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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Joe Wadakethalakal on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Joe Wadakethalakal on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Joe Wadakethalakal on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Lessons from Ulysses S. Grant.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@joe.wadakethalakal/lessons-from-ulysses-s-grant-71438916944a?source=rss-62dd0c3a27be------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/71438916944a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[us-president]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[biography]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ulysses-s-grant]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[book-review]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Joe Wadakethalakal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 16 Sep 2020 01:15:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-08-25T07:22:17.925Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*q4pPFe7U0oeHAMGWFjm3Kw.png" /></figure><p>People who know me well know that I’m a huge fan of biographies. I love biographies for so many reasons, but if I had to pick the most important one it is because biographies provide me with the most accessible lessons on how to best live my life.</p><p>One of the biographies which touched me recently was <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Grant-Ron-Chernow/dp/159420487X">Chernow’s (colossal) piece about Ulysses Grant</a>.</p><p>Compared to other historical figures, Grant is something of an accidental hero. At the age of 38 he was a failed store clerk in Galena, Illinois; his future prospects non-existent. He had a long string of failed business ventures, and a tarnished reputation due to his struggle with alcoholism (which had prematurely ended his mildly promising military career 6 years earlier). Yet at 46, merely 8 years later, he was President of the United States, the youngest president ever elected at the time. What changed in such a short period of time to so dramatically alter the path of Grant’s life?</p><p>The simple answer is of course the Civil War. Had it not occurred, his tremendous military ability would never have come to light and he wouldn’t have built the reputation required to win two consecutive Presidential elections. <strong>But while historical circumstances opened the door to his future greatness, it was Grant’s unique traits that allowed him to seize the opportunities presented to him.</strong> Countless others were thrown into the war, many with a track record superior to Grant, but none succeeded as Grant did. <strong>What separated Grant from the rest, and what lessons can we apply to our lives?</strong></p><h4><strong>4 Enduring Lessons from Grant</strong></h4><p><strong>Lesson 1: Grant’s willingness to lose allowed him to win.</strong></p><p>Grant was unafraid of failing or of looking stupid, a valuable trait which made him unafraid to fight because he was not put off by the potential consequences of losing. This was a key difference between Grant and other more celebrated, but ultimately ineffectual Union generals such as George McClellan. Grant did not let a fear of losing incapacitate him. This led him to frequently engage his enemy so that the could exploit the structural advantages of the Union.</p><p>Grant’s lack of fear led him to take risks on the battlefield, or experiment with new tactics, which were not always successful, but in every case brought him closer to victory. <strong>This was the secret to his success; his willingness to lose gave him the ability to win.</strong></p><p><strong>Lesson 2: Grant fought in a way that amplified his “home-court” advantage.</strong></p><p>Grant understood that the structural advantages (i.e. the numerical and industrial superiority) of the North stacked the decks in his favor, and he leveraged this by pursuing a strategy of continuous engagement. This meant Grant was singularly focused on capturing or destroying enemy armies and never gave up offensive pressure. This was a winning strategy because the Confederacy simply lacked the resources to sustain the level of warfare brought upon it by the Union. By 1865 Grant knew the end was near when he saw the wretched state of Confederate armies; underfed, under-equipped and peppered with young teenagers and elderly men.</p><p><strong>Lesson 3: Grant objectively identified talent, gave them significant leeway to operate independently, and commanded through end-state objectives.</strong></p><p>Grant’s chose his leadership team based on a meritocratic system that cultivated a performance driven culture which delivered results. <strong>He did not care about appearances, political connections, or any other trait that did not result in winning battles.</strong> This was a shift in the way the Army had been organized prior to the war.</p><p>At the outset of the war Grant’s two most able generals, Sherman and Sheridan, were both written off. Sherman, due to his history of depression and mental instability, and Sheridan, due to his small stature that made many consider him unfit to lead cavalry.</p><p>Grant ignored these concerns because Sherman and Sheridan delivered results where it counted: on the battlefield. <strong>Grant’s meritocratic approach provided him incredible leverage because it allowed the best to rise to the top and therefore gave him a team that he didn’t need to micromanage</strong>. This allowed Grant to delegate and focus his effort on the grand strategy of the war.</p><p>Grant was an effective general because <strong>he understood the end-state objectives </strong>that Lincoln was chasing and did everything he could to achieve them, even if it meant deviating from existing dogma. Lincoln, to his credit, understood this and gave Grant the leeway to pursue any course of action as long as it led to the result he wanted. As a result Grant could be dynamic and opportunistic on the battlefield, taking the initiative whenever it presented itself.</p><p>Working with high quality generals of Sherman and Sheridan’s caliber allowed Grant in turn to command via end state objectives as well. He simply defined the future he wanted, set the constraints, and then let his generals do whatever was needed to achieve the required outcome. It was this style of leadership that enabled Sherman’s brilliant March to the Sea (which smashed Atlanta) and Sheridan’s Shenandoah campaign (remembered as the “Burning” which crushed the breadbasket of the Confederacy), two campaigns which effectively sealed the fate of the South.</p><p><strong>Lesson 4: Grant focused on what he could control and ignored or delegated the things he could not.</strong></p><p>Several people tried to undermine Grant throughout his career, including other Union generals. Grant ignored them and concentrated solely on factors within his control. While he recognized the importance of political support he did not let political machinations rattle him. Instead he effectively delegated the management of all political issues to supporters in Washington like Elihu Washburne, who were much better placed to manage them. Once he had delegated responsibilities he had a remarkable ability to cease worrying about them and could focus solely on the battlefield and the factors within his control.</p><h4><strong>Conclusion</strong></h4><p>In my view these four lessons represent the most important skills we can learn from Grant and were the key to his successful career, particularly as a Union General. And while it is valuable to learn what made Grant successful we can also learn much from his failures and shortcomings, particularly during his tenure as President.</p><p>Grant was a remarkable general, but his presidential record was more checkered. As President, Grant had the right motives and vigorously enforced Reconstruction and black rights in the South but unfortunately his inexperience in politics handicapped him and made the changes he sought to effect temporary. This contributed to the rolling back of Reconstruction and the delay of civil rights for another 100 years. Grant’s reputation as president also suffered from accusations of corruption. While Grant was an incorruptible man, his association with some questionable characters made Grant look guilty by association. This leads us to one final lesson we can learn from Grant, which is that domain expertise in one area (military) does not readily translate into others (governance).</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=71438916944a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Four Faces of Indonesia]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@joe.wadakethalakal/the-four-faces-of-indonesia-5d8a98d384d1?source=rss-62dd0c3a27be------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5d8a98d384d1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[growth]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-expansion]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indonesia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Joe Wadakethalakal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 May 2020 16:09:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-04T14:29:22.491Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4><strong>Indonesia: A land of promise, if you know where to look</strong></h4><p><em>I wrote this article to help people understand the uneven distribution of economic power in Indonesia. Understanding this distribution is critical, because it allows you to assess the purchasing power of your target consumer. Indonesia is an alluring market, but it can be unforgiving, particularly to foreign entrants. If you want to have a chance at winning in Indonesia you need to understand what your target market can and cannot afford, and why, this is my attempt to help you do that.