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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Joshua Hughes on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Joshua Hughes on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@jghughes1991?source=rss-2c8d71c01d9c------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Joshua Hughes on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jghughes1991?source=rss-2c8d71c01d9c------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Federated learning for autonomous weapon systems?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jghughes1991/federated-learning-for-autonomous-weapon-systems-fbc1d7eb2a7?source=rss-2c8d71c01d9c------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[killer-robots]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[autonomous-weapons]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[machine-learning]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[autonomous-weapon-systems]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Joshua Hughes]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 17 Mar 2019 12:58:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-03-17T12:58:37.294Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/609/1*ZfUMe8sR0Dwmpi2D09CQ7w.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Photo Credit: U.S. Army file photo, used under open government license.</em></figcaption></figure><p>The other day, I <a href="https://go.technologyreview.com/the-privacy-preserving-machine-learning-technique-that-will-transform-healthcare?ecid=ACsprvuyD00MC5HOOAhswp-T13TBVkuD_W5-4Yw3pDZzjfAf27d0ZYzDP0DGLSa7EpayITf2PpN_&amp;utm_campaign=the_algorithm.unpaid.engagement&amp;utm_source=hs_email&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_content=70607703&amp;_hsenc=p2ANqtz-9emuybRoszZmV2xDn_QVnykAZJnMkMCtRZ-y1B40ctH_5UpDfpZYZOfTAX3KYXu5xQU0g6lkTlBNI8wB9s2mlV1MObFecLYKX9kbXqRNepvJe_BK0&amp;_hsmi=70607705">read</a> about an interesting thing that Google has been doing with machine learning (ML). They’ve been experimenting with something called ‘Federated Learning’. Here’s how they explain it:</p><blockquote><em>‘…your device downloads the current model, improves it by learning from data on your phone, and then summarizes the changes as a small focused update. Only this update to the model is sent to the cloud, using encrypted communication, where it is immediately averaged with other user updates to improve the shared model. All the training data remains on your device, and no individual updates are stored in the cloud.’</em></blockquote><p>It’s not exactly a new idea (<a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/1812.03288.pdf?utm_campaign=the_algorithm.unpaid.engagement&amp;utm_source=hs_email&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_content=70607703&amp;_hsenc=p2ANqtz-9emuybRoszZmV2xDn_QVnykAZJnMkMCtRZ-y1B40ctH_5UpDfpZYZOfTAX3KYXu5xQU0g6lkTlBNI8wB9s2mlV1MObFecLYKX9kbXqRNepvJe_BK0&amp;_hsmi=70607705">here</a> and <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/the-download/612567/a-new-ai-method-can-train-on-medical-records-without-revealing-patient-data/?utm_campaign=the_algorithm.unpaid.engagement&amp;utm_source=hs_email&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_content=70607703&amp;_hsenc=p2ANqtz-9emuybRoszZmV2xDn_QVnykAZJnMkMCtRZ-y1B40ctH_5UpDfpZYZOfTAX3KYXu5xQU0g6lkTlBNI8wB9s2mlV1MObFecLYKX9kbXqRNepvJe_BK0&amp;_hsmi=70607705">here</a>), but it’s innovative work. If you’re using an android phone with the ‘<a href="https://ai.googleblog.com/2017/04/federated-learning-collaborative.html?utm_campaign=the_algorithm.unpaid.engagement&amp;utm_source=hs_email&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_content=70607703&amp;_hsenc=p2ANqtz-9emuybRoszZmV2xDn_QVnykAZJnMkMCtRZ-y1B40ctH_5UpDfpZYZOfTAX3KYXu5xQU0g6lkTlBNI8wB9s2mlV1MObFecLYKX9kbXqRNepvJe_BK0&amp;_hsmi=70607705">GBoard</a>’ keyboard, your phone is already contributing to this federated learning. With my work being on autonomous weapon systems (AWS), I often think of how new technologies/innovations could be applied to them. Could federated learning be used with AWS? I think it could be useful.</p><p>There are lots of issues with ML that make it problematic for use in AWS. I’ve written about ML before on this <a href="https://lawofkillerrobots.wordpress.com/2016/01/29/machine-learning-as-a-method-of-programming-autonomous-weapon-systems/">blog</a>, but it was terms of how algorithms could learn from military personnel in ‘<a href="https://electrek.co/2018/07/17/tesla-autopilot-miles-shadow-mode-report/">shadow mode</a>’ rather than being trained on pre-existing data sets. The main issues with using online ML (i.e. it continues to learn during use rather than just during manufacture) for AWS revolve around what will it learn about potential targets? Will ML algorithms recognise lawful criteria of targets (meaning will the algorithms recognize an enemy uniform, or something else common in images of adversaries, for example)? What will they be allowed to learn about (just about what a target ‘is’, or about new methods of attack)? Will ML algorithms be used on operations (if so, how will they be tested — James Farrant and Christopher Ford touch on this in their great article <a href="https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ils/vol93/iss1/13/">here</a>)?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*R3qltYdFWix6Nt4Y.jpg" /><figcaption>Master Gunnery Sgt. Joseph Perara guides a robot during the Department of Defense Lab Day at the Pentagon, May 14, 2015. Perara is assigned to the Marine Warfighting Laboratory. DoD photo by EJ Hersom. Used under Open Government License.</figcaption></figure><p>So that we can actually discuss federated learning, let’s assume that these issues can be overcome and a lawful AWS using ML can be deployed. Reading about federated learning reminded me of an idea I had a few years ago which I presented at the conference ‘Machine learning: formulating an innovation policy for the 4th industrial revolution’ at Liverpool University in July 2016.