<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Jason Brodsky on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Jason Brodsky on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@jmbrodsky561985?source=rss-51272746e725------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 02:54:45 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@jmbrodsky561985/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[A Potential Game Changer in Washington and Tehran]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jmbrodsky561985/a-potential-game-changer-in-washington-and-tehran-d1ee20838b89?source=rss-51272746e725------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d1ee20838b89</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[donald-trump]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[congress]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jason Brodsky]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 13 Dec 2016 15:58:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-12-13T15:58:23.824Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/920/0*9XViuXGLp-pXxdtF." /><figcaption>President-elect Donald J. Trump</figcaption></figure><p>President-elect Donald J. Trump’s improbable electoral victory has left the international community stunned. With foreign policy elites around the world bracing for a geopolitical earthquake when it comes to the 45th President of the United States, the Iran file may very well undergo an extreme makeover, pivoting from quasi-detente to aggression.</p><p>A Trump presidency has the potential to be a game changer in relations between Iran and the United States for three principle reasons: the emboldening of Iranian hardliners as a result of his election; the initiation of a tit-for-tat retaliatory dynamic between both countries; and the thwarting of the piecemeal normalization of U.S.-Iran bilateral diplomatic contacts.</p><p>From the day the nuclear deal was inked, the Supreme Leader of Iran Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has been hedging his bets — blessing the nuclear agreement, while publicly<a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/08/iran-khamenei-nuclear-deal-sanctions-relief-barjam.html"> complaining</a> that the United States could not be trusted to fulfill its end of the bargain, akin to consuming a “lethal poison.”</p><p>With President-elect Trump’s<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-iran-idUSKBN13427E"> dubbing</a> of the accord as a “disaster” that could lead to a “nuclear holocaust” and<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-iran-idUSKBN13427E"> vow</a> that his “(n)umber-(o)ne priority” would be to “dismantle the disastrous deal with Iran,” such rhetoric will likely play into the worst suspicions of conservatives in Tehran’s corridors of power. If a U.S. presidential administration was seen as abrogating an international commitment, Iran’s firebrands would be given even more ammunition to direct at the pragmatic President Hassan Rouhani, who is up for reelection in the spring of 2017.</p><p>We’ve seen this movie before during the administration of President George W. Bush, when the Iranian leadership allegedly proposed a “grand bargain” in 2003 that would include a broad dialogue with the United States on all issues, including support for terrorism.</p><p>The Bush White House rejected the overture, suggesting that there were no guarantees that such a proposal had the support of various power centers in Iran. Nonetheless, the repudiation of this feeler and especially, as some observers have<a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/summer_iran_maloney.pdf"> noted</a>, the administration shutting down a diplomatic channel on Afghanistan issues, convinced some players in Iran that the United States was not a reliable partner.</p><p>This perception may have led, in part, to the rise of hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the Iranian presidency in 2005, and in 2016, feeds into the Supreme Leader’s narrative of a deceitful America, right ahead of President Hassan Rouhani’s reelection.</p><p>A Trump White House will also likely increase the gamesmanship with Tehran’s mullahcracy. Reports indicate that the “Never Trump” GOP establishment is preparing to work with its new counterparts to “squeeze” Iran — namely through the reintroduction of the Iran Ballistic Missiles Sanctions Act, which would sanction entire sectors of the Iranian economy that are involved in the Islamic Republic’s ballistic missiles development, and<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/house-gop-to-tackle-new-iran-sanctions-before-leaving-town/2016/07/11/e2cb620c-4790-11e6-90a8-fb84201e0645_story.html?tid=a_inl"> three related bills</a>, one of which denies the Iranian government and banks access to U.S. dollars.</p><p>That’s on top of the proposed 10-year reauthorization of the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA).