-techtonic Change</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Further thoughts on replication and continuity in science]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/socio-techtonic-change/further-thoughts-on-replication-and-continuity-in-science-2876ced68354?source=rss-1f2071eae3dd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2876ced68354</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[generalizability]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[science]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[replication]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jd Eveland]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 20 Oct 2017 19:51:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-10-20T19:51:13.487Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*RXqPgzFp60jcWIrzB1g0vw.jpeg" /><figcaption>©JD Eveland 2017</figcaption></figure><p>I’d like to follow up a little further on <a href="http://jdeveland.com/archives/1572">the issues I raised regarding the replication movement in science, particularly psychology, in my last post.</a> A lot of this bears on the issues about the nature of science and the degree to which behavioral sciences in general and psychology in particular qualify as sciences. I’ve discussed this fairly extensively a couple of years ago (<a href="http://jdeveland.com/archives/988">here</a> and <a href="http://jdeveland.com/archives/751">here</a> for examples.)</p><p>When I said that replication is impossible, I certainly didn’t mean to say that further research into any given problem shouldn’t be done. What I’m arguing against is the idea that one can replicate psychological experiments in the same way that all the 30 kids in the high school chem lab are replicating the production of oxygen and hydrogen through electrolysis of water. Do the same thing; get the same results, within a milliliter or two of error. That’s the way science works, isn’t it?</p><p>Well, yes, for certain kinds of science. Setting up the electrolysis experiment takes maybe half a dozen pieces of equipment, a few supplies, and a few procedures. Those items totally define the context and the circumstances of the experiment. In psychology on the other hand, as with any of the other behavioral sciences, the context is the Real World (see attached diagram), in which everything is connected to everything else in one way or another and it’s not possible to bound an inquiry such that much of the RW doesn’t affect it in one way or another.</p><p>Some have used this point to argue that psychology isn’t really a science at all. I think that’s wrong, because I think science is defined by a way of thinking and a disciplined way of inquiring into the universe, rather than by the immobility of the objects of its inquiry. Geology studies rocks; rocks are not materially affected by being studied. Psychology studies people; people are inherently part of the process of their being studied. But both geology and psychology operate within a framework of rules of inquiry, that govern the kind of inferences that one can draw from observations. Both responsible geologists and responsible psychologists are careful about the domain of generalizability of their findings. Where psychologists have gotten into trouble, it’s usually because they have been careless about extending this domain beyond its reasonable bounds.</p><p>As I said at the beginning, I’m strongly in favor of repeated inquiries into the same phenomenon, as well as comparing findings from these different studies. Where I think the replication movement goes off track is setting up an expectation that all these repeated inquiries should produce exactly the same findings, and that any study where a repeated kind of inquiry doesn’t generate exactly the same findings is somehow suspect. Given the shape of the RW (see above), it would be astounding if any did. Comparisons among studies claiming to examine the same phenomena can be very useful, particularly when one compares how they were carried out and the circumstances surrounding them. It’s certainly possible to work toward a research consensus about phenomena without requiring that each and every study produce exactly the same results.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2876ced68354" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/socio-techtonic-change/further-thoughts-on-replication-and-continuity-in-science-2876ced68354">Further thoughts on replication and continuity in science</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/socio-techtonic-change">Socio-techtonic Change</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Another victim of the replicant police]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/socio-techtonic-change/another-victim-of-the-replicant-police-2b4bcde94286?source=rss-1f2071eae3dd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2b4bcde94286</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[research]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[psychology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[replication]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[science]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jd Eveland]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 19 Oct 2017 22:16:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-10-19T22:16:00.232Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/620/1*FicjDiRoZ6LGaNo9pNJmpw.jpeg" /></figure><p>There’s a very interesting article in the <em>New York Times</em> describing t<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/magazine/when-the-revolution-came-for-amy-cuddy.html?_r=0">he troubles attracted by a social psychologist named Amv Cuddv who has become the latest target of the social psychology replication police. </a>The article discusses her research and the questions raised about it, as well as the social dynamics in the field in response to this confrontation. It’s another example of the kind of “sociology of science” analyses that combine discussion of science with interpersonal soap opera. Enlightening, but not particularly rewarding.</p><p>I have no particular horse in this particular race. But I have done a lot of social research over the years, and as I see it, there are two fairly separable issues involved here.</p><p>First, there’s the issue of “replication” itself. I’ve written on this on previous occasions (e.g., <a href="http://jdeveland.com/archives/997">here</a> and <a href="http://jdeveland.com/archives/1113">here</a>), and I find this to be in many respects a red herring. Replication is a concept that works well in small closed systems, particularly in physical and biological sciences. But by its very nature, research in the behavioral sciences is heavily context-dependent and findings are inevitably a function of time and place as well as research procedures. In fact, it’s not really possible to replicate any major finding in behavioral sciences; inevitably, the results will be different because the circumstances are different. The whole replication movement to me smacks of intellectual opportunism — a path to the big leagues for a few guys who picked up on this as a way to establish their own niche in a complicated and crowded field. It played right into the hands of those already crippled by the kind of “physics envy” periodically overcomes psychology.</p><p>I should note that I’m a big fan of making data available to others, but Eveland’s First Law of Data — “Treat your data as you would wish to be treated, if you were a datum” — has to be respected. That is, those who propose to take your data and reanalyze them have to understand the circumstances under which they were collected and their interaction with their participants. The data aren’t just numbers that can be tossed into a data analysis hopper and puréed; they must be interpreted within the context of their collection.</p><p>I’ve had my own experience with a lack of replication. When I was teaching statistics, I liked to present the students with real data in conjunction with the articles based on the data; in other words, approach data analysis with context in mind, not just as an exercise in mathematics. For one major study of Internet use that got a lot of publicity back in the 90s, I prevailed on the project PI (an old friend of mine ) to let me have his data for teaching purposes. The students and I working together found some significant problems with his analysis that essentially negated his original findings. I wrote a careful note to him explaining these difficulties and inquiring about possible explanations. Not only did I get no reply; the guy never spoke to me again. I did not ever publicize this or try to make a big deal of it, although I could have. It certainly never dawned on me to accuse him or his team of bad faith in research.