</p><p>When we think about an ‘arms race’ we usually think of states churning out ever more superior weapons both in technological and numeric terms so that they can win an expected conflict. But, there are infra-conflict arms races. We saw this a lot in the recent wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. For example, British troops turned up in Iraq with ‘Snatch Land Rovers’ which were fine to drive around in until militants started using road-side bombs and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/aug/18/michael-fallon-apologises-family-dead-soldier-snatch-land-rover-delays">their light armour was insufficient</a>. So the Army had to get better armour, then the militants made hard-tipped bombs, then the army got better vehicles, then the militants innovated more and on and on and on.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*PqXbOLZTgh6LsStw.jpg" /><figcaption>British Army Snatch Landrover. Photo taken at Camp Viper, Basra, Iraq. Photo by MSgt Edward D Kniery, US Marine Corps. Used under Open Government License.</figcaption></figure><p>If you had an AWS with ML that could observe, recognise, and process innovative militant practices, then the system could learn how to deal with these new behaviours. Of course, if you have a counter-innovation by a military force in one location it won’t happen in a different location. Or, in the case of AWS, counter-innovations would develop within the entire fleet unless there was some way of applying new innovations across the board. Enter federated learning!</p><p>This method would, of course, provide a military advantage where innovations by adversaries are regularly occurring, because your side is using ML to innovate at the same time. These counter-innovations would ideally need to be spread through an AWS fleet quickly. But, these innovations are modifications to the original programming. Would this modification mean it is a ‘new’ weapon and therefore require a new weapons review under <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&amp;documentId=FEB84E9C01DDC926C12563CD0051DAF7">Article 36 of additional protocol 1</a>?</p><blockquote><em>In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party.</em></blockquote><p>Boothby suggests that a modification <em>does</em> require a new weapons review (<a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/weapons-and-the-law-of-armed-conflict-9780198728504?cc=us&amp;lang=en&amp;">pg.346</a>), as do a number of states and most participants at the ‘UK Second Weapons Review Forum’ (<a href="https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1710&amp;context=ils">pg.403–407</a>). However, having a new review after every operation would be incredibly onerous on a military force, and all of their lawyers who also need to advise commanders on the legalities of combat. Farrant and Ford offer a practical solution in relation to weapons with ML (<a href="https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1710&amp;context=ils">pg.406</a>). They suggest a new review should occur when ML modifies a weapon to the extent that is not contemplated by the legal review prior to deployment <em>and</em> these changes could affect compliance with legal standards.</p><p>Following a successful review, the modifications from one AWS faced with a novel challenge in an intra-conflict arms race could be applied to every AWS in the fleet. Thus, enabling the entire force to be ahead of the adversary. If the modification does not successfully pass a review, it would need to be erased from the system memory. Of course, an unlawful modification would already have been used at the point in combat when the system made the modification — so ML that can learn <em>in situ</em> is inherently problematic for ensuring that AWS are used in legally compliant ways. Ensuring that AWS cannot modify their programming to affect legal targeting rules might be able to prevent this.</p><p>Of course, a way to avoid this issue would be to prohibit ML <em>in situ</em>, and only allow ML during manufacturing. This would, of course, remove the military advantages that it offers, especially in the case of federated learning. So, it would be a difficult choice for higher-ups to make.</p><p>Until next time!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fbc1d7eb2a7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[No, autonomous weapon systems are not unlawful under the Martens Clause]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jghughes1991/no-autonomous-weapon-systems-are-not-unlawful-under-the-martens-clause-2653d18790e9?source=rss-2c8d71c01d9c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2653d18790e9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[international-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[law-of-armed-conflict]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[autonomous-weapons]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[autonomous-weapon-systems]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Joshua Hughes]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 21 Aug 2018 14:29:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-08-21T14:29:40.977Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>No, autonomous weapon systems are not unlawful under the Martens Clause</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1oUsYxw30XpelQXicTLObw.jpeg" /><figcaption>The Martens Clause, Art.1(2), Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions</figcaption></figure><p>TL;DR: I disagree with the morality-based conception of ‘humanity’ that Human Rights Watch use in their most recent report, and do not believe that autonomous weapons go against the legal conception. There are no defined levels for how much public opposition is required to outlaw a weapon under the Martens Clause, so we cannot say that current public opposition is enough. Thus, autonomous weapons are not prohibited by the Martens Clause.</p><p>This morning I had several messages from friends telling me that there was a new report out on killer robots that I should read. The report is ‘<a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/21/heed-call/moral-and-legal-imperative-ban-killer-robots">Heed the Call</a>’ by Human Rights Watch (HRW). This is promoted as showing how ‘<a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/08/21/killer-robots-fail-key-moral-legal-test">Killer Robots Fail Key Moral, Legal Test</a>’ and has been on twitter apparently showing that ‘<a href="https://twitter.com/JanoschDelcker/status/1031815157054406656">Lethal autonomous weapons violate a century-old clause in international law</a>’.