</em></p><p><em>Note: All facts and figures here have been cited with references at the end of the article. All the analysis in this article, unless referenced otherwise, is proprietary. All opinions in this article are my own and do not reflect the views of other companies I am affiliated with. All errors and omissions are also my own.</em></p><h3>Introduction</h3><p>Indonesia is a land of incredible promise. One of the only functioning democracies in Southeast Asia, the archipelagic nation has grown consistently since 2000 and was one of only three G20 nations with positive GDP growth during the 2008 financial crisis<a href="#_edn1">[i]</a>. Indonesia has the 4th largest population in the world (268 million) <a href="#_edn2">[ii]</a>, a growing middle class, a large, young workforce whose median age is 29<a href="#_edn3">[iii]</a>, and a rapidly growing digital economy worth approximately $40bn USD in 2019<a href="#_edn4">[iv]</a>.</p><p><strong>Figure 1: Indonesia Annual GDP Growth (2000–2015).</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/526/1*x3t7u3ucMRlm9DhD-Lvj-g.png" /><figcaption>Source: Data based on Worldbank Data, Chart from Oxfam, “Towards a More Equal Indonesia”, 2017, link: <a href="https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/towards-more-equal-indonesia">https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/towards-more-equal-indonesia</a></figcaption></figure><p>These exciting statistics have brought a horde of established firms, startups, and investors into the Indonesian market.<strong> Yet, when you speak to them, many new entrants privately express a deep frustration with their prospects in Indonesia. Where is the disconnect?</strong></p><p>In their rush to enter the market, many make the critical error of treating Indonesia as a homogeneous market. A quick glance over Indonesia’s modern history makes it clear why this is a mistake. We forget that as recently as 80 years ago Indonesia did not even exist as a nation-state. Then, as it is now, the country is a patchwork of diverse groups with vast internal variation across economic, social, and cultural dimensions.</p><p>To succeed in Indonesia, you need to look past the headline numbers to understand the economic reality as it is for most Indonesians on the ground.</p><p>One of the most common mistakes I have seen made is to assume that Indonesia’s GDP per capita of $3,893 USD (in 2018) is a valid representation of the spending power of most Indonesians. This is a gross error because it does not consider the wealth distribution caused by Indonesia’s stark income inequality.</p><blockquote>The top 1.0% of Indonesians own 49.0% of the total wealth of the nation, while the poorest 40.0% own a meager 1.4%.</blockquote><p>In terms of wealth distribution, Indonesia is the 6th most unequal country in the world. The top 1.0% of Indonesians own 49.0% of the total wealth of the nation, while the poorest 40.0% own a meager 1.4% <a href="#_edn5">[v]</a>.</p><p>With these economic inequalities in mind we can develop a far more accurate view of per capita GDP:</p><p><strong>Figure 2: Distribution of GDP per Capita by Class.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/624/1*UntAJhGUOmhw9s_0QRS4Bg.png" /></figure><blockquote>$1,045 is the real GDP per capita for 80% of the population.</blockquote><p>If the goal is to understand the real spending power of most Indonesians, the $3,893 figure we referenced earlier is far off the mark<strong>. </strong>A more appropriate figure is $1,045, which is the weighted average GDP per capita for 80% of the population.</p><p>Breaking the nation up according to concentrations of wealth, we identify four distinct economic groups. These groups diverge radically from each other in terms of their purchasing power, economic growth potential, urban/rural split, and their spending patterns. Understanding the nuances of each group and identifying which ones are relevant are the most important tasks any new player in Indonesia must undertake.</p><h3><strong>The Economics of the Four Major Groups:</strong></h3><p>A glance at Indonesia’s income stratification in figure 2 makes it clear that the country does not have a homogeneous economic identity. Instead, it is useful to think of Indonesia as an amalgamation of four different economies all operating at different stages, within one country.</p><p><em>The Top 1.0% — The Elites: An Economy 40.0% larger than Singapore.</em></p><p><strong>The largest group by far in terms of spending power and wealth are the elites. </strong>Constituting a mere 1.0% of the population, Indonesian elites control close to half of the nation’s wealth. If we use their share of wealth to calculate the GDP of the elite economy we arrive at a figure in excess of $511 billion (slightly larger than Thailand which is at $505 billion<a href="#_edn6">[vi]</a>), the citizens of which have a per capita GDP more than double that of Singapore, one of the richest countries in the world ($134.8K vs. $64.5K).</p><blockquote>Indonesian elites have a GDP per Capita more than double that of the average Singaporean</blockquote><p><strong>The elite market is the largest and fastest growing market in Indonesia. </strong>Responsible for over 25% of all domestic consumption since 2010<a href="#_edn7">[vii]</a> it should come as no surprise that the growth in the spending power of the elites has eclipsed every other segment in Indonesia. Prior to 2010, in real terms, the per capita consumption of elites grew at an average of 6% for a decade, while the per capita consumption of the bottom 40.0% grew at a meager 2.0% over the same period<a href="#_edn8">[viii]</a>.</p><p>While 3.8 million people is a small proportion of Indonesia’s total population, the massive economic size of this segment makes Indonesia a compelling market for businesses catering to an upmarket population (this helps explain why there are so many Louis Vuitton stores in Jakarta). Looking forward, the prospects for consumption growth in this segment remain strong due to their share of private consumption relative to others.</p><p><strong>Figure 3: Indonesian Gini Coefficient Trend.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/462/1*bASSJKPn8GkLa353esHXVA.png" /><figcaption>Indonesia’s Gini coefficient has steadily worsened (increased) over time, this trend is not going anywhere anytime soon<a href="#_edn9">[ix]</a></figcaption></figure><p><em>The Indonesian Middle Class: Growing in size but handicapped in purchasing power.</em></p><p>Following the elites are the middle class. This group represents 20.0% of the population and controls approximately 30.0% of the nation’s wealth. The implied per capita GDP of people in this economy is $5,821, which is significantly higher than the national average and closer to Thailand’s national average of $7,274.</p><p>Over the last decade a lot has been written about the “massive potential” of the Indonesian middle class, and on the surface, these claims appear substantiated. In terms overall size and spending power, the Indonesian middle class has grown meaningfully over the past 2 decades. In 2002, the middle class made up approximately 6% of the population and was responsible for 21% of all private consumption.</p><p>Over a period of 14 years the middle class population grew at an average rate of 10.0% and by 2016 made up 20.0% of the overall population and was responsible for 43.0% of all private consumption (reflecting an average consumption growth of 12.0% in real terms over 14 years)<a href="#_edn10">[x]</a>.</p><p><strong>Figure 4: 2002–2016 Population CAGR% by Group.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/580/1*TVr1OQMfcHeB2KMu577jLg.png" /><figcaption>Note: AMC refers to “Aspiring Middle Class”, MC refers to “Middle Class”. Segment groupings in this chart defined by the World Bank in their “Aspiring Indonesia” Report. References available in the endotes</figcaption></figure><p>While these middle class growth rates are compelling at a macro level, from the perspective of the individual the improvements have been marginal. While 20.0% of the population now qualify as “middle class” the growth in their per capita spending power has been negligible. Between 2002 and 2016, while overall consumption for the group rose at a CAGR of 12.0%, per capita consumption only grew at an average of less than 2.0% per year.</p><blockquote>The middle class as a group has grown impressively, but per capita growth for middle class citizens has been dismal</blockquote><p><strong>This is bad news for businesses focused on the middle class that rely on purchasing power growth to grow</strong>. This also helps explain the extreme competition among businesses targeting this segment. With limited growth in per capita purchasing power the only way a business can access above average growth is by trying to take market share away from incumbents.</p><p><strong>Figure 5: Middle Class Per Capita Consumption Growth (2002–2016).</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/605/1*4pgz3kplVHsLgaSThN7jrg.png" /></figure><p><em>The Aspirational and Poor: Where the masses lie.</em></p><p>At the bottom of the economic pyramid are the aspiring and poor, they are also the largest group in Indonesia representing 80.0% of the population. The largest group in Indonesia is also the poorest group controlling a mere 20.0% of the nation’s wealth. Using the wealth distribution of this group as a proxy for share of GDP, the citizens of this economy have a GDP per capita in the range of $627 to $1,368 (or $1,045 on a weighted average basis, which is 1/3 the national average).</p><blockquote>The largest group in Indonesia is also the poorest group controlling a mere 20.0% of the nation’s wealth.</blockquote><p><strong>In addition to being the poorest segment of society, this group also has the worst prospects for consumption growth. </strong>This is a result of their low share of private consumption, which is unlikely to change in the medium term, and the relatively higher population growth rates of this group (poorer families tend to be larger than richer ones). The pie is not growing as fast as the number of mouths to feed<a href="#_edn11">[xi]</a>.