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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by John B. Sheldon on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by John B. Sheldon on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@johnbsheldon?source=rss-3688e4172301------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by John B. Sheldon on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@johnbsheldon?source=rss-3688e4172301------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Britain’s Vital Strategic Interests In Space]]></title>
            <link>https://johnbsheldon.medium.com/britains-vital-strategic-interests-in-space-9e2f49f40d09?source=rss-3688e4172301------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[united-kingdom]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[world]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[space]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[strategy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[John B. Sheldon]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 25 May 2021 13:46:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-05-25T13:46:42.744Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*9n3u6SM_0oTUYdwA8bGd3g.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image courtesy of the European Space Agency (ESA).</figcaption></figure><p>There are thousands of dedicated space professionals in the UK, who, between them, have established a world-class reputation in space science, commercial space and engineering, and in certain national security space operations.</p><p>This group of remarkable men and women have until recently, with a few noble exceptions, been let down by a succession of governments who have consistently failed to grasp the importance of space for UK economic, military, technological, and scientific interests at home and abroad, and who have not appreciated space as a domain of global geopolitical and geoeconomic competition in which the UK must assert and defend its interests.</p><p>This has to change, and not just because a flourishing sector of British industry needs government to take space more seriously as we look toward a post-Brexit world.</p><p>Brexit is forcing politicians to re-examine our interests in space and with whom we partner and co-operate there, as the fallout over the UK’s participation in the European Galileo programme amply demonstrates. This re-examination presents Britain with an opportunity to get back to strategic fundamentals about its interests in space and to consider the creation of an overarching policy framework that will help ensure that those interests are adequately protected. It is therefore very good news that Policy Exchange has set up Westminster’s only independent Space Policy Unit specifically dedicated to this task.</p><p>British politicians and officials must first recognise that space is a domain in which UK economic, security, technological, and scientific interests are at stake due to the intense geopolitical competition that is taking place beyond the Earth’s atmosphere. In essence, the UK’s security and competitiveness is bound up in the stability, security, and environmental health of Earth orbit and beyond.</p><p>Everything from the British way of warfare (and that of our allies) through to the daily functioning of critical infrastructure, financial networks, and logistics have become dependent upon the predictable and safe operation of hundreds of satellites in orbit.</p><p>Recognising space as a domain of geopolitical competition and national importance should then lead to the requirement for the creation of an overarching policy that governs and guides Britain’s interests in space. Among other things, such a policy should also help spotlight where the UK’s interests are most vital and acute, and thus identify capability requirements that should be developed by government, left to the commercial sector, or provided by friends and allies.</p><p>A comprehensive UK space policy should take account of British security, commercial, infrastructure, environmental, and scientific concerns, threats, interests, opportunities, and competitiveness. An example of such a policy framework can be found in Britain’s closest ally, the United States, where a comprehensive national space policy is issued with every new administration.</p><p>In any case, a comprehensive UK space policy should at the very least account for a number of fundamental space issues. First, reliable and assured options for access to space must be addressed, and should consider a mix of domestic, commercial, and allied capabilities. Without reliable and assured access to space all else is moot, and the UK has a number of choices in how this should be done that ranges from its own launch capability (as announced last year) through to using the launch services of commercial companies such as SpaceX or friends and allies such as the US, India, or Japan.</p><p>Second, consider framing guidelines and options for the UK space industrial base that identifies capabilities and requirements vital for assuring British space interests. This is not to advocate for subsidies, but it is a call to systematically and rigorously identify commercial space areas that are essential for economic and strategic interests and find ways to nurture them and make them resilient against domestic and international shocks.