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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Jed Hill on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Jed Hill on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@jedhill0?source=rss-888478413cec------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Jed Hill on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jedhill0?source=rss-888478413cec------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Euro Stories Chapter 2: Netherlands, England, and more]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jedhill0/euro-stories-chapter-2-netherlands-england-and-more-dca2b10a48b7?source=rss-888478413cec------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dca2b10a48b7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[football-tactics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[uefa-champions-league]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[netherlands]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[england]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jed Hill]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 16 Jun 2024 21:53:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-06-16T21:53:47.732Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Bvrnb1jcfusok8-kB3E-kA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Welcome back to Euro Stories. You’re here for a short tactical roundup of the games you missed while, understandably, enjoying your Sunday. So we’ll get straight into it.</p><h4>Poland 1–2 Netherlands: Notes from the LowBlock, Parallelograms</h4><p>It was Brentford’s 5–3–2 low block defensive setup against Arsenal last year that convinced me that this was the most effective way of reliably stopping possession-based teams from creating chances. Their wide midfielders and centre backs quickly joined the wingbacks when an opposition winger received the ball, preventing overloads. The front two blocked central entries, forcing these long ‘horeshoe’ passing sequences in which the opponent tediously hoped for split second openings in which they could pass, shoot or cross. This, at least I presumed, would be the most fashionable out of possession approach employed by this tournament’s ‘underdogs’ coming up against teams that want, and have the players to, keep the ball.</p><p>The Dutch, as follows from their Cruyffian DNA, are one of these possession-based teams who keep the ball. They initially attacked with five players across the front line, two midfielders responsible for circulating the ball, and a powerful three man base including Nathan Ake and Virgil van Dijk.</p><p>So, when Poland secured an unlikely lead in the early stages of the game, I was fully prepared to sit back and watch, recalling painfully Arsenal’s frustration against Brentford, this Dutch outfit try to break down a disciplined 5–3–2.</p><p>But what followed was quite different. While Poland do use a 5–3–2 of sorts, they did not defend, like Brentford, in a low block. Moreover, their left wingback is not the traditional, outside-footed, 1v1 defender who will make runs forward occasionally. Nicola Zalewski, whom Transfermarkt say has no preferred foot, is a technician who will look to keep the ball before clearing his lines. The left centre back, Arsenal’s Jakub Kiwior, is always keen to step out of the backline to follow opposition players, and similarly combine with Zalewski in risky areas to progress up the pitch. Ultimately, it is a hopeful (and immature) long ball from Zalewski across his goal that leads to the Gakpo equaliser. In this specific scenario, a left-footed clearance down the flank would have been preferred.</p><p>Not only is Poland’s 5–3–2 different in player profile and appetite for risk, but it is far less compact than the Brentford setup, which I have decided to use as the top-of-the-range 5–3–2 template. That is, there is space between the 5, the 3, and the 2. This again shows this Polish team are not happy, even when winning or holding on to a valuable point as underdogs, with relinquishing the space. Recalling Scotland’s setup from yesterday, it seems we are not being forced to watch the defensive low block football we typically associate international tournaments with.</p><p>In the end it was build-up that exploited the lack of compactness in Poland’s shape that caused the winner. Ake was advanced and managed to receive in some space. Although Poland were more attuned to opposition movements — through the aforementioned jumps into midfield by Kiwior, for example — than Scotland were, the Netherlands found a similar exploit to the Germans to create Weghorst’s winning goal.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*I0DjLAaiARnIYz6PGxlX3g.png" /></figure><p>The Dutch coach dropped his #8s deeper, creating the horizontal 4v3 shown above, along with the usual 3v2 at the base of play. Of course, Poland’s compensation for this is a 5v3 at the back. However, the more I watch football, the more I realise that if a player can pick up the ball in space, on the run, with enough time to get their head up, this can often be all they need need to create chances for their teammates, even if the recipient is outnumbered. A player in motion is always one step ahead of players who are forced to begin from rest.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4daKHvql3d-zK3H6NJ0-pA.png" /><figcaption>The phase described above</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3UL1vMEDYSXE4ipozRoMnw.png" /><figcaption>Ake receives as the free man in space and on the run</figcaption></figure><p>As we can see the Netherlands use their extra players in the first two lines to end up with Ake, running at speed and in space, towards the Poland penalty area. From here, he slides a pass into the moving Weghorst, who uses this ‘speed advantage’ to manufacture space and finish with one touch.</p><p><strong>My takeaway: </strong>‘underdogs’ are using the 5–3–2 in exciting ways. Poland did so better than Scotland, but the large spaces between the lines were vulnerable to the 4v3 exploit used above. I think we might find that the players who find themselves in this <strong>parallelogram space — </strong>4-player zone across the second line <strong>— </strong>might be the most impactful for the top teams (who are being faced with 5–3–2 midblocks). Maybe we’ll go back to seeing fullbacks holding the width (recall Germany) instead of 1v1 wingers, or maybe a combination of the two, (Netherlands started with Gakpo and Dumfries out wide). Then, teams will focus on getting their star creators and dribblers inside the <strong>parallelogram</strong> — see Musiala and Wirtz. I’m looking at you England. Let Kyle Walker hug the touchline, give Saka the freedom to go inside.</p><h4>Slovenia 1–1 Denmark</h4><p>Watched this one in bits and parts. From what I’ve seen on Twitter people found this quite interesting. Excited to watch Benjamin Šeško more closely in the next batch of Group C games (sighs in Arsenal).</p><h4>England 1–0 Serbia</h4><p>Everybody will be talking about the England games in depth so I’ll keep it brief for the sake of my Sunday evening and keeping Euro Stories limited to ~ five minutes.</p><p>I really thought this was the game that the low block would make its appearance at the tournament, frustrating England fans across my timeline. But once again the underdog was brave without the ball. I thought the 5–4–1 was a smart move by Serbia, acting against England’s potential to perhaps use a <strong>parallelogram</strong> of their own to fashion chances.</p><p>So, England were forced wide. And when you’re facing Bukayo Saka out wide, sometimes you just have to hope for the best. The Arsenal forward’s 1v1 ability in the first half got England the lead, which was enough for them to whimper through to an uninspired victory. Bellingham was great, as well.</p><p>Serbia seemed good in moments, but surely England will need to bring something different if they are to compete for this tournament. Part of me thinks their winning prospects might just be thwarted eventually by Nagelsmann’s superior ability when compared to Southgate in platforming their respective elite players tactically.</p><h4>End of chapter 2</h4><p>Thank you for reading. If you haven’t, check out chapter 1 for my thoughts on the group A and B games. Now that the weekend is over, the next few chapters will probably be a bit shorter. Stay tuned!</p><p>Cover art, as always, by the wonderful Guadiana Gonçalves.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dca2b10a48b7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Euro Stories Chapter 1: Germany, Hungary, Italy, and more]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jedhill0/euro-stories-chapter-1-germany-hungary-italy-and-more-4b3eddd33a98?source=rss-888478413cec------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4b3eddd33a98</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bayern-munich]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[arsenal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[italy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football-tactics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[germany]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jed Hill]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 15 Jun 2024 23:32:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-18T15:39:19.418Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rsuD2yovTuhk_wmIR92TJQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>The international tournament game revels in its immediacy. There is no time to settle in. After just two fixtures your team might either have secured their knockout place, or be one stop away from the next plane out of Germany. It is in that context that these games should be discussed. This is not just a month in a fifty game season. Yesterday’s results are old news. Nobody wants to hear about them when there is six hours of new football to be shown today.