</p><p>The relative poverty of this group and their lack of disposable income explain why most Indonesians are extremely price sensitive and why most of their share of wallet is focused on essential goods and services.</p><h3><strong>Where do these 4 economies live?</strong></h3><p>As one might expect, the elites and middle class are heavily concentrated in urban areas while the poorer classes are more evenly distributed between cities and the countryside. This has been the case consistently from 2002 through to 2016. In general, the poorer you are the more likely you are to live in a rural area.</p><p><strong>Figure 6: 2002 Urban / Rural Split by Class (mm).</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/518/1*PXGrOx5T-9X7S6vVNPYtgQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Figure 7: 2016 Urban / Rural Split by Class (mm).</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/525/1*yjkqpABe3Un1Xa0JkdP0kg.png" /></figure><p>For the middle class, the ratio living in urban/rural areas has been consistent at 75%/25% from 2002 through to 2016. In terms of the overall population makeup of cities however, the middle class is now more prominently represented. In 2016 the middle class represented 31% of the population of cities areas vs 11% in 2002. <strong>As a result of this, and the fact that most elites live in cities, urban spending power in Indonesia is almost 4x that of rural areas.</strong></p><p><strong>Figure 8: Estimated Purchasing Power of Urban vs. Rural Areas.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/624/1*-ThZjD2UTlZz6aqQta_qeQ.png" /></figure><blockquote>Urban spending power is 4x rural spending power</blockquote><p>Mirroring the trend in spending power, at least 60% of the nation’s GDP is concentrated in urban areas, however the distribution of this wealth across cities is highly unequal<a href="#_edn12">[xii]</a>. The greatest concentration of wealth can be found in cities in Java, specifically in Jakarta, which contributes almost a quarter of the nation’s GDP.</p><p><strong>Figure 9: Top 10 Indonesian Cities by GDP Contribution.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/583/1*C_h1vPeKQzkY3-QCmStDXg.png" /></figure><p><strong>In fact, 6 of the top 10 cities ranked by GDP are in Java, and together they are responsible for approximately 37% of Indonesia’s overall GDP.</strong> Unsurprisingly, the cities in Java are also where the greatest concentration of elites can be found, especially in Jakarta.</p><blockquote>Jakarta alone is responsible for 25% of the nation’s GDP</blockquote><p>Relative to the elites, the middle class is better distributed (in cities) across the archipelago with strong presences in places like Pekanbaru (Sumatera), Denpasar (Bali), and Makassar (Sulawesi).</p><p><strong>Figure 10: Middle Class and Aspiring Class Populations in Major Indonesian Cities.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/751/1*cQVigRBYzbcOevIkgjEeUw.png" /><figcaption>AMC = Aspiring Middle Class, MC = Middle Class, UC = Upper Class; Note that class divisions in this chart are according to World Bank calculations. Source: The World Bank, “Aspiring Indonesia — Expanding the Middle Class”, 2019, pg 20, link: <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/33237/Aspiring-Indonesia-Expanding-the-Middle-Class.pdf?sequence=1&amp;isAllowed=y">https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/33237/Aspiring-Indonesia-Expanding-the-Middle-Class.pdf?sequence=1&amp;isAllowed=y</a></figcaption></figure><h3><strong>Spending Habits by Class:</strong></h3><p><em>The Poor and Aspiring Classes: Limited disposable income and incredibly price sensitive.</em></p><p>For a citizen of the poor and aspiring classes almost all of their income is being used to feed and house themselves (60% for food, 20% for housing). The disposable income (after accounting for food and housing) of a citizen of these classes is estimated to be less than 60 cents (USD) per person per day<a href="#_edn13">[xiii]</a>. As a result, the many “promising” sectors in Indonesia such as health, education, automotive, insurance, etc. are not being driven by the masses but rather by the elites (and to a smaller extent, the middle class).</p><blockquote>The poor have less than 60 cents per day to spend on things outside of food and housing</blockquote><p><em>The Middle Class: Connected and focused on entertainment.</em></p><p>The middle class differentiates itself from the masses by spending more on non-food items than food.<strong> As Indonesians join the middle class a disproportionate share of wallet is spent on entertainment.</strong> Representing close to 0% of total spend for the poor, by the time an Indonesian reaches the middle class, entertainment is responsible for 4–9% of spending<a href="#_edn14">[xiv]</a>.</p><p>The middle class also enjoys greater internet access. 55% to 80% of middle class households have internet access while less than 30% of poor and aspiring households are online. Interestingly cell phone penetration is far higher than internet penetration across all classes. 50% to 73% of poor and aspiring families own a cellphone, while middle class and elites own 90% and 100%, respectively. Given that all cellphones today can connect to the internet, there is vast potential for internet penetration growth in Indonesia as data costs continue to decline<a href="#_edn15">[xv]</a>.</p><p><strong>Figure 11: Consumption Patterns Across Classes.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/707/1*1BhokTIuvtgPRdrGg1HmUA.png" /><figcaption>P = Poor, V = Vulnerable, AMC = Aspiring Middle Class, MC = Middle Class, UC = Upper Class; Note that class divisions in this chart are according to World Bank calculations. Source: The World Bank, “Aspiring Indonesia — Expanding the Middle Class”, 2019, pg 14, link: <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/33237/Aspiring-Indonesia-Expanding-the-Middle-Class.pdf?sequence=1&amp;isAllowed=y">https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/33237/Aspiring-Indonesia-Expanding-the-Middle-Class.pdf?sequence=1&amp;isAllowed=y</a></figcaption></figure><p><em>Elites: Spend on cars, healthcare, and education.</em></p><p>Car ownership seems to be the great divider between the elites and the rest of society. Over 60% of elite households own a car, while less than 20% of any other segment do. In addition to spending more on cars, elites also spend significantly more on private healthcare; the rapid growth of private hospitals in Indonesia is thus a reflection of elite preferences.</p><blockquote>Elites overwhelmingly prefer private healthcare and education options</blockquote><p>Elites have a strong preference for private education and are willing to spend for it. The children of elite households compose most of the students attending the growing number of expensive (tuition fees in the top 10th percentile of schools nationwide) international schools in tier 1 Indonesian cities. Elites also reach far higher levels of educational attainment than other classes. Almost every member of the elite class completes high school and 55% of them have at least a bachelor’s degree; they also make up the growing number of Indonesians travelling abroad for a better education<a href="#_edn16">[xvi]</a>.</p><p><strong>Figure 12: Educational Attainment by Class, Ages 25–34, 2016.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/736/1*r1_2NMErqUaR5bDBKH27ow.png" /><figcaption>P = Poor, V = Vulnerable, AMC = Aspiring Middle Class, MC = Middle Class, UC = Upper Class; Note that class divisions in this chart are according to World Bank calculations. Source: The World Bank, “Aspiring Indonesia — Expanding the Middle Class”, 2019, pg 25, link: <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/33237/Aspiring-Indonesia-Expanding-the-Middle-Class.pdf?sequence=1&amp;isAllowed=y">https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/33237/Aspiring-Indonesia-Expanding-the-Middle-Class.pdf?sequence=1&amp;isAllowed=y</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Conclusion:</strong></p><p>By now I hope it is clear how radically different these four classes are from each other. Companies operating in Indonesia need to think carefully about which classes they are targeting when they enter the market and they need to plan their strategy accordingly.</p><p>For instance, an FMCG business focused on the poor should prioritize offline vs. online advertising, since most of their consumers do not have access to the internet. They may focus on single-use products or something else which is cheaper because their customers are extremely price sensitive. They should use simple and direct language because most of their customers have low levels of educational attainment, and they may invest in rural expansion since that is where most of their customers live.</p><p>A company with a luxury product focused on the elite market would have a completely different approach, so too would another business that was focused on selling goods or services to the middle class.</p><p>By optimizing in this way new companies can give themselves the greatest chance of success in Indonesia and in turn help enrich the entire nation. <strong>This is how the Indonesian promise can be fulfilled.</strong></p><h3>References:</h3><p><a href="#_ednref1">[i]</a> <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html">https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref2">[ii]</a> As of 2018, based on Worldbank data (<a href="https://data.worldbank.org/country/indonesia?view=chart">https://data.worldbank.org/country/indonesia?view=chart</a>)</p><p><a href="#_ednref3">[iii]</a> <a href="https://www.visualcapitalist.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/median-age-population-every-country.html">https://www.visualcapitalist.