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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Jonathon P Sine on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Jonathon P Sine on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Jonathon P Sine on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Atomization and the Future of the CCP]]></title>
            <link>https://joncosine.medium.com/atomization-and-the-future-of-the-ccp-6fbafcb4ab16?source=rss-440c2574bdc8------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[geopolitics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[chinese-communist-party]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[future]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-relations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jonathon P Sine]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 10 Mar 2021 21:13:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-03-10T21:13:31.990Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*5v7wxj2RAwxB2UBT" /></figure><p>If you want to understand the most important challenge facing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) you should read <em>The True Believer</em> by Eric Hoffer. The book is a magisterially concise diagnosis of what fuels, energizes, motivates, and guides mass movements. The most important challenge for the CCP — or rather what top cadres believe is their most pressing challenge — is keeping the Party organization cohesive, resilient, and robust in the face of drastic change, internal and external.</p><p>Modernization uproots tradition. The material economic conditions of modern free markets — capitalism — create a political economic environment that up-ends traditional large family, clans, and lineage organizations. Children move away to big cities and marry and live outside their close families, wives become increasingly independent, and the incentives created by marketization pull people further and further apart from one another. The result is atomization.</p><p>A key, perhaps the key test, for the Chinese Communist Party lies in its continued response to this enduring phenomena.</p><p>The Chinese Communist Party has found it necessary and desirable to be able to absorb increasingly atomized individuals into a coherent organization that gives them a sense of belonging and their life a sense of meaning and purpose. Going forward, the question is how well this can continue. As organizations grow, it is increasingly difficult to mimic the very intense sense of belonging that lineages and kinship networks create. The breakdown of those networks creates individuals with a deep yearning to live for more than themselves. This yearning, necessarily following from the atomization wrought by marketization, can manifest in the desire to join new mass movements and new organizations.</p><p>Such a desire was poignantly on display with the Falun Gong. When marketization set in, and individuals who had become both increasingly atomized and now out of jobs (owing to closure of thousands of SOEs), many people turned to various spiritual organizations. One of these was Falun Gong. Of course, the creeping size of this group, and the allegiance to it and sense of purpose its members felt, came to be experienced by the CCP as a direct challenge to its authority and its ability to firmly control China. Thus Falun Gong had to be persecuted and reigned in.</p><p>The challenge of increasingly atomized individuals searching for belonging stretches <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23615141?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">beyond the Falun Gong</a>. It can be seen in the rising rates of Chinese converting to <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2011/12/ChristianityAppendixC.pdf">Christianity</a>, in <a href="https://time.com/4260593/china-buddhism-religion-religious-freedom/#:~:text=Official%20statistics%20don&#39;t%20exist,Buddhist%20beliefs%2C%20according%20to%20Pew.">Buddhist</a> revivalism, and where possible the continuation of familial worship practices. The Party-state has directly responded by attempting to co-opt all such non-Party routes to solidarity and belonging, correctly recognizing such social organizations as potentially grievous threats to its monopoly on social power. On the peripheries, where minorities are even less entwined with the Party-state structure, the draconian crack downs are far more intense. The CCP has sensed the danger to its territorial integrity stemming from the organizational challenge to its monopoly on social power and cracked down ruthlessly.</p><p>At the same time, the Party has also become innovative in ways to try to capture these free radicals — the increasingly atomized Chinese people. Most importantly, Jiang Zemin introduced the three represents to expand the realm of inclusion and goad more and more people into the Party structure. Xi Jinping, of course, introduced the idea of the China Dream and the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation to attempt to further induce people into a sense of group mission and belonging within the confines of the Party’s developmental monopoly.</p><p>Chairman Xi is emblematic of an individual who understands the challenge the CCP faces. Indeed, it speaks to the awareness that top level cadres had of this emerging trend of atomization that they fast-tracked him for General Secretary. Xi became imbued with devotion to the cause — devotion to the Party structure — from a young age. He was both weary of the Cultural Revolution’s fanaticism, owing to the detrimental impact it had on his family and himself, but also greatly appreciative of his trials and tribulations. Most important was when he was sent to the caves of Liangjiahe, Shaanxi province at 15. Isolated from his friends and family, this was when he became a true believer. Indeed, isolation and atomization is when people are most susceptible to indoctrination and joining mass movements. Xi was no different. He left the caves 7 years later with a conviction that the solidarity offered by the CCP as organization was the key to China’s future. This would become apparent throughout his career. Not only a Party man, he even went to Tsinghua for a PhD in Party organization. He then went on to head the Central Party School, the lynchpin organization for instilling Party collectivism and discipline.</p><p>Xi Jinping is a man who believes that holding the Party together — imbuing its member with a sense of belonging, mission, and purpose — is the single most important thing in the world. More important than development, more important than eradicating poverty, more important than his own well-being. This is largely because he truly believes the Party is the key to all those things.</p><p>In a way, Xi Jinping is no different from any True Believer who understands how to keep his movement alive. Atomization of individuals is the dough with which mass movements are created. If the Chinese Communist Party is unable to mold these proliferating free radicals into loyal cadres, the Party itself faces a grievous threat. Thus if the Party is unwilling to abandon the marketization process that creates these free radicals, it must increase its capacity to productively co-opt these atomized individuals.</p><p>The much-prophesied fall of the CCP at the hands of growth slowdowns or even financial collapse are thus overblown. The analysis that leads to viewing these as the key factors of regime failure is misplaced. The most important thing that leads to regime failure is the inability to productively co-opt atomized individuals. When individuals cease to identify with the larger whole of the Party, when they cease to believe in the mission, and when they cease to believe in the movement. This is also why it is misplaced to focus emphasis on the specifics of the ideology. Any belief system will do, in fact, so long as the sense of tribalism and belonging is maintained. A coherent ideological belief system is as problematic to this goal as it is beneficial. Too coherent of an ideology risks being disproven. The one that tends to stick is one that is both sweeping yet capacious and able to adopt a multitude of beliefs. This is how Catholicism evolved, and it is Marxism-Leninism in China has evolved. Marxism-Leninism in China keeps the shell of the belief system — most importantly Lenin’s contributions regarding a vanguard Party — but has cleared out its innards. And while it is true that slow-downs in growth and financial instability increase the discontent of atomized individuals and thus the risk to the Party, so long as the Party can has effectively co-opted most of these individuals and no other coherent movement exists to channel their grievances, the Party will carry on unmolested.</p><p>This, however, introduces us to the risk the CCP’s attempts to co-opt these individuals may pose to the rest of the world. We have seen that as lineages evaporate, atomized individuals in China proliferate, growth slows, and financial instability due to marketization grows, the CCP is faces ever more pressured to more effectively co-opt Free Radicals. This can and does take the form of repressing alternative movements, as well as increasing recruitment into the Party and increasing the sense of belonging and mission for those in the Party structure. While the former is devastating for those within China’s borders (or wherever the CCP extends its tentacles to attempt to squash the movements), it is the latter that poses the threat to the rest of the world. How China goes about inculcating a sense of unity and belonging amongst its expanding (90 million+) rank and file will have a major impact on the rest of the world.</p><p>Consider, analogously, the current ramifications of the debate over the Narrative™ in America. Many people want to hue towards the traditional American Narrative™ of exceptionalism that conspicuously minimized wrong-doing while emphasizing the importance of patriotism — the Trump Narrative™. Meanwhile, others want to forward a Narrative™ that paints America has little else but white supremacy, oppression, and false promises — the extreme woke Narrative™. Neither one is correct, in fact no singular Narrative can ever be correct (though the truth, as they say, is likely somewhere in the middle). The important point, though, is that the Narrative that becomes ascendant will have important implications for domestic political milieu as well as its behavior overseas. A Narrative™ is a critical part of how a nation holds itself together, how the masses are motivated to identify with the nation and push their elitse to make policies, and ultimately how elites create and enact domestic and foreign policies.</p><p>As in the US, the Narrative™ that China adopts is critically important for its future trajectory. While a Narrative™ is itself a necessary device for holding the Chinese people together and is more or less interchangeable, the specific content of the Narrative also has specific consequences. A Narrative can be more or less bellicose, for example. The Party can locate its sense of meaning in the Narrative™ by explaining prior conditions as acts of suffering imposed by others — the West, for example — and thus locate itself as a gallant savior and redeemer of the Chinese people. The Party can further nurture a sense of injury and grievance, creating within Free Radicals (atomized individuals) a reflexive disgust and hatred of Western countries and a reflexive belief in the goodness — and feeling of solidarity with — the Chinese Communist Party, who is the one and true represent of the Chinese people and, of course, can never be separated from them. At the same, the Party can create the ‘long hope’ that a community of common destiny, forged principally by the CCP, will work to the benefit of all — especially the Chinese people — and so everyone should join in and support the Party in this great mission that socialism with Chinese characteristics is about to take us on.