</p><p>The second separable part of the issue is how the field has responded to replication issues in general and to Cuddy in particular. There is a definite pile-on mentality in social psychology and related fields — a tendency to go chasing after the latest big thing, and to kick back at those who are a little later than you climbing on board. And there is always been a tendency in the field to kick those who were down for one reason or another. It’s not a particularly collegial field, perhaps because it is so crowded and it’s so hard to stand out. Cuddy is simply the latest example of someone who seemed to be really getting ahead of the field, which would have made her a target for tear-down in any event. It turned out that replicability was a convenient rubber chicken with which to whack at someone rising above the pack, but if it hadn’t been that, it would’ve been something else. Right now, the replicability police are riding high, but it’s pretty much inevitable that they in turn will be whacked down for something sooner or later, as people come to realize that replication is really a kind of phony issue in this kind of research.</p><p>I can’t really comment on the merits of Cuddy’s research or the attempts to replicate it. Perhaps the original claims made for it were exaggerated. If so, that would place it in the company of probably 95% of what does get published in the field, which is rampantly prone to overgeneralization. I think there’s enormous room for improvement in how we should structure and conduct research in our field, so that a measure of credibility can be restored to our findings. But I don’t see the current replicability movement as contributing substantially to this improvement.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2b4bcde94286" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/socio-techtonic-change/another-victim-of-the-replicant-police-2b4bcde94286">Another victim of the replicant police</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/socio-techtonic-change">Socio-techtonic Change</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Fun with genealogy]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/socio-techtonic-change/fun-with-genealogy-de288e9e2808?source=rss-1f2071eae3dd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/de288e9e2808</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[genealogy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[family]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jd Eveland]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 06 Jul 2017 02:47:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-07-06T02:50:41.113Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*K6h1wtqXmk_tIBLWKQR16w.png" /></figure><p><em>I haven’t published anything recently, but it’s about time. here’s an intriguing sidelight. It’s also been published on my blog, </em><a href="http://jdeveland.com/"><em>http://jdeveland.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><p>Genealogy is a fun exercise. It’s fascinating to try to understand one’s family background — or backgrounds, to be more precise, since most of us come from a lot of pretty diverse origins. It’s also frustrating, because often there is little to know except someone’s critical dates. The more people you can identify, the more people you want to sit down and have a drink with and learn more about their lives and circumstances.</p><p>It is, clearly, a hobby or calling that is more accessible to people from some kinds of backgrounds than others. People whose families have been in this country longer, and/or come from places elsewhere with extensive document archives that have been made accessible, have a considerable advantage. It’s interesting that many of the more significant genealogical resources have been made available through the Mormon Church. Of course, their doctrine of the retrospective baptism of the dead has motivated their work. My grandmother occasionally expressed an amused concern that one of her descendants might eventually convert to Mormonism and try to have her retroactively baptized; I told her I didn’t think she had a lot to worry about.</p><p>For the past few years, I’ve been occasionally looking into my family background through the resources of <a href="http://ancestry.com/">http://ancestry.com</a>. There are a number of different genealogical websites, but this is one of the more thorough. I happen to fit into that favored demographic where genealogical research is, if not precisely easy, at least possible. My family on both sides came to North America between about 1630 and about 1750, and are pretty well documented in England and Germany as well. I’m about as white-bred as they come, diversity-wise (with an exception, noted below.) Some of them were pretty hot stuff when they got here, but managed to throw it all away in a few generations; a lot of them were pretty ordinary folks who managed to stay ordinary. My Eveland ancestor arrived in New York in 1710 as part of the “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_Palatines">Poor Palatines</a>” — political refugees from Germany not unlike today’s Syrians, whom the British managed to mishandle every bit as much as they are doing with the Syrians today. <em>Plus ca change</em>…</p><p>Which brings me to the rather interesting story that I teased out of my family records. It seems that about 1660, there was a man living in the brand-new town of Springfield MA named Benjamin Parsons. He had been born in England and came to North America with his family in 1630. He married a woman named Sarah Vore in the 1650s, and had with her the usual extensive colonial family of 10 or 11 children. Two of his sons were Samuel (1666–1736) and his younger brother Ebenezer (1668–1752).</p><p>So far, pretty typical. What makes this story intriguing is that Ebenezer went on to have a son named Jonathan and a granddaughter named Lydia Parsons, who married a man named Moses Greenleaf about 1755, and their daughter Clarina was my maternal grandmother’s great-grandmother. We have in the family an antique travel desk that belonged to her, complete with her signature in ink that bled through to the wood at some point when she signed a particular letter. Clarina’s husband, blessed with the amazing name of Eleazar Alley Jenks, was in 1807 the publisher of the Portland Maine newspaper, and drowned in Portland Harbor when the commuter boat to Boston on which he was coming home hit an uncharted rock in the harbor and sank in full view of the entire town. Kind of a major Civic Surprise. At any rate, Ebenezer is my direct ancestor on my mother’s side.</p><p>So much for Ebenezer. What about Samuel? Well, his daughter Hannah went on to marry a man named Horton, and four generations later had a great-granddaughter named Lois Evans (1768–1848) was my paternal grandfather’s grandmother.</p><p>If you had trouble following all that, here’s the bottom line: <strong>old Ben Parsons is a direct ancestor of mine through both my maternal line and paternal line</strong>. With some six or seven generations in between, it’s hardly a prohibited degree of consanguinity, but it is really quite fascinating nonetheless. Creepy? Maybe.</p><p>Actually, it’s probably a lot more common than usually thought among families with old New England roots. Back in the 1660s, there really weren’t all that many people in a town like Springfield, particularly people named Parsons (oddly enough, Ben actually <em>was</em> a parson — nominal determinism?) So as people moved around and shifted back and forth, it wouldn’t be all that unlikely to encounter people of similar ancestry.</p><p>Now here’s the final interesting twist. Lois Evans’ father Nathaniel Evans (1740–1820) was actually more than half Iroquois (Mohawk, to be precise). His mother was full Mohawk, and his father Samuel Evans was the son of the famous <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rebecca_Kellogg_Ashley">Rebecca Kellogg</a>, by a Mohawk whose name is not been preserved. Kellogg was one of the children taken by the Iroquois in the 1704 Deerfield MA raid. She lived with the tribe for nearly 20 years and had several children there, before returning to the colonists to live with them for another 15 or so years, eventually returning to the Iroquois. On the frontier in those days, identities were not as precisely defined as they might be in the cities. The upshot is that my great-grandfather Joel Eveland (<a href="http://jdeveland.com/archives/584">the one who came to California as an illegal immigrant from Ohio</a>) was approximately 3/16ths Native American. Thus, my pretty strictly European ancestry is augmented with slightly more than 1/64th Native American heritage. Obviously, this doesn’t entitle me to anything in the diversity sweepstakes, but it is interesting and if I were to get a new haircut, at least I might be able to deflect some of the charge of cultural appropriation that could result.</p><p>Well, none of this is of cosmic significance to anybody outside my family, and of limited significance to those within. I’m going to keep digging, because that’s what us ex-history majors from reed do with our spare time. But it does go to show that when you start digging into your background, you never know precisely what you’ll find. That’s why I’d like to sit down with these folks over a little drink — well, actually a lot of little drinks — and just listen.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=de288e9e2808" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/socio-techtonic-change/fun-with-genealogy-de288e9e2808">Fun with genealogy</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/socio-techtonic-change">Socio-techtonic Change</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What is “sociotechtonics”?