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/median-age-population-every-country.html</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref4">[iv]</a> <a href="https://www.blog.google/documents/47/SEA_Internet_Economy_Report_2019.pdf">https://www.blog.google/documents/47/SEA_Internet_Economy_Report_2019.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref5">[v]</a> Oxfam, “Towards a More Equal Indonesia”, 2017, pg 8, link: <a href="https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/towards-more-equal-indonesia">https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/towards-more-equal-indonesia</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref6">[vi]</a> As of 2018, based on Worldbank data (<a href="https://data.worldbank.org/country/indonesia?view=chart">https://data.worldbank.org/country/indonesia?view=chart</a>)</p><p><a href="#_ednref7">[vii]</a> Oxfam, “Towards a More Equal Indonesia”, 2017, pg 10, link: <a href="https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/towards-more-equal-indonesia">https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/towards-more-equal-indonesia</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref8">[viii]</a> The World Bank, “Indonesia’s Rising Divide”, 2015, pg 7, link: <a href="http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/16261460705088179/Indonesias-Rising-Divide-English.pdf">http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/16261460705088179/Indonesias-Rising-Divide-English.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref9">[ix]</a> A.A. Yusuf (n.d). Has Prosperity Been For All? Revisiting the Trend of Various Dimensions of Inequality in Indonesia, p.9 (author’s calculations based on National Socio-Economic Survey (SUSENAS) data). Center for Economics and Development Studies (CEDS). <a href="http://csnbricsam.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Buku-RisetKetimpangan-Pak-Arief-Ok-1.pdf">http://csnbricsam.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Buku-RisetKetimpangan-Pak-Arief-Ok-1.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref10">[x]</a> The World Bank, “Aspiring Indonesia — Expanding the Middle Class”, 2019, pg 13, link: <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/33237/Aspiring-Indonesia-Expanding-the-Middle-Class.pdf?sequence=1&amp;isAllowed=y">https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/33237/Aspiring-Indonesia-Expanding-the-Middle-Class.pdf?sequence=1&amp;isAllowed=y</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref11">[xi]</a> The World Bank, “Indonesia’s Rising Divide”, 2015, pg 13, link: <a href="http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/16261460705088179/Indonesias-Rising-Divide-English.pdf">http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/16261460705088179/Indonesias-Rising-Divide-English.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref12">[xii]</a> The World Bank, “Time to Act: Realizing Indonesia’s Urban Potential”, 2019, pg 78, link: <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/31304/9781464813894.pdf">https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/31304/9781464813894.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref13">[xiii]</a> Proprietary calculation based on 2018 Worldbank GDP and population data and the assumption that the Poor and Aspiring classes control approximately 21% of national wealth, and represent 78% of the population</p><p><a href="#_ednref14">[xiv]</a> The World Bank, “Aspiring Indonesia — Expanding the Middle Class”, 2019, pg 14, link: <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/33237/Aspiring-Indonesia-Expanding-the-Middle-Class.pdf?sequence=1&amp;isAllowed=y">https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/33237/Aspiring-Indonesia-Expanding-the-Middle-Class.pdf?sequence=1&amp;isAllowed=y</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref15">[xv]</a> The World Bank, “Aspiring Indonesia — Expanding the Middle Class”, 2019, pg 15, link: <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/33237/Aspiring-Indonesia-Expanding-the-Middle-Class.pdf?sequence=1&amp;isAllowed=y">https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/33237/Aspiring-Indonesia-Expanding-the-Middle-Class.pdf?sequence=1&amp;isAllowed=y</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref16">[xvi]</a> <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia/publication/aspiring-indonesia-expanding-the-middle-class">https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia/publication/aspiring-indonesia-expanding-the-middle-class</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5d8a98d384d1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[“Bad Blood” and Good Lessons]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@joe.wadakethalakal/bad-blood-and-good-lessons-4b0b0cc136f3?source=rss-62dd0c3a27be------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4b0b0cc136f3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[books]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[theranos]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lessons-learned]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Joe Wadakethalakal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 Mar 2019 17:20:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-03-31T17:20:15.059Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A few days ago I finished “Bad Blood” by John Carreyrou. To the unacquainted it’s an account of the downfall of Theranos and its charismatic founder, Elizabeth Holmes.</p><p>Due largely to the success of Carreyrou’s book, the rise and fall of Theranos is well documented. I’m not going to say anything more about the Theranos tragedy except to say that the company was widely considered to be one of the leading startups of the decade and its spectacular implosion came as an abrupt shock to those involved in the tech space.</p><p>Like many failed ventures preceding it, Theranos turned out to be a colossal fraud. <strong>But why didn’t anyone notice? </strong>Some minor digging by investors beneath the company’s sparkling facade would have revealed the ugliness underneath, but most didn’t bother. Even more outrageous, the leaders of stakeholders (such as CVS or the Pentagon) that did have its teams conduct detailed diligence on the company <strong>chose to actively ignore the findings of their subordinates who warned them of the lack of scientific substance supporting the company’s claims.</strong></p><p>How could this have happened? What blinded some of the “smartest” people in the world to the fraud taking place before them? I’ve identified three key reasons and the underlying lessons we can take away from them:</p><h4>Reason 1: Attribution bias / Halo effect</h4><p>Elizabeth Holmes was an incredibly smart, driven, and charismatic founder; these traits created a halo effect around her which led investors and early supporters to believe her unverified claims. Holmes’ character also reminded investors of other exceptional entrepreneurs (such as Mark Zuckerberg) which led them to believe that she shared their underlying talent as well.</p><h4>Lesson 1: Test everything</h4><p>All fundamental claims made by entrepreneurs — which are claims that are fundamental to business model of the company — need to be thoroughly stress tested and proven to be <em>likely </em>true. This rule is particularly important when dealing with charismatic entrepreneurs, who are better at generating strong emotional responses which make people susceptible to ignoring seemingly obvious truths.</p><h4>Reason 2: Misaligned objectives</h4><p>Holmes’ primary objective was to achieve fame and fortune and she viewed Theranos as the vehicle she could use to achieve this. On the other hand, Theranos’ stated objective was to revolutionize healthcare through a new type of blood test. The misalignment between Holmes’ priorities and the stated objective of the company ultimately destroyed the company because Holmes made decisions to optimize for her own ego instead of the company’s mission.</p><h4>Lesson 2: Integrity and Alignment</h4><p>Seek to work with founders who have demonstrated (and continue to demonstrate) integrity and are aware of their ego and more importantly understand how to manage it. Make sure that the founders ultimate objectives align with the objectives of the company. As the company grows, the alignment of objectives between management, the company, and its’ stakeholders are critical for long-term success.</p><h4>Reason 3: Irrational exuberance and greed (aka FOMO)</h4><p>By strategically courting the press, attracting marquee investors early on, and later associating with such venerable names as George Schultz, General Mattis, and Henry Kissinger, Holmes generated a great deal of legitimacy for Theranos by association (another example of teh Halo effect in play). As a result people who got involved with the company deferred objective decision making and succumbed to group-think. The buzz around Theranos made people feel as if they would miss an life altering (primarily financial) opportunity if they questioned Theranos. The combination of greed and the fear of potentially looking stupid for missing an opportunity poisoned good judgement.</p><h4>Lesson 3: Ignore crowds when forming an opinion.</h4><p>When formulating an opinion, ignore what has been mentioned by third parties. Use primary sources to establish an initial point of view before stress testing this against other sources of truth to arrive at an “adjusted” view. Ask yourself if you are making a decision out of greed or the fear of looking stupid, and adjust your exposure to the decision accordingly (less exposure if you feel greedy, as you’re more likely to have willfully ignored opposing facts).</p><p>Never abandon independent judgement and thinking, particularly when making decisions of consequence. This is particularly true in high profile companies where the halo effect is abundant; everyone may have simply “passed the buck” on critical thinking assuming that others have done it (because of their reputation) and therefore no objective evaluation was ever done.