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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Jeb Ory on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Jeb Ory on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Jeb Ory on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Reflections on growing a startup]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jebory/reflections-and-lessons-on-growing-a-startup-a10a1fb23374?source=rss-2275b13b599e------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[reflections]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup-lessons]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[advocacy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeb Ory]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Jan 2023 21:20:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-01-12T21:20:51.109Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>My startup, Phone2Action (later, called Capitol Canary), grew nearly 50x in revenue between 2015 and 2021 while scaling to nearly 200 employees. Over that time, we gained more than 1,000 clients, most of whom used our software to help their constituencies engage on pressing policy issues. In September of 2022, Quorum acquired us, merging together two of the leading public and government affairs software providers. A few weeks ago, I left my day-to-day work at the company (I am still on the Board).</p><p>As this chapter of my life and my career comes to a close, I wanted to synthesize major insights I had in taking the company from an idea to a scaling business to an exit. First, three takeaways on what we did well: we solved a real problem; we were good stewards of our capital; and we built meaningful client relationships. We also navigated challenges. I could (and some day, might) fill a book with the challenges and things we could have better. But for this blog, I wanted to focus on three specific challenges: hiring senior executives; managing growing pains; and drawing the line at where to service our clients.</p><p><strong>Are you solving a real problem… and will anyone pay for it?</strong></p><p>The most important first step of building a successful business is determining if you are solving a problem that is sufficiently painful that someone will pay you for the solution.</p><p>My cofounder, Ximena Hartsock, had the idea for the original Phone2Action tools, born out of her needs as an organizing and advocacy executive at a nonprofit. She had experienced the pain of trying to move people to take action, especially at events. She <em>was</em> the customer. With the idea (and wireframe, pictured below) in hand, but prior to starting the business, we spent months doing customer development (as outlined in Steve Blank’s excellent <a href="https://medium.com/mbreads/the-four-steps-to-the-epiphany-7aee0c8e0f8e">Four Steps to the Epiphany</a>), validating that other companies and nonprofits also felt the same pain before we built an early version of the platform and launched the company. What drove us to do this? I had neglected to do proper customer development in my previous startup, and ended up with a solution looking for a problem; a pain that others wouldn’t pay to solve.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GecDSQ-p-rjQP_uL3uiiMw.jpeg" /><figcaption>An early wireframe of Phone2Action which I presented at our Good Tech Summit in 2017. More than 500 attendees joined the conference, held at the Carnegie Library in DC.</figcaption></figure><p>Companies and nonprofits started to buy our technology. As we gained traction, our software began to shift the landscape so our clients could take advocacy campaign work in-house at a fraction of the cost that external consultants would charge, upending the status quo. Because people could now build campaigns themselves, within their small teams, the adoption of advocacy software accelerated. <a href="https://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Uber-Lyft-Airbnb-harness-users-to-lobby-6005562.php">Disruptive tech company</a> usage increased, opening up new markets. Smartphones and social media drove advocate engagement, creating a virtuous cycle for our business growth. Our product fit the needs of the market.</p><p>Listening to our customers led us to develop more products to meet their needs, from integrations with Facebook to email marketing tools to GOTV. By the end of 2022, many millions of people had used our software, sending more than 130,000,000 messages to policymakers. In 2020, during the height of advocacy during the depths of COVID despair, ~25% of all advocacy messages to Congress went through our platform.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/660/0*c96wZZ026dUykw4C.png" /><figcaption>A GOTV site that one of our clients built. <a href="https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20200302005727/en/Phone2Action-Launches-Election-Center-2020-Bringing-GOTV-and-Voter-Education-Everywhere">GOTV became a very popular product </a>that companies would use to engage in elections in a non-partisan fashion.</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Be Capital Efficient</strong></p><p><a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bootstrapping.asp">Bootstrapping</a> the company wasn’t an option. We needed outside capital to fund initial hires and technology investment. So we raised money — carefully, and in a way that preserved our optionality as founders. We optimized for time (how fast can we raise) and certainty (how likely the funders would close). We wanted to limit the time spent fundraising so we could focus on building the business.