</p><p>It is too early to know how things will play out. But the hyper nationalism of online commentators, the hawkish nationalistic sentiment expressed by youth in major Chinese cities, the various militaristic outbursts in the South China Sea and on the Indian border, and the Wolf Warrior Diplomacy would seem to offer a troubling premonition. Indeed, on more than one occasion, the Chinese Communist Party has had to specifically reign in anti-foreign protests that were getting out of hand — lest they grow into something beyond the Party’s control. But the tenor of the nationalist outbursts is indicative of a successful patriotic education campaign that inculcates a belief in China as victim and other countries as abusers and bullies. A victim mentality, <a href="https://quillette.com/2021/02/27/the-evolutionary-advantages-of-playing-victim/">as Cory Clark at Quillette has well summarized</a>, can induce a sense of righteous aggrievement that justifies one’s own heinousness. As I’ve written recently, <a href="https://jonathonsine.com/writings/f/the-path-to-hell-is-paved-with-righteousness">the path to hell is paved with righteousness</a>. Perhaps these are overblown cues. Only time will tell for sure.</p><p>Ultimately, though, the Party cares less about these unpredictable future consequences than it does about shoring up its power and control in the here and now. From the beginning, the CCP was a mass movement organization and Mao Zedong was an innovative pioneer in engineering successful mass movements. This is what Xi Jinping takes away from Mao. Xi Jinping and the CCP’s other leading cadres all understand that co-opting the proliferating mass of atomized Chinese individuals is the most important task it faces. If it fails other movements will rise, and the CCP will face grave threats. But if Xi and the CCP can update and utilize Mao’s mobilization techniques, and if they can manage to burnish an increasingly market-based and atomized Chinese society with a collective sense of belonging and mission under the stead of identification with the CCP, they will live on.</p><p>As this <a href="https://daily.jstor.org/communist-party-of-china/">narrative overiew suggests</a>, the Party has an expansive apparatus for ingratiating itself with the increasingly atomized Chinese populace. In particular, the elite and sub-elite stratum. It is of interest that it was precisely this stratum that formed the Party in the first place. The Party thus has institutional memory of how disruptive an unattached group of sub-elite, atomized individuals can be. As a 1968 study on the early composition of the CCP concluded:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1006/0*pT3ccegWjmAbnKsP" /></figure><p>Thus today the Party appreciates how important it is to get this leading edge of the atomized free radicals into the confines of the CCP — where they can be safely co-opted and guided into service of the Party itself. Such is the goal of a fully institutionalized Leninist Party apparatus. To consume that base of society which it knows full well — due to its own experience as an under-dog, under-ground, anti-system organization — can destabilize an organization. Nadege Rolland describes the history in <a href="https://www.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Commanding-Ideas-Think-Tanks-as-Platforms-for-Authoritarian-Influence-Rolland-Dec-2020.pdf">a recent report </a>on co-opting the intelligentsia. Here’s the essential part:</p><p><em>“The development of think tanks in China has largely adhered to an academic tradition of subordination to or dependence on the state. As in Soviet Russia, China’s research centers were from the 1950s onward directly controlled by and attached to the Communist Party or the state bureaucracy, including specific committees, ministries, and security agencies. But neither Mao Zedong nor Deng Xiaoping ever relied on them to inform their decision making. In the 1990s, Beijing allowed a small degree of openness, which led to the formation of a limited amount of civil society organizations and nongovernmental academic centers, mostly dedicated to research on economic issues. In the mid-2000s, CCP leader Hu Jintao, who had been president of the Central Party School, started to encourage input from Chinese intellectuals and experts to support policymaking, and regularly invited them to give lectures at Politburo Study Sessions. Several new and allegedly nongovernmental research centers, such as the Center for China and Globalization and the Charhar Institute, emerged during the 2008–2009 global financial crisis. Rather than offering genuinely independent perspectives on issues ranging from economics to international relations, the entities were established to create a false impression of opinion pluralism under increasingly tight ideological control from the party-state.</em></p><p><em>Xi Jinping’s rise to power in 2012–2013 marked in many domains an acceleration and clarification of previously observable trends. Think tanks are no exception. At a December 2012 CCP economic work conference, Xi proposed establishing high-quality think tanks to serve policymaking. A year later, the third plenum of the Eighteenth CCP Congress passed a resolution to create “new types of think tanks with Chinese characteristics.” Rather than inaugurating a flourishing new phase for independent Chinese think tanks, Xi’s policies were intended to further tighten government controls. Beijing passed laws restricting foreign funding for domestic nongovernmental institutions, and required that each think tank be placed under the strict purview of party-state entities. Fu Ying, a distinguished Chinese foreign policy practitioner, explained that Chinese think tanks should “adhere to the Party leadership and serve the country” while at the same time being “independent and objective.” In this case, “independence” does not mean free from government control, but rather free from the influence of Western concepts and ideas that the CCP considers threatening and subversive. More autonomous organizations, including the widely respected Unirule Institute of Economics, have since been forced to close down. The Unirule Institute of Economics — which had actively promoted China’s economic liberalization since its founding in 1993 and had tried to carve out a genuinely autonomous space for itself in an increasingly constricting environment — was locked out of its office in 2017 and eventually forced to close in 2019.</em></p><p><em>Xi remains committed to transforming Chinese think tanks into instruments serving the policies of the party-state, and he specifically demands that they help expand the regime’s international influence and contribute to the realization of its main strategic objectives.”</em></p><p>Roland concludes: <em>“In China, most think tanks are either built into or closely affiliated with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) organs and government agencies. Their research topics are framed by detailed guidelines and oriented to reflect governmental priorities.”</em></p><p>As a <a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/report/party-speaks-you">recent report</a> on the CCP’s United Front Work Department (an organization tasked explicitly with co-opting individuals and groups outside the traditional confines of the CCP) further argues, the focus on bringing domestic students, overseas students, and intellectuals into the Party’s orbit and making them amenable to its influence is strong is a core competency.</p><p>The reason for this focus is simple: free-floating, atomized intellectuals with a bone to a pick are dangerous. They can provide the guidance needed for new and destabilizing mass movements to spring up. They can mobilize the increasingly atomized Chinese populace. The CCP recognizes that the most sustainable way to deal with these intellectuals is to co-opt them. Under Maoism, more were killed than co-opted. Today, it’s the other way around (though some who engage in really <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/12/1080242">wrong types of activities</a> are indeed killed — or ‘disappeared’). Most importantly, co-opting intellectuals into a positive endeavor — e.g. theorizing about how to make China great again — serves as bulwark against invasive and threatening <a href="https://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation">Western values</a>. An unattached Chinese intellectual is far more susceptible to being ‘infected’ with the ‘virus’ of the Western values than one productively employed fortifying the CCP’s ideological and intellectual base.</p><p>Furthermore, as <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20192850?mag=communist-party-of-china&amp;seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">Bruce Dickson</a>, Andrew Walder, and <a href="http://anon-ftp.iza.org/dp3454.pdf">others</a> have shown there are substantial economic and network benefits to joining the Party. Not just for the intellectuals, but for the masses in general. For those who avoid the Party, meanwhile, there is effectively a glass ceiling when it comes to governmental appointments, appointments in SOEs, scholarly appointments and funding in think tanks and leading universities, and even in some private sector organizations. The CCP wants to make it desirable, from a status and wealth perspective, to be a member. This creates pervasive, impersonal forces that effectively attract free radicals into its fold, neutralizing their potential to join non-Party social structures that could pose a challenge to its monopoly on social power. (As I’ve written about regarding <a href="https://jonathonsine.com/writings/f/an-analysis-of-entrepreneurship-in-china">Entrepreneurship in China</a>, though, co-opting the private sector has a tendency to run up against innovation, as the expansion of the Party and the stability it desires is hard to square with an innovation / creative destruction oriented ecosystem.)</p><p>Handling the growing problem of atomization is the CCP’s greatest challenge. They are well aware of this. That is why they have created a massive infrastructure for co-opting these free floating radicals. In particular, the most dangerous ones: particularly the intelligentsia but also <a href="https://www.prcleader.org/blanchette">increasingly the business leaders</a>. To ensure their sole monopoly as a center of social power and influence, the CCP is going all in on its ability to productively co-opt these atomized individuals. A China scholar described the CCP’s authoritarian resilience as stemming from its <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5431e6ebe4b07582c93c48e3/t/57ce4a9229687fcc42c80c34/1473137311322/rtruex+-+Writing+Sample+%28Dissertation+Chapters+1%2C+4%2C+7%29.pdf">representation within bounds</a>, i.e. attempting to maximize informational benefits while minimizing reformist elements. Another way of formulating this is ‘co-optation’ within bounds. Those atomized free radicals who can be productively brought into service of bolstering the CCP will be. Those who cannot, well…</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/0*D37fK5OnvTTI5S4I" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6fbafcb4ab16" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Books & Mental Models: How You Think]]></title>
