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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Jon DiMaggio on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Jon DiMaggio on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Jon DiMaggio on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jon.dimaggio?source=rss-45fd5e5f9bd5------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Behind the Scenes Look into Investigating Conti Leaks]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jon.dimaggio/a-behind-the-scenes-look-into-investigating-conti-leaks-f57064a2afd2?source=rss-45fd5e5f9bd5------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[ransomware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dark-web-data]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[conti-ransomware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[conti]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybercrime]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jon DiMaggio]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 04 Apr 2023 13:00:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-04-04T13:03:21.270Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Author Note: I originally published this information on 21 March 2022 when I wrote it for my employer, Anayst1. At the time, I wanted to provide insight that was different in comparison to what my peers produced. So, I went through the data from Conti leaks, identified unique information I could pivot on, and was able to link some external accounts on the dark web to some of the employees supporting Conti’s operation. I analyzed what they were doing and how it played a role in Conti’s criminal business model. This particular angle had not been discussed or identified at the time and provided a unique view of their operation and how underground resources had been leveraged. Enjoy!</em></p><p>Hello, fellow “bad guy” chasers! Jon DiMaggio here! Today I wanted to discuss the Conti ransomware gang and what I learned over the past couple of weeks since their operation was exposed. When news of the Conti leak began to emerge, I felt like a child on Christmas morning, knowing today was the day I got to peel off the wrapping paper, open the box, and see all the toys that hide within. Unfortunately for me, thousands of other kids (researchers) were also opening my same present and playing with my shiny new toy! Since there are high volumes of analysis and reporting surrounding the leak, I will try not to waste your time regurgitating the same content many of my hard-working peers are reporting.</p><p>If you have read any of my previous research, you know I like to write formal investigative papers on the longer-term research I do at Analyst1. However, today I want to share some of our findings on last week’s data leak regarding the Conti ransomware operation and share how I use Analyst1, our threat intelligence platform, to explore the data released in the leak. In other words, I intend to share my findings and tell you about how I used our TIP in a non-traditional way to explore the data provided in the Conti leak. However, I promise we will share some interesting information about the leaks and explore some leads generated through our analysis to learn more about the Conti ransomware operation. To begin, let’s briefly discuss background information on the Conti ransomware gang.</p><h3>Background</h3><p>Conti is a Ransomware as a service provider (RaaS) that relies on hackers for hire, known as affiliates, to conduct attacks. Understand that most RaaS providers, aka the “core gang” reside in Russia. The affiliates, however, are spread across several countries but primarily live in Russia and Ukraine. Due to this, In February 2022, when the Russian government began its military invasion into Ukraine, many of us in the cyber security community questioned how it would affect the internal working relationships between the core gang and affiliates and their operations.</p><p>On the one hand, bad guys running the gangs could quietly keep their opinions and let the business operate as usual. Alternatively, they could choose sides and loudly drive their national patriotism down the throats of their fellow criminal business partners. When it comes to money and running a business, even an illegal one, I feel the correct approach is common sense, right? Well, for Conti leadership, it was not. Instead, Conti chose the latter of the two options. On February 25th, Conti posted the below message to their name and shame data leak site, Conti[.]news.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/251/0*mR9Z0Sih5YreVd7f.jpg" /></figure><p>After the post, it appears Conti realized its stance might be detrimental to business and attempted to backtrack by replacing the original post with the message below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/526/0*HU5MbNpWsKiaIAgQ.jpg" /></figure><p>Conti, thanks for clearing that up. While slightly less polarizing than the first post, clearly, the gang chose to side with Russa publicly and is ready to attack “Western warmongers.” Since Ukraine is the region west of Russia, the statement alienates much of the gang’s affiliate resources and now makes them a target to any pro-Ukraine hacker. Additionally, Conti likely made enemies with some of the best hackers in the world, their affiliates.</p><p>Shortly after, on February 27th, 2022, an unknown person registered the Twitter handle “@ContiLeaks” and began to release private Conti data, publicly. You can see their profile below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*UtJopHQ9pTxvafi4.jpg" /></figure><p>There has been a lot of chatter about who is behind the @contileak account. Some believe it is a cyber security researcher, while others believe it is one of Conti’s affiliate gang members. We don’t know which theory is correct, but one thing is clear, the leaker sides with Ukraine and is anti-Russian. But, more importantly, the leaker appears to have a serious issue with the Conti gang.</p><p>The leaker posted anti-Russian messages over the first days of activity and provided several URLs that host the Conti gang’s internal communications and other sensitive content.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*7HPZMN1sBS2kldqW.jpg" /></figure><p>Note: Not long after posting the messages, the links to download files were deactivated by anonfiles. Fortunately, our friends at VX-Underground hosted the files on their own infrastructure, making it available for researchers to access and continue analysis. Thank you @vxunderground! You can find the files here: <a href="https://share.vx-underground.org/Conti/">https://share.vx-underground.org/Conti/</a></p><p>Now keep in mind Conti is known for being one of the most successful ransomware attackers we have seen to date. However, based on how the gang handled the leak, we learned that the Conti gang themselves are not that bright. For example, despite the initial data leaks over the 27th and 28th, the gang could not identify how the leak occurred or prevent further exposure. Further, Conti did not secure its access from the leaker. Over the first week of March, after the initial posts from late February, the ContiLeaks account continued to post new, “fresh” leaks showing the attacker’s continued conversations.</p><p><strong><em>Like a fly on the wall…</em></strong></p><p>Similar to many other researchers, I spent most of that week reading through Conti’s private chat logs between its members. Understand, these chat logs captured conversations between members at all levels and ranks within the gang. However, all its members used anonymous handles associated with the gang’s Tor-based jabber server “@q3mcco35auwcstmt.onion”. While we could not distinguish the actual identity of most users within the chat logs, the conversations themselves still proved extremely valuable in learning about the day-to-day operations of the gang.</p><p>It was comical to read their “water cooler talk” as they tried to determine who leaked the information and how? However, it baffles me why Conti waited to shut down their servers after realizing someone jeopardized their entire operation. Further, why would they continue to use the compromised infrastructure for nearly a week after its exposure? Conti now understands how their victims feel when making tough decisions that impact business after a breach. Further, it is puzzling why Conti did not use a chat client that provided end-to-end encryption. If they had, the majority of the leaked data would be worthless.</p><p>On a side note, you have to love the irony. In ALL their attacks, Conti taunts its victims threatening to publish their sensitive data, making it public, which is exactly what @ContiLeaks did to them. Below is an exert from the ransom note Conti leaves on its victim’s systems after infection:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*xeeJTKZaaLjL1Ss8.jpg" /></figure><p>You know what they say about Karma. Now, @ContiLeaks gave the ransomware gang some of its own medicine. Thank you @ContiLeaks!</p><h3>Digging through leak data</h3><p>Since the names and addresses used by Conti members to communicate on their jabber server are not very useful by themselves, we needed to identify which accounts were significant and which were not. My initial approach was to map out the conversations visually, but I did not have a solution to do so quickly. So instead, after discussing with one of my colleagues, I decided to ingest the data into our Analyst1 threat intelligence platform (TIP).</p><p>Initially, I was unsure how useful it would be to analyze jabber-based chat logs since defenders primarily use threat intelligence platforms to analyze threat data. However, doing so allowed me to see the volume of messages sent from each account as well as extract domains, IP addresses, and URLs, amongst others, found in the chat logs. The below screenshot displays the most active accounts located within the chat logs. The number listed under the evidence column represents how many conversations each account posted seen within the leaked data I uploaded for analysis:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*yMocYTym9nsqJK43.jpg" /></figure><p>Identifying the most active accounts allowed me to focus my time and resources on a much smaller data set. Now I could focus on what I considered high-value data and return later to review the rest. For example, from the leaked data I am analyzing, you can see that the account using the handle “stern” is the most active. Examining the evidence section also shows me each JSON file the account and its associated conversation appear in. Then, when selected, the Analyst1 platform shows me exactly where the indicator or handle is used, allowing me to read the conversations between the selected target and associated Conti member as seen below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*PkP0Iei216KSzymN.jpg" /></figure><p>Next, I wanted to try and pivot from the internal anonymized Conti accounts within the chat logs and find external leads. If I could find other accounts in the public domain and link it to the individual using the internal Conti handle, I thought I might be able to learn more about the operation itself or the people behind it.</p><p>To start, I wanted to try and find any conversations discussing handles or hacking forums on the dark web. Historically, ransomware bad guys spend time and communicate on dark web forums and marketplaces. They use the markets/forums to recruit hackers, obtain exploits and purchase attack resources. Therefore, I thought this was an excellent place to start since most of the leaked chat logs contain commentary about attack operations, making it likely they would discuss the forums they recruit from.</p><p>Looking for this information manually would be a tedious task. So instead, I used Analyst1 to identify accounts related to some known forums that ransomware bad guys frequent. To begin, I simply searched for any email address, URL, or domain that ended in “.onion”, the top-level domain used for ToR based websites. Then I removed results ending in “q3mcco35auwcstmt.onion” since the domain is only used for Conti’s internal chats and is not associated with external related accounts. Within the results, I found several URLs of forums I know ransomware bad guys frequent, the XSS and Exploit dark web forums. Below is an example of the data I found:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*6SzWkKN6a3wi-sQF.jpg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*NIzV1Q3KCcdWtCDT.jpg" /></figure><p>Next, I began to research the content on the associated URLs. Before navigating to the forums directly, I first looked at the associated evidence in Analyst1 to view the conversations in which the URLs are discussed. For example, the below conversation took place on September 9th, 2020 between two Conti members discussing a recruitment post on the hacking forum XSS:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*k14KbqZsjWup-HhS.jpg" /></figure><p>Navigating to the forum, I saw the job posted presumably by “Target”, using the alias “Khano” from their XSS account (Great Avatar, BTW!)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*eq1MLYIuCcOTvfBz.jpg" /></figure><p>Next, I Followed Khano’s posts over time. Reading each post led to discovering several other employment and service ads posted between September 2020 through February 2021, such as the ones below that provide additional context on the labor, services and technologies Conti desired to support their operation:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*VitdZCipuHMqQnzp.png" /></figure><p>Interestingly, Conti first offered $1,000/1,200 per month in September but increased the salary offered to $1,500 per week in October. Perhaps, they were not getting the applicants they desired, so they increased the salary to lure better prospects. However, for a gang that brings in hundreds of millions in extra revenue, $1,500 per week seems pretty cheap. In the same post, Target/Khano ask for individuals with the skill to bypass (Windows) defender and use their (Conti) ransomware to encrypt files. Khano makes it clear he/she is not searching for other providers who use their own ransom payload, but only wants talent that can work with their (Conti) ransomware.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*7QG_P6Yn60PM6BcS.jpg" /></figure><p>Then in February 2021, Conti is looking for bots and individuals with experience exploiting RDP, VNC, and VPN technologies to gain access into target environments. All of which are standard methods seen used in Conti attacks.