</p><p>Third, assure space systems through a combination of industrial, military, and diplomatic means. The intense geopolitical competition in space is making the satellites we rely upon more vulnerable to potential attack by adversaries such as Russia. A comprehensive UK space policy should provide guidance on what is permissible under which circumstance using a variety of means separately or in combination to protect invaluable UK satellites in peace, crisis, and war, either alone or in co-operation with friends and allies.</p><p>Fourth, Earth observation satellites play a vital role in monitoring and measuring the impact of climate change in Britain and abroad. Given the grave importance of climate change to the British population, its economy, and national security, a comprehensive UK space policy should include provisions for ensuring satellite data is received by British officials and scientists whenever it is required.</p><p>Fifth, a comprehensive UK space policy should be framed so as to assure British technological and scientific competitiveness over the coming decades. Certainly not all technology research and scientific endeavour is dependent upon space, but a great deal of it is. Everything from excellence in geophysics and environmental science through to advances in Artificial Intelligence and 3D printing crosscuts with a robust space industrial base and assured access to space.</p><p>Finally, a comprehensive UK space policy should undergird our understanding of what is happening in the space domain by setting out the requirement for national space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities, and Britain’s role and participation in global SSA activities. SSA involves the use of land-, sea-, air-, and space-based radars and telescopes that monitor the space environment in order to avoid collisions and maintain vigilance against purposeful interference with British and allied satellites. Without SSA we should be deaf, dumb, and blind in the space domain, and left needlessly vulnerable.</p><p>There are a number of reasons for British failure of strategic cognition and neglect in space over the decades. Some of these reasons are practical or the result of conscious policy decisions. For example, in military space the UK has for a number of decades been given access to highly-capable U.S. space systems that enable the British way of warfare through the use of navigation, communications, and high-resolution Earth observation satellites.</p><p>Other, less tangible, matters have also intruded upon a clear-eyed policy and strategic understanding of space in the UK. The inability to appreciate the importance of space as a domain of strategic competition, scientific achievement, and commercial opportunity has persisted in British policy circles over the years because there has emerged a similar lack of appreciation about the importance of sea, land, air, and cyber power to UK national interests.</p><p>Anyone who doubts this charge need look no further than the parlous state of the Royal Navy and the challenges it will face to secure global trade routes that will be even more vital to British economic and security interests post-Brexit.</p><p>British politicians and policy makers are going to discover that geography still very much matters in the post-Brexit world. Further, geography not only matters in navigating the resurgence of great power geopolitical competition in terms of alliances and balancing against hostile powers, but just as importantly in restoring and sustaining British mastery of all strategic domains — often in co-operation with friends and allies — in a meaningful manner as interests and circumstances dictate.</p><p>A good place to start to redress this strategic cognitive dissonance and neglect, and to assure Britain’s role as a force for good and prosperity in the 21st Century, is to acknowledge space as a strategic domain vital to UK interests and to develop an enduring comprehensive policy to assure those interests are advanced and defended.</p><p><em>This essay was originally published on 2 May 2019 by</em> <a href="https://policyexchange.org.uk/britains-vital-strategic-interests-in-space/">Policy Exchange</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9e2f49f40d09" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Middle East’s Cyber Security Crisis]]></title>