</p><p>So, with no time to rewatch games or to scowl my Twitter feed for insights and ideas, I bring you Euro Stories: quick thoughts about things I find interesting — tactics or otherwise — from each game I find the time to watch, to be consumed with your morning beverage of choice.</p><h4>Germany 5–1 Scotland: Connectors, Elusive 10s, and smart management</h4><p>I know (by my definition) this is technically old news but hey. By consequence of the Scotts’ setup, this game was mostly defined by one key game phase. Kroos with the ball in the backline, the German fullbacks holding the width, and Steve Clarke’s narrow press designed to stop Germany from progressing the ball down the middle, hoping to force them wide.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SiLrV4qv85S7oJM4UnND7g.png" /><figcaption>Key game phase. Kroos afforded time and space, German movements</figcaption></figure><p>The only problem was that nobody really was in the German centre. At least nobody started there. Aldrich was a lone ghost inside the Scottish press. But Germany did manage to get the ball into central areas, through the <strong>Connectors </strong>Gundogan and Havertz. Gundogan was tasked with arriving next to Aldrich- these arrivals into the centre are much more difficult to mark, as he moves from the blindspots of the Scottish midfielders. Havertz at times performed the same service for his team, dropping in to connect the German attack with the wide players, forming the triangles in which players like Musiala can thrive. Havertz’s principle contributions, however, were his darts into the channels, as an inverse connector opposing Gundogan, which allowed the Germans to twist and warp the Scottish defence out of shape. That type of movement is perhaps what Scotland lacked most: they would seek to make short central passes in the transition which Aldrich and the Nagelsmann counterpress gladly mopped up. The <strong>Elusive 10s </strong>Wirtz and Musiala then operated in the chaos formed by the <strong>Connectors, </strong>finding room for shots and dangerous dribbles. These 10s who are impossible to track, should not have been given that space between Scotland’s defence and press. On a side note, I appreciated Nagelsmann’s decision to introduce Groß at halftime, protecting the yellow-carded Aldrich and using his passing range to slow down and kill off the game.</p><h4>Hungary 1–3 Switzerland: Rossi tweaks his approach?</h4><p>A classic game of two halves. The Swiss made the pitch very large in-possession, with Xhaka comfortably initiating attacks as an all-phase controller. Hungary’s asymmetrical in-possession style was not very effective here: the Swiss switched and dropped quickly to prevent overloads, and dealt with the diagonal to the underloaded side easily, winning the second ball nine times out of ten. Szoboszlai did not make much of an effect in the first half, playing quite traditionally, very rarely dropping deep to initiate moves as he has done before for his national team.</p><p>I found Hungary much less asymmetrical in the second half, typically spreading four attackers across the front line. It seemed for a while that Szoboszlai was not going to be able to produce anything on the day, but he burst into life with a delightful nutmeg and give-and-go on the touchline. Then, after Varga missed his country’s first big chance of the tournament, Hungary executed a lovely move encapsulating their approach to the game. At last, they won a second ball on their underloaded side, managing to make a diagonal to the overloaded flank, in which five Hungary attackers broke at pace along the left. The ball landed with Szoboszlai, who executed a perfect cross back to the right side, which Varga gladly finished.</p><p><strong>My takeaway:</strong> a combination of a strong Swiss setup coupled with their superior talent made it difficult and impractical for Hungary to show off the unique patterns of play they displayed during qualifying. I’m excited for their upcoming match up with the Scotts, who might allow them more of the ball and will potentially call Rossi’s bluff with a high press, inviting the Hungarians’ short pass combinations. Judging by the first round of games, that might be the game to decide who will secure the important third place spot in group A.</p><h4>Spain 3–0 Croatia: Lamine Yamal</h4><p>I must admit I was not able to catch all of this one, so I’ll keep it brief. First things first, it is impossible not to aboard the Lamine Yamal hype train. This was my first time paying close attention to him in a game of this magnitude, so I’m not really qualified to discuss his technical traits in detail. I will give some soft factor analysis that nobody needed: there was a moment where he was challenging Perišić in his defensive half, and I was amazed by his braveness and determination to compete physically at his age. What a player.</p><p>Secondly, the Croatia midfield produced some excellent passages of play and certainly disturbed the Spanish high press, which at times did look out of place for a team of their quality. But maybe that’s just me looking at it with a club football eye.</p><p>Anyway, the bits I did catch of this one have been enough to convince me to make sure to watch the full games between these teams and Italy. Croatia will probably do enough to at least secure 3rd place. It is up to them to try and do so with more than three points.</p><h4>Italy 2–1 Albania: Jorginho &amp; Barella in control, The Inter Code, a worthy attack?</h4><p>An unusual mixup between club teammates Dimarco and Bastoni produced perhaps the most bizarre start we will see to any game at this tournament. But Italy immediately assumed control of the game. Barella and Jorginho gratefully accepted their side’s numerical advantage in build up, and used their excellent ball security, deception, and rotation to progress the ball into the frontline, allowing the likes of Chiesa and Dimarco to receive with speed, allowing for more direct chance creation. I could not help but constantly look for comparisons between this team and Inzhagi’s Inter Milan. After all, Bastoni, Barella and Dimarco were instrumental in this season’s Scudetto triumph. Certainly, the long diagonals into Dimarco and Calafiori’s carries from the backline were reminiscent of some of Inter’s patterns.</p><p>But this is a different team. They use a single #9, not two, who looks to combine with the #8/10 hybrids alongside him to create and receive chances. The buildup is much more risk-averse, with the security of Jorginho alongside Barella used in place of wild third man runs involving centre backs to move up the pitch.</p><p>At least, this is the face of Italy we were introduced to against Albania. While the likes of Pellegrini, Frattesi and Scamacca did at times combine in exciting ways, Italy failed to extend their lead by more than one, which caused a nervy ending to what will be the most straightforward fixture in their group. It is unlikely that Croatia or Spain, and their respective midfield threes, will allow Italy to stay comfortable in their ‘Pass to Jorginho and Barella’ controller mode. Perhaps the upcoming Spain fixture will give us a better indicator of just how far this Italy team can go, and whether Spalletti’s game model will prove effective against some of the very best.</p><h4>End of chapter 1</h4><p>Thank you for tuning in to the first chapter of Euro Stories. My apologies go out to any Scotland or Albania fans. I find it difficult to concentrate on what both teams are doing at the same time and in both their cases my eye was drawn to the team with the ball (who happened to be two of the favourites). I would also like to say that I am not as familiar with players outside of the Premier League, and part of the reason I’m attempting this series is to learn more about these players and the game. Stay tuned for chapter 2 ❤️</p><p>Cover art, as always, by Guadiana Gonçalves</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4b3eddd33a98" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Does ‘Doubling-Up’ on Saka Actually Work?