</p><p>These legislative opening salvos may trigger similar reprisals in Tehran, namely the possibility of the improvement of Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, something the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council <a href="http://www.presstv.us/Detail/2016/11/16/493826/Iran-JCPOA-Trump-Shamkhani-Safavi">hinted</a> at […] after the House of Representatives passed an extension of the ISA.</p><p>When the U.S. Treasury Department unveiled new restrictions related to Iran’s missile program in January, hardliner former presidential candidate Maj. Gen. Mohsen Rezaei wrote to President Rouhani saying, “I am hoping that with your support, the range of Iran’s missiles will exceed 5,000 kilometers (3,106 miles).”</p><p>Similarly in 2013, when U.S. legislators<a href="http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/25/world/la-fg-wn-iran-nuclear-program-parliament-20131225"> proposed</a> tightening sanctions should negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran breakdown over a final accord, Iranian parliamentarians<a href="http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/25/world/la-fg-wn-iran-nuclear-program-parliament-20131225"> retaliated and proposed</a> an increase in uranium enrichment to 60% purity, from 20%, if the sanctions legislation was enacted.</p><p>Lastly, let’s not forget the power of personalities in international diplomacy — especially the close working relationship forged between Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry. The State Department likes to point to the resolution of the episode when Iran<a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/12/politics/10-u-s-sailors-in-iranian-custody/">seized</a> ten U.S. Navy sailors in the Persian Gulf in January as resulting from both men’s personal chemistry — often<a href="http://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-media-kerry-never-complained-to-zarif-over-missile-tests/"> emailing</a> and calling each other directly.</p><p>That’s not to mention the<a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/sites/almonitor/contents/articles/originals/2016/04/iran-us-ties-obama-nuclear-deal-zarif.html"> ongoing talks</a> between Iran’s Central Bank Governor and U.S. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew; dialogue between U.S. Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz and the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization; and strong ties between other political appointees at the deputy level, like Iran nuclear deal czar Stephen Mull and Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.</p><p>Such channels were unheard before the Obama administration, and there’s no guarantee — especially given Trump’s rhetoric — that there will be a “John and Javad”-like dynamic with Trump’s Cabinet.</p><p>In the end, Trump’s victory may serve to fundamentally change the trajectory in relations between Iran and the United States — from gradual normalization to rapid destabilization. While some may argue that the President-elect’s fondness for Vladimir Putin — Russia has formed an axis with Iran in Syria — may prevent the situation from going from bad to worse, campaign pledges to scrap the nuclear deal; Republican control over Congress and the Executive Branch; and the changing of the diplomatic guard may prove even more potent.</p><p><strong><em>Jason Brodsky</em></strong><em> is the Policy Director of United Against Nuclear Iran.</em></p><p>This article was originally published in <a href="http://www.investors.com/politics/commentary/a-potential-game-changer-in-washington-and-tehran/"><em>Investor’s Business Daily</em></a> on December 1, 2016.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d1ee20838b89" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[A dangerous new president in Lebanon]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jmbrodsky561985/a-dangerous-new-president-in-lebanon-f009ab0df02e?source=rss-51272746e725------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f009ab0df02e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[lebanon]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[middle-east]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jason Brodsky]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 23 Nov 2016 16:58:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-11-23T16:58:09.645Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/870/0*jio_UAfA3r0paSxb.jpg" /><figcaption>Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah with the new President of Lebanon Michel Aoun</figcaption></figure><p>The ascendancy of Michel Aoun, a former Christian general who once served a disputed term as prime minister of Lebanon in the 1980s, to the Lebanese presidency marks a milestone in the country’s long national electoral nightmare. There have been <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/01/world/middleeast/michel-aoun-lebanon-president.html?