            <link>https://johnbsheldon.medium.com/the-middle-easts-cyber-security-crisis-797c6b85e13b?source=rss-3688e4172301------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-relations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[geopolitics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[middle-east]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[world]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[John B. Sheldon]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 24 May 2021 12:33:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-05-24T12:33:41.589Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*NXqlPJzvuvW9_8HksPJPaw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Many security specialists consider the Middle East to be the testbed for cyber espionage and warfare, especially since 2009 when the Iranian nuclear program was attacked by a malicious software called Stuxnet, allegedly by Israel and the United States. Cyberspace plays a vital role across the Middle East’s public, economic, political and strategic spheres. This year is likely to prove a watershed for the region as cybercrime, terrorism, warfare and espionage all combine into what can be described as a toxic brew that could ignite or further exacerbate already volatile tensions and crises. As if this were not bad enough, the real accelerant to these phenomena is the woeful state of cyber security throughout the region.</p><p>Yet, the vast majority of cyber incidences and attacks, whether against individuals, companies or even governments, are eminently preventable if basic safeguards are put in place and a security-conscious culture is promoted through public and workplace education and training. In looking at the cyberspace trends that are emerging and coalescing in the Middle East, it is obvious why a region-wide focus on cyber security is urgently needed.</p><p>Criminal use of cyberspace is growing rapidly throughout the region as internet use expands. This rise in cybercrime is greater than in any other part of the world. Organized crime gangs from Egypt, Israel, Lebanon and Turkey — as well as gangs from Albania, Armenia and Russia — are increasingly turning to online criminal activity in the Middle East. Similarly, terrorist groups are also turning to cybercrime in order to help finance their operations.</p><p>Next, while ISIS effectively is gone from its supposed caliphate in Syria and Iraq, it is as dangerous as ever as a terrorist threat and will likely grow a bigger presence on the internet for recruitment, financing, propaganda and coordination of attacks. Meanwhile, other terrorist groups across the region, from Hamas to Hezbollah, are revamping their online presence with more slick production standards and sophistication. In 2017, Hamas mounted a sophisticated phishing campaign on Facebook that lured Israeli soldiers to accounts that purportedly belonged to beautiful young women, convincing them to give up personal details to the terrorist group. These kinds of online information operations by states and non-state groups across the Middle East will occur more frequently, and with greater sophistication, against a range of military, political and economic targets.</p><p>And while everyone spies on everyone else, or so it seems, Iran has been particularly brazen in its cyber-espionage activities against its own citizens, as well as against its regional rivals, especially Saudi Arabia. These espionage campaigns are getting better in their execution and more difficult to detect, and will continue unabated. Significantly, while Middle Eastern governments, companies and other institutions should expect that countries like Israel, China, Russia and the United States can probably access their networks at will, more and more countries within the Arab world are acquiring the technical expertise and tradecraft required to carry out their own cyber-espionage operations.</p><p>While the Middle East is regarded by great powers as a testbed for cyber-warfare concepts, as demonstrated by the 2009 Stuxnet attack against the Iranian nuclear program, the majority of states within the region have not engaged in cyber warfare until very recently. With the exception of Israel and, to a lesser extent, Iran, most Middle Eastern states have only recently viewed cyber warfare as a viable tool in interstate rivalry and competition. According to David Patrikarakos, author of <em>War in 140 Characters</em>, information has always been a major component in war, but was always used to complement conventional force. In the 21st century, however, information is the very thing being fought over and conventional force is increasingly complementing information operations. As more and more countries across the Middle East incorporate cyber-warfare capabilities and expertise into their national security institutions, the immediate future is likely to see a significant uptick in cyber warfare among countries in the region.</p><p>On all cyber fronts, the picture looks uncertain for the Middle East, a prospect not helped by the fact that, apart from Israel, no Middle Eastern country has a significant technology base where cyber technologies and software are indigenously developed, manufactured and sold. The Middle East is behind most global benchmarks in the development and use of artificial intelligence and machine learning, software development and certification, and in robotics and other forms of automation. But it is in cyber security practice and awareness and training that the Middle East is really behind.</p><p>Yet, with relatively modest investments and effort, the majority of the malign actors in cyberspace can be thwarted. Cyber-security technologies are important and enjoy healthy sales in the region. But cyber-security technology and software are only as good as the security culture practiced by its human users, and it is here where citizens, executives and policymakers should make a concerted effort.