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/socio-techtonic-change/what-is-sociotechtonics-45aa86b34b96?source=rss-1f2071eae3dd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/45aa86b34b96</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[organizational-change]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crisis-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[organization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[metaphor]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jd Eveland]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 07 Mar 2017 04:36:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-03-07T04:36:49.164Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*OnZjUOYZg7d8EaU4izKHrQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>“Sociotechtonics” is a principle I coined many years ago by combining “<a href="http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/SPT/v4_n3html/ROPOHL.html">sociotechnical</a>” with “<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tectonics">tectonic</a>“. Organizational stresses can behave a lot like earthquakes, building slowly usually without visible effect until at some point they are triggered into erupting in sudden crises often serious out of proportion to their nominal cause. These crises can be as devastating as any 7.0 shake on the San Andreas or Cascadia Faults, at least for those they surround.</p><p>In retrospect, it’s usually clear how these crises result from various socio-technical imbalances that have been bottled up and suppressed by the organization for what seemed like good reasons at the time. Once such a crisis has erupted, it’s usually much more difficult to find an acceptable solution or solutions than it would have been to attend to the building stresses. Managers walk a fine line between “fixing what ain’t broke” and waiting for sociotechtonic Armageddon.</p><p>In theory, we ought to be able to do better than the geologists. Our raw material should be easier to observe, and certainly moves at a faster pace. But we don’t understand any better than they do why something suddenly slips sideways or under something else, bringing the whole thing suddenly crashing down. And our retrospective explanations are seldom either much appreciated or useful in the next situation.</p><p>This idea has evolved gradually, starting with sociotechnical design — a well-established, if still somewhat obscure, analytical tradition dating back to the 1950s. Basically, it distinguishes between the technical and social subsystems within organizations, and highlights problems frequently caused by sub-optimizing on either subsystem (usually the technology). At the National Science Foundation in the 1980s, our highly interdisciplinary team used sociotechnical models very effectively to study the impact of new emerging technologies, particularly information technologies. We sponsored the first studies of the impact of personal computing on organizational work (over the objections of many senior NSF staff, who considered personal computing as largely irrelevant to organizational performance — this in 1981!)</p><p>Somewhere along the line, it occurred to me that many of the effects of sociotechnical imbalance in organizations were, by virtue of organizational dynamics like cognitive dissonance reduction, inertia, and the Iron Law of Oligarchy, often damped down and suppressed until they became intolerable sources of stress — subsequently erupting into crises that were much more severe than might have been experiences if they were faced earlier when things could still be changed. This seemingly perverse organizational behavior was wholly predictable, yet very difficult to address.</p><p>At the time, I was editing the 1981 NSF Report to the Congress on New and Emerging Technologies. One of the articles I included related to the at the time still relatively new geology subfield of plate tectonics. It seemed to me that the underlying processes of subduction, slippage, and gradually accumulating stresses resulting in occasionally catastrophic readjustments bore a strong if only analogical relationship to the pattern of sociotechnological changes observed in organizations of all types. I remember first calling this “sociotechtonics” during a conference presentation sometime in the mid-80s. It sort of came to me on the spot, and I thought that it provided an interesting and graphic description.</p><p>Since then, I’ve observed this pattern over and over again, both in my own organizations and in others. Patterns of denial reinforced by inefficient and ineffective communications systems and combined with incompatible goals and interests in a political jungle result in accumulating stresses that no one has any particular interest in resolving. Eventually, something cracks — often a relatively minor problem not even necessarily related to the main issue. One thing leads to another, and suddenly there is an enormous crisis spreading into many areas of the organization. Now in crisis mode — possibly the least efficient manner in which organizations can operate — it can take enormous quantities of resources and time to repair the cracks and, if lucky, find and repair the original cause. More usually, despite the relief of the stresses provided by the crisis, they will continue to accumulate further stress until the same thing happens again.</p><p>Geologists can’t repair the gaps between tectonic plates that lead to earthquakes. But organizations can, in theory at least, repair themselves. The first step, of course, is understanding the origin of the problems. Sociotechtonic issues aren’t always easy to spot, but if we’re willing to subject all parts of our organization to scrutiny, they aren’t invisible either. And there are well-established sociotechnical design principles and procedures that well-trained consultants can use to diagnose and treat such conditions. But it’s not easy, and there’s no shortage of other consultants who are willing to apply various varieties of Band-Aids to the cracks. By the time the next sociotechtonic crisis becomes evident, they are long gone.</p><p>At any rate, sociotechtonics is an interesting and stimulating metaphor for the crises many organizations face today. It deserves further exploration and elaboration by both analysts and practitioners. I’ve changed the name of <a href="http://jdeveland.com/">my blog to <em>Sociotechtonics</em></a>, offering (I hope) a more professional-looking identity, consistent with the general theme of considering social and technological change.</p><p>I’m hoping to open a discussion both here and through my <em>Medium</em> channel, <a href="https://medium.com/socio-techtonic-change">Sociotechtonic Change</a>, on uses and limitations of this metaphor. Your thoughts and contributions are encouraged!</p><p>Originally published in <em>LinkedIn Pulse</em>, 3/4/2017</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=45aa86b34b96" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/socio-techtonic-change/what-is-sociotechtonics-45aa86b34b96">What is “sociotechtonics”?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/socio-techtonic-change">Socio-techtonic Change</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Safe Spaces]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/student-voices/safe-spaces-85cbe3428694?source=rss-1f2071eae3dd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/85cbe3428694</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[safe-space]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mental-health]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[social-justice]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trigger-warning]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jd Eveland]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 05 Nov 2016 18:25:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-06-19T11:04:31.693Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/1*P9CpEurUDsT3V61TCXP5WQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>There’s a lot of continuing interest in the concept of “safe spaces” and the role of so-called “trigger warnings” in establishing them. Like a lot of us, I have such a space to which I can retreat when things get too complicated — it’s called “my room”. I go there when <a href="https://extranewsfeed.com/tagged/trump">I’ve read enough about Trump</a> to feel my gorge rising and enough about the state of the economy and the job market to realize the utter hopelessness of it all. The entire world ought to bear a trigger warning attached — “Much about this world will appall and frustrate and scare the bejeezus out of you and occasionally cause you great pain, but there aren’t any other ones conveniently available.”</p><p>In my safe space, I can <a href="https://movietime.guru/">turn on the TV</a> and watch “Ancient Astronauts” and “Real Housewives” and “The Fairly Oddparents” until a degree of peace returns to my soul, I can begin to pick up the clothes littering the floor, and there appear to be at least some handles on the buzzing blooming chaos of the world outside. The space becomes unsafe only on those occasions when my partner opens the door to call me a “freaking idiot” (gotta investigate a lock). But the safety extends no farther than the door.