_r=0">over 40</a> failed attempts alone at selecting a successor to the previous president, Michel Suleiman, since he stepped down in May 2014.</p><p>While Beirut may not be in the global headlines every day, regional trends indicate a potentially dangerous turn of events in Lebanon for three reasons: the new president’s alliance with Hezb’allah, Lebanon’s shared border with Israel, and the mainstreaming of Iran’s political power in the neighborhood.</p><p>Aoun has been a longtime ally of Hezb’allah — a sanctioned, terrorist organization — for years. Back in 2012, when asked about Israel, he <a href="http://archive.almanar.com.lb/english/article.php?id=64991">told</a> Al Manar, a Hezb’allah media mouthpiece, “To Sayed Nasrallah, I say we are in the same path until securing victory in the end.” In fact, Hezb’allah catapulted Aoun into the presidential palace. When Sunni leader and former prime minister Saad Hariri proposed another Christian leader and Hezb’allah ally for the position, Hezb’allah chief Hassan Nasrallah <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-presidency-idUSKBN12U0M3?feedType=RSS&amp;feedName=topNews">doubled down</a> on Aoun, dubbing him “the obligatory path” to the presidency.</p><p>Despite the fact that Lebanon’s president has traditionally been branded a figurehead alongside the other centers of power — the prime minister who is by law required to be a Sunni and the speaker of the parliament who must be Shiite — the office provides a powerful platform in maintaining the country’s fragile political balance. In 2013, then President Michel Suleiman called on Hezb’allah to pull out of Syria because its actions were wreaking havoc in Lebanon, warning that a new Party of God-backed offensive to recapture Aleppo would lead to more tension at home. Fast-forward to today, given that Aoun made a <a href="http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Hezbollah-ally-Michel-Aoun-elected-President-of-Lebanon-471301">vow</a> on Monday to continue to support Syrian president Bashar Al-Assad — whom Hezb’allah is propping up — his election empowers the organization at a critical time, with Assad and his Iran-backed clients yet again trying to reclaim Aleppo.</p><p>Lebanon’s shared border with Israel also makes Michel Aoun’s new role all the more threatening. In his first public remarks upon assuming the post, Aoun<a href="http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Hezbollah-ally-Michel-Aoun-elected-President-of-Lebanon-471301">pledged</a> to “release what is left of our lands from the Israeli occupation.” The tenor of his comments stands in contrast to the tone once used by his predecessor, Michel Suleiman, who, in 2012, during talk of a pre-emptive Israeli military strike on Iran’s nuclear program, <a href="http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4218850,00.html">stated</a> in reference to Hezb’allah, “Should Israel strike Iran, it will not be attacked with missiles from Lebanon[.] … No one has the right to act without the Lebanese government’s authorization.” Given his record, it may be unlikely that Aoun, who owes a great debt of gratitude to Hezb’allah for his political fortunes, would be ready to effectively buck his political patron when violence is rapidly spilling across national borders.</p><p>Aoun’s appointment also comes on the heels of Hezb’allah <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/hezbollah-claims-responsibility-for-bomb-blast-near-israeli-convoy-1451932791">targeting Israeli forces</a> at the Lebanese border in January, bombing an Israeli military convoy near Shebaa Farms; an attempt in July of a Hezb’allah cell to <a href="http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Hezbollah-terror-plot-in-northern-Israel-thwarted-469529">plant bombs</a> in the Haifa area; <a href="http://www.timesofisrael.com/hezbollah-to-move-into-south-syria-just-across-israel-border/">reports</a> in September that a large contingent of Hezb’allah fighters have been preparing to move into southern Syria — particularly at the Quneitra passage — bordering Israel; and Jerusalem’s alleged assassination of multiple Hezb’allah operatives — for example, the <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/hezbollah-claims-responsibility-for-bomb-blast-near-israeli-convoy-1451932791">targeting of Samir Kantar</a> in an airstrike in Damascus last December — as the mayhem in Syria has enflamed this old rivalry.</p><p>Lebanon represents the linchpin in the Iranian regime’s designs to terrorize Israel. And Aoun’s dependency on Hezb’allah in this regard should be deeply concerning to the international community.