</p><p>Simple yet effective training in cyber hygiene for all employees in the workplace can go a long way in preventing the majority of cybercrime and espionage incidences. Similarly, cyber-hygiene education and training in schools, universities and in local media for all citizens who use information communication technologies can also make a large dent.</p><p>More advanced cyber-security training in government ministries, strategic industries and in media organizations is also likely needed — again, for all employees — but will pay dividends in terms of the reduction in successful cyber incidences and attacks. Regional and international companies offering cyber-security solutions should make a greater effort to emphasize the non-technical side of security to their regional clients. And private citizens, corporate executives and policymakers should all promote the idea that cyber security is the responsibility of all of us who use information technology, not just the IT department.</p><p><em>This essay was first published on 31 January 2018 by</em> <a href="https://syndicationbureau.com/en/the-middle-easts-cyber-security-crisis/">Syndication Bureau</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=797c6b85e13b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[In Defense of Space Control]]></title>
            <link>https://johnbsheldon.medium.com/in-defense-of-space-control-50743309d59d?source=rss-3688e4172301------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[space]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[strategy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[world]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-relations]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[John B. Sheldon]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 24 May 2021 12:27:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-05-24T12:27:08.319Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1HrNW48OWuoSajSwMd0nQA.jpeg" /><figcaption>An artist’s depiction of a U.S. Global Positioning Satellite (GPS). Image courtesy of the U.S. government.</figcaption></figure><p>Speaking on April 15, 2015, about the growing threat from China, Russia, and others against U.S. military satellites at the 31st National Space Symposium, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work told his audience that, “[w]hile we rely heavily on space capabilities, in both peace and war, we must continue to emphasize space control as challenges arise.”</p><p>Judging by the heated reaction to Deputy Secretary Work’s use of the term ‘space control,’ one could be forgiven for thinking that he had just made up U.S. policy on the fly — and that preparations are finally underway to build the <a href="https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/response/isnt-petition-response-youre-looking">Death Star</a>. For example, Theresa Hitchens, a scholar at the University of Maryland’s Center for International and Security Studies and the former director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, told <a href="http://www.breakingdefense.com/2015/04/depsecdef-work-invokes-space-control-analysts-fear-space-war-escalation/">Breaking Defense</a> that space control “has a connotation regarding offensive activities.” Further, Ms. Hitchens asserts that there seems to be more “aggressive attitudes on threat response” within the U.S. national security space community. Victoria Samson of the Secure World Foundation <a href="http://www.breakingdefense.com/2015/04/depsecdef-work-invokes-space-control-analysts-fear-space-war-escalation/">claims</a> that the mention of space control primes “the pump…for a more active counter space program for the United States.”</p><p>Yet Deputy Secretary Work was hardly speaking off the cuff, nor is he the first to mention the term “space control” in recent months — that honor goes to the commander of the 14th Air Force, Lt. Gen. John “Jay” Raymond, in <a href="https://www.docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS29/20150325/103106/HHRG-114-AS29-Wstate-RaymondUSAFJ-20150325.pdf">testimony</a> he gave to Congress in late March. The fact is that space control — the ability in peace, crisis and war to assure access to and use of space — has been an enduring feature of U.S. national space policy for several decades. The need to train, equip and prepare to exercise space control, should it be required, has been a continuing and consistent facet of national space policy since at least the Eisenhower administration, and is mentioned explicitly in the space policies of Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and now Barack Obama, all of which are publicly <a href="http://marshall.org/making-national-space-policy/">available</a>.</p><p>Therefore, when Deputy Secretary Work mentioned space control to his audience in Colorado Springs, he did not do so from a policy and contextual vacuum. Over the past two years there has been an increasing concern within the Obama administration about the growing threats against U.S. military and intelligence space systems. These threats emanate largely from <a href="http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2014/July/Pages/NewChineseThreatstoUSSpaceSystemsWorryOfficials.aspx">China</a> and <a href="http://marshall.