</p><p>The world in general serves up a pretty steady stream of adverse stimuli, some of which are likely to be “triggering”. You never know when something adverse is just around the corner, and if you’re solely in reactive mode, you’re going to “get triggered” on a pretty regular basis. Ultimately, there is no “safe space” outside of your own head. As long as the world is still out there, the choice is to attend to it or ignore it. Ignoring it is fine for a while, and sometimes (often?) it’s necessary to do so. But it will still be there, and eventually there is no way to avoid its demands. And it sends few if any trigger warnings that nightmares are about to ensue.</p><p>I’m not trying to minimize anyone’s pain — it comes in widely varying doses — nor suggest that it’s just a matter of “getting over it”. But humans have only two basic strategies for dealing with adversity — flight or fight. Flight includes manipulating the environment to minimize chances of encountering adversity; TWs fall in this category. Fight includes confronting the stimulus and eventually reducing its power over your reactions. I do not judge anyone’s choices of how to mix these strategies in their own case; for me, a confrontational approach has been generally useful, and I’m a lot less debilitated by my experiences than I used to be.</p><p>I make no claim that this could or should be anyone else’s choice. But I do think that people can and ought to be proactive in managing their stimuli in various ways. A TW can have value in providing some advance time to prepare for a stimulus, but it doesn’t make the stimulus go away. And the world outside the college does NOT provide such warnings, so it’s not a good idea to come to rely on TWs for stimulus management.</p><p>If a “physical safe space” is a place where threats are kept on the other side of a door, then an “intellectual safe space” would be an arena of ideas where ideas that might cause pain are likewise excluded. Obviously, this can never be absolute, and the more people involved, the less absolute it can be. The only way to exclude all painful stimuli is to exclude all content. On the other hand, it’s possible to have appropriate intellectual rigor without necessarily forcing all the students to wallow in equal amounts of doggie-poo.</p><p>All classrooms ought to be intellectual safe spaces, at least to the degree that students know that pain will not be inflicted gratuitously or gleefully; as we all know and have experienced, that is not always the case. And certainly any instructor ought to be sensitive to students’ reactions, and not push things to the point of personal pain if at all possible. But there are only so many things under hir control, so varying degrees of pain are likely to be experienced by almost everyone at one time or another. If classes are a way of learning about the world, then perhaps using the generally protected environment of the class as a place to explore and understand pain may be better than just waiting for the uncaring world to serve up its triggers, unwarned and unexpected.</p><p>I have no problems with giving people some notice within the context of a class that things may be disturbing. But I don’t see it as my responsibility as a teacher to anticipate everything that might be disturbing to someone. And I would expect that those who do find some material disturbing would make an effort to understand why it’s included in the course, and figure out how to use this material for their own education. Ultimately, there’s nothing that can be said or discussed in a class that won’t eventually make itself known in the world at large. “Safe spaces” may temporarily insulate you from these things, but ultimately your safety can come only from yourself and in yourself.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=85cbe3428694" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/student-voices/safe-spaces-85cbe3428694">Safe Spaces</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/student-voices">Student Voices</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[REPRISE: Diffusion, Technology Transfer, and Implementation: Thinking and Talking About Change]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/socio-techtonic-change/reprise-diffusion-technology-transfer-and-implementation-thinking-and-talking-about-change-e381f265af1?source=rss-1f2071eae3dd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e381f265af1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[transformation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[implementation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[change]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology-transfer]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[strategy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jd Eveland]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 09 Sep 2016 21:05:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-09-09T21:05:36.615Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><strong><em>NOTE:</em></strong><em> This article is a sort of “blast from the past”. It was originally published in </em>Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, Utilization<em> (Vol. 8 №2, December 1986 303–322), and it’s had a steady if modest readership ever since. It’s a bit long; it is, after all, an academic article.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>I’m reprinting it here (in a moderately edited version, with some new thoughts added) because so many of the issues it describes are still with us in pretty much the same form. Despite the passage of some 30 years and enormous revolutions in information technology, we are no closer to resolving most of the social issues in technology transfer and utilization than we were then. Perhaps this republication may help call attention to some of the problems we thought we’d solved a long time ago but which keep popping back up because we keep forgetting what we did that worked.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>Your comments and suggestions are welcome, both with regards to where this article is now outdated and where its conclusions and advice remain valid. The 1980s were fun (at least in part, and for some of us), but there’s no reason we need to revisit that experience completely. Hopefully, knowledge is cumulative, although it won’t be unless we remember what we did before.</em></blockquote><p>There is today an increasing consciousness that our technology has, in enough cases to worry us, outstripped the ability of many organizations and individuals to make productive use of it. In almost any scientific field one cares to mention — from agriculture to robotics, computing to genetic engineering — the refrain of practitioners is the same: “We know so much — why can’t we get people to use it right?” The degree of frustration and uncertainty surrounding the effects of technology on society generally has reached serious proportions for both technology developers and users.</p><p>And yet it is also clear that there is a substantial body of knowledge, both theoretical and practical, that bears on precisely this set of issues — namely, how ideas move and become modified in the course of being used by people and groups to accomplish purposes. Why then the frustration with the applications of these ideas in the day-to-day world? Does it matter? And what might be done about it through social action? Are there generic mechanisms whereby knowledge might be moved from place to place more effectively? And would it be a good thing if there were such mechanisms? And given what we have learned in 50 years of systematic analysis, what might we as “knowledge workers” do about the problem?</p><p>The problem of making productive use of technology — generically called “implementation” — is essentially a <em>phenomenological </em>issue — that is, one of understanding how people think about technology in relation to their lives and interests, and how thoughts lead to human action (Cochran, 1980). It is, after all, basically fruitless to look at technology outside of the context of human systems. Technology application is a problem only for people — it does not bother a machine at all not to be used, or to be used as a fancy doorstop; it matters only to those who paid for it and do not get a return on their investment.</p><p>In this article I will outline first what I see as some of the basic dimensions of the technology transfer issue generally; then look at some of the implications of those dimensions for action. The theme throughout is the centrality of the problem of <em>meaning</em> in technology utilization, and how we can use the phenomenological viewpoint to organize commonly recognized problems in diffusion, technology transfer, and implementation. There is a long and rich tradition of analysis revolving around these social issues, and my purpose is less to add entirely new insights to this tradition than to suggest how certain recurrent themes in the literature — both theoretical and “wisdom” — can be used to scientific and practical advantage. Helping others to think and talk creatively about change requires that we think as creatively ourselves, and find the appropriate organizing vision for our knowledge. It is to these points that my final conclusions are addressed.