            <link>https://joncosine.medium.com/books-mental-models-how-you-think-8d4f7b7af9ec?source=rss-440c2574bdc8------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[nassim-taleb]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[niall-ferguson]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mental-models]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[books]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jonathon P Sine]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 29 Feb 2020 14:35:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-02-29T14:37:10.030Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Books &amp; Mental Models</h3><p>There is a trite truth I have come to realize over years of reading. The best books don’t just change what you think, they change how you think. The best teachers and professors don’t fill you up with knowledge, as if pouring water into some vase, but rather train you how to think fluidly and effectively, as if giving you the tools to mold yourself into an ever-changing vessel. The best books and the best teachers provide you the tools to sculpt yourself.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/450/1*1LGH6TTts0Ja7fEXt-X_Pw.png" /><figcaption>[Man is both the marble and the sculptor]</figcaption></figure><p>Our worldview is a product of our own interpretation. There is an objective reality, I contend, but it will always be passed through our subjective interpretation mechanisms; through our own lens. Insofar as books give us new mental models, not only do they help us remold ourselves, they also offer a new perspective on the world itself.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/882/1*2t2-bp9kxt-6JGOyWXT1sg.png" /><figcaption>[Perspective]</figcaption></figure><p>The best books I have ever read have not just given me insightful and fascinating new information (though they often do), they have helped me develop new mental models, or heuristics, for interpreting my world. As Bacon once said, “Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested; that is, some books are to be read only in parts; others to be read, but not curiously; and some few are to be read wholly, and with diligence and attention.”</p><p>I recently had the exceedingly good fortune of reading two books, back-to-back, that provided me the gift of the latter experience: <em>Antifragile</em> by Nassim Nicholas Taleb and <em>The Square and the Tower</em> by Niall Ferguson.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8d4f7b7af9ec" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Hayek: Hero or Villain?]]></title>
            <link>https://joncosine.medium.com/hayek-hero-or-villain-c50a17f384a6?source=rss-440c2574bdc8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c50a17f384a6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jonathon P Sine]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 13 Oct 2019 00:03:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-10-13T00:03:59.242Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Hayek: Hero or Villain?</strong></p><p>One may wonder if Hayek’s utopian vision of unencumbered markets heralding freedom is not the antithesis (in the Marxist sense) to the Marxist’s utopian vision of freedom being found in the abolition of markets and private property. Does Hayek perhaps fall victim to doctrinaire and ideologically motivated thinking? Is Hayek, as Isiah Berlin once proposed, a hedgehog who knows one really big thing, who sees the world through the lens of an over-simplified mental model, as opposed to a craftier, more eclectic and variegated fox?</p><p>Hayek, so it may seem, knows one big thing for certain: human freedom, being the most important thing, is maximized when humans are able to exercise choices in free and unencumbered markets. Thus for Hayek state intervention in markets inherently limits and reduces human freedom by limiting choices. To Hayek, liberalism allows the individual an ultimate level of autonomy insofar as he/she is able to determine for him/herself what variant of the ‘good’ to pursue. Meanwhile, under socialism, the individual is co-opted into pursuit of the state sanctioned version of the good.</p><p>Hayek believes that the state, no matter how good and rational its ideals, will always act to constrict true freedom when it deigns to determine and enforce what the ‘good’ is for others (e.g. macro-level distribution patterns, social justice, etc.). In this way, Hayek believes socialism and liberalism are in inherent contradiction. To quote Hayek directly: “What our planners demand is a central direction of all economic activity according to a single plan, laying down how the resources of society should be “consciously directed” to serve particular ends in a definite way.” For Hayek, this is to supplant the superior market mechanism with an “inferior method of coordinating individual effort,” and more importantly, it is to abridge individual freedom.</p><p>Yet, in the neoclassical vein, and almost paradoxically, Hayek admits of ample room for state intervention. Certain interventions, applied equally to everybody, that limit such things as ‘poisonous substances’ are “fully compatible with the preservation of competition.” Additionally, Hayek believes that certain externalities can only be accounted for and remedied by a coercive body such as the state, and (quoting Adam Smith directly on this one) that certain public goods can similarly only be provided for by such an organization as the state. With these now well-known and widely agreed upon caveats (baked as they are into our neoclassical economic undergraduate textbooks), Hayek believably submits that “it is important not to confuse [his] opposition against this kind of [socialist] planning with a dogmatic laissez-faire attitude.”</p><p>Indeed, on the explicit question of whether or not Hayek is a hero or villain, I believe an old Shakespearian quote, slightly modified, applies well: he is neither good nor bad, but thinking makes him so. As Damien Cahill explores in his recent article on Embedded Neoliberalism, Hayek has been widely co-opted (and misunderstood) across the political spectrum. Many ‘free-marketeers’ commit the crime Hayek explicitly warned them against, that is of thinking of him as a dogmatic promoter of laissez-faire. Meanwhile, contemporary Marxists (who, admittedly, have the most legitimate gripe, given Hayek’s disparagement of their ideology) similarly, though with the opposite normative inflection, view Hayek as one of the linchpins of unbridled laissez-faire neoliberalism. At the risk of being trite: an analysis of whether Hayek is a hero or villain will likely reveal less insight about the man himself and more about the individual making the assertion.</p><p>Hayek has done more than his fair share to give both poles in this argument (hero vs villain) their ammunition. From his formation of the Mt Pelier society to his often times over-zealous incrimination of socialism (and of things that look like socialism), it is not difficult to see how he could be seen as a neoliberal ideologue. At the same time, though, he has also offered incisive and nuanced explanations for why liberalism and its free markets are an extremely good tool for promoting economic efficiency, as well as liberty: millions of decision makers working in unison to determine valuations of products and services is a second-to-none information mechanism in terms of efficiency (i.e. cannot be matched or beaten by a top-down system), and this mechanism simultaneously empowers human beings to make accurate and informed decisions about their lives (i.e. where to work, spend money, etc.) without the need for top-down intervention or coercion. And, perhaps surprisingly to some, Hayek even wrote that he would be in favor of a universal basic income insofar as it enabled individuals in desperate economic conditions to avoid coercion from their employers.[i] How fully Hayek appreciated employers’ power to curtail their employees freedom is, however, debatable.</p><p>Missing from Hayek’s reification of liberal market economies, and from his tepid concerns about them, is an appreciation for what both Polanyi and de Tocqueville have noted of them: their tendency to tear apart the social capital upon which they rest. The atomization and individuation of people within markets, their commodification into discrete work units pursuing their self-interest, exerts a corrosive effect on the social ties that make human life meaningful and that, prior to industrialization, largely characterized human existence. It would have been interesting to see Hayek contend with the tendency of markets to attenuate the social fabric upon which they rely, and in this way potentially sow the seeds of their own disintegration.</p><p>While I am biased against contemporary neoliberalism, I am not convinced of Hayek’s role as a lynchpin of it, and thus come out as neutral on the hero vs villain question. Hayek was a thought leader who doggedly (and, yes, sometimes dogmatically) believed in the supremacy of the liberal over socialist system. I believe Robert Solow, in a 2012 article published in the New Republic, astutely captures my feelings as he writes that there is both a ‘good’ and a ‘bad’ Hayek. The good Hayek makes nuanced and insightful observations on the shortcomings of socialism and the benefits of liberalism (and, at times, vice-a-versa). The bad Hayek, meanwhile, is prone to rhetorical flourishes that eschew nuance and border upon propaganda. I like the good Hayek.</p><p>Yet, even bad Hayek has a strong point to make, one that I would almost be tempted to agree with had his net not been cast so broad. Hayek’s view that socialism, and any ‘unnecessary’ interference in the economic domain, places one upon the steep and slippery slope toward totalitarianism is too facile (as a side note, Hayek’s own writings, as Keynes’ once pointed out in a written response to Hayek, leave very unclear exactly where this line of ‘unnecessary interference’ by the state is to be drawn). But history has certainly shown that Marxist doctrine, particularly as codified by Lenin, does have a profound and seemingly inherent tendency to degrade into totalitarianism (see Russia, Romania, China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Cuba, etc.). Had Hayek stuck to a critique of Marxism-Leninism, he may have seemed more prescient.</p><p>[i] <a href="https://www.libertarianism.org/columns/why-did-hayek-support-basic-income">https://www.libertarianism.org/columns/why-did-hayek-support-basic-income</a></p><p>P.S. All direct quotes are taken from Hayek’s book ‘The Road to Serfdom’</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c50a17f384a6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[To War on the War On Drugs]]></title>