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Russian-Space-Nov-13.pdf">Russia</a>, but also from countries such as <a href="http://csbaonline.org/publications/2012/01/outside-in-operating-from-range-to-defeat-irans-anti-access-and-area-denial-threats/">Iran</a>. The threats themselves range from capabilities that can <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/international/21582288-satellite-positioning-data-are-vitalbut-signal-surprisingly-easy-disrupt-out">jam</a>the signals from satellites, to using lasers to <a href="http://www.wired.com/2009/11/is-this-chinas-anti-satellite-laser-weapon-site/">dazzle</a> the cameras on U.S. reconnaissance satellites. Additionally, a growing <a href="http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/659ab77e-c276-11e4-ad89-00144feab7de.html#axzz3XP2Jqv7r">cyber threat</a> against space systems as well as the ongoing testing and development of <a href="http://spacenews.com/41676senior-us-official-insists-china-tested-asat-weapon/">hit-to-kill antisatellite (ASAT)</a> weapons that can physically destroy satellites in orbit pose increasing threats to U.S. national security.</p><p>Further, U.S. concerns over growing threats to satellites are hardly confined to a handful of senior officers at Air Force Space Command or officials in the Pentagon. Instead, officials in the <a href="http://breakingdefense.com/2015/04/space-control-spending-triples/">State Department</a>, members of <a href="http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/lawmakers-revive-space-caucus/article/2558656">Congress</a> from both sides of the aisle and the president himself have expressed concerns about these threats and the vulnerabilities of U.S. space assets. Just as importantly, the growing threat to space systems is not just a preoccupation of Washington, DC. Officials in Brussels, New Delhi and Tokyo, among others, are also increasingly concerned about the evolving threat environment in space, and they see China and Russia as the primary sources of these threats.</p><p>Since the United States and its allies are dependent on these satellites for everything from maintaining and operating critical infrastructure and the everyday functioning of modern society, through to the American way of war itself, these growing threats to satellites can not be ignored by policymakers. Fortunately, since the Eisenhower administration, the U.S. has crafted and evolved a remarkably <a href="https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/04/20/in_defense_of_space_control_107871.html#http://www.afpc.org/files/september2013.pdf">enduring</a> space policy. The fundamentals of which have scarcely changed over the decades, yet is more than capable of dealing with the growing threat environment in space.</p><p>That policy, last updated in <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_space_policy_6-28-10.pdf">2010</a>, is enabling government officials to carry out several initiatives designed to enable mission assurance by space systems in an increasingly hostile space domain. These include measures to physically <a href="http://www.airforce-technology.com/features/featurespace-wars-should-militaries-be-doing-more-to-protect-critical-satellite-systems-4199682/">protect</a>satellites against threats such as jamming and laser dazzling, as well as creating a new satellite architecture emphasizing <a href="http://www.afspc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-130821-034.pdf">resilience and redundancy</a> to mitigate threats such as ASATs. These initiatives are part of the space control mission and do not involve things such as ‘space weapons’ and other exotic or controversial capabilities. If offensive force is ever required to assure U.S. access to its space systems, it will take place in the traditional domains of the land, sea, and air, as well as through the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) and cyberspace — a contingency that will only come into effect in a time of actual war.</p><p>The current and proposed <a href="http://www.spacefoundation.org/sites/default/files/downloads/Update%206%20FY%202015%20DoD%20Space%20Budget%20Comparison.pdf">budgets</a> support the claim that offensive force for space control will take place in terrestrial domains, since there is no U.S. plan to deploy (or even develop) weapons in orbit. Conventional weapons and capabilities based in the traditional domains of land, sea and air, as well as the EMS and cyberspace, can achieve the space control mission without even entering space by targeting, and if necessary attacking, adversary jammers and lasers, ASAT launch sites and other capabilities that might threaten friendly satellites. In this regard space control is no different conceptually from the sea and air control that navies and air forces have been employing effectively for a very long time. Rather than implying or suggesting that we are on the cusp of some form of disturbing development in military technology, as critics assert, the actual practice of space control — should it come to that — will be viewed as prosaic when compared to the misinformed hype of its critics. There is nothing in the space control concept that mandates space-based weapons or other exotic capabilities.