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4b0b0cc136f3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why the Internet is still killing Media]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@joe.wadakethalakal/why-the-internet-will-kill-media-15e2f5590a83?source=rss-62dd0c3a27be------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/15e2f5590a83</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[disruption]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-media]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[medium]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Joe Wadakethalakal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 25 Jul 2018 10:37:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-10-08T08:31:13.434Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>No matter how many times incumbent media players try creating or investing in digital-first “new media” initiatives, they’re still quite likely to get killed by the internet. Here’s why.</h4><p>Ever since it was created 30 or so years ago, the internet has disrupted every industry we know of. The media industry, and in particular print, was one of the very first to be disrupted. Media companies have faced existential threats brought upon by new technology before, but in each case strong players have been able to use the emerging technologies to their advantage. The internet is different. Unlike the rise of previous technologies, pure play media companies haven’t been able to leverage the internet to their advantage. As a result we’ve now seen two decades of violent, internet driven disruption in media that has primarily benefited technology players outside the industry. What is going on? Why is the internet different, and what does the future look like for the media business in the internet era?</p><h3>The traditional approach to technological disruption</h3><p>The media industry has undergone multiple rounds of technological disruption over the past century. At the turn of the 20th century, print was king, but a few decades later radio technology emerged and disrupted the monopoly that newspapers had on its readers’ time. Seemingly out of nowhere radio broadcasters grew to be powerful media companies, often standing ahead of their peers in print. Years later, history repeated itself, but this time video was at the forefront. TV became the leading media format, pushing aside both print and radio to establish itself as the dominant platform for decades to come.</p><p>The rise of radio and TV brought about major shifts in the media landscape, and disrupted many players in the process, however there were many strong incumbent players who were able to profit from the disruption as well. Companies like E.W. Scripps and The Washington Post were able to thrive amidst the chaos by investing aggressively in the new formats while continuing to manage their core operations. E.W Scripps (NYSE: SSP) started life as a print publisher in 1878, but 130 years later in 2008, prior to spinning out its cable network business, Scripps was a diversified media conglomerate generating billions in revenue, a tiny fraction of which came from print. Scripps thrived for well over a century by strategically investing in new media formats as they arose, including radio, broadcast TV, and cable networks.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/773/1*X-ZNIUGfiYJQ6NYYhE-Aew.png" /><figcaption>Scripps, which started life as a publishers grew to become one of the largest diversified media conglomerates in the U.S. prior to it spinning off Scripps Networks, which held the company’s cable network assets</figcaption></figure><p>A similar tale occurred in parallel at The Washington Post Company. Prior to its sale to Jeff Bezos, The Washington Post Company, while known primarily for it’s flagship daily newspaper, was a massive media conglomerate which made more revenue from its non-print media assets than it did from print.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/821/1*68EG-nCqAsGT90Zo5mmuXg.png" /><figcaption>For many years, the Washington Post Company leveraged technological disruption to drive growth and strengthen it’s position in the media industry, but in the internet-era the company struggled to create value. (Note: Following the sale of the Washington Post to Jeff Bezos in 2013, the company was renamed to the Graham Holdings Company)</figcaption></figure><p>The playbook for media companies then, when faced with disruptive technology, was to co-opt the new technology by aggressively investing in it and to use these investments to drive its next phase of growth and expansion. In the pre-internet era, this strategy generated tremendous value for stakeholders in media, but today it is an ineffective tool against internet-led disruption.</p><h3><strong>What’s different about the internet</strong></h3><p>The disruptive power of the internet on the media industry is unique in character compared to any technological innovation that came before it. The key difference — and the crux of the problem for media companies — is that the internet has effectively dissolved the barriers to entry into the media sector and brought the market closer to what economists would define as a “perfect market” with minimal barriers to entry. The reason this is so destructive is that low barriers to entry destroys the pricing power of incumbents. Reduced barriers to entry leads to more players in the market, which then leads to an increase in the supply of advertising inventory, which finally leads to lower prices. Therefore, as a result of being unable to control the supply of inventory in the market, media companies have lost the ability to control pricing.</p><blockquote>As a result of being unable to control the supply of inventory in the market, media companies lost the ability to control pricing.</blockquote><p>Prior to the internet, the introduction of new formats did not meaningfully alter the supply dynamics in the media industry because the barriers to entry remained high. It wasn’t (and still isn’t) cheap nor easy to build and maintain a print, radio, or TV operation. It is very difficult to recruit talent, secure licenses, build distribution, acquire production assets, and develop a strong reputation. In order to do so one has to invest a considerable amount of capital, and wait (often in vain) for a considerable amount of time before seeing a return. Historical media formats had these high entry barriers in common, and as a result media inventory was structurally limited. Although the introduction of new formats did increase the overall supply of total media inventory, these were one-time supply side shocks rather then structural shifts that would allow a flood of new players into the market. Incumbents could maintain position and benefit from the new formats by investing aggressively into them and profiting as they always had from growing demand against a relatively fixed supply of media.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DGoyH9KndPFch2BOwE2mqA.png" /><figcaption>Supply and Demand of Media Inventory as a result of legacy innovations</figcaption></figure><p>An examination into the historical price of attention by Matthew Gentzkow ( <a href="https://web.stanford.edu/~gentzkow/research/DollarsForDollars.pdf">Trading Dollars for Dollars: The Price of Attention Online and Offline)</a> shows how historically, the emergence of new formats did not exert negative pricing pressure on pre-existing media inventory. During the emergence of TV (1940–1970) the effective price of attention (measured by ad revenue per hour) on both formats continued to increase.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/935/1*S2Yar-Vodh33PnHgr9pAxw.png" /><figcaption>Fig 1. The introduction of TV</figcaption></figure><p>The emergence of TV halted the growth in time spent on radio and newspapers, and while this likely killed off the weaker players in those industries it did not stop the surviving players from thriving over the next 30 years. Safe from the threat of new entrants, the surviving players now had greater leverage to raise prices and grow revenue.</p><p>With the internet, a new paradigm emerged; now, anyone with an opinion and a few dollars to spare, could start a website and effectively operate as a media company. A massive long-tail of media inventory gradually overwhelmed the market and dramatically pushed pricing downwards.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*z8UqXQ6-76cwXBsgwfOfpg.png" /></figure><p>Unlike historical formats, the internet not only brought about a new media format, but it also structurally altered the supply dynamics of the industry by democratizing access to new entrants. With the inability to influence pricing and control media supply, legacy media companies have lost the the ability to translate growing advertising demand into revenue growth as ad dollars flow away from higher priced legacy media inventory into the cheaper long tail.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/877/1*FR9Ckr-u8ie4Qq-Cd3lZaQ.png" /><figcaption>Fig 2. The introduction of the Internet</figcaption></figure><p>Fig 2. above from the Gentzkow study clearly demonstrates the destabilizing effect the internet has had on pricing for legacy media formats. Starting from a peak in the year 2000, ad revenue per hour for legacy media formats fell precipitously over the next ten years as global internet penetration accelerated.</p><h3>What about Digital Media Companies?</h3><p>The information presented thus far might make one believe that digital media companies are in a better position than their “analog” counterparts. While this might be true from an operating cost perspective the fact remains that digital media companies are subject to the same market dynamics that make it impossible to control pricing for their inventory. This inability to set prices makes it almost impossible for digital media companies (particularly media owners) to generate above average returns.