            <link>https://joncosine.medium.com/to-war-on-the-war-on-drugs-bb7be31ffb6f?source=rss-440c2574bdc8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bb7be31ffb6f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[drugs]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jonathon P Sine]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 14 Aug 2019 20:32:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-08-14T20:32:01.406Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The war on drugs is, as presently instantiated in policy, essentially a pessimists first-order thinking on drug policy.</p><p>Imagine, hypothetically, there was a society wherein a large cohort of disillusioned people, suffering from psychological / emotional / physical pain, were engaging in a very specific type of self-destructive, albeit sedative / distracting / self-medicating, behavior. Imagine further that this cohort effectively had two options: continue living normally in society and attempting to constructively deal with their pain and disillusionment, or check-out via the escape hatch that is this aforementioned harmful / self-destructive / self-medicating / numbing behavior. Now imagine that the proposed governmental intervention to respond to this conundrum was simply this: ban the harmful behavior and criminalize all who facilitate it / engage in it.</p><p>As is obvious, this is effectively the drug war in the abstract. And as should be evident, the solution to this somewhat intricate conundrum is so base and so simplistic that even my pre-teen siblings could think of a much more nuanced policy response. It’s so simplistic that it makes you wonder if the policy makers who imposed it may have been mentally impaired by drugs themselves, and thus unable to think more robustly about addressing the issue (certainly other famous law makers in US history, such as Joseph McCarthy, were often under the influence; in Joe’s case heroin).</p><p>Banning drugs out right is first-order thinking (I’ll address the pessimistic aspect later). There is no nuance to such a policy, instead substances ranging from crack-cocaine to LSD (but also including many, many more) are placed on Schedule 1, banning them outright and denying any medical benefit to them. Furthermore, this sort of policy response fails to adequately consider and respond to the most important thing: why people are taking drugs in the first place (this relates to the pessimistic aspect I will address in a moment). Instead, a facile solution is offered, i.e. ban the drugs. Little thought or attention is given to the ramifications and unintended consequences such a heavy handed and distortionary policy might have. Failing to consider both the underlying reasons for drug use as well as the unintended consequences of prohibition has been the sine qua non of the drug war’s first-order thinking. If the situation regarding drug use in America were a patient preparing to receive surgery, then the war on drugs would be the equivalent of the surgeon foregoing a scalpel in favor of a hammer and bone-saw.</p><p>Less often discussed, though, is that the war on drugs is also a pessimistic response to the problem of drug use in society. Instead of thinking aspirationally about how things could be changed to, indirectly and by comparison, make drug use less appealing (i.e. increasing the pleasure of normal societal engagement), drug war advocates have focused their attention on how to make drug use less appealing directly (I.e. attaching punishment, pain, and stigma to drug use). While both positive and negative inducements may have their place to some extent, the disproportionate focus on making the escape hatch from society (i.e. addictive drug use) ever more painful is a rather sad approach, and reflects a pessimistic world view. No matter how bad your station in life is, we can make it worse for you if you do drugs. In effect this disproportionate focus on making drug use painful is saying that we would rather see you suffer more than figure out how to fix and ameliorate your environment so that you don’t desire to turn to drugs in the first place. This is an oversimplification and not representative of all advocates of the drug war, but by and large the disproportionate focus on making drug use more painful for users via stigmatization and punishment, while focusing much less on the aspirational aspect of making people’s lots in life better, makes the drug war a generally pessimistic policy prescription.</p><p>So what has our pessimistic and base policy of a war on drugs gotten us? Here’s the kicker that drives home the folly: the vast majority of deaths related to drugs in America, and in the world more broadly, (i.e. one of the core things we desire to remedy with our drug policy) can be attributed to the war on drugs. That’s a shocking claim. Let me repeat it: the vast majority of drug related deaths (in a broad sense) is attributable to the war on drugs. Think about it: people die in two main ways as a result of drugs (if we exclude for the moment alcoholic induced violence/accidents): overdoses and violence surrounding the drug trade. I submit that the war on drugs is indirectly (at best, and in some ways directly) responsible for the vast, vast majority of overdoses while it is directly responsible for the violence related to the drug trade. Let’s talk about overdoses first.</p><p>In America in 2017, well over 70,000 people died from overdoses. That is a staggering number. Roughly 60,000 U.S. soldiers died in the Vietnam War.</p><p>More people now die from drug overdoses in a single year than died in a near decade of war in Vietnam. With an insane statistic like that, one might think that we really do need a war on drugs! But wait, we already have a war on drugs, and it’s been ongoing for the last five decades (and in some ways even longer, see: Chasing the Scream). There is no reasonable way to conclude that with drug overdoses soaring to new heights, even amidst our continued drug war, it has been a success. It is hard to concoct a counter-factual reality wherein there would be more drug overdoses than in our current reality. For, indeed, not only has our war on drugs not positively contributed to ameliorating this plight, it makes the situation worse. Overdoses are accidents, which is to say people don’t plan to overdose on drugs. Some people get sloppy and drink too much and die. This is a somewhat rare occurrence, thankfully, because people understand alcohol ingestion and there are clear labels and % content lists. But for illegal opiates, which are responsible for most drug overdoses, there is no such system for verifying the purity or strength of the heroin. There is no way of knowing what is in the drug, and many people who take these drugs have never learned proper safety or best-procedures for taking them. And to make matters worse, illicit drug users are afraid of calling for help. Drug users suffer and die in the 10s of thousands due to conditions of fear and uncertainty surrounding their drug use. Forcing people to do drugs illicitly, getting them from sketchy sources and sketchy people, in dank street corners in the dark, increases the prevalence of overdoses. While it may deter some users at the margins from ever trying the drugs, it condemns vast numbers to a grizzly death.</p><p>But perhaps the most direct negative consequence of the the war on drugs is the violence it needlessly causes. The war on drugs truly has created a war. The only problem is that the targets being shot and killed aren’t inanimate drugs, they are human beings. From Peru to Colombia, to Afghanistan to Uzbekistan, and from Mexico to the U.S., societies are being ravaged by the violence caused by the war on drugs. When a product is made illegal the only suppliers of said product will operate outside the bounds of law and order. Unfortunately, due to the large and, amongst a large enough cohort, relatively inelastic demand for drugs, producing and selling drugs turns out to be a profitable enterprise. Nefarious forces have taken control of this black market and reaped the monetary rewards. Some of these illicit market players, such as the cartels in Mexico, have become so rich and so powerful that they effectively operate as quasi-States, maintaining their own militias to protect their lucrative product and instilling their version of justice as they see fit. Meanwhile, lesser crime organizations in America (in many instances working as arms of the cartels and other large crime syndicates), or gangs, operate their own drug-supported fiefdoms, selling drugs beyond the bounds of regulatory authorities on street corners and protecting their business at any and all costs. In inner cities, where lack of opportunity induces steep-discounting of one’s future, this dangerous line of work promises prestige and opportunity to those lucky enough to survive. The war on drugs, by creating the black markets and the economic incentives to engage in the drug trade, is directly responsible for all this bloodshed. What’s more, costly bureaucracies such as the ATF and DEA (and many more at state and local levels) devote scarce resources and precious human lives to dealing with and confronting this policy-induced problem. The policies undergirding the war on drugs not only create and worsen drug related violence, they extract resources from society-at-large to deal with this perpetual, and self-inflicted, problem, and then the policies proscribe the pointless sacrifice of American law enforcement officers.</p><p>The best that can be said about our war on drugs policy was that people with some praiseworthy goals (e.g. avoiding a society bogged down with unhealthy and unproductive addicts) implemented an overly simplistic policy prescription that has been a failure. At worst, we could say it was a racist concoction that was never laudable, was always doomed, and that policy makers simply didnt care. No matter how we interpret it though, certain consequentialist facts are undeniable: massive and expensive anti-drug bureaucracies, police state militarization, racial discrimination in enforcement, unprecedented numbers of overdoses, and black markets dominated by cartels and crime syndicates. How should we think about resolving all this?</p><p>Let us return to our imagination. Let’s go to a mythological time and place wherein no federal drug policies have yet been instantiated into law. Call it point zero. What would things be like there? Well, assuming all else constant in our society (<em>ceteris paribus</em>), things would likely look like as they did during the era of big tobacco in the 40s and 50s. Corporations eager to profit off of these highly enticing substances would solicitously market them to consumers. They might get doctors (or someone dressed like a doctor) to appear in ads recommending this or that brand of mass-produced meth or heroin. Many people in society might buy these products regularly; teens would have easier access; many people might be addicted. There would be clear economic incentives for corporations to get people addicted to these substances, just as with cigarettes in the 40s and 50s. It would probably be deleterious to public health, induce more drug consumption than our status quo current reality, reduce overall productivity, and generally be repugnant.</p><p>Yet there would be no black markets filled with cartels. There would not be people hawking drugs on street corners protecting their profitable but illegal merchandise by any means necessary. There would no longer be an economic incentive or rationale for crime syndicates to sell these drugs, as massive companies would already be making them as cheaply as possible. The cartels and gangs wouldn’t be able to turn a profit, for there is little chance in a perfectly free market that corporations would be undercut by an inefficient international crime syndicate, much less your your local gang. And, importantly, there would also be far, far fewer overdoses. Consumers would be operating in the light of day, wherein they clearly understand the dosages of the substances they are purchasing. Corporations would have no incentive, nor would they be allowed (given the already existing legal structure), to surreptitiously cut their products. There would be no heroin laced with fentanyl. And the consumers would have unhindered (i.e. would not be deterred from using/ not stigmatized / not afraid) recourse to medical personnel should an emergency require it, just as alcohol consumers have in reality. Simply imagine what terrible PR it would be for a corporation, in the age of Yelp and social media, to be associated with and responsible for many overdoses. There would be a strong self-regulating force in the market to ensure safe use. The milieu would be similar to that of alcohol and cigarettes, except, unlike with cigarettes and lung cancer, overdoses from many of these substances (much like alcohol) would be immediate, direct, and easily attributable to the corporations.</p><p>Of course neither scenario — our war on drugs or full unencumbered legalization — are desirable. But a priori, is it not tempting to prefer the second to the first? And this is just the extreme case of full legalization with no regulation. Instead of using a hammer, as we have thus far in reality with our war on drugs policies, imagine if we could use nuanced instruments (like a scalpel) to methodically and thoughtfully intervene in a free market drug system. Let’s put down our hammer and Imagine for a second what we might do with a scalpel if our starting point was a perfectly laseiz faire market for drugs. In fact, we don’t have to strain our imagination very hard, as we already have a blueprint for how to proceed (and how not to) via alcohol, tobacco, and, increasingly, cannabis.