</p><p>Certainly the United States will continue to pursue diplomatic solutions to mitigate the risks posed by the counter-space capabilities being developed by the likes of China and Russia. However, diplomatic success is far from guaranteed due to China’s refusal to engage in direct government-to-government talks on space security, and the breakdown in relations with Russia over its annexation of the Crimea and continued interference in Ukraine. Geopolitics, far from stopping at the edge of space, will always extend to the orbits of Earth, and the United States should not be restrained in its ability to defend its vital interests there — as well as assure access to its own systems, especially in crisis and war.</p><p>Space control is a vital element to U.S. space policy, but it is too often naively or disingenuously maligned by critics who seem unable to offer any viable alternative. They are too ready to criticize the United States for its desire to protect its assets in space rather than condemn those who are determined to extend warfare into space by threatening American satellites. The Obama administration deserves credit for taking the threat seriously, and we should all hope that its measures are not only timely but are also sufficient to ensure continued access to space in the coming years.</p><p><em>This essay was first published on April 19, 2015, at</em> <a href="https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/04/20/in_defense_of_space_control_107871.html">RealClearDefense.com</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=50743309d59d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Realism Endures: Why States Seek Digital Arms and Will Continue to Do So]]></title>
            <link>https://johnbsheldon.medium.com/realism-endures-why-states-seek-digital-arms-and-will-continue-to-do-so-86377fa1027b?source=rss-3688e4172301------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[international-relations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-warfare]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[world]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[John B. Sheldon]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 24 May 2021 12:05:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-05-24T12:05:33.065Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BTNHMFj93npFSdOzfv3tUA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Why is there an emerging market in so-called ‘digital arms’? More particularly, where is the demand for digital arms coming from? Just as James Lewis, <a href="https://cyberdialogue.ca/2013/03/arms-trade-as-analogy-by-james-lewis/">writing elsewhere</a> in this forum, asks what it is that regulation of the digital arms trade would seek to prevent, we should also ask why there is a demand for such software in the first place.</p><p>Software that is deliberately designed (or unintentionally able) to defend, police, and control cyberspace, and even use cyberspace as a means of attack, is developed, sold, and used not only in an economic context where undoubtedly software developers can profit from their wares, but ultimately in a political context. For sure, private entities such as corporations might use such software for purposes of commercial espionage, or to actively undermine the commercial viability of competitors. Such use is a serious issue, but commercial-to-commercial espionage and dirty tricks is hardly anything new. Yet the biggest demand for such software — indeed the raison d’etre of the industry itself — is from governments around the world seeking to protect and further their interests in cyberspace.</p><p>The emergence and near-ubiquity of cyberspace around the world is certainly a technological marvel, and has become an icon of modernity which holds promises yet unseen that may make our everyday lives more convenient and comfortable. Yet it has become easy to forget, or convenient to ignore, that states exist in a constant state of insecurity. The emergence and rapid growth of cyberspace has only compounded this sense of insecurity among all states, regardless of their geographical location or political constitution. From developed, post-industrial liberal-democracies concerned about large-scale <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/11/remarks-tom-donilon-national-security-advisory-president-united-states-a">economic espionage</a> and the protection of cyber-dependent <a href="http://www.oecd.org/governance/risk/46889922.pdf">critical infrastructure</a> through to authoritarian regimes seeking to maintain their grip on absolute political power by <a href="http://www.citizenlab.org/cybernorms/letter.pdf">blocking undesirable content</a> at national firewalls and conducting intrusive and oppressive surveillance against individuals seeking to bring about democracy, the rule of law, and promote human rights, cyberspace has become a source of insecurity for governments around the world. Therefore, the nature of the problem — the source of the demand for such products — is political.