</p><p>I happened to be doing some work on how the Martens Clause applies to autonomous weapon systems (AWS) a few weeks ago, and I came to the exact opposite conclusion. Let’s dig into what this is all about.</p><p>The Martens Clause, named after its creator F.F. Martens, was drafted at the 1899 Hague Peace Conference which led to the 1899 Hague Convention. It was created as a compromise measure between disagreeing states as to whether inhabitants of occupied territories could be regarded as lawful combatants if they took up arms against the occupying force (Greenwood pg.129, in <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&amp;lr=&amp;id=ri-MB9EImPkC&amp;oi=fnd&amp;pg=PR15&amp;dq=the+handbook+of+international+humanitarian+law+dieter+fleck+1st+edition&amp;ots=wy65GAtKmc&amp;sig=6fKElG_pa-ObWWVAP_fZTmQ0Gvg#v=onepage&amp;q=the%20handbook%20of%20international%20humanitarian%20law%20dieter%20fleck%201st%20edition&amp;f=false">Fleck</a> 1995). The clause appeared in the preamble to the second 1899 Hague Convention and has been included, and slightly updated, in the 1907 Hague Conventions (IV, preamble), 1949 Geneva Conventions (Art.64, GC I; Art.62, GC II; Art.142, GC III; Art.158, GC IV), and the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions (API, Art.1(2); APII, Preamble).</p><p>The version mostly referred to in modern international law is that from API:</p><blockquote><em>‘</em>In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience<em>.’</em></blockquote><p>The more minimalist version from APII is rarely mentioned:</p><blockquote><em>‘…</em>in cases not covered by the law in force, the human person remains under the protection of the principles of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience<em>.’</em></blockquote><p>Still, they both mention the two key tenants of the rule: that in circumstances not covered by specific treaty law, then international law will determine the legality of the issue and in these cases the rules to be applied will come from customary law, the principles of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience.</p><p>First, let us consider customary law. For any non-international lawyers reading this, customary law is basically the rules which aren’t in treaties and states make up as they go along. It is made up of 2 parts: State practice, and <em>opinio juris</em>. For a rule of custom to form, ‘[n]<em>ot only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.</em>’(<a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/52/052-19690220-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf">North Sea Continental Shelf Case, 1969</a>, para.77). As technology has only recently reached a level where some systems could be considered fully autonomous (e.g. <a href="http://www.iai.co.il/2013/36694-16153-en/Business_Areas_Land.aspx">the Israeli Harpy/Harop</a>), there has been no chance for settled state practice, nor <em>opinio juris</em> to form. Thus, there cannot be any customary rules preventing the existence or use of autonomous weapons. Furthermore, many understandings of what an AWS actually is would not include the Harpy drone, and so in these conceptions customary rules are even further away.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*5htrQXzC8cd8SGRb.jpg" /><figcaption>The IAI Harop UAV. Photograph taken at: Paris Air Show, 19th June 2013 by Julian Herzog</figcaption></figure><p>This leaves us with the principles of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience. To most people, these sound like moral or ethical concepts, and indeed this is how they are portrayed in HRW’s <em>Heed the Call </em>(pgs.19–22, 28–43). The problem is that the Martens Clause comes from legal documents, is a legal concept, and in order to be applied it needs to be defined legally. Indeed, Martens himself attempted to legally define ‘humanity’ (<a href="http://www.ejil.org/article.php?article=511&amp;issue=39">Cassesse</a>, pg.188–189), and the concept has previously been referred to as the ‘<em>laws of humanity</em>’(<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-review-of-the-red-cross-1961-1997/article/martens-clause-and-the-laws-of-armed-conflict/19E402694542E42DD1EDA333027E490B">Ticehurst</a>, 129).</p><p>HRW suggest that ‘<em>The first principle of humanity requires the humane treatment of others</em>’(pg.19) and that in order to do this, ‘<em>one must exercise compassion and make legal and ethical judgments</em>.’(pg.20) The effect of this is that ‘[w]<em>hile compassion provides a motivation to act humanely, legal and ethical judgment provides a means to do so</em>.’(pg.20)</p><p>This all sounds well and good, and indeed morally right. But, this is not a legal definition of a legal concept. In terms of legally defining ‘humanity’ we might first look to the Law of Armed Conflict (LoAC) principle of humanity, which suggests that one should not use any more force than necessary for ‘<em>legitimate military purposes.</em>’ (<a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/27874/JSP3832004Edition.pdf">UK Manual</a>, para.2.4) Whilst this conception of humanity exists as a principle in LoAC, it is not necessarily the same thing as ‘<em>the principles of humanity</em>’ within the Martens Clause. Still, Ticehurst accepts this conception as applying to the Martens Clause (<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-review-of-the-red-cross-1961-1997/article/martens-clause-and-the-laws-of-armed-conflict/19E402694542E42DD1EDA333027E490B">Ticehurst</a>, pg.129). Would AWS breach this rule and use more force than necessary? I doubt it. For example, if we imagine an autonomous uninhabited aircraft (drone) is deployed to destroy enemy tanks using anti-tank missiles. There is no reason to think that just because it is autonomous, the drone would fire many missiles when one would do the job. So that isn’t a ground for AWS breaching the Martens Clause.