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jedhill0/does-doubling-up-on-saka-actually-work-6b0865ffb2e6?source=rss-888478413cec------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6b0865ffb2e6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[football-tactics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[premier-league]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[arsenal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[champions-league]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jed Hill]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 04 Dec 2023 02:55:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-12-04T02:55:05.656Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Mnp_fiPNTNHB6zHf5x7dSA.jpeg" /></figure><p>A lot has been made of Arsenal’s diminishing underlying attacking numbers this season compared to last. From the Emirates concourses to your twitter timeline, you will have heard words like “low block” or “sitting deep” bemoaned by frustrated Arsenal watchers. You may have come across more niche discussions of Declan Rice’s inability thus far to replicate #5’s build-up qualities, making the Gunners less effective at producing central progressions. In some abandoned alleys you can sometimes even hear, in a slight whisper, the words “Ødegaard” closely followed by “ceiling” — make of that what you will. Oh, and there’s always someone shouting from somewhere, calling Kai Havertz a donkey.</p><p>But most recently, our opponents’ use of two defenders to close down, kick, and block our wingers has gained some attention. To what extent does this strategy nullify Arteta’s attack? And how is this linked to attacking low blocks and achieving centrality?</p><blockquote>“I feel like a lot of games I’m facing a double team with two guys on me and it’s the same for Gabi [Martinelli]. It’s happening in every game. I keep watching all my games back trying to find a solution, what I can do better.’’ <strong>Bukayo Saka</strong></blockquote><p>This discussion was brought to the forefront after Arsenal’s victory away to Brentford last weekend. Thomas Frank’s side deployed a very well organised 5–3–2 against the Gunners. They typically pressed high with a front five, before dropping quickly into a 5–3–2 low block to defend when Arsenal managed to get through (mostly around) the press. This saw the left-wing-back track Saka, with the wide-man in the midfield three joining him to create a 2v1 against the Arsenal attacker. Saka was usually helped by Ødegaard and Tomiyasu, which saw the Brentford LCB and CM shift across to maintain the defensive superiority.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-ZeeISoPnqcmfuZod_vlZA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 1 — Brentford forwards drop into 3–2 structure, ahead of the 5 at the back</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2dGUEgxQXuzUQaCIIJ9gcg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 2 — ‘Low block’ 5–3–2 with ‘doubling-up’ on ball-side winger</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/1*qPrU_3K3bRAkoI9M8Fk6zw.gif" /><figcaption>Figure 3 — Settled phase attack. Arsenal forced wide before two players mark Saka</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/612/1*run9B1Ay-NwDz1kg6H9t9A.gif" /><figcaption>Figure 4 — Brentford quickly ‘double-up’ on Saka, and Arsenal are forced to recycle around the ‘horseshoe’</figcaption></figure><p>These patterns occurred almost every time Arsenal progressed forward after build-up, and Brentford were even able to at times return to this structure quickly after transitions. This meant that Saka and Martinelli often had very little time to make decisions, and the condensed spaces around the ball allowed very few passing angles from them toward the goal, combined with little space for other attackers to run into. But, Brentford are sacrificing two players to deal with Saka, so it would be reasonable to suggest that this approach must leave someone else unmarked. If Arsenal can use their superiority gained there, that could be something that can be exploited, right?</p><h3>Negotiating the 5–3–2</h3><p>The idea behind this system is to be one-to-one across the backline using the back 5. Then, the midfield 3 act as screeners, blocking angles into the box. When the ball is wide, a wide midfielder joins the full-back to double-up on the winger. The CM shifts to deal with the 8 or 9 that has come deeper and if the attacking full-back underlaps in attack, they will be marked by the wide centre-back. The defending front two are then responsible for making it difficult to switch play to the other side by staying close to the 6, forcing the attack around the block in a ‘horseshoe’ shape.</p><p>The theory is that by that time, the midfield would have shifted across so that the same defensive pattern can be repeated on the other side. The only free players are typically the attacking CBs, who are usually too far out for the defending team to be concerned. So, either the CBs must join the attack to compete against the defensive superiority, or the attack must find a way to switch play fast enough to generate space and passing options, before the opposition make the defensive shift.</p><p>One solution is to switch play consistently as fast as possible, and increase the size of the gaps in the midfield 3. Arsenal at times managed to achieve this, but were not able to exploit these situations well. This worked better when the ball was switched from right to left. When Ødegaard received backwards from Saka, he needed an extra touch to open his body up onto his preferred foot, allowing time for an opposition player to close him down. In contrast, when Zinchenko received a back pass from Martinelli, he could cross first time with his favoured left foot.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hgTaJv02hNnrzKFVXQoS_g.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 5 — Brentford midfield 3 have large gaps but Ødegaard avoids angle from his right foot to Tomiyasu, and there are no runners into the space open from his left foot.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/760/1*f6eaBhS-GadpLqLNEi_P8g.gif" /><figcaption>Figure 6 — Quick switch of play gives Zinchenko time before wide midfielder shifts. Left foot preference allows for quicker delivery.</figcaption></figure><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//twitter.com/scottjwillis/status/1728496845855568144%3Fs%3D46%26t%3Dw2QLTg93aRpwvHS_verMtQ&amp;image=https%3A//i.embed.ly/1/image%3Furl%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fabs.twimg.com%252Ferrors%252Flogo46x38.png%26key%3Da19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/98f3c84d3aba7d548528b89c6f3466e8/href">https://medium.com/media/98f3c84d3aba7d548528b89c6f3466e8/href</a></iframe><p>Despite these crossing opportunities, Arsenal only managed to create shots with an average of 0.1 xG per shot. The chances created from these crosses were not good enough. Bukayo Saka, despite eventually being the decisive crossing threat, did not produce a single shot in this game.</p><h3>Saka strikes back</h3><p>This weekend Gary O’Neil’s Wolves arrived at the Emirates and his team’s own 5–3–2 promised to cause similar problems for Arteta’s side. What would Arteta and Saka come up with to create chances, besides low-probability crosses?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*U-lr5i3WIMexs4YvEMDk7Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 8 — Wolves using the same 5–3 defensive structure</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/676/1*lhOtLzMOrm4s7C2gY_V9RA.gif" /><figcaption>Figure 9 — Saka goal against Wolves</figcaption></figure><p>So, what is different here? This sequence begins with the same 5–3–2 block + doubling-up on Saka we saw at Brentford. First, compare the position occupied by Jesus here to that of Figure 2 and Figure 5. He is much closer to the ball-side winger, pinning a centre-back in the space between Saka’s markers. Tomiyasu also times his position at the top of the box in the half-space really well: he arrives at exactly the moment the gap in midfield becomes too large. Clearly, he should not be allowed to occupy that space for that much time, and the Wolves midfield does not manage distances well at all here. But still, we observe two solutions made by Arsenal in dealing with the doubling-up on Saka: involve Jesus, and enter the half-space at the right time. It would have been much easier to mark Tomiyasu if he arrived at the same time as Saka and Jesus (see Figure 4). (I don’t even need to talk about how well Jesus does here)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/656/1*E47zb4qo10zjf2yG2CkqXg.gif" /><figcaption>Figure 10 — Trossard box-arrival</figcaption></figure><p>Once again we see Arsenal attack with four instead of three. We have Saka doubled-up, Tomiyasu playing the CB-pinning role, and Trossard acting as the box-arriver. Comparing with Figure 4 again, this time we have a box-presence (Tomiyasu) in the same line at the same time as Saka. Ødegaard better separates from the CM (Doyle) who is distracted by Tomiyasu and allows the distance between himself and the wide midfielder to become large. Then, when Ødegaard receives, we see a box-crashing run from Trossard, as opposed to the static positioning we witnessed at Brentford. As seen in both sequences from this game, by attacking the box with speed, attackers are better able to get past the centre-backs.</p><h3>Should you double-up against Saka?