</p><p>Ultimately, going to war on the war on drugs will benefit the American people. Most drug addicts are not malicious malcontents, rather they are people in pain looking for an escape from their suffering. The war on drugs is, unfortunately, one of the worst possible policy responses we could have settled upon. If we immediately ended this failed prohibitionist policy, black markets would evaporate, cartels would whither and die, and the American people would suffer far less. This should not be a pipe-dream, a pie in the sky idea that we whimsically contemplate. This is something that could literally be done tomorrow, if we had the political will. It will be tough. The reference point for many is the status-quo, drug war ideal of zero tolerance. This means that many people look at anything less than a total ban on these substances as immoral and soft. This is unfortunate, and the exact wrong way to look at it.</p><p>Instead, we should realize that this is one of the few issues that could not only be easily and quickly fixed (as many of the most pressing problems are simply caused by the current status-quo policy), it has the potential to be non-partisan. On the left, the war on drugs is already despised due to its undeniable racist origins and continued prejudicial enforcement. Libertarians don’t want the government infringing upon our personal liberties (and what is more fundamental than our ability to alter our conciousness?). While conservatives despise ill considered, big government interventions into markets. We must reset our moral reference points, acknowledge that the pain and suffering often surrounding drugs is made far worse by our current war on drugs, and then strive to build a bipartisan coalition to go to war on the war on drugs. Unlike the war on drugs, the war on the war on drugs is one that we can win. And it is one that we will all be better off for having fought.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bb7be31ffb6f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Risk and Uncertainty]]></title>
            <link>https://joncosine.medium.com/risk-and-uncertainty-b16a45bfdb85?source=rss-440c2574bdc8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b16a45bfdb85</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jonathon P Sine]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 06 Feb 2019 23:11:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-02-06T23:11:59.803Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Be courageous, yet judicious</p><p>Each day on earth brings new trials we must face. In order to make our way in the world we must confront and overcome these challenges. Yet this seemingly mundane reality is in fact one of near infinite complexity. We, as individuals, are expected to act in the world despite incomplete and, often, utterly inadequate information for comprehending the nature of our challenges. Entities such as governments and corporations experience this problem to an even greater degree, for the higher-level problems they face inevitably contain far more variables and thus far more complexity. Given the fact that corporations and governments must respond to the myriad challenges that confront them, how ought they do so in this world of vast complexity and incomplete information?</p><p>The broad field of risk management deals precisely with the above conundrum. Hubbard, in his book titled ‘The Failure of Risk Management’, defines foundationally necessary terms relevant to this project: <em>uncertainty</em> and <em>risk</em>. The generally (though not unanimously) agreed upon definition of uncertainty is, tautologically, the lack of complete certainty. In other words, uncertainty is simply the existence of multiple possible outcomes with various probabilities assigned to each. Risk, on the other hand, incorporates uncertainty but further necessitates having ‘skin in the game’ such that there exists tangible downside from the uncertainty. These concepts, and agreeing upon their definitions, are foundationally necessary in order to even begin considering how to operate and proceed in the world. Yet even attempts to account for risk and uncertainty can be fraught with their own ‘risk’.</p><p>As Nassim Taleb reminds us in his essay ‘Mild vs Wild Randomness’, which was further developed into his book ‘The Black Swan,’ risk managers of all stripes often attempt to measure risk and uncertainty with tools that are wholly inappropriate for the job. A ubiquitous example is the deployment of the Gaussian bell curve, which is used on the assumption that there exists a ‘normal distribution’ in a data set (one key example: modern portfolio theory). Yet so many things, including markets, cannot be characterized as mildly random (Gaussian), for the observed occurrence of six sigma events and other such anomalies far outpaces their likelihood. In his book, Taleb maintains that things in ‘mediocristan’ (such as weight and height) are well evaluated by the Gaussian, but things in ‘extremistan’ (such as stock returns, book sales, and wealth) need to be evaluated via a different framework, such as the fractal power laws introduced by Benoit Mandelbrot. The key point is that even the tactics employed by risk managers may carry risk. Creating the illusion that risk is properly accounted for may lead to false confidence and thus excessive risk taking. Long Term Capital Management, levered at least 25 to 1 just prior to its collapse, is a famous case in point.</p><p>Ultimately corporations, governments, and even individuals ought not despair at the seemingly Sisyphean task of attempting to account for risk and uncertainty in a world characterized by utter complexity and incomplete data. Indeed, we must all rise to face the challenges before us. Armed with the proper definitions of risk and uncertainty we can begin to frame problems in productive ways, which is a first and crucially important step to solving them. But as Tetlock, in his book ‘Expert Political Judgement’, poignantly reminds us, we must be open-minded about our methodologies and circumspect about their efficacy. If we become too certain of our ability to measure risk we may be fostering even greater risk. Experts who are overly confident and narrow minded, what Isaiah Berlin calls hedgehogs, are less effective predictors than those who are more circumspect, Berlin’s foxes. Thus while we must do our best to move forward in this world of uncertainty, we must always maintain humility about our abilities to accurately understand situational realities. Predictions based upon assessments of risk and uncertainty are necessary and, if carefully done, informative and helpful. Over zealousness and over confidence in our abilities to understand and manage risk can quickly turn a blessing into a curse.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b16a45bfdb85" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Meditations on Harari’s Newest Book]]></title>
            <link>https://joncosine.medium.com/meditations-on-hararis-newest-book-522733b1512c?source=rss-440c2574bdc8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/522733b1512c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[books]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jonathon P Sine]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 24 Jan 2019 02:14:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-24T02:16:42.683Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>21 Lessons for the 21st Century</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/458/0*4TEeuRdziNYjxfP0.jpg" /><figcaption>Professor Yuval Noah Harari</figcaption></figure><p>As with all of Yuval Noah Harari’s books, ‘21 Lessons for the 21st Century’ is an incisive exploration of complex issues. The benefits of Harari’s substantial experience as a meditator are on display, as he demonstrates a clear-sighted appreciation for the interconnection of disparate ideas. This newest book tackles controversial and expansive topics ranging from nationalism, immigration, religion, god, work, to meaning itself. Although he (or perhaps more accurately, his publisher) titled the book ‘21 Lessons for the 21st Century’, a more accurate description of the book would be something like: ‘the excavation of 21 issues by an insightful individual who teases out a few key lessons here and there.’ Indeed, it is often times difficult to draw concrete lessons from the book, which makes the title somewhat disingenuous and may aggrieve some readers. However, there are certainly several overarching, and important, thematic lessons Harari intends for, and hopes, the reader will take away.</p><p>The first revolves around what Harari deems to be the end of liberalism. After handily overtaking communism and fascism as the primary story of humanity, liberalism’s foundations have now been exposed as illusions. The fundamental illusory idea under-girding liberalism, that of the ‘free’ Homo sapiens, is no longer sustainable (this idea is captured by such slogans as ‘the customer is always right’ and ‘the voters know best’). Harari notes that twin revolutions in bio-technology and information-technology make persisting under this illusion not only untenable, but dangerous. As algorithms mature under the stead of Big Data and machine learning, companies and governments will soon be in the possession of tools that know Homo sapiens better than it knows itself. If Homo sapiens continues to persist in the belief that it is free, and to trust its feelings, it will be easily manipulated (as many already are) into performing at the behest of the algorithms and their owners. If Homo sapiens believes that the good feelings incited within it, upon watching a coca-cola commercial, are authentic reflections of who it is and what it wants, it is likely to unquestioningly associate coke with its good feelings and consume coca-cola products accordingly. In a virtual reality future wherein Homo sapiens’ brain is quite literally connected to the algorithms (e.g. a dystopian neural link system) this problem is poised to be greatly exacerbated.</p><p>The second theme is that the meaning of life is not a story. Homo sapiens, Harari wittily states, is a post-truth species. Contrary to assertions that humans live in a unique period dominated by ‘fake news’, Harari notes that humanity has always relied upon and existed in conjunction with fake news. Referencing his foundational claim in his first book, Sapiens, Harari notes that Homo sapiens has been able to succeed so drastically relative to other species for one major reason: its ability to believe in and cooperate on the basis of shared fictions. Although humans often base their identities upon these shared fictions (whether they be stories about religion, the nation, or something else), the primary utility of these fictions has been to facilitate effective cooperation and social harmony. None of these stories, despite their utility (or, as is often the case, disutility) are true. Harari thus points out a major problem for Homo sapiens: realizing these stories to be the fictions they are would make it much harder if not impossible for large numbers of Homo sapiens to effectively cooperate. Harari offers an olive branch: if we organize around a shared enemy we could perhaps cooperate. Toward this end, Harari makes the claim that the most real thing in the world is suffering, and it is something vast numbers of Homo sapiens may be able to join and fight against. The three things most threatening to bring suffering upon Homo sapiens, Harari contends, are nuclear war, climate change, and technology. As much a lesson as a call to action, Harari tacitly implores Homo sapiens to disentangle their identities from fictional stories, recognize suffering as a primary problem, and unite to fight against the primary problems threatening to increase suffering (note: he does not come off as optimistic about this).