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Sw9HJjjLdxRtt8-yx1cHqw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Ximena and me at the 2013 SXSW Interactive Accelerator in Austin, TX. We won the “News” category, mostly because we had both a cool product AND revenue. This win helped us raise our seed round.</figcaption></figure><p>We found an accelerator, Think Big Partners, that provided initial validation and pre-seed funding in 2012. Dundee Venture Partners, an Omaha, Nebraska-based early-stage investor led our Seed Round in 2013. Osage Venture Partners led our Series A Round in 2016.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/842/1*ClM_jv3rZnZUDFe3BmM_DA.png" /><figcaption>A picture from our first data mining project in January 2013 at our office in Think Big Partners Accelerator in Kansas City, MO.</figcaption></figure><p>We found ways to grow without raising additional equity financing, too, including collecting payment upfront from clients and tapping some business loans. These sources of capital, coupled with efficient sales, an easy-to-use product, and an exciting brand helped us grow quickly to a point where some larger companies started to express interest in buying Phone2Action.</p><p>Ultimately, in 2019, we partnered with Frontier Growth, a growth equity firm, because we wanted to continue to operate the business and tap their expertise in scaling responsibly. That partnership in turn funded the next stage of the business growth — via acquisitions, in 2020.</p><p><strong>Be Passionate Partners</strong></p><p>Our growth story over the years was the result of correctly identifying a need in the market and running as fast as we could to address that need. We became close with our customers, who turned to us to help them achieve goals that were mission critical for them.</p><p>From the earliest days, we had advocacy trailblazers like Dr. Howard Fuller, Sherman Whites, John Schilling, Michael Petricone and Laura Nisbet Hubbard believe in us, and as we grew, we started to work with more leaders in the public affairs field like Eileen Braden and Ryan Fitzpatrick, Amy Shope Manzi and Allyson Frazier, Aaron Rios, Sam Tatevosyan, Mike Whatley, Sarah Yi, Phil Minardi, and many others. One client, Will Lopez, who ended up joining Phone2Action as a customer success manager, eventually ran the entire Customer Success department. By working with customers across industries and business types, we learned about the common challenges they all faced in building out advocacy campaigns.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/627/1*kXMHAZ2t74x3ZgTlNEkFPA.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://archive.nytimes.com/dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/start-ups-make-political-organizing-mobile-ready/">My cofounders, Ximena and Patrick Stoddart, and me meeting with Laura Nisbet Hubbard from the Consumer Technology Association — as covered by the New York Times.</a></figcaption></figure><p>Our earliest products helped jumpstart real-time <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B4pk8Fn3Ilw&amp;t=7s">advocacy messaging to policymakers</a> at conferences, bridging offline and online activism. Because grassroots advocacy campaigns tended to be highly-charged initiatives, being in the trenches with our clients (whether in person or virtually) created common language, understanding, and alignment, while giving our team and our clients a chance to build personal relationships. This ethos carried over to the events we would convene and host ourselves. It helped that Ximena can throw one heck of a party. Between the great cover band <a href="https://gogogadjet.com/">Go Go Gadjet</a>, a mainstay at our parties, and the seminal <a href="https://technical.ly/diversity-equity-inclusion/good-tech-summit-recap/">Good Tech Summit</a> in 2017, we found that convening brought great energy to our business.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*307GaEdJOnyJgz0qs31FCg.png" /><figcaption>Governor Terry McAuliffe presenting Ximena the Virginia State Flag at our 2016 office opening. Pictured, from left to right: John Patton, founding team member and first sales hire, Beth Engel, Seed Investor, Luke Shaheen, founding team member and first hire, Patrick Stoddart, founding CTO, and Nate Lentz, Series A investor.</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>Not All Smooth Sailing</strong></h3><p>It wasn’t all smooth sailing — we made a lot of mistakes along the way.</p><p>One of the most challenging aspects of growing the company was consistently hiring experienced, senior talent to help the company grow to the next stage.</p><p><strong>Scaling Talent</strong></p><p>For more experienced executives, joining an early-stage startup can be exciting, a breakout opportunity from a corporate career, but it can also be a risky endeavor for the candidate and the company.</p><p>For example, bringing in sales leadership too early can introduce cumbersome processes and slow things down before the go-to-market kinks are ironed out — when speed to market is what matters most. Bringing it in too late can cause you to miss out in valuable growth opportunities, which compound in SaaS. From my experience, up to the first $4M or $5M in ARR, the CEO should be acting as the head of sales (unless he or she is a technical CEO). Participating on deals, working with the sales team directly, and getting market feedback helps tune the go-to-market motion as well as inform product development.