</h3><p>It is not obvious whether Arsenal’s solutions in the Wolves game would have translated if they were used against Brentford. Certainly Brentford’s 5–3–2 did seem more drilled and organised than that of Wolves, and the large Emirates pitch certainly did not help Gary O’Neil. I do believe that our forwards possess the associative qualities needed to find solutions in these situations, and add to that the rotations (Tomiyasu occupying CF???) and the ability to time box-arrivals excellently, the potential gaps created when teams double-up could be serious weaknesses.</p><p>But is there an alternative? You can’t really leave Saka 1v1 against your full-back. He’ll probably get past at least a couple times every match. Maybe teams should play a 5–4–1 Out of Possession, to reduce those massive gaps in midfield. But this will only allow Arsenal to dominate possession and build-up even further, and give the centre-backs the room to switch play even faster.</p><p>I still believe teams should probably try to emulate Thomas Frank’s approach, especially at home. For now, it seems, we need to be at our very best to produce good chances against that type of structure. Saka has been our most prolific performer thus far this season, and focusing on stopping him is a good place to start.</p><p>//illustrations by Guadiana Gonçalves</p><p>SpaceTime Football Part 1 is still on the way! Until then, Happy Holidays!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6b0865ffb2e6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[KILLING THE CHAOS: Arsenal vs Manchester City]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jedhill0/killing-the-chaos-arsenal-vs-manchester-city-626d45f51576?source=rss-888478413cec------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/626d45f51576</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[premier-league]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football-tactics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[arsenal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[manchester-city]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jed Hill]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 19 Oct 2023 02:28:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-10-19T10:48:58.348Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*a-tlBfpTA6dygudZiOKi3A.png" /></figure><p>The second half battle between Arsenal and Manchester City existed in its own footballing bubble. Not that it was an exhibition of ahead-of-its-time, high-end tactics to be replicated across the land. Or that it was the unchartered space produced when an unstoppable force meets an immovable object. This was not two opposing forces cancelling each other out. For the most part, this was a careful dance between two sides trying their best to keep the contest at equilibrium, i.e. killing the chaos and removing all unpredictability from the encounter. Grab a coffee, you’ll need it.</p><p>While not trying to build on the ‘chess match’ cliché that has been used to describe this game, I find the comparability between the opening in chess and the ‘build-up’ in football to be particularly useful here. For chess players, the opening is their chance to make use as much as possible of the exact moves and theory they have learned before the inert randomness of the game comes into play, and the opening becomes the middle game where players might be forced into finding solutions in positions that are less familiar to them than traditional opening sequences. Similarly, when a team is building from the back, especially for positional sides like that of Guardiola and Arteta, the players will use the patterns they have practised in training to get the ball up the pitch. The centre-backs spread out either side of the goalkeeper, a pivot drops to provide a central option with the full-backs out wide, or maybe one of the fullbacks invert to provide an extra man in the centre. Build-up is where players are most coached and rely most on instruction and practice. Similarly, for the team without the ball, their behaviour when defending another team’s build-up relies on a press that would have been drilled into players in the days, weeks, months leading up to a fixture. So, what is my point?</p><p>Well, it is clear that in this game both teams preferred to keep the game in these build-up type phases as much as possible. When a team loses/regains possession (the transition), the seconds after this moment is typically where you will find the most randomness or chaos in a football match. It is the ‘middle game’ in chess. The team that won the ball is not in its attacking shape, the team that lost the ball is not in its defensive shape, and the ball is moving pretty quickly. This moment in between defence and attack is when teams are most vulnerable, both on the ball and off it since shape equals security. So, by recycling the game to build-up type possession and diffusing most of the transition moments in the game, both teams found safety and control in their collective preparation rather than their individual quality in exploiting transitions and more uncertain game phases. The match was like a chess game where the players put all the pieces back to their starting blocks whenever the next move isn’t obvious. We will explore how this was done, when it was done well and when it was not.</p><h3>‘Speed Advantages’</h3><p>The primary focus of this piece is to observe how City performed in possession and what Arsenal did to prevent City from producing moments of ‘speed advantage’.</p><p>I define a <em>speed advantage</em> as a superiority in a position that results when players achieve faster runs than their opponents. For example: counterattacks, transitions, or a player running onto a pass around static defenders. Football, unlike chess, is not discrete but continuous. You are not allowed to reset after every single pass. Therefore, a defending team must not only be aware of the free player at an exact instant, but the free player that is available in the following seconds after opponents continue in their running direction.</p><p>In their most recent Premier League encounter prior to this fixture, City were consistently able to generate speed advantages. The aggressive Arsenal press on the night meant that when De Bruyne received a progressive pass, he was running with an opposite speed to the press, creating a transition-like moment, or ‘artificial transition’. When the ball went long to Erling Haaland, he had only to win the ball against static Arsenal centre-halves, allowing De Bruyne to peel off with a speed advantage. In a nutshell, City achieved many speed advantages, putting themselves (especially De Bruyne) in control and were able to create quick chances or keep the ball higher up the pitch.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*02EJLu25R68r2jfIBvVR5g.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*poG7kV-1h-33lymTatH31g.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jfzEWG3wP4iMeU2ofba24Q.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1a,1b,1c — City go long from build-up and De Bruyne finds a speed advantage over Thomas Partey</figcaption></figure><p>So, without Rodri and De Bruyne who were instrumental in that game, Guardiola’s in-possession plan in this season’s fixture was slightly different: use narrow ball-safe midfielders and narrow attackers with the fullbacks being tasked to keep width. By keeping narrow in the centre, City would not give Arsenal a lot of space if they lost the ball. City wanted to keep the ball as much as possible, building around the press and either locating Alvarez or Foden in the half-spaces to create chances for Haaland running in-behind at speed or by going directly to the Norwegian with long passes, with Foden and Alvarez looking for the De Bruyne-esque speed advantage.</p><p>As for Arsenal, Arteta wanted to prevent a repeat of the previous fixture by man-marking the central players and adding a zonal defender to the centre instead of man-marking the wide fullbacks. Further, he wanted to reduce the size of passing lanes from the back line through to City’s attackers by keeping horizontal distances in the press small and by instructing the wingers to keep the fullbacks in the shadow. Then, when City go wide, use the phenomenal running power of the front five to shift horizontally and collapse on City to force errors or bad passes. By not going man-to-man against the fullbacks Walker and Gvardiol, Zinchenko and Jorginho positioned themselves to pick up the loose passes and begin Arsenal’s in-possession sequence.</p><p>This plan revolved around two key features:</p><ol><li>Quick horizontal jumps in the front line as City shift the ball sideways in attempt to go around the press</li><li>Abandoning double coverage to add an extra defender in the centre to prevent a City attacker from gaining speed advantages</li></ol><h3>Regaining in the centre</h3><p>We see two Man City build-ups in the first few minutes of the second half very similar to the example from the previous fixture (1a,1b), but this time with Arsenal regaining both times. City deploy a 1–3–4 build-up, with the centre-backs (Dias and Ake) spread wide, Bernardo receiving very deep next to Ederson and the 8s (Kovacic and Lewis) pinning the centre. In the absence of Rodri, Pep has opted for a loaded build-up with 8 City players including the fullbacks up against the 5 in Arsenal’s press. Typically, this overload would mean City may find it easy to progress the ball up the pitch. But Arteta has organised the press not necessarily to win the ball back as soon as possible, but instead to deny City from progressing with a speed advantage.