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*VfiQtzCe6Bfult_E.jpg" /></figure><p>Following forum posts and ads on the Dark Web is an excellent source of information and a resource I always take advantage of when investigating cybercriminals. After reviewing the posts on XSS I jump back to the Analyst1 platform and query for email accounts for (@exploit.im) the other dark web forum I saw discussed in the leak data.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*69DcUGTGFipdnecS.jpg" /></figure><p>From the leaked data, 24 accounts associated with the Exploit forum exist. Using the information, I begin to go through the forum and look at each account, their posts, and mentions from other users. I found several accounts used to buy and sell digital certificates used later in malicious attacks. Below is one of the certificate related posts of interest to Conti:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*vg3bmcwpA50a0aCi.jpg" /></figure><p>Obtaining code signing certificates makes sense since Conti needs to sign their code and malware payload so it appears legitimate and passes security checks when introducing it to victim operating systems.</p><p>Next, I continued to check the ToR based URLs and accounts discussed in the leak data. We will not detail everything we found, but one more is worth discussing. One of the accounts Conti members discuss has long-standing roots in the ransomware community. The associated Exploit account existed long before Conti ransomware operations began. The account authored a post back in 2017 that provided a hands-on tutorial on how to “write ransomware for windows” and created a tutorial with screenshots, the ransomware code itself, and even a video:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*dJhWhoDYw1c7ADl-.jpg" /></figure><p>Obviously, we wanted to look for any indication the code could have later been used to create the Conti payload. Unfortunately, it was a long shot and did not match Conti ransomware code. Instead, the code appears to compile legacy ransomware detected as ransom.spora (Malwarebytes). Still, it provided us insight into the individuals working the Conti operation today and how they may have begun their interest in ransomware development years before the Conti operation began.</p><p>Since there are many valuable and interesting resources on the darkweb besides criminal forums, I looked into other URLs discussed within the chat logs. I expanded my search to show all dark web infrastructure. Analyst1 quickly identified 43 URLs accessed across 5 root domains:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*uhI53_UHQpA8LeBB.jpg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*so7y6oKLM0KAJS9H.jpg" /></figure><p>Many of the listed domains/URLs are no longer active, but I could use the evidence section of Analyst1 to quickly read the conversation in which the domain is discussed and gain more insight into its relevance to the attacker.</p><h3>Wrapping up</h3><p>As I stated at the beginning of the blog, there is a LOT of data to go through from the leak. While that will take time, as a lone analyst, I gained a lot of information quickly at the start of my investigation simply by extracting the data to the Analyst1 platform and correlating the data within. I had many other findings early on by using Analyst1 to correlate the data and expand on its context by conducting research on each lead. Many of the interesting findings have since been reported by other researchers and security organizations which is why I have not included everything here. However, I thought this use case presented a unique way to use a threat intelligence platform and allowed me to share some of the interesting aspects of my early research from the first few days of the leak. More importantly, I was able to identify previously unknown IOCs seen in Conti attacks and use them to defend against future attacks. In total, I identified:</p><ul><li>652 domains</li><li>782 email addresses</li><li>266 file hashes</li><li>649 IP addresses</li><li>4,565 URLs</li><li>4,323 HTTP Requests</li></ul><p>Keep in mind not all of these are from the chat logs alone, but from other Conti data and code released as well. You should also know that many of the IOCs are from websites and services used to facilitate Conti’s operational needs and were not necessarily malicious. For that reason, it takes a human to examine the data and make it actionable, but Analyst1 gave me a head start. Unfortunately, leaks such as this are rare. However, this is the first time we have been able to pull the curtain back and look at a ransomware gang from behind the scenes. Eventually, I may put out an in-depth report on Conti, similar to what I did with a “<a href="https://analyst1.com/whitepaper/history-of-revil">History of REvil</a>”, but for now, I found the data perfect for this use case and wanted to share some of our own behind the scene details into how I use Analyst1 in my investigations.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f57064a2afd2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Iran CNE: Unmasking State Sponsored Hacking (2014)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jon.dimaggio/iran-cne-unmasking-state-sponsored-hacking-2014-6cccc11f54db?source=rss-45fd5e5f9bd5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6cccc11f54db</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-espionage]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybercrime]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jon DiMaggio]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 05 Oct 2022 15:49:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-10-05T15:49:48.828Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Author Note:</strong><em> I originally published this and several other blogs between 2013–2014 on my website, which I took down several years later. I thought it would be fun to repost and share the research for historical purposes. If you have read my book, </em><a href="https://nostarch.com/art-cyberwarfare"><em>The Art of Cyberwarfare</em></a><em>, or read any of my public work from </em><a href="https://analyst1.com/company/blog"><em>Analyst1</em></a><em>, you can see how my writing has developed over the years. I wrote these as a hobby at the time and there was no affiliation with any of my employers at the time.</em></p><h3>Intro</h3><p>Recently Iran has been in a hot topic in political news as well as the cyber arena. Iran has had a lot of change and has stood up new cyberinfrastructure over the last few years. The most notable event was in November of 2010 when Iran stood up the Cyber Defense Command after the Stuxnet incident. Below is a high-level over view of the cyberinfrastructure in place by the Iranian government (1):</p><ul><li>High Council of Cyberspace</li><li>Iran’s Cyber Army (likely affiliated with the IRGC)Defense Command</li><li>-FETA (Cyber Police Unit)</li><li>Basij Paramilitary Force</li></ul><p>Many of the organized attacks conducted by these groups are either unknown or go unreported by the media. The incidents that are reported by the media are usually attributed to hacking teams (groups), lone hackers, and hacktivist organizations. Below are some of the attacks directly affecting the US that have been documented by the media:</p><ul><li>Denial of Service (DoS) campaigns against banking and financial websites as well as corporate networks. These DoS attacks have been on going since at least 2011 (3). According to sources at Reuters, the Iranian hackers targeted banks in retaliation for their enforcement of Western economic sanctions against Iran.</li><li>Cyber attacks against computer networks of Energy and Gas companies responsible for power infrastructure and gas pipelines. The hackers were able to gain access to control system software used to control oil and gas pipelines. (4)</li><li>A major cyber attack targeted the Navy Marine Corps network. A quoted official stated the Iranians were able to conduct surveillance and compromise communications over the unclassified computer networks of the Navy and Marine Corps. (2)</li><li>The self-proclaimed Iranian hacker group “Parastoo” posted data to pastebin web sites multiple times since 2012. Parastoo claimed to have obtained the data by hacking the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Janes IHS (US Defense publication). Additionally, usernames and personal addresses of IAEA personnel were released. Parastoo claims to have an affiliation with the hacktivist group Anonymous.</li><li>The Iranian hacking group known as the “Ashiyane Digital Security Team” hackedinto NASA and posted data to Pastebin websites. (5)</li><li>95 sites affiliated with “Voice of America” were hacked by a group calling itself the “Iranian cyber army”. On one of the defaced websites a message was posted asking “Ms. Clinton, do you want to hear the oppressed voices of nations from the heart of America?” This was in response to an ABC interview with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who spoke about Arabic and Farsi social media (6).</li></ul><p>These are just a few of the highly publicized incidents over the past few years. All of these have either been attributed to Iranian computer network exploitation (CNE) sponsored organizations or to Iranian hacking teams. Many of the attacks attributed to these hacking teams and hactivists may actually be the Government of Iran using the personas of hackers to protect their true motives and identities. While there is no way to know for certain, I think the place to start is by identifying the groups involved in these attacks.</p><h3><strong>Hacker groups: Parastoo</strong></h3><p>On November 25th 2012, a post was made to a pastebin website listing the email addresses of United Nations Representatives to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). A self proclaimed Iranian hacking group named “Parastoo” posted the email addresses and demanded that the email owners either sign a petition to investigate Israel’s secret nuclear facilities or further personal and professional details of the listed individuals would be released to the public (7).</p><p>Over the next year Parastoo claimed to hack into multiple organizations within the Defense and Energy industry. In a posting made in February 2013, Parastoo claimed to have obtained over 8,000 records from IHS Janes information group, which is an organization that provides data to the defense industry specific to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN)‐ related products. (8)</p><p>The postings by Parastoo are extreme rants that, in my opinion, bring very little validity to this being a real threat. I question if Parastoo is actually a group as opposed to a single individual. I am also not convinced that Parastoo is capable of hacking a website such as IAEA or Janes IHS. It has been discussed a number of times on security and research sites if the posts actually came from an individual with good OSINT skills, as opposed to having actually compromised a website to obtain the data.</p><p>Their posts in which they claim to have obtained control of a US drone degrade the legitimacy of Parastoo further. Parastoo claims they launched the drone and flew over Maryland (US). The citizens of MD and VA are then warned with the following message from Parastoo: “NO MATTER WHERE YOU ARE, EVEN INSIDE PROTECTED CUBES IN MARYLAND OR THE MOST NUCLEAR­POWER DEPENDENT AREA — VIRGINIA, YOU ARE NOT ANONYMOUS. EXPECT US” (9). I think Parastoo has received enough time and attention and should be re­evaluated. I do not believe Parastoo is a viable threat and assess their true level of threat to be very low.</p><p>The cyber security blogger Krypt3ia wrote a very good assessment on Parastoo in late January 2014 (11). According to Krypt3ia, Parastoo is actually a single individual and not a group as Parastoo would like everyone to believe. Krypt3ia does a great job of connecting the dots and is able to trace back the activity to an individual with the handle DarkPassenger who has quite a few postings on public hacking forums.</p><p>The recent post made to a pastebin website by Parastoo speaks of a new website Parastoo.ir that will be going live in April 2014. Krypt3ia traces Parastoo.ir back through registration details and finds two other websites hacking4hire.ir and rce.ir which are registered to the name “zohre sajadian” with the email “r.rastegari@chmail.ir” with a Tehran IR physical address. The DarkPassenger handle had many postings on both hacking4hire.ir and rce.ir.</p><p>The content was all very similar to the Parastoo pastebin posts in content and wording. As an example see the posting below made by DarkPassenger on the website hacking4hire.ir. The photo in the post shows the output of a Flir systems imaging system, which is used on US drones to capture imagery (10). The post also shows a pastebin posting and is titled “Expect us”. While this term is used by Anonymous in many of their postings, DarkPassenger uses this phrase in many of his forum postings, as does Parastoo (12).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/538/1*q-hvmRiKFHNp0iT5dFovMg.png" /></figure><p>For other examples and connections take a look at the write up by Kryp3ia, as he does a good job mapping out the connections between Parastoo and the DarkPassenger handle. Below is the second drone related posting that was made by Parastoo in July of 2013 (9).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/513/1*UIFmD3M25Ig22AM3fAJcTQ.png" /></figure><p>Another point that I want to make about Parastoo is the reference Parastoo made in both the post above and in a pastebin post on 10 March 2013 (12). The post referenced a drone that was flown into airspace near JFK airport that Parastoo claims to have controlled and been responsible for. Specifically the post states (13):</p><p>“GO DETECT WHAT WAS THAT UNKNOWN THING AT JFK , INSTEAD OF MAKING LONG ISRAELI ASS­KISSING SPEECHES AT IAPAC AND REASSURING THE ZIONIST REGIME THEY WILL ALWAYS GET THE GOOD STUFF COMING IN FREE , EVEN THOUGH MANY MILLIONS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS DOES NOT HAVE A POT TO PISS IN.”</p><p>Again this threat by Parastoo was posted on March 10th. Apparently, Parastoo is a reader of Wired magazine as an article referencing an unidentified drone was seen near JFK airport and was printed on 5 March 2013, which was five days prior to Parastoo taking credit for the incident. Again this is more evidence that Parastoo is great at taking credit for things they find in open source that have been published in news and other media.