</p><p>When you bring on a new sales leader, they need time to learn the market and the product, the personalities of the sales reps, as well as the idiosyncrasies of the founders. I hired one sales leader early then gave them a lot of latitude. However, I did not provide enough mentorship and support, which resulted in problems festering and sales stagnating. Those outcomes would pull me back towards micromanagement, which was not helpful.</p><p>We encountered a similar challenge as we began to scale our engineering team and operations in response to customer demand for product growth and maturity. Our founding CTO, Patrick Stoddart, was brilliant, and both an effective engineer and strong product leader, especially for the early stages of our company.<br> <br>And our early prioritization decisions allowed us to bring to market beautiful and functional software very quickly. But in doing so, we made some trade-offs that emphasized new feature development, while accruing technical debt, creating challenges down the road. Knowing then what I now know, I would have spent more time to do things right the first time, even if it would have resulted in slowing down sales.</p><p>After we brought on growth equity investors, we started to use more retained search firms, as well as more structured interview processes and assessments, with mixed results.</p><p>Many of our best hires tended to come through our own networks, or networks of other executives we had brought in. Steven Schneider, who joined as CEO in 2021 (I moved to the Chief Product Officer role when Steven joined) tapped his network of excellent executives to fill out a strong management team.</p><p><strong>Growing Pains</strong></p><p>In 2020, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/14/business/dealbook/roblox-tech-ipos.html">we made two acquisitions</a>. One was a young, venture-backed startup, and the other was 20 year-old bootstrapped company. Strategically the pieces made a lot of sense, but it took us a few months to get the right cultural alignment between the three businesses to create one unified company.</p><p>The startup had the majority of its engineering based outside the United States, with centers in Eastern Europe and Brazil. One major “aha” moment for me was when I heard that the European center was worried what the acquisition would do to their culture. Because we were in the midst of the pandemic, we couldn’t easily travel to meet in person. It was a very important reminder to me that underlying everything is people, and people throughout the world have similar hopes, aspirations, and fears. That “aha moment” led me to invest more time in integrating the international teams with the US-based ones, ensuring a more cohesive outcome.</p><p>Another challenge we ran into during the pandemic had to do with how to manage our internal communications. The period around George Floyd’s murder in June 2020 was especially challenging to lead through as many employees at our company (and around the US) were stressed by COVID, uncertain about their jobs, and were dealing with heightened awareness to social issues as a result of 24/7 social media access by working at home, among other reasons. Injecting visible racial injustice to the mix turned up the heat considerably.</p><p>Slack, the internal chat tool that we use, had become a medieval faire of sorts where conversations were happening concurrently everywhere, and anyone could publicly duel one another — and company executives. In my attempts to foster open dialogue I allowed distracting conversations to percolate. Slack-driven frustrations carried into (virtual) team meetings, fueling discontent. Things stared to get better in 2021, after we consolidated the three companies to one slack instance and established clearer usage protocols and online venues for conversations. Dialing down the temperature on slack helped increase productivity and collaboration in a remote-first, international environment.</p><p><strong>How much support to provide our clients</strong></p><p>Providing service to our clients was — and still is — one of the company’s greatest strengths. We embraced being partners and always went the extra mile to help our customers be successful.</p><p>This practice had great benefits — drawing customers closer, engendering loyalty, and securing long-term business. But it also had downsides. The team that managed client relationships would spend increasing amounts of time helping our clients with time consuming custom configurations that were not easy to do within the product suite.</p><p>We had some engineers start to support clients too, which slowed down the development of new features all of our customers could benefit from.</p><p>We eventually course-corrected with a better feedback loop between customer success and our product department, improving certain advanced features within the platform so that clients could do more, more easily, themselves. These improvements in turn alleviated the burden on customer success, who could spend more high-value, strategic time with clients.</p><h3><strong>What’s Next</strong></h3><p>For the first time in a decade, I am not in the trenches with Phone2Action (or Capitol Canary). I am incredibly excited to watch what happens as the Quorum team continues to evolve our collective vision to redefine public affairs through technology, and to help government affairs professionals move smarter and work faster.