</p><p>The Arsenal wide-men Martinelli and Jesus are the hybrid pressers, ready to close down Dias and Ake while keeping the fullbacks Walker and Gvardiol in their shadow. Other than that, City have a +1 with Bernardo and Ederson vs Nketiah. The only area where City can achieve running at Arsenal at speed are the wide/ half-space regions behind the front five press. City choose to go around the press and the ball goes wide to Dias.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*z02D8zMm2-YgoumHReLt4A.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IvBX6l0rmLxNvF1unG8APw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VjoB70P-o0qJtyWBns82oA.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2a,2b,2c — High Arsenal press. Martinelli ready to jump to Dias while blocking pass for Walker to run onto. Rice and Nketiah go man-to-man. Zinchenko is the ‘zonal defender’ and intercepts in the half-space</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JIY3A0btpnsbXfyMd3oceA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bmJEhMTzvw50S-bmodsJ6g.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2d,2e — Zinchenko makes a quick pass and Ødegaard plays back passively</figcaption></figure><p>We see that Martinelli has closed Dias down while keeping Walker in his shadow (2b). Dias and Walker are on the same vertical line, so there is no way to get Walker into a speed advantage by giving him a pass to run onto. Dias chooses to go long instead of playing via Lewis who is tracked by Rice. Zinchenko, rather than man-marking Walker as we said, defended the space behind him and was there to make the interception (2c). He fires it to Ødegaard who prefers recycling back to Jorginho, over attempting risky passes into Nketiah or Jesus that might result in a transition.</p><p>Minutes later, we see an almost identical pattern:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eiLpn9fbn6yr6SnWJiRoHQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*p2E0wA5pRDDZLocqocZu4Q.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wlHI-PxM-aIDZgeLbQxQ8Q.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3a,3b,3c — Build-up with Bernardo pushed into the block. City avoid risky passes into the centre and go wide</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VLQhlrntb4lU8tPrFCGPVg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BFIAlrLp24a6ZGeSfqgjmg.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3d,3e — The Arsenal press collapse on City horizontally with Martinelli blocking Walker again, and Jorginho defends the ‘speed advantage’ space</figcaption></figure><p>This time, Bernardo Silva positions himself further forward, between Ødegaard and Rice so that when Ake receives, City have an extra man in the centre- Lewis is no longer marked by Rice who has to mark the now ball-side midfielder, Bernardo (3b). But Ake does not play the pass to the open Lewis. Lateral passes into the centre carry some risk, and without Rodri’s quality and composure in this area of the pitch, Guardiola’s team are cautious against conceding central transitions. So we see the ball go back to Ederson and then to Dias again (3c). By this time Rice has made the horizontal jump to Lewis, putting him off his pass and Arsenal regain once more with Jorginho performing the same zonal role as Zinchenko.</p><p>So what can we take from these sequences? Arsenal allow City a far-side free man and when City do have a moment to find them, they choose to be cautious instead. This free player is then marked when the press jumps horizontally as the ball is switched. Arteta does not want to allow City to produce progressive passes into space occupied by runners — he uses a double-pivot of Zinchenko and Jorginho to defend these spaces zonally which does not affect his man marking system since the two ‘free’ fullbacks Walker and Gvardiol are only allowed to receive passes at an angle that does not allow for speedy dribbles up the pitch (2b, 3c). This zonal defending approach by Jorginho and Zinchenko is useful as they make themselves available for the first short pass after winning possession, and Arsenal use them as a reset to get out of their pressing structure and into attacking shape.</p><p>We do later see an example of City finding a small speed advantage with Bernardo. Arsenal have been caught out after a transition, and Rice is not high enough to press John Stones (4a) and prevent the central pass from the backline, as he did in the previous sequences (2a,3b). However, when Bernardo receives with a speed advantage over Rice, he chooses not to carry forward and once again goes back to familiar, less risky, slower possession (4b,4c). This was in part forced by Rice’s power and ability to recover space extremely well, a key feature in Arteta’s plan.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*01_BIkm9xB7PQ8lBVgCbsg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iehxumHHYXJdYViEw8uYGQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0288xeLZsrMQNgmo2fyxug.png" /><figcaption>Figure 4a,4b,4c — When Bernardo receives from Stones he has a speed advantage over Rice. But instead of dribbling forward, he comes back and allows Rice to get back into position.</figcaption></figure><h3>Double coverage? Martin, where we’re going, we don’t need double coverage</h3><p>More often than not when it comes to defending against strikers, defending teams will use ‘double coverage’: deploying two defenders against one attacker. Teams prefer allowing the opposition one free player further from goal, than rely on one centre back winning all duels against the striker. When it comes to Haaland and his physicality and pace, teams are especially reluctant to use only one centre back against him.</p><p>However, for Arteta’s man-to-man plan to work, he needed every player to be ready to jump to the ‘free’ opposition player when needed. So that meant that the City front three Foden-Haaland-Alvarez would need to be defended by White-Saliba-Gabriel. No double coverage. Further, to keep the man-to-man system, if ever any of those three dropped deep to receive, they had to be followed.</p><p>In the below sequence, Foden drops deep from the frontline but Saliba has followed him so that he cannot let the boll roll to achieve a speed advantage (5a,5b). He has to stop the ball and go out wide. White is jockeying Doku, Saliba on Haaland and Zinchenko follows Bernardo from his central position such that it is man-to-man (5c).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/904/1*oZxXa1dhyQRrjeONZaLRnA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/904/1*Snjy9UuK7Ien4jxAcYVp9g.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/904/1*1_zmIED0xswZI-B6SHckIw.png" /><figcaption>Figure 5a,5b,5c — Foden drops to help build-up but is followed tightly by Saliba. No double coverage and Arsenal remain man-to-man.</figcaption></figure><p>When the press was not well organized and a centre back did not follow the attacker deep, the game became much more chaotic, with fast, central, artificial transitions (Figure 6). Here, Arsenal’s press is less narrow, with Ødegaard going high to Ake without the horizontal shift and effort required from Nketiah to block the pass back to the goalkeeper (6a). Looking closely, you can see what Ødegaard thinks of Nketiah’s positioning. Compare this with figures 2b and 3c, where Arsenal did not allow Ederson to receive with open ground passing lanes to the front three (although only the very best goalkeepers in the world can actually make this pass). He finds Alvarez exceptionally, who Gabriel does not make the jump to, and City have an opportunity for a quick attack with a speed advantage over the Arsenal press (6d). Zinchenko is not in the central zonal role, from which he defended speed advantages in previous sequences (2c), likely because someone had to stay close to Walker on the touchline after Martinelli made the horizontal shift to Lewis (6b). We can see how the front five failing to all make the horizontal jump correctly (Nketiah did not jump to Ederson before he received from Ake) produces side effects across Arsenal’s shape, resulting in Zinchenko giving up the centre and more space for Ederson to pass into.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GpcZYYy_oZMAOozUZVO31w.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/904/1*f_kh8yLdc7V5NToSZO2rCw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/904/1*bJb8lL3Ca1ry-WB96U6Oxg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/904/1*2-oJfi4sCgTsVLtlo5rYaA.png" /><figcaption>Figure 6a,6b,6c,6d — Arsenal do not shift horizontally in the press and Gabriel does not jump to Alvarez .</figcaption></figure><h3>Now, what does this all mean?