</p><p>The funny part about this is that Parastoo does not mention that the “drone” identified in the JFK incident by the FBI was a civilian model similar to the one posted below and not the flying death plane that Parastoo depicts in their posts (12). My assessment is that Parastoo picked up on the article in Wired magazine and went on their tirade. Based on the evidence (Wired magazine article) I do not believe Parastoo had anything to do with this incident. I assess Parastoo as a low level threat and concur with Kryp3ia that this is likely one individual with extreme anti- ­Israeli and US beliefs that has too much time on his hands.</p><p>Below is a civilian commercial grade drone from the Wired magazine article referencing the drone cited near JFK airport (12):</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/435/1*LZfDvJaJncEo9JpTWPvIWg.png" /></figure><h3><strong>Ashiyane Digital Security Team</strong></h3><p>The Ashiyane Digital Security Team (often referred to as just Ashiyane) is considered to be one of the more elite groups of hackers in Iran. This group started in 2002 as Iranian hackers that were not funded or working for the government of Iran. However since at least 2009 it is believed that the Iranian government has recruited Ashiyane to support its CNE programs. According to open source intelligence (OSINT) the individual in charge of Ashiyane is Behrooz Kamalian. His LinkedIn profile can be seen here :https://www.linkedin.com/pub/behrooz­ kamalian/64/73a/284 as well as his Google+ profile here:</p><p><a href="https://plus.google.com/107725945276429650317/posts.">https://plus.google.com/107725945276429650317/posts.</a></p><p>Ashiyane has their company headquarters in Tehran and is believed to have between 15 and 30 official members. (13) Below is a photo of Behrooz Kamalian at a speaking engagement in 2011 (14).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/441/1*IZWricCndnZ_MPHM0bCptA.png" /></figure><p>Additionally, the Ashiyane Digital Security Team has a website: Ashiyane.ir and it is registered to Behrooz.</p><p>Registration info for Ashiyane[.]ir:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/553/1*M92FvZQzBSv8DNtlT_MitQ.png" /></figure><p>The registrant email ashiyane.center@gmail.com is affiliated with 243 additional domains.</p><p>On 10 October 2011, the Council Implementing Regulation (EU) published the “implementing Article 12(1) of Regulation concerning the restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in the view of the situation of Iran by the Official Journal of the European Union. In this document, they listed Mr. Behrouz (spelled Behrouz as opposed to behrooz as seen in LinkedIn and domain records) as the Head of Ashiyane, which the EU list as part of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as seen below (15):</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/442/1*f2YaGFD5pmQPYOtPWr9aUw.png" /></figure><p>This is major link if it is true. With the sophistication and level of success of the Ashiyane hacking team, it is very plausible that they would be a valuable addition to the IRGC. The EU document also claims that Ashiyane holds the responsibility to “Crackdown” against both foreign and domestic adversaries. Further support of the IRGC link comes from an article published by the Iranian Republic News Agency in 2009 that stated Behrouz “ordered his cyber­criminal organization to work for the Iranian government by attacking foreign government and media websites”. (16)</p><p><strong>Ashiyane members:</strong></p><p>The following list documents the names and handles associated with some of the members of the Ashiyane Digital Security Team:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/380/1*Fk2_8Dirnw3SuTZF-4C10Q.png" /></figure><p>The following email addresses have been identified as associated with the Ashiyane.ir domain:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/187/1*qe3GUHPm9VSHgr971va2LA.png" /></figure><p>The following domains belong to Ashiyane and resolved to the corresponding IP addresses:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/291/1*bBh4ruOmyF2dYv710FA-Qw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/271/1*mUGySTcQNQ1LR23yIq6cAQ.png" /></figure><h3>The Emperor Hacking team</h3><p>The Emperor Hacking team (eMP3R0r_TEAM) are Iranian hackers that portray themselves as hacktivists conducting cyber attacks for the better of Iran. They primarily hack European targets and appear to be very good at what they do based on the level of successful compromises that have been documented on various web postings from victims (17). The leader of this group is a 31­ year­old male named Amir Hosein. Amir uses the handles iM4n, Scorpin0, and Amir (18). I was able to find his name as both Amir Hosein and Amirhosein Seyrafi in OSINT sources. Amir lives in Tehran Iran. I also found a very detailed profile on a social network for Amir. While not necessarily useful from a cyber perspective, it included information on some interesting personal details which I will not include in this blog.</p><p>Amir has not only hacked and defaced websites, but he has also been known to go back and taunt the victim if their webpage accepts comments (19). Amir has a profile on the website www[.]soliderx.com in which he states that he was one of the Iranians that worked on reversing Stuxnet. More importantly though, Amin, who is the head of the Emperor hacking team, also states that he is part of the Shabgard Security Group (18).</p><h3>Shabgard Security Group and Simorgh</h3><p>Shabgard and Simorgh are known to have conducted highly visible hacking campaigns against both foreign and domestic adversaries of the government of Iran (24). Prior to 2009 both groups were known for attacking websites for both notoriety and political motivations. It is widely speculated that since 2009 both groups have been working in cooperation with the Iranian government (20). There have also been multiple publications in addition to cyber related blogs and forums that claim hackers from both Shabgard and Simorgh have been used as instructors to teach military technicians in the IRGC Cyber­Defense organizations (21). Shabgard has their own website which is used to discuss cyber related topics and hacking. The website can be seen at shabgard.org</p><p>Infrastructure<br> The following infrastructure is associated with the Shabgard Security Group:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/263/1*aMAGMAQChx4x6o56YjYhLA.png" /></figure><p>The domain webmooz.ir is hosted on the same IP address as all of the Shabgard.org domains. While this does not mean it is definitely associated with the Shabgard Security Group the following data provides strong support that this is part of the Shabgard infrastructure:</p><p>Domain Registration for <strong>webamooz.com<br> </strong>Person: <strong>Mohammad Jorjandi<br> </strong>E­mail: m.jorjandi@gmail.com<br> Address: Ghytariye, Hoseini St., №3, Tehran, Tehran, IR Phone: 2122212530</p><p>Domain registration for <strong>shabgard.org </strong>Person: <strong>Mohammad Jorjandi</strong></p><p>“Mohammad Jorjandi Shabgard Co. Ltd” owns both webamooz.com and shabgard.org. I did some OSINT research on Mr. Jorjandi and found that he is also a “Clan Leader” on the Shabgard Security Group website. Below is Mr. Jorjandi posting on shabgard.org using the same email address that is used to register the shabgard.org website. This post also shows his clan leader status (22).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/727/1*GMSVxiVNC7sKrOrVdp1Sbg.png" /></figure><p>Mr. Jorjandi does not have a photo of himself on his shabgard.org profile. I was, however, able to find his Linkedin profile which has his photo and lists him as working at at a Bank in Iran. He also previously worked at the Shahid Beheshti University.</p><h3>Cyber Army</h3><p>This group is known as the Iranian Cyber Army though for many years was only referred to as the “Cyber Army”. The Iranian Cyber Army is a politically motivated group that targets organizations and individuals believed to represent the opposition to Iran. The Iranian Cyber Army has conducted cyber attacks against the social media website Twitter, the Chinese search engine Baidu, and many other websites of political leaders that opposed the former President of Iran Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. While it was once disputed officially by Iran, the Iranian Cyber Army is widely recognized as the IRGC.</p><p>In 2010 the Fars News Agency published an article quoting Ebrahim Jabbari, the Commander in Chief of Ali­ebn­Alitalib Sepah, in Qom (Referred to in the US as Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp) (23). Jabbari stated “today, we take pride in our Cyber Army founded by us, which is the second strongest Cyber Army in the world. There have been many destructive efforts directed towards our Islamic country’s cultural and social values and we have been able to stop their devastating operations using our Cyber Army directed by Sepah in the Cyber — virtual reality — world”.</p><p>Since this statement was made Iran has had a much more difficult time maintaining deniability that the Iranian Cyber Army is not operating under the IRGC. I have listed this group under in the hacking group section as well as part of the official Iranian cyber infrastructure at the beginning of this report.</p><h3>Conclusion:</h3><p>Iran is one of the biggest threats to US companies and cyber infrastructure. Some threats are lone hackers, while others are hacking groups. It is not easy to determine which groups and individuals are associated with state sponsored organizations but clearly Iran has invested in using its civilian hacker base as a resource. They appear to have done a good job of it as well and are one of the most dangerous CNE threats to both US government and military organizations and also pose a major threat against financial organizations and companies involved with critical infrastructure. I believe Iran will continue to increase in sophistication as they direct funding and attention to their CNE capabilities.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6cccc11f54db" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Parastoo: Iran Based Cyber Threat Continues to Mislead Media Channels]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jon.dimaggio/parastoo-iran-based-cyber-threat-continues-to-mislead-media-channels-6ea47bec059?source=rss-45fd5e5f9bd5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6ea47bec059</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[hacktivism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-espionage]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jon DiMaggio]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 05 Oct 2022 15:00:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-10-05T15:02:23.553Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Author Note:</strong><em> I originally published this and several other blogs between 2013–2014 on my website, which I took down several years later. I thought it would be fun to repost and share the research for historical purposes. If you have read my book, </em><a href="https://nostarch.com/art-cyberwarfare"><em>The Art of Cyberwarfare</em></a><em>, or read any of my public work from </em><a href="https://analyst1.com/company/blog"><em>Analyst1</em></a><em>, you can see how my writing has developed over the years. I wrote these as a hobby at the time and there was no affiliation with any of my employers at the time.</em></p><p>In February 2014, I wrote a blog on Iranian-based cyber threats which included the self-proclaimed hacking team “Parastoo”. In the blog, I provided a threat assessment and some details as to why I believed Parastoo to be a low-level threat that has received high-level threat attention. Parastoo has promised that on April 4th, as part of “#OPISRAL2”, they will do damage to “COMMUNICATION AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS”. They not only threaten Israel but go on to threaten the U.S. and specifically the CIA. The entertainment does not stop here, however… Parastoo also is in the weapons business, as you can in the below quote from their 28 January 2013 post on cryptome.org (partial exert) (1):</p><p>“@FOLKS WHO GOT ACCESS TO MILITARY EQUIPMENT OWNED AND OR OPERATED BY : ANY U.S , ANY NATO , ANY ISAF , ANY USEFUL STUFF FROM THE DUMPS RELATED TO COMMUNICATION AND COMPUTERS AND PRINTERS AND AUTHENTICATION COMPONENTS VERY USUAL IN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT OF A BASE AND THINGS ALIKE ARE OF OUR INTEREST . YOU GOT ANY ? IN THE BUSINESS ? HOOD . WAIT A BIT UNTIL WE</p><p>GET A SECURE LINE UP,THEN YOU CNN TALK TO US ABOUT AND WE MAKE DEALS,SIMILAR TO EBAY. YEAH , WE DO BUY HEAVY WEAPONS AS WELL , AND SERIOUS EXPERTS WHO CAN DO “WAR MAGIC” STUFF CONTACT US , YOU WILL NOT DISCONNECT WITH DISAPPOINTMENT ,WE TRUST .”</p><p>I am not downplaying Anonymous, #Opisreal, or state-sponsored hacking. I am simply saying that I believe that all of these are greater threats than Parastoo, who in my opinion is a very excited individual with a basic level of hacking knowledge and a huge imagination. Parastoo has done a fantastic job of getting media attention and has been very smart in using Anonymous operations to excite and recruit people to help him/them. That is the real threat that Parastoo brings to the table. I am not sure how or why people take him/them seriously, as they have claimed to have stolen and flown U.S. drones over MD, VA, and JFK airports (2). All of which is just crazy talk.</p><p>As I pointed out in my previous Iran-based blog, Parastoo generally claims to have done things after they have already been reported by the media. In Parastoo’s first posting, they claimed to have hacked the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and threaten to release stolen data revealing sensitive information about the members of IAEA related to the United States (3). I believe Parastoo did at least to some degree compromise a public-facing webserver hosting IAEA web pages. However, I do not believe they gained access to IAEA-secured infrastructure. Parastoo eventually releases this “sensitive” data exposing names and emails of individuals associated with the organization. However after looking at the list of emails and names posted by Parastoo, I wanted to see if I could find this same data from information posted prior to the Parastoo data. I found many of the details listed in the Parastoo dump in online libraries and other open source intelligence (OSINT) sources (4).