</p><p><strong>Defining “Technology Transfer”</strong></p><p>If we are to understand how technology transfer should be conceived and understood, we have to begin with the words themselves. First, <em>technology.</em> The concept of technology has to be used in the broadest possible sense if it is to make any sense at all. Technology is not simply hardware or physical objects; rather, it is knowledge about the physical world and how to manipulate it for human purposes. This point is absolutely critical — technology is essentially information. The physical objects usually regarded as “technology” are important only insofar they embody and convey this information.</p><p>At a minimum, they must encompass both the tools (sometimes physical, sometimes procedural) and the uses — the purposes to which that tool is put (Eveland, Rogers &amp; Klepper, 1977). All technology is essentially behavioral. Tools cannot be understood aside from the things they are used to do — the purposes of the individuals and groups that use them. This is essence of the “sociotechnical system” concept (Taylor, 1975; Cherns 1976).</p><p>Both tools and uses are defined at varying levels of abstraction — “hammers,” “computers,” “hybrid corn,” and “flexible manufacturing systems” all can refer to extremely generic concepts, or to highly specific objects and procedures, or to a vast range in between. Choosing an appropriate degree of specificity is critical to the technology implementation process. Over time, uses define tools and tools define uses, interacting iteratively (Pelz, 1982).</p><p>Technology transfer depends critically on <em>facilitation</em> — that is, does this tool help me do something useful? if what you want to transfer does not help, your transfer arrangements won’t work (Bikson et al., 1985). As we note later, uses and goals for technology may be defined in many different ways and from the point of view of many diverse groups and individuals. A consequence valued by one person may be a disaster from the viewpoint of another. Understanding how different ideas about the usefulness of technology interact with implementation is one of the major advantages of a phenomenological approach to technology transfer.</p><p>The term<em> transfer </em>is also problematical. Technology is essentially information, and “transfer” is essentially <em>communication of information</em> — both within individuals and groups and between them — and the use of that information in the recipient system (Bikson et al., 1984).<a href="#one">1</a> Technology transfer is a subset of technological change or innovation (Eveland, 1979). <em>Transfer</em> is essentially a metaphor for physical relocation (Eveland, 1997). But the movement of physical objects from one place to another is meaningless unless the recipient does something with that object and information it embodies. Thus, “utilization” is both the target and the test of the process (Larsen, 1980). Concentrating on the transaction itself rather than on what happens as a result of the transaction is a notable shortcoming in technology transfer as it is currently practiced (if not in the conceptual literature itself).</p><p>Technology transfer uses language to communicate, and understanding how language affects individual, organizational, and social action is essential (McHugh, 1968; Blumer, 1969). People understand new things largely through <em>metaphors</em> — that is, defining new things by how they are both like and unlike already familiar things (Bandler and Grinder, 1975; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). Each metaphor carries with it a set of affective and substantive associations that for good or ill carry over to the new thing (Meyer, 1982).</p><p>Different metaphors create different responses. Consider the personal computer during its introduction to an organization that has not had such tools before. Three commonly used metaphors for such computers are “typewriter,” “calculator,” and “terminal.” Seeing PCs as typewriters implies one-to-one access, usually by secretaries, on desks or in typing pools (“WP Centers”); there is little consultation by system engineers with those who use them, except possibly about aesthetics or ergonomics. The “calculator” metaphor implies that the tools will be used one-on-one, largely by engineers in professional offices, with choices about both equipment and usage left largely to the individuals. Others see PCs as “terminals”, an approach that implies they should be scattered around, spaced roughly equally apart, for open use by anyone who wanders by. None of these metaphors is precisely wrong — but each tends to limit the choices of users in critical ways (Englebart, 1982).</p><blockquote>2016 NOTE: since the publication of this article, the computer has entirely revolutionized office work. Keyboarding has become an essential work skill, practiced almost universally; from the CEO to the intern, everyone types. These metaphors have faded into the background as familiarity with the device has spread. But new tools are now undergoing the same process of definition. Consider how different organizations are trying to decide what role, if any, Facebook might play in their technology mix. What is it like, and not like, among tools they currently use? Tools change; the process of their adoption and implementation is remarkably stable<em>.</em></blockquote><p>“Myths” are sets of metaphors used for explanation in circumstances where empirical evidence is lacking. They help with sense making while experience is accumulating. Myths build gradually, as metaphors are continually reshaped, usually to be more specific — for instance, what <em>kind</em> of typewriter, or calculator, or whatever. Unfortunately, once you have decided what something <em>is</em>, it is often difficult to go back and decide it is really something else. This is true for both physical tools and social roles. Eventually objects and practices become their own things, and serve as the basis for subsequent metaphors for new ideas and objects (while, of course, retaining their own metaphorical associations). They become familiar constructs whose meaning is generally assumed to be shared and not generally discussed.2</p><p>Sharing information among people (and organizations) requires that everyone is operating at the same general level of abstraction, and using sharing roughly the same kind of metaphors. It does not require perfect information, or precise specificity, to be effective. Ambiguity and generality can be very effective, particularly one does not know just what sorts of metaphors an information recipient is applying. This is a lesson known to all good salesmen, but only recently has it been understood equally well by the research community (Havelock, 1973).</p><p>In some critical ways, therefore, the term ‘technology transfer” is an unfortunate one — almost as unfortunate as ‘diffusion,” which is also applied to these phenomena. Both terms have the disadvantage of erroneous metaphorical connotations. Speaking of “technology” tends to lead us to focus on the hardware, the physical object involved, which is, as I noted earlier, almost the smallest part of the question. The term focuses our attention away from the behavioral dimensions of tools and their interactions with human purposes. “Transfer” emphasizes the movement of physical objects from one place to another, with the implication that the object moved is the same at the beginning and at the end.</p><p>“Diffusion” is even worse. It implies some sort of anonymous if inexorable physical process spreading across the landscape, rather like a disease.<a href="#three">3</a> If we as analysts persist in using terms whose connotations are directly opposite from what we wish to convey, we cannot really blame an audience of practitioners trying to apply the concepts for drawing the wrong conclusions.</p><p>Our understanding of technology transfer systems was shaped in this awkward way through a perfectly reasonable and logical chain of events. Like many parts of behavioral science, the “diffusion of innovations” started out as a real-world problem, and only later turned into a field of study (Rogers, 1983). The original problem was simple market research, in this case how to sell hybrid seed corn back in the 1930s. In the course of finding out that what farmers thought about corn really did affect what they decided to do about it, Ryan and Gross (1943) and their followers also formulated a set of categories and models that soon came to be seen as generalizable.</p><p>Generalizing came first from individuals to organizations, then to a lot of other situations — first fluoridation and health practices (Becker, 1970), then school programs, public works, and social policies (Feller and Menzel, 1976: Bingham, 1976; Berman and McLaughlin, 1977; Lambright, 1980), recently computers and related tools (Johnson et al., 1985). The number of such studies is now incalculable, and there is a well-established “literature” in the field (Doctors and Stubbart, 1979). What is less clear is how deeply the best ideas in this field have penetrated into the applications literature, still less into field practice in transfer.