</p><h3><strong>So, who wins?</strong></h3><p>Who wins in an internet led media industry? The obvious winners are the platform owners. Instead of fighting the internet’s ability to open up closed markets, companies like Google, Facebook, and WeChat harnessed it’s power to empower new entrants, and in turn generated massive scale and leverage. It is hard to think of media owners in recent history who have successfully taken this platform approach and transformed their business model. A more realistic path forward for media companies is to invest in the very platforms that are disrupting their business. This is what Naspers did with their investment in Tencent, and in the process transformed a little known South African newspaper into one of the largest media companies in the world today.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=15e2f5590a83" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why Branding is Still Relevant in a Digital World]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@joe.wadakethalakal/why-branding-is-still-relevant-in-a-digital-world-bb65c7f3d635?source=rss-62dd0c3a27be------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bb65c7f3d635</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[branding]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-marketing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[marketing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Joe Wadakethalakal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 07 Jun 2017 04:25:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-06-07T04:33:50.754Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>2016 marked a breakout year for the digital advertising market. In the US, total digital advertising sales reached $70bn USD, finally overtaking television advertising sales of $67bn USD.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/588/1*V4tmwspqD30eLK3CXmKiEQ.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="http://www.adage.com/">www.adage.com</a> via MAGNA</figcaption></figure><p>In 2017, this gap is forecast to widen further, with approximately $83bn USD flowing into digital advertising compared to approximately $73bn USD in television advertising. Check out the forecast from eMarketer below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/922/1*Q-xIsoyRsXTJh0udowpzSg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Source: eMarketer</figcaption></figure><p>Marketers are pushing more dollars to digital for multiple reasons, but perhaps the most important factor is that <strong>digital is the easiest media format on which marketers can track marketing performance</strong>.</p><p>Marketers have known intuitively that advertising drives sales since the dawn of the industry, but it wasn’t until the emergence of digital — and the accompanying rise in data — that the impact of advertising could be precisely and accurately calculated.</p><p>Quantifying the impact of advertising spend is the holy grail in advertising as it provides clear financial justification for the industry to exist. However, more importantly for those of us in digital, <strong>the rise of quantifiable data has empowered marketers to drive more ad dollars into the digital market</strong>, and effectively gave birth to the digital performance marketing industry.</p><p>Today, performance or call-to-action marketing is where about 90.0% of digital dollars go with the 10.0% remaining focused on branding related expenditures.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/922/1*aVv8NvluRAwPlE0DaLuGsw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Source: eMarketer</figcaption></figure><p>Notice that the split of performance vs. branding spend on digital is in sharp contrast to TV where <strong>the majority of TV ad dollars actually go to branding</strong> (80.0%) instead of performance (20.0%).</p><p>The increasing use of data in digital has created a generation of marketers who obsess over performance metrics and spend the majority of their budgets in performance marketing because they think that <strong>branding does not have a place in digital budgets.</strong></p><p>This thinking is shortsighted and ultimately counterproductive to the stated goal of most digital marketers which is to optimize their ad spend to maximize sales / revenue.</p><p>The reason branding remains relevant today in digital <strong>is because of its ability to actually reduce the cost of performance marketing, and drive greater ROI.</strong></p><p>This happens through a well researched phenomenon called the <strong>mere exposure effect</strong>.<strong> </strong>Coined by a scholar named Robert Zajonc, the mere exposure effect describes the tendency of human beings to like an unfamiliar stimuli merely by being exposed to it over a period of time.</p><p>To cut a long story short, Zajonc proved that if you expose someone to something unfamiliar (image, sound, taste, experience, etc.) over a period of time the person will actually develop a preference (a liking) for the (once) unfamiliar thing. Furthermore, <strong>the more you’re shown something unfamiliar the more you will actually end up liking it</strong>. This process works on a subconscious level, <strong>so you don’t even have to be aware of the object to develop a liking for it</strong>. Studies have shown for instance that people will develop preferences for images that were shown to them so quickly that they weren’t even able to consciously process them.</p><p>The mere exposure effect is essentially the justification for branding. But how does it improve performance marketing?</p><p>The answer is that spending on branding effectively reduces your customer acquisition cost (CAC), which in turn drives greater ROI. The fact is, the more a user has seen your brand the more likely they are to click on the campaigns you’re running online.</p><blockquote><strong>More exposure = greater brand preference = more clicks = lower CAC = higher ROI</strong></blockquote><p>What does this mean in practice?</p><ol><li>If a user runs a search online for a product similar to yours, they’re more likely to click on your product’s sponsored search result than on your competitors’</li><li>If you run a display based sales promotion campaign, users will be more likely to click on your banners if they recognize your brand</li><li>If customers are shopping online they’re more likely to add your product to cart if they’ve been exposed to the brand before</li><li>The effect works offline as well. If users walk into a physical store they’ll be more likely to pick up your product if it’s the brand they recognize the most</li></ol><p>This is especially relevant for companies that sell relatively inexpensive products at high volumes (e.g. FMCG companies) or companies that sell products which are fairly indistinguishable in terms of price and features from their competitors (e.g. TVs within similar size categories). When you go to the store to buy toothpaste, the cost of the product is not high enough to justify a rational exploration of the pros and cons of various brands. Similarly when you buy a TV, once you’ve decided which size you want, most of the brands offer similar price points and features and so the most efficient way for your brain to decide which brand to choose is driven by brand exposure.</p><p><strong>The mind is lazy, and when the stakes aren’t high enough or when it is too difficult to differentiate between options, it will just choose the option that it likes the most.</strong></p><p>The digital marketers that internalize this point and leverage the power of branding in their digital marketing budgets are going to experience the greatest results in the long-term.</p><p>I hope you enjoyed the read! If you want to chat more about branding, I’d love to hear from you, e-mail me at joe@brilio.net</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bb65c7f3d635" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How do I go Viral (in Indonesia) ?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@joe.wadakethalakal/how-do-i-go-viral-ead10564a401?source=rss-62dd0c3a27be------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ead10564a401</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[social-media]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[content-marketing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indonesia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[medium]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Joe Wadakethalakal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 07 Mar 2017 06:10:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-03-07T06:12:44.078Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>“How do I go viral?” It’s the first question I’m usually asked when I meet someone. The truth is, although we’re known for creating a <strong>lot</strong> of “viral” content, there really is no guaranteed formula to manufacture virality (almost every week we’ll see content go viral at Brilio which completely surprise us). The fact is the virality of content is influenced by a wide range of factors, most of which are — as much as we hate to admit it — outside of our control as publishers.</p><p>In the era of social media, our role as media owners have changed. Media companies are no longer one of the few voices capable and responsible for setting the conversation and shaping public discourse. The unprecedented popularity of social media and the resulting proliferation of user generated content has given users the ability to define what content is popular, and what is not.</p><p>This shift in the control of content production from media firms to users has made it far more difficult to predict what content will turn into a “hit” with audiences. Simply put when you had an audience focusing on a limited set of channels, it was a fairly safe bet that one of those channels would generate a popular hit. Today, we effectively have an infinite number of channels, and the next hit could come from an established media company or from a woman hallway around the world in Texas sitting in a parking lot outside of a Kohl’s department store.