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/805/1*NcMrc7ZhhZbbexb99Xyf6w.png" /></figure><p>The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) website has directories that have hundreds of documents and scanned images, all of which are from an organization that has a direct relationship with IAEA. Many of the names and details posted by Parastoo can be found there and this may be the source used by Parastoo to find the information in the first place. It is likely that the list of names, phone numbers and emails was not from compromised sensitive data but more likely from publicly available information such as this. Why these documents and emails are publicly available and not secured from the world-wide-web is what I would like to know.</p><p>Another inconsistency with Parastoo took place in March of 2013. In my previous blog on Iranian hackers, I pointed out how Parastoo posted a message on 10 March 2013 claiming to have flown a drone near JFK airport (5). Wired magazine published an article referencing an unidentified drone that was seen near JFK airport and published the article on 5 March 2013, five days prior to Parastoo taking credit for the incident (6).</p><p>Then on 2 January 2014, Parastoo posts another message claiming to have physically attacked PG&amp;E Metcalf Power station located in California (7). You did not read that wrong</p><p>Parastoo claimed responsibility for this in January 2014, eight months after the incident made national headlines. On 16 April 2013 CBS and other major media organizations reported vandals had “cut fiber optic cables, knocking out some 911 service, and then fired a rifle at a PG&amp;E substation” (8).</p><h3>Time Line of Events:</h3><p><strong>25 Nov 2012</strong> — Parastoo claims to have hacked the website for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (10)</p><p>Parastoo threatens to list information on the identities of personnel associated with IAEA unless they sign a petition to investigate Israel’s” nuclear arsenal” at Dimona (Israel)</p><p><strong>29 Nov 2012</strong> — Parastoo releases information about IAEA due to the lack of response to their initial demands to sign a petition. The data released includes names and email addresses, as well as sub-domains and IP addresses related to IAEA (11)</p><p><strong><em>Example of data released:</em></strong></p><p>Names &amp; Email: Newton, Traci t.newton[at]iaea.org bernasconi Gabriel G.bernasconi[at]iaea.org / Broodryk alta a.broodryk[at]iaea.org Infrastructure: nucleus.iaea.org, goto.iaea.org, vichousing.iaea.org, forums.iaea.org, intranet.iaea.org]</p><p><strong>21 Jan 2013 </strong>— Parastoo claims to continue to have access to Department of Energy (DOE) Servers and threatens to release additional data (12).</p><p>“To show you *a glance* of how serious and active #Parastoo is, we are hereby publish part of information about one of the USA Department of Energy (DOE) critical servers we have access to.”</p><p><strong>22 February 2013 </strong>— Parastoo claims to have compromised servers holding information on IHS Holding (+JANES INFORMATION GROUP) and releases data (13).</p><p>“TARGET : IHS HOLDING INC AND JANES INFORMATION GROUP”</p><p>“ALL SERVERS AND STATIONS PWNED DURING THIS OP RESIDE INSIDE U.S AND A COMPANY NAMED HOSTING.COM PROVIDED THE DATA CENTER”</p><p>“8500 RECORDS OF DISTINCTIVE CURRENT CUSTOMERS FETCHED . ROUGHLY 70% ARE GOVT , MILITARY OR THEIR CONTRACTORS “</p><p>Data released was unclassified and it was not clear if this was actually taken from a new compromise or if it came from previous leaks.</p><p>Additionally Parastoo threatens Joe Biden and the Secret Service.</p><p>WHEN THE VICE PRESIDENT OF A COUNTRY THREATS THE LEADER OF ANOTHER COUNTRY TO BE “SERIOUS” FOR A TALK OR EVERYTHING IS ON THE TABLE, DOES HE HAVE A CLUE HOW EASY IS TO HUNT A DRONE AND .., SAY , HIT A SECRET SERVICE CONVOY ?</p><p><strong>8 March 2013 </strong>— Parastoo claims to have flown a drone in U.S. air space near JFK airport, as well as threaten VP Joe Biden and Eric Smicht of Google.</p><p>PARASTOO IS SPEAKING . WE DOUBT JOE HEARD OUR LAST MESSAGE . IS HERE IS A LOUDER ONE . GO DETECT WHAT WAS THAT UNKNOWN THING AT JFK , INSTEAD OF MAKING LONG ISRAELI ASS-KISSING SPEECHES AT IAPAC AND REASSURING THE ZIONIST REGIME THEY WILL ALWAYS GET THE GOOD STUFF COMING IN FREE , EVEN THOUGH MANY MILLIONS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS DOES NOT HAVE A POT TO PISS IN . GOOD LUCK WITH YOUR F-22 AND F-35 UNCLE JOE .</p><p><strong>23 May 2013</strong> — Parastoo claims to attack the National Nuclear Security Administration “NNSA (14).</p><p>PARASTOO HAVE SUCCESSFULLY PENETRATED A TOP SECRET LINK OPERATING BY NNSA IN CENTRAL ASIA WHERE URANIUM AND PLUTONIUM MATERIALS TO ADVANCE THE ABOVE MENTIONED ADVANCEMENTS ARE BEING EXFILTRATED . THIS MESSAGE WAS A PLATFORM FOR OUR FUTURE RELEASES IN THIS REGARD . IN OUR NEXT MESSAGE ON THIS SUBJECT WE WILL RELEASE THE NNSA DOX IN ADDITION TO HIGH RESOLUTION SATELLITE IMAGES OF EVERY SINGLE SITES</p><p><strong>2 July 2013</strong> — Parastoo claims to launch a second UAV in US airspace (specifically MD and VA)</p><p>WHILE YOU ARE ENJOYING WATCHING A BIT OF UAV FUN FLYING OVER MONSTER FLEETS [4] WE WOULD LIKE TO REMIND YOU NO MATTER WHERE YOU ARE,EVEN INSIDE PROTECTED CUBES IN MARYLAND OR THE MOST NUCLEAR-POWER DEPENDENT AREA — VIRGINIA, YOU ARE NOT ANONYMOUS. EXPECT US.”</p><p><strong>2 January 2014</strong> — Parastoo claims to attack PG&amp;E Metcalf Power Station</p><p>VANDALISM OP ON THE TARGET WAS PART OF A BROADER TEST WE HAVE BEEN DOING FOR SOMETIME NOW ON YOUR NATIONAL CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE USING CYBER/KINETIC VECTORS.</p><p><strong>27 January 2014</strong> — Parastoo announces their new website “Parastoo.ir” and warns of an attack coming on April 4th 2014 (7).</p><p>“HERE WE ANNOUNCE THAT 4 APRIL 2014 , DURING #OPISRAL2 WE WILL DO DAMAGE TO ASSASSIN REGIME PARTICULARLY IN COMMUNICATION AND “CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE” SECTORS ”</p><h3>Conclusion:</h3><p>Parastoo has a pattern of taking credit after events take place and are reported by the media. Their most recent claim is that they are preparing a major attack on 4 April 2014 as part of the Anonymous operation “OpIsrael”. This is a major planned event that has been discussed by major news and media organizations for months now and is an event that has taken place by Anonymous in April for several years and is a reoccurring event. This, as with most of the other Parastoo references, is being done to attempt to gain credibility by taking credit for events that they have nothing to do with. All of these reasons as well as the lack of proof to produce any credible source of definitive sensitive stolen data leads me to believe that Parastoo is a low level cyber threat. The real threat and danger that Parastoo brings to the table is their ability to create headlines and make the media believe that they are a true cyber threat.</p><h3>References</h3><p>(1) <a href="http://cryptome.org/2014/01/parastoo-sti.htm">http://cryptome.org/2014/01/parastoo-sti.htm</a><br> (2) <a href="http://www.cyberintel.us/iran-cne-unmasking-state-sponsored-hacking/">http://www.cyberintel.us/iran-cne-unmasking-state-sponsored-hacking/</a></p><p>(3) <a href="http://cryptome.org/2012/11/parastoo-hacks-iaea.htm">http://cryptome.org/2012/11/parastoo-hacks-iaea.htm</a> (4) <a href="http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/">http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/</a><br> (5) <a href="http://www.wired.com/2013/03/ufo-black-drone-fbi/">http://www.wired.com/2013/03/ufo-black-drone-fbi/</a><br> (6) <a href="http://cryptome.org/2013/03/parastoo-iaea-mossad.htm">http://cryptome.org/2013/03/parastoo-iaea-mossad.htm</a> (7) cryptome.org/2014/01/parastoo-pge-metcalf.htm​</p><p>(8) <a href="http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2013/04/16/gunshots-cause-oil-spill-at-san-jose-pge-">http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2013/04/16/gunshots-cause-oil-spill-at-san-jose-pge-</a> substation/<br> (10) <a href="http://pastebin.com/s96K4D6j">http://pastebin.com/s96K4D6j</a><br> (11) <a href="http://cryptome.org/2012/11/parastoo-hacks-iaea-2.htm">http://cryptome.org/2012/11/parastoo-hacks-iaea-2.htm</a></p><p>(12) <a href="http://pastebin.com/wa46tTve">http://pastebin.com/wa46tTve</a><br> (13) <a href="http://cryptome.org/2013/02/parastoo-janes-cbrn.htm">http://cryptome.org/2013/02/parastoo-janes-cbrn.htm</a></p><p>(14) cryptome.org/2013/05/parastoo-nnsa.htm​</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6ea47bec059" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Risk Behaviors and Insider Threat: Cyber Espionage Use-case]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jon.dimaggio/risk-behaviors-and-insider-threat-cyber-espionage-use-case-506661129a4f?source=rss-45fd5e5f9bd5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/506661129a4f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[espionage]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[department-of-defense]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-espionage]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jon DiMaggio]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 04 Oct 2022 15:57:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-10-04T15:57:43.013Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Author Note:</strong><em> I originally published this and several other blogs between 2013–2014 on my website, which I took down several years later. I thought it would be fun to repost and share the research for historical purposes. I have left any grammar and punctuation as they were when I posted this. If you have read my book, </em><a href="https://nostarch.com/art-cyberwarfare"><em>The Art of Cyberwarfare</em></a><em>, or read any of my public work from </em><a href="https://analyst1.com/company/blog"><em>Analyst1</em></a><em>, you can see how my writing has developed over the years. I wrote these as a hobby at the time and there was no affiliation with any of my employers at the time.</em></p><p>On 27 June 2014, the DoJ issued an affidavit against a Chinese nationalist, Su Bin, who owned and operated an aviation technology company, “Lode Technologies Co.” (AKA Lode Tech). The company operated out of the United States and had partnered with Boeing, a large Aerospace corporation with ties to both commercial organizations in the Aviation field as well as the US Defense industry.</p><p>The orchestrator of the four year long corporate espionage campaign, Su Bin, had two accomplices that were not named in the incident though there are a number of details about them that provide information on their role in the campaign. Interestingly, while the individuals identities have not been documented, there is evidence that they are be affiliated with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. This five year campaign is well detailed in the publicly available indictment and is a good example that can be used to better understand the methodology and techniques used in a corporate espionage. While the technology stolen in this campaign would benefit the PLA, it also provided a competitive advantage to Su Bins company which had also partnered with the Chinese Aerospace company “Xi’an Aircraft Company” (XAC)”. XAC makes both commercial passenger and military grade aircraft. Additionally, based on opensource information XAC is alleged to be a China state funded organization. While this information was not included in the DoJ affidavit, the relationship will play a factor in the motive later in this story.</p><p>Lode Technologies had a subcontracting relationship with Boeing, the victim of the theft which gave Su Bin access to both virtual and physical data that would have been more difficult without the relationship. This relationship along with the assistance of two skilled hackers allowed Subin and his counterparts to compromise and steal sensitive data from Boeing used to develop the C-17 Globemaster III military transport aircraft.</p><p><strong>TIP:</strong> Unfortunately, with the rise of hacking campaigns to include Information Warfare and cyber-attacks, Criminal affidavits and indictments into organized hacking crimes are being issued more frequently. These documents are extremely detailed and make very good training tools. Prior to reading the below assessment, read the associated court filing:</p><p><a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1216505-su-bin-u-s-district-court-complaint-june-27-">https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1216505-su-bin-u-s-district-court-complaint-june-27-</a></p><p>This will assist in seeing how you can take a legal record of events, document the findings and expand on the information to learn and identify attributes of the attack that are not included in the filing. Tools and methods to assist you in developing additional information will be discussed later in this book. Once you have read the court filing, let’s begin.</p><p>The following output is taking from the information in the court filing from the DoJ and documents a series of events, both human and cyber related, in relation to espionage that took place between 2009 and 2014. The goal is to extract the relevant information so we can connect the dots and build a larger picture. The court document details events but do not build and assess the bigger picture that can then be used to find additional information and make analytical conclusions:</p><p>The criminal complaint filed in a Central District Court in California charged “Su Bin” a Chinese Nationalist residing in Canada with “Conspiracy to Gain Unauthorized Access to a Protected Computer and Obtaining Information and Things of Value with Intent to Defraud”. The criminal complaint is based on a 50 page affidavit derived from the FBI Special Agent assigned to the Los Angeles Field Office. Two unnamed individuals identified in the affidavit as “Uncharged Co- Conspirator” 1 &amp; 2 (UC1 &amp; UC2), allegedly, military trained espionage hackers, worked with Su Bin to gain unauthorized access to computer networks owned by Boeing and other US companies in an effort to steal data related to Boeing research and development for the C-17 aircraft.</p><p>According the DoJ affidavit Su Bin, UC1 and UC2 are citizens of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). UC1 and UC2 are located in China and Su Bin is located in Canada. This is important when understanding the relationship between the three individuals, as well as the taskings and communications that took place between them over the 4-year period in which the corporate espionage was conducted (2009–2013).</p><p>A timeline (extracted from details in the affidavit) with details of events will be presented and discussed below, primarily to identify the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used in to conduct the theft of sensitive Intellectual Property.