</h3><p>Earlier I talked about this second half being a showcase of both managers being reluctant to involve themselves in a game of transitions and uncertainty against each other’s most dangerous rival. What we have seen, from the perspective of Arsenal defending against City, is that a mix of Arsenal’s out of possession (OOP) approach and Manchester City’s risk-aversive profiles in their lineup resulted in a game where possession was very build-uppy and weaknesses were not tested as much as they could have been. Near the end, City added Nunes and Doku to be more brave in exploiting potential transition moments, which made the game more open. For Arsenal, the performances of Ødegaard and Rice OOP were crucial in ensuring that the horizontally shifting press was mostly very successful, and Saliba’s ability to defend 1v1 vs Haaland and at the same time drop to follow Foden was important in disallowing City even a sniff at goal in the second half. In general, the Arsenal front five demonstrated brilliant football intelligence and understanding of distances, marking rotations and jumps. I believe it is safe to say that Arsenal are one of the best (perhaps the very best) OOP team in the world at the moment.</p><p>I’d like to give a massive shoutout to Guadiana Goncalves for creating such an awesome cover illustration. In my upcoming piece ‘Spacetime Football: Part 1’ I will begin expanding on the idea of ‘speed advantages’. But for now, why don’t you make like a tree and get outta here?</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=626d45f51576" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Attacking Patterns and the False False 9: Yes, Haaland Does Make City Better]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jedhill0/attacking-patterns-and-the-false-false-9-yes-haaland-does-make-city-better-3069edbe18f7?source=rss-888478413cec------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3069edbe18f7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[premier-league]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football-tactics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[manchester-city]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[haaland]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sports]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jed Hill]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 28 Mar 2023 00:27:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-03-28T00:27:04.462Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*K9fhW5bKXMRGAwPZaeJ6Gg.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>A Man City midfielder has the ball. A teammate drops near to receive a short pass. Defenders follow. Give and go. Free man waits in the open space left behind. Pass, shot, goal.</em></p><p>We’ve seen this pattern countless times since Pep Guardiola took over at Manchester City. Nonstop forward rotations, dismarking in the half spaces, cutbacks into zone 17. But more generally, the use of the false 9.</p><p>Famously perfected by Lionel Messi, the false 9 became a hallmark of Guardiola’s famous Barcelona side. A forward that operates like a midfielder, who drops deep to generate combinations with the rest of midfield, often resulting in vacated space in-behind for runners to attack from which they can either finish or cutback for a tap-in.</p><p>Since the departure of Sergio Agüero, and before the arrival of Erling Haaland, Guardiola often lined up with no definitive centre forward. Instead, the likes of Phil Foden, Raheem Sterling, Ilkay Gundogan or Gabriel Jesus would rotate in and out of the false 9 position. These players’ low centre of gravity, dynamism and energy meant that they fit the physical profile of the role. Their close touch, creative passing and proficient dribbling satisfied Guardiola’s technical requirements, while the tactical nuance of the role was instilled in them day by day during his and Arteta’s sessions.</p><p>So, when Erling Haaland arrived on the blue side of Manchester, it was unclear exactly how he would fit into Pep’s system. A tall, pacy centre forward who thus far in his short, but exceptionally prolific career, had operated solely in the high middle zones of the pitch. If not in the penalty area waiting for a pass, then sprinting into the penalty area onto a pass.</p><p>And these instincts have certainly been visible as we near the end of his first season in England. When passers like De Bruyne, Rodri and Riyad Mahrez pick up the ball behind him, his first instinct is always to make his way to goal, with aggressive runs that frighten defenders. He seems to turn centre halves into shells of their best self, as he chases long balls or darts toward the goal as soon as a teammate gets their head up. As of writing, he has scored 42 goals this season. We’re in March.</p><p>But many believe City are not as good this season as they were last. They trail league leaders Arsenal, and have picked up up fewer expected goals per game in the league compared to last season. Since Haaland is the big new addition in their starting XI this season compared to last , and given how he has replaced the false 9 position in City’s team, people have dared suggest that he is what is making City worse.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FMHh3jty1SrQ%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DMHh3jty1SrQ&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FMHh3jty1SrQ%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/7ec29c322762cdc530068d25261994ac/href">https://medium.com/media/7ec29c322762cdc530068d25261994ac/href</a></iframe><p>In the above Tifo video, ‘Has Erling Haaland Made City Worse?’, Jon Mackenzie describes the metrics which suggest changes in City’s style of play owing to Haaland’s introduction and the types of passes on which he thrives. The video does a great job explaining the statistical perspective of this debate, so I will not speak to that in this article. Instead, I will suggest, through analysis of his most recent goal, why Haaland does have the capabilities to perform in a fluid Manchester City attack, without hindering his appetite for goals.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Zo05MkWYK1bbL74tFqj5qw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Rodri recovers in second phase</figcaption></figure><p>In the goal sequence, we get the position above after City used a long pass to bypass Kompany’s Burnley’s high press. Laporte played long to Foden, which pinned back the Burnley defense and created a vast amount of space in the midfield, due to the rest of Burnley’s players being positioned high up the pitch. When Rodri picks up the loose ball (above frame), we notice that City’s attack have already picked up their natural roles. We have two wingers, Foden and Mahrez, pinning the Burnley full-backs out wide. Haaland holds position between the CBs. At this point in the game he has already scored twice, and both defenders are wary of affording the Norweigan too much space. He has pinned them back as well. This means that the entire back four is completely powerless to what happens ahead of them, since any attempt to defend the space ahead leaves them vulnerable to through passes in behind to any of the front three.</p><p>Behind the front three we see the two City 8’s. In this case, De Bruyne and Alvarez. Notice the rotation of Alvarez, who you would initially expect to be in the front three, and Foden, who commonly operates as an 8. Alvarez is the ‘free man’: Burnley pressed City’s five outfield players in build up with five players. Since their back four marks City’s front three, City have one unmarked outfield man. Typically, this free man would be a full-back. However, since the full-back Rico Lewis inverted into midfield, this created the numerical superiority in the central zones, allowing City to have an 8 as a free man. De Bruyne immediately notices the open space, and moves into a position to receive.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4UDe4Eex1nHbM0PS9OmsHQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Man City’s transitions typically involve De Bruyne picking up the ball in the middle and right zones of the pitch. In these areas, he has bigger passing angles from his stronger right foot compared to when he is positioned on the left: he can play angled passes vertically towards Haaland (or even Foden) or laterally towards Alvarez or Mahrez. In transition moments when decisions need to be quick to capitalise on the opposition’s unstructured defence, having greater passing angles when receiving allows De Bruyne to make these passes earlier.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yRB3IsOMBt8GtqskprL_jg.jpeg" /></figure><p>De Bruyne finds Mahrez. We immediately see another attacking pattern as the Algerian receives: Alvarez quickly darts toward space behind in between the full back and centre half, pinning the defenders and affording more space to Mahrez.</p><p>Just looking at the above frame, we notice how Burnley have recovered their defensive shape relatively well. The back four are settled in line, and three midfielders are tracking back to support the defense. The pass out wide slowed the play enough such that Burnley could track back and put a stop to City’s numerical superiority. Further, City only have four players across the front line, instead of the five players occupying each channel. So, Burnley should be fine, right?</p><p>Well, there are few things to consider. Haaland has moved out of the centre halves’ line of sight, and can see both of their shirt numbers. All the Burnley players are fixated on Mahrez, except the right back, who is pointing at Haaland and presumably demonstrating that he is being unattended, which leaves the centre backs vulnerable to a run in-behind. However, Foden is positioned excellently in his blind-side. His attention is on Haaland, leaving Foden the opportunity to drift and locate space.