</p><p>Now while we don’t believe that there’s a sure recipe for virality, we thought it would be interesting to look back on the 1 billion + content views we generated in 2016 to see if we could glean any insights on how one might increase their odds of actually going viral. We’ve organized our findings into three categories; distribution, genre, and content type. Let’s take a look at the insights.</p><h4>Distribution</h4><p>At Brilio, we think that the single most important thing you can do to maximize the popularity of your content is to distribute on multiple platforms. Contrary to when we started, today the majority of our content views (~80%) actually occur off-site through a combination of social media platforms, chat applications, and news aggregators.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/495/1*UiJSvWDci1vJB7pG8EOgYg.png" /></figure><p>The table above shows the mix of content consumption by platform for the month of January, 2017. As you can see, the majority of our content was consumed off-site with only 21.2% of views occurring on our website. Users, particularly on mobile, have a <strong>limited attention span</strong> and spend the <strong>majority of their time on a few apps</strong>, usually a combination of social media applications and chat. If you want to reach your audience, you must publish on the apps where they are spending their time.</p><h4>Genre</h4><p>Here’s a quick breakdown of the most popular content categories we saw in 2016:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*We7Xg3wN9tti2ZMPAu1stA.png" /></figure><p>One thing which is immediately apparent is that the ‘80/20’ rule applies when it comes to content. We have 32 content categories at Brilio, but our top 5 categories (15.0% of total categories) generated 75.0% of our total content impressions in 2016. We see this trend continuing in the early months of 2017.</p><p>Within the top 5 categories at Brilio, Celebrity and LOL (humor) lead in terms of views, generating close to 50.0% of our total views in 2016. This should come as no surprise; <strong>celebrity and humor content are extremely popular among young audiences in Indonesia</strong>. Interestingly the Celebrity category ended the year ahead of LOL in 2016, switching places from where these two categories stood in the beginning of the year.</p><p>When we rank content categories by content efficiency (i.e. Avg. Views Per Content) The LOL and Celebrity categories trade places. This is because Celebrity content consumption is less evenly distributed than LOL content, with a few standout hits that help carry the average for the entire category. As a case in point our best Celebrity article generated close to 2 million views, about 70.0% better than our best LOL article, however in terms of volume we created 20.0% more viral LOL articles than Celebrity articles (we define viral content as any content piece which exceeds 200,000 views soon after release). The takeaway is clear: Focus on humorous content if your goal is to reach the widest possible audience and maximize your odds of going viral in Indonesia.</p><h4>Content Formats</h4><p>What about the form and subject of the content? Note that for now I’m going to ignore video as over 90.0% of our content views last year were driven by written content. At Brilio we have four kinds of written content: Standard articles (a short 300–400 word article supplemented with images and video), Listicles (a list of images or text), Memes, and Interactive articles (Quizzes, Polls, Surveys). What does the data say about the most popular content format?</p><p>Here are our top 10 articles in the Celebrity category:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/709/1*LnAt20xqoo2iPpD2dQUmmQ.png" /></figure><p>And here are our top 10 articles in the LOL category:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/708/1*o2uMH0YX42mgGTjfuP3KWQ.png" /></figure><p>The overwhelming number of articles in the top 10 lists of either category are listicles (6 out of ten in the Celebrity category, and 9 out of 10 in the LOL category). Within the LOL category the combination of Listicle and Meme content formats perform extremely well with 5 out of the top 10 articles being a combination of these two. We believe this reflects a millennial preference for <strong>dense content formats, </strong>meaning that millennials favor formats which can convey more information with less time and space</p><p>One final interesting point to note is the similarity in content themes within the top 10 lists of both the Celebrity and LOL categories. In the Celebrity category, content focusing on comparisons of celebrities performed particularly well with 5 out of the top 10 articles focusing on these kinds of stories. In the LOL category we saw that content which combined humor and nostalgia, specifically humorous stories around major life events (e.g. high school, first job, marriage), performed quite well.</p><h4>Closing Thoughts</h4><p>There is no secret recipe for viral content, the ever-changing interests of our audience make such a simplistic formula impossible, but there are ways to increase your odds of success. First, make sure that you are distributing your content across all the distribution platforms available to you. Mobile users represent the majority of the audience in Indonesia and you’re much more likely to reach them if they can find your content on the apps on which they spend most of their time. Second, focus on humorous content, and make sure to write a wide range of articles within this genre. The 80/20 rule is dominant in content creation, and if you write a wide range of pieces you’re much more likely to arrive at a topic which will resonate with readers. Finally, focus on maximizing content density when thinking of content formats. Providing as much information as possible to be consumed in the shortest time possible is surefire way into the hearts of attention deficit millennials throughout the archipelago.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ead10564a401" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why we are doubling down on livestreaming]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@joe.wadakethalakal/why-we-are-doubling-down-on-livestreaming-dd16a459f618?source=rss-62dd0c3a27be------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dd16a459f618</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[social-media]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-marketing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[videos]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[marketing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[live-streaming]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Joe Wadakethalakal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 10 Dec 2016 09:22:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-12-10T09:22:10.226Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When we first launched Brilio in March 2015 our focus was solely on written content. We had an extremely strong and experienced editorial team that we brought over from other leading publishers and written content was what we knew best. We saw a clear gap in the market for millennial-first content in Indonesia and we went for it.</p><p>Over the past 18 months we have seen this strategy succeed far beyond our initial expectations. As of the end of November 2016 we drove over 114 million monthly pageviews to our platform across all of our distribution channels. In terms of monthly pageview traffic we have grown over 76 times from when we first launched the site.</p><p>During the early days of Brilio our primary concern was in finding our voice. Our goal at that time was to make sure that we were genuinely in touch with our audience and producing the kind of content they wanted. Today it is clear that our voice resonates with a massive and growing audience in Indonesia, and while maintaining that voice is a critical part of our business, innovating to find the best formats for that voice is what will take our business to the next level.</p><p>This is what drove us to move aggressively into video earlier this year. When we launched our video segment in March 2016 we were producing about 5 videos per month. Today we produce over 40 videos per month, a number which will continue to grow as long as our audiences continue to show a preference for video content.</p><p>Our audience engages more with videos than other media formats. In our early days, our best videos achieved around 100,000 views. Last month our best videos (organically) generated over 4 million views and 30,000 shares.</p><p>We are still at the very beginning of our video journey, but we are now poised for our next big leap: Live broadcasting and taking on Television head-to-head via digital live platforms.</p><p>In a few key ways, the opportunity in digital live video today is similar to what we saw in text 18 months ago. Today there are only a few players focused on creating high quality content for digital live platforms, and among those who are active, there is no clear leader among Indonesian millennials. Crucially, those who are active are simply moving TV formats online, instead of creating content formats tailored for the new platforms.</p><p>Audiences worldwide are embracing live broadcasts online. Since Facebook launched their live effort in May, the number of active users on their live platform quadrupled. Although Instagram only launched their livestreaming feature, Instagram Stories, in August, as of September the platform had over 100 million daily active users.</p><p>We see this as evidence that the ongoing transition in the viewing behavior of Indonesian millennials from analog to digital will only accelerate. Digital video will be one of the most valuable media formats in Indonesia and live will play a key role in making this a reality.