</p><p>Corporate Espionage Events:</p><p>The following events took place between 2009 and 2013:</p><p>➢ Summer 2009 — Su Bin emails UC1 and UC2 identifying companies to begin reconnaissance to “evaluate for computer intrusions”.</p><p>➢ 6 Aug 2009 — Su Bin sends UC1 an email with the subject “My cell phone number” and a password protected attachment. The password to open the attachment was Su Bins cell phone number. The attachment was an Excel spreadsheet that listed the email addresses, telephone numbers and program roles of over 80 engineers associated with US companies and US military personnel who worked on a “development project”.</p><p>➢ 4 September 2009 — Su Bin emails UC1 and UC2 to tell them the US defense contractor Boeing would be sharing a booth with Lode-Tech at the Beijing Aviation Expo. Su Bin is the owner and manager of Lode-Tech, which deals with aviation technologies. Below is a screenshot of Lode-Tech’s website displaying an affiliation with aviation:</p><p><a href="https://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/contractor/xac.htm">https://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/contractor/xac.htm</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kIIuLK2bi5BrvqZct5_ZnQ.png" /></figure><p>It is unclear in the Affidavit if there was a relationship between Lode-Tech and Boeing. It is unknown as to why the two companies shared a booth at the Expo.</p><p>➢ 14 Dec 2009 — Su Bin sends an email to UC1 with the subject “Target” and an attachment that listed the names and positions of individuals who worked on projects related to weapons control and electronic warfare systems.</p><p>➢ Jan 2010 — Su Bin emails UC1 a list of file names within a C-17 directory residing on the US defense contractor Boeing’s internal network. The email identifies the high-value data related to the C-17 aircraft that Su Bin wanted UC1 to exfiltrate. The C-17 is a large military transport aircraft developed by Boeing for the US Air Force.</p><p>➢ 14 Jan 2010 — UC1 sends Su Bin multiple emails and attachments with examples of exfiltrated documents related to the C-17. Attachments were in the RAR archive file format. Some of the attachments included the titles “C-17”, C-17_2” and “22”.</p><p>➢ RAR supports data compression and is used to compress files in order to reduce the file size of the data which is likely why it was used by UC1.</p><p>➢ 7 July 2011 — UC1 sends UC2 an email with a report attached. The report identified the “targets, objectives, and successes” of recent intrusion activity against US defense companies. The report listed “past achievements” which included the compromise of a US defense company’s FTP server, from which UC1 claimed to have exfiltrated over 20G of “technology information” as well as targeting information on the network and personnel that worked on a program that developed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). The report claimed that “military technology intelligence was the main focus”.</p><p>➢ 13 August 2012 — UC1 sends UC2 an email with the subject “C-17” and an attachment of a report named “C-17 work Summary”. The report claimed that reconnaissance of Boeing’s network began in</p><p>➢ 2009 and the internal network was compromised in January 2010. Additional details into how they moved around networks to evade detection included:</p><p>❏ “Skipped around the internal network to make it harder to detect”</p><p>❏ “Skipped around at suitable times in countries outside the US”</p><p>❏ “In the process of skipping we were supported by a prodigious quantity of tools, routes and servers to ensure a smooth landing of intelligence data. We used technology to exit the network securely”</p><p>❏ “We had to rely on technology to separate and bundle data, change the document format, etc. Ultimately we avoided the many internal automatic and manual auditing facilities to transfer data safely and smoothly out of the Boeing facility.” 21 February 2013 — A report documenting additional details on “activities and methodologies” was sent by UC1 to UC2. The report provided details on the TTPs used by Su Bin and his accomplices. The report included the following details:</p><p>❏ Technology was established outside China for the sake of security / safety and stability.</p><p>❏ Servers were set up in the “U.S, Korea, Singapore and etc.”</p><p>❏ “Machine Rooms” were set up in the surrounding areas / regions (Hong Kong and Macao)</p><p>❏ Surveillance work and intelligence collection are done outside China to avoid “legal and diplomatic complications”</p><p>❏ Collected intelligence will be sent by an intelligence officer via a temporary server placed outside of China</p><p>❏ The intelligence is always picked up and transferred to China in person</p><p>❏ US Military technologies are primary targeted technologies from American enterprises that belong to the “top 50 arms companies”</p><p>❏ Obtained “military industrial technologies” including sensitive data pertaining to the F-35 and C-17 Summary of Cyber Espionage Methods &amp; TTPs</p><p>The following is a high-level overview of the TTPs and methodologies used by Su Bin and his accomplices as documented in the Affidavit submitted by the Los Angeles FBI Field Office.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*l5WnfoyXssUBXc5nHK3IYQ.png" /><figcaption>TTP Diagram of Su Bin and his accomplices (created with Maltego)</figcaption></figure><p>1. Attacker #1 performs reconnaissance and identifies high value data and provides information on program personnel to include phone numbers, program role and associated infrastructure.</p><p>2. Attacker #1 emails targeting information to Attacker #2 &amp; #3, whom will use the information to attempt to compromise the targeted organization.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nfqX_l2yjGim0-Bw_cribw.png" /></figure><p>1. Attacker #2 moves frequently (Referred to as “skipping” by UC2) through routes and servers to exit the network securely and avoid defense mechanisms identifying a pattern in their activity.</p><p>2. Data is altered (format is changed) and bundled (RAR format) prior to exfiltration.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3aHeK0vCvd-0fyts93bsAA.png" /></figure><p>3. Data is exfiltrated through multiple hop points (all outside of China) to make it difficult to trace back to the attackers and harder to identify by the targeted organization.</p><p>4. Exfiltrated data is sent to a “Machine Room” where a temporary server (likely refers to a leased server) is used to access the data by a Foreign Intelligence Officer.</p><p>5. The exfiltrated information is <strong>hand</strong> carried into China….</p><h4>Lessons learned / Takeaways</h4><p>The events documented in the Criminal Complaint against Su Bin and his company provide an in depth look from the attacker’s perspective of corporate espionage performed against US companies in the Aviation and Defense industry. The correspondence between Su Bin and his unnamed accomplices show the attack from targeting to data exfiltration. The reporting between the individuals documented the attacks and showed where the attackers had difficulties, as well as where they easily defeated network defenses. All of these things are details that as an analyst you want to be aware of.</p><p>The level of involvement Su Bin had with the compromised victims is unknown, however, he owned Lode-Tech, which conducts business in the Aerospace and Aviation Industry. All of his successful compromises, based on the exfiltrated data confirmed by the FBI, were companies that also worked in the Aerospace Industry. If he did have working relationships with these companies, the first question to ask is how were he and his company able to successfully navigate the vetting processes at these companies? Further, to what degree did that ‘partnership’ or relationship aid in the attacks? Are there additional victims and stolen tech that we do not know about?</p><p>The accomplices in this case, UC1 &amp; UC2 allegedly had connections with the PLA. It is not known how Su Bin came in to contact with them but what has been determined is the theft of 630,000 files related to the C-17, the research and development cost associated with the C-17 that Boeing had to invest prior to developing the first aircraft is 3.4 Billion US dollars [#]. There is not conclusive evidence that XAC was given the stolen C-17 data. There is no evidence that they are capitalizing on making the same aircraft as Boeing bypassing the 3.4 billion dollars worth of research and there is not definitive proof, they had a competitive advantage over Boeing, a competitor in the Aviation industry.</p><p>The below photo is a visual comparison of the XAC Y-20 on the left and Boeing’s C-17 on the right. I will leave it up to you to decide.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4Kf5fNp2AFJNcL5GADzAfg.png" /></figure><p>There is no way to know, without investigating further, if looking into Lode-Tech’s background would have raised any red flags that Boeing missed. However, these incidents clearly demonstrate the potential risk of such relationships and follow a consistent pattern of China-based corporate espionage dating back over 10 years. As these types of theft take place over time, and one country spends the money to develop technologies and another is able to steel it and make the same technology for less, it will eventually change from corporate espionage to economic espionage. If this theft did take place and XAC was the beneficiary, they can sell the same aircraft for much less as they do not have over three billion dollars of debt to make makeup before turning a profit. This is corporate espionage.</p><h3><strong>Su Bin’s Conviction</strong></h3><p>So, what ever happened to Su-Bin and his conspirators [#]<a href="#_msocom_1">[1]</a> ? Well UC-1 and UC-2 were never convicted and likely never will be assuming they are back in China which is reasonable to assume if they were PLA officers. Su Bin plead guilty.</p><p>(Su Bin) “admitted that he engaged in the crime for the purpose of financial gain and specifically sought to profit from selling the data the he and his co-conspirators illegally acquired.”</p><p>He also admitted that <em>“</em><a href="https://www.wired.co.uk/topic/china"><em>China’s</em></a><em> Second Department, General Staff Headquarters, and Chinese People’s Liberation Army were given details of the stolen information”</em></p><p>At Su Bin’s plea hearing, the Assistant Attorney General made the following statement:</p><p><em>“Su Bin admitted to playing an important role in a conspiracy, originating in China, to illegally access sensitive military data, including data relating to military aircraft that are </em><strong><em>indispensable in keeping our military personnel safe</em></strong><em>,” said Assistant Attorney General Carlin. “</em><strong><em>This plea sends a strong message that stealing from the United States and our companies has a significant cost; we can and will find these criminals and bring them to justice. </em></strong><em>The National Security Division remains sharply focused on disrupting cyber threats to the national security, and we will continue to be relentless in our pursuit of those who seek to undermine our security.” [#]</em><a href="#_msocom_2">[2]</a></p><p>Unfortunately for Boeing and the United States, the strong message the Attorney General sent for a crime that by their own words was a direct detriment to keeping our military personnel safe, was not felt by the Judge ruling over the case who sentenced Su Bin nor was the message heard by the lawmakers who decide the maximum sentences allowed for crimes such as this.</p><p>On July 13th, 2016, Su Bin was sentenced to four years in prison, which was not even the max sentence allowed for this sort of crime (which is only 5). The lesson to learn and take with you is that it is rare that individuals are ever convicted for these sorts of crimes since they are often out of reach from law enforcement and when they are, the sentencing is a joke. This is why if you are an analyst reading this book your job is so important. You are responsible to protect your employer and their data. You have to hunt as part of your daily routine for nefarious activity and think outside of the box. In cyber world we live in, you cannot rely on automation alone to identify threats. You have to diligently and aggressively push yourself to find the things that others miss. That is the only way to identify advanced threats such as this. If there is an upside to this story, it is in that after Su Bin serves his time in a US prison he will likely be sent back to China where they will not take his admission of their involvement lightly.</p><p><a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-national-pleads-guilty-conspiring-hack-us-defense-contractors-systems-steal-sensitive">https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-national-pleads-guilty-conspiring-hack-us-defense-contractors-systems-steal-sensitive</a></p><p><a href="https://www.wired.co.uk/article/chinese-hack-us-military-su-bin">https://www.wired.co.uk/article/chinese-hack-us-military-su-bin</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=506661129a4f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Hacking Healthcare]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jon.dimaggio/hacking-healthcare-a5c6c6a6d9?source=rss-45fd5e5f9bd5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a5c6c6a6d9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybercrime]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-espionage]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[healthcare-technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jon DiMaggio]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 04 Oct 2022 15:29:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-10-04T15:29:41.636Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Author Note:</strong><em> I originally published this and several other blogs between 2013–2014 on my website, which I took down several years later. I thought it would be fun to repost and share the research for historical purposes. If you have read my book, </em><a href="https://nostarch.com/art-cyberwarfare"><em>The Art of Cyberwarfare</em></a><em>, or read any of my public work from </em><a href="https://analyst1.com/company/blog"><em>Analyst1</em></a><em>, you can see how my writing has developed over the years. I wrote these as a hobby at the time and there was no affiliation with any of my employers at the time.