</p><p>Finally, above all else, Harari recommends that we become much more self-aware. As the Bible implores us, ‘know thy self.’ Accomplishing this requires incorporating the lessons previously identified, and, even more importantly, requires coming to terms with the idea that what we often call ‘the self’ is indeed an illusion (i.e. “I” or “me”). Homo sapiens all have distinct self-identities crafted in the form of a story, which are often further buttressed by other fictional stories that find a place for that particular Homo sapiens in a larger cosmic drama that further gives that Homo sapiens’ story a role within the larger cosmic-story. These are all foundational fictions we should relinquish. In a lesson derived from his personal experience (having spent years of his life on silent retreat), Harari recommends meditation as a key to achieve this. Meditation, in essence the careful study of one’s own mind, allows Homo sapiens to see how little control one has even over one’s own thoughts, feelings, and attention. When such a foundational lack of control is revealed to the Homo sapiens it becomes much easier to question the fictions that Homo sapiens often unquestionably adopts about itself, the world, and its place in the world. Ultimately, Harari paints this as a race for the very essence of our species. If Homo sapiens does not win the race of self-awareness and discover the truth about its lack of free will (i.e. that Homo sapiens does not craft its own wants / desires / ambitions / self-images, etc), Homo sapiens may end up being manipulated by ultra-sophisticated algorithms in ways far deeper and more insidious than any dictator, regime, corporation, or religious sect thus far has every even dreamt of. Meanwhile, Homo sapiens may remain blissfully ignorant of the fact, operating under the happy liberal illusion of its own free will. A Brave New World dystopia may await Homo sapiens (echoing Harari’s previous book, Homo Deus) if it does not heed the assorted lessons found in Harari’s book.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=522733b1512c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Power of the Monster Within]]></title>
            <link>https://joncosine.medium.com/the-power-of-the-monster-within-9715888ac87c?source=rss-440c2574bdc8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9715888ac87c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[life]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jonathon P Sine]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 24 Jan 2019 01:45:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-24T02:18:30.209Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/635/0*maf98nN1_m9vCII4" /></figure><p>Nietzsche once said, “spend not too much time fighting monsters lest you become one; when you gaze into the abyss the abyss gazes also into you.”</p><p>But what if the monster and the abyss existed within oneself? Indeed, a monster does in fact exist within each of us, and it is what Carl Jung might call the ‘shadow’ self. It is that part of us that we often repress of otherwise wish did not exist. Although it appears in different forms, with different intensities for different people, common themes include anger, fear, anxiety, lust, and so forth. These emotions are some of the most powerful we can experience, and often they have been heightened and made more intense via traumatic life events.</p><p>Yet the shadow and the associated emotional states are inherent to the human repertoire of emotions. The destructively powerful forces that comprise our shadow selves are a constituent part of us. But too often we fail to confront, let alone properly integrate, our shadow. The result is that we are often unknowingly hindered or even controlled by our shadow. Do you ever lose control when angry? Have you ever felt overcome with lust? Succumb to addictive tendencies? How much time do you spend consciously trying to hold such things at bay?</p><p>As Alexander Solzhenitsyn said, “the line dividing good and evil cuts through the heart of every man.” It is ultimately up to each of us to confront our shadow selves and confront reality: there is a monster living inside us. In order to achieve worthwhile pursuits in life we must face this monster within us, integrate our shadow, and co-opt its power into our Being, for the good of existence. By honestly staring into ourselves we will find monsters, but we need not become one. It is possible to confront the shadow and integrate it, and in so doing achieve what is effectively a super power: self-mastery. Once one integrates the power of the monster within, one can begin to fell the monsters outside.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9715888ac87c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[China: Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping]]></title>
            <link>https://joncosine.medium.com/china-foreign-policy-under-xi-jinping-65df17f891e4?source=rss-440c2574bdc8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/65df17f891e4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-affairs]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jonathon P Sine]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 24 Jan 2019 01:27:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-24T02:04:26.622Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/980/0*Ep5FsBmJqdE7VAOx" /><figcaption>Xi Jinping Promises Sweeping Changes in China. Illustration from: SCMP</figcaption></figure><p>Has Chinese leadership assigned greater priority to foreign policy and diplomacy under Xi? What are the possible implications for China’s international behavior?</p><p><strong>Executive Summary:</strong> Foreign policy in China has gained increasing importance over the last few decades. Under Xi Jinping this trend has accelerated. The increasing focus on foreign policy should be viewed as a strategy for increasing Xi and the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy at home. Achieving the ‘rejuvenation’ of the Chinese nation, as Xi’s ‘China Dream’ campaign promises to do, will increase the legitimacy of Xi and his Communist Party domestically. Foreign policy under Xi has two core elements: geo-economics and sharp-power. Geo-economics encapsulates Xi’s substantial expansion of development loans, construction projects, and economic relations with other countries (done largely under the umbrella of the Belt and Road Initiative), while sharp-power refers to China’s increasing use of manipulation abroad to coerce foreign populations into viewing China-related issues favorably. As China continues to rise, its foreign policy will be increasingly assertive. Although China continues to work within the confines of the existing international order, its increasing demands presage a new era of great power relations with Chinese characteristics.</p><p><strong>Discussion:</strong></p><p>The Jiang and Hu era was characterized by the increasing bureaucratization, pluralization, professionalization, and globalization of China.<a href="#_edn1">[i]</a> China’s economy, continuing on the trailblazing path set by Deng Xiaoping, has grown rapidly and become increasingly interconnected with the world-at-large. China’s total trade was worth less than $40 billion in 1985. As of 2015, Chinese trade was worth over $4 trillion.<a href="#_edn2">[ii]</a> By the time Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), China was already a deeply integrated and globalized power that placed substantial emphasis on foreign policy. Xi’s tenure thus far, though different in many ways from Jiang’s and Hu’s, demonstrates a continued, if greater, emphasis on foreign policy.</p><p>A key change in Chinese foreign policy under Xi is a shift away from Deng’s long heeded advice to ‘hide one’s strength and bide one’s time’ (<em>taoguang yanghui) </em>and toward, as Xi said in a 2013 speech, a strategy of ‘striving for achievements’ (<em>fenfa youwei</em>).<a href="#_edn3">[iii]</a> Indeed, Xi’s grand ambitions for China necessitate increasing emphasis on foreign policy. Xi envisions China regaining the preeminent world position it once had.<a href="#_edn4">[iv]</a> In this sense foreign policy must also be considered directly related to Xi and the CCP’s domestic situation in China. Although Xi is a powerful authoritarian leader, he and his Party are deeply concerned about the regime’s stability, which is predicated on whether or not the Chinese public views the regime as legitimate. The two primary forms of legitimacy the regime relies upon are nationalistic pride and economic performance.</p><p>Foreign policy can thus be viewed through this lens as a tool for augmenting these two forms of domestic legitimacy. Xi and the CCP believe that by achieving status as a great power, the populous will herald them as the legitimate stewards of China.<a href="#_edn5">[v]</a> But, as Xi understands, this will require successfully navigating and operating in the foreign policy arena. Chinese foreign policy is thus a two level game that attempts to deftly balance the interests of China’s domestic and international constituencies.</p><p>Over the last several decades, the Party has meticulously utilized the long standing narrative of China’s ‘100 Years of Humiliation.’ The CCP portrays themselves as the strong source of stability that brought an end to the era of injustice wherein China was subordinate to foreign powers. This rhetoric has increased under Xi.<a href="#_edn6">[vi]</a> Furthermore, the fundamental campaign identified with Xi, the ‘Chinese Dream,’ strives to portray Xi as ‘rejuvenating’ the historically great Chinese nation and restoring its place as not only a great power, but as the historically important Middle Kingdom. In order to make good on his rhetorical flourishes over China’s place as a great power, Xi must engage with and meld the international system to China’s interests. Three strategies exist for doing so: coercion, payment, or attraction.<a href="#_edn7">[vii]</a> Chinese influence abroad thus far relies predominately upon the first two.</p><p>China is establishing new economic partnerships near and far<a href="#_edn8">[viii]</a>. In what many view as a ‘Westward March,’ China is cultivating close relationships with the Central Asian countries that, in addition to being viable markets for Chinese goods, can provide much needed energy resources.<a href="#_edn9">[ix]</a> In Asia more generally, China has created the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and secured substantial buy in. In Africa, the fastest growing region in the world by population, China has invested substantial amounts of capital and financial resources, and sent substantial numbers of Chinese to aid in construction projects in places like Kenya and Tanzania, all in service of what China considers to be a new, ‘no strings attached’ China model of economic diplomacy (while also establishing its first overseas military base in Djibouti). And in South America, China has supplied over $150 billion to the region since 2005, primarily to Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, and Ecuador.<a href="#_edn10">[x]</a></p><p>Meanwhile, just two of China’s development banks, China’s Export-Import Bank (CHEXIM) and China Development Bank (CBD), hold equivalent global assets to the six largest Western development banks combined.<a href="#_edn11">[xi]</a> And, of course, all of this is interconnected with China’s massive Belt and Road Initiative, publicized as China’s modern reincarnation of the historic Silk Road.