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cKAqA601AXpe6FLMWZ7hdA.jpeg" /></figure><p>So, how do City break apart the fairly well-structured defensive shape? It all comes down to a phenomenal bit of ‘playmaking’ by Erling Haaland. Instead of running in-behind, or positioning himself for a diagonal cross from Riyad Mahrez, which one might expect from a traditional centre forward, he runs across the centre halves, making use of their ignorance of his position, before darting away from the penalty area towards Mahrez. In doing so, he drags one of the centre halves with him, and attracts a midfield challenger when Mahrez makes the pass.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VkI5sRpsRdXdVN2RtzCohw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Haaland backs up his moment of tactical intelligence with a perfect lay off for Mahrez. The combination tightens the Burnley shape, while allowing city to expand. Notice how Foden is instructed to hold his position wide, and not to follow the play. When the full back narrows to protect the space vacated by his centre backs, Foden is able to find himself in space. With good movement by Erling Haaland, Manchester City have created a positional superiority on the left flank in a second.</p><p>From a defensive viewpoint, Kompany will not be pleased. The seven players closest to Mahrez are all wearing Burnley colours. The Algerian’s markers did not follow their man, and the others either lost their duel or did not press early enough.</p><p>But lets not forget about the protagonist of this goal. Immediately after playing his pass, Haaland dashes toward the goal, while the Burnley men have their eyes locked on the ball.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0vtX6Fj_ybJOtVjkzPiSnw.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jUT1E-SSCqenZbnLSfLJFA.jpeg" /></figure><p>The only thing preventing this goal from being picture-book Pep is the finish: Foden’s effort strikes the post.</p><p><em>The centre forward dropped into space, there was a give and go, opening space for a midfielder to have an effort on goal.</em></p><p>But now it’s different. Now there’s more.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*B9vYJBvX9i6inrhklFR2xQ.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YmlFE-MupiqYaUfL1i4YxQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Seemingly like magic, Haaland finds himself waiting exactly where the ball lands after hitting the post, and converts an easy (for him at least) finish into an unguarded net.</p><p>But there’s nothing magical about this. And not even luck accounts fully for this goal. Remember when Burnely stood still, and Haaland dashed towards goal? Or when Foden hit the ball, and Haaland opened his body, and focused on the path of the ball? And how in less than than a second he reacted to the ball coming off the post, and angled his foot for the finish?</p><p>This goal is a result of a player making perfect decisions at every moment of an attack. This is not a player who is one-dimensional, who cannot fit into a Pep Guardiola team. This is a player who can learn and adapt. Manchester City do not need to compromise their fluid attacking patterns to suit Haaland. They simply have a centre forward who is ‘Pep’ enough to create a chance for a teammate, and brilliant enough to help them finish it all in one.</p><p>Perhaps as we get closer to the end of the season, we will notice these ‘False 9’ behaviours appear more and more in Haaland’s game. I suspect his reliance on his typical playing style in the early parts of the season is reflected in the data and perhaps skews it in such a way that suggests he has ‘disrupted’ Manchester City’s attacking patterns. He is only 22 years old. As he better learns Guardiola’s required movements and adds them to his already stellar physical and technical toolset, he will only improve City further.</p><p>Did you prefer City’s football without Haaland? Let me know.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3069edbe18f7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Villa’s goal against Palace: superiorities, mistakes and why a goal happens]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jedhill0/villas-goal-against-palace-superiorities-mistakes-and-why-a-goal-happens-407b97c224e2?source=rss-888478413cec------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/407b97c224e2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[crystal-palace]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[positional-play]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football-analytics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[aston-villa]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jed Hill]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 18 Mar 2023 01:47:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-07-01T07:28:46.457Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Sam Tighe on Twitter: &quot;This literally happened yesterday pic.twitter.com/0JVEquVAXI https://t.co/pb3OWYIgc5 / Twitter&quot;</h3><p>This literally happened yesterday pic.twitter.com/0JVEquVAXI https://t.co/pb3OWYIgc5</p><p>Football tactics have always been a totally frustrating part of the game for me. If both teams have eleven players, why should there ever be numerical superiority? Are games decided by moments of genius, or lapses in concentration? To what extent are these related?</p><p>So, when scrolling through my Twitter timeline (the ‘For you’ version which I secretly prefer) I encountered an aerial camera view of Unai Emery’s Aston Villa’s goal against Crystal Palace, I decided to ignore the rest of my uni tutorial and instead watch the same goal scored about forty times until I felt I had some idea of what was going on.</p><p>Below are some of my ideas (based solely on having read half of Zonal Marking and following Twitter tacticos) as I attempt to understand the above passage of play..</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PnCTAv3YULYHwsQswihMMA.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Figure 1 Phase 1: Build-up</em></figcaption></figure><p>First, begin with the basics. Who has the ball? What does our video not show us? What is the phase of play? What shapes do the teams take in and out of possession?</p><p>Aston Villa are in possession, with the ball at goalkeeper Emi Martinez’ feet. He is just outside his six-yard area, and Villa are looking to play up the pitch. This is phase 1 of play, i.e. build-up. There are three Villa players not shown in this frame: the right centre-half, the right back, and the number 9, Ollie Watkins. As for Crystal Palace, we cannot see their right centre-half and right back, as well as their goalkeeper.</p><p>Both teams use a back four, with a double pivot and three creative players behind a centre forward. In the above frame, we see Patrick Vieira’s Crystal Palace applying a high press, led by Wilfred Zaha, who is preventing Martinez from playing the ball to the right, either to the centre half or the full back. The Palace midfield pivot are man-marking their Aston Villa counterparts, and Sambi has followed his man towards Martinez to prevent Villa from building up through the middle. So, Martinez is forced to play to his left. He has two options: play short to Mings, or longer to the fullback, Moreno. Mings is free, Olise has not pressed him yet, and the pass is simple. Moreno is also free, as Ayew has remained deep, presumably to track Ramsey, who the Palace defenders feel is too deep to mark themselves. However, Zaha is closing in on Martinez, and given that the Argentine has no particular strength in ball playing, it is unlikely that he backs himself to make the longer pass. So, he plays short to Mings instead.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ndvCZ84u0_a0aaisiUXg5g.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 2: Mings receives</figcaption></figure><p>As Mings receives, this is Olise’s pressing trigger. However, Ayew hardly moves away from Ramsey towards Moreno who is still in plenty of space. Guehi has pushed up slightly to get nearer to the Villa number 10, Buendia. Again, Palace press to channel the ball wide, with Olise blocking any passing lanes into the middle zones of the pitch. At this point Zaha and Sambi have done their job to force the ball left, but are now vulnerable. Zaha no longer performs a pressing function, and Sambi needs to track back and reduce the distance between him and his pivot partner, Doucoure, who has three Villa players in his vicinity.</p><p>There is no space for Mings to carry into, and the next pass has already been decided for him owing to Vieira’s press.