</em></p><h3><strong>Overview:</strong></h3><p>On 18 August 2014, reports surfaced that Community Health Systems, a healthcare organization, had its network and data compromised in a cyber attack. The incident exposed information on a staggering 4.5 million patient records. The initial reports surrounding the incident attribute the attack to a State sponsored advanced persistent threat (APT) group based out of China [6]. The compromise and data exfiltration took place between April and June 2014 [1]. This, however, is only the most recent of what appears to be an increasing problem in the medical and pharmaceutical industry.</p><p><strong>What we know:</strong></p><p>Multiple sources have reported that the Community Health Systems compromise was initiated by an attacker using the OpenSSL HeartBleed vulnerability (CVE-2014–0160). This vulnerability was identified in April 2014 [11] and was exploited on an unpatched Juniper router to access the Community Health Systems network [4]. Taking advantage of this vulnerability allows an attacker to steal the Open SSL private keys held in memory, which can then be used to decrypt otherwise encrypted traffic. The attacker likely moved laterally and escalated privileges until they had the correct privilege level to access the targeted data. A tactic technique &amp; procedure (TTP) utilized previously by this threat actor is to use VPN tunnels to make connections and exfiltrate data once they have legitimate credentials. This may have been used in the Community Health Systems compromise to avoid detection and make it difficult for defenders to identify the attackers entry and exit onto the network.</p><p>On August 20th 2014 multiple media sources reported the FBI distributed an alert warning the healthcare industry of a “malicious actors targeting healthcare related systems, perhaps for the purpose of obtaining Protected Healthcare Information (PHI) and/or Personally Identifiable Information (PII)” [9] [10]. Based on the timing, and similarities between the two, it is likely that this alert was related to the Community Health Systems compromise.</p><p>The malware detailed in the FBI alert referenced malware from the Miras malware family. The primary name used to identify the malicious file identified in the FBI advisory is “raswmi.dll”. Searching through the submissions of the publicly available virus sandboxes such as Virus Total yielded a number of MD5 hashes that appeared to be relevant to the compromise:</p><p><strong>MD5: 5837557998975c70be685c59ee61666a</strong></p><p><strong>MD5: f90cd3c576aef074a1052998cac64161</strong></p><p><strong>MD5: b129bf707a0dca62fca6c4fbb4e87509</strong></p><p><strong>MD5: 2b1d6aeef98b7244edef150380c8b457</strong></p><p><strong>MD5: 6608c1780221e1fe14773f5620c2b8bd</strong></p><p><strong>MD5:98a3a68f76ed2eba763eb7bfb6648562</strong></p><p>The malware referenced in the healthcare related compromise addressed in the FBI alert installs itself on the victim system and runs as a service from the following location: “C:\Windows\system32\wbem\rasemi.dll”</p><p>The malware also creates the following registry entries [4]:</p><ul><li><strong>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\raswmi\Parameters\”ServiceDll”=C:\WINDOWS\System32\wbem\raswmi.dll</strong></li><li><strong>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\raswmi\”Type”= 0x00000010</strong></li><li><strong>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\raswmi\”Start“= 0x00000002</strong></li><li><strong>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\raswmi\”ErrorControl”=0x00000001</strong></li><li><strong>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\raswmi\”DisplayName”= “WMI service provider”</strong></li><li><strong>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\raswmi\”Description”=”WMI service client”</strong></li></ul><h3><strong>Infrastructure:</strong></h3><p>All of the samples identified by IntelThreat had the IP address “96.39.210.49” hardcoded within the binary. Additional research showed that the domain microsoften.com was hosted on the IP address. The domain microsoften.com currently uses privacy protect to masquerade the true registrant information. However the historical records for the domain showed a registrant address of johnsmith101567@yahoo.com.</p><p>The diagram below is a visual representation of the malware likely used in the health care compromise with the C2 domain microsoften.com which was observed the most in the identified samples:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ECNmVbfjxmqUecwRzJjezA.png" /></figure><p>The email address johnsmith101567@yahoo.com is associated with the following two domains:</p><p><em>Domain: microsoften[.]com</em></p><p>The following are subdomains and the IP addresses they reside on as of 3 September 2014:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/712/1*Sr0y6imjxqyyBFbiKaMbaA.png" /></figure><p>Passive DNS records identified the domain microsoftca[.]com which shared the same infrastructure as microsoften.com. Based on the shared infrastructure and Microsoft theme the two domains likely related. The domain microsoftca.com was registered by the email address andy.okay@yahoo.com</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/704/1*btfhBAvffmeSEXOyuKWjwQ.png" /></figure><h3><strong>Why Target Medical Records?</strong></h3><p>In March of 2011, the Chinese government announced the 12th “Five-Year Plan”. One of the major areas addressed in this Five Year Plan (FYP) was to create innovation throughout the medical and pharmaceutical industry and become a market leader within “pharmaceuticals, vaccines, medical products and traditional Chinese medicine.” Since 2011 there have been a number of reported compromises involving probable State Sponsored APT groups that have taken place.</p><p>While this does not directly explain why China would want information related to patient medical records, it is possible medical records may have not been the only target. The malware and cyber threat has supposedly been mitigated; however Community Health Systems is still conducting an investigation and assessing the total damage [4] [5]. Previously, State Sponsored threats have targeted organizations in various industries to steal intellectual property for industry advancement or economic gain. If intellectual property or other specific technologies were also targeted in the Community Health Systems breach it has not yet been made public.</p><h3><strong>Previous State Sponsored Attacks:</strong></h3><p>In January 2012 a State Sponsored cyber threat group staged malicious domains with names that resembled the domain names of legitimate medical and pharmaceutical companies. The malicious domains were used in spear phishing attacks targeting individuals associated with legitimate medical and pharmaceutical companies [12]. Malware used to infect the victim systems in these incidents was unique and known as the “Sykipot” malware [13][14]. This malware has only been seen used by a China-based APT group. This is not the same group that targeted Community Health Systems but it does provide evidence that the medical industry has been actively targeted by China since at least 2012. In the 2012 incident, the technologies and research that went into making medical and pharmaceutical products was the primary target of the attack.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>The transition from paper-based to electronic health records requires providers to shift the focus of their security controls to protect electronically protected health information (ePHI). It will take some time for the healthcare industry to evaluate the processes and identify where they need to improve to better protect sensitive data. Until security measures are hardened and the emphasis on protecting data is placed before convenience and accessibility it is likely that the number of serious breaches will increase.</p><p>Serious financial penalties can be levied on Healthcare providers by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) when a compromise like the one against Community Health System takes place. It is in the provider’s best interest to take a proactive approach in defending their networks and protecting ePHI handled and processed by their systems as well as their business associates. HIPAA compliance is just the beginning when it comes to the level of security necessary to fend off these attacks. Additionally, it is often more expensive to respond and mitigate an advanced attack once an attacker gains a foothold, and often requires hiring a third party to respond to the incident and mitigate the threat. Finally, no amount of money can alleviate the damage to the reputation of the compromised organization, not to mention the harm to patients that results from these incidents.</p><h3>References:</h3><p>[1] <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/id/101927433">http://www.cnbc.com/id/101927433</a><br> [2] <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/id/101708255">http://www.cnbc.com/id/101708255</a><br> [3] <a href="http://www.databreachtoday.com/malware-leads-to-health-data-breach-a-6258">http://www.databreachtoday.com/malware-leads-to-health-data-breach-a-6258</a><br> [4] <a href="https://www.trustedsec.com/august-2014/chs-hacked-heartbleed-exclusive-trustedsec/">https://www.trustedsec.com/august-2014/chs-hacked-heartbleed-exclusive-trustedsec/</a> [5] <a href="http://www.foxbusiness.com/technology/2014/08/18/china-based-hackers-steal-45m-">http://www.foxbusiness.com/technology/2014/08/18/china-based-hackers-steal-45m-</a> records-from-community-health/<br> [6] <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/18/us-community-health-cybersecurity-">http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/18/us-community-health-cybersecurity-</a> idUSKBN0GI16N20140818<br> [7] <a href="http://reverseip.domaintools.com/search/?q=210.56.56.201">http://reverseip.domaintools.com/search/?q=210.56.56.201</a><br> [8] <a href="http://www.symantec.com/security_response/earthlink_writeup.jsp?docid=2014-">http://www.symantec.com/security_response/earthlink_writeup.jsp?docid=2014-</a> 082114–1902–99<br> [9] <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/20/us-cybersecurity-healthcare-fbi-">http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/20/us-cybersecurity-healthcare-fbi-</a> idUSKBN0GK24U20140820<br> [10] <a href="http://www.ihealthbeat.org/articles/2014/8/21/hackers-directly-targeting-health-care-">http://www.ihealthbeat.org/articles/2014/8/21/hackers-directly-targeting-health-care-</a> organizations-fbi-warns<br> [11] <a href="https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-098A">https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-098A</a><br> [12] <a href="http://www.cybersquared.com/2013/03/network-health-advanced-cyber-threats-to-">http://www.cybersquared.com/2013/03/network-health-advanced-cyber-threats-to-</a> the-medical-life-sciences-industries/<br> [13] <a href="http://www.cyberintel.us/chinas-five-year-plan-a-target-list-for-hacking/">http://www.cyberintel.us/chinas-five-year-plan-a-target-list-for-hacking/</a><br> [14] <a href="http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/malicious/detailed-analysis-sykipot-">http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/malicious/detailed-analysis-sykipot-</a> smartcard-proxy-variant-33919</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a5c6c6a6d9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Lies from the DarkSide: Ransomware Gang Lied About Pipeline Attack]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/useanalyst1/lies-from-the-darkside-ransomware-gang-lied-about-pipeline-attack-b3780f655cc6?source=rss-45fd5e5f9bd5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b3780f655cc6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ransomware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dark-side]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[colonial-pipeline]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybercrime]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russian-hacking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jon DiMaggio]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 14 May 2021 16:41:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-05-14T16:41:22.485Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*msxgcV8qMlO-SAHq.jpg" /></figure><p>In May 2021, DarkSide, a Russian criminal gang, hacked Colonial Pipeline, the organization responsible for the largest Gas pipeline spanning the east coast of the United States. However, the gang soon backtracked, claiming they did not intentionally hack the organization. Instead they claimed it was an accidental infection caused by the gang’s partner affiliate, who assisted in the attack for a share of the ransom profit.</p><p><em>“From today we introduce moderation and check each company that our partners want to encrypt to avoid social consequences in the future.” -DarkSide Ransomware Gang</em>.</p><p>However, their statement is not valid. DarkSide predetermines and selects every target before an attack and creates individual ransomware payloads for each. The payload infects and encrypts victim data and generates the ransom note. Each ransom note is tailored to the specific victim and includes a unique key and URL as seen in Figure 1:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*oyD1xUKNeNePt6EM" /></figure><p>Figure1: Ransom note with unique victim key and website URL</p><p>With the key, URL and payload compiled before the attack, DarkSide had to be aware of who they were attacking prior to attack execution. This is also a major attack locking down an entire network of operational systems and not some accidental infection of a few computers. Even without the evidence presented, it’s hard to fathom an attack of this magnitude could be conducted accidentally.</p><p>Without the unique key and URL, negotiations cannot begin. Using a key prevents researchers or the media from establishing communications or pretending to be the victim in an attempt to extract information from the attacker. Pre-populating a key into each ransom note and payload indicates the attacker has to select the victim intentionally. <strong>Therefore, the DarkSide group itself, not the affiliates, are responsible for the ransomware payload.</strong> DarkSide had to create the payload for the Pipeline victim specifically.</p><p>Figure 2 below shows the key authentication window presented after the victim clicks on the unique URL included in their ransom note.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/859/0*f2tA8nfEm-SOnheQ" /></figure><p>Figure2: DarkSide victim key authentication window</p><p><strong>Pre-Populated Data Posts</strong></p><p>Another unique tactic used by DarkSide is how they populate victim data and messages to their data leak site. According to the ransom note, “<em>The data is preloaded and will be automatically published if you do not pay.