</p><p>The practice of innovation diffusion was critically shaped by marketing. It is impossible for anyone to speak ten words about diffusion without two of them being “agricultural extension.” Expectations about what technology transfer systems should and should not do and look like have, for good or ill, been critically shaped by our understanding of that program, its practices and its effects (Rogers et al., 1976; Feller et al., 1985). In many ways, extension is the defining metaphor for all technology transfer efforts.</p><p>I will not attempt here to define or describe all its features — only to note that what extension really <em>is </em>is virtually impossible to untangle from all the things people <em>think it is </em>or should be. Untangling extension-as-an-organization from extension-as-a-concept is more readily accomplished in the literature than in the field.</p><p>This point is evident when one looks at how agricultural extension served as the basis for a large number of Federal programs in the 1970s aimed at replicating extension’s success in other technical areas (Roessner, 1975; FCCSET, 1977). Agencies such as NASA (Chakrabarti and Rubenstein 1976), the Department of Defense (Hetzner and Rubenstein, 1971), the Office of Education (Hall and Loucks, 1977), and the National Institute of Justice (Blakely et al., 1983), among others, all started “diffusion” programs aimed at industry or governmental users of technology.</p><p>There are ebbs and flows in these movements; lately (<em>i.e, the mid-1980s</em>), direct transfer efforts appear to have been overshadowed by an emphasis on “university-industry cooperative relationships” of various varieties (Eveland and Hetzner, 1982). While transfer remains a significant political symbol, it is clear that its content has and will continue to shift considerably.</p><p>In summary, each phase of the development of the field of technology transfer — both conceptual and practical — has contributed new insights and complexities that have enriched subsequent, developments. But there has been a consistent tendency to focus on the content of the change rather than on the meaning of the change for those who changed. If one’s research is being sponsored by seed companies, it is reasonable to concentrate on the seed as the central focus — but letting the meaning of the seed for users be defined entirely by the meaning as perceived by developer/sellers is excessively limiting. Only by looking at the problem from the point of view of the recipient systems can we take our understanding of technological innovation to its next productive level (Havelock and Eveland, 1985).</p><p><strong>Generic Problems with Understanding Technology Transfer</strong></p><p>We have gone to great lengths to define what “technology” and “technology transfer” really are. But what can we do with this formulation? In the remainder of this article I sketch some of the things about technology transfer that make the formulation and application of generic models of process rather problematical, and then suggest some principles might guide us to a new and more effective formulation of the issues involved.</p><p>Two main sets of problems/issues complicate understanding of technology transfer — <em>structural problems </em>(largely independent of context and organization) and <em>dynamic problems </em>(those posed by processes evolving over time in particular situations).</p><p><strong>Structural problems.</strong> The first problem is deciding what the technology really is. A great deal of the conceptual history of diffusion research was focused on the development of lists of “innovation characteristics,” aimed at defining “adaptability” of different technologies (Tornatzky and Klein, 1982). If we only understood enough things about technologies, it was felt, we could predict efficiently where and by whom they would (or at should) be used.</p><p>By the mid -1970s, we had come to see that this approach was terminally complicated by differences in perceptions, or, in the language used earlier here, by varying metaphors for the new ideas (Downs and Mohr, 1977). This became particularly apparent when the innovations under study were “social technologies” such as educational or social programs (Larsen, 1982), rather than hardware. One way around this was to conceive of innovations as sets of specific “elements,” bundled in various ways, like a car that can be bought in any number of different configurations (Hall and Loucks, 1977). The more specific these elements are, the better chance they stand of being “transferred” in some form recognizable to their original definer (Blakely et al., 1983). While this approach makes the job easier for the analyst, it does little to resolve problems for the user.</p><p>As noted earlier, the choice of an appropriate level of aggregation to look at organizational behavior is a key issue both analytically and practically (Roberts et al., 1978). Organizations are at bottom made up of individuals, who are at best “partially included” in the organizational system — that is, they participate in many other systems as well, and must relate what they do in one system to what they do in another to maintain some degree of personal integration. When we speak of “the organization’s behavior” we sometimes forget that such behavior — however useful as an analytical construct — is nothing more than a composite average of the behavior of lots of individuals each acting out of their own context and responding to their own imperatives and interests. Ultimately, technology transfer is a function of what individuals think — because what they do depends on those thoughts, feelings, and interests. Choosing a high level of aggregation to look at transfer phenomena can sometimes obscure this key concern.</p><p>The interplays of individual and collective judgments about costs, benefits, and behavior are essentially the province of organizational politics. I use this word here in its relatively strict sense to refer to the interactions of interests among parties in a relationship (Weiss, 1973; Benson, 1975). Commitment to goals in social group is always relative. People embrace goals with positive consequences to themselves with considerably more fervor than they do goals for which their payoff is more personally tenuous. The problem is complicated by culturally induced embarrassment in talking about values and value conflicts; but such issues do not go away simply because we avoid them.</p><p>Any technology, and particularly any technological change, involves an unequal distribution of these costs and benefits in the system. Some people must pay the costs, and others receive the benefits. If all the costs are to be paid by the lower hierarchical levels of the system and all benefits appropriated by the upper levels, “resistance to change” is not merely understandable but positively rational (Mechanic, 1962). The problem is really why some <em>should</em> make a change — that is, what is in it for them. As I noted earlier, research tends to confirm that functionality is a critical determinant the acceptance of new technology; people do things for which they are rewarded. Any analysis of technological change that does not address explicitly cost/benefit distribution or allows the costs and benefits to be defined according to the perspective of only a limited part of the participants will be fundamentally misleading.</p><p>Since all organizations have a range of purposes, they also have reasons why those purposes have not been reached — the set of things they define as “problems” (Walker, 1974). This agenda is a constantly shifting set, redefined as circumstances change. Innovation, as a part of the general system demand for adaptability, is only one of the system problems to be addressed — others include integration, coordination, and the achievement of output (Parsons, 1965). In fact, most organizational decisions have very little to do with technology as such, but with things like finance, personnel, scheduling, and resource management. That is sometimes hard for a change agent (or even someone researching change) to appreciate. No one else takes your changes as seriously as you do. On the other hand, you do not take the organization’s problems as seriously as it does. Eventually, the interaction balances out.</p><p><em>Culture</em> has recently become a word in organizational analysis with many diverse meanings. Essentially, shared meanings, remembrances, patterns of activity, and particularly expectations about what other people will do in organizations really matter in explaining what takes place. With culture, we are applying and anthropologist’s view of the relationships rather than a sociologist’s or a psychologist’s.</p><p>Technology affects culture dynamically. For example, as we noted earlier, personal computers have a wide variety of potential meanings to those who use them, meanings that change over time. These meanings are part of organizational culture, and both are shaped by it and shape it in turn as they evolve through experience.