</p><p>Meron and Cassesse have similar conceptions of ‘humanity’ as it relates to the Martens Clause, which are different to Ticehurst. Both cite a number of cases and other influential instruments which link to the Martens Clause (<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/div-classtitlethe-martens-clause-principles-of-humanity-and-dictates-of-public-consciencediv/F55EECE5BED3DDB9D78162DA4509A03A">Meron</a>, pg.82–83; <a href="http://www.ejil.org/article.php?article=511&amp;issue=39">Cassesse</a>, pg.202–207). For brevity, I’ll put their conclusions together, and not discuss the cases individually. Their analyses suggest that ‘<em>the principles of humanity</em>’ as they relate to the Martens Clause are: the rules of warfare in Common Article 3; the distinction principle; prohibition on attacking civilians; sparing civilians as much as possible; limitations of means and methods of warfare; abiding by the notion of chivalry; prohibition on torture; prohibition on collective punishment.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/0*pGLYc5-X3Ox0OQDl.jpg" /></figure><p>In terms of Common Article 3, there are two aspects which are problematic for AWS. First, is the prohibition on ‘<em>violence to life and person</em>’ of those <em>hors de combat</em> (‘out of the fight’, those who surrender, are prisoners, or who cannot fight due to incapacitation or sickness). Those who surrender could be protected if a system is programmed to recognise ‘hands up’ gestures (e.g. <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-policy-essay-south-korean-sentry%E2%80%94-killer-robot-prevent-war">Samsung SGR-A1</a>) or white flags. Those prisoner in PoW camps, or in military hospitals can be protected through no-strike lists. This leaves us with those who are incapacitated through injury or sickness on the battlefield. One day, AWS may be able to recognise such protected individuals (although this is unlikely). However, attackers need only take such individual into account where it would be reasonable. For example, those prosecuting an aerial or artillery attack would find it difficult, or impossible, to evaluate injuries sustained by the enemy from afar. Thus, if it would be reasonable to use an AWS which cannot evaluate injuries or sickness on the battlefield, then this would be lawful (see <a href="https://usnwc.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=2998228">AMW Manual</a> Rule 15(b) commentary para.7). Therefore, it is possible that AWS attacks could be lawful under Common Article 3. Of course, ideally, a human operator would take control of an AWS where there is a risk of harming those <em>hors de combat</em> even if this means the system does not perform the operation wholly autonomously.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/0*86ms_VG8DGd323G7" /><figcaption>The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights</figcaption></figure><p>The second aspect of common article 3 that could be problematic is the notion of ‘<em>outrages upon personal dignity</em>’. According to HRW, human dignity is a second principle of humanity (pg.23). One conception that HRW mention (pgs.23–27) is Heyns, who has written on this subject as it relates to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02587203.2017.1303903">armed conflict</a> and <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/617743/pdf">law enforcement</a> from a human rights perspective. As Heyns himself notes, the notion of the ‘right to dignity’ is unclear (<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02587203.2017.1303903">pg.49</a>). Therefore, despite being provided for in the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights <a href="http://www.humanrights.se/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/African-Charter-on-Human-and-Peoples-Rights.pdf">Art.5</a> (which HRW mistake as Art.7, see fn.76), due to the lack of clarity as to how this right might apply it is difficult to say for certain that it applies to AWS. Even if it does, it only applies to AWS to the extent that the African charter applies, as neither the charter nor the African Courts have expanded on extraterritorial application we should assume that its applicability extends to states parties within their national borders (for an overview of extraterritoriality as it applies to the African Charter, see <a href="https://www.academia.edu/31026174/Extraterritorial_Applicability_of_the_African_Charter_on_Human_and_Peoples_Rights">here</a>).</p><p>Regardless of extraterritoriality, due to the unclear application of the right to dignity, and what it entails as a matter of law, it would seem that the notion as it applies to AWS is a suggestion of <em>lex ferenda</em> (what the law should be) rather than <em>lex lata</em> (what the law is). Thus, as it is not fully formed it cannot be applied as a legal concept and AWS cannot breach it, nor the Martens Clause on this ground. Still, I would agree with this notion in a moral sense. To paraphrase Heyns words, AWS may be ‘<em>lawful, but awful</em>’.</p><p>We shall now return to the other aspects which Meron and Cassesse found applied to ‘<em>humanity’</em> in realtion to the Martens Clause. In terms of the distinction principle and the prohibition against attacking civilians, an AWS programmed only to recognise and attack adverse military targets would abide by these rules. Regarding sparing civilians as much as possible and limitations on means and methods, these duties would normally fall to humans programming the mission parameters into an autonomous system and so is not a ground for AWS breaching the Clause.</p><p>In terms of chivalry, this has been confusingly defined in several works. However, Solis considers the concept really well, and essentially concludes that it means to act in good faith (<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/the-law-of-armed-conflict/286ED6AD4C4164B473DF03E339F64A86">Solis</a>, pg.5–6). Unless AWS are programmed in bad faith, this is not a notion that could lead to AWS breaching the Martens Clause. Finally, torture and collective punishments are things that would need to be decided upon by humans, and do not relate to the autonomous nature of an AWS. This, therefore would not be a ground for AWS breaching the humanity principle.</p><p>So, we can see that AWS do not breach the humanity principle according to Meron and Cassesse’s understandings of it, although protecting those <em>hors de combat</em> can be problematic. So, we can now move onto the ‘<em>dictates of public conscience.