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jYo_i6KGZNal_DO2UAvm9Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 3: Mings finds Moreno</figcaption></figure><p>This is where things become slightly confusing. Palace were happy to channel Villa’s build up wide. However, once Moreno receives, there is no press from Ayew, and he continues to have open space ahead. Ayew chooses to remain deep, tracking Ramsey. The problem is that he has allowed Ramsey to come narrow on the wrong side, in Ayew’s blind spot. Doucoure himself now wants to block the open passing lane from Moreno to Ramsey, and in doing so has left Douglas Luiz free to receive from Moreno which allows them to enter phase 2. So, Palace used high front press, but did not continue this press once the ball was shifted wide. This lack of cohesion in the press meant that Zaha and Olise’s efforts to force Villa wide achieved little: Douglas Luiz was still allowed to pick the ball up in space in the interior.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VrtLaDJZhGN7ZtAeaIvd2w.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Figure 4: Start of Phase 2</em></figcaption></figure><p>Luiz receives it well on the turn, allowing him to open up his body and play with his preferred right foot. In this time, Sambi has run back to reduce his distance between himself and Doucoure. This means he has left the second Villa pivot, his man, free. Eze realizes the gap left by Sambi, and is thus forced to come narrow, opening up space on Villas’s right flank. Further, the above frame shows already how the Villa attackers’ positioning is causing unrest in the Palace back line. Buendia is operating as a traditional number 10, finding the space between the Palace midfield and defence. He is behind Sambi, who has eyes on Luiz and does not look behind him to locate Buendia. The high Palace press and the decision to man mark the Villa midfielders meant that their pivot had advanced responsibilities, allowing Buendia to find space. Buendia’s position worries the Palace LCB, Guehi, who goes higher to get tighter to the Argentine. Meanwhile Watkins (out of frame) remains deep, pinning back Andersen and not allowing Palace to maintain a level back line.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XKfacY4zEUzR4F2hoptoSg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 5: Kamara drives into space</figcaption></figure><p>When doing analysis, we cannot underestimate the quality that is present at this level of the game. Luiz expertly plays a quick pass into his pivot partner. When Kamara receives the ball, he is not pressed by Sambi who has decided to no longer man mark and is attempting to defend the space. Further, there is no time for Sambi to press owing to the pace of Luiz’s pass. Eze cannot press as that would open even more space for the right full back to run into. So, Kamara is allowed to drive relatively calmly into space, with Sambi and Eze both dropping off. Guehi stops his forward movement toward Buendia and drops back again, now that a ball over top is available for Villa.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xuNydle-4PRmNnf10afvCg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 6</figcaption></figure><p>All of McGinn, Buendia, and Ramsey occupy space in between the lines. This is because there is no coordination in the Palace positioning nor press. Sambi and Doucoure’s man marking solution to prevent Luiz and Kamara from finding time on the ball failed. Further, the Palace line was not prepared to support this aggressive high press by moving up to reduce the space available to the Villa ‘10s’. This is in part because Ollie Watkins operates well on balls over the top and into space, thus pinning back the Palace back four and leaving space between the lines. The Crystal Palace left back was initially tight against McGinn, but the threat posed by Cash at right full back forced him to drop off. This allowed a relatively easy pass into the Scotsman, and the start of phase 3.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hVzN11-bT0fAX6CDbzrdbQ.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Figure 7 Start of Phase 3</em></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uW91yH7PsZEhoPhLFV2PeQ.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Figure 8: Hollywood pass</em></figcaption></figure><p>As McGinn receives, he has a few options. We must remember at this point that although Villa have managed to play through phase 1 and 2 easily without much challenge by Palace, they are still only at the halfway line, with the Palace back four coordinated relatively well in a line and with McGinn about to be pressed by Eze and Sambi. McGinn’s first option is to link up with his other ‘10s’. Buendia is nearby, and Ramsey has found a pocket of space in between the CBs (figure 7). He also has Watkins up ahead, who could receive to feet or in behind. However, Villa’s strongest weapon is the positional superiority they have created in the wide positions. Emery has instructed his ‘10s’ (the 3 in his 4–2–3–1) to be deep and narrow. The Palace full backs thus remained narrow to prevent a numerical superiority for Villa in these zones of the pitch. Further, their quality in build up meant that Eze needed to come narrow to help Sambi (figure 5), who had lost his man. Thus, as Palace players stood still in the middle zones of the pitch, the Villa full backs (especially Cash) were running quickly into space out wide, allowing no opportunity for either being tracked by a Palace body or being played offside (since they began their runs from deep). McGinn played intelligently, and knew that this was an area he could exploit. While we can appreciate the tactical side of the game, we cannot ignore the moments of real technical quality that allow teams to realise and make use of their tactical advantages.</p><p>McGinn’s ability to receive on the turn and place the ball on his stronger left foot before unleashing a perfectly weighted pass in behind to connect with Cash’s run is the type of pass found in the elite levels of the game. Now, not only is the Palace front line bypassed, so too is the midfield and left back. Buendia and Ramsey who were initially far from goal, can now sprint with momentum towards the box and look for space for a cutback. Watkins can move towards either post to either receive a cross or drag a CB with him, and even Moreno can join the attack and position himself around the back post for a recovery or maybe even a chance. This one pass from John McGinn achieves all this. Playing for positional superiority is highly reliant on having gifted players at the top of the pitch. This move would not suit many teams. Emery implemented this tactic to get the most of his best players, who all operate in the ’number 10’ zones of the field.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LtcQ7Z6yJ2m65a37Hj88fw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 9</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Mq_aOw8UYebDJ2SmlJX8vA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 10</figcaption></figure><p>Once Cash finds himself beyond the Palace back line, he is looking to find a man for a shot on goal. Watkins has moved toward the back post, taking Andersen with him. Guehi is looking to block Cash’s cross, because his left back was bypassed by the McGinn pass. This leaves space between the CBs for Buendia and Ramsey to run into to receive. These passes are more difficult, as Guehi defends well and makes the angle for the pass to Buendia or Ramsey small. So, Cash looks instead to find Watkins for a tap-in at the back post, hoping to either find him or for the ball to eventually break to a Villa man in the box.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VWBS755kab_uMuLNdaOt2A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 11</figcaption></figure><p>The cross is too close to Andersen and should instead attack the space between Andersen and his goalkeeper. Here, 9 times out of ten Andersen will intercept and put the ball out for a corner. Unfortunately for him, he cannot find the right contact with the ball, and he plays it into his own net. Goal for Aston Villa.</p><p>So, why was this goal scored? We cannot expect a team playing a high press to be perfect for ninety minutes; at some point the opposition will play through the press and find space and time in phase 2. The narrow deployment of the Villa attackers created space out wide. This meant that when Kamara and McGinn had the ball, there was indecision in the likes of Sambi, Eze and Mitchell about whether to drop off and allow the man with the ball time to look up and play forward or press and allow the pass out wide. Both Kamara and McGinn were allowed too much space and time, and Palace would have been better served pressing in phase 2 and allowing the ball to go wide whilst there was still time to recover shape, instead of backing off and allowing McGinn to take almost every palace player out the game.</p><p>In these positions Palace should be trying to create transition moments (exploit the qualities of Eze, Zaha) just as Villa played to their attacking outfit’s strength. In the Premier League, where managers like Unai Emery are called to help teams in the bottom half of the table, we can expect all teams at some point or another in the game to generate superiority. In this instance, Villa’s tactical decisions managed to exploit the Palace players’ positional indecision, which culminated in a chance being created.</p><p>Let me know what you guys think.</p><p>//annotations by guadiana goncalves.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=407b97c224e2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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