</p><p>Lastly, Aoun as president represents the effective mainstreaming of Iran as a political kingmaker. Not only will Aoun carry the Hezb’allah imprimatur, but Nabih Berri, the Shiite speaker of Lebanon’s parliament, <a href="http://en.annahar.com/article/489497-hezbollah-to-support-berri-remaining-as-speaker">received</a> the political party’s endorsement to continue in his current position. Despite Berri’s initial opposition to Aoun and his own tensions with Hezb’allah in the past, these developments demonstrate the power that Iran — vis-à-vis its proxy Hezb’allah — wields in the internal political dynamics of yet another country in the Middle East. With Saudi Arabia dramatically <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-lebanon-idUSKCN0X20DG">pulling out</a> from Lebanon in April after cutting $3 billion in military aid and $1 billion in assistance to Lebanese security forces, the country has become yet another destination in an Iranian sphere of influence, comprising Baghdad, Damascus, Sanaa, and now Beirut.</p><p>Only time will tell if the violence enveloping Iraq, Syria, and Yemen will soon follow in Lebanon’s Mediterranean enclave. But Beirut matters — politically and geographically — and the country’s new power lineup is bound only to add to the regional powder keg.</p><p><strong><em>Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran.</em></strong></p><p>This article was originally published in the <a href="http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2016/11/a_dangerous_new_president_in_lebanon.html#ixzz4QqrHcvln"><em>American Thinker</em></a><em> </em>on November 2, 2016.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f009ab0df02e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[A Second Term for Hassan Rouhani? Not So Fast]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jmbrodsky561985/a-second-term-for-hassan-rouhani-not-so-fast-330eba1d7397?source=rss-51272746e725------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/330eba1d7397</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran-deal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[elections]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jason Brodsky]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 21 Oct 2016 17:15:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-10-21T18:23:31.071Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*2A008MKyG7EEDbSn.jpg" /><figcaption>Rouhani’s Inauguration, Iran’s Political System, and America’s Strategic Suicide in the Middle East | Huffington Post</figcaption></figure><p>With Iran’s former chief executive Mahmoud Ahmadinejad effectively out of the picture after being “advised” by the Supreme Leader not to enter the 2017 election, observers across the globe have been breathlessly arguing that President Hassan Rouhani’s path to victory has been cleared. For instance, Iranian scholar, Ali Omidi, <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/10/five-reasons-five-more-years-rouhani-reelection-may-2017.html">wrote</a> this month that “all the political conditions for the smooth re-election of Rouhani seem to be in place.” But such prognostications overlook three main factors that will continue to plague President Rouhani for the duration of his term — the targeting of his cabinet; the imprisonment of dual-nationals and political dissidents; and the doubling down of Tehran in its regional and terrorist machinations. All undermine the confidence at home and abroad in President Rouhani’s ability to lead beyond the confines of the nuclear file.</p><p>A fifth column of conservative forces has routinely attempted to uproot members of the Rouhani administration. Parliament axed his Science, Research and Technology Minister, Reza Faraji-Dana, in August 2014 due to his policy of readmitting student “seditionists” from the 2009 Green Revolution to universities around the country. And this week, President Rouhani was forced to dismiss Culture Minister Ali Jannati, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/994fd7ee-96a9-11e6-a1dc-bdf38d484582">who made waves for his approval of controversial concerts and the decrease in the censorship of books under his watch</a>. His resignation <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/994fd7ee-96a9-11e6-a1dc-bdf38d484582">letter</a> leaves no room for doubt in the calculations behind his removal: “[c]onsidering that the secret policymaking rooms [of hardliners] have demonstrated serious determination to destroy all the government’s achievements … tensions will intensify in the coming months… I would rather [leave office for] the government to pursue its cultural policies in a calmer atmosphere.”</p><p>We’ve seen this movie before in Iranian politics — during the last presidency of a reform-minded Iranian leader, Mohammad Khatami, his then Culture Minister, Atoallah Mohajerani, survived an impeachment vote, but later resigned in 2000 under pressure, writing “the conditions and requirements that have taken shape in the realms of art, culture, and the intellect have made it impossible for me to continue my duties.” Like Khatami’s thwarted attempts to ease the domestic repression that is rampant in the country, such an abrupt departure casts doubt on Rouhani’s ability to further deliver on the expansion of social freedoms he promised during his 2013 campaign — potentially weakening enthusiasm among reformists.