</em>” DarkSide pre-loads victim data after theft to populate their data leak site once a predetermined time passes. If the victim pays, DarkSide halts the process. If not, it automatically releases a post leaking victim data. This, however, did not happen with the Colonial Pipeline attack. The attacker likely decided not to post data due to the backlash from the US government after the attack took place. The attacker may want to leave themselves plausible deniability due to the amount of attention the attack generated.</p><p><strong>Activity Decline</strong></p><p>The volume of victim data leak posts significantly reduced in May 2021. It’s worth noting at the time of this writing: there have only been twelve days in May to compare against other months. However, the DarkSide attacker has only made one post to their data leak site in May. In comparison, within the first twelve days of April, DarkSide made eight posts, releasing small amounts of victim data. Similarly, DarkSide made a much higher volume of posts from January through March, as seen in Figure 3 below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/361/0*Z_5bYC-GKXIwH8Ta" /></figure><p>The DarkSide gang also “pinned” two older victim posts to the top of their victim list in May after the Pipeline attack took place. Yet, Darkside has still not posted any of the Pipeline data. The discrepancy may be an attempt to give the appearance operations are continuing as usual.</p><p>Additionally, due to the post DarkSide made to their website about the attack, many media outlets and researchers question whether DarkSide and the Russian government are affiliated with one another. The DarkSide gang insinuates they have no Russian government affiliation in a post they made to their website’s press section on May 10th. The message is displayed in Figure 4 below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*9y0JHWx47-vJnxpq" /></figure><p>Figure 4: DarkSide post regarding the pipeline attack</p><p>On 13 May, fuel once again began to flow through the pipeline delivering gas across the east coast. As Colonial reinstated pipeline operations, President Biden released an executive order addressing new cybersecurity requirements and standards intended to improve the security posture of federal government computer networks and systems. While all of this took place, DarkSide’s infrastructure mysteriously went down. Sometimes adversaries move their infrastructure; however, this does not appear to be the case. Instead, DarkSide’s data leak site no longer resolves. It’s unclear what happened, but a US government takedown operation is certainly plausible.</p><p><strong>Closing</strong></p><p>Despite the attempt to distance themselves from the Russian government, it’s worth noting the aftereffect of the Pipeline disruption fits nicely with Russian tactics used in the past (e.g., attacks against Ukraine, Georgia, Estonia, etc.). This type of attack causes major gas outages resulting in panic and doubt regarding the victim government’s ability to protect critical infrastructure. All of this fits the Russian government’s playbook of cyber operations. For now, we must treat this as a criminal attack as more evidence is needed to make any government-affiliated attribution. However, even if criminals are the only perpetrator, the claim the attack is accidental, is laughable and simply not true.</p><p><em>*You can find the related indicators of compromise </em><a href="https://analyst1.com/blog/lies-from-the-darkside-ransomware-gang-lied-about-pipeline-attack"><em>here</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b3780f655cc6" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/useanalyst1/lies-from-the-darkside-ransomware-gang-lied-about-pipeline-attack-b3780f655cc6">Lies from the DarkSide: Ransomware Gang Lied About Pipeline Attack</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/useanalyst1">useanalyst1</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Ransomware Gangs Move Toward Efficient Self-Automated Attacks]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/useanalyst1/ransomware-gangs-move-toward-efficient-self-automated-attacks-46fdf434afa5?source=rss-45fd5e5f9bd5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/46fdf434afa5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[malware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ransomware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybercrime]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[raas]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jon DiMaggio]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 04 May 2021 19:26:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-05-04T19:26:11.802Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fAMJ5b0yz7tLO2aIktduVw.jpeg" /></figure><p>In early April 2021, Analyst1 published a whitepaper analyzing a self-proclaimed ransom cartel. While conducting research for the whitepaper, we reviewed several ransomware gangs and their activities. Now, we want to expand on one of our findings, which poses an extreme threat to enterprise organizations. Since February 2020, three of the five ransomware variants we researched — Lockbit, Ryuk, and Conti variants — began adding new functionality to automate components of their attack. Gangs are introducing this functionality into their ransomware payloads to improve their efficiency, thereby shortening the time it takes to compromise victims. This benefits attackers in a couple of ways:</p><ol><li>Ransomware as a Service (RaaS) providers pay affiliates to conduct on-network activities that require human interaction to stage and compromise the environment. Gangs have realized they can eliminate these middlemen by automating affiliate-operated phases of their attacks. Currently, RaaS providers and affiliates share profits. If gangs can remove the affiliate dependency, then they can significantly increase their profits.</li><li>Today, most ransomware attackers spend anywhere from days to weeks in a victim’s environment. They spend their time staging and preparing the environment before executing the ransom payload. By optimizing their attacks and reducing the attack time from weeks to hours, attackers can significantly increase the volume of their operations. Naturally, this leads to an increase in revenue.</li></ol><p>In the Ransom Mafia whitepaper,1 we discuss how the Lockbit gang took advantage of unpatched VPN software present on public-facing victim infrastructure. In doing so, they ran the most efficient enterprise ransomware attack we have seen to date.2 The vulnerable software and brute force tactics allowed for the perfect storm; it provided the gang with administrative privileges in addition to remote access into the victim’s environment. From there, the ransomware payload issues an ARP request to identify and connect to additional hosts. The ransomware achieves this by leveraging the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol to access each connected system. Next, each new victim’s system issues a request to attacker C&amp;C infrastructure to download and execute the ransom payload, thereby reducing attacks from weeks to hours. Of course, the attack chain is more complex than we describe here, and we further detail it in our whitepaper. However, the primary takeaway is that with proper access, new automated features significantly reduce how long it takes the attacker to fully compromise a target.</p><p>Similarly, another gang known as Wizard Spider added new automation functionality to their Ryuk ransomware. In this instance, the ransomware can now automate host discovery and spread the ransom payload on its own. To accomplish this, Wizard Spider used a legitimate wake-on- LAN technology to discover all other hosts on the network. From there, they spread the ransomware payload, which removes most of the attacker&#39;s manual interaction.3 In addition to identifying hosts, the wake-on-LAN technology allows Wizard Spider to power on offline systems before executing the ransomware payload across all systems in the victim environment. This ensures that the attacker can infect all systems within the target environment. Again, this capability reduces overall attack time and greatly reduces the attacker’s own interaction.</p><p>Wizard Spider also conducts operations involving Conti ransomware. The gang added capabilities to Conti — the gang’s newest ransomware variant — to reduce attack time significantly. Similar to Lockbit, Conti also takes advantage of the SMB protocol to self- propagate in addition to scripts, which further automates the compromise. However, its developers found other novel methods to reduce attack timeframes. Conti’s developers understood that the quicker they could move from initial access to ransomware execution, the fewer opportunities defenders would have to mitigate the attack.</p><p>To maximize efficiency, Conti ransomware uses 32 simultaneous threads to encrypt files. This reduced the time required to encrypt large amounts of data from hours to minutes. Furthermore, another update to the Conti payload added a file selection process prior to encryption. Specifically, this capability allows the attacker to encrypt local, network, or all data found in a target’s environment. Organizations will often store important data on network drives to make it accessible to their teams who may need it. Additionally, this ransomware feature provides attackers with the ability to encrypt high-value networked data if they choose to — as opposed to encrypting everything. By doing so, the attacker spends less time and resources encrypting the locally stored data, which is often less critical to the operation. This and its multi-thread encryption process significantly shorten the attack timeline.</p><p><strong>What’s to come?</strong></p><p>Ransomware attackers’ immediate focus will center on identifying new and creative ways to quickly acquire administrative privileges. Secondly, gangs will continue adding more efficient automated capabilities into their ransomware payloads. The elevated privileges are necessary to automate the attack. As of today, these upgrades have not replaced all “human on keyboard” phases of the attack. However, attackers are quickly moving toward this goal. Based on the additions and upgrades geared toward attack efficiency which we observed over the last year, we will likely see fully automated ransomware attacks becoming the norm within the next two years. The best way to reduce the risk of these attacks is to ensure that all public facing infrastructure is secure and up-to-date. Analyst1 continues to monitor Ransomware attackers, and we will provide updates upon discovering new information.</p><p>Endnotes:</p><p><em>1. DiMaggio, Jon. “Ransom Mafia — Analysis of the World’s First Ransomware Cartel.” Analyst1, 07 Apr. 2021, </em><a href="https://analyst1.com/whitepaper/ransom-mafia-analysis-of-the-worlds-first-ransomware-cartel."><em>https://analyst1.com/whitepaper/ransom-mafia-analysis-of-the-worlds-first-ransomware-cartel.</em></a></p><p><em>2. Lopez, Marc Rivero and the ATR Operational Intelligence Team. “Tales From the Trenches; a Lockbit Ransomware Story.” McAfee, 30 Apr. 2020, </em><a href="https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/tales-from-the-"><em>https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/tales-from-the-</em></a><em> trenches-a-lockbit-ransomware-story/.</em></p><p><em>3. Abrams, Lawrence. “Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan To Encrypt Offline Devices.” Bleeping Computer, 14 Jan. 2020, </em><a href="https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-"><em>https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-</em></a><em> offline-devices/.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=46fdf434afa5" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/useanalyst1/ransomware-gangs-move-toward-efficient-self-automated-attacks-46fdf434afa5">Ransomware Gangs Move Toward Efficient Self-Automated Attacks</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/useanalyst1">useanalyst1</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Operation Bachosens: A detailed look into a long-running cyber crime campaign]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/threat-intel/cybercrime-investigation-insights-bachosens-e1d6312f6b3a?source=rss-45fd5e5f9bd5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e1d6312f6b3a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[deep-dives]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jon DiMaggio]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 31 May 2017 13:04:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-04-03T09:59:11.461Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A recent investigation into a unique malware attack on an automotive parts supplier in China ended quite unexpectedly. As well as discovering rarely-used malware techniques, we also discovered unexpected motivations of the individual who is likely behind the attacks, and the great lengths he went to for relatively meager gain.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*M5NzqRfD_ghVaqCiIrPpRQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>In March 2016, Symantec’s automated attack notification systems, which run on our vast telemetry, identified a potentially interesting targeted attack. One of the initial interesting attributes of the attack was the small number of organizations and regions targeted. Our initial triage found a custom keylogger, along with two unknown suspicious files.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PpIUh_zy97pJgvDxiwK1Vw.png" /></figure><h3><strong>Part 1: Following the malware</strong></h3><p>Analyzing the unknown samples, we confirmed they were a new backdoor Trojan that Symantec now detects as <a href="https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2017-022316-1436-99">Trojan.Bachosens</a>. Once the Bachosens malware is dropped on the victim computer, it creates a number of files which, in this instance, were designed to masquerade as the legitimate Java application on the target’s computer to avoid detection:</p><p><em>%AppData%\Java\jusched.exe</em></p><p><em>%CommonProgramFiles%\java\jusched.exe</em></p><p><em>%CommonProgramFiles%\java\java update\jusched.exe</em></p><p><em>%CommonProgramFiles%\jusched.exe</em></p><p><em>%System%\</em><strong><em>sens.dll</em></strong></p><p><em>%System%\</em><strong><em>stor64.dll</em></strong></p><p><em>%System%\</em><strong><em>stor32.dll</em></strong></p><p>Trojan.Bachosens then creates a registry entry so that it remains persistent on the computer and runs every time Windows starts:</p><p><em>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\”JavaUpdater” = “[PATH TO MALWARE]\jusched.exe -v”</em></p><p>Both a 32 bit and a 64 bit keylogger were also identified being used in these attacks, depending on the target’s environment. This was our first clue that the attacker was tailoring their tools and malware specifically for targets’ environments. The keylogger was not dropped by the malware, so we suspect it is pushed manually by the attacker to systems of interest after the initial infection.