</em>’</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/0*IO8sfM8GmJpSSB0d" /></figure><p>In terms of what this means, there is no agreed definition, but it is assumed to be synonymous with public opinion (<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/div-classtitlethe-martens-clause-principles-of-humanity-and-dictates-of-public-consciencediv/F55EECE5BED3DDB9D78162DA4509A03A">Meron</a>, pg.83). Indeed, HRW note that ‘<em>“public” clarifies that these dictates reflect the concerns of a range of people and entities</em>’ (pg.28) and I see no reason to disagree. HRW emphasise public opposition to AWS (pgs.30–31), and the groups which disagree with the production and usage of AWS, or find them morally reprehensible (pgs.32–43). However, as Greenwood notes, the notion of ‘public conscience’ is so vague that, not only has it garnered little support, it is impractical to use (pg.129, in <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&amp;lr=&amp;id=ri-MB9EImPkC&amp;oi=fnd&amp;pg=PR15&amp;dq=the+handbook+of+international+humanitarian+law+dieter+fleck+1st+edition&amp;ots=wy65GAtKmc&amp;sig=6fKElG_pa-ObWWVAP_fZTmQ0Gvg#v=onepage&amp;q=the%20handbook%20of%20international%20humanitarian%20law%20dieter%20fleck%201st%20edition&amp;f=false">Fleck</a> 1995). Therefore, there is no threshold above which one could say there is enough public opinion opposing AWS that they should be deemed unlawful. Thus, despite the considerable opposition which HRW note, we cannot say that AWS go against the ‘<em>dictates of public conscience</em>’ because we simply cannot know what level of opposition is required, and how it should be measured.</p><p>In conclusion, despite being morally problematic, AWS do not breach the Martens Clause. Firstly, because there are no customary rules prohibiting the use of AWS. Second, because it by no means clear that AWS will breach the ‘<em>principles of humanity</em>’ as they are legally understood — although safeguarding those <em>hors de combat</em> is problematic in some situations. Finally, the ‘<em>dictates of public conscience</em>’ have no defined limit as to what level of public opposition is required to make a means or method of warfare unlawful, thus we cannot say that AWS go against these dictates. Therefore, there is nothing inherent about the existence or use of autonomous weapon systems which makes them unlawful under the Martens Clause.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2653d18790e9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Tech Call to Disarm]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/hackernoon/a-tech-call-to-disarm-d6e111208d04?source=rss-2c8d71c01d9c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d6e111208d04</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[artificial-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[autonomous-weapon-systems]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Joshua Hughes]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 23 Aug 2017 10:32:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-05-22T06:17:06.715Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*8yqH6Sl4yKzQnwUK." /></figure><p>A new <a href="https://futureoflife.org/autonomous-weapons-open-letter-2017">open-letter</a> signed by 116 founders of AI and robotics companies seems to have made quite a racket in the <a href="https://hackernoon.com/tagged/tech">tech</a> section of quite a few news sites (<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-40995835">here</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/aug/20/elon-musk-killer-robots-experts-outright-ban-lethal-autonomous-weapons-war?CMP=share_btn_tw">here</a>). It follows on from an <a href="https://futureoflife.org/open-letter-autonomous-weapons">open-letter</a> published a couple of years ago from AI and robotics researchers.</p><p>Unfortunately, Elon Musk (founder of Space X and Tesla) seems to have been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/aug/20/elon-musk-killer-robots-experts-outright-ban-lethal-autonomous-weapons-war?CMP=share_btn_tw">attributed</a> as the main person behind it. He isn’t. The person who put the hard work into getting all the signatures was <a href="https://www.cse.unsw.edu.au/~tw/">Toby Walsh</a>, professor of <a href="https://hackernoon.com/tagged/artificial-intelligence">Artificial Intelligence</a> at the University of New South Wales.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/0*IJOK2ZGdpTI-cmi6.jpg" /><figcaption>Toby Walsh, 2008. Photo by Avobronte. Used under CC3.0 License.</figcaption></figure><p>Although Musk is probably the biggest name in tech pop culture that is continuing to bang the drum about the dangers of AI, he has been criticised for his understanding of it (<a href="https://www.wired.com/story/elon-forget-killer-robots-focus-on-the-real-ai-problems/">here</a> and <a href="https://www.facebook.com/zuck/videos/vb.4/10103911836230631/?type=2&amp;theater">here</a> [about 50:00] — and has <a href="https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/889743782387761152">criticised</a> others). However, this letter is focussed specifically on autonomous weapons, rather than unlikely threats of self-aware AI taking over.</p><p>This letter was supposed to coincide with the first of two meetings this year of the ‘Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems’ at the UN in Geneva. But, this was <a href="https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/3D20EDEBBF0E6B68C125813A00566285/$file/Letter_CCW+MSP+Chairperson_6Jun2017.pdf">cancelled</a> (not delayed, as has been reported) because a number of countries hadn’t paid their UN bills. So the accounts for the Certain Conventional Weapons Convention (CCW), which campaigners hope to ban autonomous weapons under a new protocol of, are down by about $50,000.</p><p><a href="https://lawofkillerrobots.wordpress.com/2016/04/18/united-nations-meeting-of-experts-on-lethal-autonomous-weapon-systems/">When I was at </a>the Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems at the UN last year, the previous open-letter was referred to a number of times. Some states talked about it, but it was mostly in the speeches by campaigners against autonomous weapons. Most of these groups are part of the ‘<a href="https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/">Campaign to Stop Killer Robots</a>’ coalition of NGOs.