<a href="#_edn12">[xii]</a> These new trade and economic partnerships, if successful, will allow China to maintain high-octane economic growth (i.e. maintain performance legitimacy), while also creating jobs (over 5 million Chinese workers are estimated to be abroad).<a href="#_edn13">[xiii]</a> Equally important, as part of China’s two level game, these investments and developments send a strong signal to the world, and to the domestic population, that Chinese geo-economic power is massive, and that the Chinese nation is strong.</p><p>Coercion is another prominent focus of Xi’s foreign policy. Far from ‘soft power’, which relies upon principles of attraction to affect influence, the instruments of influence Xi favors are best considered ‘sharp power,’ as they strive to aggressively manipulate people abroad, similar to what occurs domestically.<a href="#_edn14">[xiv]</a> One journal accurately called China the ‘<em>meddle kingdom</em>.’<a href="#_edn15">[xv]</a> United Front Work, the Party’s institution for coercion of non-Communist groups inside and outside of China, has expanded its role sizably.<a href="#_edn16">[xvi]</a> Additionally, the Ministry of Education has utilized Confucius Institutes to spread Chinese propaganda abroad to students via Chinese language courses (there are 500 registered in the US alone)<a href="#_edn17">[xvii]</a>. Similarly, many members of the Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSA) have been coerced or bribed into serving as the CCP’s agents abroad.<a href="#_edn18">[xviii]</a> The Party has also exercised greater use of Chinese media (e.g. CGTV and Xinhua) to further influence Chinese living abroad.<a href="#_edn19">[xix]</a> As one scholar succinctly put it, “Xi Jinping’s ambitious strategy to harness the overseas Chinese population for the CCP’s current economic and political agenda, builds on existing practices and then takes it to a new level of ambition.”<a href="#_edn20">[xx]</a></p><p>While many view China’s foreign policy as one of pure self-interest, Xi has also taken part in several efforts to reinforce China’s international image as a legitimate and beneficent actor on the world stage. This includes unprecedented engagement in the United Nations via sending troops to South Sudan for the first time, sending troops on a peace keeping mission to Mali, and drastically increasing China’s peacekeeping funding.<a href="#_edn21">[xxi]</a> However, China continues to stridently maintain its anti-regime-change stance and continues to reject a pro-human rights status quo, while China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, insists on actively bending international norms to China’s will on these issues.<a href="#_edn22">[xxii]</a> Indeed, China is likely averse to these notions due to its own increasingly heavy-handed and abusive handling of its ethnic and religious minorities in periphery provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet. Thus while we see a China increasingly utilizing and engaging with the existing international order, we also see China’s interests diverging sharply from it. In conjunction with this divergence, China’s nascent development of its own multilateral institutions (AIIB, Silk Road Fund, and the New Development Bank) portends the rise of a competing system in which China’s norms and desires are predominant.</p><p>Perhaps the most significant institutional development related to foreign policy under Xi Jinping is the establishment of the Central National Security Commission. This new commission centralizes national security issues under Xi’s purview and cements the connection between external and domestic security as well as the importance of the Party over these issues.<a href="#_edn23">[xxiii]</a> Another important development is the creation of the ‘Voice of China’ which, centralizing propaganda authority under the Party, has drastically increased China’s external propaganda work since Xi’s time in power.<a href="#_edn24">[xxiv]</a> The Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (LSG) has now been upgraded to a commission, the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, indicating its increased importance and closer ties to the Party.<a href="#_edn25">[xxv]</a> As referenced above, the United Front Work Department has now taken on a far greater role in overseeing and influencing Chinese abroad, as well as strategizing how to handle ethnic and religious minorities within China. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, despite increasing professionalization, continues to lack representation in the Politburo and continues to recede in importance as other, more specialized ministries (e.g. Commerce, Public, and State Security) gain influence.<a href="#_edn26">[xxvi]</a> Finally, Xi has also aggressively and decisively consolidated power over the PLA.<a href="#_edn27">[xxvii]</a> These trends point collectively to Xi’s attempt to centralize control over foreign affairs within the Party and within his own hands.</p><p>Yet despite Xi’s attempt to streamline and concentrate foreign affairs policy, two problems persist. First, despite Xi’s desires, China is still lacking in foreign policy coordination. Incredibly, despite the Belt and Road Initiative’s staggering plan to spend $1 trillion on investment (equal to roughly 7 Marshall Plans), there continues to be little coherent oversight of it,<a href="#_edn28">[xxviii]</a> aside from a new leading small group within the NDRC (China’s economic planning organization, which many believe has itself been demoted after the 19th Congress).<a href="#_edn29">[xxix]</a> Second, the lack of planning and coordination of policy is compounded by the larger problem of centrifugal forces, particularly the provinces and commercial actors, whose varied interests continue to pull China’s foreign policy in divergent, and sometimes problematic, directions.<a href="#_edn30">[xxx]</a> This ‘fractured authoritarianism’ continues to present problems, and Xi has specifically sought to resolve it. As a party publication has said, “the key to running things well in China and realizing the China Dream lies in the Party”<a href="#_edn31">[xxxi]</a> and to do this the Party ultimately needs “a disciplined, focused, and loyal cadre of Party workers.”<a href="#_edn32">[xxxii]</a> The recent creation of the National Supervisory Commission, which “extends the Party’s jurisdiction in granular fashion down to ‘literally anyone doing anything with a link to governance and organization’”<a href="#_edn33">[xxxiii]</a> demonstrates the degree to which Xi intends to resolve these issues.</p><p>Although China still has a plethora of substantial developmental problems, it is a simple fact that China has grown more powerful and more bold. Whereas Deng traveled, hat-in-hand, to America, Japan, and other developed countries to humbly request technical and financial assistance for his “backward country” in the 1980s<a href="#_edn34">[xxxiv]</a>, Xi now confidently strides to foreign capitals to make demands. In the short-run, the two most prominent demands are that China be recognized as a great power in the councils of the world and that China be allowed to regain its historical sphere of influence in Asia.<a href="#_edn35">[xxxv]</a> When Secretary Clinton spoke at the ASEAN Regional Forum in 2010 to discuss a pivot to Asia, she directly, if inadvertently, stepped on both of these demands at the same time.<a href="#_edn36">[xxxvi]</a> Similarly, the demand for regional influence helps explain China’s refusal to recognize the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea’s ruling against it, and its continued building of islands in the South China Sea.<a href="#_edn37">[xxxvii]</a> Finally, in the short-run, Xi has staked a large portion of his legitimacy and reputation on making China great again, and thus sets himself up for a crisis of legitimacy if he is perceived to have failed. This is likely to make China even more assertive of its interests. It behooves world leaders to understand the new great power logic China operates under so as to avoid confrontations.</p><p>The more distant future portends grander Chinese ambitions. While China continues to benefit mightily from the US led international order, it is increasingly clear its interests are not perfectly aligned with it. Indeed, China is already taking decisive steps to develop its own international order. China’s longer game may culminate in a modern <em>tianxia</em>; an attempt to regain its status as the ‘Middle Kingdom’ perched between Heaven and Earth.<a href="#_edn38">[xxxviii]</a> The United States would do well to keep China’s grand vision in mind.<a href="#_edn39">[xxxix]</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref1">[i]</a> These are the four meta-trends highlighted in:</p><p>Lampton, David M. <em>Following the Leader: Ruling China, from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping.</em> (University of California Press, 2014), 13–136</p><p><a href="#_ednref2">[ii]</a> Allison, Graham. <em>Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?</em> (New York: Mariner, 2017), 6.</p><p><a href="#_ednref3">[iii]</a> Nien-chung Chang-Liao (2016) China’s New Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping, Asian Security, 12:2, 82–91, DOI: <a href="https://doi-org.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/10.1080/14799855.2016.1183195">10.1080/14799855.2016.1183195</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref4">[iv]</a> Minxin Pei. “A Play for Global Leadership.” <em>Journal of Democracy</em> 29, no. 2 (2018): 37–51. <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/">https://muse.jhu.edu/</a> (accessed October 12, 2018).</p><p><a href="#_ednref5">[v]</a> Lampton, D. (2016). China’s Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China. JOHN W. GARVER . Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. xviii 868 pp. £32.99. ISBN 978–0–19–026105–4. <em>The China Quarterly,</em> <em>227</em>, 825–826. doi:10.1017/S0305741016000886</p><p><a href="#_ednref6">[vi]</a> French, Howard W. “China’s Quest to End Its Century of Shame.” The New York Times. July 13, 2017. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/13/opinion/chinas-quest-to-end-its-century-of-shame.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/13/opinion/chinas-quest-to-end-its-century-of-shame.html</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ednref7">[vii]</a> Joseph Nye, “What China and Russia don’t get about Soft Power,”Foreign Policy, April 29, 2013, <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/29/what-china-and-russia-dont-get-about-soft-power/">http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/29/what-china-and-russia-dont-get-about-soft-power/</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref8">[viii]</a> Aisch, Gregor, Josh Keller, and K. K. Rebecca. “The World According to China.” The New York Times. July 24, 2015. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/24/business/international/the-world-according-to-china-investment-maps.html">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/24/business/international/the-world-according-to-china-investment-maps.html</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ednref9">[ix]</a> Wang Jisi, “‘Marching Westwards’: The Rebalancing of China’s Geostrategy,” International and Strategic Studies Report, 73 (Center for International and Strategic Studies, Peking University: October 2012)</p><p><a href="#_ednref10">[x]</a> Gallagher, Kevin P. and Margaret Myers (2017) “China-Latin America Finance Database,” Washington: Inter-American Dialogue. <a href="https://www.thedialogue.org/map_list/">https://www.thedialogue.org/map_list/</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref11">[xi]</a> Gallagher, Kevin, Rohini Kamal, and Yongzhang Wang, “Fueling Growth and Financing Risk: The benefits and risks of China’s development finance in the global energy sector,” GEGIWorking Paper 2, May 2016. <a href="https://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/files/2016/05/Fueling-Growth.FINAL_.version.pdf">https://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/files/2016/05/Fueling-Growth.FINAL_.version.