</p><p>Consider a hierarchical, controlled organization introducing PCs — a potentially anarchic,” power-to-the-user” situation. Such organizations often respond with elaborate control systems, sets of passwords, procedures for controlling access to disks, and the like. Results are often circumvention of the rules, frustration on the part of managers, and general failure to achieve the promised benefits of the technology. Sometimes this just produces paralysis; sometimes it can lead to a new culture more adapted to being able to use the technology, as, for example, professionals begin to keyboard their own work and clerical personnel are freed for more valuable and productive tasks. Sometimes there is a “synthesis” in which old patterns are reinterpreted in light of new conditions, such as is evident in the recent trend for data-processing managers to reassert control over stand-alone computing equipment. The point is that lots different outcomes are possible, but no one outcome is necessary or inevitable.</p><p>Over time, cultures and patterns of technology usage both change. New information based on experience is incorporated into the mental sets of the participants in the culture. The process almost always involves friction and costs. The degree to which those costs are worth the positive consequences of the change is a function of the change process itself as well as of the inherent features of the technology and the context. Appreciating the role that culture plays in organizations, and how culture can be dynamically shaped by the organization’s own intelligent sociotechnical choices, can vastly improve the efficiency of innovation utilization (Johnson, 1985).</p><p><strong>Dynamic Problems of Process.</strong> The second set of issues arises because most technological innovations of any interest are embedded in organizational contexts (Chakrabarti, 1973). Each change has repercussions for the whole system, “ripple effects” across both space and time moderated by the degree of “coupling” of the system but always present to varying degrees. Understanding how different parts of the system are interdependent can help a lot in accounting for unplanned and unanticipated effects, which can be both positive and negative. Often when we fail to understand such interdependencies, we sub-optimize a system, making one part (usually the technical subsystem) work a lot better and other parts (typically the social subsystem) work a lot worse. Satisfaction with these arrangements depends a lot on whether you are talking to the person in charge of the first part of the system, or to the people in charge of the others, or to someone who has to balance the interests of the whole system.</p><p>Issues related to the staging and dynamics of implementation have intrigued researchers for a long time. It is self-evident that putting technology into place in an organization is not matter of a single decision, but rather of a series — usually a long one — of linked decisions and non-decisions. People make these choices, and these choices condition future choices. While the researcher may identify one particular choice as a focal point of “adoption,” he only fools himself he believes that choice has the same meaning to the user as it does to him. Understanding the leverage exerted by some decisions over other decisions is critical to making intelligent choices about where to intervene creatively in the process (Hall and Nord, 1984).</p><p>Researchers have developed the idea of innovation “stages” as a way of categorizing how some decisions of necessity precede and shape those later on. There are many different formulations of such stages; the question is not which one (if any) is “true,” but what the relative utility of a particular formulation might be to you (Tornatzky et al., 1983). One basic difference in frameworks relates to whether you prefer to focus on the <em>content </em>of decisions (such as the technology itself) or on the nature of the <em>action</em> being taken by the system. These different approaches lead somewhat different ways of categorizing behavior. While the same general phenomena are under discussion in each model, the categories tend to highlight rather different focal issues.</p><p><strong>Two Views of Innovation</strong></p><p>The action-centered approach essentially considers change as process of gradually shaping a <em>general </em>idea, which can mean lots of different things to different people, into a <em>specific </em>idea that most people understand to mean more or less the same thing. Five general stages or categories of decisions to be made in sequence can be distinguished (Eveland, Rogers &amp; Klepper, 1977):</p><ul><li>agenda setting</li><li>matching</li><li>redefining</li><li>structuring</li><li>interconnecting</li></ul><p>The first stage is one of establishing the “agenda of problems and solutions”, a set of ideas known to the system but that do not necessarily provoke the system to action directly. All organizations and units within them have such agendas, although they may not be consciously aware of them without elicitation. When a problem and a solution come together in the mind of a person or persons in the system, a “match” is made and organizational action commences. Rather than a defined “adoption” point, this model emphasizes a more or less gradual “redefinition” in which both the proposed innovation and its potential uses come to be understood in sequentially greater detail.</p><p>When both “tool” and “use” are defined clearly enough to be communicated to others, a process of creating the organizational structure to embody the innovation can begin. When the structure is generally understood, it can be interconnected to other parts of the system as its relationships to them become clear. The whole process, in these terms, is one of defining the innovation in successively greater detail, distinguishing both what it is and what it is not.</p><p>Regardless of how stages are defined, they cannot be stretched too far out of shape; nor can they be anticipated in great detail before they take place. The principal value of stage models of any sort lies in helping the analyst and the change agent to understand that he or she can encompass or affect only a relatively small part of the process any given time. Analytical humility is generally to be encouraged.</p><p>The structural approach, by contrast, looks at consistent issues that arise across situations; what is the structure of recurrent problems? One of these is the assessment of effects of technological change — whose criteria are to shape decisions? As I have noted, organizations are made up of multiple people (and aggregates of people), and therefore multiple criteria and evaluations of outcomes based on diverse goals are the rule in complex decision sequences (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret, 1976; Nutt, 1984). Multiple criteria can affect even individual decisions aimed at a similar purpose.</p><p>Sometimes such complex decision criteria allow “win-win” solutions to be formulated; sometimes situations are truly zero-sum, and someone has to lose (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1981). Moreover, criteria can change in salience and applicability over time (Prien, 1966; Kimberly and Miles, 1980). In any event, the problem of multiple criteria of assessment is the dynamic problem posed by the political nature of organizations described above.</p><p>Another issue is that of <em>horizons</em> — when do you choose to make your valuation of outcomes, given that there is never any if defined end-point to a change process? Sociotechnical analysts refer to this as the problem of “incompletion” — nothing is ever final (Trist, 1964). Short-term and long-term criteria are both appropriate (and used) depending on the perspective of the analyst and his or her interests (Hayes and Abernathy, 1985). Reinterpretation of past results is a constant phenomenon, as new information about decision consequences remote in space and becomes available.</p><p>Again, there is no single answer about what “true” outcomes are, only the need to remember that the issue cannot be unequivocally resolved, either by the participants in the process or of the analyst. This does not mean that perceptions about consequences do or should not shape decision making, only that such perceptions should not be “reified” beyond their limits.</p><p><strong>The Bottom Line</strong></p><p>Where does all this leave us in our quest for efficient and effective ways to increase the utility of knowledge transfer research for organizational and social management? In some ways, it is easy to feel that we almost know less than we did 30 years ago; at least, we are probably a good deal less certain of what we do know than we used to be. Agricultural extension is not the last word in technology transfer.</p><p>A more realistic assessment is that we are a good deal more conscious now of just what are the limitations on the utility or prescribabilty of any particular analytical paradigm or organizational model. The more we study the technological innovation processes that underlie technology transfer, the more complex and contingent they seem, and the less clear it is that any model, regardless of its sophistication, can adequately represent more than a small part of the whole range of processes of interest to us. Even agricultural extension has proved singularly inapplicable to most other situations — and perhaps even, today, to agriculture.