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*-enEE9GmCO3U6V6Q.jpg" /><figcaption>Panaorama of the UN CCW Conference room, 2016. (Photo by Author.)</figcaption></figure><p>The fact that most of the references to the previous open-letter, and to speeches and writing against autonomous weapons is, of course, no surprise. But, the slim minority of states who have actually states they are against these systems does not bode well for a ban.</p><p>Most states have not made any rumblings towards a ban. <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/08/21/britain-will-not-support-pre-emptive-ban-killer-robots-mod-says/">Some are dead against it</a>. Still, none have explicitly said they are totally in favour of such weaponry. This leads us to three real issues when it comes to the likelihood of a ban. The first is that all the campaigners in the world can support a ban, but if state parties to the CCW do not want a ban, it will not happen. So far <a href="http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/KRC_CountryViews_13Dec2016.pdf">only 19</a> state parties have called for a ban. This is out of 121 State parties to the Convention with a further five having signed but not yet ratified. So, the momentum of state parties is clearly not behind a ban.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*8o0XBvhxIGH7hB_X.jpg" /><figcaption>Campaign to Stop Killer Robots meeting 2013. Used under CC2.0 license.</figcaption></figure><p>Secondly, it seems to me that although seemingly everyone involved in the debate accepts that there are significant dangers, risks and <a href="https://twitter.com/BanKillerRobots/status/899414571273900032">ethical issues</a> associated with autonomous weapons, they could also be extremely useful in future conflicts. It’s the potential utility that seems to me to be the reason states do not wish to ban them. Should a full-scale conflict erupt between major (or even middle) powers, the ability to decimate enemy forces accurately, quickly, and with no physical risk to your own is hugely advantageous.</p><p>It might seem unlikely that such a conflict could ever happen, but major powers retain nuclear weapons to fight the unlikely (maybe almost impossible) conflicts with each other. So, the adoption of weapons with autonomy for unlikely future conflicts is not hard to imagine. Indeed, arguably autonomous weapons offer the ability to individually destroy multiple targets that might be prosecuted by a single nuclear bomb, thereby reducing collateral damage.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*0Z3h35fEXzFzvUMF.jpg" /><figcaption>Master Gunnery Sgt. Joseph Perara guides a robot during the Department of Defense Lab Day at the Pentagon, May 14, 2015. Perara is assigned to the Marine Warfighting Laboratory. (US DoD photo by EJ Hersom.)</figcaption></figure><p>Thirdly, the argument for a ban often refers to the inability of the law of armed conflict (LoAC) to deal with autonomous weapons. But, there is no reason why it cannot. LoAC lays down certain requirements which fighters must adhere to. The main ones are not targeting civilians, doing everything feasible to reduce collateral damage, and not launching attacks that may cause disproportionate levels of collateral damage when compared to the military advantage to be gained. LoAC says nothing of how these must be done, so there is no reason an autonomous system cannot perform them in law. Technologically, everyone accepts that current systems cannot comprehend their environments, potential targets, or civilians to such a degree that they could recognise differences between civilians and human targets accurately. But, that does not mean that future systems could not do this. If a future system can comply with the legal requirements there is no problem with the law, there is only a problem with current systems that are inadequate. Any system that is inadequate would be unlawful to use, and so would never be deployed. So LoAC is providing sufficient protection to future civilians. Indeed, people who suggest this is still not enough civilian protection should probably start arguing for a renegotiation of LoAC, rather than against autonomous weapons specifically.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*NvuRCKyio5ZypO6T.jpg" /><figcaption>US 911th Airlift Wing law of armed conflict training, Aug. 11, 2012. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Joshua J. Seybert/Released)</figcaption></figure><p>Consequently, I would think that a ban is unlikely to be negotiated by states. Even if states were to agree to the creation of an additional protocol on autonomous weapons, I wouldn’t expect it to be anything more than a minimal restriction of usage. Even if this were manageable, I’d expect it to be flouted if a high-intensity interstate conflict began between two autonomous weapon-armed states. So, the likelihood of a ban is very small. Even if an international legal instrument could be negotiated, I wouldn’t expect it to do much.</p><p>Until next time</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2Fdde502%3Fas_embed%3Dtrue&amp;dntp=1&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2Fhackernoon%2F&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=upscri" width="800" height="400" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/3c851dac986ab6dbb2d1aaa91205a8eb/href">https://medium.com/media/3c851dac986ab6dbb2d1aaa91205a8eb/href</a></iframe><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d6e111208d04" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/hackernoon/a-tech-call-to-disarm-d6e111208d04">A Tech Call to Disarm</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/hackernoon">HackerNoon.com</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[An autonomous weapon systems optimist in the Trump administration?