</p><p>Once we had this information, the next step was to uncover the communication protocol of the backdoor. Right away, we discovered the backdoor used a domain generation algorithm (DGA). A DGA causes the command and control (C&amp;C) server that the threat communicates with to change depending on the current date. This makes shutting down the attacker’s infrastructure more difficult.</p><p>Some malware will generate hundreds or thousands of possible C&amp;C domains as part of their DGA. Oddly, the Bachosens attacker developed his malware to only generate 13 domains per year. Only two of the 13 domains are active at any given time: one domain that changes each month, and another that is static for the entire year.</p><p>For the monthly changing domain, Bachosens’ DGA generates a predefined number of random characters seeded by the current date and pairs them with a free Dynamic DNS (DDNS) provided root domain:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*G2LQTLKuobaB7N2xk9jp1Q.png" /></figure><p>For the yearly domain, Bachosens does the same, but ads .com rather than a static root domain.</p><p>Once we figured out this algorithm, we were able to generate all the domains for 2016 and 2017.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/890/1*7DX5i6L3lj2-MBEBeJC8Uw.png" /></figure><p>However, even after determining the threat used a DGA, we still had not fully uncovered the backdoor’s C&amp;C protocol. What we discovered next was not only unexpected, but became the catalyst for us to dig further.</p><h4><strong>Covert channels</strong></h4><p>Most backdoors use HTTP or HTTPS for communicating with their C&amp;C servers, but this malware was communicating over DNS, ICMP, and HTTP protocols.</p><p>Our analysis showed the attacker actually coded the malware to attempt DNS (domain name system) communication first, switching to alternative methods only when necessary. DNS is the protocol used to translate domain names (example.com) into IP addresses (127.0.0.1). Using DNS for C&amp;C communication has been documented previously, such techniques were seen being used in malware found in the Shadow Brokers leak, but it is rare.</p><p>In this case, the malware sends data encoded within the domain name to the DNS server and receives data from the attacker in the DNS response packet. DNS response records can provide multiple IP addresses and Bachosens relies on DNS AAAA response records. An AAAA response contains the requested domain’s 128-bit IPv6 address. Instead of a valid IPv6 address, the address is encoded data from the attacker. Below is an example of the DNS traffic seen in the initial communication:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2J1ohhNF55y9hKf_2DWmvg.png" /></figure><p>The information transmitted in the initial communications from the malware to the DNS server includes an attacker-determined “Infection ID” (decoded below), along with the infection date.</p><p>So, for example, “lok4723peoi8n1c0mk23rtmc91z” is decrypted to “0c23ca440908c1e80301020000000000”, which can be decoded into the “infection id” and infection date below:</p><p><em>nonce = 0c</em></p><p><em>cksum = 23ca (verification PASS)</em></p><p><em>infection_id = c1080944</em></p><p><em>infection_year = 2016</em></p><p><em>infection_month = 8</em></p><p><em>infection_day = 8</em></p><p><em>infection_random = 0944</em></p><p><em>sid_relative_identifier = 1000</em></p><p><em>request_kind = 0201</em></p><p><em>padding_size = 0</em></p><p><em>request_sequence = 00000000</em></p><p>The DNS server responds back to the malware with a provided “session ID” and an RSA-encrypted communication channel is established over the same protocol where the victim’s environment, including operating system, computer name, and user name, is sent to the attacker.</p><p>The malware can perform this handshake and session establishment in a similar manner using DNS A records, DNS TXT records, ICMP Echo packets, and HTTP. After the communication channel session is established, the attacker has been seen to change protocols. For example, the attacker can instruct the malware to change from DNS to ICMP by sending the command “conn icmp &lt;id&gt;”.</p><p>While DNS is considered a covert method of communication, once we discovered it was being used we could search for historical DNS request and response records and decode the infection ID associated with each target and the precise infection date. This allowed us to build an accurate timeline based on the attacker’s own metrics. Through this process we were able to determine the adversary was active and present on the automotive victim’s network from December 2016 through February 2017.</p><p>The historic DNS records also confirmed attempted attacks on two other organizations: a commercial airline and an organization involved in the online entertainment industry.</p><p>While analyzing the malware we also came across an interesting aspect that could provide support for attribution. Russian strings for data sizes were used. For example, б and гб were found in the binary, which are the Russian equivalents of bytes (B) and gigabytes (GB).</p><h3><strong>Part 2: Determining attacker motivation</strong></h3><p>At this point in the investigation, we had a solid grasp of the malware features, including its unique communication protocol. However, the limited and diverse targets of an automotive parts supplier, an airline, and an online entertainment organization were puzzling. The automotive parts supplier was especially worrisome in the context of the recent Vault 7 leaks, which describe automobile hacking by a likely nation state. Understanding the objective of these attacks and who else may be a target was necessary. The following were the likely scenarios:</p><p><strong>1.</strong> Could this be corporate espionage in which intellectual property is being stolen for the advantage of a competing firm?</p><p><strong>2.</strong> Could this be a financially motivated cyber crime gang with the ability to develop or purchase unique undetected malware?</p><p><strong>3.</strong> Could this be a nation-state attacker with a sabotage motivation?</p><p>Through our reconstructed infection timeline, we were able to see what systems the adversary spent the most time on and noticed a reoccurring theme in the targets of interest. The systems in which the attacker spent the most time were automotive technology developer systems. Of the developer systems, the primary technology that appeared to be of interest to the attacker involved the development of a very specific automotive diagnostic technology. This technology is loaded into handheld diagnostic devices and sold to automotive repair shops globally. To protect the victims we are masking the technology and product name and will refer to it as “Diag-1000” for the remainder of the article.</p><h3><strong>Part 3: Attacker infrastructure and IOC ties</strong></h3><p>In addition to understanding the attack methods and victim profiles, analyzing the attacker’s infrastructure can provide potential attribution clues. The earliest known Bachosens keylogger from December 2013 did not rely on a DGA to generate the C&amp;C domain but instead connected to the hardcoded domain of “pstars.org”. As seen in the diagram below, pstars.org used the name servers ns1.oyy[.]name &amp; ns2.oyy[.]name.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*qb5QvNI35UUqBVLHYSdKYQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>At this point in the investigation, we had more than 70 samples we had analyzed made up of two versions of the Bachosens Trojan and two versions of the keyloggers. Using internal systems that can find similar malware samples, we were able to then identify another previously unknown sample associated with the attacker. The sample looked like it was developed for testing purposes as opposed to actually being used in attacks. The attacker made a mistake in their operational security with this sample, however, as it included a hardcoded IP address of 95.153.122.210. This IP address was associated with the domain gorkogo77.ddns[.]net, which is also associated with the oyy.name name servers as seen in the diagram below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Kq8xFNBcM-13JniMbK5_fw.png" /></figure><p>The AAAA record for oyy.name also led to a variety of other domains that also had similar IPs and registration information.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*c9XYmWj852BeMXGZYI3qLw.png" /></figure><p>Looking at the registration information for oyy.name and a number of other domains associated with the above domains, we see the name Igor C****** was used, as well as the common email of “igor.********@gmail.com” and the phone number “+373.7777****”. In addition, the addresses were all located in Moldova. While this name may be a pseudonym, we have found it, or variations of it, used consistently across the supporting infrastructure, including on a linked personal social network page.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rGxBAbyedxBPvICeblXBbw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Next we looked at the common phone number used and identified a number of domains that were registered with the same registrant phone number, as seen below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dPWiafgIRtYHx5KGiP2cEQ.png" /></figure><p>After checking the registration information for each of these domains we identified another tie to the registrant and Bachosens activity. The domain “funny-penny.com”, seen above with the same phone number as related Bachosens domains, used the street address “str. Gorkogo 77”, which matches the previously discovered gorkogo77.ddns.net domain used by Bachosens.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/908/1*3M1_FtEQ4vtgFe2yQTmtZA.png" /></figure><p>Within these related domains, only one appears to have an active business. The domain sells auto parts online.</p><p>Furthermore, this online shop actually has a physical shop in Moldova that matches the domain registration information.</p><p>We now knew the registrant of the infrastructure used to compromise an automotive technology supplier was also associated with an automotive parts shop in Moldova. But why this automotive technology supplier was compromised wasn’t yet completely clear.</p><p>Pivoting off the registration information led to a variety of other sites, including Android applications developed by the same individual and a GitHub site. The aliases and email addresses used on these sites finally led to forum postings with the subjects (translated):</p><p><em>The [ DIAG-1000 ] (All Android / the IOS)</em></p><p><em>Sale upgrade scan tool [ DIAG-1000 ]</em></p><p>These posts were attempting to sell a stolen version of the exact diagnostic technology produced by the victim automotive supplier. After a lengthy investigation, we discovered the attacker’s complex efforts appear to have been simply to steal the technology for resale on the black market — a considerable effort for a technology that can be legitimately purchased for around $1,100.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eGkvtHuhYM2fKgUtl5BxDQ.png" /></figure><blockquote>“After a lengthy investigation, we discovered the attacker’s complex efforts appear to have been simply to steal the technology for resale on the black market”</blockquote><h3><strong>Conclusion</strong></h3><p>Going into this investigation, we thought there was a good chance this would be associated with a nation-state attacker based on the regions of the victims, the highly selective targeting, and the methods in which the malware used covert channels to communicate and go undetected.</p><p>The discovery that all of the attacker’s complex coding was for such small financial gain in reselling stolen automotive diagnostic tools was very surprising. The attacks resulted in a meager payout for the attacker, who went through such elaborate means to obtain the automotive diagnostic technology. The legitimate “Diag-1000” is sold new for less than $1,100 and the stolen version was being sold for $110.</p><p>Based on the Russian strings in the malware infrastructure, Russian characters used for data size suffixes, and the open source traces left by the attacker, we are reasonably confident the attacker is located in Tiraspol, Moldova and is associated with the automotive industry.</p><p>This investigation provided us with a good example as to why analysts cannot make assumptions when conducting an investigation and must set a hypothesis, follow the data, and prove or disprove that hypothesis based on the facts. The initial facts could have led one to believe this was a highly sophisticated operation carried out by a nation state, however, by following the evidence and connecting the dots we were able to develop and see the complete picture of the life cycle of the Bachosens attacks against the victim organizations.</p><p><strong><em>For more information on this investigation, take a look at the </em></strong><a href="http://symc.ly/2r5insm"><strong><em>Security Response blog</em></strong></a><strong><em> on the subject.</em></strong></p><p><em>Check out the Security Response </em><a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/symantec-blogs/sr"><em>blog</em></a><em> and follow Threat Intel on </em><a href="https://twitter.com/threatintel"><em>Twitter</em></a><em> to keep up-to-date with the latest happenings in the world of threat intelligence and cybersecurity.</em></p><p><em>Like this story? Recommend it by hitting the heart button so others on Medium see it, and follow Threat Intel on Medium for more great content.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e1d6312f6b3a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/threat-intel/cybercrime-investigation-insights-bachosens-e1d6312f6b3a">Operation Bachosens: A detailed look into a long-running cyber crime campaign</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/threat-intel">Threat Intel</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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