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*yoyzxFameqYIafBc.jpg" /><figcaption>Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami | Rouhani.ir</figcaption></figure><p>Likewise, the continued imprisonment of dual-nationals — Iranian-Americans Siamak and Baquer Namazi and U.S. green card holder Nizar Zakka who were all sentenced this week to 10 years in prison, respectively — is intended to embarrass President Rouhani on the international stage. And during 2016 alone, at least six other dual-nationals have been arrested. So, as Iran’s Foreign Minister, Economy Minister, and Central Bank Governor embark on a global roadshow to showcase Iran as the next frontier for foreign investment, these never-ending headlines are already causing Western companies to think twice about exposing their employees to a high risk of harassment, arrest, prosecution, and incarceration without due process of law. Consider a recent report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, which said that annual foreign direct investment <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/iran-foreign-direct-investment-fdi-post-jcpoa.html">dropped</a> from $4.662 billion in 2012 to $2 billion in 2015 — at least two years into President Rouhani’s presidency. It is also noteworthy that in 2016, the first company with whom the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) inked a deal using a new contractual model to attract outside investment was Persia Oil &amp; Gas Industry Development Co., which is part of an Iranian firm directly controlled by the Supreme Leader. This lack of global confidence in the Iranian market trickles down to the streets of Tehran — President Rouhani admitted as such when he <a href="http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/iran-needs-30-50-billion-annual-foreign-investment-hassan-rouhani-president/articleshow/50613352.cms">highlighted</a> that Iran required annual foreign investment of $30–50 billion to reach its goal of an eight percent growth rate. This gap in expectations on the part of the public is sure to be exploited by President Rouhani’s opponents.</p><p>Lastly, while Iran has dialed-back atomically in adhering to the letter of the nuclear accord with the P5+1, it has doubled down in its hegemonic regional designs and support for terrorism. Yemen is the latest example of this worrying trend. According to a <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-iran-idUSKCN12K0CX">report</a> in Reuters, weapons transfers between Iran and its Houthi rebel allies have increased over the past few months — particularly anti-ship missiles, explosives, money, and personnel through over-land routes in Oman. That’s not to mention the Houthis firing on at least two U.S. warships in the Red Sea last week; the <a href="http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/09/26/thousands-iran-backed-fighters-converge-on-aleppo-amid-deadly-syria-airstrikes.html">three thousand</a> Iranian-backed fighters arriving in Aleppo to bolster the Assad regime; and the Treasury Department and Saudi Arabia <a href="https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0587.aspx">sanctioning</a> four individuals and one entity this week for ties to Iran’s proxy, Hezbollah, which, according to the U.S. government “continues to plan, coordinate and execute terrorist attacks around the world.” Such developments dampen the global economy’s confidence in not wanting to be associated with Tehran’s menacing behavior, which in turn hinders improvement in the lives of ordinary Iranian citizens still reeling from years of economic stagnation.</p><p>Hardliners also seem hell-bent on not doling out too much relief to suffering Iranian families. Consider that Article 22 of Iran’s 2016–2017 budget <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-06-09/u-s-taxpayers-are-funding-iran-s-military-expansion">orders</a> money received as settlements — and in some cases ransom for American hostages — from past arms sales between the United States and Iran be deposited in the Islamic Republic’s defense accounts.</p><p>While it is unknown who will be the conservative standard-bearer in the 2017 elections, President Rouhani’s reelection prospects are far from certain. Next spring is a lifetime in the political life of any country, including Iran, and Hassan Rouhani’s enemies have plenty of time to continue their campaign to hamstring his political potential.</p><p><em>Jason M. Brodsky is the Policy Director of United Against Nuclear Iran.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=330eba1d7397" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>