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jghughes1991/an-autonomous-weapon-systems-optimist-in-the-trump-administration-767ceb8addf7?source=rss-2c8d71c01d9c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/767ceb8addf7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[law-of-armed-conflict]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trump]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[autonomous-weapon-systems]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[killer-robots]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Joshua Hughes]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 22 Jun 2017 08:47:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-06-22T08:47:02.580Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/998/0*5F8pF8U5mB-Zl5Wm." /><figcaption><a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/hmk/25836833426">Image </a>by <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/hmk/">H. Michael Karshis</a>. Used under CC2.0 license</figcaption></figure><p>So,</p><p>I was reading this article, ‘<a href="https://www.fastcompany.com/3069048/where-are-military-robots-headed">The Rise Of The Robots: What The Future Holds For The World’s Armies</a>’ by Steven Melendez yesterday. It’s quite good and gives a basic introduction to most of the major trends in the changes in military technology since 9/11. In the article, it referred to a report I’d read a while ago: ‘<a href="http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/manual-adapting-the-law-armed-conflict-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems">A Manual Adapting the Law of Armed Conflict to Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems</a>’. What is interesting about this report is that it was written by Steven Groves.</p><p>His name didn’t mean much to me until I read the Melendez article. Groves used to be a researcher at the Heritage Foundation, then he became an adviser to the Trump transition team, and now works for the US ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley. From his report, Groves seems to fit quite well into the category of ‘optimists’, whom he describes as pro-autonomous weapon system.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/741/0*tuwtUaJRdjY7vCMA.png" /></figure><p>This is important because now there is a definitive cheerleader for AWS in the Trump administration. The impact of this is two-fold. First, the US Department of Defense directive on ‘<a href="http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300009p.pdf">Autonomy in Weapon Systems</a>’ from 2012 runs out this year. If it is not renewed, it stays the same for another five years, at which point it ceases to be current. The presence of Groves means that if he can get into the Pentagon, he could be involved in writing a new directive. Considering his apparent position from his report, this could be a much more liberal approach to regulating and restricting AWS that we have seen previously (and the 2012 directive was barely restrictive in itself.)</p><p>Secondly, having an AWS cheerleader not only in the US administration but also in the US delegation to the UN means that this could influence the US position at the discussions on AWS at the <a href="http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/8FA3C2562A60FF81C1257CE600393DF6?OpenDocument">UN in Geneva</a>. Already reticent to accept any voluntary restriction on the potential for itself to develop new weapon systems which could provide a battlefield advantage, the US delegation could become openly pro-AWS. The presence of a pro-AWS delegation at the meetings of the Certain Conventional Weapons Convention (CCW, generally where non-nuclear disarmament is discussed), could create an even more divisive atmosphere, and make any agreement much more unlikely.</p><p>Perhaps, as Groves suggests in his report, an informal expert manual on how the Law of Armed Conflict applies to AWS would be the best approach to regulating them. There has been an absence of large treaties binding states on their conduct of hostilities recently. The trend has been to replace these with expert manuals, such as the San Remo Manual on Naval Warfare, the Air and Missile Warfare Manual, and the Tallinn Manual on Cyberwarfare. The creation of a manual restarting the law of armed conflict as it applies to AWS is probably much more likely to come to fruition than an additional protocol to the CCW. However, Groves suggests that the US government should lead the way. Most of the recent manuals have been semi-academic pursuits initiated by university research institutions (although in the case of the Tallinn Manual, this was initiated by NATO), but including a multi-national collection of military and academic lawyers. Groves seems to suggest that by leading the creation of an expert manual on AWS, the US can make its stamp on how international law should apply. Yet, that is not how previous manuals have been written. They are a long process of debate and negotiation towards the final rules determined by the experts. The idea that by initiating an expert manual, the US could have the final say is wrong and simply reeks of American exceptionalism.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*_oFhcECxzEwlLihr.jpg" /><figcaption>Campaign to Stop Killer Robots meeting 2013. Used under CC2.0 license.</figcaption></figure><p>I’m also not convinced he fully understands some of the terms, particularly ‘meaningful human control’. He suggests that if a commander does not ‘<em>rely solely on the programming of </em>[AWS]’, they would be exercising meaningful human control. As Human Rights Watch <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/11/killer-robots-and-concept-meaningful-human-control">states</a>:</p><blockquote><em>In the arms arena, the term “meaningful human control” signifies control over the selection and engagement of targets, that is, the “critical functions” of a weapon. “This means when, where and how weapons are used; what or whom they are used against; and the effects of their use,” according to Article 36, a UK nongovernmental organization. Humans should exercise control over individual attacks, not simply overall operations.</em></blockquote><p>It’s a little more than a commander thinking about attack decisions alongside an AWS.