</p><p>As for me — I will be taking some off as I figure out what my next venture is later in 2023. In the interim, if you want to chat startups, scaling, or anything policy (or anything else interesting) hit me up.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a10a1fb23374" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[UnderAge]]></title>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeb Ory]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 14 Nov 2013 15:27:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2013-11-14T15:35:49.124Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Yes, that was really the name of the first newspaper I published.</h4><p>I started my first company before startups were sexy.</p><p>I started my first company in 1997, when I was 17. It was a news magazine targeting the middle schoolers at McCulloch Intermediate School in my Dallas-area community of Highland Park. We called it UnderAge.</p><p>The entendre—the sheer ridiculousness—of the name is clear to me now, but at the time, it seemed to work, and not one adult that I met, shared the vision with, or sold an advertisement to said anything about it. My business cards had a beeper number, my name, UnderAge, and my email (rootsdown@aol.com) on it. Company website? Not at that time.</p><p>I started a newspaper because, into my third year with the school newspaper (the Highland Park Bagpipe), I felt that I understood how to run a paper. I convinced the papers’ best designer, John Murchison, to join forces with me. The school sanctioned our use of equipment over free periods, and we set about to build an empire. Or at least, a first edition. I was a publisher. Check that one off the lifelong bucket list.</p><p>I sold the ads. I convinced my friends—amazing people who were awesome writers, thinkers, and photographers—to help write and interview middle schoolers. We covered cross country meets, science fairs, school elections, etc.</p><p>We managed to fill 16 pages in 12 pt. Helvetica, with a center spread. I even found advertisers, with whom I had previous relationships, who were ready to buy advertisements, site-unseen, in the new product. One local established purchased a years’ worth of back-page advertising, worth more than $10k (if we would have continued publishing monthly papers). Thanks, New York Subs, for believing in me.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/128/1*_Vp60FUEoCSxP5tcU3Qe6Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>The original New York Subs in Dallas, Texas</figcaption></figure><p>We thought we had all of the bases covered. The middle schoolers didn’t have a paper, and seemed to like the idea (my sister was in 7th grade, and based on an official survey of her friends, everyone seemed game). The high school supported it. My team, expanding at this time, got stuff done on time and on schedule. We went to press and produced 2,000 copies.</p><p>The day we launched, I went to the middle school to distribute the paper, and realized that I had a fatal flaw in my plan. While I had met with the principal of the middle school, she had never given permission for us distribute the paper on campus. And when we launched, she refused to let us distribute. Didn’t want to set a bad precedent.</p><p>So my friends and I tried to distribute by standing across the street. We were able to hand out a few hundred copies, but because we weren’t allowed inside the school, parents shunned us — and “UnderAge” — and students didn’t make the connection that the papers were designed for them.</p><p>We went home with more than 1,700 copies. I realized the business wasn’t going to turn the corner. We had made just enough from advertising to cover the production costs, with about $120 left over. Since I hadn’t yet taken economics, we considered this profit, split it, and shut down the paper. The advertisers took it in stride, and invited me back when I came calling on them again for the Bagpipe, the official high school paper.</p><p>I didn’t consider this a failure at the time. While I didn’t have a framework for opportunity cost, I quickly realized that the time invested wasn’t worth the outcome. I remember thinking “I have the rest of my life to make money. I don’t need to start now.”</p><p>Two lessons stuck with me. The first is about making sure that there is a market for what you are building. We produced the first paper largely because we could, rather than because there was a hole in the market. The second lesson, about distribution, is equally as important. No matter how good the idea, or how solid the execution, if you don’t have a sales strategy — how to distribute the goods, or reach the customers — you will fail. The trick is learning how to apply what a distribution model is to the various types of businesses you will enter — whether it’s enterprise sales or B2C application sales. It matters, and it will sink or save your business.</p><p>And UnderAge? If you are interested in a copy, my mom still has hundreds of copies at her home in Dallas. Email me if you want a copy of your own! What’s also interesting is that this blog post is the first electronic reference that exists to this publication.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=526d932788a5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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