</p><p>What I would like to suggest here is a set of propositions that must underlie any effective approach to understanding technological change, regardless of context or content. Any administrative system that we create to distribute and apply knowledge must take these principles into account or fail.</p><p><strong><em>First, technological change is a process without beginning or end</em>.</strong> Individual people and tools and purposes come and go, but the sequence is iterative and evolutionary, and linear patterns are always artificial constructs generated by the analyst (Eveland, 1979). If the working model for organizational research is the <em>novel</em>, a model with a clear starting point, defined characters (variables), a plot (the model), and an ending (dependent variables), the working model of organizational life must be the <em>soap opera,</em> where characters come and go, their roles are constantly changing and being reinterpreted, and what seems good today is bad tomorrow and good again day after tomorrow.</p><p>Like the characters, the technology is constantly subject to modification and reinterpretation. “Routinization” of technology takes places only in the sense that one tends after time to forget that one ever thought of a particular tool as “new,” given all the other new things that have come along in the meantime. As we noted earlier, over time even a technology as unusual and shocking as personal computers becomes accepted and even ignored; the keyboard is today as ubiquitous and unremarkable as the telephone, and this is in barely five years.</p><p>But technology is never “routine” to the point that it is not subject to change and modification. If we aim our efforts at routinization, we are likely to damn ourselves with success. Organizations that carefully implement state-of-the-art computer systems tend to have a great deal of difficulty taking advantage of changing technology; they have too many “sunk costs” in the old systems (Bikson et al., 1985). It is well to remember that every old, outdated, ossified tool or practice in any organization was once an innovation” that got “routinized” all too well. We would do well to remember this in our zeal to fasten new things on organizations.</p><p><strong><em>Second, the context of change is vitally important</em>. </strong>Because organizations are systems, any action or choice has repercussions across both space and time, and even across the borders of systems we are trying to affect. Members are aware (sometimes) of these; a change agent/sales person must be equally so. The organization’s culture and its connections with the rest of the world provide the context within which all external messages — including those dealing with technological change — get filtered and interpreted. Meaning must of necessity be generated internally by people; only in the most general terms can it be supplied by an external source.</p><p>The one thing we have rather conclusively demonstrated in the course of 20 years of public programs intended to promote technological change — in fact, through the long years of agricultural extension as well — is that one cannot pay people enough, long enough, to get them to do things or use tools that do not have intrinsic worth and value to them. <em>“Incentives” that do not institutionalize a clear long-term yield have only short-term effects</em>. While one can through “demonstration programs” or other subsidy mechanisms induce the temporary use of a technique or policy, it will not outlast the subsidy unless it becomes structured as part of the system and interconnected to it in multiple ways, because it provides such value. External sources cannot provide that value; it must be of value to those who practice it. This is one of the hardest lessons all change agents must come to terms with. It implies that change agents must concentrate far more attention on how people think about the change than what actually changes.</p><p><strong><em>Third, what matters most to organizations, whether they realize it or not, is process, not technological content</em>.</strong> From the point of view of a given organization, the key problem should be less choosing and implementing the “right” technology than it is developing and putting into place a procedural set for making technology choices intelligently. Computers are today perhaps the most extreme of a technological area where no single choice remains valid indefinitely; those organizations that cope well with computer technology are those where the system has the capacity to remain experimental (Johnson et al., 1985). Organizations need to encourage continuous learning about technology and sociotechnical interactions on the part of members, and to maintain and use that learning without being paralyzed by it. Remembering too much, after all, can create so many metaphors that the system can never work through to an understanding of the change itself.</p><p>An organization that understands the strategic nature of innovation choices, and can approach the process systematically rather than as series of individual and discrete decisions, will always have an advantage, according to the Law of Requisite Variety. A technology transfer system that can facilitate change processes rather than sell specific technologies is one that will have long-term success.</p><p><strong><em>Finally, the purpose of innovation/diffusion research is not to prescribe but to raise consciousness.</em> </strong>To the extent that research can help organizations understand that they have the power to make good choices, and help them understand the implications of those choices, it will contribute to social goods. To the extent that research creates new and better ways to manipulate individuals and organizations into adopting other people’s views of what is a “good thing,” it will contribute instead to a devolution of social progress. I realize that this may be a difficult point to swallow for those who legitimately believe they have a “good thing” other people really need — a group that includes most of the “true believers” in technological and social innovation.</p><p>On balance, however, we are all likely to be better off by encouraging the development of the capacity for effective and purposive internalized self-directed evolution and control than by relying on any “diffusion system” to overcome the shortcomings of organizational and individual change processes. As Peters and Waterman (1983) tell us, one of the key lessons their “excellent companies” have all learned is to appreciate the validity of their customers’ needs and understanding of those needs. Surely public mechanisms for “technology transfer” can do as much.</p><p><strong>Notes</strong></p><ol><li>“Information” is usually defined as something that reduces uncertainty about the world (Miller. 1965). In fact, technology information not infrequently increases uncertainty about applications as it expands the horizons of the possible. Uncertainty should not be confounded with ignorance.</li><li>This may or may not be a good thing. In fact, as we note later, one of the major failings in many technology implementation processes is a tendency to assume that meanings are shared without exploring them. This leads almost inevitably to confusion, frustration, and costs beyond what needs to be incurred.</li><li>In fact, classical diffusion models are in practice largely indistinguishable from epidemiological models in terms of parameters and underlying dynamics (Hamblin et al., 1973).</li></ol><p><strong>References</strong></p><p>Bandler, R. and J. Grinder (1975) The Structure of Magic. Palo Alto, CA: Science and Behavior Books.</p><p>Becker. M. H. (1970) “Sociometric location and innovativeness: reformulation extension of the diffusion model.” Amer. Soc. Rev. 35: 267–282.</p><p>Benson, J. 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G., J. D. Eveland, M. G. Boylan, W. A. Hetzner, E. C. Johnson, D. Roitman, and I. Schneider (1983) The Process of Technological Innovation: Reviewing the Literature. National Science Foundation</p><p>Walker. J. L. (1974) “The diffusion of knowledge and policy change: toward a theory of agenda-setting.” Presented to the American Political Science Association, Chicago.</p><p>Weiss, C. H. (1977) “Research for policy’s sake: the enlightenment function of social research.” Policy Analysis 3(4): 531–546.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e381f265af1" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/socio-techtonic-change/reprise-diffusion-technology-transfer-and-implementation-thinking-and-talking-about-change-e381f265af1">REPRISE: Diffusion, Technology Transfer, and Implementation: Thinking and Talking About Change</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/socio-techtonic-change">Socio-techtonic Change</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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