</p><p>It seems to me that although Groves generally has a good idea about regulating AWS through an expert manual, his report lacks the nuance required. Hopefully, the increased experience of working at the UN with seasoned diplomats might make flesh out this proposal to be a little more realistic. After all, I do agree with him that an expert manual is probably the best method of regulating AWS in the future.</p><p>Until next time!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=767ceb8addf7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Back to the future of the TechnoWar?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jghughes1991/back-to-the-future-of-the-technowar-b08e2be8870e?source=rss-2c8d71c01d9c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b08e2be8870e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[autonomous-weapon-systems]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[killer-robots]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[artificial-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vietnam-war]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Joshua Hughes]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 23 May 2017 09:15:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-05-23T09:23:18.640Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/607/0*EQ9fQtWXSZmroK-V." /><figcaption>US Cyber Command</figcaption></figure><p>So,</p><p>this week I was interested to hear about <a href="http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/05/pentagons-new-algorithmic-warfare-cell-gets-its-first-mission-hunt-isis/137833/">Project Maven</a>. It’s a potential solution to the big issue of how the US and friends are supposed to deal with the hours and hours and hours of footage that is captured by drones and video pods on conventional aircraft when flying over war zones, whether on intelligence gathering, or strike missions.</p><blockquote><em>If an analyst sees something now, he or she typically types the data manually into a spreadsheet. Pentagon leaders do not believe that’s a good use of these analysts’ time.</em></blockquote><p>According to Air Force Lt. Gen. John N.T.“Jack” Shanahan:</p><blockquote><em>“How do we actually begin to automate that in a way that gives time back to analysts who otherwise spend 80 percent of their time doing…mundane, administrative tasks associated with staring at full-motion video”</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>…</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>About 60 percent of the full-motion video gathered over the battlefield is benign while the drone or aircraft flies to and from a point of interest. Then there could be bad weather where the camera cannot see through the clouds.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>The goal is to find technology that can clean up that video, “finding the juicy parts where there’s activity and then labeling the data,” Shanahan said. That work today is done by three-person teams of analysts.</em></blockquote><p>So, the project is all about the use of AI and machine learning to identify the interesting bits from all that full-motion video. It’s slightly more boring that ‘<a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-4508874/Pentagon-use-AI-defeat-ISIS.html"> AI will defeat ISIS</a>’. But, it could have implications for autonomous weapon systems. After all, if video analysis software can identify something as interesting, then perhaps with the use of machine learning and some evolution in programming, similar software could be used to identify targets and other criteria related to law of armed conflict compliance. Of course, the use of machine learning raises some significant issues about whether the operators and programmers <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-dark-secret-at-the-heart-of-ai/">actually know what the system is learning</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/680/0*kAcxwJoUwbrM9Aqi." /><figcaption>A U.S. Navy X-47B Unmanned Combat Air System. DoD photo by Capt. Jane E. Campbell, U.S. Navy. (Released)</figcaption></figure><p>But, that’s not really what I want to talk about here. I wanted to focus on a quote which was shown to me by my friend, and philosophy scholar, Mike.</p><blockquote><em>‘collection and production of information for its own sake generated a fictional account of the conflict based on a misplaced sense of omniscience and on the basis of which incorrect decisions were taken.’</em></blockquote><p>It’s from Antoine Busquet, <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Scientific-Way-Warfare-Battlefields-Modernity/dp/1850659451"><em>The Scientific Way of Warfare</em></a> (2009, p.156) (original thesis <a href="http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2703/1/U615652.pdf">here</a>), and refers to the Vietnam War. For those who don’t know, this conflict was referred to at the time as ‘The Techno-War’ because it was the first time many technologies were used in warfare, including computers and drones.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/680/0*E-nJIDPC0jq_MNLi." /><figcaption>USAF Ryan AQM-34L Firebee drone “Tom Cat” of the 556th Reconnaissance Squadron, 1969. Photo: USAF, USGOV-PD</figcaption></figure><p>It seems that, perhaps, the increasing use of technology in the War on Terror might be giving the US a similar sense of total superiority because of the industrial scale upon which they gather and analyse information. Daesh are still out there fighting, but they are also <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-39864950">losing</a>. At the moment, it doesn’t seem like the conflict against Daesh will turn into the quagmire of Vietnam again.</p><p>Perhaps, this time the feeling of total superiority created by the technological superiority might be justified. But, who knows what will come after the defeat of Raqqa? Wil Daesh disperse into a global terror group attacking Western targets and allies at random? Will its leaders and fighters flee to other Daesh offshoots in the Sinai, or Nigeria? Or will Daesh die? Or something else…</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/680/0*6DnPi1uNkaMGjYU5." /><figcaption>Himalayas, 2010. Photo by John Hill.</figcaption></figure><p>Until next time!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b08e2be8870e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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