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref12">[xii]</a> For an example, see: “Xinhua Headlines: New Silk Road Brings More than Trade to China, Europe.” Xinhua Headlines: New Silk Road Brings More than Trade to China, Europe — Xinhua | English.news.cn. August 18, 2018. Accessed October 26, 2018. <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-08/18/c_137399857.htm">http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-08/18/c_137399857.htm</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ednref13">[xiii]</a> Fulton, Jonathan. “China’s strong arm: protecting citizens and assets abroad”. By Jonas Parello-Plesner and Mathieu Duchâtel, <em>International Affairs</em>, Volume 92, Issue 5, 1 September 2016, Pages 1287 1288, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12736">https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12736</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref14">[xiv]</a> Walker, Christopher, and Jessica Ludwig. “The Meaning of Sharp Power.” Foreign Affairs. October 26, 2018. Accessed October 26, 2018. <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-11-16/meaning-sharp-power.">https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-11-16/meaning-sharp-power.</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref15">[xv]</a> “Australia Battles Chinese Political Influence.” The Economist. June 15, 2017. Accessed October 27, 2018. <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2017/06/15/australia-battles-chinese-political-influence">https://www.economist.com/asia/2017/06/15/australia-battles-chinese-political-influence</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ednref16">[xvi]</a> Brady, Anne-Marie. “New Zealand and the CCP’S “Magic Weapons”.” <em>Journal of Democracy</em> 29, no. 2 (2018): 68–75. doi:10.1353/jod.2018.0026.</p><p><a href="#_ednref17">[xvii]</a> Ha, Melodie. “Hidden Spies: Countering the Chinese Intelligence Threat.” The Diplomat. August 03, 2018. <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/hidden-spies-countering-the-chinese-intelligence-threat/">https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/hidden-spies-countering-the-chinese-intelligence-threat/</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ednref18">[xviii]</a> This report highlights the results of an investigation into CSSA’s on multiple college campuses in the US and finds substantial attempts to coerce and / or pay off Chinese students:</p><p>Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany. “China’s Long Arm Reaches Into American Campuses.” Foreign Policy. March 07, 2018. Accessed October 27, 2018. <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/07/chinas-long-arm-reaches-into-american-campuses-chinese-students-scholars-association-university-communist-party/">https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/07/chinas-long-arm-reaches-into-american-campuses-chinese-students-scholars-association-university-communist-party/</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ednref19">[xix]</a> CGTV and Xinhua have increasingly served as mouth pieces for Xi and the Party’s interests, and their propaganda efforts have increased. As a result, the US recently ordered these Chinese media outlets to register as Foreign Agents under the Foreign Agents Registration Act:</p><p>Kuo, Lily. “Beijing Complains as US ‘orders Chinese Media to Register as Foreign Agents’.” The Guardian. September 20, 2018. Accessed October 27, 2018. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/20/beijing-complains-as-us-orders-chinese-media-to-register-as-foreign-agents.">https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/20/beijing-complains-as-us-orders-chinese-media-to-register-as-foreign-agents.</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref20">[xx]</a> Brady, Anne-Marie. “New Zealand and the CCP’S “Magic Weapons”.” <em>Journal of Democracy</em> 29, no. 2 (2018): 68–75. doi:10.1353/jod.2018.0026.</p><p><a href="#_ednref21">[xxi]</a> Pauley, Logan. “China Takes the Lead in UN Peacekeeping.” The Diplomat. April 18, 2018. Accessed October 27, 2018. <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/china-takes-the-lead-in-un-peacekeeping/">https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/china-takes-the-lead-in-un-peacekeeping/</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ednref22">[xxii]</a> Fung, Courtney J. “Separating Intervention from Regime Change: China’s Diplomatic Innovations at the UN Security Council Regarding the Syria Crisis.” <em>The China Quarterly</em> 235 (2018): 693–712. doi:10.1017/S0305741018000851.</p><p><a href="#_ednref23">[xxiii]</a> Wuthnow, Joel. “China’s New ‘Black Box’: Problems and Prospects for the Central National Security Commission.” <em>The China Quarterly</em> 232 (2017): 886–903. doi:10.1017/S0305741017001308.</p><p><a href="#_ednref24">[xxiv]</a> Bowie, Julia, Anne-Marie Brady, Kerry Brown, Timothy R. Heath, Samantha Hoffman, David Gitter, David Shambaugh. “Annual Report | Party Watch.” Center for Advanced China Research. October 18, 2018. <a href="https://www.ccpwatch.org/single-post/2018/10/18/Party-Watch-Annual-Report-2018">https://www.ccpwatch.org/single-post/2018/10/18/Party-Watch-Annual-Report-2018</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref25">[xxv]</a> Legarda, Helena. “In Xi’s China, the Center Takes Control of Foreign Affairs.” The Diplomat. August 01, 2018. Accessed October 27, 2018. <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/in-xis-china-the-center-takes-control-of-foreign-affairs/">https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/in-xis-china-the-center-takes-control-of-foreign-affairs/</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ednref26">[xxvi]</a> Sun, Jing (2017) Growing Diplomacy, Retreating Diplomats — How the Chinese Foreign Ministry has been Marginalized in Foreign Policymaking, Journal of Contemporary China, 26:105, 419–433, DOI: <a href="https://doi-org.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/10.1080/10670564.2016.1245895">10.1080/10670564.2016.1245895</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref27">[xxvii]</a> As the author puts it: “CCP-PLA relations in the Xi Jinping era are characterized by the centralization of power in a single civilian individual.” Kou, Chien-wen. “Xi Jinping in Command: Solving the Principal–Agent Problem in CCP–PLA Relations?” <em>The China Quarterly</em> 232 (2017): 866–85. doi:10.1017/S0305741017001321.</p><p><a href="#_ednref28">[xxviii]</a> Ang, Yuen Yuen. “Needed for China’s Belt and Road: A Roadmap” Bloomberg.com. September 27, 2018. <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-09-27/china-s-belt-and-road-initiative-is-a-campaign-not-a-conspiracy">https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-09-27/china-s-belt-and-road-initiative-is-a-campaign-not-a-conspiracy</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ednref29">[xxix]</a> “China Sets up Leading Team on Belt and Road Initiative.” China Sets up Leading Team on Belt and Road Initiative — Xinhua | English.news.cn. March 29, 2015. Accessed October 27, 2018. <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03/29/c_134107435.htm">http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03/29/c_134107435.htm</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ednref30">[xxx]</a> Provinces pursue their own parochial economic interests and can even lead Beijing into troubling developments, for example commercial interests encouraging island building in the South China Sea, see:</p><p>Wong, Audrye. “More than Peripheral: How Provinces Influence China’s Foreign Policy.” <em>The China Quarterly</em> 235 (2018): 735–57. doi:10.1017/S0305741018000930.</p><p><a href="#_ednref31">[xxxi]</a> Joseph Fewsmith, “Xi Jinping’s Fast Start,” <em>China Leadership Monitor, </em>no. 41, Spring 2013, <a href="https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/CLM41JF.pdf">https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/CLM41JF.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref32">[xxxii]</a> Bowie, Julia, Anne-Marie Brady, Kerry Brown, Timothy R. Heath, Samantha Hoffman, David Gitter, David Shambaugh. “Annual Report | Party Watch.” Center for Advanced China Research. October 18, 2018. <a href="https://www.ccpwatch.org/single-post/2018/10/18/Party-Watch-Annual-Report-2018">https://www.ccpwatch.org/single-post/2018/10/18/Party-Watch-Annual-Report-2018</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref33">[xxxiii]</a> Ibid.</p><p><a href="#_ednref34">[xxxiv]</a> Garver, John W. “Opening to the Outside World.” In <em>China’s Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China</em>. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. Oxford Scholarship Online, 2016. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190261054.003.0013, 365</p><p><a href="#_ednref35">[xxxv]</a> Allison, Graham. <em>Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?</em> (New York: Mariner, 2017), 109.</p><p><a href="#_ednref36">[xxxvi]</a> Tiezzi, Shannon. “Why China Dreads a Hillary Clinton Presidency.” The Diplomat. February 13, 2016. Accessed October 27, 2018. <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/why-china-dreads-a-hillary-clinton-presidency/">https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/why-china-dreads-a-hillary-clinton-presidency/</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ednref37">[xxxvii]</a> Hayton, Bill. “Two Years On, South China Sea Ruling Remains a Battleground for the Rules-Based Order.” Chatham House. July 11, 2018. Accessed October 27, 2018. <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/two-years-south-china-sea-ruling-remains-battleground-rules-based-order.">https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/two-years-south-china-sea-ruling-remains-battleground-rules-based-order.</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref38">[xxxviii]</a> Thayer, Bradley A., and John M. Friend. “The World According to China.” The Diplomat. October 03, 2018. Accessed October 27, 2018. <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/the-world-according-to-china/">https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/the-world-according-to-china/</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ednref39">[xxxix]</a> Recommendations for the United States</p><p>· Bolster US ‘soft-power’ by maximizing the strength of civil society. China’s model is inherently unattractive to many, and only has legitimacy due to its economic growth, which is likely to slow and falter due to secular problems in China.</p><p>· The United States should focus predominately on resolving its many domestic problems and not on containing China. If it can do that, then it, not China, will be able to bide its time.</p><p>· Maintain and strengthen existing alliances and institutions without excluding China.</p><p>· Increase development assistance funds for developing countries around the world.</p><p>· Re-engage in the Trans-Pacific Partnership and ensure that countries in China’s near-abroad always have an alternative to the China model, even if they choose to embrace China.</p><p>· The US should continue to be more forceful in demanding China comply with norms of the US-led international system (e.g. property rights), and use a carrots and sticks approach, which China will understand, to incentivize better behavior.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=65df17f891e4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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