</p><p>Watch this space.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dd16a459f618" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why mobile video will become the most valuable media channel in Indonesia]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@joe.wadakethalakal/why-mobile-video-will-become-the-most-valuable-media-channel-in-indonesia-8670d4dcea7a?source=rss-62dd0c3a27be------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8670d4dcea7a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[mobile-video]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mobile]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[advertising]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indonesia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-media]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Joe Wadakethalakal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 01 Sep 2016 10:28:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-09-01T10:34:40.266Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I was on the balcony of Brilio’s office the other day when I noticed two young construction workers taking some time off on the roof of an unfinished house across the street. Neither interacted with the other. Both had their heads down, focused on their smartphones.</p><p>They stayed like that for their whole break.</p><p>I couldn’t see what they were doing on their devices but I <em>can</em> make some educated guesses. They were most likely using sub-$100 USD Android devices and accessing social media (most likely through a subsidized prepaid social media plan), or on Youtube watching a video, or perhaps just chatting with friends through one of many popular messaging apps.</p><p>Contrast this image with a decade ago. The young men might still have phones, but they would be simple feature phones incapable of accessing the web or rich media. Instead of consuming content on their devices they would have most likely spent their break talking to each other, or huddled closely with a few others watching TV, if one was available.</p><p>This dramatic shift in behavior is caused primarily by the proliferation of smartphones, driven in turn by rapid improvements in their technology and a significant decline in prices that has made them accessible to tens of millions across Indonesia.</p><p>In 2013, Indonesian smartphone penetration was 18% percent. Today, that number is closer to 45% percent. This growth shows no sign of slowing down, and by 2020 we expect smartphone penetration to approach 90%+ of the population, bar a few stubborn holdouts. Indonesians with access to smartphones are also spending significantly more time on their devices than their televisions (on average, Indonesians spend 291 minutes per day in front of their mobile or tablet screen, vs. 132 minutes in front of their TV), and as far as we know there’s no indication that they will turn to TV as they age.</p><p>This rapid proliferation in smartphone penetration and usage has brought with it a sea change in Indonesians’ media consumption habits and in how a digital media company like Brilio should operate. Within another 10 years, this change will have significantly increased the value of mobile video in Indonesia, with the potential to equal or even overcome the size of the traditional broadcast TV market.</p><p>Smartphone penetration is only part of the story. Vast improvements in mobile targeting and data capabilities and accelerating growth in the quality of mobile video content are also key factors in driving the growth of value in mobile video.</p><p><strong><em>Mobile video offers greater effective reach vs. TV</em></strong></p><p>If the current rate of smartphone penetration growth holds over the next 5 years, mobile video as a channel will match the reach of broadcast television by 2020. This alone is a significant contributor to value, but we believe that viewers reached through smartphones are more valuable than those reached through TV because smartphones are able to deliver content targeted towards audiences on an individual basis.</p><p>Television penetration is extremely high in Indonesia, currently at 75% of total households, but the statistic is misleading because it tracks users on a household rather than on an individual basis.</p><p>Assuming a three-person household, the probability that all three members will want to watch the same content at a given time is actually fairly small. Think about how many times you have had to compromise while growing up.</p><p>What’s much more likely is the broadcaster will optimize the relevancy of their content for about a third to a half of their audience at any given time. Therefore, although broadcasters may claim to reach an extremely large audience, their effective reach, as measured by audiences for whom the content is relevant, is at best only half the published reach.</p><p>Broadcasters can gain some insight on the viewing behavior of households through measurement services such as Nielsen and Comscore but it is very hard for them to distinguish individual viewing habits within the household. TV broadcasters also lack the ability to monitor the true number of viewers at any given time. How many people are actually watching television, as opposed to leaving it on in the background, or spending most of their time on their second screens — for example, their smartphone? These are all questions that traditional broadcasters cannot answer, but mobile video producers <em>can</em>.</p><p>With smartphones, content creators and brands know when viewers are watching because content isn’t distributed passively once the phone is on. Creators and brands have access to real data showing them who is watching, where and at what time — key insights that traditional broadcasters lack.</p><p><strong><em>TV is king today, but not tomorrow</em></strong></p><p>While rising smartphone penetration means that more people will view video content on their mobile devices, the quality of video content produced for mobile devices today is still far inferior to the quality of television content. Part of this can be explained by the lower budgets allocated to mobile video, but much of this is still due to a lack of expertise, quality control, and experience in TV quality production amongst mobile video creators.</p><p>While this is true today, the gap in production quality is rapidly shrinking. Just look at popular Buzzfeed videos now streaming on Apple TV to see how quickly the quality of mobile video content is improving. This improvement is primarily driven by the deep analytics which are available on mobile.</p><p>Brands distributing content on mobile video can track with accuracy and precision the behavior of their audience as they watch content online. Detailed demographic data allows content creators to determine what kind of content works with various audiences so that they can optimize their content creation process. Creators can even track major drop off points in a video to identity weak moments that can then be corrected in future work.</p><p>The rich re-targeting features available through mobile is another critical factor which drives significant value for mobile video as a channel. Re-targeting allows brands to generate greater ROI from their campaigns by targeting individuals who have previously engaged with the brand and are therefore more likely to convert into a customer. Used properly, this approach can reduce ad-fatigue, increase brand awareness, and most importantly help drive customer conversions in the long-run.</p><p>Perhaps most valuable, creators and brands are able to receive direct feedback from their audience on their work by tracking comments and reactions on social media on a real-time basis. This direct interaction helps engender a greater sense of loyalty from the audience and eventually translates into a larger audience base.</p><p>All these data points consolidated and analyzed in concert drive a powerful positive feedback engine that allows mobile video content to improve at a much faster rate than traditional channels. This improvement translates into richer, customized content for targeted audiences that in turn improves ROI and increases the value of the channel as a whole.</p><p><strong><em>The future as I see it</em></strong></p><p>From where I sit, it’s clear to me that mobile video will become the most valuable content channel in the country. In time the vast majority of Indonesians will have access to a smartphone screen, and they will spend most of their time on that screen thanks to better content, driven in large part by advanced analytics. Noticing this improvement, and the significantly lower cost of creating mobile video content, brands will shift a greater portion of their marketing budget to the channel. This improvement in cost coupled with greater campaign performance due to strong data analytics and retargeting capabilities will further drive ROI improvements which will accelerate the budget shift. Zooming out of Indonesia for a moment, these factors combined lead me to believe that mobile video will be eventually become the dominant channel globally since these trends are in play throughout the world generally. Stay tuned on mobile video, it’s going to be an exciting space to watch over the next few years.</p><p><strong>Sources:</strong></p><ol><li>eMarketer, Media Penetration in Indonesia 2010–2014</li><li>eMarketer, Mobile Data and Device Metrics in Indonesia, 2015 &amp; 2020</li><li>Milward Brown, AdReaction Survey 2014</li><li><a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/05/17/to-watch-or-not-watch-the-power-lies-your-fingertips.html">http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/05/17/to-watch-or-not-watch-the-power-lies-your-fingertips.html</a></li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8670d4dcea7a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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