</p><p>Understanding the political context in this regard is essential if we are to at least fully comprehend the phenomenon, even if there is little chance that we can effectively regulate or curb the development, sale, and use of such software. <a href="http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/7273/the-case-against-cyber-arms-control">I echo Jim Lewis’ pessimism</a> that such a market, and its remorseless demand, can ever be meaningfully controlled. Demand — and the market that feeds it — will only dissipate when the political context adequately changes and the calculus of insecurity with it. For this to happen requires, at root, political change that takes place within larger, dynamic social, cultural, and technological interactions that are impossible to predict or control.</p><p>It’s bad enough that this takes place at a local level. Our challenge is compounded by the fact that we must also understand the political context at a regional and even global level. Alexander Klimburg <a href="https://cyberdialogue.ca/2013/03/wcit-12-the-shadow-at-evening-rising-by-alexander-klimburg/">rightly points out</a> the stark political cleavages that now exist between liberal-democratic states and other countries in light of the 2012 World Conference on International Telecommunications in Dubai. This is not to argue that illiberal states cannot, or will not, change. Many illiberal states probably will change, but that change will happen due to deeper forces at work over long periods of time rather than the purported transformational, and supposedly rapid, effect of cyberspace. Though Klimburg correctly identifies a worrying development in the governance of cyberspace he is perhaps hyperbolic, and certainly misreads the wider political context, when he employs Cold War metaphors such as the 1945 Yalta Conference and the Iron Curtain to describe what is happening.</p><p>The political cleavages in cyberspace are certainly an issue of great concern, but it is a clash of interests that does not necessarily impede other facets of international politics elsewhere, or at worst, is simply a reflection of <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/article/ennui-becomes-us-3330">a much wider and slow fracturing</a> of the international order that malign activities in cyberspace are certainly exacerbating, but most definitely did not cause. What is occurring in cyberspace is taking place across the spectrum of global political interactions. From managing the global economy through to dealing with climate change, international consensus is becoming increasingly difficult to achieve (though, in reality, international consensus on any issue has always been a rarity). The political cleavages in cyberspace are merely a part of this wider trend that is itself a reflection of tremendous geopolitical change ongoing today as new powers rise at the relative expense of established powers.</p><p>Despite these changes, however, differences in cyberspace are overshadowed by more important problems, as well as by more powerful interests. For example, it is possible to disagree — and disagree vehemently — with a country about Internet freedom while at the same time maintaining otherwise healthy and constructive relations. It is plausible to argue that a country’s stance on Internet freedom is a reflection of their stance on human rights and other values we hold dear, and that this is enough to cast a shadow over all relations with such a country. Yet, politicians and policy makers in most countries have yet to be convinced that this is a prudent course of action because, in their calculations, more is obviously at stake. We sanction North Korea not because it has an abysmal Internet freedom and human rights record but because, against the wishes of the wider international community, it possesses nuclear weapons and is bellicose.</p><p>If only it were otherwise, but politics is just as flawed and pregnant with tragedy today as it was when Thucydides wrote <a href="http://www.amazon.com/History-Peloponnesian-War-Thucydides/dp/0140440399/ref=sr_1_3?s=books&amp;ie=UTF8&amp;qid=1363307734&amp;sr=1-3">The History of the Peloponnesian War</a> nearly 2,500 years ago. The emergence of cyberspace has led many to believe that it is a harbinger of political change of a magnitude not seen since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The truth of the matter is that the most powerful actors shaping how cyberspace is used and governed today are not super-empowered individuals campaigning for justice, but <a href="http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2011/spring/demchak-dombrowski.pdf">states advancing and protecting interests</a> and seeking to mitigate their sense of insecurity. Digital arms — such as they are — will be a permanent feature in one form or another of domestic and international political landscapes so long as states have interests and insecurities in cyberspace, but this does not mean that repeated acts of individual defiance and courage won’t make a difference. It’s just a continuation of the same ancient struggle but by other, digital means.</p><p><em>This essay was originally published on March 15, 2013, on the</em> <a href="https://cyberdialogue.ca/2013/03/realism-endures-why-states-seek-digital-arms-and-will-continue-to-do-so-by-john-b-sheldon/">CyberDialogue.ca</a> <em>blog.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=86377fa1027b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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